China Media Research, 2(3), 2006, Yin, Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse

Toward a Confucian Feminism: A Critique of Eurocentric Feminist

Discourse
Jing Yin, Clemson University

Abstract: Feminist movements in the United States and Western Europe have called attention to the oppression
of women worldwide. However, as Western feminisms are gaining more and more currency, it is vital for non-
Western women to be cautious of the pitfall of replacing one form of oppression with another. This article explores
an alternative framework for non-Western feminism. The article offers a critique of the hegemony of Eurocentric
discourse in feminist movements around the world. It problematizes three characteristics of Eurocentric feminist
discourse: universalism, individualism, and right-based ethics. The article also proposes a Confucian feminism
based on the principle of ren (humanness), the notion of rights as fen (share), and duty-based ethics. [China Media
Research. 2006;2(3):9-18].

Keywords: Feminism; Eurocentrism, individualism; Confucianism; ren (humanness); fen (share); duty-based
ethics

Feminism is one of the most powerful struggles for
social justice in the world (hooks, 2000). Feminist
movements in the United States and Western Europe
have called attention to women’’s oppression and
exploitation worldwide. However, just as white males
dominate Eurocentric humanist discourse, Western
feminist discourse is also a dominant discourse that
displaces non-Western cultural values. Western
feminisms,1 to differing extents, have been accepted by
many across the world as an inseparable part of
modernization and development (e.g., Fung, 2000). In
the same manner as Eurocentric modernization, Western
feminisms are also forms of colonization that codify
non-Western cultures as Others (Mohanty, 2002).
In the case of Chinese women, with few exceptions,
Western studies present a homogeneous picture of
gender oppression in traditional Chinese society or
under the socialist regime (Chow, 1991; Gilmartin,
Hershatter, Rofel & White, 1994; Mann, 1994). This
type of research concentrated on how Chinese women
were victimized and marginalized by the traditional
patriarchal kinship system or the contemporary
socialism (Mann, 1994). According to this view,
Chinese women were victims of oppression, or were
complicit in their victimization, or were their own
oppressors. These analyses essentially reduced Chinese
women to a monolithic Other by subjecting their
experiences to Western measures and frameworks.
Rather than advancing a vision of real equality, these
discourses subjugate Chinese women to the hegemony
of Western feminisms.
Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2002) contends that the
conceptualization of non-Western feminisms ought to
be a political project that simultaneously involves ““the
internal critique of hegemonic ‘‘Western’’ feminisms,
and the formulation of autonomous, geographically,
historically, and culturally grounded feminist concerns
and strategies”” (p. 159). In order to achieve this dual
goal, the present article first offers a critique of
Eurocentric feminism. By Eurocentric feminism I mean
different forms of feminism that are rooted in the
experiences of European and European-American
women and are relevant only to the understanding of
such experiences. Second, this article explores the
possibility of a form of Confucian feminism that
resonates with the sociocultural experiences of women
in China and other parts of Asia, such as South Korea,
Japan, and Vietnam. Specifically, the present discussion
will turn to the Confucian principle of ren (humanness),
the conception of rights as fen (share), and duty-based
ethics for cultivating feminist consciousness in China
and beyond.
A Critique of Eurocentric Feminism
Asante (1980) avers that ““humanism itself was
frequently nothing more than a Eurocentric concept of
what was good for the world”” (p. 2). By the same token,
feminism itself is often nothing more than a Eurocentric
concept of what is good for all women. Just like
Eurocentric humanism, the first and foremost
characteristic of Eurocentric feminist discourse is its
assumed universality.
Although Western feminist discourses or practices
are by no means monolithic or homogenous, they are all
rooted in the experiences of European and European-
American women. However, this Eurocentric vision of
womanhood is projected as the universal or natural
definition for all women of different cultures and
classes. From the outset, Eurocentric feminist discourse
appropriated the notion of ““common oppression”” to
build solidarity (hooks, 2000). The employment of a
rhetoric of commonality or sameness by middle-class
European (American) women constructed women as a
homogenous ““powerless”” group. Nonetheless, Western
feminists’’ emphasis on commonality or sameness did
not in fact lead to an inclusion of women of different

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 China Media Research, 2(3), 2006, Yin, Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse
cultures and classes. Working-class women and non-
Western women often experience exclusion and
alienation in feminist gatherings and college classrooms
(e.g., hooks, 2000).
