Legal Ethics Reporting

(Canon 7 9 cases)

Submitted to:
Marissa B. Dela-Cruz-Galandines , Assistant Solicitor
General

Submitted by:
Jareo, Samantha Emelli S.
Kim, Keoung Ann A.
Villamin, Maritoni A.
 CANON 7

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES. B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005
FACTS:
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, Atty. Cecilio Arevalo files a motion for exemption
for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after
admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his
retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to
practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion
that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment
for IBP annual membership

HELD:
NO. The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory
measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine
Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a
member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption
from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon: Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of
its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
The membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005.]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues
filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, 1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues
in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He
alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for
the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in
the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the
Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and
10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the
exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the processof discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues
In his reply 4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is
the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers
from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He
also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income
derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership
dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims
that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his
dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State,
an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge ofthe
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility,
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support ofevery attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar 8 which power required members of a privileged class, such
as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that
the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the
Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that
the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to
a member resulting from his required payment ofthe annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature ofpayment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in. DSIaAE
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues.
At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated
Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their
dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one
that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause
to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
 respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee
as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, 11 one of which is the payment ofmembership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years
1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law. HSaEAD
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 1.
2.Rollo, p. 5.
3.Rollo, pp. 12-16.
4.Rollo, pp. 18-25.
5.In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554, 562.
6.In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 25.
7.Ibid., citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
8.Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.
9.Appendix D, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Martin, Ruperto G., p. 440.
10.Supra, note 5, pp. 567-568.
11.In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. M.A. Edillon, A.C. No.
1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612, 617.
 EMERENCIANA V. REYES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE C. WONG, respondent.

A.C. No. 547 . January 29, 1975

FACTS:

Emerencia Reyes is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, graduating from the
MLQ University in 1960. In 1958 Reyes and Felipe Wong were classmates at the same
university. Wong began courting petitioner and finally won her love Sometime in the first week
of February, 1960, Reyes was requested to fill up and sign an application for marriage license
and later on, upon the request of Wong, She also filled up and signed a marriage contract
thereafter, she was shown by Wong the marriage contract, dated February 15, 1960, now
allegedly signed by witnesses and the Honorable Arsenio Dizon as the solemnizing minister.
Believing that She was married to Wong, she went with him in hotels and had carnal
knowledge with him. They lived together in an apartment at 1236 Isaac Peral, Manila, but
moved out after some 4 months when Wong went to Zamboanga City to work at the Bank of
P.I. While Wong was away, Reyes gave birth to her first child on November 28, 1960. In July
1961, Wong was in Manila reviewing for the Bar Examinations which was to be held in August
of that year. Reyes who was then in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, was called by wong to Manila. She
stayed at her sister's house in Pandacan where Wong used to visit her. After Wong took the Bar
examinations, he left for Mindoro to help candidate Cesar Climaco in his senatorial campaign.
On May 25, 1962, Reyes gave birth to her second child. She received news from her cousin in
Zamboanga City that Wonghad married someone else. She found out from the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Bacoor, Cavite, that their alleged marriage was not registered. She
now comes before the Supreme Court asking for Wongs disbarment on the ground of grave
immorality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felipe Wong should be disbarred

HELD:

No. The acts imputed against him may constitute immorality for surely, cohabitation is
immoral for lack of marriage. But the same is not sufficient to disbar him for in order for such
result to take place, the act complained of must not merely be immoral; it must be grossly
immoral. It must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. And the same must be established by clear and convincing
proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power.

Its highly impossible that Reyes actually believed that shes married to Wong. Shes a
law student and as early as the first year of law studies, the essential requisites of marriage is
discussed. She could have not believed that there was a valid marriage considering that no
celebration actually took place plus other infirmities in the alleged marriage. Further, the
Supreme Court said: Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, is neither so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.
 [A.C. No. 547 . January 29, 1975.]

