RepublicofthePhilippines

SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.46371February7,1940
FORTUNATON.SUAREZ,petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL
FISCALOFTAYABAS,VIVENCIOORAISandDAMIANJIMENEZ,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
ProvincialFiscalofTayabasHermogenesCaluagforrespondents.
LAUREL,J.:
ThisisanoriginalpetitionfortheperemptorywritofmandamusfiledbyFortunatoN.Suarezwiththis
court,tocompeltherespondentjudgetoreinstatecriminalcaseNo.6426oftheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Tayabassothatthecasemayproceedtotrialintheordinarycourse.
It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the
respondentsinthiscase,filedacomplaintunderoathwiththejusticeofthepeaceofCalauag,Provinceof
Tayabas,chargingthepetitionerherein,FortunatoN.Suarez,andoneTomasRuedas,withseditionunder
Article142oftheRevisedPenalCode.Thecomplaint,uponpreliminaryexamination,wasdocketedand
given due course. While the said case was pending preliminary investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in
obediencetoanorderoftheProvincialCommanderofTayabas,movedforthetemporarydismissalofthe
case.ThismotionwasgrantedbythejusticeofthepeaceofCalauagonMay20,1935,andthecasethus
dismissed.
Attheinstanceofthepetitionerherein,FortunatoN.Suarez,thedeputyprovincialfiscalofTayabas,
PerfectoR.Palacio,inturnchargedLieutenantVivencioOraisandDamianJimenezinthejusticeofthe
peacecourtofCalauagwiththecrimeofarbitrarydetentioncommitted,accordingtotheinformation
underdateofJuly8,1935,asfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe9thdayofMay,1935,inthemunicipalityofCalauag,ProvinceofTayabas,P.I.,and
withinthejurisdictionofthisCourt,theaccusedVivencioOraisbeingthenapublicofficertowit:a
secondlieutenantofthePhilippineConstabularydulyappointedandqualifiedassuchanddetailedinthe
ProvinceofTayabas,withoutwarrantofarrestandwithoutanylegalgroundwhatsoever,movedby
personalgrudgeandillfeelingwhichheentertainedagainstAttorneyFortunatoSuarez,did,thenand
therewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyarrestanddetainsaidAttorneyFortunatoSuarezinthetrain
whilethelatterwasgoingtoCalauag,andwiththepurposeofconcealingtheillegalityofsaidarrestand
detentionofsaidFortunatoSuarezsaidaccusedVivencioOraisconnivingwiththeotheraccused,Damian
Jimenez,justiceofthepeaceofthesaidmunicipality,preparedandsubscribedunderoathbeforesaid
FortunatoSuarezwiththecommissionofthecrimeofsedition;thatthesaidjusticeofthepeaceDamian
Jimenez, conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the
illegalityofthearrestanddetentionofsaidFortunatoSuarez,withoutlegalgroundswhatsoeverwillfully
andunlawfullyissuedanorderdeclaringthatthereweremeritsinthecomplainttherebysanctioningthe
illegalandunjustarrestanddetentionofFortunatoSuarezwhowaskeptinthemunicipaljailofCalauag
foreighthours.
ThejusticeofthepeaceofCalauag,beingoneoftheaccused,thepreliminaryexaminationwasconducted
bythejusticeofthepeaceofLopez,Tayabas,whothereafterboundthedefendantsovertotheCourtof
FirstInstance,wherethecasewasdocketedascriminalcaseNo.6426.Whilethecasewaspendinginthe
latter court, on petition, of the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto,
reinvestigatedthecase.Aftersuchreinvestigation,hefiledonApril23,1936,amotionforthedismissal
of the case. Fortunato N.Suarez, the petitioner herein, onMay 5,1936, askedthe court toappoint
AttorneyGodofredoReyesasactingprovincialfiscaltohandletheprosecution,alleging,amongother
things,thattheprovincialfiscalhadnocouragetoprosecutetheaccused.OnMay11,1936,Attorney
GodofredoReyesenteredhisappearanceasprivateprosecutor,andvigorouslyobjectedtothemotionof
dismissalfiledbytheprovincialfiscal.TheBarAssociationofTayabas,throughitspresident,Emiliano
A.Gala,entereditsappearanceasamicuscuriaeandlikewiseobjectedtothedismissalofthecase.On
August14,1936,thethenpresidingjudgeofBranchIoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofTayabas,Hon.Ed.
GutierrezDavid,afterhearing,deniedthemotion,rulingthattherewasprimafaciecaseagainstthe
accused.Thecourt,uponpetitioneroftheprovincialfiscal,designatedDeputyProvincialFiscalPerfecto
R.Palaciotohandletheprosecution.ButFiscalPalacio,beingapparentlyofthesameopinionasthe
provincialfiscal,declinedtoproceed,andmovedthatapracticingattorneyoracompetentattorneyinthe
Bureau ofJusticebe designated inhis stead.Accordingly,the provincialfiscalofSorsogon,Jacinto
Yamson,attherequestofthejudgeaquowasassignedbytheDepartmentofJusticetohandlethe
prosecutionofthecase.FiscalYamsonaftergoingoverthecaselikewiseenteredanolleprosequi.So,on
September231936,hemovedforreconsiderationofthecourt'sorderofAugust14,1936,denyingthe
motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously
objectedtothismotiononthegroundthattherewassufficientprooftowarranttheprosecutionofthe
accused.ThecaseinthisstatewhenJudgeEmilioPenawasappointedtotheplaceofJudgeGutierres
David.Later,JudgeServilianoPlaton,oneoftherespondentsherein,wasappointedtopresideovercase
No.6426corresponded,andthecasewasthustransferredtothatsalaforaction.JudgePlaton,after
considerationofallthefactsandproofssubmittedinthecase,consideredthecourt'sorderofAugust14,
1936,anddismissedthecase,holdingthattheevidencewasinsufficienttoconvicttheaccusedofthe
crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here
docketedasG.R.No.45431.OnJune30,byacloselydividedcourt,theappealwasdismissed.
Thepetitionerhasnow filedwiththisCourtthepresentpetition,inwhich,as statedintheopening
paragraph of this decision, we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the
respondentjudgetoreinstatethecriminalcasewhichhadbeenordereddismissedbythesaidjudge.The
petitionergivesthefollowinggroundsfortheissuanceofsaidwrit:
Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al
sobreseerlamencionadacausacontralosotrosdosrecurridosVivencioOraisyDamianJimenez,despues
dequeelJuzgadodePazdeLopezhabiadeclaradoqueexistenmeritos paraproseguirsecontralos
mismosydespuesdequeunJuezdePrimeraInstanciadelamismacategoriaqueelJuezPlatonhabia
rehusadosobreseerlacausaporcreerqueexistianmeritosparaprocedercontralosacusados.
QueelmencionadoJuezHon.ServillanoPlatonincurrioenunabusogravedediscrecionporcuantoque
laspruebasexistentesenlacausa,enlascualessefundoelfiscalprovincialalpresentarlaquerellaenel
JuzgadodePaz,demuestrandeunmodoclaroyconcluyenteeldelitocometidoylaresponsibilidaddelos
acusados.[Lasexpresadaspruebasconstanapaginas65al106deladjuntoalegatoanexo("A").]
QueelHon.ServillanoPlatonincurrioenungraveabusodediscrecionaljuzgardichaspruebasconun
criteriodeunTribunal"sentenciador"cuandoquesuunicamisioneraconsiderarlasbajoelcriteriodeun
tribunalmeramente"investigador".(E.U.vs.Barredo,32Jur.Fil.,462,482.)
Shouldthewritofmandamusprayedforbeissued?Weobservethatafterthefilingoftheinformationby
theprovincialfiscalofTayabasforarbitrarydetentionagainstLieutenantOraisandthejusticeofthe
peace of Lopez, the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, because 'despues' de una
reinvestigaciondeloshechosquedieronmargenalapresentecausa,yexaminadalamismaconladebida
atencionquesuimportanciarequireasicomolascircunstanciasdelcaso,hallegadoalaconclusionde
que nohaybasejustificativapara laprosecuciondeesta causa."The grounds forthis actionofthe
provincialfiscalarestatedinhissaidmotionfordismissalofApril23,1936:
Ensintesis,loshechosson:queeldia9demayode1935,enocasionenqueelabogadoFortunatoN.
SuarezyeltenienteVivencioOraisdelaconstabularia,seencontraroneneltrenqueibaaCalauag,aquel
paradefenderalossakdalistasacusadosenestemunicipio,yesteparaatenderasusdeberesofficialesen
relacionconelordenpublicoalgoanormal,porcausadelosmismossakdalistasendichomunicipiode
Calauag,ambostuvieronuncambiodepalabrasconmotivodelmismoasuntoquelesllevabaalli,ypor
haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado, de quelos sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en
Calauagporlasautoridadesmunicipalesylaconstabularia,yqueeraunabusodelasautoridadesdicha
persecusion,trayendoalpropiotiempoacolacionloocurridoenlosmunicipiosdeCabuyaoyStaRosade
laProvinciadeLaguna,queselevantaroncontraelgobiernoporlosabusosymatanzasdesakdalistasen
dichospueblos,yquelomismopodiatenerlugarenestaProvinciadeTayabas,yqueelpodiaincitara
lossakdalistas,teniendoencuentaqueconanterioridadeltenienteOraishabiarecibidoinformesdequelos
sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas, uno de los acusados en el
municipiodeSariayaporeldelitodeconspiracionparacometersedicion,queelabogadoayudariaalos
sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion,fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez,
conduciendolealmunicipiocomoasilohizoconrespectoaTomasRuedas,quiensalioalencuentrode
Suarez cuandollegoalaestaciondel trenen Calauag, diciendo aeste queyateniaarregladoa los
sakdalistasenCalauag.Quedespuesdehaberlesarrestado,presentounadenunciacontraestosporel
delitodesedicion,eneljuzgadodepazdeCalauag,aunqueporinstruccionesdesussuperiores,dicho
TenienteVivencioOraispidioelsobreseimientoprovisionaldesudenuncia.
AunqueelabogadoSuarezniegaqueelhayaprofiredopalabrassediciosas,niquehayaincitadoalos
sakdalistasaactosdeviolenciacontraelgobiernoconstituidoocontralasautoridadesyoficiales,sin
embargo,delasdeclaracionesdelostestigostantodelaacusacioncomodeladefensaenloqueson
consistentes, se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden
considerarsecomosediciosasysubversivas,maximeteniendoenconsideracionelestadocaoticoporque
atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los
sakdalistas,araizdelosdisturbiosydesordenespublicosquetuvieronlugarenlosmunicipiosdeCabuyao
ySta.Rosa.
