CRIMINAL LAW

CASE DIGESTS

CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW

Theories

Magno v. Court of Appeals

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the
system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are
the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of
punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether
petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the
offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng
amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in
order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction.

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is
inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the
moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment

Enactment of Penal Statutes

Romualdez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.
They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such
statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.'"

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity."
While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct
application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found

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unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a
portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because
of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties
whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a
sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

"The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a

"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.

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The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct."
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally
unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face
and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least,
that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

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Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may
be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for"
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed
to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP
1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.

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Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.40

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As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same
Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no
guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.

Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council

G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As
for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are

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invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation
of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and
cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.58

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of
it is protected.59

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facialinvalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the

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basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. 60

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot
thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect"
on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. 62 As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.63

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged"
and "underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected
to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I
have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties,
the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to
the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.

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Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely"as applied for"
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed
to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, 67 observed
that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression." 71

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
chargeagainst them

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct.

People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy

G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989

A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.

The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In
addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still
to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision
has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."

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In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to
ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts
to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What
valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a
term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law,
the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an
outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither
a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus
given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power
and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules
on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption
of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No.
4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared
unconstitutional.

It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as may
have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that
the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00
would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether
imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a
prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the
Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of
penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term
of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction
with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as
imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW

Diplomatic Immunity

Minucher v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as
it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host
state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf
both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the

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RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the
governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct
surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent
or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges
of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials
of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at
the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of
the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected
drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-
buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Liang v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

The immunity mentioned in the agreement is not absolute, but subject to the limitation that the act was
done in official capacity. In this case, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the agreement
as it is not done in official capacity.

Retroactivity

People of the Philippines v. Lacson

G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003

Procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the court.

xxxxxx

(2002 Case): Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect.
However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus,
there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the
express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party,
(3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for
the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.

There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against
respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss
the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that
their dismissal bears his express consent.

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The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to
the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then
Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who
desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits.

Go v. Dimagiba
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

The Circular merely lays down a rule of preference. It serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. In
other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less
those convicted by final judgment.

Territoriality

United States v. Bull

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

When the vessel came within the 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance
of Manila Bay, the vessel was within territorial waters. The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the political agency.

People of the Philippines v. Wong Cheng

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

Under the English rule, which is the one followed in this jurisdiction, crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessel are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed.
To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within Philippine territory.

People of the Philippines v. Look Chow

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account
of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the rule does not apply
when the article is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in
the absence of an agreement under an international treaty

People of the Philippines v. Lol-lo and Saraw

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G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes.

ARTICLE 3:
DEFINITION OF FELONY

Dolo v. Culpa

United States v. Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

There is mistake of fact in this case which is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law
is necessary ingredient of the offense charged, except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he
intended to commit.

People of the Philippines v. Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

There is no mistake of fact in this case since there is fault or carelessness. In this case, there is no
circumstance whatsoever which would press the accused to immediate action. The person in the room
being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made.
The crime committed by the accused is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.

People of the Philippines v. Pugay

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988

Pugay is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence (reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide). There is ample evidence that there are no ill-feelings between accused and the deceased. The
group merely intended to make fun of the deceased. However, the accused Pugay failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed
by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.

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People of the Philippines v. Garcia

G.R. No. 153591 February 23, 2004

The accused is guilty only of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
There is no evident premeditation in this case. There was no showing that appellant performed other
overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. Appellant could have reacted on instinct
and relied on sheer impulse to respond to the situation at hand. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006

The act penalized under Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is classified as mala in se. If it is otherwise, even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of
votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound
to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Manuel v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Good faith is a defense in the crime of bigamy. However, it cannot be appreciated in the case at bar.
Bigamy is a felony by dolo (deceit). A felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified
as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words with malice do not appear in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary. Manuel is
presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general
rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

People of the Philippines v. Delim

Specific intent is not the same as motive. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence need not
be proven. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to
deprive the victim of his liberty. In this case, it is evident that the specific intent of the malefactors when
they entered the house was to kill the victim and that he was seized precisely to kill him. The abduction
of the deceased was merely incidental to the primary purpose of killing him.

Ivler v. San Pedro

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Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-
Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely
a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was
based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly
and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29(promulgated in
1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en
banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.),
and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These
cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the
reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court
in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the
same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas

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inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate,
all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals
conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction
for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People
vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double
jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-
CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside,
without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost
as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40

Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who

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was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in
the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval
its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in
the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in
the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96)
signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a
duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to
quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed
by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After
such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga,
one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal,
the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language:

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the
municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for
having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the
accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to
prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the
damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal

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by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is
whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is
an ingredient of the other. x x x

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney
that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with
the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view
of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might
be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence
of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the
case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the
lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless,
that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or
similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand,
there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case.
It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical
case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act

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constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46);
and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models
that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property
with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial
dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply
to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a
single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge
with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will
be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting
acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in
which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the
quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:

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[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for
the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.53(Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing
one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking
its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime,
abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of
cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their
number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws
constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies
under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) anoffense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way
back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge
for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted
the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more

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serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior
court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved
and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting
of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Mala in se v. Mala prohibita

People of the Philippines v. Bayona

In acts mala in se, there must be criminal intent. However, in acts mala prohibita, which is the situation in
this case, it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. When defendant carried his firearm
within the fence, it was his intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, even if he had no criminal intent.

United States v. Chico

In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is
entirely immaterial. In this case, the display itself, without any intervention of any other factor, is the evil
sought to be avoided and penalized.

ARTICLE 4:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Proximate Cause
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People of the Philippines v. Iligan

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the
doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this
case.

The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was
considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point. What is material
is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate
part of the body: the head. 29

The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any
moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and
having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.

Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan's hacking of Quiones, Jr.'s head might not have
been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter's death. Proximate legal cause is defined as
"that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In
other words, the sequence of events from Iligan's assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by
a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having
triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability

People of the Philippines v. Mananquil

The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary.
There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings
immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere
complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the
court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second
degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as
to the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

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Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed
by the offender.

The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs.
Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as follows

One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the
death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the deceased
might litem recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or
that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that
death was men." caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound.
The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application. It lies at the foundation
of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the
natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a
manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked
act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the fatal result. Neglect of the wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are
themselves consequences of the criminal act, must in law be deemed to litem been among those
which are in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must be responsible The rule has its
foundation on a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting
theories of medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and
injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment

Quinto v. Andres

The prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal
act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delictiincludes
two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that
the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder,
there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed
(with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and

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the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If
the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed

People of the Philippines v. Quianzon

The possibility that the patient might have survived had the deceased not removed the drainage does not
mean that such act was the real cause of his death. Even without said act, the fatal consequence could
have followed.

Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is
to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as
the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his
death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be
qualified as homicide, etc.

Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court

At the time Javiers wound was inflicted by Urbano, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Considering the nature of tetanus, Javiers wound could have been infected 2 or 3 days before he
died. The infection was therefore distinct and foreign to the crime.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Impossible Crimes

Intod v. Court of Appeals

The crime committed is an impossible crime. In this case the crime intended cannot be produced because
the intended victim was not present. Thus, accused failed to accomplish the intended crime.

People of the Philippines v. Domasian

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery
of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would
have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267
although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

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ARTICLE 6:
STAGES OF A FELONY

Subjective and Objective Phase of a Felony

United States v. Eduave

The murder was committed in its frustrated stage because the act passed the subjective phase of the
felony but the victim survived. The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the
phase is objective. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his
own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so
stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.

The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the
acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A
crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by
overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment
when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is
his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of
the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element
which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a
foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the
moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while
in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of
the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.

To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the
subjective phase is passed.

On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase.
The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will
of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control.

The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also

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be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period
between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points
the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective
phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the
last act, it is frustrated

Rape

People of the Philippines v. Orita

In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains
his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to
produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration
is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.

People of the Philippines v. Campuhan

In rape, the touching which would consummate the rape must be inextricably viewed in light of, in
relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the
ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. In this case, the
touching sufficient to consummate the rape was not proven beyond reasonable doubt in view of the
failure of the witnessed to really see the penetration.

Theft

Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines

Theft is already produced, and therefore consummated, upon the taking of personal property without the
consent of the owner. It is not necessary, therefore, that the offender shall have effective control thereof.
Necessarily, there can be no frustrated theft.

Robbery

People of the Philippines v. Lamahang

Accused committed attempted trespass to dwelling. The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal
Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation. There is no doubt that the intention in the case at bar was to enter the store.

People of the Philippines v. Salvilla

It is no defense that the accused and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities
taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession
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of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is
complete.

The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short
time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he
should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful
possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it."

Murder

Epifanio v. People of the Philippines

The crime was only attempted. It is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a
felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the
commission of the offense. In this case, the subjective phase was not passed because accused had to stop
stabbing the victim when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds sustained
by Crisaldo. The Court has discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a
victim inPeople v. Matyaong,29 thus:

In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the
various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could
be made, would be very desirable; but the unexpected complications and the various extraneous
causes which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of
some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The
general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the
possibility of the slight wound terminating with the loss of the persons life, and the apparently
mortal ending with only a slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x

The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the
form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved,
the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and
constitution of the person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical
treatment. x x x30

No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound without
timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated, murder

People of the Philippines v. Sy Pio

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The crime committed as to Tan Siong Kiap is only attempted murder. The fact that the victim was able to
escape, which accused must have seen, must have produced in his mind that he was not able to hit his
victim at a vital part of the body. Hence, accused knew that he was not able to produce all the acts of
execution necessary for the consummation of the crime.

People of the Philippines v. Ravelo

The facts and evidence on record do not show anything from which intent to kill could be deduced to
warrant a conviction for frustrated murder. A mere statement by the accused stating that Lugatiman
would be killed is not sufficient proof of intent to kill to convict a person of frustrated murder.

In a crime of murder or an attempt or frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual
design to kill (US v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418 [1921]) which must be manifested by external acts. For there to be
frustrated murder, the offender must perform all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a
consequence, but the felony is not thereby produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. A verbal expression that Lugatiman would be killed sixteen (16) hours after such statement
was made is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only
by a statement by the aggressor of the purpose to kill, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of
means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.
However, after the performance of the last act necessary, or after the subjective phase of the criminal act
was passed, the crime is not produced by reason of forces outside of the will of the aggressor. (People v.
Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433 [1930]).

Tying the victim's left leg with a chain on a 2" by 3" piece of wood and leaving him inside the house of
accused-appellant, Bonifacio Padilla are not acts that would result in death. These were done only to
restrain his liberty of movement for the period of time the accused-appellants were busy hanging and
burning the body of Reynaldo Gaurano some thirty (30) meters away from where Lugatiman was left.
Also, tying Lugatiman's hands behind his back and his whole body to the wall, and blindfolding him
were for the purpose of restraining his liberty until the evening of May 22, 1984 came.

Under the circumstances, accused-appellants could not even be convicted of an attempt to commit
murder. There was no commencement of the criminal act by over acts which have a direct connection
with the crime of murder intended to be committed. As stated earlier the manhandling, express statement
of purpose, and the restraint of liberty were not such as to put the victim in danger of an imminent death.
The small abrasions and hematomas of the victim resulting from the torture by the accused were not
mortal. After the victim was restrained of his liberty immediately before Gaurano was killed, he was able
to watch how Gaurano was burned hanging upside down from a mango tree near the Awasian bridge.
Due to his fatigue and extreme weakness, he was even able to lie down and sleep after looking at the
horrible incident. (TSN, May 31, 1985, pp. 22-23)

During the long period of time Lugatiman was informed that "he would be killed" and was left behind
(5:00 in the morning) until he was able to escape at 10:00 in the morning, it was not certain whether or not
appellants would really kill him as they did to Gaurano. Anything could have happened in between.
There was no distinct evidence to prove that the accused appellants were really decided on killing him at
the time specified

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Homicide

People of the Philippines v. Kalalo

There is an attempt to commit homicide in this case. Marcelo performed everything necessary on his part
to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his
will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none
of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by Marcelo constitute attempted homicide.

Estafa

United States v. Dominguez

Accused is guilty only of frustrated estafa. For estafa to be consummated, the accused must have
completely divested the owner of his money, which in this case was not completed because of the
discovery of the deceit, a circumstance independent of the will of the accused.

Bribery

Pozar v. Court of Appeals

Since Ocampo did not accept the bill, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official only.
However, the prosecution failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of Pozar. Hence, Pozar is
acquitted.

Arson

People of the Philippines v. Hernandez

Arson was consummated. Once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does
not depend upon the extent of the damage cause. It is consummated the moment the object to be burned
was burned even if partially.

United States v. Valdez

The accused performed all the acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to
causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense
committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the
reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag,
soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to
burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

ARTICLE 10:

Ladonga v. People of the Philippines

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Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard
to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory
construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. 24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact,
the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second
clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the
provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically
provide the contrary.

The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests
on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code
to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 2228 of the Code to violations of
Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to
the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as
defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in
the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature,
are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17
which was applied in the case of U.S. vs. Ponte.

People of the Philippines v. Simon

Although R.A. No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of
the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by force of Article
10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective
effect to crimes punished by special laws.

xxxxxx

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses
under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code

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cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals
that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for
the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in
the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide
for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the
aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since
the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

xxxxxx

Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently
from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific
penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to
five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed
during the American regime.

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder
shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively,
for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the
periodicity prescribed therein, provided:

Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act,
shallprima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer
by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen,
paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same
manner as therein provided. 63

Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by
the penalties as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto

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mayor toprision mayor; and Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts
involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involveprision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
perpetua or death.

Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the
penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4
months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than
17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation
of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed.

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are
without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of
the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based
on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative
intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true
that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration
of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given
to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the
Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation.

On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the
Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700
and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the
fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly
reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in
these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the
intendment of Congress.

xxxxxx

The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which
would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion
perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.

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It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the
Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in
the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under
special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which
were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be
no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense,"
as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore,
considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is justified
under the rule of contemporanea expositio.

ARTICLE 11:
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

Self-Defense

Unlawful Aggression

Manaban v. Court of Appeals

When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to
him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life.27 The accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that all the requisites of self-defense are present.28

Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a
justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself.29 Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense.30 Self-defense is founded on
the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. 31 Thus,
without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete
self-defense.32

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury
upon a person.33 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression,34 unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to
cause injury.35 There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which
puts the defendants life in real peril.36

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In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the
back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still
inside a locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista.

People of the Philippines v. Alconga

There were two stages in the fight in this case. The initial stage was when the deceased assaulted accused,
but it terminated when the deceased fled. The second stage commenced when accused pursued the
deceased and ended when the fatal blow was delivered. In this stage, accused was no longer acting in
self-defense, there being then no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the
moment the deceased took to his heels.

People of the Philippines v. Genosa

The existence of the battered woman syndrome does not, in itself, established the legal right of the
woman to kill her husband. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Without
continuous aggression, there can be no self-defense, and absence of aggression does not warrant complete
or incomplete self-defense. Since accused killed her husband while the latter was sleeping, there was no
unlawful aggression by the deceased and therefore there is no self-defense.

xxxxxx

Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense 60 -- she
must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him
in order to save her life.

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real
threaton one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw
from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past
violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver
harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of
the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim

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in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.66 Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Test of Real and Imminent Peril

Senoja v. People of the Philippines

The test to use to determine whether the person defending himself is confronted by a real and imminent
peril to his life or limb should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of his
reason, his life or limb is in danger? Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an
inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the
former aggressor. In this case, there was no imminent danger to the accused since the deceased was
already pacified. In addition, the accused stabbed the deceased from behind.

Reasonable Necessity

People of the Philippines v. Razon

The defense employed by accused was not reasonable. The means employed by a person claiming self-
defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must
be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The nature or quality of the weapon;
the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor as well as those of
the person who invokes self-defense; and the place and the occasion of the assault also define the
reasonableness of the means used in self-defense. In this case, the deceased was a polio victim. In
addition, accused was then armed with two knives.

Eslabon v. People of the Philippines

The gauge of rational necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression as against one's self or in
defense of a relative is to be found in the situation as it appears to the person repelling the aggression. It
has been held time and again that the reasonableness of the means adopted is not one of mathematical
calculation or "material commensurability between the means of attack and defense but the imminent
danger against the subject of the attack as perceived by the defender and the instinct more than reason
that moves the defender to repel the attack. It has further been stress in such cases that to the imminent
threat of the moment, one could not be hoped to exercise such calm judgment as may be expected of
another not laboring under any urgency and who has sufficient time to appraise the urgency of the
situation.

People of the Philippines v. Luague

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An attempt to rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense.
Inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, cannot her very
existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in an
outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim.

People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz

There is self-defense in this case. The accused was justified in attacking her assailant considering that the
deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the night in question, and whether he intended to rape
her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the deceased grabbed her from
behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say who he was, and in the
struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by means
of her strength alone.

People of the Philippines v. Jaurigue

Stabbing the deceased was not necessary in this case considering that the chapel was then well lighted
and there were already several attendees. Accused could have prevented the lewd intent of the deceased
by merely shouting for help.

Sufficient Provocation

People of the Philippines v. Oriente

Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly
be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must immediately precede the act means that there
should not be any interval of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of
the crime by the person provoked. The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not
by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Moreover,
petitioner failed to establish by competent evidence that the victim had a gun and used it to threaten
petitioner.

Defense of Property

People of the Philippines v. Apolinar

Defense of property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a
justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said
property.

People of the Philippines v. Bumanglag

It is indisputable that, without any prior illegal aggression and the other requisites which would fully or
partially exempt the accused from criminal responsibility, the accused and his two companions assaulted
the deceased with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds,
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and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation,
fully convicted, together with his co-defendants.

People of the Philippines v. Narvaez

Self-Defense in Libel

People of the Philippines v. Chua Hong

Self-defense is a man's inborn right. In a physical assault retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has
ceased, because there would be no further harm to repel. But this is not the case when it is aimed at a
person's good name. Once the aspersion is cast its sting clings and and the one thus defamed may avil
himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel which, if adequate, will
be justified.

Granting that the publication in question is libelous, is it unnecessarily libelous?" it was intended no
doubt to counteract the impression left in the mind of the public by the articles "doubtful citizenship"
which the aggrieved party caused to be published in the Manila Chronicle.

People of the Philippines v. Pelayo

For self defense to exist in instances such as this, the defendant should not go beyond explaining what
was previously said of him for the purpose of repairing or minimizing if not entirely removing the effect
of the damage caused to him. Where the defender goes beyond mere explaining his sideand/ or
repairing, minimizing or removing the effect of the damage by hitting back with equally if not more
scurrilous remarks against the one who first made the imputation, his retaliation becomes entirely an
independent act of his own of which he may stand to answer the consequences.

State of Necessity

Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co.

It appears that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of
driver Julito to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-
truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline
deposit of the company. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater
harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision.

Fulfillment of Duty and Exercise of Right

People of the Philippines v. Oanis

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
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and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
otherwise. It may be true that the man they were searching for was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a
fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no
justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can
be offered, as when he is asleep.

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of
a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.

Lawful Order

People of the Philippines v. Beronilla

The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late
Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters, instructing all
military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of
at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote.

People of the Philippines v. Barroga

Even supposing that the order was indeed given to defendant, and that the defendant committed the
crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield
the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be
due, or it must be a compliance with a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern,
and that the person commanding, act within the scope of his authority.

ARTICLE 12:
Exempting Circumstances

Insanity/Imbecility

People of the Philippines v. Ambal

The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. In order
that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere

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abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. In the instant case, the alleged insanity
of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not
overthrown.

xxxxxx

To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.

The test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to
distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is the subject of the
inquiry.

Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is
excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental
disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act.

The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible
impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person
alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of
a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for
his unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect
having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement or
deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a physical or mental disease."

The general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to understand the nature and
consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as to such act,
and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test.

People of the Philippines v. Puno

When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. Insanity
should be proven by clear and positive evidence. Unfortunately for Puno, the facts and the findings of the
psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will.

People of the Philippines v. Dungo

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The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to
evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime. One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged
cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts.

People of the Philippines v. Taneo

The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.

Minority

People of the Philippines v. Estepano

Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen
(15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment. The minor
referred to here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise. However, the prosecution failed to prove that Rene
acted with discernment.

