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L-363

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

A.M.No.L363July31,1962

INRE:DISBARMENTPROCEEDINGSAGAINSTATTY.DIOSDADOQ.GUTIERREZ,respondent.

VictorianoA.Savellanoforcomplaint.
NestorM.Andradaforrespondent.

MAKALINTAL,J.:

RespondentDiosdadoQ.GutierrezisamemberofthePhilippineBar,admittedtoitonOctober5,1945.Incriminal
case No. R793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon
Samaco,formermunicipalmayorofCalapan,andtogetherwithhiscoconspiratorswassentencedtothepenaltyof
death.UponreviewbythisCourtthejudgmentofconvictionwasaffirmedonJune30,1956(G.R.No.L17101),but
thepenaltywaschangedtoreclusionperpetua.Afterservingaportionofthesentencerespondentwasgranteda
conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"onconditionthatheshallnotagainviolateanyofthepenallawsofthePhilippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding
pardonindefense,ontheauthorityofthedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseofInreLontok,43Phil.293.

Undersection5ofRule127,amemberofthebarmayberemovedsuspendedfromhisofficeasattorneybythe
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime.Theterm"moralturpitude"includeseverythingwhichisdonecontrarytojustice,honesty,modestyorgood
morals.InreCarlosS.Basa,41Phil.275.Asusedindisbarmentstatutes,itmeansanactofbaseness,vileness,or
depravityintheprivateandsocialdutieswhichamanowestohisfellowmenortosocietyingeneral,contrarytothe
acceptedruleofrightanddutybetweenmanandman.Stateexrel.Conklinv.Buckingham,84P.2nd495Am.Jur.
Sec.279.pp.428429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyondthescopeoftheruleondisbarmentaforecited.RelianceisplacedbyhimsquarelyontheLontokcase.The
respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the GovernorGeneral. In a subsequent
viction,thisCourtdecidedinhisfavorandheld:"Whenproceedingstostrikeanattorney'snamefromtherollsthe
fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
convictionandisabartoanyproceedingforthedisbarmentoftheattorneyafterthepardonhasbeengranted."

Itisourviewthattherulingdoesnotgovernthequestionnowbeforeus.InmakingittheCourtproceededonthe
assumptionthatthepardongrantedtorespondentLontokwasabsolute.Thisisimplicitintheratiodecidendiofthe
case,particularlyinthecitationstosupportit,namely.InReEmmons,29Cal.App.121Scottvs.State,6Tex.Civ.
App.343andExparteGarland,4Wall,380.ThusinScottvs.Statethecourtsaid:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no
longerbeusedasabasisfortheproceedingprovidedforinarticle226.Therecord,whenofferedinevidence,
was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a
convictionofanyfelony."Havingbeenthuscancelled,allitsforceasafelonyconvictionwastakenaway.A
pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of
executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344 Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
citedYoungv.Young,61Tex.191.

AndtheportionofthedecisioninExparteGarlandquotedwithapprovalintheLontokcaseisasfollows:

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3/16/2017 G.R. No. L-363
Apardonreachesboththepunishmentprescribedfortheoffenseandtheguiltoftheoffenderandwhenthe
pardonisfull,itreleasesthepunishmentandblotsouttheexistenceofguilt,sothatintheeyeofthelawthe
offenderisasinnocentasifhehadnevercommittedtheoffense.Itgrantedbeforeconviction,itpreventsany
of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching if granted after conviction, it
removesthepenaltiesanddisabilities,andrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrightsitmakeshim,asitwere,anew
man,andgiveshimanewcreditandcapacity.

Thepardongrantedtorespondenthereisnotabsolutebutconditional,andmerelyremittedtheunexecutedportion
of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and
amnestyforalloffensebyhimcommittedinconnectionwithrebellion(civilwar)againstgovernmentoftheUnited
States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez,supra.Thedegreeofmoralturpitudeinvolvedissuchastojustifyhisbeingpurgedfromtheprofession.

Thepracticeoflawisaprivilegeaccordedonlytothosewhomeasureuptocertainrigidstandardsofmentaland
moralfitness.FortheadmissionofacandidatetothebartheRulesofCourtnotonlyprescribeatestofacademic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed
withnorloweredafteradmission:thelawyermustcontinuetoadheretothemorelseincurtheriskofsuspensionor
removal.AsstatedinExparteWall,107U.S.263,27Lawed.,552,556:"Ofallclassesandprofessions,thelawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancytohispositionandofficeandsetsaperniciousexampletotheinsubordinateanddangerouselementsof
thebodypolitic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
DiosdadoQ.Gutierrezhasbeenconvicted,heisordereddisbarredandhisnamestrickenfromtherolloflawyers.

Bengzon,C.J.,Labrador,Concepcion,Barrera,Paredes,DizonandRegala,JJ.,concur.
Padilla,J.,tooknopart.

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