EN BANC interposed by the appellee was well-founded inasmuch as it appears that the complaint
does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. When the appellants refused
[G.R. No. 34937. March 13, 1933.]
CONCEPCION VIDAL DE ROCES and her husband, MARCOS
ROCES, and ELVIRA VIDAL DE RICHARDS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
appellee.
Feria & La O, for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. INHERITANCE TAX; GIFTS "INTER VIVOS"; SECTION 1540,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised
Administrative Code are, obviously, those donations inter vivos that take effect immediately
or during the lifetime of the donor, but are made in consideration of his death. Gifts inter
vivos, the transmission of which is not made in consideration of the donor's death, should
not be understood as included within the said legal provision for the reason that it would be
equivalent to levying a direct tax on property and not on the transmission thereof, which act
is not within the scope of the provisions contained in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code referring expressly to tax on inheritances, legacies and other
acquisitions mortis causa.
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION. Such interpretation of the law is not in conflict
with the rule laid down in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289),
wherein it was said that the expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos, because the law
considers them as advances in anticipation of inheritance in the sense that they are
gifts inter vivos made in consideration of death. In that case, it was not held that that kind of
gifts consisted in those made completely independent of death or without regard to it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY. The legal provision cited is not null and void on the
alleged ground that the subject matter thereof is not embraced in the title of the section
under which it is enumerated. On the contrary, its provisions are perfectly summarized in
the heading, "Tax on Inheritance etc." which constitutes the title of Article XI. The
constitutional provision should not be so strictly construed as to make it necessary that the
title contain a full index to all the contents of the law. It is sufficient if the language used
therein is expressed in such a way, that, in case of doubt, it would afford a means of
determining the legislator's intention. (Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II,
page 651.)
4. ID.; ID.; JONES LAW. The circumstance that the Administrative Code was
prepared and compiled strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law on that
matter should not be overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws such as the
Administrative Code, it is but natural and proper that provisions referring to diverse matters
should be found. (Ayson and Ignacio vs. Provincial Board of Rizal and Municipal Council of
Navotas, 39 Phil., 931.)
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT; STEPS TO
BE TAKEN WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION. The demurrer
to amend the same, in spite of the court's order to that effect, they voluntarily waived the
opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to have the case remanded for any
further proceedings, which would serve no purpose altogether in view of the insufficiency of
the complaint.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J p:
The plaintiffs herein brought this action to recover from the defendant, Collector
of Internal Revenue, certain sums of money paid by them under protest as inheritance tax.
They appealed from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the action, without costs.
On March 10 and 12, 1925, Esperanza Tuazon, by means of public documents,
donated certain parcels of land situated in Manila to the plaintiffs herein, who, with their
respective husbands, accepted them in the same public documents, which were duly
recorded in the registry of deeds. By virtue of said donations, the plaintiffs took possession
of the said lands, received the fruits thereof and obtained the corresponding transfer
certificates of title.
On January 5, 1926, the donor died in the City of Manila without leaving any
forced heir and in her will which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the
donees the sum of P5,000. After the estate had been distributed among the instituted
legatees and before delivery of their respective shares, the appellee herein, as Collector of
Internal Revenue, ruled that the appellants, as donees and legatees, should pay as
inheritance tax the sums of P16,673 and P13,951.45, respectively. Of these sums
P15,191.48 was levied as tax on the donation to Conception Vidal de Richards and
P1,481.52 on her legacy, and, likewise, P12,388.95 was imposed upon the donation made
to Elvira Vidal de Richards and P1,462.50 on her legacy. At first the appellants refused to
pay the aforementioned taxes but, at the insistence of the appellee and in order not to
delay the adjudication of the legacies, they agreed at last, to pay them under protest.
The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts
alleged therein were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After the legal questions
raised therein had been discussed, the court sustained the demurrer and ordered the
amendment of the complaint which the appellants failed to do, whereupon the trial court
dismissed the action on the ground that the aforementioned appellants did not really have a
right of action. In their brief, the appellants assign only one alleged error, to wit: that the
demurrer interposed by the appellee was sustained without sufficient ground.
