How tax refunds are construed?

La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez

Facts:
Sometime in September 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons
of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central
Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November
1955 the Central filed, through the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20, 872.09 paid
(the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of 5
haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in
accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as amended by RA 1375.On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the
petition. The Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re\examination of all pertinent papers the
reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the
Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does
not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the
decision of the Auditor, Central Bankof the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme
Court.
Issue: WON upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act
No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).
Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were
imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by
planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word directly has been interpreted to mean without anything
intervening. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his
cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption. When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax
imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority
and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly
construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or
farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering useless the only exception expressly
established in the case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives

Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 184266, 11 November 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Value\Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer engaged in the importation and exportation business, as a pure buy\sell trader.
Petitioner alleged that from September 1998 to December 31, 2000, it paid an aggregate sum of input taxes for its importation of
food ingredients.Subsequently, these imported food ingredients were exported between the periods of April 1, 2000 to
December 31, 2000, from which the petitioner was able to generate export sales amounting to P114,577,937.24. The
aforestated export sales which transpired from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 were zero\ rated sales, pursuant to Section
106(A (2)(a)(1) of the NIRC of 1997.Petitioner alleged that the accumulated input taxes for the period of September 1, 1998 to
December 31, 2000 have not been applied against any output tax. On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed two
separate applications for the issuance of tax credit certificates.On July 24, 2002, in view of respondents inaction, petitioner
elevated the case before this Court by way of a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6513.Trial ensued and the
CTA First Division rendered a Decision on 13 June 2007. It denied petitioners claim for failure to comply with the invoicing
requirements prescribed under Section 113 in relation to Section 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 and
Section 4.108\1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7\95.On appeal, the CTA En Banc likewise denied the claim of petitioner citing
violation of the invoicing requirements.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a tax certificate or refund representing creditable input taxes
attributable to zero\rated sales?
HELD NO. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of
complete documents in support of the application within which to decide on the administrative claim.Counting 120 days from 26
March 2002, the CIR had until 24 July 2002 within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for an input VAT refund attributable
to the its zero\ rated sales for the period April to September 2000.On the other hand, the CIR had until 26 October 2002 within
which to decide on petitioners claim for refund filed on 28 June 2002, or for the period covering October to December 2000. In
this case, the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July 2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120\day
waiting period. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a
dismissal, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. In accordance with the ruling in San Roque and considering
that petitioners judicial claim was filed on 24 July 2002, when the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law and
BIR Ruling No. DA\489\03 had not yet been issued, petitioner does not have an excuse for not observing the 120+ 30 day
period. Failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory 120\day period is fatal to its claim and rendered the CT A devoid of
jurisdiction over the judicial claim
Who has burden of proof in tax cases?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEvs.COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 115349, APRIL 18, 1997

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: In the Interpretation of tax laws, a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax
unless it does so clearly, expressly and ambiguously. A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that
impose. Provisions of taxing laws are not to be extended by implication.
FACTS: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non\stock, non\profit educational institution with auxiliary units
and branches all over the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal
personality separate and distinct from that of private respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies
of Philippine society and culture, which occasionally accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international
organizations, private foundations and government agencies.Private respondent received from Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged deficiency
contractors tax, and an assessment dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for
the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter\protest and
subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the assessments.On 17 March 1988, petitioner
rendered a letter\decision canceling the assessment for deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency
contractors tax by increasing the amount due to P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration
or reinvestigation of the modified assessment.On 12 July 1993, the respondent court set aside respondents decision, and
canceling the deficiency contractors tax assessment in the amount of P46,516.41 exclusive of surcharge and interest for the
fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. No pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA\GR SP 31790,
affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a
petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ateneo de Manila University, through IPC, is performingthe work of an independent contractor thus
subjecting them to the 3% contractors tax levied by then Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue?
HELD: No. The CIR failed to apply the abovementioned doctrine as they should have determined first if the Ateneo was covered
by Section 205. Instead, they asked Ateneo to prove its exemption without establishing its coverage under Section 205. And as
stated by the Court of Tax Appeals, they found no evidence that Ateneo sells the services of IPC.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITYvs.HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, THE CITY OF CEBU,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, AND EUSTAQUIO B. CESA G.R. NO. 120082, SEPTEMBER
11, 1996
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:Statutes granting taxexemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayers and liberally in favor ofthe taxing authority.
FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958,
mandated to principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City... and such other airports as may be established
in the Province of Cebu... (Sec. 3, RA 6958).Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption
from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa,
Officer\in\Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the petitioner.Petitioner objected to such demand for payment is baseless and unjustified, claiming in its favor the
aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality
of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts
limitations on the taxing powers of local government units.Thecity refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC performing
proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234of the LGC. Petitioner filed a declaratory
relief before the RTC.The trial courtdismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew the tax exemption granted the GOCCs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Cebu has the powerto impose taxes on
petitioner?
HELD: Yes, the City of Cebu has the powerto impose taxes onpetitioner since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally
withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including government\owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government\owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of
its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn.