Llave v. People of the Philippines

Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the rape
incident, as well as his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment. The fact appears
undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecutions witness, Teofisto Bucud,
petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly
conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed
something wrong.

Jarco Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Held: Yes. The conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence is applicable in this case. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine
years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt
from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a
case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and aquasi-delict and required discernment as a condition
of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed
to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our
law.

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Guevarra v. Almodovar

The terms intent and discernment convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the
mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to
the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot
another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same
person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that
since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act
to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

xxxxxx

Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect
to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that
"discernment" connotes 'intent', invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto. In that case We held that
the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged
when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying
that:

If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the
accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be
fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction
tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or
exception.

If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a
quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.

The word "intent" has been defined as

(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a
person acts.'

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in
Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:

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The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's
act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person
may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may
cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue,
as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment,
then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot
him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the
basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part
of the accused. 1In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:

The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has)
no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely
exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the
act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an
element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as
defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which
includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below
fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-
offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off
with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec
nos distinguere debemos.

In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the
law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying
sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:

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That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she. .
."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita
Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got
drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what
would be the consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be
wrong.

From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What
We meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge,
on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not
validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged
"intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of
passivity while the latter signifies activity.

People of the Philippines v. Sarcia

In this case, it can be concluded that in 1996, accused was 18 years old. Since the prosecution was not able
to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial
to the latter.

xxxxxx

Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his
appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and
July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed
down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with
Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is now
approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City
and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.

R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted
and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18
years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case

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wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.

The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child
in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court
(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the
law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.49 Since R.A.
No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another
who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations 50 on Senate Bill No. 1402
(Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted
below:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the
child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention
should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx

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Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective
of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled,
or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the
court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated,
even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.

People of the Philippines v. Mantalaba

While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic.

Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear

People of the Philippines v. Caballeros

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The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force.
Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against
him.

People of the Philippines v. Exaltacion

The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to
the Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity,
relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct
of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to
Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the
bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This
conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and
that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he
was captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.

Accident

Pomoy v. People of the Philippines

Balboa was killed by an accidental firing of the gun which resulted in the course of the scuffling for the
gun. Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing, Pomoy is exempted from criminal
responsibility under Article 12.

xxxxxx

Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out
of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-
defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both
parties attempts to possess the firearm.

Absolutory Causes

People of the Philippines v. Doria

It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons
violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into
a criminal career. 25 Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had.26 Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind
of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state,
or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused

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is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there
is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature
of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing
sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden
shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal
courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v.
United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the
accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial
exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his
past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to
assess his state of mind before the crime. 33 The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to
commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a
"trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 35If the accused was found to have
been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will
fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. 36 Some states, however, have adopted
the "objective" test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v.
State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the
test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. 39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by
government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.
For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one
who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; 41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible,
but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to sentiments such as
pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this test believe that
courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm
but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the
government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion
that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties. 45 Hence, the
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer
and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of
detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct
would on a normal person. 46

Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was
predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices
will be deemed impermissible. 47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the
more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have

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committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the other extreme,
the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's
predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon
the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The undisputed fact
that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a
criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50

Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United
States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. State, 52 the Florida Supreme Court
declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is
satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca
v. State, 54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a
criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of
predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of
proper investigation. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.

As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught inflagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of
smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to
commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the
accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug. 57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v. Abella, 59 we
acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price,
. . . a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused. 60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated
that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to
Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by
pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure
of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.

xxxxxx

Entrapment and Instigation. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime
for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent
the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning

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complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if
the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an
agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for
larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being
authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless
committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the
purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

xxxxxx

It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the
accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. 72 To determine whether
there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending
officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied
in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting the
"objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v.
Boholst, 74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation
and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him.
Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal
record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to
engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-
narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience designed
to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita. 78 They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson,
etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to
many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how
furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon
the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that
the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or
through informants, spies or stool pigeons.

ARTICLE 13:

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Mitigating Circumstances

Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong

People of the Philippines v. Ural

G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974

Ural had no intention to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him. Hence, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong was appreciated in his favor.

People of the Philippines v. Callet

G.R. No. 135701 May 9, 2002

The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon
used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the
accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be
held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.

Sufficient provocation

People of the Philippines v. Leonor

G.R. No. 125053 March 25, 1999

The provocation sufficient to mitigate the liability for an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of
the retaliatory act. Leonors claim that a push and bad words justify retaliation with a knife is
undeserving of belief and does not entitle him to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of prior
provocation by the offended party.

Immediate vindication of a grave offense

People of the Philippines v. Espina

G.R. Nos. 132325-26 July 26, 2001

As the evidence on record show, Espina was urinated on by the victim in front of the guests. The act of
the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated Espina, came within the purview of a grave
offense under Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines v. Diokno

G.R. No. L-45100 October 26, 1936

Although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of said month and
year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the
deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to
the vindication thereof. Herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a
daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and
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tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members
thereof.

xxxxxx

The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he
refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to
produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which
they are charged.

United States v. Ampar

G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917

There is an immediate vindication of a grave offense in this case. The offense which Ampar was
endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this
defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of
so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a
mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for
the crime of murder.

People of the Philippines v. Pajares

G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992

The mitigating circumstance being claimed cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused because, while
it may be true that his was mauled by the companions of the deceased there is a lapse of about ten (10)
hours between said incident and the killing of Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to
enable appellant to recover his serenity.

Passion or obfuscation

People of the Philippines v. Adlawan

G.R. No. 131839 January 30, 2002

The mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated to mitigate accused-

appellant's criminal liability. The requisites of this mitigating circumstance are: (1) that there be an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. In the case at bar, Adlawan thought
his father whose face was bloodied and lying unconscious on the ground was dead. Surely, such a
scenario is sufficient to trigger an uncontrollable burst of legitimate passion. His act, therefore, of
shooting the deceased, right after learning that the latter was the one who harmed his father, satisfies the
requisite of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Paragraph 6, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.

United States v. Hicks

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G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909

The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate
from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

United States v. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912

The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had
theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was
entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of the
above-cited article.

xxxxxx

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of
self-control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to
accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already
provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those
already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his
victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his
apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design,
behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.

In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation,
disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit
relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the present case
however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and
obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation
that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the
supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and
natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the
extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.

Drunkenness

People of the Philippines v. Crisostomo

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G.R. No. L-32243 April 15, 1988

The allegation of Crisostomo that he was drunk when he committed the offense is self-serving and
uncorroborated. Besides, appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy, and that he was on the
way to another drinking spree. Obviously he had not drunk enough. He remembers the details of the
shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed and the persons who were with him.
He realized the gravity of the offense he committed so he fled and hid from the authorities. He sought
sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca
bus to Manila. All these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been impaired.

