RUBI ET AL.

vs THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

GR No. 14078 (1919)
Ponente: Malcolm, J.

Facts:

Petitioners apply for the writ of habeas corpus.

in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against
their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Feb. 1, 1917: Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25, where 800 hectares of public land
in the sitio of Tigbao, Naujan Lake was deemed the convenient place for the permanent settlement of the
Mangyans.

Feb. 21, 1917: Secretary of the Interior approved Resolution No. 25

Dec. 4, 1917: Gov. Juan Morente, Jr. of Mindoro issues Executive Order No. 2, pursuant to Sec. 2145 of
Admin Code of 1917, which implements Resolution No. 25 and directing the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola,
and east of the Baco River (including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in Calapan) to
resettle at the sitio of Tigbao, Naujan Lake until Dec. 31, 1917. Refusal to comply is a ground for
imprisonment.

Rubi and those living in his rancheri/a have not fixed their dwellings and are liable to be punished in
accordance with Sec 2759 of Act No. 2711.

Rubi has challenged the validity of Sec 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 before the Supreme
Court.

Sec. 2145, Administrative Code of 1917:

Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of
the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.

In re: Sec. 2759, Administrative Code of 1917:

Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to
comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days.

Ratio
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the historical context of the case, discussing the pertinent laws
during the Spanish period and the American period in which the authority to promulgate laws
concerning non-Christian tribes emanated. In both cases, there was a unique way of handling such
groups, especially during the American period.

Indios be reduced to poblaciones (Emperor Charles V) : At these meetings it was resolved that indios be
made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras
and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot
profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men
are obliged to give one another.
 Non-Christian tribes was not sufficiently defined merely as those who profess the Christian faith. Nor
does the term actually suggest religious denomination. The Secretary of the Interior designated the
group as backward Philippine peoples. It suggests that these people were not civilized (i.e. low degree
of civilization), and that efforts by the government must be done for the advancement of civilization and
material prosperity. The Mangyans were classified as among the third class, as there were various
stages that the non-Christians approached civilization.
Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

PH CENSES (1903) The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and
have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life,
and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government.

The assailed provision of the Administrative Code of 1917 was considered a valid delegation of
legislative power, as it gave discretionary authority to the provincial governor in the execution of the law.
The segregation of Non-Christians was deemed to be constitutional and not against religious
discrimination, since the term refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.
The liberty of such group was deemed to be properly regulated by the law, a valid exercise of police
power, and equally applied to all that belong to that particular class of people.

It was the legislative intent of the Legislature to begin the process of civilizationSegregation really
constitutes protection for the Mangyans.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS:

A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

PETITIONER: The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not
delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature
has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.

COURT: The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
PETITIONER: The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of
his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and
in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-
Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the
Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional.

COURT: We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade
of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between
individuals an account of religious differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

PETITIONER: The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's
instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be
enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.

COURT: Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

PETITIONER: Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is
not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation,
it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:

(1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization.

COURT: The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights
which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are
citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be
in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Ruling:
Petition was not granted, and the Supreme Court held that petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus cannot be, therefore, issued.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.

They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Ynot vs IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Facts:

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.

On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in a pumpboat.
He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Confiscated by a police officer.

Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to
due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. Allows police officer to confiscate the cows and arrest them.

Even without trial, they are penalized. By policer officers.

Legislative power conferred is invalid*****

The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order
to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is Constitutional or not.

Held:

The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.

Due process clause is kept vague - so those seeking remedy arent limited to a category of rights etc.
justice wont be served

EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of
carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
(VALID EXERCISE)

- Small farmers rely on carabaos (thats why theres qualifications for the carabaos that would be killed
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law.

As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the
petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.

Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional

Corona v UHPAP (1997)

Petitioners: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports
Authority

Respondent: UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION

Ponente: Mendoza, J

Facts:

Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the
PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules
mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must train as
probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after
they have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless
sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued AO 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots
to 1 year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation.

Originally, under AO 03-85, pilots are mandated to undergo training and once obtaining a pilot license,
the PPA gives them permanent and regular appointments until they reach the age of 70.

With the new AO, the PPA took away the privilege of continued appointments/ licensure by limiting their
appointments to just a year (as compared to until they reach 70 years old), and subjecting the pilots to a
license renewal process.

After failed complaints at the DOTC and Office of the President (Sec. Corona decided in favor of PPA),
respondents filed before the RTC, which declared AO 04-92 null and void. Petitioners then elevated the
case to the SC.

Issues:

1. Did AO 04-92 violate the procedural due process of UHPAP members?

2. Did AO 04-92 violate the substantive due process of UHPAP members? (RIGHT TO EXERCISE THEIR
PROFESSION)

Held

*In order to fall under Sec 1, Art III, the two conditions are that there is a deprivation and that the
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.

1. Procedural NO.

Procedural Due Process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced

Though the respondents argued there was no hearing conducted for the pilots to ventilate
their views, jurisprudence states as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.

The pilots were actually able to question the AO at least 4 times before the matter reached the
SC. For an administrative body, notices and hearings are only required in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial functions, not their executive and legislative functions, that latter being the situation in this case.
2. Substantive YES.