DIAGEO PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Petitioner Diageo Philippines, Inc. (Diageo) is primarily engaged in the business of importing, exporting, manufacturing,
marketing, distributing, buying and selling, by wholesale, all kinds of beverages and liquors. It is registered with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) as an excise tax taxpayer. Diageo purchased raw alcohol from its supplier for use in the manufacture of
its beverage and liquor products. The supplier imported the raw alcohol and paid the related excise taxes thereon before the
same were sold to the petitioner. The purchase price for the raw alcohol included, among others, the excise taxes paid by the
supplier. Diageo filed with the BIR applications for tax refund/issuance of tax credit certificates corresponding to the excise taxes
which its supplier paid but passed on to it as part of the purchase price of the subject raw alcohol invoking Section 130(D) of the
Tax Code.
CIR, CTA and CTA en banc ruled that Diageo is not the proper party to claim a refund but the supplier.
ISSUE : WON Diageo has the legal personality to file a claim for refund or tax credit for the excise taxes paid by its supplier on
the raw alcohol it purchased and used in the manufacture of its exported goods.
HELD: No. Diageo has no legal personality to file the claim. Excise taxes partake of the nature of indirect taxes. Excise taxes
imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on property which are imposed on "goods manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported." Though excise taxes are paid
by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from the place of production or by the owner or importer
before the release of imported articles from the customs house, the same partake of the nature of indirect taxes when it is
passed on to the subsequent purchaser. Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls
on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person. When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in
effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered.
Accordingly, when the excise taxes paid by the supplier were passed on to Diageo, what was shifted is not the tax per se but an
additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the supplier remains the statutory taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser, actually
shoulders the burden of tax.
The statutory taxpayer is the proper
party to claim refund of indirect
taxes.

TAX sales construed

FEDERICO SERFINO AND CORNA BACHAR vs. CA AND LOPEZ SUGAR MILL CO. INC.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of tax payers but also all any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to
enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public is an essential and indispensable requirement
of law, the non\fulfillment of which vitiates the sale.
FACTS: On August 25, 1937 a parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares, was patented by Pacifico Casa mayor. Not long
after, the land was sold to Nemesia Baltazar which then sold it to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc. Lopez Sugfa Central Mill did
not registered to the Office of Registry of Deeds until December 17,1964. However, the Registry of Deeds did not accept the
registration because the said land was already registered under the name of the spouses Frederico Serfino and Corna Bachar.
The couple said they acquired the land when the Provincial Treasurer of Negros auctioned it due to tax deliquency. Serfino
mortgaged the land to PNB to secure a loan amounting to five thousand pesos which is why when Lopez Sugar Mill filed an
action to recover the land, which the lower courtgranted and cancelled the title of TCT No. 985 (under Serfinos name), the lower
court orderedLopez Sugar Mill Co. Inc.to pay PNB the balance of Serfino.Both parties appealed the decision.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the auction ofthe property is null and void? 2.Whether or not PNB is entitled to the payment?
HELD: The selling of the land by the Province of Negros to Serfino is void because the provinces not the real owner.Since
Baltazar did not receive any notice nor was she given a certificate of sale, it is clear that the sale was null and void.PNB is
entitled to the payment as the invalidity of the auction was not PNBs fault and when they loaned the sum of money and
considered the land as mortgage, they were acting in good faith. It should be noted that there was a title under Serfinos name,
which served as PNBs basis.