The judgment appealed from was based on the provisions of section 1540 of the
Administrative Code which reads as follows:
"SEC. 1540. Additions of gifts and advances. After the
aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added to the
resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the
predecessor to any of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his
heirs, devisees, legatees, or donees mortis causa."
 The appellants contend that the above-mentioned legal provision does not or personal, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal." (26 R. C. L.,
include donations inter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the p. 208, par. 177.)
following reasons: first, because it violates section 3 of the Jones Law which provides that
In the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra, it was also held that
no law should embrace more than one subject, and that subject should be expressed in the
section 1540 of the Administrative Code did not violate the constitutional provision
title thereof; second, that the Legislature has no authority to impose inheritance tax on
regarding uniformity of taxation. It cannot be null and void on this ground because it equally
donations inter vivos; and third, because a legal provision of this character contravenes the
subjects to the same tax all of those donees who later become heirs, legatees or
fundamental rule of uniformity of taxation. The appellee, in turn, contends that the words
donees mortis causa by the will of the donor. There would by a repugnant and arbitrary
"all gifts" refer clearly to donations inter vivos and, in support of his theory, cites the
exception if the provisions of the law were not applicable to all donees of the same kind. In
doctrine laid down in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289). After a
the case cited above, it was said: "At any rate the argument adduced against its
careful study of the law and the authorities applicable thereto, we are of the opinion that
constitutionality, which is the lack of uniformity, does not seem to be well founded. It was
neither theory reflects the true spirit of the aforementioned provision. The gifts referred to in
said that under such an interpretation, while a donee inter vivos who, after the
section 1540 of the Revised Administrative Code are, obviously, those donations inter
predecessor's death proved to be an heir, a legatee, or a donee mortis causa, would have
vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor but are made in
to pay the tax, another donee inter vivos who did not prove to be an heir, a legatee, or a
consideration or in contemplation of death. Gifts inter vivos, the transmission of which is not
donee mortis causa of the predecessor, would be exempt from such a tax. But as these are
made in contemplation of the donor's death should not be understood as included within
two different cases, the principle of uniformity is inapplicable to them."
the said legal provision for the reason that it would amount to imposing a direct tax on
property and not on the transmission thereof, which act does not come within the scope of The last question of a procedural nature arising from the case at bar, which
the provisions contained in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which deals should be passed upon, is whether the case, as it now stands, can be decided on the
expressly with the tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa. merits or should be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. According to our
view of the case, it follows that, if the gifts received by the appellants were not given mortis
Our interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the rule laid down in the case of
causa, the same would not be subject to the payment of an inheritance tax and said
Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra. We said therein, as we say now, that the
appellants would have the right to recover the sums of money claimed by them. Hence the
expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos inasmuch as the law considers them as
necessity of ascertaining whether the complaint contains an allegation to that effect. We
advances on inheritance, in the sense that they are gifts inter vivos made in contemplation
have examined said complaint and found nothing of that nature. On the contrary, it may be
or in consideration of death. In that case, it was not held that that kind of gifts consisted in
inferred from the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 7 thereof that said
those made completely independent of death or without regard to it.
donations inter vivos were made in consideration of the donor's death. We refer to the
Said legal provision is not null and void on the alleged ground that the subject allegations that such transmissions were effected in the month of March, 1925, that the
matter thereof is not embraced in the title of the section under which it is enumerated. On donor died in January, 1926, and that the donees were instituted legatees in the donor's will
the contrary, its provisions are perfectly summarized in the heading, "Tax on Inheritance, which was admitted to probate. It is from these allegations, especially the last, that we infer
etc." which is the title of Article XI. Furthermore, the constitutional provision cited should not a presumption juris tantum that said donations were made mortis causa and, as such, are
be so strictly construed as to make it necessary that the title contain a full index to all the subject to the payment of inheritance tax.