LapresentecausasehainiciadoadenunciadelabogadoSr.GodofredoReyescontraeltenienteVivencio
OraisdelaconstabulariayeljuezdepazDamianL.Jimenez,poreldelitodedetencionarbitraria.
Eldelitodedetencionarbitrariaestaprevistoycastigadoenelarticulo124delCodigoPenalRevisado,
quediceasi:
Elfuncionariooempleadopublicoquedetuviereaunapersonasinmotivolegalalgunoseracastigado;etc.
...
Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos, y que a la
acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito, el que suscribe,
haanalizadoesteextremo,relacionandoloshechosquedeterminaronlaalegadadetencionarbitrariadeque
fueobjectoelabogadoFortunatoN.Suarez,conlas circunstanciasylosantecedentesdelasituacion
porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna,
acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son
sediciosasysubversivas,porlomenoseranabusivasparaconlasautoridadesdelgobierno,especialmente
conlasdelaProvinciadeTayabasalascualessereferian.Asientendidoelaspectolegaldelacuestion,y
haciendoaplicaciondeloquenosdicelamismaleyenloenqueconsisteladetencionarbitraria,quepara
queexistaestedelito,ladetencionteniaquehabersidosinmotivolegalalguno,creemosquehabiaalgun
motivolegalparaladetenciondelabogadoSr.SuarezysucompaneroTomasRuedas,yestabajustificada
porhaberellosmismosdadolugaraello.(E.U.vs.Vallejoyotro,11Jur.Fil.,202;E.U.vs.Santos,36
Jur.Fil.,909.)
WehavenotoverlookedthefactthatthismotionfordismissalwasdeniedbyJudgeGutierrezDavidof
August 14, 1936. It appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated above was
assignedbytheDepartmentofJusticetoconducttheprosecutionofthecase,movedforreconsideration
of the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon
grantedthemotionforreconsiderationanddismissedthecase.Inthismotionforreconsiderationnotonly
doesFiscalYamsonreiteratetheargumentsadvancedbyFiscalValdezyNietointhelatter'smotionfor
dismissal,butadds:
(a)EnloquerespectaalacusadoTenienteOrais,noexistepruebaalgunaenlosautosdeestacausaque
dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, solamente por el mero gusto de
arrestarles.TampocoexistepruebasdequeeltenienteOraishayasidoinducidopormotivosdevenganza
oresentimientoalgunocontradichoabogadoSuarezyTomasRuedasalarrestaleseneldiadeautos.
AunqueesverdadqueelTenienteOraishasidoacusadoanteelJuzgadodepazdeSariayapor'abusosde
autoridad',sinembargo,noconstaenlosautosdedichacausaqueelabogadoSuarezyTomasRuedas
hayanintervenidocomoabogadoniparteofendidaotestigosenlamisma,portanto,novemosrazon
algunaparaqueelTenienteOraistengamotivosdevengarsedeestospordichacausa.(Veasepag.1,
AnexoO.)Afaltadepruebasobreestoshechos,ennuestrahumildeopinion,existeafavordeTeniente
OraislapresunciondehabercumplidoconsudeberalarrestaralabogadoFortunatoN.SuarezyTomas
Ruedas,teniendoencuentalascircunstanciasextraordinariasreinantesentoncesenCalauagaraizdelos
disturbiosydesordenespublicosquetuvieronlugarenlosmunicipiosdeCabuyaoySta.Rosadela
ProvinciadeLaguna,diasantesdeocurrirelsucesodeautos.Sedebetenerencuenta,ademas,elhecho
dequedespuesdehaberarrestadoalabogadoFortunatoN.SuarezyTomasRuedas,elaquiacusado
TenienteVivencioOraispresentodenunciainmediatamenteantesucoacusadoDamianJimenez,juezde
pazdeCalauag,porinfracciondelarticulo142delCodigoPenalRevisado.
Wecannotoveremphasizethenecessityofclosescrutinyandinvestigationofprosecutingofficersofall
caseshandledbythem,butwhilstthisCourtisaversetoanyformofvacillationbysuchofficersinthe
prosecutionofpublicoffenses,itisunquestionablethattheymay,inappropriatecases,inordertodo
justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations.InthelanguageofMr.JusticeSutherlandoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,the
prosecutingofficer"istherepresentativenotofanordinarypartytoacontroversy,butofasovereignty
whoseobligationtogovernimpartiallyisascompellingasitsobligationtogovernatall;andwhose
interest,therefore,inacriminalprosecutionisnotthatitshallwinacase,butthatjusticeshallbedone.As
such,heisinapeculiarandverydefinitesensetheservantofthelaw,thetwofoldaimofwhichisthat
guiltshallnotescapeorinnocencesuffer.Hemayprosecutewithearnestnessandvigorindeed,he
shoulddoso.But,whilehemaystrikehardblows,heisnotatlibertytostrikefoulones.Itisasmuchhis
dutytorefrainfromimpropermethodscalculatedtoproduceawrongfulconvictionasitistouseevery
legitimatemeanstobringaboutajustone,"(69UnitedStatesLawReview,June,1935,No.6,p.309.)
Consideringallthecircumstances,wecannotsaythatJudgeServillanoPlaton,ingrantingthemotionfor
thedismissalofthecaseforarbitrarydetentionagainstLieutenantOraisandthejusticeofthepeaceof
Lopez,abusedhisdiscretionsoflagrantlyastojustify,intheinterestofjustice,adeparturefromthewell
settledrulethataninferiortribunalintheperformanceofajudicialactwithinthescopeofitsjurisdiction
and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the
examinationofevidenceandthedecisionofquestionsoflawandfact,sincesuchadutyisnotministerial.
(High,ExtraordinaryLegalRemedies,sec.156,pp.173175).Upontheotherhand,itshouldbeobserved
thatinthecaseofLieutenantOrais,inthefaceofthecircumstancessurroundingthearrestassetforthin
thetwomotionsfordismissalbytheprovincialfiscalofTayabas,whichfactsandcircumstancesmust
havebeeninvestigatedanddulyweighedandconsideredbytherespondentjudgeoftheCourtofFirst
InstanceofTayabas,thearresteffectedbyLieutenantOraiscannotbesaidtohavebeentirelyunjustified.
If,"undertryingcircumstancesandinazealousefforttoobeytheordersofhissuperiorofficerandto
enforcethelaw,apeaceofficermakesameremistakeingoodfaith,heshouldbeexculpated.Otherwise,
thecourtswillputapremiumoncrimeandwillterrorizepeaceofficersthroughafearofthemselves
violatingthelaw.SeegenerallyVoorheesonArrest;5CorpusJuris,pp.399,416;2R.C.L.,450.(United
Statesvs.Santos,36Phil.,853,855.)"
Thepetitionisherebydismissed,withoutpronouncementregardingcost.Soordered.
Avancea,C.J.,VillaReal,DiazandConcepcion,JJ.,concur.
 RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.L35133May31,1974
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO
ANDRES@"Ross",defendantsappellants.
FranciscoG.Munsayac,Sr.forappellantMadera.
ApolinarF.TolentinoandJoseC.VitugforappellantAndres,etal.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L.
QuirozandSolicitorSinfronioI.Anchetaforappellee.

FERNANDEZ,J.:p
ThiscaseisnowbeforeUsonappealofthethreeappellantsfromadecisionoftheCircuitCriminalCourt
1findingthemguiltyofthecrimeofmurder,andsentencingthemtosufferthepenaltyofreclusion
perpetuaandtojointlyandseverallyindemnifytheheirsofthevictimintheamountofP12,000.00
withoutsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofinsolvency,andtopaythecostproportionately.
Thereisnoquestionthatatabout2:00o'clockintheearlymorningofApril20,1970,threemenbargedat
thedoorstepofthehouseofthevictimElinoBanainSitioBaag,BarrioBantug,Gabaldon,NuevaEcija.
Thegunman,standingonthefirstrungofthestairsofthehouse,firedavolleyofshotsfroma.45caliber
gunatElinoBanawhowasthensleepingonthefloorofhishousenearthestairs.Twogunshotwounds
wereinflictedonthevictimbutthefatalonewastheonethathithimontheabdominalregion.ElinoBana
didnotdieimmediately.HestoodupandtoldhiswifetocallforhisbrotherConradowholivesnotfar
awayfromtheirhouse.Thevictim'swifefetchedConrado;butwhentheyreturned,thewoundedmanwas
nolongerathomeforhewasalreadybroughttotheMunicipalBuildingofGabaldon.Hewascarriedby
hissoninlaw,FranciscoViloria,withtheassistanceofsomepeople.FromtheMunicipalBuilding,he
wasbroughttotheNuevaEcijaGeneralHospital,buthediedonthewaythatsameday,April20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
appellantRaymundoMaderawastheonewhofiredtheshotsatthevictimElinoBana,oneofwhichwas
thefatalshot,andthatappellantsMarianitoAndresandGenerosoAndreswerewithMaderaatthetime.
JuanitaBana,asonofthevictim,testifiedthathewasawakenedbythegunfireandsawtheappellant
RaymundoMaderastandingonthefirststepoftheirstairsholdinga.45caliberfirearm.Healsosawthe
appellantsMarianitoAndresandGenerosoAndresjustbehindtheappellantMadera,atadistanceof11/2
metersfromthestairs.BernardaBana,wifeofthevictim,declaredthatshesawRaymundoMademasthe
one who shot her husband with a footlong firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
AndreswerethenwithMadera.
Inadditiontothetestimoniesofthesetwowitnesses,theprosecutionpresentedthedying,declarationof
thevictimElinoBana.ThetripfromthehouseofElinoBanatotheMunicipalBuildingtookonlyabout
thirtyminutes.Ontheway,theyweremetbypolicemanAmbrosioFelicianofromGabaldonwhowas
fetchedfromhishousebyBarrioCaptainEmilianoJornadalofBantugtolookintotheshootingincident.
UponreachingtheMunicipalBuilding,PatrolmanFelicianotoldElinoBanathathewouldhavetotake
downhiswrittenstatementregardingtheshootingincident,andthelatteragreed.Thelatterwasthenin
agony.Itwasthen3:00o'clockinthemorning.Insaiddyingdeclaration,hewasaskedwhoshothimand
theanswerwas:MundoMaderaandtwootherswhomhecouldnotrecognize.