SPOUSES RAMON AND ROSIOTA TAN vs. GORGONIA BANTEGUI,

FACTS:
In 1954 Gorgonia Bantegui ( married to Jesus Bayot) acquired a parcel of land located in Quezon City under TCT no. 28458.
The property was rented to spouses Florante B. Caedo and Florencia B. Caedo who resided in said property until 1994. In 1970
Bantequi left for the US, returned to the Phil in 1988 to execute a special power of attorney, making Guadalupe B. Bautista her
representative before going back to the US.
Taxes were paid until 1977 but the real property taxes from the year 1978 to 1983 inclusive of penalties were not paid. Due to no
payment of taxes, the city treasurer of Quezon City sold said property at public auction on November 21,1984 to Spouses
Edilberto and Jose na Capistrano for the sum of P10,000. The Certi cate of Sale of Delinquent Property was issued on Nov.
26,1984.
The property was not redeemed within one year, title to said property was consolidated to the Capistranos and TCT No. 361851
was issued in their names on July 4,1987. The Capistranos , however, did not take possession of the land nor inform the
Caedos about the sale or collected any rent form them. They did not pay any real property taxes thereon. On June 20,1998, The
property was later sold by the Capistranos to spouses Evelyn (daughter of the Caedos) and Jesse Pereyra for P60,000. Their
TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued on Jan. 10,1989 to Pereyra who also did not take possession of the property in
question but instead mortgaged the property to Rural Bank of Imus, Cavite. Said mortgage was annotated on the title. Bantegui
and Caedos were not informed of the transactions, all the while Caedos paid rent to Bantegui until December 1993. Bantegui on
her part, applied for administrative reconstitution of her title as it was lost in a re. Reconstituted Title no. 28458 was
subsequently issued in her name. She paid the realty taxes on the said property for the years 1987 to 1989 but the city treasurer
did not accept the payment for the year 1990. On May 3,1990, the same property was sold by the Pereyras to the spouses
Ramon and Rosita Tan for P350,000 with the latter paying the amount of P300,000 to the Rural Bank of Imus, Cavite for the
release of the mortgage per agreement by the parties. The Tans likewise paid the overdue taxes and other expenses incurred by
the Pereyras pertaining to said mortgage. The Tans did not immediately take possession of the property nor inform the
occupants (Caedos ). But in the latter part of 1990 the Tans through their lawyer informed the Caedos of their ownership and
demanded that they vacate the property. They later led an action for ejectment against the Caedos before the MTC of Quezon
City on Jan. 18,1991. On Oct. 31,1991 the court ruled in favor of Tans. The Caedos interposed an appeal but failed to appear
during the hearing of the case and was declared in default and later ejected from the property on Feb. 20,1994 when the house
was demolished. On Feb 11,1992, Bantegui, through her sister Guadalupe Bautista led a complaint for the annulment of sale ,
quieting of title, injunction and damages with the RTC of Quezon . spouses Caedo enjoined the complaint. The complaint was
later amended on May 14, 1992, impleading the spouses Capistrano and the City Treasurer of Quezon City as co-defendants,
and deleting quieting of title from the prayer and inserting reconveyance.
RTC decided in favor of respondents, petitioners appealed to the CA.
CA decided in favor of respondent. Declaring that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith and had no better right to the
subject property than that of any of their predecessor-in-interest, that the auction was tainted with irregularities such as: no
notice of delinquency and of sale were sent to the owner.
ISSUES: WON the Auction sale was valid.
RULING: No. the auction sale was not valid.
First, no notice of delinquency or of sale was given to either Gorgonia Bantegui, the delinquent owner; or to her representative
as provided under Section 65 and 73 of PD 464 the Real Property Tax Code
The auction sale of real property for the collection of delinquent taxes is in personam, not in rem. Although su cient in
proceedings in rem like land registration, mere notice by publication will not satisfy the requirements of
proceedings in personam. [P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not su ce, considering that the procedure in tax sales
is in personam. It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -- the registered owner of
the property -- in order to protect the latters interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication, an auction
sale is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer.
The sale of land for tax delinquency is in derogation of property rights and due process[;] the prescribed steps must be followed
strictly.
In the present case, notices either of delinquency or of sale were not given to the delinquent taxpayer. Those notices are
mandatory, and failure to issue them invalidates a sale.
Because it was clearly in contravention of the requirements under the law and jurisprudence,
The subsequent sale of the real property did not make its purchaser the new owner.
While it is true that Transfer Certi cates of Title have already been issued in the names of the subsequent purchasers, they
should nonetheless be invalidated. Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a proceeding in
personam, no better title than that of the original owner can be assumed by the transferees.
Quod nullum est, nullum producit e ectum. That which is a nullity produces no e ect.
Moreover, failure to assert ownership over a property is indicative of the doubtful validity of its sale. The immediate purchasers in
the present case neither took possession nor informed the occupants (the Caedos) of the formers alleged acquisition of the
property. The purchasers did not even demand rent or ask them to vacate, as a result of which the Caedos continued to pay rent
to Respondent Bantegui.
Section 80 of PD 464 provides that any balance of the proceeds of the sale left after deducting the amount of the taxes and
penalties due and the costs of sale, shall be returned to the owner or his representative. Again contrary to the mandate of the
law, the balance of the proceeds from the tax sale was not even returned to Respondent Bantegui or her representative after the
issuance of the nal bill of sale. The failure to return the proceeds reinforced the apparent irregularity not only in the conduct of
the tax sale, but also in its subsequent disposition.
GOOD FAITH
Petitioners were not innocent purchasers for value. Despite their awareness of defects in their title, they still failed to investigate
or take the necessary precaution.
Good faith is a question of intention. It consists in the possessors belief that the person from whom a thing has been received is
its owner and can convey title. It is determined by outward acts and proven conduct
Purchasers cannot close their eyes to facts that should have put any reasonable person upon guard, and then claim that they
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title. If petitioners do not investigate or take precaution
despite knowing certain facts, they cannot be considered in good faith.
The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes the title despite a notice of the aw in it.
From a vendor who does not have any title to begin with, no right is passed to a transferee.
In the present case, the exercise of the right of possession over the property was attempted by none of the purchasers, except
petitioners. Furthermore, nothing on the record shows that, aside from Respondent Bantegui, the purchasers paid real property
taxes, as required of every registered property owner.
Curiously, the city government allowed Respondent Bantegui to continue paying real property taxes even after the redemption
period and the con rmation of the nal bill of sale. Moreover, the records mention no payment of real property taxes from 1984 to
1986.
The Register of Deeds issued a reconstituted title in her name, in which the property had been registered as early as 1959. For
reasons known only to the alleged purchasers, no attempt was even made to have the title immediately cancelled. It is basic that
registration does not vest title, which is a mere evidence of title to a property.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED

Rule on Labor Laws

MARIA E. MANAHANvs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS (LAS PIAS MUNICIPAL HIGH
SCHOOL)G.R. No. L:44899April 22, 1981
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: This Court applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as
amended, on passing upon petitioners claim. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may have its onset before 10
December 1974, thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, in any case, and in case of doubt, the same should be
resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmens Compensation Act and the Labor Code
should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the
event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the
Workmens Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0070. GSIS
denied the claim for death benefit of herein petitioner, Maria Manahan, wife of the deceased. The claimant, petitioner herein,
widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever" while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High
School, Las Pias Rizal, on May 8, 1975. In a letter dated June 19,1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment
of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
theground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health when admitted to the serviceand such ailment was
attributable to his employment
ISSUE: Whether or not Manahan is entitled of death benefits?
HELD: Yes. In any case, Supreme Court have always maintained that in case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of
the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to
give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.As a teacher of the
Las Pias Municipal High School at Las Pias Rizal, the deceased used to eat his meals at the school canteen. He also used
the toilet and other facilities of the school. Said the respondent Commission," ... it is not improbable that the deceased might
have contracted the illness during those rare moments that he was away from his family, since it is medically accepted that
enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by ingestion of contaminated food or drinks. Contamination
of food or water may come from the excretion of animals such as rodentsflies, or human beings who are sick or who are
carriers, or infection in meat of animals as food. Meat, milk and eggs arethe foods most frequently involved in the transmission
of this type of species, since the organism may multiply even before ingestion. ..." These findings of the respondent Commission
lead to the conclusion that the risk of contracting the fatal illness was increased by the decedent's working condition.