EMERENCIANA V. REYES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE C. WONG, respondent.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J p:

Felipe C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave immorality
by Emerenciana V. Reyes, who filed her sworn complaint on October 26, 1962 (pp. 1-4, rec.)
In his answer filed on December 17, 1962, respondent completely denied the charge, claiming
that he and petitioner were merely friends (pp. 5-7, rec.)
On January 21, 1963, petitioner filed her reply to the answer of respondent, attaching thereto
Xerox copies of two letters written by respondent to her dated October 20, 1960 and December
14, 1960 (pp. 30-34, rec.) for comparison with the penmanship of the respondent in his answer
sheets to the Bar questions in 1961 to disprove respondents claim that he never wrote letters to
petitioner. The aforesaid reply was forwarded to the Solicitor General, to whom the case was
referred on December 28, 1962 for investigation, report and recommendation (pp. 10, 15, rec.)
After the submission of petitioners evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated July 31,
1963, contending that in the light of the ruling of this Court in Soberano vs. Villanueva (Dec. 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 891-896), the evidence presented by the petitioner does not make out a case
against him (pp. 61-70, 85-90, rec.). Respondent likewise filed on August 1, 1963 a motion for
the cancellation of all scheduled hearings of the case until after the Court has resolved the said
motion to dismiss (p. 85, rec.)
Petitioner in turn filed an opposition dated August 17, 1963 to the motion to dismiss, arguing that
the Soberano ruling does not apply to her situation, because, unlike the complainant in said case
petitioner never doubted her marriage with respondent; and that respondent in fact wrote her
numerous letters and sent her telegrams, all addressing her either as E.R. Wong or
Emerenciana R. Wong (pp. 91-95, rec.)
To this opposition, respondent filed a reply dated August 28, 1963, substantially reiterating the
same arguments contained in his motion to dismiss (pp. 96-100, rec.)
On June 9, 1972, then Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin, now CFI Judge, issued an
order resetting the case for hearing on June 20, 1972 (p. 58, rec.). The June 20, 1972 hearing was
however postponed, and it was only on September 6, 1972 that the hearing of the case was
continued but was again reset to October 18, 1972, upon motion of respondent so as to give him
time to file a motion with this Court in connection with his 1963 motion to dismiss (pp. 61, 66-
74, 82, rec.)
On September 13, 1972, respondent thus filed with this Court a motion reiterating his still
unresolved 1963 motion to dismiss the case, adding that the Solicitor General had already reset
the case for hearing; that subsequent to the filing of the present administrative case, petitioner
herein filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action against
herein respondent, entitled Emerenciana V. Reyes, plaintiff, versus Felipe C.Wong, defendant,
Civil Case No. E-00454, For Recognition of Natural Children and Support; and that in the
compromise agreement dated October 28, 1966 submitted in said case, respondent acknowledged
that he is the father of the two daughters of petitioner and that he agreed to support these
children, while petitioner in turn agreed to withdraw this administrative case against respondent,
which compromise agreement was approved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on
November 14, 1966 (pp. 105-108, rec.; p. 4, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, p. 118, rec.)
On September 18, 1972, petitioner filed another pleading reiterating her opposition to the motion
to dismiss of respondent (p. 109, rec.)
The aforesaid pleadings were referred to the Solicitor General (p. 110, rec.)
Before the Solicitor General could resolve the motion to dismiss, petitioner
Emerenciana V. Reyes filed on November 21, 1972 an affidavit of desistance, requesting
permission to withdraw the administrative complaint against respondent. Her affidavit, which
was subscribed and sworn to before City Fiscal Manuel R. Maza of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija,
stated that it would be for the good of her children that the administrative case against respondent
be dismissed and terminated (p. 114, rec.; pp. 4-5, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General; p. 118, rec.)
Since withdrawal by a complainant in an administrative case does not ipso facto exonerate a
respondent (Co vs. Candoy, 21 SCRA 438, 442 [1967]; Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586;
Bolivar vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, 628 [1966]) especially so in this instant case where the
withdrawal of the complainant came after she had rested her case the Solicitor General did not
act upon petitioners motion to withdraw; but instead proceeded to take up respondents motion
to dismiss.
With petitioners desistance at this stage of the proceeding, and considering respondents motion
to dismiss, the question left for resolution is whether in the light of the evidence presented by
petitioner, there is a prima facie case against respondent to warrant requiring respondent to
present his evidence.