ThelowercourtwascorrectinrefusingtogivecredencetothetestimonyofPatrolmanFelicianothat
whiletheywereontheirwaytotheMunicipalBuilding,ElinoBanatoldhimthathecouldnotidentifythe
personswhoshothim.Saidpolicemanhasbeenaninvestigatorinthepoliceforcesince1964.Heshould
haveaskedElinoBanawhilehewasgivinghisdyingdeclarationintheMunicipalBuildingwhyhesaid
earlierthathedidnotknowwhoshothim.ButPatrolmanFelicianodidnotdothis.Itmustbenotedthat
notonlyPatrolmanFelicianobutalsoFranciscoViloria,awitnesstothedyingdeclaration,testifiedtoits
lawfulexecution.
ThefactthatJuanitoBanaandBernardaBanafailedtorevealrightawaytheidentitiesoftheappellantsto
theVictimhimselfandtotheirrelativesConradoBanaandFranciscoViloria,doesnotmilitateagainst
theircredibility.Thereisnoevidenceonrecordthattheywereaskedbytheirrelativesabouttheidentity
oftheappellants.Hadtheybeenasked,theywouldhavereadilyrevealedappellants'identitiesastheydid
totheChiefofPoliceandMunicipalMayorofGabaldononlyafewhoursafterthefatefulincident,
duringaformalinvestigationofthecaseintheOfficeoftheChiefofPolicewhenandwherethey
executedtheirrespectiveswornstatements.
IntheirrespectivewrittenstatementstakenonApril20,1970,subscribedandswornonthesamedate
beforetheMayorofGabaldon,BernardoBanaandJuanitoBanacategoricallystatedthatElinoBanawas
shotbyRaymundoMadera@Mundo,whileRossandTotoyAndresweredownstairs.
JuanitoBanawasthenlivingwithhisparents.Hemustbefamiliarwiththeirhouse.Hetestifiedondirect
examinationthathesleptinthebalconyoftheirhouse.Oncrossexamination,hesaidthathesleptinside
theirhouse.Thatdoesnotshowanyinconsistencyinhistestimony,becauseonfurtherquestioning,he
saidthatthebalconyreferredtobyhimwasinsidetheirhouse.Yes,hesaidthatafterheheardtheshots,
hejumpedtothegroundthroughthebackportionoftheirhouse.Thefalsityofthisstatementhasnotbeen
shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there was no such
opening,canbeexplainedbythefactthatthetallgrassescouldobscurethebackportionofthehouse
wherethekitchendoorwaslocated.
JuanitoBanaadmittedthathewasgrippedwithfearwhenheheardtheburstofgunfire.Butthatwould
notprovethathefailedtorecognizetheappellants.
Anexcitedpersonmayoverlookthepresenceofanotherwhomhewouldotherwisehaveobserved.
Undersomecircumstance,however,excitementmaywhettheattentiontoakeenedge.Insomeother
cases,ithasbeenobserved,ineffect,thattheemotionincidenttotheimpendingperilmaynotbethekind
ofexcitementwhichconfuses,butthatwhichfocalizesthefacultiestoscrutinize.thecircumstanceofthe
threateneddangerinordertoavoidit.2
Theappellantsassertedintheirbriefs3that"theevidenceonrecorddoesnotshowthattherewasamoon
shiningintheearlymorningofApril20,1970,atBarrioBantug,Gabaldon,NuevaEcija;"thatitwasthen
"amoonlessnight;"hence,JuanitoBanaandBernardaBanacouldnothaverecognizedtheappellants.
Thispositionisuntenable.Why?
TheCourtcantakejudicialnoticeofthe"lawsofnature"4and,underthisrule,ofthetimewhenthe
moon rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto
OurselvestogetacertificationfromtheWeatherBureau6whichshowsthatthemoonwasbrightatthe
timeoftheshootingincident.Itreads:
TowhomItMayConcern:
Thisistocertifythat,basedonthecomputationsmadebythisoffice,thefollowingastronomicaldatafor
Gabaldon,NuevaEcijaaretrueandcorrect:
1.thatthemoonroseat4:11P.M.onApril19,1970andsetthefollowingday,April20,at4:27A.M.;
2.thatat2:00A.M.onApril20,1970,themoonwasatanaltitudeof34degreesabovethewestern
horizonwithbearingofSouth73degreesWest;
3.andthatthemoonwasillumined97%at2:00A.M.onApril20,1970,fullmoonhavingoccurredat
00.21A.M.onApril22,1970.
ThiscertificationisissuedupontherequestofMr.EstanislaoFernandez,AssociateJustice,Supreme
Court,Manila.
FortheAdministrator:
(Sgd)SimeonV.Inciong
SIMEONV.INCIONGChief,AstronomicalDivision
Itwasnotnecessaryfortheprosecutiontoprovemotiveonthepartoftheappellantsforthereisnodoubt
astotheiridentities.
Itistruethat,accordingtoMaximoA.Obra,theforensicchemistoftheNBI,appellantRaymundo
Maderawasfoundnegativeinaparaffintest.ButObrahimselfadmittedthat,theparaffintesthaving
beenconductedfourteendaysaftertheincident,thetestcouldhavegivenanegativeresultevenifthe
appellanthadfiredagunfourteendaysearlier,becausethenitratedepositsonhishandscouldhavebeen
washedoffbywashingorcouldhavebeenremovedbyperspiration.
Thedefenseoftheappellantswasalibi.Butsaiddefensecannotprevailoverthepositiveidentificationof
theappellantsbytheprosecutionwitnesses.ThehouseofappellantRaymundoMaderaisjustabout400
metersawayfromthatofthevictimElinoBana.
WeneednotdiscussfurtherthedefenseofalibioftheappellantsMarianitoAndresandGenerosoAndres
becausetheSolicitorGeneralrecommendedtheiracquittal.AndWeagree.
ThefactthatthesetwoappellantswerestandingbehindappellantMaderawhenthelatterfiredshotsat
ElinoBana,didnotmakethemliableforwhatMaderadid,therebeingnoproofwhatsoeverofany
conspiracyamongthethreeappellants.Theywerenotarmed.TheydidnothingtohelpMadera.Their
merepassivepresenceatthesceneofthecrimedidnotmakethemliableeitheras coprincipalsor
accomplices.InoneofthelatestdecisionsofthisCourt,pennedbyJusticeFelixQ.Antonio,Weheld:
Itiswelltorecallthesettledrulethatconspiracypresupposestheexistenceofapreconceivedplanor
agreementandinordertoestablishtheexistenceofsuchacircumstance,itisnotenoughthatthepersons
supposedlyengagedorconnectedwiththesamebepresentwhenthecrimewasperpetrated.Theremust
beestablishedalogicalrelationshipbetweenthecommissionofthecrimeandthesupposedconspirators,
evidencingaclearandmoreintimateconnectionbetweenandamongthelatter,suchasbytheirovertacts
committedinpursuanceofacommondesign.Consideringthefarreachingconsequences,ofcriminal
conspiracy,thesamedegreeofproofrequiredforestablishingthecrimeisrequiredtosupportafindingof
itspresencethatis,itmustbeshowntoexistasclearlyandconvincinglyasthecommissionoftheoffense
itself.
Theevidencefailstomeetsuchrequirements.Toholdhimliable,upontheotherhand,asanaccomplice,
it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be
demonstratedbypreviousorsimultaneousactswhichcontributestothecommissionoftheoffenseasaid
theretowhetherphysicalormoral.AsaptlystatedinPeoplev.Tamayo:"Itisanessentialconditiontothe
existenceofcomplicity,notonlythatthereshouldbearelationbetweentheactsdonebytheprincipaland
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledgeofthecriminalintent,shouldcooperatewiththeintentionofsupplyingmaterialormoralaid
intheexecutionofthecrimeinanefficaciousway."...Fromourviewoftheevidenceithasnotbeen
convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally,
throughadvice,encouragementoragreementormateriallythroughexternalactsindicatingamanifest
intentofsupplyingaidintheperpetrationofthecrimeinanefficaciousway.Suchcircumstancesbeing
absent,hismerepassivepresenceatthesceneofthecrimecertainlydoesnotmakehimeitheraco
principaloranaccompliceinthecommissionoftheoffense.7
Thisisgoodatimeasanytoemphasizeuponthoseinchargeoftheprosecutionofcriminalcasesthatthe
prosecutor'sfinesthourisnotwhenhewinsacasewiththeconvictionoftheaccused.Hisfinesthouris
stillwhen,overcomingtheadvocate'snaturalobsessionforvictory,hestandsupbeforetheCourtand
pleadsnotfortheconvictionoftheaccusedbutforhisacquittal.Forindeed,hisnobletaskistoprosecute
only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza,AssistantSolicitorDominadorL.QuirozandSolicitorSinfronioI.Anchetaforhavingcorrectly
recommendedtheacquittaloftheappellantsMarianitoAndresandGenerosoAndres.
WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyaffirmedwithrespecttotheappellantRaymundo
Maderaalias"Mundo",with1/3ofthecostchargedagainsthim;anditisherebyreversedasregards
appellantsMarianitoAndresalias"Totoy"andGenerosoAndresalias"Ross",whoareherebyacquittedof
thecrimechargedwithproportionatecostsdeoficio.Theirimmediatereleasefromconfinementishereby
orderedunlesstheyareheldforanotherlegalcause.
Zaldivar(Chairman),Fernando,Barredo,AntonioandAquino,JJ.,concur.
 ENBANC
[G.R.Nos.15180912.April12,2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN(FifthDivision),LUCIOC.TAN,CARMENKHAOTAN,FLORENCIOT.
SANTOS,NATIVIDADP.SANTOS,DOMINGOCHUA,TANHUINEE,MARIANOTANENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANOKHOO,MANUELKHOO,MIGUELKHOO,JAIMEKHOO,ELIZABETHKHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLYCO,ALLIEDBANKINGCORP.,ALLIEDLEASINGANDFINANCECORPORATION,
ASIABREWERY,INC.,BASICHOLDINGS CORP.,FOREMOSTFARMS,INC.,FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICESANDTRADECORP.,MARANAWHOTELSANDRESORTCORP.,NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITOP.MENDOZA,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:
Thiscaseisprimaimpressionesanditisweightedwithsignificanceforitconcernsononehand,the
effortsoftheBartoupgradetheethicsoflawyersingovernmentserviceandontheother,itseffectonthe
rightofgovernmenttorecruitcompetentcounseltodefenditsinterests.