contents of the law. It is sufficient if the language used therein is expressed in such a way
Wherefore, the demurrer interposed by the appellee was well- founded because
that in case of doubt it would afford a means of determining the legislator's intention.
it appears that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
(Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, p. 651.) Lastly, the circumstance that the
When the appellants refused to amend the same, in spite of the court's order to that effect,
Administrative Code was prepared and compiled strictly in accordance with the provisions
they voluntarily waived the opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to have
of the Jones Law on that matter should not be overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws
the case remanded for further proceedings, which would serve no purpose altogether in
such as the Administrative Code, it is but natural and proper that provisions referring to
view of the insufficiency of the complaint.
diverse matters should be found. (Ayson and Ignacio vs. Provincial Board of Rizal and
Municipal Council of Navotas, 39 Phil., 931.) Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs of this
instance against the appellants. So ordered.
The appellants question the power of the Legislature to impose taxes on the
transmission of real estate that takes effect immediately and during the lifetime of the Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Butte,
donor, and allege as their reason that such tax partakes of the nature of a land tax which JJ., concur.
the law has already created in another part of the Administrative Code. Without making
express pronouncement on this question, for it is unnecessary, we wish to state that such is
not the case in this instance. The tax collected by the appellee on the properties donated in
1925 really constitutes an inheritance tax imposed on the transmission of said properties in Separate Opinions
contemplation or in consideration of the donor's death and under the circumstance that the
donees were later instituted as the former's legatees. For this reason, the law considers
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
such transmissions in the form of gifts inter vivos, as advances on inheritance and nothing
therein violates any constitutional provision, inasmuch as said legislation is within the
power of the Legislature. I sustain my concurrence in Justice Street's dissenting opinion in the case of
Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289).
The majority opinion attempted to distinguish the present case from the above-
"Property Subject to Inheritance Tax. The inheritance tax mentioned case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, by interpreting section 1540 of the
ordinarily applies to all property within the power of the state to reach Administrative Code in the sense that it establishes the legal presumption juris tantum that
passing by will or the laws regulating intestate succession or by gift inter all gifts inter vivos made to persons who are not forced heirs but who are instituted legatees
vivos in the manner designated by statute, whether such property be real in the donor's will, have been made in contemplation of the donor's death. Presumptions
 are of two kinds: One determined by law which is also called presumption of law or of right;
and another which is formed by the judge from circumstances antecedent to, coincident
with or subsequent to the principal fact under investigation, which is also called
presumption of man ( presuncion de hombre). (Escriche, Vol. IV, p. 662.) The Civil Code as
well as the Code of Civil Procedure establishes presumptions juris et de jure and juris
tantum which the courts should take into account in deciding questions of law submitted to
them for decision. The presumption which the majority opinion wishes to draw from said
section 1540 of the Administrative Code can neither be found in this Code nor in any of the
aforementioned Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, said presumption
cannot be called legal or of law. Neither can it be called a presumption of man ( presuncion
de hombre) inasmuch as the majority opinion did not infer it from circumstances antecedent
to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact which is the donation itself. In view of
the nature, mode of making and effects of donations inter vivos, the contrary presumption
would be more reasonable and logical; in other words, donations inter vivos made to
persons who are not forced heirs, but who are instituted legatees in the donor's will, should
be presumed as not made mortis causa, unless the contrary is proven. In the case under
consideration, the burden of proof rests with the person who contends that the
donation inter vivos has been made mortis causa.
It is therefore, the undersigned's humble opinion that the order appealed from
should be reversed and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant ordered to file his
answer to the complaint.
Street, J., concurs.
||| (Roces v. Posadas, Jr., G.R. No. 34937, [March 13, 1933], 58 PHIL 108-116)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 36770. November 4, 1932.]
LUIS W. DISON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, Jr., Collector
of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Marcelino Aguas for plaintiff-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. INTERNAL REVENUE; INHERITANCE TAX; GIFTS "INTER VIVOS".