Substantive Due Process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law
would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just.
Respondents argued that the pilots have the exclusive and vested right to exercise harbor
pilotage, which can only be withdrawn or shortened by observing the constitutional mandate of due
process of law.

Pilotage as a profession is a property right. A license is a right or permission granted by a

competent authority to carry on a business/ do an act. The granting of the license is a vested right.

The pilots had gone through stringent tests (5 tests) in order to obtain the license. Taking away
the security of their licensure with the already adequate tests/ this pre-cancellation is what makes the AO
unreasonable and is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation

TAADA V. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 | G.R. No. L-63915

(Apr. 24, 1985)
Ponente: Escolin, J.

Facts:

Invoking the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on the matters of public
concern, petitioners sought for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent officials to publish in the
Official Gazette the various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters on Instructions (LOIs), General Orders,
Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Information, and Administrative Orders to be valid and
enforceable.

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant

PETITIONERS: maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be
given due course.

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than
the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
RESPONDENTS further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It
is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Issue: WON the publication of the laws in the Official Gazette is necessary for their effectivity.

Held:

Publication of laws is a condition sine qua non for their effectivity, giving the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice of.

Needless to say, the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. Thus, presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.

The respondents are ordered to publish all unpublished presidential issuances of general application,
which are of no force and effect, unless so published.

Relevant Opinions:

C.J. Fernando (Concurring, qualified; opinion concurred by JJ. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas,
Alampay)
Without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of
law. But it does not mean that publication must be in the Official Gazette. Justice Plana points out that the
Constitution does not require publication in the Official Gazette.

J. Plana (Concurring, qualified; opinion concurred by JJ. Cuevas, Alampay)

The Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.

Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette.

J. Teehankee (Concurring, concurring also with opinion of J. Melencio-Herrera)

The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that
a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation, citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated
in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of
the Civil Code.

J. Melencio-Herrera (Concurring)
There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only
fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if
the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

Relevant Laws:

Article IV, Section 6, 1973 Constitution (Now Article III, Section 7, 1987* Constitution):
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, [as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development,]* shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article 2, New Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 200 (s. 1987):
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 638:

There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. x x x

Nuez v. Sandiganbayan
Petitioner: Rufino Nuez

Respondent: Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

Ponente: Fernando, CJ

Facts:

Nunez was accused before Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
cases.
 Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.

Hence the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity of Presidential Decree 1846
creating the Sandiganbayan.

He contends that the creation of Sandiganbayan is violative of the due process, equal protection,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioners right to equal protection, because appeal
as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one
chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances;
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and
to CA and SC.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1846 creating Sandiganbayan violated equal protection right?

Held:

Petition dismissed.

The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have
original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption.

The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware
as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a
showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring and dissenting):

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of
its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the
CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft
and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only
allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a
trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry
and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures
better justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be
reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial
court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of
fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality
unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution).

ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69 Phil

635
FACTS

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new
trial.

The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather;

that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal;

that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National
Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents
attached are inaccessible to the respondents.

ISSUE: WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR

HELD: No.

The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation.

It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented
to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between
them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation
or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and
compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable."
It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached.
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their
report and decision are only advisory.

(6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.

(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity
to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is grant ed, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to
the CIR.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS CA

Petitioner: POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION

FACTS:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-
Tinejeros River.

On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2
findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant, directing Solar immediately to cease and
desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.

However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board but the same
was dismissed based on 2 grounds i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned order of the
Board as well as the writ of execution was the proper remedy, and that the Boards subsequent order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solars petition moot and academic.

On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. (CA also declared the Writ of Execution null and void.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte
orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such
establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).

Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex part order
may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that Solars wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had
been denied due process by the Board.

SUB-ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and
Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.

RULING:
YES, CA erred

YES, the Order (CDO) was lawful and w/in the authority of the Board. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as police power.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:

Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under
the following circumstances:

(a) Public Hearing . . . .Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an
ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of
operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until
said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or
modified or nullified by a competent court.

On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the waste discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set
by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the
Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence
of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards.

*Please see case for the comparison of Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 on allowable
standards and the findings of the Board. (Basta, I assure you lumagpas yung results.)

~Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes
our water resources.

Minor lang naman yung change in ownership from Fine Touch Finishing Corp to Solar Textile Finishing
corp. I didnt include it na, basta the 1st owner was issued a notice of violation 1st. Basta hindi lang based
on the 1st test yung basis of the issuance of CDO. (meaning reinspections were conducted also when i
was already under the ownership of Solar and
~Petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing (Patient) in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis- a-vis Solar.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.

It doesnt mean that they cant contest the CDO issued and the findings, it just means that that
opportunity is subsequently available to Solar. Prima facie is enough cause we have to protect (insert
environment stuff here).
The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal
to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should
have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution, and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals.
RULING: Petition is given DUE COURSE; CA Decision and Resolution is SET ASIDE; Order of Board
and writ of execution as well as trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

NON v DAMES

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines

Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the
pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to

the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse
its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case.

The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-
enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used
its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The
Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students
whose conductdiscredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere
with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in
accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However
there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights
within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially
disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.