FEDERICO vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated

elections, the Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make
efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election: the
Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec.
15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its
discretion.

FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Partys official
mayoralty candidate.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial
candidate for the province of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC
and the corresponding Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the
position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.

Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as
official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in
lieu of Edna.

Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was
allegedly filed after the deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No.
8678.

However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of
Edna and Petitioner.

However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been
printed, the name of Edna was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto.
Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna garnered the most votes for that
election, beating Private Respodent for the position of mayor. Eventually the board
ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the replacement of
Edna).

Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner

Federico.

The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner and

proclaimed Private Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya). The COMELEC
declared that Petitioner's substitution of Edna was void because if was filed after the
period for filing of COCs had lapsed.

Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that
Comelec Resolution No. 8678, which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs
cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides
that a party's replacement candidate of one who withdraws, dies or is disqualified
may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled
Federicos proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his
substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.

HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is
empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful
the conduct of the first national automated election. RA 9369 which governs the
conduct of automated elections specifically allows COMELEC to set deadlines for the
filing of certificates of candidacy etc.

Under Sec. 15, the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec.
15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its
discretion.

Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.
Wherefore, Maligaya pa rin si Maligaya.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to
the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter
in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of
Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by
Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC
who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of

Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on
the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a
bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election.
For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place
but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b)
where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c)
a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken
for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia
when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and
lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law
and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite
the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a
domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil
since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be
in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village
where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates,
from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like
the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct
palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The
evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his
domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life
to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
Case Digest: Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH

SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House
of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner
submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of
candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without
any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision,
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy
are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of

the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that
she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her.

The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

UMALI vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203974
FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC
subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for
in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute
Resolution No. 12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered
residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified
Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question
will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main
argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question
does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the
spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit
(LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec.
453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the
units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the
various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its
residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara,
city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art.
X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise
argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the
qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private
respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a
municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then
municipality of Santiago.
COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being
converted from a component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly
affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance,
no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from
another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely
reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the
political units probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance
with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of
the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only those in
Cabanatuan City.
RULING:
Yes.
"Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite,
what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire
to participate will be "directly affected" by the change.
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the
basis for determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to
resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected"
necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva
Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their
votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim
that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec.
453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of the
President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall
have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding
Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the
qualified voters therein.
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring
only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process
the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination
on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied with.
The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to
declare a component city as highly urbanized once the minimum requirements,
which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied.
The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no
room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for
purposes of conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is
necessary before the city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an
HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority
is the very LGC.
The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply
to conversions as well.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into
an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.