Illness

People of the Philippines v. Javier

G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999

For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the presence
of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2)
such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. However, aside from the
testimony of Javier, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at the time of
killing. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness
which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing. On the other hand, it is clear that
Javier was aware of the acts he committed. He remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use
of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding
himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital.
Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the
killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his mental
faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his
will-power.

Analogous Circumstances

People of the Philippines v. Navasca

G.R. No. L-28107 March 15, 1977

The act of testifying for the prosecution, without previous discharge, by Lorenzo Soberano should be
considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a plea of guilty, hence there exist in the
case of Lorenzo Soberano, one mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance which offset
each other.

Canta v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 140937 February 28, 2001

In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint
had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly
held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the

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authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require. In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre
Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of
having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary
surrender and should be considered in favor of petitioner.

ARTICLE 14:
Aggravating Circumstances

Special Laws

People of the Philippines v. Ladjaalam

G.R. Nos. 136149-51 September 19, 2000

R.A. No. 8294 states that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can
no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Celino, Sr. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007

The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime
was committed by the person arrested. The word committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of
the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final
conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission. When the other offense
involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. No. 8294, any information for illegal possession of
firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with
such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed
as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat. Conversely, when the other
offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. No. 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

Insult to Public Authorities

People of the Philippines v. Rodil

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

The Chief of Police is considered a public authority for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to
maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the
laws and municipal ordinances. And since Rodil knew Panaligan as the Chief of Police and Panaligan
was present when Rodil stabbed Lt. Masana, the aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to
public authority may be appreciated.

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xxxxxx

The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-
smuggling unit, is patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a
person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or
contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either
circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either
aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged with and
convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for the
death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen.
Mariano Castaneda;

(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for the
killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero supra where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police
Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.

People of the Philippines v. Tac-an

G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

Teachers of a public or a recognized private school are deemed to be persons in authority only for the
purposes of application of Articles 148 and 151 of the Revised Penal Code. They are not considered as
public authorities for the purpose of aggravating the crime committed.

Dwelling

People of the Philippines v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. Nos. L-40367-69 August 22, 1985

There is no dispute that the place where the crimes herein involved were committed is the house of
Consolacion Grulla. It is there where she lives with her daughter, Natividad and where Salvacion was
temporarily staying. The fact that Salvacion's stay in the said place may be considered as a temporary
sojourn adds no validity to Pacito's stance on this point. Hence, in a case, the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling is present when the appellant killed his wife in the house occupied by her other than the

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conjugal home. Similarly, dwelling is aggravating where the offended party was raped in a boarding
house rented by her.

People of the Philippines v. Apduhan, Jr.

G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968

The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, like
the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Dwelling is inherent only in
crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and
robbery in an inhabited house. In a case, the Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances of dwelling and
scaling were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with
violence or intimidation against persons the authors thereof could have committed it without the
necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim. The commission of the crime in another's
dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm.

xxxxxx

Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of art. 294 are
committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods. The circumstance
of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294.
Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones
graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which
are described in art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under art.
295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code.1 Hence, with the present
wording of art. 2952 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide"
under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.

Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by the members of the band. The
ascertainment of the definite function and range of applicability of this article in relation to articles 294
and 295 is essential in the disposition of the case at bar.

Nighttime

People of the Philippines v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979

The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed at
night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is this
basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, provides that it is an
aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may
facilitate the commission of the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating

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circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the
commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was
purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely
sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether
nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the
course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m.
was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity
by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their Identity because of the
darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. There circumstances combine to pass the
objective test, and find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense.
Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of
the belief that they could not be readily identified.

xxxxxx

Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. But in the case of implied
conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to how and when
the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can not be
determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to
consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity
for reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design.

xxxxxx

In People vs. Metran, the aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men, abuse of superiority, and
nocturnity, were considered as constituting treachery, which qualified the crime as murder, since there
was no direct evidence as to the manner of the attack. However, in this case we believe that the correct
qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here we are confronted with a helpless
victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor
unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The victim could have made a defense; hence, the
assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing when the intent to kill was formed,
it can not be said that treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule is found in People vs. Proceso
Bustos, where alevosia was not appreciated because it was deemed included in abuse of superiority.

We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made this
finding on parallel facts Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where four persons
attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and treachery was
not proven, the fact that there were four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority.

Evident Premeditation

United States v. Manalinde

G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909

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On going to Cotabato, Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the
fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the
crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is
always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent
circumstances.

People of the Philippines v. Discalsota

G.R. No. 136892 April 11, 2002

In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. The time appellant determined to
commit the crime was when he started shouting at the victim and the latters companions: You, there,
get out and we will kill you! By staying outside the house and following the victims companions when
they came out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his determination. However, the third element is
not present. It took less than an hour from the time appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as
manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the time he stabbed the victim. The span of less than
one hour could not have afforded the former full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the crime he committed. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the
determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.

Treachery

United States v. Baluyot

G.R. No. L-14476 November 6, 1919

Even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of
any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is
helpless and unable to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that,
where there is no treachery in the attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no
treachery which will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow
was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so frequently
the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.

People of the Philippines v. Escote

G.R. No. 140756 April 4, 2003

It is true that treachery cannot be appreciated in the crime of robbery as it is a crime against property and
treachery may be appreciated only in crimes against persons. However, in robbery with homicide, while
treachery cannot aggravate robbery, treachery may be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned for
the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is killed
with treachery. Hence, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.
Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

xxxxxx

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The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There
is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.52 The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be
appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable
to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.53 In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds,
one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the
upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with
handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When
the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim
was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death,
leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity
of man to his fellowmen.

The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan
and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has ruled over the years54 that
treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex
crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo
indivisible).55 However, this Court in two cases has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against
property and hence treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.56 It held in another case that treachery is not
appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property. 57 These
rulings of the Court find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape,
homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of
the criminal.58 Indeed, in People vs. Cando,59 two distinguished members of this Court advocated a review
of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. They
opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all, in People vs. Bariquit,60 this
Court in a per curiamdecision promulgated in year 2000 declared that treachery is applicable only to
crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide,
treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This
Court opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.

Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not in full
accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in crimes
against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code.61 Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is
of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.62 However, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado (Retired) is of a different view.63 He says that treachery cannot be considered in robbery but can
be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs.
Balagtas64 for the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of
homicide is killed with treachery.

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xxxxxx

Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying
circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878,
the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense.69

Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty
for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances
which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.70 Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or

which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

xxx

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to
such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially
punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and
prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide
for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.

In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with homicide. The high
court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code) and
ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it
inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to
said crime. The high court of Spain was not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified
as a crime against property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with
homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It
further declared that it would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery with
homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so, the high tribunal ruled, because when robbery is
coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not only an assault(ataca) on the property of the
victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):

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In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks
at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery
which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the
constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex
and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent
any generic mitigating circumstance.