Section 1540 of the Administrative Code subjects the plaintiff and appellant to the payment
of the inheritance tax upon the gift inter vivos he received from his father and which really
was an advancement upon the inheritance he would be entitled to receive upon the death
of the donor.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. Section 1540 of the Administrative Code does not tax gifts per
se, but only when those gifts are made to those who shall prove to be the heirs, devises,
legatees or donees mortis causa of the donor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "HEIRS". The expression in section 1540 of the Administrative
Code "those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs" includes those who are given
the status and rights of heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they may receive as
such heirs.
DECISION
BUTTE, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
favor of the defendant Juan Posadas, jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, in a suit filed by the
plaintiff, Luis W. Dison, for the recovery of an inheritance tax in the sum of P2,808.73 paid
under protest. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal because he
received the property, which is the basis of the tax, from his father before his death by a
deed of gift inter vivos which was duly accepted and registered before the death of his
father. The defendant answered with a general denial and with a counterdemand for the
sum of P1,254.56 which it was alleged is a balance still due and unpaid on account of said
tax. The plaintiff replied to the counterdemand with a general denial. The court a quo held
that the cause of action set up in the counterdemand was not proven and dismissed the
same. Both sides appealed to this court, but the cross-complaint and appeal of the
Collector of Internal Revenue were dismissed by this court on March 17, 1932, on motion of
the Attorney-General.
The only evidence introduced at the trial of this cause was the proof of payment
of the tax under protest, as stated, and the deed of gift executed by Felix Dison on April 9,
1928, in favor of his son Luis W. Dison, the plaintiff-appellant. This deed of gift transferred
twenty-two tracts of land to the donee, reserving to the door for his life the usufruct of three
tracts. This deed was acknowledged before a notary public on April 20, 1928.
At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following ingenious stipulation of
fact:
"1. That Don Felix Dison died on April 21, 1928;
"2. That Don Felix Dison, before his death, made a gift inter
vivos in favor of the plaintiff Luis W. Dison of all his property according to
a deed of gift (Exhibit D) which includes all the property of Don Felix
Dison;
"3. That the plaintiff did not receive property of any kind of Don
Felix Dison upon the death of the latter;
"4. Than Don Luis W. Dison was the legitimate and only child of
Don Felix Dison."
It is inferred from Exhibit D that Felix Dison was a widower at the time of his
death.
The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that he received and holds the property
mentioned by a consummated gift and that Act No. 2601 (chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code) being the inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The provision directly here
involved is section 1540 of the Administrative Code which read as follows:
"Additions of Gifts and Advances. After the aforementioned
deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting
amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any
of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devisees,
legatees, or donees mortis causa."
The question to be resolved may be stated thus: Does section 1540 of the
Administrative Code subject the plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an inheritance tax?
The appellant argues that there is no evidence in this case to support a finding
that the gift was simulated and that it was an artifice for evading the payment of the
inheritance tax, as is intimated in the decision of the court below and the brief of the
Attorney-General. We see no reason why the court may not go behind the language in
which the transaction is masked in order to ascertain its true character and purpose. In this
case the scanty facts before us may not warrant the inference that the conveyance,
acknowledged by the donor five days before his death and accepted by the donee one day
before the donor's death, was fraudulently made for the purpose of evading the inheritance
tax. But the facts, in our opinion, do warrant the inference that the transfer was an
advancement upon the inheritance which the donee, as the sole and forced heir of the
donor, would be entitled to receive upon the death of the donor.
The argument advanced by the appellant that he is not an heir of his deceased
father within the meaning of section 1540 of the Administrative Code because his father in
his lifetime had given the appellant all his property and left no property to be inherited, is so
fallacious that the urging of it here casts a suspicion upon the appellant's reason for
completing the legal formalities of the transfer on the eve of the latter's death. We do not
know whether or not the father in his case left a will; in any event, this appellant could not
be deprived of his share of the inheritance because the Civil Code confers upon him the
status of a forced heir. We construe the expression in section 1540 "any of those who, after
his death, shall prove to be his heirs", to include those who, by our law, are given the status
and rights of heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they may receive as such heirs.
