New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363

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New Ideas in Psychology

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newideapsych

Egocentrism in moral development: Gibbs, Piaget, Kohlberg

Jan Boom
Department of Developmental Psychology, Utrecht University, PO Box 80.140, 3508 TC, Utrecht, The Netherlands

a b s t r a c t

Keywords: In Gibbs theory of moral development Piagetian ideas concerning

Moral Development egocentrism play an important role. Based on these ideas Gibbs
Egocentrism
offers a detailed analysis of transitions in moral development.
Constructivism
However, Gibbs still fails to utilize the full potential offered by
Equilibrium
Habermas
Piagets equilibration theory, because he does not generalize the
idea of overcoming egocentrism, as an important mechanism, to all
stage transitions. Gibbs seeks a non-relativistic theoretical/ethical
justication for his claims about moral development in a difcult
to substantiate notion of an underlying reality. Moreover, such
objectivist claims are difcult to reconcile with his endorsement of
Piagets constructivism.
Following Piagets equilibration theory development can be seen
as the march to an ever widening perspective, possible through
reecting abstraction, and implying overcoming egocentric biases
that recur at all levels of development. Assuming the widest level
in the case of moral development is the moral point of view, an
impartial procedure that should guarantee that everybody
involved can freely agree as the result of considering arguments
reecting all viewpoints, ts in with a tradition in ethics from Kant,
to Rawls, to Habermas which takes the moral point of view as the
ultimate moral principle. These so called Procedural Ethics
theories are not relativistic, but not objectivist either, because they
ultimately depend on the characteristics of the procedure.
2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

E-mail address: j.boom@uu.nl.

0732-118X/$ see front matter 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.007
356 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363

1. Egocentrism in moral development

In Kohlbergs theory of moral development (Kohlberg & Colby, 1987) and more pronounced in
Gibbs recent theory of moral development (Gibbs, 2009), Piagetian ideas concerning egocentrism,
centration, and decentration play an important role. In his model of moral developmental, Gibbs
heavily draws on Piagetian ideas, although the terminology he uses differs somewhat from Piagets. For
example, the notion of early childhood superciality is Gibbs (2009) rendering of Piagets notion of
egocentrism. Closely related terms used by Gibbs are egocentric bias and self-centration. Of course,
Kohlberg, in his cognitive developmental approach, took up Piagetian notions earlier. Gibbs, despite his
credits to and admiration for Kohlberg, however, claims to go deeper, and correct some unfruitful
deviations from Piaget introduced by Kohlberg. He suggests being more true to Piaget compared to
Kohlberg, while not eschewing criticism of Piagets ideas.
Gibbs in his 2009 book (a revised edition of his 2003 book) offers a theoretical justication and
foundation for his account of moral development. In contrast to relativists, who deny even the
possibility,1 he believes that a theory of moral development requires a foundation and that moral
development is development in the direction of a more mature and more adequate morality. Basically
he uses Piaget to delve deeper into descriptions and mechanisms relevant to moral development;
deeper than Kohlberg that is. His thoughts on the non-relativistic foundation of morality and the
ultimate aim of moral development depart considerably from those of Kohlberg. My nal assessment is
that Gibbs return to Piaget is immensely valuable for recent moral developmental theory (as evi-
denced by the successful intervention program EQUIP), but unfortunately, in the deeper justications
of his approach he departs from Kohlberg and Piaget at points where he better had not.
I am interested in the connections between cognitive structural developmental theories (e.g. Piaget
and Kohlberg) and the conceptualizations of the moral point of view because I have been always
intrigued by the possibility that these psychological theories and ethical reections can mutually
support each other, or that, for them to be viable, they depend on each other. Kohlbergs original
intuition on this was that the fact that a new stage is morally better is precisely an important part of
why people would prefer it and move towards it (Kohlberg, 1971). The title of this (in?)famous paper
was From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral
development. This paper was not well received, to put it mildly, but the idea is very intriguing.
Anyhow, I am sympathetic towards non-relativistic approaches to moral development such as Gibbss
and of course Kohlbergs. This does not imply that I agree completely with either of them. In fact my
own position differs from theirs and is more inuenced by Habermas (1990) and his discourse ethics.
But then again, of course, Habermas was inspired by Piaget and Kohlberg.
In this paper, I reconstruct Gibbs use of Piagetian ideas, in particular his rendering of the notion of
egocentrism (Piaget, 1932, 1995; Piaget & Inhelder, 1967), working all the way from its Piagetian origin
to the present day use in Gibbs (2009) book, but rst I present some background for Gibbs approach.
Then I point out some problems for Gibbs and propose two points of elaboration or renement and
a conclusion.