People of the Philippines v. Caratao

G.R. No. 126281 June 10, 2003

Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused without danger to his person. The first element was established by the fact that appellant
suddenly attacked from behind the unsuspecting and unarmed victim who was then astride his
motorcycle. However, the second element is lacking. The rule is that chance encounters, impulse killing
or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are
generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a
treacherous mode of attack. It appears from the evidence that appellants grudge against the victim was
brought about only moments before the attack, when the latter ignored his repeated pleas for rice. It was
thus only by chance and not by plan that he attacked the victim the way he did.

People of the Philippines v. Sitchon

G.R. No. 134362 February 27, 2002

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is beyond
dispute that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to
put up a defense, is treacherous.

People of the Philippines v. Ancheta

G.R. Nos. 138306-07 December 21, 2001

While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never
saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the
commencement of the assault. And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the
aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and
developed, treachery can in no way be established. Neither was treachery established in the shooting of
Jonathan Aromin. In the case at bar, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that accused-
appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime against Jonathan
Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw accused-appellant carrying a
gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a wall. Thus, there could be no
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treachery since prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and even managed
to flee, albeit unsuccessfully.

Ignominy

People of the Philippines v. Alfanta

G.R. No. 125633 December 9, 1999

There was ignominy in this case because the appellant used not only the missionary position but also the
same position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The contention of the accused may be true. However,
such position is being done by consenting partners. The case herein involved is not between consenting
partners.

Cruelty

People of the Philippines v. Dizon

G.R. No. 134802 October 26, 2001

The appreciation of cruelty, as an aggravating circumstance, is relative. It depends upon the crime
committed. As long as the wrong done in the commission of the offense is deliberately augmented and
that such wrong is not essential for the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose of the offender, the same
could be considered as aggravating. The nature of the wrong or the number thereof is immaterial. The
test of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing
another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or
outraged, or scoffed at his person or corpse. Where the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, inflicted
on the victim unnecessary physical and moral pain, with the intention of deliberately and inhumanly
intensifying or aggravating the sufferings of the victim, cruelty is present.

ARTICLE 17:
Principals

Conspiracy

People of the Philippines v. Pelagio

G.R. No. L-16177 May 24, 1967

As to Pelagio, his criminal liability cannot be extended beyond simple robbery and he is innocent of the
policeman's death. When the homicide was committed, Pelagio could not have had the least intervention
or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far as the records disclose,
the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is no evidence that homicide
besides was determined by them when they plotted the crime. In addition, Guico should have been
acquitted. There is ample and positive evidence on record that Guico was absent not only from the
second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the
first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy, such participation and involvement,
however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone,

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without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances which,
however, do not include robbery

People of the Philippines v. Federico

G.R. No. 99840 August 14, 1995

The trial court overlooked the fact that the conspiracy which the records and the evidence of this case
show and which the prosecution successfully established is to kill Fernando only and not Escala also. It is
very obvious that the accused-appellant and his cousins intended to harm Fernando because of the bad
blood that existed between the latter and Francisco. The actions of the accused-appellant in arming
himself with a sling and darts which he aimed towards the bakery where Fernando and the others were
and in blocking the path of Fernando when the latter tried to run away from Francisco establish his
concurrence in the criminal purpose of Francisco, the actual assailant of Fernando. But with respect to the
stabbing of the victim herein, Pastor Escala, the evidence failed to established conspiracy. The rule has
always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence
of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. In such a case, the dictum that the act of one
is the act of all does not hold true anymore.

People of the Philippines v. Aguilos

G.R. Nos. 136149-51 September 19, 2000

Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does
not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the
plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly
contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.

Principals by Inducement

United States v. Indanan

G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913

The domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to
make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders. In the case at bar, the words and
acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any
official relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. According to
tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and
whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically
committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts

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committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This
representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that
the accused knew the representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional
factor going to insure obedience to his orders.

xxxxxx

The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles to
particular cases.

In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the defendants
conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys with which to open
it. He took no immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:

These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as
the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was
the first to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out
himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime by a promise to
pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to induce him to commit
the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished, instructed him as to the
best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all
the difficulties in the way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in
question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said
robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2
of article 13 of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the accused induced
certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that by such act they would be
able to obtain P40 which was then in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned,
saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao
and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town." They having made an unsuccessful
attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and explained why they had not been
able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what
I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill
them." The Igorrotes then spent three days clearing some land for another person from whom they
received P2.25. About noon of the third day of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now
you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day,
and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same place
you were concealed before." The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of
the crime, and that he was liable as principal.

In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the accused had a
conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato
and his associates, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon
you a commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when you

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arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave
him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then he gave him a bolo and P10 and
said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be responsible to
the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The
court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of
article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:

Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and more or less
dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this
crime was committed, a man of great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people
working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political leader of his
party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-in-law in the municipal
council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were members of the police force.
He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic Church and the
Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where
the question of murdering the priest was discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He
dominated all who were present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and
directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his
uncle Gil and reported the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great
and powerful that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly induced to
murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no question.

In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the "one who
employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he does nothing himself in
the actual commission of the crime."

In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a married woman
suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband
in order that thereafter they might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and
actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference of the husband, killed
him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together as man and wife until
the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:

We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully established por pacto (for
a consideration); that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations
with the murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept) which constituted "a
real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement (excitacion) to commit the crime." The
propositions and suggestions of the woman constituted something more than mere counsel or
advice which her co-defendant was entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a
consideration which, in view of the relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong
enough to induce the man to take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to
these illicit relations she had required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent
suggestions that he commit the crime had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.

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In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the accused proposed to
his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied
them during the assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the stairs of
said house so that his companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he accompanied them to the
place where the deceased was killed. These facts were held by the court to be sufficient to make the
accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct participation.

In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem to
have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill
Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official
position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom,
however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose commands were to
be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically committed the crime that he had a
warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon them, in
effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it
produced the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the
representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure
obedience to his orders.

Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the accused within
the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still remain all of
the elements necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore
cited and the principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the determination of whether or
not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it may be stated as a general proposition
that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it
becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the intention of
producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the person so
induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made
directly for the purpose in view.

People of the Philippines v. Kiichi Omine

G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935

Under the circumstances of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the
words in question, they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not
appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first
place Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have
uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question were not in this particular
case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo
Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to the testimony of Angel Pulido,
he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo
Autor.

Principals by Indispensable Cooperation

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People of the Philippines v. Montealegre

G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally
guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. Montealegre was a
principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly
interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: (1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there
is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

United States v. Lim Buanco

G.R. No. L-5240 November 19, 1909

Lim Buanco certainly by implication represented to the bank that possessed a credit to which he was not
entitled, and with the assistance of Reyes he gave that claim the color of truth, and thus deceived the
bank. The fact that Reyes falsified the accounts-current of Lim Buanco, making him appear as a creditor
when as a matter of fact he was a debtor of the bank, together with the fact that he acted in collusion with
Lim Buanco, made him guilty of a deceit. The fraudulent conduct of Reyes cannot be deprived of its
criminal character by the fact that other officers, directors, or employees of the bank may have been
careless in the performance of their duties. Whatever may have been the strict duty of the other officers of
the bank, the fact remains that Reyes was guilty of the fraudulently manipulating the records of the bank,
and he cannot escape the legal consequences thereof by showing that if others had properly performed
their duties he would not have been able to have accomplished anything by his fraudulent acts.