In1976,GeneralBankandTrustCompany(GENBANK)encounteredfinancialdifficulties.GENBANK
hadextendedconsiderablefinancialsupporttoFilcapitalDevelopmentCorporationcausingittoincur
dailyoverdrawingsonitscurrentaccountwiththeCentralBank.[1]ItwaslaterfoundbytheCentralBank
that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
totalingP172.3million,ofwhich59%wasclassifiedasdoubtfulandP0.505millionasuncollectible.[2]
Asabailout,theCentralBankextendedemergencyloanstoGENBANKwhichreachedatotalofP310
million.[3]Despitethemegaloans,GENBANKfailedtorecoverfromitsfinancialwoes.OnMarch25,
1977,theCentralBankissuedaresolutiondeclaringGENBANKinsolventandunabletoresumebusiness
withsafetytoitsdepositors,creditorsandthegeneralpublic,andorderingitsliquidation.[4]Apublic
bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submittedthewinningbid.[5]Subsequently,formerSolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.Mendozafiledapetition
with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANKsliquidationasmandatedbySection29ofRepublicActNo.265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG)torecovertheallegedillgottenwealthofformerPresidentFerdinandMarcos,hisfamilyandhis
cronies.Pursuanttothismandate,thePCGG,onJuly17,1987,filedwiththeSandiganbayanacomplaint
forreversion,reconveyance,restitution,accountinganddamagesagainstrespondentsLucioTan,Carmen
KhaoTan,FlorencioT.Santos,NatividadP.Santos,DomingoChua,TanHuiNee,MarianoTanEng
Lian,EstateofBenitoTanKeeHiong,FlorencioN.Santos,Jr.,HarryC.Tan,TanEngChan,ChungPoe
Kee,MarianoKhoo,ManuelKhoo,MiguelKhoo,JaimeKhoo,ElizabethKhoo,CelsoRanola,William
T.Wong,ErnestoB.Lim,BenjaminT.Albacita,WillyCo,AlliedBankingCorporation(AlliedBank),
AlliedLeasingandFinanceCorporation,AsiaBrewery,Inc.,BasicHoldingsCorp.,ForemostFarms,
Inc.,FortuneTobaccoCorporation,GrandspanDevelopmentCorp.,HimmelIndustries,IrisHoldingsand
DevelopmentCorp.,JewelHoldings,Inc.,ManufacturingServicesandTradeCorp.,MaranawHotelsand
ResortCorp.,NorthernTobaccoRedryingPlant,ProgressiveFarms,Inc.,Shareholdings,Inc.,Sipalay
TradingCorp.,VirgoHoldings&DevelopmentCorp.,(collectivelyreferredtohereinasrespondentsTan,
etal.),thenPresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,ImeldaR.Marcos,PanfiloO.Domingo,CesarZalamea,Don
FerryandGregorioLicaros.ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.0005oftheSecondDivisionofthe
Sandiganbayan.[6]Inconnectiontherewith,thePCGGissuedseveralwritsofsequestrationonproperties
allegedly acquired by the abovenamed persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influencewithformerPresidentMarcos.
RespondentsTan,etal.repairedtothisCourtandfiledpetitionsforcertiorari,prohibitionandinjunction
tonullify,amongothers,thewritsofsequestrationissuedbythePCGG.[7]Afterthefilingoftheparties
comments,thisCourtreferredthecasestotheSandiganbayanforproperdisposition.Thesecaseswere
docketedasCivilCaseNos.00960099.Inallthesecases,respondentsTan,etal.wererepresentedby
theircounsel,formerSolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.Mendoza,whohasthenresumedhisprivatepracticeof
law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondentsTan,etal.withtheSecondDivisionoftheSandiganbayaninCivilCaseNos.0005[8]and
00960099.[9]ThemotionsallegedthatrespondentMendoza,asthenSolicitorGeneral[10]andcounsel
toCentralBank,activelyintervenedintheliquidationofGENBANK,whichwassubsequentlyacquired
by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly
intervenedintheacquisitionofGENBANKbyrespondentsTan,etal.when,inhiscapacityasthen
SolicitorGeneral,headvisedtheCentralBanksofficialsontheproceduretobringaboutGENBANKs
liquidationandappearedascounselfortheCentralBankinconnectionwithitspetitionforassistancein
theliquidationofGENBANKwhichhefiledwiththeCourtofFirstInstance(nowRegionalTrialCourt)
ofManilaandwasdocketedasSpecialProceedingNo.107812.ThemotionstodisqualifyinvokedRule
6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Rule6.03prohibitsformergovernmentlawyersfrom
acceptingengagementoremploymentinconnectionwithanymatterinwhichhehadintervenedwhilein
saidservice.
OnApril22,1991theSecondDivisionoftheSandiganbayanissuedaresolutiondenyingPCGGsmotion
todisqualifyrespondentMendozainCivilCaseNo.0005.[11]ItfoundthatthePCGGfailedtoprovethe
existenceofaninconsistencybetweenrespondentMendozasformerfunctionasSolicitorGeneralandhis
presentemploymentascounseloftheLucioTangroup.ItnotedthatrespondentMendozadidnottakea
positionadversetothattakenonbehalfoftheCentralBankduringhistermasSolicitorGeneral.[12]It
furtherruledthatrespondentMendozasappearanceascounselforrespondentsTan,etal.wasbeyondthe
oneyearprohibitedperiodunderSection7(b)ofRepublicActNo.6713sinceheceasedtobeSolicitor
Generalintheyear1986.Thesaidsectionprohibitsaformerpublicofficialoremployeefrompracticing
hisprofessioninconnectionwithanymatterbeforetheofficeheusedtobewithwithinoneyearfromhis
resignation,retirementorseparationfrompublicoffice.[13]ThePCGGdidnotseekanyreconsideration
oftheruling.[14]
ItappearsthatCivilCaseNos.00960099weretransferredfromtheSandiganbayansSecondDivisionto
theFifthDivision.[15]InitsresolutiondatedJuly11,2001,theFifthDivisionoftheSandiganbayan
deniedtheotherPCGGsmotiontodisqualifyrespondentMendoza.[16]Itadoptedtheresolutionofits
SecondDivisiondatedApril22,1991,andobservedthattheargumentswerethesameinsubstanceasthe
motiontodisqualifyfiledinCivilCaseNo.0005.ThePCGGsoughtreconsiderationoftherulingbutits
motionwasdeniedinitsresolutiondatedDecember5,2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December5,2001oftheFifthDivisionoftheSandiganbayanviaapetitionforcertiorariandprohibition
underRule65ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.[18]ThePCGGallegedthattheFifthDivisionacted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutionscontendingthat:1)Rule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprohibitsaformer
governmentlawyerfromacceptingemploymentinconnectionwithanymatterinwhichheintervened;2)
theprohibitionintheRuleisnottimebound;3)thatCentralBankcouldnotwaivetheobjectionto
respondentMendozasappearanceonbehalfofthePCGG;and4)theresolutioninCivilCaseNo.0005
wasinterlocutory,thusresjudicatadoesnotapply.[19]
Thepetitionatbarraisesproceduralandsubstantiveissuesoflaw.Inview,however,oftheimportand
impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government,weshallcutourwayandforthwithresolvethesubstantiveissue.
I
SubstantiveIssue
ThekeyissueiswhetherRule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityappliestorespondent
Mendoza.Again,theprohibitionstates:Alawyershallnot,afterleavinggovernmentservice,accept
engagementoremploymentinconnectionwithanymatterinwhichhehadintervenedwhileinthesaid
service.
I.A.ThehistoryofRule6.03
AproperresolutionofthiscasenecessitatesthatwetracethehistoricallineageofRule6.03oftheCode
ofProfessionalResponsibility.
Intheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,ethicalstandardsforlawyerswerepervasiveinEnglandand
otherpartsofEurope.Theearlystatementsofstandardsdidnotresemblemoderncodesofconduct.They
werenotdetailedorcollectedinonesourcebutsurprisinglywerecomprehensivefortheirtime.The
principalthrustofthestandardswasdirectedtowardsthelitigationconductoflawyers.Itunderscoredthe
centraldutyoftruthandfairnessinlitigationassuperiortoanyobligationtotheclient.Theformulations
ofthelitigationdutieswereattimesintricate,includingspecificpleadingstandards,anobligationto
informthecourtoffalsehoodsandadutytoexploresettlementalternatives.Mostofthelawyer'sother
basicdutiescompetency,diligence,loyalty,confidentiality,reasonablefeesandservicetothepoor
originatedinthelitigationcontext,butultimatelyhadbroaderapplicationtoallaspectsofalawyer's
practice.
