LABOR CASES FOR FINALS

CASE 1: Sarmiento vs. Tuico, G.R. No. 75271-73, June 27,1988

FACTS:

Asian Transmission Corporation (ACT) terminated the services of

Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union
(BATU) for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in company premises. BATU
filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed an unfair labor
practice. When the conciliatory conference failed to settle the dispute, ATC
filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to
assume jurisdiction over the matter or to certify the same to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration. The MOLE did the latter on the ground that the
impending strike impending strike would prejudice national interest. It also
enjoined the management from locking out the employees and the union
from declaring a strike. MOLE then directly assumed jurisdiction and
enjoined the company to accept all returning workers (return-to-work
order). This decision was set aside but later re-adopted in a resolution,
ordering the company to reinstate the employees on payroll immediately.
ATC challenged the resolution through certiorari.

Meanwhile, three criminal complaints were filed against petitioning

workers by an officer of ATC and by the Philippine Constabulary. They were
charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading ATCs gates and
preventing entry of workers through harassment and force (violation of
the Labor Code, coercion). Judge Tuico issued a warrant of arrest and
committed them to jail. The petitioners moved for the lifting of the warrant
and referral of the charges to the NLRC. Later they moved for the
dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the
NLRC pending determination of the legality of the strike
2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal
prosecution of certain persons involved in the strike may be validly
restrained

RULING
1. YES. Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides that when a labor dispute is
likely to cause strikes adversely affecting national interest, the Minister of
Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. This shall
have the effect of enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout,
and all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employer shall readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. ACT is an export-
oriented enterprise that generates millions of dollars per year and
employs 350 workers. Disruption in operations will cause delay in exports,
possible cancellation of contracts with foreign importers, and will hamper
the governments economic recovery program and will affect the
livelihood of 350 families. Furthermore, the return-to-work order confers
an obligation, not a mere waivable right.

When the remaining workers refused to comply with the order and
defiantly picketed to prevent resumption of operations, they forfeited their
right to be readmitted. They abandoned their positions and could be
validly replaced. The return-to-work order is enforced pending the
determination of the legality/illegality of the strike to maintain the status
quo. Otherwise, strikers can claim their strike is legal and cause a
standstill in the company operations while retaining their positions and
claiming money for work not done. The order only benefits those who
actually return to work (payment for work done).

2. YES. As a general rule, the prosecution of criminal offenses is not

subject to injunction. Here, the injunction is justified on the ground of
prematurity. The acts complained of are connected with the compulsory
arbitration proceeding. The first two complaints are captioned with
violations of the Labor Code and the third relates to the alleged acts of
coercion committed in blocking access to ATC premises. The cases should
be suspended until the completion of the NLRC proceedings. Circular No.
15 (series of 1982) and Circular No. 9 (1986) in relation to BP 227 indicate
that fiscals and government prosecutors are required to secure clearance
from the MOLE or the Office of the President before taking cognizance of
complaints for preliminary investigation related to a labor dispute,
including coercion, physical injuries, assault, etc. Here, no such clearance
was obtained before the criminal cases were filed.

Case 2: Cercado vs. UNIPROM Inc., G.R. No. 188154, Oct. 13,2010
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Cercado (Cercado) worked as ticket seller for
UNIPROM, Incn at Fiesta Carnival, then was promoted as a cashier then a
clerk typist. UNIPROM instituted an Employees Non-Contributory
Retirement Plan which provides that any participant with twenty (20)
years of service, regardless of age, may be retired at his option or at the
option of the company. However, it amended the said plan and reserved
the option to the employees qualified.
UNIPROM implemented a company-wide early retirement program which
included petitioner, who, at that time, was 47 years old, with 22 years of
continuous service to the company. She was offered an early retirement
but she rejected the same.
UNIPROM nonetheless pursued its decision and Cercado was no longer
given any work assignment.
Cercado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter
(LA), alleging that UNIPROM did not have a bona fide retirement plan, and
that even if there was, she did not consent thereto.
For its part, respondent UNIPROM averred that Cercado was automatically
covered by the retirement plan when she agreed to the companys rules
and regulations, and that her retirement from service was a valid exercise
of a management prerogative.
LA ruled in favor of Cercado, and this was affirmed by the NLRC. But the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision.