In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General recommended that the present
administrative case be dismissed in the light of the Soberano case (p. 118, rec.)
We sustain the said recommendation of the Solicitor General, on the force of the Soberano ruling
and on the fact that the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to disclose a case against
respondent warranting disciplinary action.
As contained in the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General (pp. 1-3, 118, rec.), the
evidence adduced by petitioner reveals that:
Petitioner is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, graduating from the
MLQ University in 1960 (pp. 21-22, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); in 1958 petitioner
and respondent were classmates at the same university (p. 2, t.s.n., May 28,
1963); respondent began courting petitioner and finally won her love (p. 6,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); sometime in the first week of February, 1960, petitioner
 was requested to fill up and sign an application for marriage license (p. 4, t.s.n.,
May 28, 1963); later on, upon the request of respondent, petitioner also filled up
and signed a marriage contract (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., May 28, 1963; pp. 38-39, t.s.n.,
May 31, 1963); thereafter, petitioner was shown by respondent the marriage
contract, dated February 15, 1960, now allegedly signed by witnesses and the
Honorable Arsenio Dizon as the solemnizing minister (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., May 28,
1963; p. 46, t.s.n., May 31, 1963); believing that petitioner was married to
respondent, she went with him in hotels and had carnal knowledge with him
(pp. 5-6, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); they lived together in an apartment at 1236 Isaac
Peral, Manila, but moved out after some 4 months when respondent went to
Zamboanga City to work at the Bank of P.I. (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., May 28, 1963);
while respondent was in Zamboanga City, petitioner gave birth to her first child
on November 28, 1960 (p. 7, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); in July 1961, respondent
was in Manila reviewing for the Bar Examinations which was to be held in
August of that year (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner who was then in
Muoz, Nueva Ecija, was called by respondent to Manila (p. 11, t.s.n., May 28,
1963); petitioner stayed at her sisters house in Pandacan where respondent used
to visit her (pp. 11-13, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); after respondent took the Bar
examinations, he left for Mindoro to help candidate Cesar Climaco in his
senatorial campaign (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); on May 25, 1962,
petitioner gave birth to her second child (p. 14, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner
thereafter received news from her cousin in Zamboanga City that respondent
had married someone else (p. 20, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner found out
from the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Bacoor, Cavite, that their alleged
marriage was not registered (pp. 18-20, t.s.n., May 28, 1963).
Quite clearly, petitioners evidence disclosed that petitioner voluntarily yielded to the carnal
desire of respondent, with whom thereafter she freely lived as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage an illegitimate cohabitation that stemmed from love and mutual desire. In
fact, in his letters to petitioner (Exhibits A, C, G, H, I, J, K, M, O, Q, R, T, U, V, W and AA),
respondent manifested much concern for the health and well-being of petitioner and their Baby
Sheila (p. 8, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.). And in the
compromise agreement embodied in the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
in C.C. No. E-00454, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two natural children,
Sheila Reyes Wong and Florinda (Thelma) Reyes Wong, and agreed to support them (p. 8,
Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.). It was indeed a relationship
that was devoid of deceit on the part of the respondent and a happy one until his sudden
turnabout and marriage to another woman that compelled him to abandon petitioner and their
children.
Petitioners claim that she consented to live with respondent as husband and wife because she
was made to believe by respondent that she was legally married to him as she was made to
sign by respondent an application for a marriage license and afterwards a marriage contract
which later was shown to her complete with the alleged signatures of supposed witnesses and of
a solemnizing officer allegedly in the person of no less than a member of the Supreme Court
is belied by the contents of her letter dated December 18, 1961 (Exhibit 2-H) to respondent, from
which letter We can readily infer that she had knowledge of the legal infirmities of the said
marriage contract. Said letter reads:
Another thing that worry me so much is about our relationship at present. My
family is in good faith about the legality of our marriage. If theyll discover the
truth I dont know if what shall happen to both of us. Im sure that theyll take
some drastic action against you and I dont want this thing to happen.

