Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77716 February 17, 1988

HEIRS OF THE LATE DOCTOR CORAZON DIAZ-LEUS, namely, her husband, CLETO P. LEUS and children,
CEZAR LEUS, DRA. CORAZON D. LEUS, JR., and CLARISSA LEUS, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI MELVIDA, ALMARIO ROSAS, VICTORY LINER, INC., SPOUSES LEONISA GALI and JESUS GALI and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Almario Rosas and Hernani Melvida were charged of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Double Homicide,
Serious and Slight Physical Injuries and Damage to Property allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 30th day of June, 1972, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Hernani Melvida and
Almario C. Rosas, being then the chauffeurs and the persons in charge of Plymouth car bearing plate No.
99-OW-Caloocan City 1971 and a Victory Liner bus with body number 512 and bearing plate No. 27-55
PUB Caloocan City 1972, respectively, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and
operate their respective motor vehicles along the North Expressway (Marcelo H. Del Pilar Highway)
towards opposite directions in the said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and the weather conditions, and without taking the
necessary precaution to avoid injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence the said Plymouth car bearing plate No. 99-OWL-Caloocan City 1971
driven by the said accused Hernani Melvida to swerve to its left, cross the island, and move onto the lane
for the opposite traffic, and the said Victory Liner bus with body number 512 and bearing plate No. 27-55
PUB Caloocan City 1972 to hit and bump the said Plymouth car, thereby inflicting on DRA. Corazon Diaz-
Leus, Florencio Carbilledo Y Canhagas and Mrs. Leonisa Gali, passengers of the said Plymouth car,
serious physical injuries, which directly caused the death of the said Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus and
Florencio Carbilledo Y Canhagas, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of the said deceased
Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio Carbilledo Y Canhagas, and incapacitated the said Mrs. Leonisa
Gali from performing her customary labor and required her medical attendance for a period of more than
30 days and also inflicting slight physical injuries on Leonisa Payumo, passenger of the said Victory Liner
bus, which required medical attendance and incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a
period of not more than 9 days, and further causing damages to the said Plymouth car and the said
Victory liner Bus, to the damage and prejudice of their owners, Jesus Gali and the Victory Liner Bus Lines
Inc., respectively. Contrary to law. 1

Upon arraignment Rosas and Melvida entered a plea of not guilty and after trial a decision was rendered by the trial court,
the dispositive portion of which reads

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Hernani Melvida guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate
penalty of from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor; as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; to
indemnity (sic) the legal heirs of the deceased Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio Carbilledo the sum
of P12,000.00. each; to pay the legal heirs of Dra. Leus the amount of P14,000.00 as funeral and death
expenses; to pay the said legal heirs of the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

For failure to establish the guilt of accused Almario Rosas beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
acquitted of the offense charged. With costs. 2

From said decision Cleto Leus and his children as legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals only with respect to the
civil aspect. The vital issue raised to the Court of Appeals is whether or not accused-appellee Almario Rosas could still be
held civilly liable despite his acquittal in the criminal case. 3 They also contend that the Victory Liner and Jesus Gali
owners of the colliding vehicles, are subsidiarily liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals made the following finding of facts:

The facts adduced from the evidence presented by the prosecution shows that in the afternoon of June
30, 1972, a vehicular accident happened along the North Expressway. A Plymouth car bearing plate No.
99-OWL-Caloocan City figured in the accident. The car was driven by accused Hernani Melvida and the
passengers were the victim Mrs. Leonisa Gali and the deceased Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus, wife of
complainant Atty. Cleto Leus and Florencio Carbilledo. The Plymouth car driven by accused came from a
Quezon City hospital and was on its way home to Bulacan taking the North Expressway. Accused Melvida
drove the car at a fast speed and in a negligent manner causing it to swerve to the left, traversing the
grassy island which separates the North and the South lanes of the Expressway until it reached a portion
of the left lane more or less two (2) feet from the asphalted portion of the south lane on the left side facing
South going to Manila as shown in Exhibit 'C', 'C-2' and 'C-3' when it was bumped on the rear portion by a
Victory Liner bus and dragged about 50 meters off the cemented road to the grassy island where it was
crash-landed on by the front portion of said Victory Liner bus. Said bus bearing plate No. 27-55 PUB-
Caloocan City 1972 was driven by accused Almario Rosas, travelling South towards Manila in an
imprudent and negligent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and to the weather
condition which was then stormy.