Cerdao moved for a reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the instant
recourse.

Issues:
1) whether UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan?
2) whether petitioner was validly retired pursuant thereto?

The petition is meritorious.

1. No.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter,
after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with
the former.

Article 287 of the Labor Code, pegs the age for compulsory retirement at
65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60
years. An employer is, however, free to impose a retirement age earlier
than the foregoing mandates, as a management prerogative.

It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option to

retire its employees below the ages provided by law must be assented to
and accepted by the latter, otherwise, its adhesive imposition will amount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law. In various
jurisprudence cited, the retirement plans in issue were the result of
negotiations and eventual agreement between the employer and the
employees. The plan was either embodied in a CBA, or established after
consultations and negotiations with the employees bargaining
representative. The consent of the employees to be retired even before
the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus clear and unequivocal.
Unfortunately, no similar situation obtains in the present case. In fact, not
even an iota of voluntary acquiescence to UNIPROMs early retirement age
option is attributable to petitioner. The assailed retirement plan of
UNIPROM is not embodied in a CBA or in any employment contract or
agreement assented to by petitioner and her co-employees. On the
contrary, UNIPROMs Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan was
unilaterally and compulsorily imposed on them.

2. No. Implied knowledge, regardless of duration, cannot equate to the

voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an early retirement age
option to an employer. The law demands more than a passive
acquiescence on the part of employees, considering that an employers
early retirement age option involves a concession of the formers
constitutional right to security of tenure.

We reiterate the well-established meaning of retirement in this

jurisdiction: Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a
voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby
the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her
employment with the former.

Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be

explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. Only the implementation and
execution of the option may be unilateral, but not the adoption and
institution of the retirement plan containing such option. For the option to
be valid, the retirement plan containing it must be voluntarily assented to
by the employees or at least by a majority of them through a bargaining
representative.

We disagree with the CAs conclusion that the retirement plan is part of
petitioners employment contract with respondent. It must be underscored
that petitioner was hired in 1978 or 2 years before the institution of
UNIPROMs retirement plan in 1980. Logically, her employment contract
did not include the retirement plan, much less the early retirement age
option contained therein.

We also cannot subscribe to respondents submission that petitioners

consent to the retirement plan may be inferred from her signature in the
personnel action forms. It should be noted that the personnel action forms
relate to the increase in petitioners salary at various periodic intervals.
Moreover, voluntary and equivocal acceptance by an employee of an early
retirement age option in a retirement plan necessarily connotes that her
consent specifically refers to the plan or that she has at least read the
same when she affixed her conformity thereto.
 Hence having terminated petitioner merely on the basis of a provision in
the retirement plan which was not freely assented to by her, UNIPROM is
guilty of illegal dismissal.

CASE 3: Milan vs. NLRC and Solid Mills Inc., G.R. No. 202961, Feb.
4,2015
Doctrine: An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits
pending the employees return of its properties.

Facts:

Petitioners are employees of Solid Mills and they are represented by their
collective bargaining agent, NAFLU. Petitioners and their families were
allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by Solid Mills, this was out of
liberality and for the convenience of employees and it was under the
condition that the employees would vacate the property anytime the
company deems it fit.

In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10,

2003, Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses.
This was recognized by NAFLU and in their memorandum of agreement, they
agreed for a grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick
leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the
employees.

After SMI sent the petitioners their individual notices to vacate the SMI
Village. The employees were also required to sign a memorandum of
agreement with release and quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay would be released. Petitioners
refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and
separation pay.

Petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment
of separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay.

Petitioners contention: The accrued benefits and separation pay should not
be withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice;
13th month pay is based on PD 851.Their possession of Solid Mills
property is not an accountability that is subject to clearance
procedures. They had already turned over to Solid Mills their uniforms and
equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations.