People of the Philippines v. Madali

G.R. Nos. L-67803-04 July 30, 1990

Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and
warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a
victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the
commission of the felonious acts of shooting. Ricarte could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal
acts without Annie's cooperation and assistance since it was not too dark that night. Neither may Annie's
shouts of be considered as having incited Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by
inducement. There is no proof that those inciting words had great dominance and influence over Madali
as to become the determining cause of the crimes. Hence, Annie is liable only as an accomplice and not as a
principal.

ARTICLE 18:
Accomplices

People of the Philippines v. Tamayo

G.R. No. L-18289 November 17, 1922

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After the deceased had received the fatal injury, Ramon continued to hold and choke the deceased until
after life was extinct. It shows that Ramon approved of the blow strucked by Jose, thereby showing his
participation in the criminal design of Jose and this is sufficient to make Ramon responsible as an
accomplice.

People of the Philippines v. Realon

G.R. No. L-30832 August 29, 1980

Soliven cannot be held criminally responsible as principal since there is no direct proof that he conspired
with his co-appellant or directly participated in the commission thereof. He cannot also be held criminally
responsible as an accomplice. In order to hold one liable as an accomplice, it is essential that it be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that between the supposed accomplice and the principal, there is community of
criminal purpose which implies that it be shown that the supposed accomplice committed the acts
imputed to him with the intention to help morally or materially in the commission of the crime. However,
Soliven is not without criminal liability. Soliven is guilty of the crime as an accessory.

In finding Soliven guilty as an accessory, We have considered the following facts and circumstances as
gathered from the evidence: (1) from where he was seated at the grandstand of the Athletic Bowl, Soliven
must have seen Realon leave his place in the formation, approach the victim from behind and fire the gun
at the latter; (2) Soliven ran with Realon when the latter fled from the scene of the crime; (3) while in
flight, Realon passed the fatal weapon to Soliven who in turn dumped the gun inside a garbage barrel;
and (4) upon his apprehension Soliven did not show or make any act of protestation. From the foregoing,
there can be no conclusion other than that Soliven witnessed his friend Realon commit the crime and that
having done so, Soliven assisted in Realon's escape by concealing the instrument used in the perpetration
of the offense in an obvious effort or attempt to prevent its discovery. The additional fact that Soliven
made no protest at the time of his apprehension only serves to indicate a guilty mind.

People of the Philippines v. Doctolero

G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991

The presence of the Conrado and another brother upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their
brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing
the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child. Where one goes with the principals, and
in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former
effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.

ARTICLE 19:
Accessories

Profiting from the Effects of the Crime

Mendoza v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-46484 January 29, 1988

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The testimony of Reponte that there was a previous understanding among the accused to sell the stolen
RCA rice to Mendoza is sufficient in this case. While there is no direct proof that Mendoza knew that the
rice had been stolen, the totality of circumstantial evidence point to the fact that he knew that the rice he
was receiving from Frank was stolen. Circumstantial evidence may be the basis for conviction if there is
more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences may be derived are proven, and the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. All
these requirements are satisfied in this case.

Taer v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990

The facts established Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either as
principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part
subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an
accessory (for the crime of cattle rustling) after the fact. By employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer
was profiting by the objects of the theft.

Presidential Decree No. 1612

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994

Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing, it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found
in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other
natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in
the fundamental law. The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612.

xxxxxx

Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is
defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light
under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification
set forth in Article 60 thereof. Noting, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and
thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready
buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy
penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory
in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under
P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the
crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the
other, are separate and distinct offenses. 13 The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable

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considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing 14 and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

Tan v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 134298 August 26, 1999

The crime of fencing requires that a theft or robbery should have been committed. However, complainant
did not report any loss. As complainant reported no loss, it cannot be held for certain that there was
committed a crime of theft. Thus, the element that there a crime of robbery or theft has been committed is
absent.

Assisting the Principal to Escape

People of the Philippines v. Talingdan

G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978

Accused-wife is guilty as an accessory in this case. She was inside the room when her husband was shot.
As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants
of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits,
Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of
warning her, Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later, when the peace
officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas,
before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-
appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active
in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in the
escape of the principal in the crime which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

Vino v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the
principal since the corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct
from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal. In addition, notwithstanding the acquittal of Salazar, the alleged assailant, Vino may still be
convicted as an accessory. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence
in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he
assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be
identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

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The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As
long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the
conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity
(Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact
established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of
the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was
committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction
of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense
had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The
trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius
Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is
uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the
information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as
his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father
and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure
of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug
recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the
crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court
made the following observation:

There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law enforcement
agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public
prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to
adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as
the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.

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A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as
passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the
crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although
not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and
held liable independently of the assailant.

We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and
sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the
responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held
criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two
witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of
Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively
identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against
Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was
established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of
the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of
the accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is
indubitable.

Complex Crimes

Compound Crimes

People of the Philippines v. Pincalin

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex
offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense.

People of the Philippines v. Toling

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they
cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
refers to cases where a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.

People of the Philippines v. Tabaco

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

In view of the special mechanism of the weapon used in this case, the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the

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trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced
them. The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.

Complex Crime Proper

Enrile v. Salazar
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The doctrine laid down in the case of People v. Hernandez is still binding operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

People of the Philippines v. Valdez

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment
at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder. Therefore, accused is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four
counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case.

People of the Philippines v. Garcia

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

There is complex crime only as to the first rape but not as to the succeeding rapes. Therefore, the crimes
committed are complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and three counts of rape. The crime of
forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer
be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from
and considered independently of the forcible abduction.

People of the Philippines v. Alfeche

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Paragraphs one to five of Article 294 are single, special and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as
defined under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 17 The penalties imposed do not take into account the
value of the personal property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or
intimidation.

Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible crime of
occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. It is likewise not a complex crime as defined under Article 48. However, while
Article 294 provides a single penalty for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single,
albeit two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of violence,
and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. This is clear

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from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him." For want of a better
term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty.

What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the
violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But, whenever,
appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on
the value of the gain obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the
crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2 of Article 263 is
committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; or when, in
the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its
commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; or when it is
committed through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by subdivisions
1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266
of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312. However, he
shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation and physical
injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical injuries 18 or for the intimidation,
which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal
Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall
be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100 per centum of such gain, but in no case less than seventy-five
(P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to
500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.

Batulanon v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document. Hence, it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If
the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime to be charged is estafa.

Continued Crimes

People of the Philippines v. De Leon

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one
occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully
belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one
crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two
crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations
nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.