As I observed you even doubt the paternity of our children. I swear before God
and before all that this children are yours. But if you dont like to recognize
them as yours, nobody else can force you.
In this situation of ours now, nobody can be blamed for it except the two of us.
How can you expect me not to worry when in spite of our present situation
well have another child?
Have we not gone to the extent of committing this mistake, both of us will be
happy. But now, its too late for us to repent.
In spite of everything we can still remedy our situation if youll only grant my
request. All I want you to do is to come here before or on January in order to
settle down everything smoothly. (Pp. 6-7, Report and Recommendation of the
Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.)
The above-quoted portions of petitioners letter to respondent show that petitioner was aware all
the time of the nature of her relationship with respondent, foreclosing all doubts that the
petitioner knowingly and freely lived with respondent without the benefit of marriage
(Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893-894).
Furthermore, complainant was then in the fourth year in the School of Law, MLQ University. In
the first year of the law course, she already knew the requisites and formalities of a valid
marriage, which she took up again in Civil Law review in her senior year. Complainant could not
have been so nave as to be easily deceived to believe that she was legally married to respondent,
knowing fully well that no marriage ceremony was performed publicly, in the presence of
witnesses and solemnizing minister, before whom the parties to the marriage are to declare that
they take each other as husband and wife (Articles 55 & 57, New Civil Code). Petitioner should
have realized that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court would not have consented to taking
part in the execution of a simulated or fictitious marriage contract. This circumstance alone
should have put her on her guard and should have provoked her into further inquiry before
submitting herself to the sexual passions of respondent, if she valued her honor and virtue as she
now pretends.
Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid
marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must
be grossly immoral it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of
Court; Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100
Phil. 587, 591-93; Royong vs. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol,
April 29, 1966, 16; SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-
440, 444-445). And the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power
(Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the dubious character of the
act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra).
The evidence adduced by petitioner lacks the quantity and quality required by the foregoing
criteria.
All told, because of petitioners active and voluntary participation in her illicit relationship with
respondent, the latters acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible. For as We have
declared in Soberano:
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, . . . is neither so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar. . . (p.
895)
It should be added that the decision of the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
embodied the compromise agreement between the parties herein under which respondent
expressly acknowledged their two children and committed himself to support them.
WHEREFORE, THIS DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST RESPONDENT FELIPE
C. WONG IS HEREBY DISMISSED.
Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner, vs. QUINCIANO VAILOCES, respondent. A.C.
No. 439 . April 12, 1961.
FACTS:
On December 14, 1950, Quinciano Vailoces, as member of the bar and in his capacity
as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. The
probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying probate to the will.
This decision became final. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of
public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will where,
after trial, they were found guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision with regard to Vailoces but modified it with regard to his co-accused. As finally
adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsified of
public document defined and penalized in Art.171 of the RPC.The sentence having become
final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party
instituted the present disbarment proceedings.
Vailoces contends that the judgment is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence,
the charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of
herein complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing
him in double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Quinciano Vailoces should be disbarred

HELD:
YES. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if
it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as
used in section 25, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, includes any act deemed contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals.
Conviction of the crime of falsification of public document is clearly contrary to justice
and good morals. Hence such crime involves moral turpitude. Embezzlement, forgery, robbery
and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and as general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude. The disbarment of an attorney
does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court." The purpose of disbarment proceeding is
"to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence."
[A.C. No. 439 . April 12, 1961.]
 LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner, vs. QUINCIANO VAILOCES, r
espondent.