Ruling of the LA: In favour of petitioners. SMI illegally withheld the benefits
and separation pay since these were vested to them by law and contract.
Petitioners possession should not be construed as petitioners
accountabilities that must be cleared first before the release of benefits.
Their possession is not by virtue of any employer-employee relationship. It
is a civil issue, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Solid Mills appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

Ruling of the NLRC: Reversed the decision of the LA. Petitioners failure to
vacate SMIs property, SMI was justified in withholding their benefits and
separation pay. SMI granted the petitioners the privilege to occupy its
property on account of petitioners employment thus it also has the
prerogative to terminate such privilege. The termination of Solid Mills and
petitioners employer-employee relationship made it incumbent upon
petitioners to turn over the property to Solid Mills.

NLRC denied the MR filed by petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for

certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC
decision. Petitioners raised the following errors on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

Issues:

1. WON the NLRC has the jurisdiction to preliminarily determine the issue
relating to property rights arising from employee employer
relamtionship.
2. WON the payment of benefits and other monetary claims be held in
abeyance pending the compliance of accountabilities, specifically the
failure to turn over the occupancy of the SMI Village by the employees.

Ruling:

1. YES. The NLRC may determine preliminarily the rights over a property
if it is necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims
arising from an employee employer relationship. Stated in Art. 217,
the Labor Arbiter, in his or her original jurisdiction, and the National
Labor Relations Commission, in its appellate jurisdiction, may
determine issues involving claims arising from employer-employee
relations.

As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected

to the labor issue raised and must arise from an employer-employee
relationship for the labor tribunals to have jurisdiction.

The return of its properties in petitioners possession by virtue of their status

as employees is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether
benefits can be released immediately. The issue raised by the employer is,
therefore, connected to petitioners claim for benefits and is sufficiently
intertwined with the parties employer-employee relationship. Thus, it is
properly within the labor tribunals jurisdiction.

2. YES. Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the

employee is a standard procedure among employers, whether public or
private. Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the
properties, real or personal, belonging to the employer but are in the
possession of the separated employee, are returned to the employer
before the employees departure.
GR: Employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. (Art.
116 prohibition on withholding of wages and kickbacks; Art. 100
prohibition on the diminuition of benefits; Art. 113 prohibition on wage
deduction, with the exception #3 that in cases where the employer is
authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.)

Respondent Solid Mills and NAFLU, the union representing

petitioners, agreed that the release of petitioners benefits shall be
less accountabilities.

Accountability, in its ordinary sense, means obligation or debt. The

ordinary meaning of the term accountability does not limit the definition of
accountability to those incurred in the worksite. As long as the debt or
obligation was incurred by virtue of the employer-employee relationship,
generally, it shall be included in the employees accountabilities that are
subject to clearance procedures. Petitioners possession of the SMI Village
properties should, therefore, be included in the term accountability. Solid
Mills allowed the use of its property for the benefit of petitioners as its
employees. Petitioners were merely allowed to possess and use it out of
respondent Solid Mills liberality. The employer may, therefore, demand the
property at will.
The return of the propertys possession became an obligation or liability on
the part of the employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased.
Thus, respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold petitioners wages and
benefits because of this existing debt or liability.

Withholding of payment by the employer does not mean that the employer
may renege on its obligation to pay employees their wages, termination
payments, and due benefits. The employees benefits are also not being
reduced. It is only subjected to the condition that the employees return
properties properly belonging to the employer. This is only consistent with
the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at
the expense of another.

Case 4: MERALCO vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, Oct. 5,2010

Facts:
Respondent is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO).
An anonymous letter was posted at the door of MERALCO imputing
respondents disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave. Copies of
the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
In light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against respondent from unknown individuals and which could
possibly compromise safety and security, she was ordered transferred to
another MERALCO Sector.
Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive"
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She further
requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners for the latters
unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security
amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security,
correctible by habeas data.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether or not the issuance of the writ is within the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Held:
(1) No. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
It is evident that respondent's reservations on the real reasons for her
transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one's
employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Respondent suspects that her transfer to another place of work
betrays the real intent of management and could be a punitive move. Her
posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. Jurisdiction over
such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.
(2) No. The issuance of the writ is not within the parameters expressly set
forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty, and security against abuse in
this age of information technology.
However, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners'
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondent's safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative.