The discursive construction of commonality is
essentially a self-representation of Western feminisms
that signified the needs and desires of middle-class
European (American) women as a unitary standard for
all women in the world. The universalist feminist
discourse imposes the Eurocentric definition of
womanhood on non-Western women. Placed in the
context of Eurocentric feminism, non-Western women
are often viewed as Others, whereas the West remains
the unquestionable standard against which non-Western
cultures are measured and evaluated (Gilmartin,
Hershatter, Rofel & White, 1994; Yin, 2005). The claim
of common oppression in Eurocentric feminist discourse
obscures asymmetrical power relationships among
cultures and disguises racism, colonialism, and
imperialism.
Moharty (2002) asserts that through the discursive
construction of ““the third world women,”” Western
feminists appropriate and colonize the complex
experiences of women in non-Western countries. The
construction of the homogenous ““third world women””
robs non-Western women of their political and
historical agency and thus renders them objects. Just
like white male dominated Western humanism,
Eurocentric feminism defines non-Western cultures as
Others or the peripheral. Only through the designation
of non-Western women as the peripheral can the
Western women represent themselves as the center. The
center can be sustained only when it is placed against
the peripheral that represents the lack of values (Jandt &
Tanno, 2001; Said, 1978; Zhang, 2002).
Eurocentric feminist discourse, despite the rhetoric
of sameness and common oppression, is in fact a form
of hierarchal discourse. According to Asante (1998),
hierarchal discourse has three characteristics: ““control
over the rhetorical territory through definition,
establishment of self-perpetuating initiation or rite de
passage, and the stifling of opposing discourse”” (p. 34).
Here I am not suggesting that Western feminist
discourse has the same authority or status as Eurocentric
humanist discourse. However, in the context of Western
hegemony in the production of knowledge, Western
feminists’’ definition of womanhood is a manifestation
of the political, economic, and cultural colonization of
non-Western cultures (Moharty, 2002). The power of
this hierarchal discourse is to impose one vision of the
world while suppressing others (Asante, 1998). While
protesting against the androcentricism in white-male
dominated humanist discourse, the writings of Western
feminists impose an authoritative construction of norms
which privilege the experiences and practices of
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European (American) women at the expense of those of
non-Western women.
Eurocentric feminist discourse also created a self-
perpetuating ritual that reserves the ““real”” or ““true””
definition of womanhood only for Western feminists
who initiated such a definition. The self-perpetuating
characteristic of hierarchical discourse makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the colonized, non-
Western women, to question Western feminisms’’
fundamental assumptions, such as Eurocentrism and
individualism. Furthermore, Eurocentric feminist
discourse is intolerant toward other feminist discourses.
Non-Western women’’s resistance to the Eurocentric
standard is dismissed as ““not progressive,”” ““backward,””
““ignorant,”” or ““irrelevant.”” hooks (1981, 2000) and non-
Western women report being ostracized and silenced by
Western feminists who suppose that their issues and
problems are not qualified for feminist discussion.
Despite the fact that the critique of the
universalistic feminist discourse can be dated back to
the mid-1980s, Eurocentric feminism remains as the
unmarked standard against which all other forms of
feminism are measured. For example, Fung (2000)
evaluates the success of feminist movements in Asian
countries according to women’’s employment
opportunities and involvement in politics. Wang (1999)
challenges the communist domination of feminism in
China because the liberalist feminism movement was
not allowed to flourish as an independent movement in
China. Even in the writings of post-colonialist feminists
(e.g, Moharty, 2002; Shohat, 2003), which initiated the
challenge to the universality of Eurocentric feminist
discourse and argued for specific forms of resistance in
relation to diverse forms of oppression, the conception
of women’’s rights is still rooted in Eurocentric
individualism.
This issue brings us to the second characteristic of
Eurocentric feminist discourse: the unambiguous
assumption of individualism. Eisenstein (1981)
maintains that feminism in North America is rooted in
““the competitive, atomistic ideology of liberal
individualism.”” It is my contention that not only liberal
feminism but also other forms of Western feminism——
such as radical feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist
feminism, post-modernist and post-colonialist
feminism——conceive women’’s rights and freedom
within the realm of individualism.