DECISION

ANGELO, J p:

This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar.
It appears that as member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, Vailoces, on
December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter.
Consequently, the probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying
probate to the will. This decision became final. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for
falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to
the will before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental where, after trial, they were found
guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard
to Vailoces but modified it with regard to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsified of public document defined and
penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years
1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, fine and costs. This
sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a
consequence, the offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him in
the criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence,
the charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein
complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed
contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1 Among the examples given of crimes of this nature
by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage. 2 The
crime of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of
this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence such crime
involves moral turpitude. Indeed it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery,
swindling are crimes, which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (53 C.J.S., 1206).
It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 26, Rule 127,
of our Rules of Court. It is futile on his part much as we sympathize with him to dispute now the
sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a
closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are
concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude. As this Court well said:
"The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment
not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as
a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved, himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." (In the Matter of
Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229,
April 30, 1957).
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which resulted in
the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental
would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only
be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included
therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The disbarment of
an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3
Phil., 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence" (In re McDougall, 3 Phil., 77).
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this effect, our
Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Lobrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the IBP-CBD seeking the
disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action
against Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon
presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be a notarized document
executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung
laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado narito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo
sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet before the start of a
hearing.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the
IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal
cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.

The Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel
in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence
that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP board of governors and the IBP investigating commissioner erred
in finding respondent guilty of the charges against him and if the penalty imposed was justified

HELD:
NO. Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession
at all times.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at
Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty.Ferrer did not present
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a
certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly
made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that
recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before
the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn
to uphold.
 ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN
Z. FERRER, SR., respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J p:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives
upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following
offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case 7040,
filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive,
offensive, and improper language which insinuated that
Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case
7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly
falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date
when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines
Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang
lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte,
ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines
Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without
bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with
gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is
presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a
related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and
grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000,
 Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who
worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of
Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him
with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination,
Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These
charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients filed a case for falsification of
public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that
her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against
Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that
the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct
contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that
Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law
profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his
character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty
of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this
disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of
the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He
alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his
son's taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle's
passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and,
during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle
driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident
to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its
Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as
judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and that he was
facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an
employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-
CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of
Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove
Atty. Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the
plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been
falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also
found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of
other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-
225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the
Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP
for resolution of Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 9 of the Investigating
Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors' IBP
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat
Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he
presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned
Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he
imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil
Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the
affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. aHIDAE
 Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum
and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions
of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation
and "FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to mislead this
Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for
Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for
presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of
office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason,
that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the
"SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in
view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses,
there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of
the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere
fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible
for said falsification and distortions. 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times.
Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at
Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty.Ferrer did not present
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a
certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly
made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that
recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng
pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay
mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently,
he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in
the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in
court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot
countenance it.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring
down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever
 moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation. SaIEcA
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due
process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 18 So long as the parties
are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave
Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of
Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court,
before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are
sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin
Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record as an attorney
with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-9.

2.Id. at 71.
3.Id. at 73.
4.Id. at 74-75.
5.Id. at 120.
6.Id. at 137.
7.Id. at 164.
8.Id. at 203.
9.Id. at 585-600.
10.Id. at 584.
11.Id. at 601-606.
12.Id. at 728-734.
13.Id. at 740-741.
14.Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 91.
15.Rollo, p. 12.
16.Saberon v. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359, 368.
17.De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals Justices, 454 Phil. 718, 727 (2003).
18.Batongbakal v. Zafra, 489 Phil. 367, 378 (2005).
19.Calma v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 297, 304 (1999).
20.Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 104 (2003).
 CANON 8

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel (G. R. No L-27072, January 9, 1970)

FACTS:

In July 31, 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision adverse
to MacArthur International Minerals Co. the Solicitor General brought to our attention
statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala,
and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken
against them. The MacArthur International Minerals lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a
motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him
where the following paragraph was stated:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what
the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem
to be constitutionally incapable of considering th

at any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or
unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge
Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly
totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved and also of
Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who
is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it
that many of our government officials are just amoral?

Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the
Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal.

In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred
Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was appointed
to a significant position in the government. Implying that the decision was not fair and that it was
influenced.
 In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was
only included due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used was
necessary to defend his client.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago categorizing the Supreme Court decision as
false, erroneous, or illegal constitutes Disrespectful language towards the court?