2. The main trend in development of moral judgment

According to Gibbs (2009) life-span moral judgment can be subdivided into two broader Phases2: It
begins with standard moral development possibly (but not necessarily) followed by existential
development. Standard moral development involves an invariant sequence consisting of two over-
lapping levels each of which nests two stages. Standard development encompasses roughly Kohlbergs
rst 4 stages of moral development. The next phase concerns existential development and it replaces
stages 5 and 6 of Kohlbergs system but (hard-) stage characteristics do not apply here. The most
important developmental change is the emergence of ideal moral reciprocity in stage 3. The

1
Gibbs specically mentions the following relativist positions: post-modernism, virtue ethics, narrative psychology, prag-
matic accounts, neo-Nativism, social intuitionists theory, and cultural psychology (Gibbs, 2009, p. 3).
2
Gibbs distinguishes phases, levels, and stages.
 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363 357

instruments designed by Gibbs (Gibbs et al., 1984; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) accordingly have this
transition as focus, in contrast to, for example, the DIT (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000), an
instrument also derived from Kohlbergs original model, which is focused more on the transition from
stage 4 to stage 5 and higher.

2.1. The immature or supercial stages

The rst two stages are characterized by early childhood superciality and are denoted as immature
(Gibbs, 2009, p. 73). Gibbs uses notions from Piagets work on cognitive development to characterize
young childrens thinking in both cognitive and social domains, and to diagnose shortcomings in that
thinking. Typical of early childhood are self-centrations or over-attention to eye catching features;
centration on salient stimuli; and egocentric bias, or centration, on ones own immediate perspective at
the expense of others. Given general shared criticisms on Piaget, Gibbs acknowledges that egocentrism
does not imply a complete lack of perspective taking skills. Rather, egocentrism involves the bias or
tendency to distort others perspectives according to ones own working memory and experience.
Despite different emphases and different labels, Gibbs takes it that his descriptions are roughly in line
with Kohlbergs designation of the rst two stages. Note that Piaget rejected the idea of stages of moral
development; perhaps because his account of moral development (Piaget, 1932) dates from a period in
when his stage theory (Piaget, 1960) was not yet fully developed.

2.2. The mature or profound stages

For the characterization of the next two stages, Gibbs departs from Kohlberg and builds on Piaget
instead. He criticizes Kohlberg for mistakenly deriving the overall framework for his stage and level
denitions from Dewey, thereby focusing too much on conformity and internalization. Instead, so
Gibbs argues, Kohlberg should have focused on construction, which would have been more consistent
with the general trust of Kohlbergs theory. As a former collaborator on the Moral Judgment Interview
Manual, Gibbs should know what he is talking about, so let us accept his objections to Kohlberg
without going into details. According to Gibbs, the core of more mature thinking is recognition of the
ideal bases in mutual trust, caring, and respect, and some awareness of the moral point of view (or ideal
reciprocity). In stage 3, this is applied to interpersonal relationships, and in stage 4 to social systems.
These stages are also characterized as going beyond the supercial, and beyond the centrations of the
previous immature stages. Gibbs connects the understanding of idealizations that emerges at stage 3
with cognitive primacy in moral motivation. Cognitive primacy in moral motivation means that
cognitive considerations can be directly motivating for moral issues, similar to the urge to correct
a logical violation. But this is, according to Gibbs, dependent upon the condition that the moral
principles endorsed by the subject are self constructed and that there is no doubt about what is right,
and this obtains typically when, for example, experiences of reciprocity become generalized to ideal
reciprocity (do-as-you-would-be-done-by morality).