 That the appellant in this case occupies the status of heir to his deceased father cannot be
questioned. Construing the conveyance here in question, under the facts presented, as an
advance made by Felix Dison to his only child, we hold section 1540 to be applicable and
the tax to have been properly assessed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
This appeal was originally assigned to a Division of Five but referred to the
court in banc by reason of the appellant's attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540.
This attack is based on the sole ground that insofar as section 1540 levies a tax upon
gifts inter vivos, it violates that provision of section 3 of the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands (39 Stat. L., 545) which reads as follows: "That no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of
the bill." Neither the title of Act No. 2601 nor chapter 40 of the Administrative Code makes
any reference to a tax on gifts. Perhaps it is enough to say of this contention that section
1540 plainly does not tax gifts per se but only when those gifts are made to those who shall
prove to be the heirs, devisees, legatees or donees mortis causa of the donor. This court
said in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289):
"When the law says all gifts, it doubtless refers to gifts inter
vivos, and not mortis causa. Both the letter and the spirit of the law leave
no room for any other interpretation. Such, clearly, is the tenor of the
language which refers to donations that took effect before the donor's
death, and not to mortis causa donations, which can only be made with
the formalities of a will, and can only take effect after the donor's death.
Any other construction would virtually change this provision into:
"'. . . there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of
all gifts mortis causa . . . made by the predecessor to those who, after his
death, shall prove to be his . . . donees mortis causa.' We cannot give to
the law an interpretation that would so vitiate its language. The truth of
the matter is that in this section (1540) the law presumes that such gifts
have been made in anticipation of inheritance, devise, bequest, or gift
mortis causa, when the donee, after the death of the donor proves to be
his heir, devisee or donee mortis causa, for the purpose of evading the
tax, and it is to prevent this that it provides that they shall be added to the
resulting amount." However much appellant's argument on this point may
fit his preconceived notion that the transaction between him and his
father was a consummated gift with no relation to the inheritance, we hold
that there is no merit in this attack upon the constitutionality of section
1540 under our view of the facts. No other constitutional questions were
raised in this case.
The judgment below is affirmed with costs in this instance against the appellant.
So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL, J.:

I concur in the result.

||| (Dison v. Posadas, G.R. No. 36770, [November 4, 1932], 57 PHIL 465-470)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003.]
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO
GANUELAS, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29),
LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G.
SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA,
represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, respondents.
Taada Vivo & Tan for petitioners.
SYNOPSIS
The late Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of Ursulina
Ganuelas. Private respondents alleged that the deed was a void disposition mortis causa as it
lacks the legal requirement of acknowledgment by attesting witnesses thereto before the notary
public. Petitioners, however, insist that the donation was inter vivos.
Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa, the Court ruled that, it was mortis causa.
It noted that there was nothing in the Donation which indicates that any right, title or interest in
the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The
phrase therein "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina
on her death, not during her lifetime. It was also provided therein that if the donee should die
before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect. The
deed even contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa.
Nevertheless, as there was failure to comply with the formalities of a will, the Court ruled that the
donation was void.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATION INTER VIVOS
DISTINGUISHED FROM DONATION MORTIS CAUSA. Crucial in the resolution of the issue
whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-
testator. The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating: If the donation
is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the
donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causawhich should be embodied
in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or
independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas)
of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his
death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos. The distinction
between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the
donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when
it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation
must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and
cannot transfer ownership.