HELD: Yes. The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme
Court as a "civilized democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his
motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and accusing
two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the
other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the
petitioners including the President constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It
undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27072. January 9, 1970.]

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET

AL., petitioners, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET
AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; STATUS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT; DUTY

OF RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE. As categorically spelled out in Sec. 20 (b), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, lawyers should observe and maintain respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics provides that "it is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." It is incumbent upon them to support the courts against unjust criticism and
clamor. The attorney's oath solemnly binds them to a conduct that should be "with all
good fidelity . . . to the courts." The duty of an attorney to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which
he is bound to uphold.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO PROMOTE DISTRUST IN THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. As an officer
of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. The

language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a
"civilized democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his
motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and
accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in
fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits
received from any of the petitioners including the President constitute disrespectful
language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF CLIENT, NOT A VALID JUSTIFICATION. A

client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since "lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath- bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their
client, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their client's success
is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ABSTAIN FROM OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY AGAINST

A PARTY OR WITNESS. A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession. It is the duty of a member of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT

TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS MOTU PROPRIO. That the Solicitor General or
his assistants may not be considered as offended parties in this case, is unavailing as a
defense. The Supreme Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. For,
inherent in courts is the power "to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before
it, in every manner appertaining thereto."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO MISLEAD THE JUDGE; USE OF DISTORTED
QUOTATIONS, IMPROPER. The act of intentionally omitting the qualification to the
rule quoted is not proper. Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds the lawyer
to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO COUNSEL TO MAINTAIN SUCH ACTIONS OR

PROCEEDINGS ONLY AS APPEAR TO BE JUST. A lawyer has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client take should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics provides that "a lawyer
should use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his clients from doing those things
which the lawyer himself ought not to de, particularly with reference to their conduct
towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors and witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in
such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; IMPROPER
CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; USE
OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE IN MOTION TO INHIBIT. Where counsel, in his
motion to inhibit, called petitioners as "vulturous executives" and spoke of the Supreme
Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not;
categorized its decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a
presumptuous manner; warned the Court that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a
member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country "although the process
had already begun"; mentioned "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent and "unjudicial
favoritism" for petitioners, and that "any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including that President" should inhibit
themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in law, he is guilty of indirect
contempt for use of language tending to degrade the administration of justice. The
mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY DELETION OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE;
EFFECT OF. The deletion of paragraph 6 which contained disrespectful language did
not erase the fact that it has been made. The explanation that the deleted portion was
included in the motion filed in Court only because of mere advertence, does not make
much of a distinguishing difference. It erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly
made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included
paragraph 6.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISBEHAVIOUR OF AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND

IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE IN PLEADINGS. Where
counsel, in his pleadings, accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur"; describing
such efforts as "scattershot desperation" and the proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on
its face," laying bare "the immortal and arrogant attitude of the petitioners"; and charging
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only from case to
case but from pleading to pleading in the same case, he is guilty of indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehaviour as an officer of the court
in the performance of his official duties and under Sec. 3(d) of the same rule for improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Such language is the surfacing
of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. It offends the court before which it is made.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT; FACT OF BEING A NON-LAWYER
IS NO DEFENSE. A person who admitted having prepared the motion for
reconsideration which contained contemptuous language is guilty of contempt. The fact
that he is not a lawyer is no defense.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNING A CONTEMPTUOUS PLEADING WITHOUT

READING IT IS NO EXCUSE. Counsel's insistence that he had nothing to do with
the contemptuous motion for reconsideration and had not even read it does not excuse
him. As counsel of record, he has control of the proceedings.

RESOLUTI ON *

SANCHEZ, J : p

After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of
record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose
Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken
against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda
personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

"a. `They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have

made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could
be accurately called `scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for
Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom
of page 13 and first line page 14).

b. `Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the

immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.' (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum
Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).

c. `The herein petitioners . . . opportunistically change their claims

and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the
same case.' (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17, sixth,
seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page)."
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his
behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose
B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:

"d. `. . . ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable

law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel.' (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).

e. `. . . Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such

a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used
by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.' (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)."