The Eurocentric individualist tradition views
women as individuals endowed with inalienable rights
against the competing claims of different social
relations (Woo, 2002). The individualistic idea of rights
is expressed in terms of individual choices of
employment, political participation, identity, and
cultural recognition. Those Western feminists who
advocate social equality call for the establishment of
either a gender-blind society with equal opportunities
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for both men and women as individuals or a mode of
production that does not exploit or discriminate against
individuals in terms of class or gender (Campbell,
2002). Those Western feminists who champion
representational egalitarianism demand a new cultural
formation that provides women——as individuals——with
opportunities to be heard with the same respect given to
their male counterparts.
Even though post-modernist, especially post-
colonialist, feminists are often from non-Western
cultures, many of them reside in the United States and
Europe. Undoubtedly, their emphasis on differences
among women and anti-essentialism marks a major
advance in challenging the Eurocentric universalistic
definition of womanhood and in conceptualizing
identity and difference. Nevertheless, their theorizing is
a continuation of, rather than a rupture with, the
individualist tradition. In the post-colonialist
conception, no collective identity is innocent, and they
all need to be unmasked or deconstructed (Fraser,
1997). They assume that female individuals should not
be reduced to any kind of group or category, and that
they should have sovereignty over their own bodies.
Following this logic, the only innocent political
project is deconstruction. However, deconstruction does
not necessarily lead to the emancipation and
empowerment of women. Deconstruction strips women
of certain sociocultural relations. Indeed, at the end of
deconstructing every collective identity, when all forms
of social relations have been cast away, we will find the
woman as an atomistic individual——a biological object,
prior to entering any social relations. It is precisely
through social relations that persons become
cultural/ideological subjects and gain a sense of agency.
Hence, indiscriminate deconstruction eventually not
only reduces women to biological objects but also
deprives them of a sense of political and historical
agency. Ironically, this is exactly what post-colonialist
feminists are fighting against. Asante (2005) articulates
the destructive nature of deconstructionist research:
The forms of deconstruction often suggested
by many postmodernist [and post-colonialist]
thinkers leave nothing in the process but
unadulterated individualistic narcissism that
undermines the human capacity to feel solidarity
with others. . . . Life as a random collage or free
association of images may invoke an isolationist
individuality, but it is never cohesive enough to
deal with the reality of community and
communities, that is, groups of people who are
bound together by similar historical experiences
and who are developed by common
phenomenological responses. (p. 11)
Regardless of the means, whether through the
reorganization of socioeconomic structure or through
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the transformation of cultural representation,
Eurocentric feminism attempts to restore to female
individuals the rights that have been robbed from
women by unjust sociocultural relations. Here the
notion of the rights of women is no different than John
Locke’’s (1967) Eurocentric philosophy that privileges
white men. Rights are defined as natural, absolute, and
inalienable to the autonomous individual (Rosemont,
1998). From this perspective, rights are expressed as
““negative”” liberties, i.e., free from external oppressive
forces (Twiss, 1998). The negative form of freedom
does not allow a conceptualization of positive
empowerment that serves as an equally valid form of
human flourishing (Yin, in press).
The Eurocentric ontology based on individualism
prevents a non-anthropocentric theorization of rights in
which the individual is not the center of the world, and
in which human beings embrace interdependent
relationships with other beings and nature (Chen &
Starosta, 2003; Ishii, 2001; Miike, 2003a, 2003b). The
individualistic assumption also does not allow a
conception of rights as a collective good that requires
different kinds of rights and restrictions of individual
freedom for greater social goods such as harmony,
peace, and ecological sustainability (Parekh, 2002).
Still another characteristic of Eurocentric feminism
is rights-based ethics. In Western traditions, rights are
absolutely central for many theorists, especially for
Kantian scholars (Rosemont, 1998; Tu, 2001). ““Rights
talk”” is especially ubiquitous in the moral and political
discourse of the United States. Western feminists’’
subversion of androcentrism places an exclusive
emphasis on the rights of women (in a very limited
sense). In this respect, Eurocentric feminist discourse is
again similar to the Western humanist project largely
sponsored by white males.
Right-based ethics or morality obscures inequality,
discrimination, and other wrongs in today’’s world.
Fingarette observes that the doctrine of individual rights
““has profound potentials as socially disruptive and anti-
human forces”” (cited in Rosemont, 1998, p. 56).