2.3. Existential development

In this second major phase of development, qualitative differences in thinking can be found but,
according to Gibbs, these can no longer be characterized as natural-stage development. This phase,
which encompasses hypothetical contemplation, meta-ethical reection, and spiritual awakening, can
emerge as early as adolescence, but may not emerge in all persons.
The idea that only the lower stages do form a natural sequence is not new: Kohlberg pondered the
possibility of a 7th soft3 stage and admitted that after stage 4 and 5 the Piagetian hard stage model
might not apply and it is perhaps better to understand advanced moral development as existential or
reective (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Habermas also considers development beyond stage 4 as

3
The hard stage model refers to Piagets explicit strict criteria for the relation between stages (Piaget, 1960), whereas soft
stages refer to a global characterizations that are less clearly related to each other (Kohlberg et al., 1983).
358 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363

not being natural (Habermas, 1990). On the other hand, several proposals have been advanced that
retain the idea of an ever continuing pattern of higher developmental stages, for example: Cases model
of Central Conceptual Structures (Case, 1992), Fishers Skill theory (Fischer & Bidell, 2006), and
Commons model of hierarchical complexity (Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998).
Perhaps it is more important to consider the mechanisms of change than the issue of (ir)regularity in
the pattern of stages.

3. Mechanisms of development and deviant development

Gibbs ideas about the mechanisms of development are based on Piaget. However, his interpretation
seems to be based mainly on earlier works of Piaget (and on Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). He focuses
on the transition from stages 1 and 2 (immature early childhood superciality) to stages 3 and 4
(mature profound stages), while he is less clear on subsequent development. As it is notoriously
difcult to explain developmental transitions or developmental progression, describing what has to
change constitutes a good beginning.
First, according to Gibbs, development requires decentration from an egocentric way of thinking.
Decentering stands for taking multiple perspectives and coordinating them and implies that the child
has to keep more things in mind, consider more aspects of a situation, and coordinate these aspects in
more complex ways as in the earlier stage, as is beautifully illustrated in cognitive development by
numerous studies using the conservation task.
Second, development requires higher orders or new levels of equilibration to emerge. In explaining
the transition from stage 2 to stage 3, Gibbs (2009, p. 38) stresses the transition from pragmatic
reciprocity to reciprocity as an ideal. Judgments are increasingly felt to have a sort of logical necessity,
at least in the cognitive domain. For Gibbs, the move from moral developmental stage 2 to stage 3
requires, or is at least correlated with, the emergence of hypothetical thinking and the emergence of
formal operations. Gibbs refers to the Piagetian notion of reective abstraction to describe this tran-
sition; however, he has not made use of Piagets more recent books on this important mechanism.
Although, both pragmatic and ideal reciprocity may motivate behavior, only ideal reciprocity is,
according to Gibbs, a reliable cognitive source of mature moral motivation. In positive circumstances
a concrete expectation can be sufcient, but not in case of mistrust: pragmatic reciprocity is payback
logic reinforcing revenge! (Gibbs, 2009, p. 40).
Third, the actual mechanism that explains how development works and can be stimulated is social
construction. Gibbs stresses that this is something entirely different from internalization, although
internalization may play a role too. In particular, social construction through perspective taking and
reection is central according to Gibbs. What he tries to show, using some older studies as evidence, is
that the mechanisms invoked by Piaget are the same for cognitive as well as for social development and
that they are to an important degree social in nature. Although this kind of social constructivism has
not generated as yet a successful research tradition, social constructivism remains an intriguing
mechanism. For moral development more specically, role-taking is considered to be most important
by Gibbs, as already had been proposed by Kohlberg also.

4. Aims of Gibbs

After reviewing some of the pieces of the Piagetian puzzle, we examine how and why Gibbs puts the
pieces together. Let us assume that he is seeking a theoretical/ethical justication for his claims about
moral development in general and in particular for a treatment program for antisocial and delinquent
youth: EQUIP. This program is partly based on Gibbs approach to moral development and is one of the
most successful such recent treatment and/or prevention programs. Such a program needs a justi-
cation, as Gibbs is well aware. Moreover, notwithstanding success, it is difcult to prove that such
a program works as intended (Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2005; Van der Velden, 2010), which adds to the
need for a theoretical justication. Such a theoretical justication may seem, to some, a bit old fash-
ioned or superuous in this area of cognitive neuroscience, but I would suggest that it is philosophically
and ethically naive to think we can do without. Gibbs is not naive in these but he also knows that this is
a theoretical mineeld and he is wise enough to focus on the lower stages in most of his book.
 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363 359