It also appears that before the accident, the bus driven by accused Rosas overtook the car of Dr. Romeo
San Diego which was running at the speed of 80 kilometers per hour. The said bus when it overtook the
car of Dr. San Diego was running at a fast speed thus creating a 'whizzing sound'. As a result of the
vehicular accident, Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus was pinned to death inside the car together with another
passenger Carbilledo.

Thereafter it was held

Upon review of the whole records WE find as the lower court did that the accident in question cannot be
attributed to any negligence of appellee Rosas. The stubborn and undisputed facts reveal that appellee
Rosas was driving his bus on his own lane of the highway going south when the Plymouth car suddenly
encroached on his (Rosas) lane in front of its path after crossing the wise grassy strip of land separating
the North and the South lane of the expressway. Appellee Rosas who was properly traversing his own
lane should not be expected to anticipate and/or foresee that a private car coming from the North lane
would be thrown to his path. Even, assuming as alleged that appellee Rosas was driving at a very fast
speed, had the Plymouth car remained on its proper lane collision would not have occurred. The
proximate cause of the accident is the Plymouth car's leaving its proper (north) lane, swerving to its left
and intruding into the south-bound lane. The collision which resulted in the destruction of the Plymouth
car had not been due to any negligence on appellee Rosas part. It was a fortuitous event which appellee
Rosas could not prevent. And, since appellants appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon appellee
Rosas negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the
extinction of his civil liability and therefore the offended parties, herein appellants may no longer appeal
and recover damages from said appellee Rosas. As a consequence, the rule that--extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,' . . .; (Sec. 3, (c), Rule III, Rules of Court) does not apply
to the present instance. The case falls squarely under the exception that , unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a (sic) initial judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. . . . .
(Sec-3, (c), Rules of Court). It has been held that where the judgment of acquittal in a criminal prosecution
for arson through reckless imprudence states that the offense was caused by fortuitous event, the civil
action to recover damages is barred.(Cf. Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 48 O.G. 2745). The decision
appealed from which is final and executory as regards its criminal phase, has not only acquitted accused,
but also declared that the collision, which resulted in the destruction of appellants' car, had not been due
to any negligence on his part. Since appellants' civil action is predicated upon accused alleged
negligence, which does not exist, according to said final judgment, it follows necessarily that his acquittal
in the criminal action carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom.(Faraon vs.
Priela G.R. L-23129, August 2, 1968, 24 SCRA 582).

Appellant's also alleged that the lower court committed error in not considering the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Dra. Leus. According to appellants, the deceased as a doctor had an average
earning of P600.00 covering the year 1971 and for six (6) months from January to June 1972 and an
average earnings in business for the years 1971 and 1972, the sum of P1,010.

The deceased Dra. Leus was 59 years of age when she died. At such age the normal life expectancy is
14 years, according to the formula (2/ 3 x [80-301 adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Villa Rey
transit Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511 on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actualrial (sic) Combined Experience Table of Morality. In the computation of the amount
recoverable by the heirs of the victim of tort, the loss of the entire earnings is not considered. It is only the
net earnings lease expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and
 other incidental expenses. In the case at bar, the earnings after computing was P904.96 a year and
deduction of P200.00 a month as necessary expenses to the creation of such income is reasonable. The
amount of P704.96 net yearly income multiplied by 14 years, or P9,869.44 is the amount which should be
awarded to appellants. (Davila vs. Phil. Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497; People vs. Henson, CA-G.R. No. 12521-
CR, May 25, 1973). Then to, We believe that the award of damages for the death of Dra. Leus in the
amount of P200,000.00 without interest is reasonable and We find no justification to modify.

In view thereof, appellee Melvida is hereby ordered to pay complainant--appellants additional sum of
P9,869.44.

WHEREFORE, with the modification as to the award of damages, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects. 4

Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the legal issue whether or not the trial court should be ordered to
determine the civil liability of Rosas and subsidiary civil liability of the owners of the car and the bus to the heirs of Dra.
Diaz-Leus in accordance with Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides--

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found
to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Petitioner also invokes the ruling of this Court in Paman vs. Seneris, 5 where it was held

Moreover, it has been invariably held that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to
pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only
with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.