Case 5: Paguio vs. PLDT Comp. Inc., G.R. No. 154072, Dec. 3,2002
Facts:
Paguio was appointed Head of PLDTs Garnet Exchange where he reports
to respondent, Santos. At about this time, PLDT implemented a performance
assessment program which Paguio criticized for being unfair. Despite Paguios
complaints, the assessment program continued, so he elevated the matter to
Ferido, the First Vice President. Santos then furnished petitioner with a blank
assessment sheet with instruction to rate petitioners own performance.
Petitioner gave himself an outstanding rating based on Garnets performance,
but Santos reduced it.
Santos issued a memorandum reassigning petitioner. Protesting the said
transfer, petitioner asked Ferido for a formal hearing on the charges against
him and for the deferment of his re-assignment. As no immediate action was
taken by respondent Ferido, petitioner elevated the matter to Perez, Senior
Executive VP and COO of PLDT.
Ferido affirmed the transfer of Paguio stating that the reassignment is
based on Santos well-founded conclusion that petitioner is not a team player
and cannot accept decisions of management. Perez affirmed the action taken
by Ferido and explained to petitioner that his transfer was not in the nature of
a disciplinary action that required investigation, confrontation, and evaluation
and that the same was not done in bad faith.
Paguio filed a complaint for illegal demotion and damages against
respondents. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but upon appeal to
NLRC, LAs decision was reversed and petitioner was awarded P384,000.00
representing salary increase on the ground that on account of petitioners
transfer, he was assigned a functionless position which deprived him of the
opportunity to get promoted or to be entitled to wage increase.
PLDT filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals and CA upheld the NLRC
decision with modification, deleting the salary increase award.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to salary increase during his
demotion.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner bases his right on the fact that, throughout his employment
until his illegal transfer, he had been consistently given by the company
annual salary increases on account of his above outstanding performance.
This particular award which petitioner is seeking is not based on any wage
order or decree but on an employees performance during a certain period.
Petitioner likens his claim to that for backwages in illegal dismissal cases.
Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost
due to their illegal dismissal from work. They are a reparation for the illegal
dismissal of an employee based on earnings which the employee would have
obtained, either by virtue of a lawful decree or order or by rightful
expectation. The outstanding feature of backwages is, thus, the degree of
assuredness to an employee that he would have had them as earnings had
he not been illegally terminated from his employment.
Petitioners claim, however, is based simply on expectancy or his
assumption that. His claim is tantamount to saying that he had a vested right
to remain as Head of the Garnet Exchange and given salary increases simply
because he had performed well in such position, and thus he should not be
moved to any other position where management would require his services.

Case 6: Michael Press vs. Galit, G.R. No. 153510, Feb. 13,2008
FACTS:

Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset

machine operator, whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Mondays to Saturdays, and he was paid PhP230 a day. During his
employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117
minutes, and was absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days.

On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime

service in order to comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so.
The following day, respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobia told
him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he
returned, a copy of an Office Memorandum was served on him, as follows:
To : Mr. Nicasio Galit
From : ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA
Re : WARNING FOR DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF HEARING

This warning for dismissal is being issued for the following offenses:

(1) habitual and excessive tardiness

(2) committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing superiors

(3) failure to work overtime after having been instructed to do so

(4) Insubordination - willfully disobeying, defying or disregarding company

authority

The offenses youve committed are just causes for termination of

employment as provided by the Labor Code. You were given verbal warnings
before, but there had been no improvement on your conduct.

Further investigation of this matter is required, therefore, you are summoned

to a hearing at 4:00 p.m. today. The hearing will determine your employment
status with this company.

(SGD) ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA

Manager

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment.

The employer, through petitioner Escobia, gave him his two-day salary and a
termination letter averring that Galit was dismissed due to the following
offenses: (1) habitual and excessive tardiness; (2) commission of
discourteous acts and disrespectful conduct when addressing superiors; (3)
failure to render overtime work despite instruction to do so; and (4)
insubordination, that is, willful disobedience of, defiance to, or disregard of
company authority.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money
claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and

money claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV. Then, the labor arbiter rendered a decision
finding that complainant was illegally dismissed.