TheformsoflawyerregulationincolonialandearlypostrevolutionaryAmericadidnotdiffermarkedly
from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and
proceduralrulestogovernattorneybehavior.ThedifferencefromEnglandwasinthepervasivenessand
continuityofsuchregulation.ThestandardssetinEnglandvariedovertime,butthevariationinearly
Americawasfargreater.TheAmericanregulationfluctuatedwithinasinglecolonyanddifferedfrom
colonytocolony.Manyregulationshadtheeffectofsettingsomestandardsofconduct,buttheregulation
wassporadic,leavinggapsinthesubstantivestandards.Onlythreeofthetraditionalcoredutiescanbe
fairlycharacterizedaspervasiveintheformal,positivelawofthecolonialandpostrevolutionaryperiod:
thedutiesoflitigationfairness,competencyandreasonablefees.[20]
ThenineteenthcenturyhasbeentermedthedarkagesoflegalethicsintheUnitedStates.Bymidcentury,
Americanlegalreformerswerefillingthevoidintwoways.First,DavidDudleyField,thedrafterofthe
highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for
lawyers.Thisconcisestatementofeightstatutorydutiesbecamelawinseveralstatesinthesecondhalfof
thenineteenthcentury.Atthesametime,legaleducators,suchasDavidHoffmanandGeorgeSharswood,
andmanyotherlawyerswereworkingtofleshoutthebroadoutlineofalawyer'sduties.Thesereformers
wroteaboutlegalethics inunprecedenteddetailandthusbroughtanewlevelofunderstandingtoa
lawyer's duties. A number of midnineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governedlawyerbehavior.Afewformsofcolonialregulationse.g.,thedonofalsehoodoathandthe
deceitprohibitionspersistedinsomestates.Procedurallawcontinuedtodirectly,orindirectly,limitan
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence,
loyaltyandsafeguardingofclientproperty.Evidencelawstartedtorecognizewithlessequivocationthe
attorneyclientprivilegeanditsunderlyingtheoryofconfidentiality.Thus,allofthecoreduties,withthe
likelyexceptionofservicetothepoor,hadsomebasisinformallaw.Yet,asinthecolonialandearly
postrevolutionaryperiods,thesestandardswereisolatedanddidnotprovideacomprehensivestatement
of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a
lawyer'sduties,andtheyactuallyusheredanewerainAmericanlegalethics.[21]
Towardtheendofthenineteenthcentury,anewformofethicalstandardsbegantoguidelawyersintheir
practicethebarassociationcodeoflegalethics.Thebarcodesweredetailedethicalstandardsformulated
bylawyersforlawyers.Theycombinedthetwoprimarysourcesofethicalguidancefromthenineteenth
century.Liketheacademicdiscourses,thebarassociationcodesgavedetailtothestatutorystatementsof
dutyandtheoathsofoffice.Unliketheacademiclectures,however,thebarassociationcodesretained
someoftheofficialimprimaturofthestatutesandoaths.Overtime,thebarassociationcodesbecame
extremelypopularthatstatesadoptedthemasbindingrulesoflaw.Criticaltothedevelopmentofthenew
codeswasthereemergenceofbarassociationsthemselves.Localbarassociationsformedsporadically
duringthecolonialperiod,buttheydisbandedbytheearlynineteenthcentury.Inthelatenineteenth
century,barassociationsbegantoformagain,pickingupwheretheircolonialpredecessorshadleftoff.
Manyofthenewbarassociations,mostnotablytheAlabamaStateBarAssociationandtheAmericanBar
Association,assumedonthetaskofdraftingsubstantivestandardsofconductfortheirmembers.[22]
In1887,Alabamabecamethefirststatewithacomprehensivebarassociationcodeofethics.The1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the
AmericanBarAssociation's(ABA)1908CanonsofEthics.[23]
In1917,thePhilippineBarfoundthattheoathanddutiesofalawyerwereinsufficienttoattainthefull
measureofpublicrespecttowhichthelegalprofessionwasentitled.Inthatyear,thePhilippineBar
Associationadoptedasitsown,Canons1to32oftheABACanonsofProfessionalEthics.[24]
Asearlyas1924,someABAmembershavequestionedtheformandfunctionofthecanons.Amongtheir
concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
governmentservicefromprivatelifeandthenleaveitforlargefeesinprivatepractice,wheretheycan
exploitinformation,contacts,andinfluencegarneredingovernmentservice.[25]Theseconcernswere
classifiedasadverseinterestconflictsandcongruentinterestconflicts.Adverseinterestconflictsexist
where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is
substantiallyrelatedtoamatterthatthelawyerdealtwithwhileemployedbythegovernmentandthe
interestsofthecurrentandformerareadverse.[26]Ontheotherhand,congruentinterestrepresentation
conflictsareuniquetogovernmentlawyersandapplyprimarilytoformergovernmentlawyers.[27]For
several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendmentsandinterpretativeopinions.In1928,theABAamendedonecanonandaddedthirteennew
canons.[28]Todealwithproblemspeculiartoformergovernmentlawyers,Canon36wasmintedwhich
disqualifiedthembothforadverseinterestconflictsandcongruentinterestrepresentationconflicts.[29]
Therationalefordisqualificationisrootedinaconcernthatthegovernmentlawyerslargelydiscretionary
actionswouldbeinfluencedbythetemptationtotakeactiononbehalfofthegovernmentclientthatlater
could be to the advantage ofparties who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36
provides,viz.:
36.Retirementfromjudicialpositionorpublicemployment
Alawyershouldnotacceptemploymentasanadvocateinanymatteruponthemeritsofwhichhehas
previouslyactedinajudicialcapacity.
Alawyer,havingonceheldpublicofficeorhavingbeeninthepublicemployshouldnot,afterhis
retirement,acceptemploymentinconnectionwithanymatterhehasinvestigatedorpasseduponwhilein
suchofficeoremploy.
Overthenextthirtyyears,theABAcontinuedtoamendmanyofthecanonsandaddedCanons46and47
in1933and1937,respectively.[31]
In1946,thePhilippineBarAssociationagainadoptedasitsownCanons33to47oftheABACanonsof
ProfessionalEthics.[32]
Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,therewasgrowingconsensusthattheABACanonsneededmore
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA Presidentelect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a
committeetostudytheadequacyandeffectivenessoftheABACanons.Thecommitteerecommended
thatthecanonsneededsubstantialrevision,inpartbecausetheABACanonsfailedtodistinguishbetween
theinspirationalandtheproscriptiveandwerethusunsuccessfulinenforcement.Thelegalprofessionin
theUnitedStateslikewiseobservedthatCanon36oftheABACanonsofProfessionalEthicsresultedin
unnecessarydisqualificationoflawyersfornegligibleparticipationinmattersduringtheiremployment
withthegovernment.
TheunfairnessofCanon36compelledABAtoreplaceitinthe1969ABAModelCodeofProfessional
Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were
supplementedbyDisciplinaryRulesthatdefinedminimumrulesofconducttowhichthelawyermust
adhere.[34]InthecaseofCanon9,DR9101(b)[35]becametheapplicablesupplementarynorm.The
draftingcommitteereformulatedthecanonsintotheModelCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,and,in
Augustof1969,theABAHouseofDelegatesapprovedtheModelCode.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standardssetforthbyDR9101(b)andtheModelCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityasawhole.Thus,
inAugust1983,theABAadoptednewModelRulesofProfessionalResponsibility.TheModelRules
usedtherestatementformat,wheretheconductstandardsweresetoutinrules,withcommentsfollowing
eachrule.Thenewformatwasintendedtogivebetterguidanceandclarityforenforcementbecausethe
onlyenforceablestandardsweretheblackletterRules.TheModelRuleseliminatedthebroadcanons
altogetherandreducedtheemphasisonnarrativediscussion,byplacingcommentsaftertherulesand
limitingcommentdiscussiontothecontentoftheblackletterrules.TheModelRulesmadeanumberof
substantiveimprovementsparticularlywithregardtoconflictsofinterests.[37]Inparticular,theABAdid
awaywithCanon9,citingthehopelessdependenceoftheconceptofimproprietyonthesubjectiveviews
ofanxiousclientsaswellasthenormsindefinitenature.[38]
Incadencewiththesechanges,theIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP)adoptedaproposedCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibilityin1980whichitsubmittedtothisCourtforapproval.TheCodewasdrafted
toreflectthelocalcustoms,traditions,andpracticesofthebarandtoconformwithnewrealities.OnJune
21,1988,thisCourtpromulgatedtheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.[39]Rule6.03oftheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibilitydealsparticularlywithformergovernmentlawyers,andprovides,viz.:
Rule6.03Alawyershallnot,afterleavinggovernmentservice,acceptengagementoremploymentin
connectionwithanymatterinwhichhehadintervenedwhileinsaidservice.
Rule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityretainedthegeneralstructureofparagraph2,Canon
36oftheCanonsofProfessionalEthicsbutreplacedtheexpansivephraseinvestigatedandpassedupon
with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverseinterest conflicts and
congruentinterestconflicts.
ThecaseatbardoesnotinvolvetheadverseinterestaspectofRule6.03.RespondentMendoza,itis
conceded,hasnoadverseinterestproblemwhenheactedasSolicitorGeneralinSp.Proc.No.107812
andlaterascounselofrespondentsTan,etal.inCivilCaseNo.0005andCivilCaseNos.00960099
beforetheSandiganbayan.Nonetheless,thereremains theissueofwhetherthereexists acongruent
interestconflictsufficienttodisqualifyrespondentMendozafromrepresentingrespondentsTan,etal.
I.B.ThecongruentinterestaspectofRule6.03
ThekeytounlockRule6.03liesincomprehendingfirst,themeaningofmatterreferredtointheruleand,
second,themetesandboundsoftheinterventionmadebytheformergovernmentlawyeronthematter.
TheAmericanBarAssociationinitsFormalOpinion342,definedmatterasanydiscrete,isolatableactas
wellasidentifiabletransactionorconductinvolvingaparticularsituationandspecificparty,andnot
merelyanactofdrafting,enforcingorinterpretinggovernmentoragencyprocedures,regulationsorlaws,
orbriefingabstractprinciplesoflaw.
Firstly,itiscriticalthatwepinpointthematterwhichwasthesubjectofinterventionbyrespondent
Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
MendozaasconstitutingthematterwhereheintervenedasaSolicitorGeneral,viz:[40]
ThePCGGsCaseforAtty.MendozasDisqualification
ThePCGGimputesgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheSandiganbayan(FifthDivision)inissuing
theassailedResolutionsdatedJuly11,2001andDecember5,2001denyingthemotiontodisqualifyAtty.
MendozaascounselforrespondentsTan,etal.ThePCGGinsiststhatAtty.Mendoza,asthenSolicitor
General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
proceedwiththesaidbanksliquidationandevenfilingthepetitionforitsliquidationwiththeCFIof
Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials oftheCentralBank,namely,thenSeniorDeputyGovernorAmadoR.Brinas,thenDeputy
GovernorJaimeC.Laya,thenDeputyGovernorandGeneralCounselGabrielC.Singson,thenSpecial
AssistanttotheGovernorCarlotaP.Valenzuela,thenAsistanttotheGovernorArnulfoB.Aurellanoand
thenDirectorofDepartmentofCommercialandSavingsBankAntonioT.Castro,Jr.,wheretheyaverred
thatonMarch28,1977,theyhadaconferencewiththeSolicitorGeneral(Atty.Mendoza),whoadvised
them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said
memorandumstates:
Immediatelyaftersaidmeeting,wehadaconferencewiththeSolicitorGeneralandheadvisedthatthe
followingprocedureshouldbetaken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluationhadbeenmadesincethelastexaminationofthebankasofAugust31,1976anditisbelieved
thatthebankcannotbereorganizedorplacedinaconditionsothatitmaybepermittedtoresume
businesswithsafetytoitsdepositorsandcreditorsandthegeneralpublic.
2.IfthesaidreportisconfirmedbytheMonetaryBoard,itshallordertheliquidationofthebankand
indicatethemannerofitsliquidationandapprovealiquidationplan.