Western feminists, while challenging men as
oppressive, often refuse to confront the impact of their
own privileges and prejudices. hooks (2000) believes
that by identifying themselves as ““victims”” of gender
oppression, white feminists ““could abdicate
responsibility for their role in the maintenance and
perpetuation of sexism, racism, and classism, which
they did by insisting that only men were the enemy”” (p.
46).
Here the underlying assumption is that nurturing
and peace-loving women are morally superior to
competitive and militaristic men (Fraser, 1997). Many
Western feminists sincerely believe that because women
are different from men and would exercise power
differently, they would not endorse domination or
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control over others ——the good girls/bad boys
dichotomy (Fraser, 1997). In reality, however, women
in power do not necessarily work toward the end of
gender inequality or other forms of oppression. It is also
clear that given the opportunity, women have the
capability and willingness to kill or torture other human
beings.
Rights-based ethics indeed help sustain the myth of
equal opportunity for everyone. Consequently, it does
not permit social remedies for injustice. Rights
consciousness based on individualism makes the
conflict between liberty and equality irreconcilable (Tu,
1998). Some people in the Untied States reject
affirmative action on the ground that it is preferential
treatment, which violates the basic right of equal
consideration. Moreover, rights-based ethics sanctions
and even encourages self-centeredness or selfishness. In
the individualist tradition, priority is always given to
one’’s own rights when rights are invoked.
This form of ethics also leads individuals to view
others as rival rights claimants. When talking about
affirmative action, white men often feel angry because
their rights are ““trumped”” by the rights of women and
minorities (Rosemont, 1998). As a result, there is no
motivation to address social justice, which is perceived
by many people as advocating the rights of others. This
mentality of rivalry also results in indifference to other
people’’s suffering. Rights-based ethics and the idea of
people as freely choosing, rational, and autonomous
individuals further make it possible for the established
order to attack the oppressed and social welfare
programs. Because in the rights-based tradition, one
must give up one’’s personal rights and privileges for the
sake of one’’s rivals, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to attend to social remedies, through
redistribution, transformation, or reformation.
Even many Western feminists themselves are not
willing to give up their class and racial privileges to
redress the needs and rights of oppressed groups. This is
the very difficulty that Marxist and socialist feminists,
who insist on redistribution as a remedy for
social/gender inequality, are wrestling with with. In
Marxist theory, the proletarians are the grave-diggers of
the bourgeoisie because they had nothing to lose but
would gain everything in the proletarian revolution.
However, in today’’s capitalist society where the myth of
equal opportunity has been taken for granted, false class
consciousness has been internalized by the working
class, since 80% of the population claims to be middle
class. Therefore, no social force is available to carry out
redistribution in order to achieve equality.
The rival mentality associated with rights-based
ethics has been extended to the relations of humans to
nature and to other beings. The sense of entitlement
rooted in individualism and the lack of respect for the
rights of others justify and naturalize the
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overexploitation of nature. The rights-based mentality
does not allow a genuine concern for environmental
issues, which means giving up one’’s rights for nature.
What is missing in rights-based Eurocentric
feminist discourse is the notion of responsibility.
Responsibility is a key component of ethics and the
backbone for community building. However,
responsibility has been ostracized and marginalized in
the Western axiology informed by individualism
(Rosemont, 1998). Without the notion of responsibility,
without communal consciousness, it is impossible to
envisage a form of feminism that regards women’’s
rights not only as individual liberty but also as
empowerment and enablement for women to function as
truly equal participating members in a polity or
community.
As we are faced with the challenge of ecological
destruction, economic disruption, and political and
social instability, the harmful impact of excessive
individualism has become more obvious than ever (Tu,
2001). Consequently, there is an urgent need for
remedies stemming from other cultural traditions
(Ching, 1998). Furthermore, as argued earlier,
Eurocentric feminism based on individualism has been
colonizing efforts to emancipate and empower women
in non-Western cultures.
Asante (2002) notes that challenging gender
oppression in the non-Western world does not mean to
accept Eurocentric feminism as the only right way.
Non-Western women would never truly have equal
rights in any meaningful way if they have to accept a
definition of womanhood that does not reflect or
resonate with their own experiences. Shohat (2003)
argue that post-Third-Worldist feminists should refuse a
Eurocentric universalizing of ““womanhood,”” and even
of ““feminism,”” and claim a ““location”” that confronts
diverse forms of oppression.