The petitioners elevated the case to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRC, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. On November 14, 2001, the CA rendered its judgment
affirming with modification the NLRCs Decision.

Then, petitioners asked for reconsideration but was denied.

Persistent, petitioners instituted the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondents tardiness can be considered condoned by

petitioners.

2. Whether or not the charge of insubordination is meritorious.

3. Whether or not the due process was observed.

HELD:

1. No, the respondents tardiness cannot be considered condoned by

petitioners.

Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative,

diligence, and discipline to come to work on time everyday exhibit the
employees deportment towards work. Habitual and excessive tardiness is
inimical to the general productivity and business of the employer. This is
especially true when the tardiness and/or absenteeism occurred frequently
and repeatedly within an extensive period of time.

The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not
been immediately subjected to sanctions cannot be interpreted as
condonation of the offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company
rules. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known legal right or privilege. It has been ruled that "a waiver to be valid
and effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him." Hence, the management prerogative to discipline
employees and impose punishment is a legal right which cannot, as a general
rule, be impliedly waived.

Also, it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial

evidence to demonstrate condonation or waiver on the part of management
to forego the exercise of its right to impose sanctions for breach of company
rules.

In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show
waiver or condonation on the part of petitioners.

Also, the petitioners in the case at bar did not impose any punishment
for the numerous absences and tardiness of respondent. Thus, said
infractions can be used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.

Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence is paid based

on such arrangement. For said daily paid workers, the principle of "a days
pay for a days work" is squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in
any wise that such nonpayment of the daily wage on the days he was absent
constitutes a penalty.

2. Yes, the charge of insubordination is meritorious.

For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two

elements must concur: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioners order for

respondent to render overtime service to meet a production deadline
complies with the second requisite. Art. 89 of the Labor Code empowers the
employer to legally compel his employees to perform overtime work against
their will to prevent serious loss or damage.

In the present case, petitioners business is a printing press whose

production schedule is sometimes flexible and varying. It is only reasonable
that workers are sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet
production deadlines.

The fact that respondent refused to provide overtime work despite his
knowledge that there is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that
without him, the offset machine operator, no further printing can be had,
shows his wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness.
 Respondents excuse that he was not feeling well that day is
unbelievable and obviously an afterthought. He failed to present any
evidence other than his own assertion that he was sick. Also, if it was true
that he was then not feeling well, he would have taken the day off, or had
gone home earlier, on the contrary, he stayed and continued to work all day,
and even tried to go to work the next day, thus belying his excuse, which is,
at most, a self-serving statement.

After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent

unjustifiably refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so.
The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he
was a difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final
straw that broke the camels back, and, with his gross and habitual tardiness
and absences, would merit dismissal from service.

3. No, the due process was not observed.

The Court held in Agabon v. NLRC:

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article

282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a
hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee
before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds
for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to
dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the
Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to
the effectivity of his separation.

Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two
(2) notices before his employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to
apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate
to the employees that their employment is being terminated. Not to be taken
lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity for the employee to defend
himself personally or by counsel of his choice.

In King of Kings Transport v. Mamac, the court had the occasion to

further elucidate on the procedure relating to the twin notice and hearing
requirement, thus:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should

contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them,
and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit
their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance
that management must accord to the employees to enable them to
prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a
period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to
 give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against
them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and
decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover,
in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their
explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will
not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be
given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance
of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity
to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the

employers shall serve the employees a written notice of
termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge
against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have
been established to justify the severance of their employment.

In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious and imminent

threat to the life or property of the employers or of other employees like theft
or physical injuries, and there is a need for preventive suspension, the
employers can immediately suspend the erring employees for a period of not
more than 30 days. Notwithstanding the suspension, the employers are
tasked to comply with the twin notice requirement under the law. The
preventive suspension cannot replace the required notices. Thus, there is still
a need to comply with the twin notice requirement and the requisite hearing
or conference to ensure that the employees are afforded due process even
though they may have been caught in flagrante or when the evidence of the
commission of the offense is strong.