Incidentally, he also knows that there is a large gap between the theoretical considerations and
practical work, hence his interest in Hoffmans (2008) work on empathy, but I will not pursue this issue
here. Briey, a justication must address three issues. First, unless thinking at the next stage is morally
better somehow, we have no grounds to stimulate the emergence of the higher stage. Second, morally
superior thinking must somehow provide a motive to act accordingly (motivation), otherwise it is
useless (lart pour lart). Finally, there must be a sensible mechanism that can be exploited in an
intervention (or prevention) program.
My understanding of his theory is that Gibbs has basically two messages in response to these issues.
The rst message Gibbs tries to get across is that a deeper reality is uncovered: This inference as to
underlying reality represents a qualitatively new, more adequate understanding and a kind of
knowledge that . has much to do with the right and wrong of morality. (Gibbs, 2009, p. 30). He
observes that a new level attained in cognitive development, as for example in mastering conservation
(more advanced reasoning) is not only better but also is accompanied by the feeling of logical necessity.
The second message is that development is, to a large and important extent a construction and not
just the mere internalization of norms preexisting in the environment. Because the new insight is
constructed through social interaction, involving, for example, role-taking opportunities, combined
with the idea that it is an understanding of a deeper truth (rst message), it provides a feeling of being
right that can be a strong motive for behavior.
Of course Piaget was also occupied with these issues, as have many followers and critics (cf. Boom,
1991). If the next stage (whether in cognitive or moral development) can be shown to be objectively
better, and also to have the power to motivate behavior, we have a very strong foundation for a program
fostering moral development. So assuming that a foundation is needed and that Piagets theory is
a promising point of departure, let us see how convincing Gibbs approach is.

5. Problems for Gibbs account of overcoming egocentrism

Unfortunately the pieces do not t together very well in Gibbs account. A foundation is needed,
alright; the diagnosis is in order, but the solution is not completely satisfying. The core of Gibbs
argument is that Piaget has made a strong case that, briey: logico-mathematical knowledge can be
experienced as necessary knowledge, that is the result of a construction process, and that such
knowledge has a sort of motivating power. There is much support for this interpretation of Piaget and
not surprisingly Piagetian studies support the argument (see Mller, Carpendale, & Smith, 2009).
But then Gibbs goes on to argue: rstly, that logico-mathematical knowledge is objectively correct.
He uses Piagets conservation task as illustration to suggest that there is a deeper reality in which
conservation holds and that logical thinking gives us entry to this deeper reality (Gibbs, 2009, p. 30).
Secondly, that some moral and social rules also represent knowledge that can be subsumed under this
category of logico-mathematical knowledge (Gibbs, 2009, p. 223) which, if we accept this, means that
these are constructed and motivating too (these desirable properties are transferred so to speak from
the non-social domain to the socio-moral domain). Thirdly, completing the analogy between socio-
moral and cognitive knowledge, Gibbs assumes there is or must be a deeper reality too for the
social domain (Gibbs, 2009, p. 1). Since this is not so self evident Gibbs feels the need to provide
additional support and devotes an entire chapter (chap. 8) to near-death experiences. Fourthly, that
(logico-mathematical) knowledge is a social construction (Gibbs, 2009, p. 28). These four additional
arguments are also attributed to Piaget but I see some problems with these arguments and with their
attribution to Piaget.
The rst problem concerns the deeper reality posited by Gibbs, because, an objectively given deeper
reality and constructivism do not go together very well. Piaget was more a constructivist then an
ontological realist, meaning Piaget was well aware that there is no way of knowing the world as it really
is (even assuming there is such a thing). That is the point of constructivism: we cannot step outside our
knowledge constructions to check whether they correspond to reality (Mller et al., 2009, chap. 1.). At
best we can make a new and more encompassing knowledge construction. Of course, our knowledge
constructions, on the one hand, have to t in with a deeper reality, but taking this to far would imply
that discovery or even internalization is at issue, instead of construction! This would be unwanted, on
the other hand, because the motivating power of these knowledge constructions was precisely
360 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363