Afrocentrists (e.g., Asante, 1980, 1990, 1998, 2003)
and Asiacentrists (e.g., Miike, 2002, 2003a, 2003b,
2004, 2006) demand that the displaced people,
knowledges, and histories of Africa and Asia should be
recentered. Other scholars such as Starosta and Chen
(2003) advocate ““multiple centers”” in intercultural
communication research. It is also crucial for non-
Western feminists to assert a location where non-
Western women’’s experiences are examined and
analyzed from their own perspectives, and where they
are subjects as opposed to objects of someone else’’s
analysis. Toward this end, I will turn to Confucianism
for a new conceptual framework for a form of feminism
that can cultivate a consciousness of communal good
and gender equality.
Envisioning a Confucian Feminism
To many contemporary scholars and observers,
Confucianism and feminism would seem to be an
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incompatible couple. Indeed, in China, the birthplace of
Confucius, from the May Fourth Movement and the
New Culture Movement at the dawn of the 20th century
down through the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s,
Confucianism was condemned as the ideological cause
for China’’s underdevelopment or backwardness. Even
today, many in China as well as in the West still view
Confucianism as a drag on modernization (de Bary,
1998). The Chinese liberal feminist movement was
initiated by New Culturalists (mostly male literati).
Those New Culturalists adopted Western liberalist
humanism and insisted that the feiren (inhumanness) of
Confucianism is the source of women suffering in China
(de Bary, 1998; Wang, 1999). Both the Chinese
communist government and Western feminists often
echo this argument (Woo, 1994).
However, it was in the context of Western
imperialism and Manchu domination that New
Culturalists (male literati) connected women’’s
oppression with China’’s subordination to Western
powers. In addition, they equated Confucianism ethics
to feudalism, which they judged to be the origin of
women's oppression (Wang, 1999). It was the discourse
of the New Culture Movement that depicted
Confucianism as the cause for all problems by which
China was troubled. In this type of discourse, Confucian
ethics was constructed in opposition to liberal
individualism, which was symbolized as the only viable
means to rescue China from Western colonization and
other social ills. Nevertheless, the acceptance of
Western liberalism and the rejection of Confucianism
did not liberate China from Western imperialism. Nor
did it eliminate asymmetrical power relationships
between women and men in China.2
The rejection of Confucianism emerged from the
belief that the Confucian ethics was opposed to
independence, liberty, and the inalienable rights of the
individual (Tu, 2001). Rather than the timeless truth,
this belief was strategically articulated as a response to a
particular historical situation, that of Western
colonization and Manchu domination. Now the global
and local environments have changed drastically from
those of a century ago. It is necessary to reevaluate and
reexamine such a belief within the current political and
historical context. Moreover, as the detrimental
potential of individualism in Eurocentric feminism has
become clearer, it is high time to return to some
Confucian values that prioritize the collectivity for an
alternative form of feminism. Specifically, the principle
of ren (humanness), the notion of rights as fen (share),
and duty-based ethics in Confucian teaching are
invaluable to cultivate a communally based critical self-
awareness and a common language of justice that foster
gender equality.3
The Principle of Ren (Humanness)
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One of the major difficulties that Western feminists
face is the antipathy to women’’s rights and the lack of a
philosophy for addressing the issue of justice. The
Confucian principle of ren (humanness) can help
Chinese and other Asian feminists utter a social
consciousness that is sensitive to women’’s suffering and
thus makes it possible to engage in social transformation
toward gender and other forms of social equality.
Ren (humanness) is regarded as the cardinal
principle in Confucian teaching (Yum, 1987). Ren is the
ideal of a humane person, who values moral
relationships above everything else (Ching, 1998). To
be humane or to be human is to ai ren (love all human
beings) (Chang, 1998; Ching, 1998). The humane
person practices the five virtues (i.e., respect, tolerance,
trustworthiness in words, diligence in action, and
kindness) in her or his relations with all human beings
(Chang, 1998). Ren is thus the goal of human nature, the
ideal for the kind of people that we should strive to
become (Yum, 1987).