3.TheCentralBankshallinformtheprincipalstockholdersofGenbankoftheforegoingdecisionto
liquidatethebankandtheliquidationplanapprovedbytheMonetaryBoard.
4.TheSolicitorGeneralshallthenfileapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstancerecitingtheproceedings
whichhadbeentakenandprayingtheassistanceoftheCourtintheliquidationofGenbank.
ThePCGGfurthercitestheMinutesNo.13datedMarch29,1977oftheMonetaryBoardwhereitwas
shownthatAtty.MendozawasfurnishedcopiesofpertinentdocumentsrelatingtoGENBANKinorder
toaidhiminfilingwiththecourtthepetitionforassistanceinthebanksliquidation.Thepertinentportion
ofthesaidminutesreads:
TheBoarddecidedasfollows:
...
E.ToauthorizeManagementtofurnishtheSolicitorGeneralwithacopyofthesubjectmemorandumof
theDirector,DepartmentofCommercialandSavingsBankdatedMarch29,1977,togetherwithcopies
of:
1.MemorandumoftheDeputyGovernor,SupervisionandExaminationSector,totheMonetaryBoard,
datedMarch25,1977,containingareportonthecurrentsituationofGenbank;
2.AideMemoireontheAntecedentFactsRe:GeneralBankandTrustCo.,datedMarch23,1977;
3.MemorandumoftheDirector,DepartmentofCommercialandSavingsBank,totheMonetaryBoard,
datedMarch24,1977,submitting,pursuanttoSection29ofR.A.No.265,asamendedbyP.D.No.1007,
arepotonthestateofinsolvencyofGenbank,togetherwithitsattachments;and
4.SuchotherdocumentsasmaybenecessaryorneededbytheSolicitorGeneralforhisuseinthenCFI
prayingtheassistanceoftheCourtintheliquidationofGenbank.
Beyonddoubt,therefore,thematterortheactofrespondentMendozaasSolicitorGeneralinvolvedinthe
caseatbarisadvisingtheCentralBank,onhowtoproceedwiththesaidbanksliquidationandevenfiling
thepetitionforitsliquidationwiththeCFIofManila.Infine,theCourtshouldresolvewhetherhisactof
advisingtheCentralBankonthelegalproceduretoliquidateGENBANKisincludedwithintheconcept
ofmatterunderRule6.03.TheprocedureofliquidationisgiveninblackandwhiteinRepublicActNo.
265,section29,viz:
Theprovisionreadsinpart:
SEC.29.Proceedingsuponinsolvency.Whenever,uponexaminationbytheheadoftheappropriate
supervisingorexaminingdepartmentorhisexaminersoragentsintotheconditionofanybankornon
bankfinancialintermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctions,itshallbedisclosedthattheconditionof
thesameisoneofinsolvency,orthatitscontinuanceinbusinesswouldinvolveprobablelosstoits
depositorsorcreditors,itshallbethedutyofthedepartmentheadconcernedforthwith,inwriting,to
inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
departmentheadtobetrue,forbidtheinstitutiontodobusinessinthePhilippinesandshalldesignatean
officialoftheCentralBankorapersonofrecognizedcompetenceinbankingorfinance,asreceiverto
immediatelytakechargeofitsassetsandliabilities,asexpeditiouslyaspossiblecollectandgatherallthe
assetsandadministerthesameforthebenefitofitscreditors,exercisingallthepowersnecessaryforthese
purposesincluding,butnotlimitedto,bringingsuitsandforeclosingmortgagesinthenameofthebankor
nonbankfinancialintermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctions.
...
IftheMonetaryBoardshalldetermineandconfirmwithinthesaidperiodthatthebankornonbank
financialintermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctionsisinsolventorcannotresumebusinesswith
safetytoitsdepositors,creditorsandthegeneralpublic,itshall,ifthepublicinterestrequires,orderits
liquidation,indicatethemannerofitsliquidationandapprovealiquidationplan.TheCentralBankshall,
bytheSolicitorGeneral,fileapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstancerecitingtheproceedingswhichhave
beentakenandprayingtheassistanceofthecourtintheliquidationofsuchinstitution.Thecourtshall
havejurisdictioninthesameproceedingstoadjudicatedisputedclaimsagainstthebankornonbank
financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholdersanddoallthatisnecessarytopreservetheassetsofsuchinstitutionandtoimplementthe
liquidationplanapprovedbytheMonetaryBoard.TheMonetaryBoardshalldesignateanofficialofthe
CentralBank,orapersonofrecognizedcompetenceinbankingorfinance,asliquidatorwhoshalltake
overthefunctionsofthereceiverpreviouslyappointedbytheMonetaryBoardunderthisSection.The
liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution ornonbank
financialintermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctionstomoneyorsell,assignorotherwisedispose
ofthesametocreditorsandotherpartiesforthepurposeofpayingthedebtsofsuchinstitutionandhe
may,inthenameofthebankornonbankfinancialintermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctions,
institutesuchactionsasmaybenecessaryintheappropriatecourttocollectandrecoveraccountsand
assetsofsuchinstitution.
Theprovisionsofanylawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,theactionsoftheMonetaryBoardunderthis
SectionandthesecondparagraphofSection34ofthisActshallbefinalandexecutory,andcanbeset
asidebythecourtonlyifthereisconvincingproofthattheactionisplainlyarbitraryandmadeinbad
faith.NorestrainingorderorinjunctionshallbeissuedbythecourtenjoiningtheCentralBankfrom
implementingitsactionsunderthisSectionandthesecondparagraphofSection34ofthisAct,unless
thereisconvincingproofthattheactionoftheMonetaryBoardisplainlyarbitraryandmadeinbadfaith
andthepetitionerorplaintifffileswiththeclerkorjudgeofthecourtinwhichtheactionispendinga
bondexecutedinfavoroftheCentralBank,inanamounttobefixedbythecourt.Therestrainingorderor
injunctionshallberefusedor,ifgranted,shallbedissolveduponfilingbytheCentralBankofabond,
whichshallbeintheformofcashorCentralBankcashier(s)check,inanamounttwicetheamountofthe
bondofthepetitionerorplaintiffconditionedthatitwillpaythedamageswhichthepetitionerorplaintiff
maysufferbytherefusalorthedissolutionoftheinjunction.TheprovisionsofRule58oftheNewRules
ofCourtinsofarastheyareapplicableandnotinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisSectionshall
governtheissuanceanddissolutionoftherestrainingorderorinjunctioncontemplatedinthisSection.
Insolvency,underthisAct,shallbeunderstoodtomeantheinabilityofabankornonbankfinancial
intermediaryperformingquasibankingfunctionstopayitsliabilitiesastheyfalldueintheusualand
ordinarycourseofbusiness.Provided,however,Thatthisshallnotincludetheinabilitytopayofan
otherwise noninsolvent bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions
causedbyextraordinarydemandsinducedbyfinancialpaniccommonlyevidencedbyarunonthebankor
nonbank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions in the banking or financial
community.
TheappointmentofaconservatorunderSection28AofthisActortheappointmentofareceiverunder
thisSectionshallbevestedexclusivelywiththeMonetaryBoard,theprovisionofanylaw,generalor
special,tothecontrarynotwithstanding.(AsamendedbyPDNos.72,1007,1771&1827,Jan.16,1981)
WeholdthatthisadvicegivenbyrespondentMendozaontheproceduretoliquidateGENBANKisnot
themattercontemplatedbyRule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.ABAFormalOpinion
No.342isclearasdaylightinstressingthatthedrafting,enforcingorinterpretinggovernmentoragency
procedures,regulationsorlaws,orbriefingabstractprinciplesoflawareactswhichdonotfallwithinthe
scopeofthetermmatterandcannotdisqualify.
Secondly,itcanevenbeconcededforthesakeofargumentthattheaboveactofrespondentMendoza
fallswithinthedefinitionofmatterperABAFormalOpinionNo.342.Bethatasitmay,thesaidactof
respondentMendozawhichisthematterinvolvedinSp.Proc.No.107812isentirelydifferentfromthe
matterinvolvedinCivilCaseNo.0096.Again,theplainfactsspeakforthemselves.Itisgiventhat
respondentMendozahadnothingtodowiththedecisionoftheCentralBanktoliquidateGENBANK.It
isalsogiventhathedidnotparticipateinthesaleofGENBANKtoAlliedBank.Thematterwherehegot
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANKthruthecourtsandinfilingthenecessarypetitioninSp.Proc.No.107812inthethenCourt
ofFirstInstance.ThesubjectmatterofSp.Proc.No.107812,therefore,isnotthesamenorisrelatedto
but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the
sequestrationofthestocksownedbyrespondentsTan,etal.,inAlliedBankontheallegedgroundthat
theyareillgotten.ThecasedoesnotinvolvetheliquidationofGENBANK.Nordoesitinvolvethesale
ofGENBANKtoAlliedBank.WhetherthesharesofstockofthereorganizedAlliedBankareillgotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidatedbytheCentralBankdue,amongothers,totheallegedbankingmalpracticesofitsownersand
officers.Inotherwords,thelegalityoftheliquidationofGENBANKisnotanissueinthesequestration
cases.Indeed,thejurisdictionofthePCGGdoesnotincludethedissolutionandliquidationofbanks.It
goeswithoutsayingthatCode6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitycannotapplytorespondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
interventiononamatterdifferentfromthematterinvolvedinCivilCaseNo.0096.
Thirdly,wenowslidetothemetesandboundsoftheinterventioncontemplatedbyRule6.03.Intervene
means,viz.:
1:toenterorappearasanirrelevantorextraneousfeatureorcircumstance...2:tooccur,fall,orcomein
betweenpointsoftimeorevents...3:tocomeinorbetweenbywayofhindranceormodification:
INTERPOSE...4:tooccurorliebetweentwothings(Paris,wherethesamecitylayonbothsidesofan
interveningriver...)
Ontheotherhand,interventionisdefinedas:
1:theactorfactofintervening:INTERPOSITION;2:interferencethatmayaffecttheinterestsofothers.
Thereare,therefore,twopossibleinterpretationsofthewordintervene.Underthefirstinterpretation,
interveneincludesparticipationinaproceedingeveniftheinterventionisirrelevantorhasnoeffector
littleinfluence.Underthesecondinterpretation,interveneonlyincludesanactofapersonwhohasthe
powertoinfluencethesubjectproceedings.Weholdthatthissecondmeaningismoreappropriatetogive
tothewordinterventionunderRule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityinlightofitshistory.