2. ID.; ID.; SUCCESSION; DONATION MORTIS CAUSA; DISTINGUISHING
CHARACTERISTICS. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
following: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; 3. That the
transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. CTAIDE
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the donation subject of the present
case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated
properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase "to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that
Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not
during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should
die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect
shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the
decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void
if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly
confirming the donation as mortis causa.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVATION. To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is
founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted
by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no
particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not,
because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may also
underline transfers mortis causa.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES FORMALITIES OF A WILL. As the subject deed then is in the
nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code
should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect. As
noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary
public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
(Italics supplied) TcICEA
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law,
the February 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an action for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of
Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas
(Ursulina), one of herein petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
xxx xxx xxx
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR
has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in
the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer
and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx. 3
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of
Donation 4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or on August
18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. cDSAEI
After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with
private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina.
In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina secured the
corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, to wit: Tax
Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she
refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated
demands.
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando,
La Union a complaint 5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas
who were alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation
executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting
witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a
disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding
formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private respondents
thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the
possession and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for the cancellation of the tax
declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the partition of the properties among the intestate
heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of the
properties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of their shares.
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer 6 that the donation in favor of Ursulina
was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code, 7hence, the deed did not
have to comply with the requirements for the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of
Donation is null and void as the ground mentioned therein is not among those provided by law to
be the basis thereof; and at any rate, the revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of
the appropriate complaint in court within the prescriptive period provided by law, which period
had, at the time the complaint was filed, already lapsed.
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of
Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is
a donation mortis causa, 8 found for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the
Deed of Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and
orders the partition of the estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs.
SO ORDERED. 9
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that
Celestina retained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion that
the donation is mortis causa, 10 and that while the deed contained an attestation clause and an
acknowledgment showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the
acknowledgment was defective as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the
deed before the notary public, thereby rendering the entire document void. 11
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of
Donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus
sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis causa. 12
On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the ground
mentioned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the trial court
held that the legal grounds for such revocation as provided under the Civil Code arise only in
cases of donations inter vivos, but not in donations mortis causa which are revocable at will
during the lifetime of the donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the
disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to comply with the formalities required therefor, the
Deed of Revocation was a superfluity. 13
Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court erred:
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION
EXECUTED BY CELESTINA GANUELAS;
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER
URSULINA GANUELAS. 14
Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main consideration
for its execution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the donor's death; 15 that
the provision on the effectivity of the donation after the donor's death simply meant that
absolute ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor's death; 16 and that since the
donation is inter vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles
760, 17 764 18 and 765 19 of the Civil Code.
In a letter of March 16, 1992, 20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this Court's
January 28, 1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for failure to submit the name and address of
their new counsel, explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are
"willing and ready to waive whatever rights" they have over the properties subject of the
donation. Petitioners, who were required to comment on the letter, by Comment of October 28,
1998, 21 welcome private respondents' gesture but pray that "for the sake of enriching
jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and resolved."
The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. 22
Donation inter vivosdiffers from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-
testator. 23 The following ruling of this Court inAlejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating: 24
 If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning
that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the
donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the
donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or
independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because
of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation isinter vivos, it must be
executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 25 and 749 26 of the Civil
Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis
causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,
otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. 27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. 28
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any
right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death
of Celestina. CTSDAI
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina
on her death, not during her lifetime. 29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor,
the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the
donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. 30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis
causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot
of this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all
of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other have
in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses. 31 (Emphasis
supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the
donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining
whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an
identical motivation. 32 In other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis
causa. 33
In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan, 34 the deeds of donation contained provisions almost
identical to those found in the deed subject of the present case:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for
the DONEE, . . . the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer,
convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described
property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded
and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis supplied)
In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-quoted
provision conclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and
possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former's death. Like in the
present case, the deeds therein did not contain any clear provision that purports to pass
proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor's death. CcTIDH
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is
void and produces no effect. 35
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the
notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to
retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of Donation to
be mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. STECAc
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part. Knows one of the parties.
||| (Ganuelas v. Cawed, G.R. No. 123968, [April 24, 2003], 449 PHIL 465-477)