On the surface, it would seem that petitioners observed due process

(twin notice and hearing requirement): On February 23, 1999 petitioner
notified respondent of the hearing to be conducted later that day. On the
same day before the hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an office
memorandum which contained a list of his offenses, and a notice of a
scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the same day. The next day, February
24, 1999, he was notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael
Press had been terminated.
 A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners leads
the court to conclude that they only paid lip service to the due process
requirements.

The undue haste in effecting respondents termination shows that the

termination process was a mere simulationthe required notices were given,
a hearing was even scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given
a real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had
already decided to dismiss respondent from service, even before the first
notice had been given.

Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that
there was merely a general description of the claimed offenses of respondent.
The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999the
day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any
opportunity at all to consult a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare
for his defense.

Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it can be inferred

that respondent, without any lawyer or friend to counsel him, was not given
any chance at all to adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked if
he did not agree to render overtime work on February 22, 1999 and if he was
late for work for 197 days. He was never given any real opportunity to justify
his inability to perform work on those days. This is the only explanation why
petitioners assert that respondent admitted all the charges.

In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified

respondents dismissal by citing his admission of the offenses charged. It did
not specify the details surrounding the offenses and the specific company
rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was grounded.

CASE 7: ADELINO FELIX v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

and REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION (November 17, 2004)

Facts:
Petitioner Adelino Felix was hired by the Republic Asahi Glass
Corporation as a Cadet Engineer. Sometime in 1992, Felix was offered a
chance to train and qualify for the position of Assistant Manager but he
declined and waived the opportunity to the one who was next-in-line. By
Felix's claim, he was asked by certain officers of the company to resign and
accept a separation package, failing which he would be terminated for loss of
confidence.
Felix, however, refused to resign and accept separation benefits,
drawing the officers of the company to, by his claim, start harassing him.
Thus, he was not given work and another employee, Mr. Elmer Tacata, was
assigned to take over his post and function. Unable to withstand the manner
by which he was being treated by the company, Felix, through his lawyer,
warned the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation about the illegality of its
actions. Felix attributed the company's harassment against him to his being a
member of the supervisory union then being formed. The Republic Asahi
Glass Corporation subsequently terminated Felixx services for loss of trust
and confidence.
Felix thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Felix's complaint. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed Felix's quoting
extensively from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dismissed petitioners
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
decision, but it was denied in a resolution. The Court of Appeals likewise
dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the companys loss of trust and confidence is founded
on facts established by substantial and competent evidence
Held:
No. The petition is impressed with merit.
The rule is that high respect is accorded to the findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies, more so in the case at bar where both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC share the same findings. The rule is not however, without
exceptions one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on
which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence.
The same is true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred
or deducted from bare facts adduced in evidence.
The employers evidence, although not required to be of such degree
as that required in criminal cases i.e. proof beyond reasonable doubt, must
be substantial it must clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which
loss of confidence in the employee may be made to rest. In the case at bar,
the company failed to discharge this burden.
Felix was hastily dismissed by ASAHI as the former was not given
adequate time to prepare for his defense but was peremptorily dismissed
even without any formal investigation or hearing. It is settled that where the
employee denies the charges against him, a hearing is necessary to thresh
out any doubt. The failure of the company to give petitioner, who denied the
charges against him, the benefit of a hearing and an investigation before his
termination constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due
process.
It bears emphasis that the matter of determining whether the cause for
dismissal is justified on the ground of loss of confidence cannot be left
entirely to the employer. Impartial tribunals do not only rely on the statement
made by the employer that there is loss of confidence unless duly proved or
sufficiently substantiated. At all events, even if all the allegations are true,
they are not of such nature to merit the penalty of dismissal given the 14
years in service of Felix. Dismissal is unduly harsh and grossly
disproportionate to the charges. This rule on proportionality that the penalty
imposed should commensurate to the gravity of the offense has been
observed in a number of cases.
There being no basis in law or in fact justifying Felixs dismissal on the
basis of loss of trust and confidence, his dismissal was illegal.
 CASE 8: Merin vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 171790, Oct. 17,2008
Petitioner was contracted by Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation
(GSM) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, IMC Shipping, Co., Pte. Ltd., as
an ordinary seaman on board the vessel MT Selandang Permata for 10
months. Barely 3 months after he boarded the vessel, petitioner was
repatriated by the master of the vessel. Petitioner allegedly refused to
receive his termination letter. After his arrival in Manila, he inquired from GSM
the reason for his dismissal, but allegedly none was given to him by his local
employer.