TheevilssoughttoberemediedbytheRuledonotexistwherethegovernmentlawyerdoesanactwhich
canbeconsideredasinnocuoussuchasxxxdrafting,enforcingorinterpretinggovernmentoragency
procedures,regulationsorlaws,orbriefingabstractprinciplesoflaw.
Infine,theinterventioncannotbeinsubstantialandinsignificant.Originally,Canon36providedthata
formergovernmentlawyershouldnot,afterhisretirement,acceptemploymentinconnectionwithany
matterwhichhehasinvestigatedorpasseduponwhileinsuchofficeoremploy.Asaforediscussed,the
broadsweepofthephrasewhichhehasinvestigatedorpasseduponresultedinunjustdisqualificationof
formergovernmentlawyers.The1969Coderestricteditslatitude,hence,inDR9101(b),theprohibition
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial
responsibility.The1983ModelRulesfurtherconstrictedthereachoftherule.MR1.11(a)providesthata
lawyershallnotrepresentaprivateclientinconnectionwithamatterinwhichthelawyerparticipated
personallyandsubstantiallyasapublicofficeroremployee.
Itis,however,allegedthattheinterventionofrespondentMendozainSp.Proc.No.107812issignificant
andsubstantial.Wedisagree.Forone,thepetitioninthespecialproceedingsisaninitiatorypleading,
hence,ithastobesignedbyrespondentMendozaasthethensittingSolicitorGeneral.Foranother,the
recordisaridastotheactualparticipationofrespondentMendozainthesubsequentproceedings.Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination.Moreover,wenotethatthepetitionfiledmerelyseekstheassistanceofthecourtinthe
liquidationofGENBANK.Theprincipalroleofthecourtinthistypeofproceedingsistoassistthe
CentralBankindeterminingclaimsofcreditorsagainsttheGENBANK.Theroleofthecourtisnot
strictlyasacourtofjusticebutasanagenttoassisttheCentralBankindeterminingtheclaimsof
creditors.Insuchaproceeding,theparticipationoftheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralisnotthatofthe
usualcourtlitigatorprotectingtheinterestofgovernment.
II
BalancingPolicyConsiderations
Tobesure,Rule6.03ofourCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityrepresentsacommendableeffortonthe
partoftheIBPtoupgradetheethicsoflawyersinthegovernmentservice.Asaforestressed,itisatake
offfromsimilareffortsespeciallybytheABAwhichhavenotbeenwithoutdifficulties.Todate,thelegal
professionintheUnitedStatesisstillfinetuningitsDR9101(b)rule.
InfathomingthedepthandbreadthofRule6.03ofourCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,theCourt
tookaccountofvariouspolicyconsiderationstoassurethatitsinterpretationandapplicationtothecaseat
barwillachieveitsendwithoutnecessarilyprejudicingothervaluesofequalimportance.Thus,therule
wasnotinterpretedtocauseachillingeffectongovernmentrecruitmentofablelegaltalent.Atpresent,it
isalreadydifficultforgovernmenttomatchcompensationofferedbytheprivatesectoranditisunlikely
thatgovernmentwillbeabletoreversethatsituation.Theobservationisnotinaccuratethattheonlycard
thatthegovernmentmayplaytorecruitlawyersishavethemdeferpresentincomeinreturnforthe
experienceandcontactsthatcanlaterbeexchangedforhigherincomeinprivatepractice.Rightly,Judge
Kaufmanwarnedthatthesacrificeofenteringgovernmentservicewouldbetoogreatformostmento
endureshouldethicalrulespreventthemfromengaginginthepracticeofatechnicalspecialtywhichthey
devotedyearsinacquiringandcausethefirmwithwhichtheybecomeassociatedtobedisqualified.
Indeed,tomakegovernmentservicemoredifficulttoexitcanonlymakeitlessappealingtoenter.
IninterpretingRule6.03,theCourtalsocastaharsheyeonitsuseasalitigationtactictoharassopposing
counselaswellasdeprivehisclientofcompetentlegalrepresentation.Thedangerthattherulewillbe
misusedtobludgeonanopposingcounselisnotamereguesswork.TheCourtofAppealsfortheDistrict
ofColumbiahasnotedthetacticaluseofmotionstodisqualifycounselinordertodelayproceedings,
deprivetheopposingpartyofcounselofitschoice,andharassandembarrasstheopponent,andobserved
thatthetacticwassoprevalentinlargecivilcasesinrecentyearsastopromptfrequentjudicialand
academiccommentary.EventheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtfoundnoquarrelwiththeCourtofAppeals
description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualifyrespondentMendozaisdifficulttodivine.ThedisqualificationofrespondentMendozahaslong
beenadeadissue.ItwasresuscitatedafterthelapseofmanyyearsandonlyafterPCGGhaslostmany
legalincidentsinthehandsofrespondentMendoza.Forafact,therecycledmotionfordisqualificationin
thecaseatbarwasfiledmorethanfouryearsafterthefilingofthepetitionsforcertiorari,prohibitionand
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketedasCivilCaseNos.00960099.Attheveryleast,thecircumstancesunderwhichthemotionto
disqualifyinthecaseatbarwererefiledputpetitionersmotiveashighlysuspect.
Similarly,theCourtininterpretingRule6.03wasnotunconcernedwiththeprejudicetotheclientwhich
willbecausedbyitsmisapplication.Itcannotbedoubtedthatgrantingadisqualificationmotioncauses
theclienttolosenotonlythelawfirmofchoice,butprobablyanindividuallawyerinwhomtheclienthas
confidence.Theclientwithadisqualifiedlawyermuststartagainoftenwithoutthebenefitofthework
donebythelatter.Theeffectsofthisprejudicetotherighttochooseaneffectivecounselcannotbe
overstatedforitcanresultindenialofdueprocess.
TheCourthastoconsideralsothepossibleadverseeffectofatruncatedreadingoftheruleontheofficial
independenceoflawyersinthegovernmentservice.AccordingtoProf.Morgan:Anindividualwhohas
thesecurityofknowingheorshecanfindprivateemploymentuponleavingthegovernmentisfreeto
workvigorously,challengeofficialpositionswhenheorshebelievesthemtobeinerror,andresistillegal
demandsbysuperiors.Anemployeewholacksthisassuranceofprivateemploymentdoesnotenjoysuch
freedom.Headds:Anysystemthataffectstherighttotakeanewjobaffectstheabilitytoquittheoldjob
andanylimitontheabilitytoquitinhibitsofficialindependence.Thecaseatbarinvolvesthepositionof
SolicitorGeneral,theofficeonceoccupiedbyrespondentMendoza.Itcannotbeoverlystressedthatthe
position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this
independencethatgiveshimtherighttorefusetodefendofficialswhoviolatethetrustoftheiroffice.
AnyunduedimunitionoftheindependenceoftheSolicitorGeneralwillhaveacorrosiveeffectonthe
ruleoflaw.
Nolesssignificantaconsiderationisthedeprivationoftheformergovernmentlawyerofthefreedomto
exercisehisprofession.Giventhecurrentstateofourlaw,thedisqualificationofaformergovernment
lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of
becomingthelepersofthelegalprofession.
Itis,however,profferedthatthemischiefsoughttoberemediedbyRule6.03oftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibilityisthepossibleappearanceofimproprietyandlossofpublicconfidenceingovernment.But
aswellobserved,theaccuracyofgaugingpublicperceptionsisahighlyspeculativeexerciseatbestwhich
canleadtountowardresults.NolessthanJudgeKaufmandoubtsthatthelesseningofrestrictionsasto
formergovernmentattorneyswillhaveanydetrimentaleffectonthatfreeflowofinformationbetween
thegovernmentclientanditsattorneyswhichthecanonsseektoprotect.Notably,theappearanceof
improprietytheoryhasbeenrejectedinthe1983ABAModelRulesofProfessionalConductandsome
courtshaveabandonedpersedisqualificationbasedonCanons4and9whenanactualconflictofinterest
exists,anddemandanevaluationoftheinterestsofthedefendant,government,thewitnessesinthecase,
andthepublic.
ItisalsosubmittedthattheCourtshouldapplyRule6.03inallitsstrictnessforitcorrectlydisfavors
lawyerswhoswitchsides.Itisclaimedthatswitchingsidescarriesthedangerthatformergovernment
employeemaycompromiseconfidentialofficialinformationintheprocess.Butthisconcerndoesnotcast
ashadowinthecaseatbar.Asaforediscussed,theactofrespondentMendozaininformingtheCentral
BankontheprocedurehowtoliquidateGENBANKisadifferentmatterfromthesubjectmatterofCivil
CaseNo.0005whichisaboutthesequestrationofthesharesofrespondentsTan,etal.,inAlliedBank.
Consequently,thedangerthatconfidentialofficialinformationmightbedivulgedisnil,ifnotinexistent.
Tobesure,therearenoinconsistentsidestobebotheredaboutinthecaseatbar.Forthereisnoquestion
thatinlawyeringforrespondentsTan,etal.,respondentMendozaisnotworkingagainsttheinterestof
CentralBank.Onthecontrary,heisindirectlydefendingthevalidityoftheactionofCentralBankin
liquidatingGENBANKandsellingitlatertoAlliedBank.Theirinterestscoincideinsteadofcolliding.It
isforthisreasonthatCentralBankofferednoobjectiontothelawyeringofrespondentMendozainCivil
CaseNo.0005indefenseofrespondentsTan,etal.Thereisnoswitchingofsidesfornotwosidesare
involved.
ItisalsourgedthattheCourtshouldconsiderthatRule6.03isintendedtoavoidconflictofloyalties,i.e.,
thatagovernmentemployeemightbesubjecttoaconflictofloyaltieswhilestillingovernmentservice.
The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the
company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.InthecautionarywordsoftheAssociationoftheBarCommitteein1960:Thegreatestpublic
risksarisingfrompostemploymentconductmaywelloccurduringtheperiodofemploymentthroughthe
dampeningofaggressiveadministrationofgovernmentpolicies.Prof.Morgan,however,considersthis
concernasprobablyexcessive.Heopinesxxxitishardtoimaginethataprivatefirmwouldfeelsecure
hidingsomeonewhohadjustbeendisloyaltohisorherlastclientthegovernment.Interviewswith
lawyersconsistentlyconfirmthatlawfirmswantthebestgovernmentlawyerstheoneswhowerehardest
tobeatnottheleastqualifiedorleastvigorousadvocates.Butagain,thisparticularconcernisanonfactor
inthecaseatbar.ThereisnochargeagainstrespondentMendozathatheadvisedCentralBankonhowto
liquidateGENBANKwithaneyeinlaterdefendingrespondentsTan,etal.ofAlliedBank.Indeed,he
continuesdefendingboththeinterestsofCentralBankandrespondentsTan,etal.intheabovecases.