Ren is not an innate trait. Rather, it is the result of
self-development or self-cultivation (Chang, 1998). In
the Confucian tradition, a person or the self is regarded
as the center of relationships as opposed to the Western
notion of the independent, freely choosing, atomistic
individual (Tu, 1985, 1998, 2001). The Confucian
person from birth stands in a network of relations that is
guided by the principle of ren (Kwok, 1998). Tu (1985)
notes that learning to be a humane person (or to be
human) is ““to learn to be sensitive to an ever-expanding
network of relationships”” (p. 175).
The primary concern of self-cultivation is de
(virtue), the ability to achieve harmony both within the
person and with other people (Cheng, 1998). Thus, self-
cultivation is a process of transforming the private ego
to the all-encompassing self which has the ability to feel
the suffering of others——or, put in the often seen
negative form, the inability to endure others’’ suffering
(Tu, 1985). Self-realization is essentially to extend the
bonding with our parents and immediate family to larger
networks of human relationships——from respecting our
parents to respecting all elderly, from caring for our
own children to caring for all children in the world.
Tu (1985) maintains that egoism, nepotism,
parochialism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinistic
nationalism are forms of human insensitivity. Self-
cultivation as an ever-expanding network of
relationships transcends such an insensitivity to embrace
all human beings. Cheng (1998) calls this
transformation ““cohumanity”” –– ““a holistic human
existence extending in time and space”” (p. 143). The
Confucian teaching of tianrenheyi (the unity of Heaven
and humanity) further transcends anthropocentricsm in
Eurocentric humanist and feminist discourse to establish
a community encompassing all beings in the universe
(Tu, 1998).
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The process of self-cultivation is a social act
because it can take place only in interactions with other
human beings (Chang, 1998). Self-cultivation requires a
social order that enables the development of a person,
while it simultaneously contributes to develop and
maintain that order (Cheng, 1987, 1998). Moreover, the
goal of self-cultivation is not merely personal growth or
moral perfection. It is not just for a person’’s self-
interest. Rather, self-cultivation is a way for a person to
make herself or himself available to the society——to
contribute to the social order that makes moral
transformation possible (Cheng, 1998).
The Confucian teaching of ren also has
implications for political governing. In that case, ren is
defined as the benevolent or humane government that
requires the leader not only to provide for and protect
the welfare of people so that the people could be taught
how to develop ren, but also to set the example of
personal integrity and altruistic devotion to the people
(Cheng, 1998; Ching, 1998). The leader’’s rule is thus
legitimized by her or his de (virtue)——a true respect for
human dignity, a critical awareness of social
relationships, and the ability to make moral
transformation of the society and individuals possible
(Ching, 1998).
Through the Confucian principle of ren, Chinese
and other Asian feminists can articulate and cultivate a
consciousness founded on genuine concern and care for
women (indeed for all human beings) at personal and
societal levels. The interhuman regard associated with
ren not only invokes empathy and compassion for the
suffering of women (or the inability to endure their
suffering), but also propels a social order to eliminate
such an agony. Therefore, in the context of ren, we can
envision a social transformation that aims at gender
equality and other forms of social justice.
Self-cultivation inspired by ren is not only a means
for Chinese and other Asian women to gain a sense of
agency but also contributes to the development of
agency of other female members of the society.
Furthermore, the principle of ren compels us to
conceptualize a form of political order in which the
government truly represents the interests of women of
different sociocultural groups. In this conception, the
government is obligated to create a goal that requires joint efforts of both groups.
cultural/social/political environment that recognizes and
empowers women as equal contributing members of the
community.
Rights as Fen (Share) and Duty-based Ethics
Another problem that hinders feminist movements
in the West is the definition of rights as a natural
endowment of the individual. Grounded in
individualism, the natural-rights assumption not only
confines the notion of rights to a narrow definition, but
also makes it impossible to address women’’s rights
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without resistance from other groups or individuals who
perceive women as rival claimants for rights. Moreover,
living in a collectivistic society that emphasizes social
relationships, Chinese women tend to understand rights
in relation to the family or community (Wang, 2002;
Yin, 2006, in press; Yin & Hall 2002). Thus, rather than
uncritically adopting the Eurocentric notion of
individualistic rights, Chinese feminists should
challenge gender oppression from the viewpoint of
Chinese women. The Confucian conception of rights as
fen (share) can provide an alternative framework for
Chinese, and possibly other Asian, feminists to
conceptualize women’’s rights as communal and societal
efforts.