It appears that petitioner had committed several infractions while on board

the vessel. At one time, he allegedly failed to report for work after he drank
too much alcohol at a party. He apologized for the incident, and even
submitted a letter of apology to the master of the vessel. In another instance,
the master of the vessel found petitioner sleeping in the crews smoke room.
When roused from his slumber, the master of the vessel noticed that he had
bloodshot eyes and was in fact intoxicated.

On the same day, petitioner inquired from the Chief Officer if he would be
repatriated due to the incidents. He claimed that he had strong connections
with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), warning
that should he be repatriated, the ship agent would be held liable. This
conversation was recorded in the ships logbook.

The following day, the master of the vessel received a letter-complaint from
the vessels bosun and petitioners immediate superior, narrating previous
incidents of petitioners refusal to obey his instructions without justifiable
reasons. The bosun also related that petitioner threatened to harm him when
he learned of his impending repatriation. Petitioner was repatriated the
following day.

Petitioner filed a claim for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Antonio A. Cea
who, issued a decision declaring petitioners repatriation illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiters decision.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied
for lack of merit by the NLRC. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Issue: 1. WON the dismissal is with just cause

2. WON the dismissal was done with due process.

SC:
The petition is unmeritorious.
1.) The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during
the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to
be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner
should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment
cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character,
conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While it may be
true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not
and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his
infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in
determining the penalty that should be meted out since an employees past
misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the
proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, he
continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior on
board. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving
employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the
right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-
protection. We find just cause in petitioners termination.

2.) The manner of his dismissal, however, is another matter. Records show
that petitioners employer failed to observe the procedure prescribed in the
POEA Standard Employment Contract, which requires for a written notice of
the charges and the time and place for a formal investigation, a hearing of
the charges, and a written notice of the penalty. Petitioner was repatriated
without the requisite notices and hearing. Such failure, however, does not
affect the propriety of his dismissal. In Agabon v. NLRC, we ruled that when
the dismissal is for just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, it warrants
the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Conformably with
the Agabon case, the proper amount for nominal damages would be
of P30,000.00.

CASE 9: Royal Plant Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers-Cebu Plant, G.R.

No. 198783, April 15,2013

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of softdrink
products. It has several bottling plants all over the country, one of which is
located in Cebu City. Under the employ of each bottling plant are bottling
operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling
operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling
operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are
members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union (ROPWU).

In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with
chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line
1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was
likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the
operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of petitioner. This
directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of
petitioner for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the
responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean
and safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly
move about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities.

The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Through the
representation of herein respondent, they initiated the grievance machinery
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in November 2008. Even after
exhausting the remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the parties
were still at a deadlock with petitioner still insisting on the removal of the
chairs and respondent still against such measure. As such, respondent sent a
Notice to Arbitrate, dated 16 July 2009, to petitioner stating its position to
submit the issue on the removal of the chairs for arbitration. Nevertheless,
before submitting to arbitration the issue, both parties availed of the
conciliation/mediation proceedings before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Branch No. VII. They failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement.
They then executed a Submission Agreement which was accepted by the
Arbitration Committee on 01 October 2009. As contained in the Submission
Agreement, the sole issue for arbitration is whether the removal of chairs of
the operators assigned at the production/manufacturing line while performing
their duties and responsibilities is valid or not.

Ruling of the Arbtration Committee

On June 11, 2010, the Arbitration Committee rendered a decision in favor

of the Royal Plant Workers Union (the Union).

Not contented with the Arbitration Committees decision, CCBPI filed a

petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On May 24, 2011, the CA rendered a contrasting decision which nullified

and set aside the decision of the Arbitration Committee.