Likewise,theCourtisnudgedtoconsidertheneedtocurtailwhatisperceivedastheexcessiveinfluence
offormerofficialsortheirclout.Prof.Morganagainwarnsagainstextendingthisconcerntoofar.He
explainstherationaleforhiswarning,viz:Muchofwhatappearstobeanemployeesinfluencemay
actuallybethepowerorauthorityofhisorherposition,powerthatevaporatesquicklyupondeparture
from government x x x. More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in
government.Toquotehimfurther:xxxTheideathat,presentofficialsmakesignificantdecisionsbased
onfriendshipratherthanonthemeritsaysmoreaboutthepresentofficialsthanabouttheirformerco
workerfriends.Itimpliesalackofwillortalent,orboth,infederalofficialsthatdoesnotseemjustified
orintended,anditignoresthepossibilitythattheofficialswilltendtodisfavortheirfriendsinorderto
avoideventheappearanceoffavoritism.
III
Thequestionoffairness
Mr.JusticesPanganibanandCarpioareoftheview,amongothers,thatthecongruentinterestprongof
Rule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityshouldbesubjecttoaprescriptiveperiod.Mr.
JusticeTingaopinesthattherulecannotapplyretroactivelytorespondentMendoza.Obviously,and
rightlyso,theyaredisquietedbythefactthat(1)whenrespondentMendozawastheSolicitorGeneral,
Rule6.03hasnotyetadoptedbytheIBPandapprovedbythisCourt,and(2)thebidtodisqualify
respondentMendozawasmadeafterthelapseoftimewhoselengthcannot,byanystandard,qualifyas
reasonable.Atbottom,thepointtheymakerelatestotheunfairnessoftheruleifappliedwithoutany
prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressedbytheIBPandourCommitteeonRevisionoftheRulesofCourt.
INVIEWWHEREOF,thepetitionassailingtheresolutionsdatedJuly11,2001andDecember5,2001of
theFifthDivisionoftheSandiganbayaninCivilCaseNos.00960099isdenied.
Nocost.
SOORDERED.
 SUAREZvs.PLATON
69Phil.556

Facts:
InMay1935,Atty.FortunatoSuarezwasridingatrainonhiswaytoCalauag,Tayabas.Apparentlyhe
wasveryvocalandhewasdespisingtheabusesmadebygovernmentofficers.Incidentally,Lieutenant
VivencioOraiswasaboardthetrain.OraisarrestedSuarezandchargedhimwithsedition.Oraishowever
latermovedforthedismissalofthecaseupontheinstructionofhissuperior.Thereafter,Suarezfileda
caseagainstOraisforarbitrarydetention.ProvincialFiscalRamonValdezmovedforthedismissalofthe
case due to insufficiency of evidence. Suarez asked Valdez to inhibit and later asked for a special
prosecutortotakehisplaceasheallegedthatValdezdoesnothavethecouragetoprosecutethecase.
ValdezwasthenreplacedbyspecialprosecutorJacintoYamzonwhoalsofoundthatthereisinsufficient
evidencetoprosecutethecase.Eventually,thecasewasdismissedbyJudgeServillanoPlatononthe
groundthatthereisinsufficiencyofevidence.Suarezappealedthedismissalofthecasebuthisappeal
wasdeniedonthegroundthatmandamusistheproperremedy.Hence,SuarezfiledthisMandamuscase
tocompelPlatontoreinstatethecase.

Issue:Whetherornotthecaseshouldbereinstated.

Held:
No.Thefiscalsarewellwithintheirrightsnottopushthroughwiththecaseiftheyfindtheevidenceto
beinsufficient.Theprosecutingofficeristherepresentativenotofanordinarypartytoacontroversy,but
ofasovereigntywhoseobligationtogovernimpartiallyisascompellingasitsobligationtogovernatall;
andwhoseinterest,therefore,inacriminalprosecutionisnotthatitshallwinacase,butthatjusticeshall
bedone.Assuch,heisinapeculiarandverydefinitesensetheservantofthelaw,thetwofoldaimof
whichisthatguiltshallnotescapeorinnocenceshallsuffer.

PEOPLEV.MADERA
57SCRA349

Facts:
InApril1970,whileElinoBanawassleepinginhishouse,hewasshotbyRaymundoMadera.Behind
MaderawereMarianitoAndresandGenerosoAndres.ElinoBanadiedbeforehecouldbebroughttothe
hospitalbuthemadeadyingstatementwhereinhepositivelyidentifiedMaderaashisshooter.Twoof
BanassonswhowereatthehousewhentheshootinghappenedidentifiedMaderaastheshooteraswell
asthetwobehindhim.Thetrialcourtconvictedthethreeformurder.Theyappealed.ThenSolicitor
GeneralEstelitoMendozarecommendedtheconvictionofMaderabutalsorecommendedtheacquittalof
MarianitoandGeneroso.

Issue:Whetherornottheconvictioniscorrect.

Held:
No,insofarasMarianitoandGenerosoisconcernedMaderasguiltisprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt.
ButMarianitosandGenerososguiltwerenotestablished.TheirmerepresencebehindMaderawhenthe
lattershotandkilledBanaisnotconstitutiveoftheirguiltwithoutanyshowingthattheysharedthe
criminalintentofMadera.Itmustbeshownthattheyhadknowledgeofthecriminalintentionofthe
principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the
commissionoftheoffenseasaidtheretowhetherphysicalormoral.Thiswasabsentinthecaseatbar.
TheSupremeCourtlaudedtheSolicitorGeneralforrecommendingtheacquittalofthetwo.TheSupreme
Courtalsoemphasizedthattheprosecutorsfinesthourisnotwhenhewinsacasewiththeconvictionof
theaccused.Hisfinesthourisstillwhen,overcomingtheadvocatesnaturalobsessionforvictory,he
standsupbeforetheCourtandpleadsnotfortheconvictionoftheaccusedbutforhisacquittal.For
indeed,hisnobletaskistoprosecuteonlytheguiltyandtoprotecttheinnocent.

PCGGv.SANDIGANBAYAN
455SCRA256

Facts:
Atty.EstelitoP.MendozawastheSolicitorGeneraluntil1986.Heresumedhisprivatepracticeof
law.HeappearedascounselforLucioC.Tan,et.al.beforetheSandiganbayaninvolvingcivilcasesof
sequestrationofpropertiesallegedly illgottenwealth.WhenstilltheSolicitorGeneral,headvisedthe
CentralBankonhowtoproceedwiththeliquidationofGENBANKwhichbecamesaddledwithbanking
problems.GENBANKwaslaterboughtbytheALLIEDBankownedbyLucioC.Tan,et.al.Atty.
MendozacontinuesdefendingboththeinterestsoftheCentralBankandLucioTan,et.al.
PCGGfiledaMotiontoDisqualifyAtty.MendozaanchoredonRule6.03readingAlawyershallnot,
afterleavinggovernmentservice,acceptengagementoremploymentinconnectionwithanymatterin
whichhehadintervenedwhileinthesaidservice.

ISSUE:WhetherornotAtty.MendozaisdisqualifiedtoappearascounselforLucioTan,et.al.under
Rule6.03.

HELD:
Rule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityretainedthegeneralstructureofparagraph2,
Canon36oftheCanonsofProfessionalEthicsbutreplacedtheexpansivephraseinvestigatedandpassed
uponwiththewordintervened.Itis,therefore,properlyapplicabletobothadverseinterestconflicts
andcongruentinterestconflicts.
ThecaseatbardoesnotinvolvetheadverseinterestaspectofRule6.03.RespondentMendoza,it
isconceded,hasnoadverseinterestproblemwhenheactedasSolicitorGeneralinSp.Proc.No.107812
andlaterascounselofrespondentsTan,et.al.inCivilCaseNo.0005andCivilCaseNo.00960099
before
theSandiganbayan.Nonetheless,thereremainstheissueofwhetherthereexistsacongruentinterest
conflictsufficienttodisqualifyrespondentMendozafromrepresentingrespondentsTan,et.al.
TheCourtheldthatthisadvicegivenbyrespondentMendozaontheproceduretoliquidateGENBANKis
notthemattercontemplatedbyRule6.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
Similarly,theCourtininterpretingRule6.03wasnotunconcernedwiththeprejudicetotheclient
whichwillbecausedbyitsmisapplication.Itcannotbedoubtedthatgrantingdisqualificationmotion
causestheclienttolosenotonlythelawfirmofchoice,butprobablyinindividuallawyerinwhomthe
clienthasconfidence.Theclientwithadisqualifiedlawyermuststartagainoftenwithoutthebenefitof
theworkdonebythelatter.Theeffectsoftheprejudicetotherighttochooseaneffectivecounselcannot
beoverstatedforitcanresultindenialofdueprocess.Nolesssignificantaconsiderationisthe
deprivationoftheformergovernmentlawyerofthefreedomtoexercisehisprofession.Given
the current state of our law,the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
membersofhislawfirm.Formergovernmentlawyersstandindanger
ofbecomingthelepersofthelegalprofession.
Itishowever,preferredthatthemischiefsoughttoberemediedbyRule6.03oftheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibilityisthepossibleappearanceofimproprietyandlossofpublic
confidenceingovernment.Butaswellobserved,theaccuracyofgaugingpublicperceptionsisa
highly speculativeexerciseatbestwhichcanleadtountowardresults.NolessthanJudgeKaufman
doubtsthatthelesseningofrestrictionsastoformergovernmentattorneyswillhaveanydetrimental
effectonthatfreeflowofinformationbetweenthegovernmentclientanditsattorneyswhichthecanons
seektoprotect.Notably,theappearanceofimproprietytheoryhasbeenrejectedinthe1983ABAModel
RulesofProfessionalConductandsomecourtshaveabandonedpersedisqualificationbasedonCanon4
and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant,government,thewitnessesinthecase,andthepublic.Atty.Mendozawasnotdisqualifiedby
theSupremeCourt.