The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered
and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy,
and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and
Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The
motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and
illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered
in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the
son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy
discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates
"incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief
that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism"
in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited
by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:

"(a) said decision is in violation of the law; which law has not been
declared unconstitutional.
 (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above
entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the
right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this
nature.

(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first
place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development
of the law but only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
favored party.

(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the
status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it
was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.

(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said

decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise
in previous decisions, and the main issue `right to reject any or all bids' is
being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.

(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme
Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision
manifests.

(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred
million dollars by said decision without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial
court, which is elementary."

On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R.
Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in Writing pointed out to this Court that the
statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be
defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the
fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney
could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law.
However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court"
appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
 "6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances
are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some
seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation
from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or
unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the
recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to
hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved - and also
of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal
case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases.
What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack
of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials are just amoral?"

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-paragraphs (f) and (h) of

paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this
Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and
third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be
held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November
21, 1968.

On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already

deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but
that it was still included through inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an

amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion
and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original
motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments
attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.

On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968,
he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of
MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit
the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against
counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the
questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the
defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements
lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20 (f),
Rule 138, had been violated.

On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there
averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him
because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable
by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He
also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as
required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the
stead of an "offended party or witness."

We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as

further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the
use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by
him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's
behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him
whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his
professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise
turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate
their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the
preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this
case.

On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his aide of the case. In brief, he denied
participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed
that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name
included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he
was on leave of absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 8, 1969.

A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur,
through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the
purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
 "4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside
the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral
Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: `Justices;
who may take part. . . . only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This
provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals

Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1960, required
by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court of grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its
executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made."

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito
M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he
should not be dealt with for contempt of court."

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said
fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion;
that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about
the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations
in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there way nothing wrong with the motion he was
persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true
facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly
made in the case.

Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. this Court, on August 4, 1969,
resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their
answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of
court, on or before August 16, 1969; and . . . to direct that the three, Atty. Juanito M.
Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear before this Court
on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:80 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings
against all of them will be heard by this Court."

On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the
truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion.
The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and
asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for
reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he thereupon accompanied
Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago
insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.

On August 15. 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14,
1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which
he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some
changes in pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur
wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While
Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave
his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then
filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the
motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half.
Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about
fifteen minutes.

In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the
Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of
context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial
quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World
Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World
Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and
Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident.

We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a
"civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
"false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case
even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary
of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the
claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism,
only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the
case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism
or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their
actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must
be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although
the process has already begun."

It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is
as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that he
deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion
filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make
much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly
made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included
paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that
come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly
ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of
two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"

Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice"

against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is
a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of
confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who
have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or
members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President",
should also inhibit themselves.

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law.
The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly
casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other
justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including
the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered
to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of
this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government
operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties
to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics
which pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against `unjust criticism and
clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
`with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts `can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.'"

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts
to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." 3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice." 4

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary
for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that
"[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this,
their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm
in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to
defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately
support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain
conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel
possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges
may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part
of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice." 7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice 8 is
thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed
out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having
made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a
proposition of petitioners as corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunity changing their claims
and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt
towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that
these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the
pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession." 9It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged." 10

Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel
for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief:
"The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his
boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a
chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job.
Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once
in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the
promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there
held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be
considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings
of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for
contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in
any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3(a),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official
duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of
contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for
Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's
knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other
lawyers of respondents that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the
above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel
in this case. He is exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty.
Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the
preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held
exempt from contempt.