This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil. 495 that the court has no other function
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to
amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and
independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the victim.'
(115 SCRA, P. 715).

The findings of the Court of Appeals were a complete exoneration of Rosas. Since petitioner's appeal on the civil aspect is
predicated upon Rosas' alleged negligence which has been found not to exist, this Court must likewise uphold the Court
of Appeals' ruling that Rosas' acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability which bars herein
petitioners from recovering damages from Rosas. Since Rosas is absolved from any act of negligence which in effect
prevents further recovery of any damages, the same is likewise true with respect to his employer victory Liner, Inc. which
at most would have been only subsidiarily liable.

Nor can the spouses Jesus Gali and Leonisa Gali as employers of respondent Hernani Melvida be subsidiarily liable. Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code provides,

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

In order that employers may be held liable under the above-quoted provision of law, the following requisites must exist.

(1) That an employee has committed a mime in the discharge of his duties;

(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; and

(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. 6

The preceding requisites are not present in the case of the Gali spouses. They are not engaged in any kind of industry.
Industry has been defined as any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially, one which employs
much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade, as the sugar industry. 7

Thus, the Gali spouses cannot be held subsidiarily liable. As We stated in a previous case: "Where the defendant is
admittedly a private person who has no business or industry, and uses his automobile for private purposes, he is not also
subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff for the damages to the latter's car caused by the reckless imprudence of his insolvent
driver." 8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989

GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as Public Respondent, and ANTONIO
SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR respondents.

Rodolfo d. Dela Cruz for petitioner.

Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor
taken with the consent of the latter.

The facts are summarized in the contested decision, as follows:

From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio Catuar,
Antonio Sarmiento, Jr., Ruperto Catuar, Jr. and Norberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28, 1971
plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number 77-99-F-I
Manila, 1971, owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan,
Rizal; that plaintiff's jeep, at the time, was running moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and while
approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that suddenly, another jeep with plate
number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep on
the portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact plaintiff's jeep fell on its right and skidded
by about 30 yards; that as a result plaintiffs jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential,
the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was thrown to
the middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise
plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.

Evidence also shows that the plaintiff Virgilio Catuar spent a total of P2,464.00 for repairs of the jeep, as
shown by the receipts of payment of labor and spare parts (Exhs. H to H-7 Plaintiffs likewise tried to prove
that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar, immediately after the accident was taken to Immaculate Concepcion Hospital,
and then was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital; that while plaintiff Catuar was not confined
in the hospital, his wrist was in a plaster cast for a period of one month, and the contusions on his head
were under treatment for about two (2) weeks; that for hospitalization, medicine and allied expenses,
plaintiff Catuar spent P5,000.00.

Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. sustained injuries on
his leg; that at first, he was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital (Exh. K but later he was confined at
the Makati Medical Center from July 29, to August 29, 1971 and then from September 15 to 25, 1971; that
his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of eight (8) months; and that for hospitalization and medical
attendance, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. spent no less than P13,785.25 as evidenced by receipts in his
possession. (Exhs. N to N-1).

Proofs were adduced also to show that plaintiff Antonio sarmiento Sr. is employed as Assistant
Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P1,200.00 a month; that as sideline he also
works as accountant of United Haulers Inc. with a salary of P500.00 a month; and that as a result of this
incident, plaintiff Sarmiento was unable to perform his normal work for a period of at least 8 months. On
the other hand, evidence shows that the other plaintiff Virgilio Catuar is a Chief Clerk in Canlubang Sugar
Estate with a salary of P500.00 a month, and as a result of the incident, he was incapacitated to work for
a period of one (1) month.

The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto Duavit as
owner of the jeep.

Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. 99-07-F-J Manila,
1971), denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit claimed that he has
not been an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the present.
 On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano was an
employee of the Board of Liquidators from November 14, 1966 up to January 4, 1973 (Annex A of
Answer).

Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of
defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter (TSN, September 7, 1978, p. 8). He testified
further, that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push
through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

Defendant Oscar Sabiniano, on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, makes it
appear that he was taking all necessary precaution while driving and the accident occurred due to the
negligence of Virgilio Catuar. Sabiniano claims that it was plaintiffs vehicle which hit and bumped their
jeep. (Reno, pp. 21-23)

The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-employee relationship
between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he took the vehicle without the
authority and consent of the owner. The petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The private respondents appealed the case.

On January 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally
liable with Sabiniano. The appellate court in part ruled:

We cannot go along with appellee's argument. It will be seen that in Vargas v. Langcay, supra, it was held
that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or
registered owner, and it is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and who the
employer of the driver is. When the Supreme Court ruled, thus: 'We must hold and consider such owner-
operator of record (registered owner) as the employer in contemplation of law, of the driver,' it cannot be
construed other than that the registered owner is the employer of the driver in contemplation of law. It is a
conclusive presumption of fact and law, and is not subject to rebuttal of proof to the contrary. Otherwise,
as stated in the decision, we quote:

The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters will be defeated and thwarted if
we entertain the argument of petitioner that she is not liable because the actual owner and employer was
established by the evidence. . . .

Along the same vein, the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be allowed to prove that the driver Sabiniano was
not his employee at the time of the vehicular accident.

The ruling laid down in Amar V. Soberano (1966), 63 O.G. 6850, by this Court to the effect that the
burden of proving the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship is upon the defendant and this
he must do by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence, has to defer to the doctrines evolved by the
Supreme Court in cases of damages arising from vehicular mishaps involving registered motor vehicle.
(See Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226, 230). (Rollo, pp. 26-27)

The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding him jointly and
severally liable with Sabiniano in spite of the absence of an employer-employee relationship between them and despite
the fact that the petitioner's jeep was taken out of his garage and was driven by Sabiniano without his consent.

As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said
vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. Thus, in Duquillo
v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134) [1939] we said:

Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. At the time of the accident,
James McGurk was driving the truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor did he have
anything to do with the latter's business; neither the defendant nor Father Ayson, who was in charge of
her business, consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident, as it was a holy day,
and much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge of driving it; the use of the defendant's truck in the
circumstances indicated was done without her consent or knowledge; it may, therefore, be said, that there
was not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and the defendant. It
necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code, cited by the appellant,
have no application in this case, and, therefore, the errors attributed to the inferior court are without basis.
The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present day circumstances.

The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957] and Vargas v. Langcay (6
SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, the registered owner of the truck which collided with a
taxicab, and which resulted in the killing of Erezo, claimed that at the time of the accident, the truck belonged to the Port
Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was not known to the Motor Vehicles Office. This Court
sustained the trial court's ruling that since Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles
Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicle in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the
representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. Thus, even if Jepte were not the
owner of the truck at the time of the accident, he was still held liable for the death of Erezo significantly, the driver of the
truck was fully authorized to drive it.

Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person, so that at
the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney. This court, nevertheless, affirmed Vargas' liability
since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law and Commonwealth Act No. 146. We further ruled that the operator of record continues to be the operator of
the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and as such is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operator. The vehicle involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the law
does not only require the surrender of the AC plates but orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as
a form of public transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities.

As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Herein
petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely denies having employed the
driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's
garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his
driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident
caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard, we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken
from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or
mechanics of auto repair shops using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair.

We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases.
Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this case, the records of the
petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring driver
or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner liable.

We, therefore, find that the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in holding the petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Sabiniano to the private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, 8th Judicial District, Branch
6, dated July 30, 1981 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987

CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario
Claudia respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105,
Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8
January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated
criminal cases.

It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.

The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse
dated May 19,1986.

The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105 which was then presided over by
Judge Johnico G. Serquina

During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty
to the charges. Pre-trial was then set on January 8, 1987.

In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private
prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any
civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."

The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.

Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987.

In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.

The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless
checks as an offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal
complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or
prosecutor may intervene.

On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends
that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at bar.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that
when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this
rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as
a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal
prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an
act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime
but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of
the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on
account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime
(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a
penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair
of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not
only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was
assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when
the checks bounced.

In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that
"The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when
we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the
public."

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment
of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private
party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party
unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of
the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of
her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution
(Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be
costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private
prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909
to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this court a quo for further proceedings. This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.