Contrary to the liberal definition of natural rights
that prioritizes those who claim rights, Confucianism
gives weight to those who make the claimed rights
possible (Chang, 1998). For example, in the ruler-
subject relationship, Confucian teaching emphasizes
what the ruler can do to secure the well being of the
people as opposed to what the people could claim for
their rights. Hence, rights in the Confucian tradition are
expressed as fen (share or entitlement). Fen differs from
the Western notion of rights that views rights as a
product of human interaction or natural endowments.
Fen is strictly a social product. It is a share of social
good that is created by joint efforts of many members in
a society (Chang, 1998). Fen, unlike the Western
version of rights, is not something a person is born with
or claims. It is what the society, or specifically those
who are concerned, sees as fit for a person to enjoy.
Understanding women’’s rights as fen delegates the
responsibilities for gender equality to every member of
the society. In consequence, not only women but also
men are obligated to work toward the interests of female
members of the community. When women’’s rights are
conceived as fen, a share of common good created for
women upon social agreement, it will not leave men or
other social groups feeling that their rights are taken
away by women. Indeed, if the competition mentality
derived from rights-based consciousness segments
different social groups as rival claimants for rights, the
notion of fen unites women and men through defining
gender equality as a moral imperative and a common
To be sure, fen, as assigned or allowed by the
society, is valid or meaningful only in a society that is
guided by ethics based on duty or responsibility.
Without duty-based ethics, the notion of fen can be
easily used by the dominant group to deprive the rights
of the dominated. In Confucian teaching, people are
viewed as persons located within social networks and as
having specific duties or moral obligations (Yum,
1987). In duty-based ethics, the realization of the self, or
the worth of the person, is essentially tied to her or his
ability to fulfill her/his social responsibilities (Cohen,
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 China Media Research, 2(3), 2006, Yin, Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse
1996, cited in Tu, 1998, p. 304). Although relationships
in Confucianism are often hierarchical, obligations are
mutual or reciprocal and required for all parties
concerned (Ching, 1998; Yum, 1987). Indeed, rights
associated with a position are often defined as duties.
Take the ruler-subject relationship as an example. It
is commonly understood that Confucianism requires the
people to meet the obligations of the ruler. However,
Confucius also insisted that the entitlement of the ruler
is inseparably linked to her or his responsibilities for the
people. A ruler is endowed by Heaven precisely because
she or he is given more responsibilities than the
governed. Thus, for the ruler, her or his rights as well as
identities are expressed in terms of duty or
responsibility. As Cheng (1998) elegantly puts it: ““For
the ruler to define his [or her] identity in terms of ruling
means his [or her] duties are also his [or her] rights; on
the other hand, for the ruler to define his [or her]
identity as serving the interests of the people means his
[or her] rights are also his [or her] duties”” (p. 145).
Moreover, in the Confucian tradition, all virtues are
expressed in the form of duty or moral obligations
(Cheng, 1998). The principle of ren is also expressed as
a person’’s duty to define her or his relationships with
other human beings. This is a duty that benefits the
society as a whole (Cheng, 1998). Duty-based ethics is
crucial for formulating a Chinese feminism based on fen
because it promotes the kind of consciousness and
behaviors that benefit other members of the community.
Duty-based ethics emphasizes the reciprocity
between the self and the community. On the one hand, a
person’’s self-cultivation or acquisition of virtues is
encouraged and nurtured by the community. On the
other hand, self-cultivation is to make the self available
to contribute to the social order that enables self-
cultivation. Therefore, a person’’s moral development is
both a duty of the self to the community and a duty of
the community to the self. As Cheng (1998) states, ““the
duty consciousness comes from a vision of the perfect
union or unity of self and community in which both
their needs are realized”” (p. 148).
Furthermore, in duty-based ethics, public or
common good is not only a moral ideal but also actually
expected. Individual members’’ duties to the community
promise a sense of public good. On the other hand,
every member of the community is also an indirect
beneficiary of other members’’ duties (Cheng, 1998).
Therefore, public good can be defined not only as moral
obligations but also as something intertwined with the
personal interests of individual members.