DOMNA N. VILLAVERTvs.EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEMG.R. No. L:48605, DECEMBER 14, 1981
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:Labor laws are to be construed liberally in favour of the employees. Further, Article
4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favour of labor.
FACTS: Marcelino Villavert, who was employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary, died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis on December 12, 1975. It was shown in the records that he did not only perform duties as a Code Verifier but also
served as a computer operator and clerk typist due to the lack of manpower in the Philippine Constabulary. This means that he
handles administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs. On the day prior to his death, he was required to do an
overtime service until late in the evening after a whole day of strenuous activities. He went when home without taking his meal.
Shortly, he was gasping for breath, perspiring profusely and mumbling incoherent words. He was rushed tothe UE Ramon
Magsaysay Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 5:30 oclock in the morning of the following day.His mother, Domna
Villavert, filed for income benefits for the death of her son under PD n. 626 as amended with the Government Insurance System
on March 18, 1976. Her claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an
occupational disease and that the petitioner failed to show the causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the
natureof his employment. She appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission but it affirmed the decision of the GSIS.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domna Villavert is entitled to her sons income benefits?
HELD: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite
extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal
factors in the development of the disease. It is then clear that the cause of death of Marcelino Villavert was directly caused or at
least aggravated by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary.
There is no evidence that he had a bout of alcoholic intoxication, in connection to the claim of the respondents that
alcoholism causes such disease. Domna Villavert is, therefore, entitled to collect the income benefits of his son from the GSIS.

DEL ROSARIO & SONS LOGGING ENTERPRISES, INC.vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PAULINO
MABUTI, NAPOLEO BORATA, SILVINO TUDIO and CALMAR SECURITY AGENCYG.R. No. L:64204, May 31, 1985
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:The rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in
proceedings before the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters. It is the spirit & intention of the Labor Code which shall be used to
ascertain the facts of the case without due regard to the technicalities of a case proceeding.
FACTS:Petitioner Del Rosario & Sons Enterprises, Inc. entered into a Contract of Services with private\respondent Calmar
Security Agency. The employees (security guards stationed at petitioners premises) filed a complaint against petitioner and
private\respondent because of underpayment of salary, non\payment of living allowance and 13th month pay. Petitioner
contends that the complainants had no cause of action due to the absence of employer\employee relation while
private\respondent alleged that due to inadequacy of the amounts paid by petitioner under the Contract, it could not comply with
the above payments to the complainants. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Petitioner but a resolution of the NLRC reversed
the decision declaring petitioner as an indirect employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is responsible for salary payment on the ground of being a direct employer?
HELD: It is the Security Agency, and not the petitioner, who isresponsible for the payment of salaries of the employees. On
ascertaining the facts of a labor case, the spirit and intention of the Labor Law shall give its aid. The NLRC & its Labor Arbiters
do not need to deal with the technicalities of the proceedingsof a Labor Case such as the indirectness of being an employer as
in this case. Although the technical problem arose from the contract between the petitioner and private\respondent, it doesnt
mean that the Security Agency may preclude itself from performing its obligation towards its employees.
VICTORINO OPINALDO, Petitioner, v. NARCISA RAVINA, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Narcisa Ravina (Ravina) is the general manager and sole proprietor of St. Louisse Security Agency (the
Agency). Petitioner Victorino Opinaldo (Opinaldo) is a security guard who had worked for the Agency until his alleged illegal
dismissal by respondent on December 22, 2006. The Agency hired the services of petitioner on October 5, 2005, with a daily
salary of P176.66 and detailed to PAIJR Furniture Accessories (PAIJR) in Mandaue City.
The owner of PAIJR sent a written complaint to respondent stating that one of the two guards assigned SG Opinaldo and SGT.
Sosmenia be relieved; and that he chose Opinaldo be detailed/assigned at PAIJR for the reason that he is no longer physically
fit to perform his duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health condition.
Acceding to PAIJR request, respondent relieved petitioner from his work. Respondent also required petitioner to submit a
medical certificated to prove that he is physically and mentally fit for work as security guard. On September 6, 2006, respondent
reassigned petitioner to Gomez Construction, after working for a period of two weeks and upon receipt of his salary, petitioner
ceased to report for work.
On November 7, 2006, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
for underpayment of salary and nonpayment of other labor standard benefits. The parties agreed to settle and reached a
compromise agreement. However, after almost 4 weeks, petitioner claims that when he asked respondent to sign an SSS
Sickness Notification which he was going to use in order to avail of the discounted fees for a medical check-up, respondent
allegedly refused and informed him that he was no longer an employee of the Agency. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter held the Agency liable for illegal dismissal. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent elevated the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision and resolution of the NLRC. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed?
HELD: Petitioner was illegally dismissed.
LABOR LAW: illegal dismissal
What behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on record which establishes that respondent informed petitioner that his failure
to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment.It is a basic principle of labor protection in this
jurisdiction that a worker cannot be deprived of his job without satisfying the requirements of due process. Labor is property and
the right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. As enshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The due process requirement in the deprivation of one
employment is transcendental that it limits the exercise of the management prerogative of the employer to control and regulate
the affairs of the business.In the case at bar, all that respondent employer needed to prove was that petitioner employee was
notified that his failure to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment and eventually the
termination of his employment as a security guard.There is no iota of evidence in the records, save for the bare allegations of
respondent, that petitioner was notified of such consequence for non-submission.
Respondent did not properly exercise her management prerogative when she withheld petitioner employment without due
process.Respondent failed to prove that she has notified petitioner that her continuous refusal to provide him any work
assignment was due to his non-submission of the medical certificate.Had respondent exercised the rules of fair play, petitioner
would have had the option of complying or not complying with the medical certificate requirement having full knowledge of the
consequences of his actions.
LABOR LAW: motions for reconsideration under the NLRC rules of procedure
Time and again, we have ruled and it has become doctrine that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.Failure to do so renders the questioned decision final
and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. In
labor cases, the underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the
employer to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle for less
than what is due him.
In the case at bar, the applicable rule on the perfection of an appeal from the decision of the NLRC is Section 15, Rule VII of the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission:
Section 15. Motions for Reconsideration. Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the Commission shall
not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished,
within the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be
entertained.
We are not, however, unmindful that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the
application of its rules in deciding labor cases.
The subject motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed on June 25, 2009. The evidence on record shows that the
decision of the NLRC dated April 24, 2009 was received by respondent herself on June 17, 2009.The same decision was,
however, earlier received on June 8, 2009 by respondent former counsel who allegedly did not inform respondent of the receipt
of such decision until respondent went to his office on June 23, 2009 to get the files of the case.If we follow a strict construction
of the ten-day rule under the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission and consider notice
to respondent former counsel as notice to respondent herself, the expiration of the period to file a motion for reconsideration
should have been on June 18, 2009.The NLRC, however, chose a liberal application of its rules: it decided the motion on the
merits. Nevertheless, it denied reconsideration.
We cannot uphold the stand of petitioner that the petition for certiorari before the CA was filed out of time, and at the same time
rule that the NLRC acted in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction when it liberally applied its rules and resolved the motion for
reconsideration on the merits.
Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