The CA held, among others, that the removal of the chairs from the
manufacturing/production lines by CCBPI is within the province of
management prerogatives; that it was part of its inherent right to control
and manage its enterprise effectively; and that since it was the
employers discretion to constantly develop measures or means to
optimize the efficiency of its employees and to keep its machineries and
 equipment in the best of conditions, it was only appropriate that it should
be given wide latitude in exercising it.

Disgruntled with the adverse CA decision, the Union has come to this Court
praying for its reversal on the following GROUNDS

Issues:

1. Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy
in challenging the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators.
2. Whether or not the removal of the bottling operator's chairs for CCBPI's
production/manufacturing lines a valid exercise of management
prerogative.

Ruling:

1. YES. A Petition for Review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy

CCBPI is correct. This procedural issue being debated upon is not novel.
The Court has already ruled in a number of cases that a decision or award
of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43. The recent case of Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa
Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Hon. Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C.
Magsalin and Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines6 reiterated the well-
settled doctrine on this issue, to wit:

In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v.

Bacungan,7 we repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under
Rule 43. We held that:

"The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary

arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court held
that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line
with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
(now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated
therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial
entities.

2. YES. Again, the Court agrees with CCBPI on the matter.

 The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with
due regard to the rights of labor.10

In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the

operators chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I
Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program, launched to enable the Union to
perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were
not removed indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due regard
to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was
compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling
operators from a two-and-one-half (2 )-hour rotation period to a one-
and-a-half (1 ) hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break
period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations.

Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good
intentions as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on
the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and
because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary considering that
the operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal
of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPIs
exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without
doing any harm to the workers rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Case 10: Goya Inc. vs. Goya Inc. Employees Union-FMW, G.R. No.
170054, Jan. 21,2013

FACTS:

1. Goya, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture,

importation, and wholesale of top quality food products.

2. Said corporation hired contractual employees from PESO Resources

Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional
services in its factory.
3. This prompted respondent Goya, Inc. Employees UnionFFW (Union) to
request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual
workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the
existing CBA.

4. When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the
NCMB for voluntary arbitration. They agreed to submit for resolution the
solitary issue of whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor acts
in engaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider, under the
existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence.

5. VA dismissed the Unions charge of ULP for being purely speculative and
for lacking in factual basis, but the Company was directed to observe and
comply with its commitment under the CBA.

6. The Company immediately filed a petition for review before the CA to set
aside the directive to observe and comply with the CBA commitment
pertaining to the hiring of casual employees when necessitated by
business circumstances contending that such order was not covered by
the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator can decide questions not covered
by Submission Agreement.

2. Whether the CBA violation constitute a ULP.

3. Whether the act of hiring contractual employees is a valid exercise of

management prerogative.

RULINGS:

1. YES. First, the said ruling of the VA is interrelated and intertwined with the
sole issue to be resolved that is, Whether or not the Company is guilty of
unfair labor practice in engaging the services of PESO, a third party
service provider, under existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence. Both
issues concern the engagement of PESO by the Company which is
 perceived as a violation of the CBA and which constitutes as unfair labor
practice on the part of the Company.

In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly

stated and limited in the submission agreement. However, since
arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the
arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a final settlement.
Law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of
authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for
which the law on voluntary arbitration was created speedy labor justice.

2. NO. While the engagement of PESO is in violation of the CBA, it does not
constitute unfair labor practice because it is not characterized under the
law as a gross violation of the CBA. Violations of a CBA, except those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice. Gross violations of a CBA means flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

3. NO. As repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative is not

unlimited; it is subject to the limitations found in law, collective
bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and justice. In
contracting out services, the management must be motivated by good
faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law
or must not have been the result of malicious arbitrary actions.

In the case at bench, the CBA of the parties has already provided for the
categories of the employees in the Companys establishment. These
categories of employees particularly with respect to casual employees
serve as limitation to the Companys prerogative to outsource parts of its
operations especially when hiring contractual employees. With the
provision on casual employees, the hiring of PESO contractual
employees, therefore, is not in keeping with the spirit and intent of their
CBA.