Finally, duty consciousness helps overthrow
powers that may distort or dominate public interests
(Cheng, 1998). In Confucianism, the ruler is obligated
to provide for the people’’s welfare. If the ruler’’s private
interests dominate public interests, she or he should be
removed (Ching, 1998). Although Confucian teaching
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does not encourage violent revolt, which should be
reserved as the last resort for exasperated people, it does
recognize that other civil processes should be taken to
depose a tyrannical ruler (de Bary, 1998).
The relationship between individual members and
the community defined by duty-based ethics thus makes
it possible to cultivate a feminist mentality. Self-
cultivation, as a social act and a mutual obligation of
individual members and the community, can be used by
Chinese and other Asian feminists to develop a sense of
feminist consciousness and agency in the members
(both male and female) of the community. Duty-based
ethics fosters a unity of individual members and the
community, which makes the conception of public
(common) good not only possible but also expected. As
a result, a public consciousness for women’’s rights can
be elaborated as both individuals’’ duty to the
community and the community’’s duty to women. In
addition, a Confucian feminism does not preclude
women, or any other oppressed group, from demanding
and fighting for their own rights if the community or
society fails to fulfill the obligation to provide the well-
deserved rights.
Concluding Remarks
As feminist movements are attracting increasing
attention around the world, it is vital for non-Western
women to be cautious of the pitfall of replacing one
form of oppression with another. Challenging gender
oppression in non-Western cultures should not lead to
an uncritical acceptance of Eurocentric feminism, which
is anchored in the experiences of European and
European-American women. Non-Western women
should develop different forms of feminisms that reflect
and resonate with the experiences of non-Western
women as subjects. Non-Western women can never be
truly free if they take on the experiences of someone
else.
Furthermore, we also need to keep in mind that
Western feminisms themselves are struggles in process.
Many fundamental problems are still yet to be addressed
and resolved in Western cultures. It is very dangerous
for non-Western women to accept Western feminisms
as the truth or panacea for gender problems everywhere
in the world. Indeed, the time is long overdue for non-
Western women to re-claim their own locations and to
become masters of their own destiny.
To explore alternative forms of feminism does not
mean to ignore the contribution and spirit of Western
feminisms. A Confucian feminism does not preclude the
use of theories and strategies developed by Western
feminists for Chinese and other Asian women to claim
the rights that they duly deserve. The point here is that
Eurocentric feminism should not be the only right way
for women’’s emancipation and empowerment
regardless of the locations and contexts.
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 China Media Research, 2(3), 2006, Yin, Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse
Notes:
1. There are different forms of feminisms
developed in Europe and the United States,
including liberal feminism, radical feminism,
socialist feminism, Marxist feminism,
postmodernist feminism, and post-colonialist
feminism.
2. The Chinese feminist movement in the context
of the New Culturalist Movement aimed to
reform women so that they could be the ““same””
as men (Wang, 1999). Barlow (1994b) argues
that the male-led feminist movement in this
period reflects a masculinist frame of anti-
Confucian discourse. The liberalist feminism
movement was soon subordinated by class
struggles as leftist intellectuals accepted Marxist
theories. Once the Communist Party established
power in China, it denounced the liberal feminist
movement as ““bourgeois feminism,”” and
employed the new slogan of ““women’’s
emancipation movement.”” This is yet another
masculinist form of gender equality, which
views women as genderless workers, the ““iron
woman.”” As a rejection of state ideological
hegemony, Chinese women have returned to a
biological definition that stresses gender
differences since the 1980s (Barlow, 1994a).
3. My argument is here not that Confucianism in
itself and its later interpretations are not
patriarchal. The feminist critique of the
oppressiveness of man-made discourse is
definitely applicable to Confucian discourse.
Indeed, Cho (1998) notes that Confucian texts
are simultaneously expressions of patriarchal
principles based on agnation and endorsements
of complementary relationships between the two
sexes. Therefore, it is unfair to completely
abandon Confucianism simply because it has an
oppressive aspect. It is not uncommon for many
in the West to make such a simple judgment and
discard a non-Western tradition so quickly. To
my knowledge, however, no feminist argues that
Aristotle should be tossed into the trash because
his notion of citizen excludes women (as well as
slaves).
Correspondence to:
Dr. Jing Yin
Department of Communication Studies
Clemson University
408 Strode Tower
Clemson, SC 29634, USA
Phone: (864) 656-4516
Email: jyin@clemson.edu
http://www.chinamediaresearch.net
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