attributed to the fact that they were our own autonomous constructions. So referring to a deeper
reality is not as unproblematic as Gibbs is suggesting. The empirical fact that subjects may feel very
condent and certain (as is often the case for conservers as Gibbs rightly observes) is by itself no
guarantee that they are right: Piaget speaks of pseudo-necessity for unjustied feelings of necessity
(once people were quite certain that the earth was the center of the universe). So, if feelings of
necessity are not sufcient, how do we know they are right? For the social-moral domain the situation
is even more problematic. Gibbs postulation of a deeper reality (with vague religious undertones) as
a foundation does not help. Invoking privileged entrance, as in near-death experiences, to such
a deeper reality is question begging because it by denition the source of information is subjective and
not objective. My suggestion for an alternative will be that, if we generalize the developmental
mechanisms, and dont take typical stage 2 egocentrism as the point of departure for the justication,
we dont need to bring in such deeper realities.
The second problem is that pointing to role-taking opportunities as a mechanism is not very
satisfying. Because the question remains: why do some people not take advantage of role-taking
opportunities? Is it because of harsh parenting, or mental decits, as discussed in chapter 6 of
Gibbs (2009) book? From a theoretical point of view, we might wonder why someone should consider
the perspective and interests of someone else anyway. In particular, when most people are fair and
considerate it is very protable to be unfair. This brings us to the crucial question, why should we be
moral? If someone takes the perspective of the other he is likely to be more considerate and more social
towards that other person, but why should he take the perspective of the other to begin with? We are
in the dangerous area of providing circular arguments. Revisiting the concept of egocentrism may be
helpful to better t the pieces of the puzzle, alluded to earlier, together.

6. Beyond egocentrism according to Piaget

Before proposing some modications for Gibbs theory, let us rst summarize how Piaget concep-
tualizes egocentrism, as egocentrism was the starting point of Gibbs deliberations.
Early childhood egocentrism is unconscious confusion of ones own point of view with that of the
other: from symbolic play to copy of adult thought (Piaget, 1995, p. 279). A failure in the coordination
of viewpoints occurs (Chapman, 1988, p. 187). Consistent with these quotes, egocentrism is mostly
seen as being typical of a particular stage, specically the preoperational stage in cognitive develop-
ment. This is the dominant way in which Piagets concept of egocentrism has been received/is depicted
in almost all developmental psychology textbooks (e.g. Berk, 2006). This interpretation goes back to
the famous three-mountain task (more on it later).
However, also relevant is the use of the idea of egocentrism in Piagets account of moral develop-
ment. This account dates from an earlier period (Piaget, 1932) in which the notion of stages was not yet
fully developed. The key characteristic here was dominance of the parts over the whole and this kind of
egocentrism stands in contrast to constraint which is dominance of the whole over the parts in which
the individuals are subordinated to society as a whole. What is needed, according to Piaget, is
a morality of cooperation or reciprocity, as a synthesis of the interest of persons considered as indi-
viduals and of those persons taken together (see Chapman, 1988).
Moreover, it is more accurate to state that decentering and being centered are recurrent phenomena
for Piaget: each major stage begins relatively centered and gradually gets elaborated by decentrations.
In each stage decentration brings one to the limits of what can be assimilated in that stage, but then
a reorganization is needed to establish a higher level (e.g. formal operational). On this newly acquired
level thinking starts out by being relatively centered again and gradual process of decentering begins
anew (Piaget, 1985). Therefore, egocentrism (or being centered) and decentering can better be
understood as part of the more general developmental mechanism of equilibration to which we will
now turn.
For Piagets views on mechanisms of development, we can best consider his book on equilibration
(see Boom, 2009; Piaget, 1985, original 1975). Although this book constitutes the most elaborate recent
version of relevant parts of Piagets theory, it is not cited by Gibbs (2009). In the equilibration theory
a more general mechanism is outlined, which encompasses most or all mechanisms proposed by Gibbs.
This equilibration theory can be used to sort out the two problems discussed in the previous section
 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363 361