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Santiago v. Garchitorena
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

There was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be filed against her. For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and
same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. In addition,
although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, the concept of delito continuado has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws.

Gamboa v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the deposits made by the customers
of the optical supply company cannot be considered as proceeding from a single criminal act within the
meaning of Article 48. The abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but
on variable dates. Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal
resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by itself.

Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private
respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". In the above formulation of Cuello Calon,
We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain day as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code. As earlier pointed out, an individual abstraction or
misappropriation results in a complete execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private
respondent cannot be held to have entertained continously the same criminal intent in making the first
abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days and months until
December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit
by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession and control. At most,
his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each business
day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result,
there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted
and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be said that the City Fiscal
had acted properly when he filed only one information for every single day of abstraction and bank
deposit made by private respondent. 10 The similarity of pattern resorted to by private respondent in
making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to divisible crimes.

People of the Philippines v. Penas

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The three falsifications proceeded from a single purpose of the accused; that is to appropriate the P600.
When, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered only as one offense.

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xxxxxx

On the dates alleged in the three informations, the appellant was assistant postmaster in the municipality
of Barotac Viejo, for which reason he was aware that no money order could be brought or issued for a
sum greater than $100, as expressly provided in section 1968 of the Administrative Code. In accordance,
therefore, with said provision of the law, in order to issue a money order for P600, it was necessary to
make three separate money orders.

As shown by Exhibits A, B and C, which are the falsified money orders subject of the three informations,
the appellant falsified the same on a single date: November 24, 1936, and he collected them also on a
single date, January 4, 1937 from which it is inferred that the three acts of falsification and the said
three acts of appropriation of the sum of P200 in each case proceed from a single purpose of the
appellant, namely, to appropriate for himself the sum of P600. If he had to resort to this means falsifying
three money orders, it was because he was aware that he could not do otherwise, in view of the legal
provision, which he was supposed to know, limiting the issuance of money orders to sums not greater
than P100 or P200. When, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts
are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense. Under this view, the appellant committed
only the complex crime of estafa with falsification of three postal money orders which are, without doubt,
official and public documents, the falsification being the means he employed to appropriate, as he did for
himself the sum of P600, to the prejudice of the Government.

People of the Philippines v. Madrigal-Gonzales

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The existence of the motive to conceal malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of fact which should
be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of double jeopardy. The Court cannot
assume that the purpose of committing the twenty-seven (27) falsifications was to conceal the
malversation. This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount they had malversed
on a certain period, they had purposedly perpetrated the corresponding falsification to cover up such
amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been completely misappropriated.
In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed that in the falsification of each document, the
criminal intent was separated and distinct.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

People of the Philippines v. Bon

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Prision mayor. The effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 is the deletion of the penalty of death from
the enumeration of penalties under Article 71. Thus, reclusion perpetua, now being the highest penalty, is
the penalty imposed for consummated qualified rape. Necessarily, the penalty for the attempted
qualilfied rape should be counted from reclusion perpetua.

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The graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the
exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified
rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death
for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal.

xxxxxx

The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent
effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having
barred the application of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In
particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale
for graduated penalties.

Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of
appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous
examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion
temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such
sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as
amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the
same sentence as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus,
the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in
ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.

The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the
reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two
degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.

xxxxxx

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth,
"death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in
the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled
by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of
"death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death,"
as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not
concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we

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did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings
that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as
it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal,
would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive
benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of
Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No.
9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did
to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their
reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not make operative the release of
such convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There
are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted.
Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist
detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.

People of the Philippines v. Simon

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

For the purpose of applying the provisions Indeterminate Sentence Law, reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment are the same. Hence, when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable.

Extinction of Criminal Liability

Pardon and Amnesty

People of the Philippines v. Patriarca

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The amnesty granted in favor of Patriarca totally extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. Once
granted, it is binding and effected. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

Prescription

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Domingo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, crimes for violation of its provisions shall prescribed in 15 years from
the commission of the crime or from its discovery. In the case at bar, the crime could have been
discovered only between February 1986 and May 26, 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed
considering that the President, at the time the illegal transaction was made, was in conspiracy to defraud
the government.

People of the Philippines v. Pacificador

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice
thereof to the whole world. Hence, the period of prescription of the crime started to run from such date
because it is the date of the discovery of the crime.

Sermonia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of Bigamy as judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in
secrecy from the spouse of a previous subsisting marriage.

Romualdez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The applicable law as regards the interruption of the period of prescription is Act No. 3326. However,
since Act No. 3326 did not provide that absence of the offender from the country will toll the running of
the prescriptive period, it can only be interpreted that such silence means that the Act No. 3326 did not
intend such as an interruption of the period of prescription.

Probation

Llamadao v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The Probation Law provides for a specific period within which an applicant may apply for probation. An
application for probation may be filed only before the judgment of conviction has become final.
Necessarily, it may be filed only within the period for perfecting an appeal. Since such period already
lapsed, Llamado can no longer apply for probation.

Bala v. Martinez
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

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The expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. There must be
first issued by the court an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the
probation officer.

Salgado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The condition imposed did not alter the decision of the trial court. The condition did not increase nor
decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but only provided for the manner of payment of
the same. After all, the conditions enumerated under Section 10 of the Probation Law are not exclusive.

Francisco v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The Probation Law expressly provides that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Having perfecting an appeal, the
application for probation of petitioner should not be granted.

Moreno v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Moreno is qualified. The effect of the grant of probation to Moreno is the suspension of the imposition of
the sentence of imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties. Because the accessory penalty was
suspended, there is no legal impediment for his desire to run for public office.

Colinares v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The appeal made by petitioner did not bar him from applying for probation considering that the
judgment appealed from sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of more than six years as maximum
thereby disqualifying him from the benefits of the probation law. Hence, before the appeal, he was not in
a position which would enable him to choose whether to appeal or apply for probation.

CIVIL LIABILITY

Subsidiary Liability

Basilio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The statutory basis of an employers civil liability is found in Article 103 of the RPC. This liability is
enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution
against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the

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offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of
such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.

Philippine Rabbit v. Mangawang

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

Petitioner had no right to appeal since it was not a party in the criminal case against Ancheta. And since
petitioner has no right to appeal, it cannot claim that it was deprived of due process. Indeed, to allow an
employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via appeal would be to defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.

Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies

Carpio v. Doroja
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action.
Moreover, as long as all the requisites are present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. In this case, all the requisites
were satisfied.

What Civil Liability Includes

Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

In case the felony involves death, indemnification includes consequential damages. In addition, moral
damages, which may be awarded even without proof, is included. Exemplary damages may also be
awarded as part of the civil liability depending on the presence of aggravating circumstances.
Compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased shall also constitute the civil
indemnity in favor of the offended party.

Extinction of Civil Liability

People of the Philippines v. Bayotas

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. When the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-
appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. Nevertheless, if the private offended
party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation.

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