Rule in the interpretation of insurance provisions

Ty v First National G.R. No. L:16138 April 29, 1961 J. Labrador
Facts: Ty, a mechanic foreman in Caloocan, bought 18 insurance policies at 8 pesos each. A fire broke out, and Ty fought his
way out of the factory. His hand was broken by a heavy object in the process. He wanted to collect an indemnity valuing 650
pesos for the loss of hand by means of amputation even if he only suffered from broken fingers. The insurance companies sued
him in court and they won. Ty then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Can he collect the sums even if there was no amputation?
Held: No
Ratio: The insurance policies clearly define loss of hand as amputation of the bones on the wrist. The injury was only a
temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand." This wasnt covered by the policies.

De La Cruz V. Capital Ins. & Surety Co, Inc. (1966)

G.R. No. L:21574 June 30, 1966
FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon\Suyoc Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an accident
insurance policy "against death or disability caused by accidental means" January 1, 1957: For the celebration of the New Year,
the Itogon\Suyoc Mines, Inc. sponsored a boxing contest for general entertainment wherein Eduardo, a non\professional boxer
participated. In the course of his bout with another non\professional boxer of the same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped
and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the
ring.He was brought to the Baguio General Hospital the following day. He died due to hemorrhage, intracranial. Simon de la
Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the insurance
company. The Capital Insurance and Surety co., inc denied stating that the death caused by his participation in a boxing contest
was not accidental
RTC: favored Simon
ISSUE: W/N the cause of death was accident
HELD:YES. Eduardo slipped, which was unintentional The terms "accident" and "accidental"as used in insurance contracts,
have not acquired any technical meaning and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptationhappen by
chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen event that takes place
without one's foresight or expectation event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause
and, therefore, not expected where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of
policies insuring against death or injury from accident while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, the
injury was sustained when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes of the
ring is not The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of external injuries does not make any injuries received in the course
of the game not accidental In boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as basketball or baseball, death is not
ordinarily anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be accidental or produced by some
unforeseen happening or event as what occurred in this case. Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from
its coverage (e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing,
polo\playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling. Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing
contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract

Ambigous provision interpreted against insurer

Qua v Law Union. G.R. No. L:4611 December 17, 1955 J. Reyes
Facts: Qua owned 4 warehouses used for the storage of copra and hemp. They were insured with the Law Union.
Fire broke out and completely destroyed 3 bodegas. The plaintiff submitted claims totalling P398,562.81. The Insurance
Company resisted payment on the grounds that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in
connivance with him. Que Chee Gan and his brother were tried for arson, but were acquitted by the trial court. As regards the
insurance claim, the trial court ruled in favor of Qua and entitled him to recover more than Php 300,000 for indemnities from the
insurance company. Hence, the company appealed to the SC. In its first assignment of error, the insurance company alleged
that the trial Court should have held that the policies were avoided for breach of warranty. The contract noted that fire hydrants
were required in a particular measurement of space (every 150 feet). Hence, they argued that since the bodegas insured had an
external wall perimeter of 500 meters, the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the compound, and that he actually had only
2, with a further pair.
Issues:
1. WON the insurance company can void the policies it had issued 2. WON the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" provisions
of the policy against the storage of gasoline
Held: No. Ratio: 1. The insurer, who at the time of issuance, has knowledge of existing facts which would invalidate the contract
from the beginning, such constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is stopped
thereafter from asserting the breach of such conditions. Also, an insurance company intends to executed a valid contract in
return for the premium received; and when the policy contains a condition which renders it voidable at its inception, and this
result is known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to waive the conditions and to execute a binding contract,
rather than to have deceived the insured into thinking he is insured when in fact he is not. The appellant is barred estoppel to
claim violation of the so\called fire hydrants warranty, because it knew the number of hydrants demanded therein never existed
from the very beginning and issued the policies.To allow a company to accept one's money for a policy of insurance which it
then knows to be void and of no effect, though it knows as it must, that the assured believes it to be valid and binding, is so
contrary to the dictates of honesty and fair dealing, and so closely related to positive fraud, as to the abhorrent to fair\minded
men.The appellant company so worded the policies that while exacting the greater number of fire hydrants and appliances, it
kept the premium discount at the minimum of 2 1/2%, thereby giving the insurance company a double benefit. Such abnormal
treatment of the insured strongly points at an abuse of the insurance company's selection of the words and terms of the
contract, over which it had absolute control.Receipt of Premiums or Assessments after Cause for Forfeiture Other than
Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as no
longer in force, receives and accepts a premium on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It cannot treat the
policy as void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss thereafter occurring and at the same time treat it as
valid for the purpose of earning and collecting further premiums. Moreover, taking into account the well known rule that
ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by
appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances called for in the insured premises
2. The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. So
long as insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate and technical provisions, which conceal rather than
frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance, construe every ambiguity in
favor of the insured.

Corporate Law
Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on
board the SS Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods. The vessel is owned and
operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance against all risks in the amount of
P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils discharged from the vessel were in bad order. The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361
coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, which had to be considered as scrap. The weight also had a
net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the
consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the
rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands for payment against Eastern Shipping and the
transportation company for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. (A case Home insurance
v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen consolidated with this case is of the same nature).
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance company authorized to do business in the
Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern Shipping Lines denies
the allegation of plaintiffs capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof,
while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods
denied plaintiffs capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the same ground, that the plaintiff
failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance
business in the Philippines during the filing of the case. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines initially without a license can claim indemnity through
Philippine Courts.
Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must
be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which
fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if the
law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means that no
foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippine Islands, as this phrase is known in corporation law,
unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in
the local courts. A contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be
easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.The petitioner sufficiently alleged
its capacity to sue when it averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in
the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as
required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of
capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. Nevertheless, even if the plaintiffs lack of
capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had
the authority to engage in the insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil Case
71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home Insurance Company the sum
of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the costs.
The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent Columbian
Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully
paid, the sum of P500.00 attorneys fees, and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.
Naturalization Laws
Co v. Republic
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of
China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and
writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary
studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has
never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of
any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He
mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve
the government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part
owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been
accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town
fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he
claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he
stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner
of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and
completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes.
But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his
father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be
issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA
503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered democracy.; that he
stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his income tax returns; and that he
presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is the
fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that
an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so
stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which
are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that
he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien
Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of
P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of
the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic

Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese parents. He came to the Philippines sometime
in February 1921 and was given the corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration. He settled in Cebu City (where
he as continuously resided up to the present time). Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private
institution recognized by the government. He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He, having associated with
some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the lumber business (1946-present). He
invested P5,000.00 capital in the business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00. Petitioner is
receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a profit share worth P10,000.00 every year. He has no tax liability to the
government. He possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he married
one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu City. All these children had been
issued the corresponding alien certificate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized Filipino
citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and
Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and colleges
recognized by the government.
Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu. On 30 August 1956, the court rendered
decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino citizen. On 2 October 1957, however, the government filed a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which if presented may affect the qualification of petitioner, and finding the
same well founded, the court entertained the motion. After hearing, the court again rendered decision reaffirming its holding that
petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen. The government interposed an appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.
Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose
may be fully fulfilled. In the present case, the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen
because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached
grade five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her. Lourdes Lee has studied only as far as
3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that
she continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance
betrays the sincerity of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not have tolerated such
deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against petitioner.

Agrarian Reform Laws

Guerrero v. CA
Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.
In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing
within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose
to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean
the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. Harvest time which
usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed
and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.
On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy.
Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part
of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the
attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacaang, Manila. This led to an execution of an
agreement whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that
their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines).
In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm
if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and
the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where Benitez and
his family lived, thus, making the Benitez feel that they meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant reinstatement to the plantation
Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the
meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to
another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon
his dismissal or termination any time, is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under
the law. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. Cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land but also includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or
husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. Agreement to share the produce or harvest on
a tercio basis that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer works
for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the
other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of
harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is
extinguished according to law. In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made on 2 May 1973 is clear and
categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent was different, being that of a hired farmhand, the law existing
at that time the agreement was made militate against the claim. Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his
ejectment, and thus, was unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in
ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision. No costs.

Rules of Court
Bello v. CA
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for
allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for
sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a petition to dismiss appeal on the ground that since the
case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the
appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296,
as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of
Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment.
Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners motion for having been erroneously addressed to this court instead of to the CFI
ignoring petitioners predicament that the CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without
notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against
the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the
Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity
in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the city
courts judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the
exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not
implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be
said to deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting
the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees cause
Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the
construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice,
discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the higher
courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be
overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief
sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was
tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had
timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court,
should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the
petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and
further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latters disposition on the
merits; without costs.

Expropriation Laws
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city,
praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement,
specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that
there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the
dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the
defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of
these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses
the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses
under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for
future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which
fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that
is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right
under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for
the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should
be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the
greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue
may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the cemetery from the record. But
that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The
Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Election Laws
Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate
of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that
day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy for personal
reasons. His unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25 January
1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendozas withdrawal, filed his own sworn Certificate of
Candidacy in substitution of Mendozas for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed
petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however,
disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officers opinion that
petitioners name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendozas withdrawal was not under oath as
required by Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last day for filing of certificate
of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on the same day.
Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vice mayor.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or
disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendozas withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for
regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the
provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through the
invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election
would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the
election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal requirement
that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendozas failure to observe the requirement should be
considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully
assailed. The votes cast in his favor must be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation
of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is
made immediately executory.

Rule on Interpretation of Wills

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner
Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a
testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19
November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and
Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of
the testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her name and surname
in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second
page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did
not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the three instrumental
witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin of the first
and second page, in the presence of the testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed
freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator)
undue influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22 February 1957, the testator
died in here house in Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the
petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila
Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
because it involves purely a question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the
petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision
of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it
bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted
to probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.
TAC-AN vs. CA
FACTS:
Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim
as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were terminating his services
because their wives and parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another
lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the
land previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario.
On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim.
And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga
del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be
annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al
appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites.
On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to
the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as non-Christians. The petitioner asserts that the
revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the
land which had already vested.
ISSUE:
Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA
4252?
HELD: Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and
when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and
since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary.

Antonio Villegas v. Abelardo Subido

Facts: Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila.
But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo
Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is
against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside
under the heat of the sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a
violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo
has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner.
HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept
of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably
convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A
public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an
agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the
responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be
conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of
the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such
an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.