(concerning the deeper reality, and the moral point of view, respectively). The general thrust of Gibbs
project (at least in my understanding of it) can be retained provided two modications are made which
might lead to a more coherent alternative when worked out appropriately.
1A Although Gibbs is clear that the egocentrism of stage 2 will be replaced by ideal reciprocity of stage
3 in normal development, and that this is a crucial difference, he is not so clear about how this is achieved.
Offering role-taking opportunities or social perspective taking opportunities, or confronting children
with another perspective, is important but can only be a rst step. According to Piaget the mechanism for
transitions to higher stages involves not only coordinating perspectives between partners (inter-indi-
vidual), but also intra-individual, and most importantly between-level (part-whole). In the famous
three-mountain task, described in The childs conception of space (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, chap. 8), the
younger child assumes his perspective is the only perspective or at least does not differentiate the
perspective of someone sitting opposite to him. But in Chapter 13 in The childs conception of space,
concerning what later became known as the water-level task, the child has to draw how the water
looks in a drawing of an outline of a tilted, half lled, bottle. Younger children tend to focus on the
surface internal to the bottle ignoring the position of the bottle in the environment and draw the water
parallel to the bottom of the bottle; older children draw the water-level horizontal despite bottle tilt. So,
whereas in the case of the water-level tasks, different perspectives within the same child have to be
coordinated, in the three-mountain tasks ones own and another persons perspective need to be
coordinated. The question as to when children realize that other persons can hold different perspectives
has led to the ourishing business of TOM, but Piaget was more occupied with the question of when
children could coordinate perspectives (instead of confusing them or mixing them up). More important
for us is the hierarchical aspect: a higher order perspective is added that incorporates lower level
perspectives, because it leads to closure. Role-taking opportunities might lead to perspective taking but
unless the consideration of multiple perspectives is reected upon such that a generalization occurs and
an abstraction results, this is of little consequence. In some places this seems to be recognized by Gibbs,
but then he is not very consistent. Anyhow, the issue is important for the following.
1B Gibbs, in his description of stage 3 seems to be well aware of the importance of idealizations and
generalizations, but he cant explain very well how ideal reciprocity can be a cognitive source of moral
motivation other than by referring to the deeper reality. What is lacking is a better incorporation into
his theory of Piagets equilibration theory and his account of reecting abstraction (Piaget, 2001,
original 1977). The point is that Piaget tried to devise a mechanism such that that very mechanism itself
guarantees that a deeper and better way of understanding emerges, but not because a deeper onto-
logical reality is uncovered.
Space does not permit to discuss more than just a small part of Piagets account. In particular his
idea of gamma reactions is instructive. Piaget distinguishes three sorts of reactions to perturbations in
his equilibration account (Boom, 2009; Piaget, 1975). Alpha reactions are characterized by the absence
of any attempt to integrate the perturbations into the system in question. Minor perturbations do not
move the system far from equilibrium, and a simple modication may be sufcient to achieve
reequilibrations. By contrast, when the perturbation is stronger, the subject may ignore or even actively
ignore the perturbation. Beta reactions integrate the perturbing element that has sprung up into the
system. What was a perturbation for the system becomes a variation within a reorganized structure.
New relationships are established that connect the elements incorporated with those already existing.
It involves partial compensations, superior to alpha reactions, through the reworking of the concep-
tualizations involved. The aim is not to cancel the change introduced by the perturbing object but to
integrate it with a minimization of costs. Finally, gamma reactions consist in anticipation of variations
that otherwise could become perturbations. If every possible transformation is fully compensated by
an inverse or converse transformation, and every possible afrmation by a corresponding negation,
then variations are no longer perturbations. The closure of the structure eliminates all contradictions
from the outside and from within. But it is not a simple resultant of opposing factors because it has an
intrinsic necessity.
In sum, these reactions cannot be understood in terms of an adaptation to a xed, subject-
independent (objective?) reality. Even though Piaget assumes that there is a subject-independent
reality at the ontological level, and while he assumes that the overall stage sequence is such that
objectivity is approached as a limit, this limit plays no role in his account of the construction of
362 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363

knowledge. At the epistemological level he remains a constructivist. But, since gamma reactions are
supposed to lead to closed structures, to more stable structures, to better structures in the sense that
they allow to anticipate outside reactions better, they might describe how ideal reciprocity can emerge
and might be a cognitive source of moral motivation. It seems likely at least that they will also lead to
cognitive structures that are motivating. This implies also that with each new stage interaction
possibilities increase, experiences get better organized, and din the social domaind perspectives
become better organized (Boom, 2003).
So, the rst modication I propose is to see the proposition of an intrinsic relatedness of the social
and the non-social domain not as a corollary of a shared deeper ontological reality, but as a corollary of
a much more mundane state of affairs: because in all our actions we are connected with each other and
gamma reactions in both cognitive and moral domain therefore lead in the same direction (see
next section).
2 The second modication concerns the moral point of view and the question why be moral. Gibbs
has tried to identify an objective basis for an answer to this question. He assumes there is an invisible,
deeper reality, as reported by people with near-death experiences, to justify such an idea. He also refers
to theories like those of Roger Penrose in his last chapter to give such an idea more credibility in terms
of speculations on higher physics. He even refers to Kohlbergs suggestion of a deeper reality and
cosmic perspective (Gibbs, 2009, p. 1). However, as I tried to demonstrate above, Piaget would reject
positing such a seemingly blunt objectivism, and I would agree that these parts of the book only offer
a non-developmental, rather mystical, and untenable solution. But, if the answer to the question why
be moral cannot be related to knowledge of an ultimate deeper reality what is the alternative?
I propose that the kind of ethical theory that ts best with the Piagetian and Kohlbergian cognitive
developmental assumptions are instances of the so called procedural ethics (from Kant to Rawls to
Habermas). These approaches focus on a best procedure to arrive at a solution for moral problems: the
procedure should guarantee that the solution is ethically justied (Habermas, 1992). These ethical
theories are not relativistic, but not objectivist either, because they ultimately depend on the char-
acteristics of the procedure. Note that (my designation of) Piagets conceptualization of development
could also be designated is procedural! Hence the connection referred to in the introduction of this
paper!
But how does this relate to the question why we should take the perspective of the other? It is
relevant once we recognize that moral development is inherently relational in the sense that the
individuals egocentric position is not the origin or basis of moral and social development (see Car-
pendale & Racine this issue). This means the question was wrong; we dont have to argue why someone
should take the perspective of the other; it is not something strange and new to be learned, requiring
putting asides ones clear own obvious self interest. Role-taking and interaction in normal circum-
stances leads to awareness of both self and others and therefore is important. Of course, a procedural
way to solve problems is at the one end of a developmental continuum in which Gibbs egocentric stage
might be the opposite end, but this does not imply the assumption that egocentrism is the original
position and that we have to explain how we get from egocentrism to the moral point of view. Indi-
viduation (forming and developing a self and an identity) and the participation in, and understanding
of, a social network both develop from more undifferentiated precursor stages. The last point is
generalized in Habermas discourse ethics (Habermas, 1990). To be human is to build up an identity and
a personality. This can only be done in communication and in intersubjective relations, thus with other
selves. Your being a person, a self, and having an identity, is possible only by getting recognition as such
by others. This implies an elaborate and fragile network of relations. The function of moral rules is to
maintain, protect, and build both: the identities and the network.
My discussion of the alternative based on Habermas is much too brief and requires much more
unpacking, but I hope it sufces for now and I have at least hinted at a serious non-relativistic alter-
native interpretation for the foundations of moral development.

7. Conclusion

From a Piagetian view, development is a march to an ever widening perspective. The widest level in
the case of moral development is the moral point of view: an impartial procedure that should
 J. Boom / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 355363 363

guarantee that everybody involved can freely agree, as the result of considering arguments reecting
all viewpoints. This interpretation of moral development is based and founded upon the idea that we as
humans are all connected, and certainly our actions are. So, dperhaps surprisinglyd I agree with Gibbs
that we are all connected. It is our human condition. But we dont need an invisible deeper reality or
near-death experiences to justify such an idea, or give it more credibility. Instead, I would suggest, with
Habermas and Mead, that connectedness is rooted in the idea that we can never develop (an identity)
in isolation. If Gibbs would follow the Piagetian line of arguments only slightly further that could be
enough to arrive at a more consistent and more tenable position regarding the moral point of view.

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