5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for
reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this
has been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was
quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. . . . only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication . . .." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus

"SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters

submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all
of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time
when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication,
whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the
parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed
with the clerk at the date of submission." 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came
about the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS", which is a common practice
among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to
characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is
being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or
the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that
time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that
MacArthur "will inevitably . . . raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965; . . . to the World Court" and would
invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to
the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than
fifty million dollars annually . . ."

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its
favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return.
There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the
decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any
move to reconsider that decision. And yet. it would appear that the appeal to the World
Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such
act has no aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted
from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He
admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While
he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken
care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for
reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he
is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with
the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too
transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling
represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with
Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling
says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On
the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget,
too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with
Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not
read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He

has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings.
Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility.
Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a]
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists
in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice.

9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this
Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur.
As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms
and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that
"bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the
bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It
would not require the admit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond,
contrary to the instructions to bidders. is not entitled to any consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court,
even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the
decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's
cause would just the same have failed.

For the reason given, this Court hereby finds:

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty.
Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy
not guilty of contempt of court; and

2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty.
Juanito M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an
additional P1,000, Morton F. Meals, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling. P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for
whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads
who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General,
for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of
Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the
personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., did not take part.

Attorneys Vicente C. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling and Morton F.
Meads held guilty of contempt of court. Attorneys Graciano C. Regala & Associates and
Erlito R. Uy held not guilty.

Footnotes

*Editor's Note: See main decision in 24 SCRA 491-495.

1.People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855.

2.In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602.

3.Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160.

4.People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580.

5.5 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69, citing In re Kelly, 243 F. 696,
706.

6.Malcolm, op. cit., p. 161.

7.Ibid., pp. 161-162; italics supplied.

8.Section 3(d), Rule 71, provides:

"SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

xxx xxx xxx

9.5 Martin, op. cit., p. 97.

10.Section 20(f), Rule 138, Rules of Court.

11.Section 5(d), Rule 135, Rules of Court.

12.Italics supplied.

13.Decision of July 31, 1968, p. 3: Rollo, p. 387.

Cornejo v. Tan ( G.R. No. L-2217, [March 23, 1950], 85 PHIL 772-776)

FACTS:
The petitioner, Atty. Miguel R. Cornejo was (allegedly) asked by Acacio, in
civil case of "Cario, et al vs. Acacio, et al.," to act as their counsel; but for his
convenience he requested his companion, Attorney Palacol, to handle it. The latter
entered his appearance and acted accordingly. On 1948, during the hearing of the
case, Cornejo was presented as a witness. Practically all the questions were objected
to by opposing counsel, and the judge, the respondent Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained
almost all objections. Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and
approached the attorney's table asking that his appearance for the defendants be noted.
It was apparent he wanted to say as counsel what he had been prevented from saying
as witness. The respondent judge told him he could not thus appear, there being
already one lawyer and no substitution of counsel had been accomplished in
accordance with the rules.
Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in which he said that the judge
had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the extent of advising Attorney Palacol "to fix the
case because his position was hopeless," and that the memorandum was filed as a
protest against the "unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude of the judge."
The memorandum further stated that copies thereof had been sent to the Secretary of
Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the President of the Senate.
In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge, rejecting the accusation
of partiality, stated that in accordance with his usual practice he had told Attorney
Palacol to see if the matter could be settled amicably. Then he required Attorney
Cornejo to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt on four counts,
namely, for appearing in court without being a party or attorney in the case, for using
offensive language, for misbehavior in the presence of the court and for publishing his
memorandum before it was submitted and decided by the court.
Immediately thereafter Attorney Cornejo repaired to this Court asking for
judgment ordering the respondent judge to admit his appearance as counsel for the
defendants and to refrain from rendering his decision in said case.
On June 7, 1948, the court required the respondent to answer the amended
petition within ten days. However, on June 5, 1948, the respondent judge decided civil
case No. 483. And on June 4, 1948, he declared Attorney Cornejo guilty of contempt
and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 or in case of insolvency, to suffer
 imprisonment for ten days. It also appears that on the same day Attorney Cornejo
interposed an appeal, which was denied by the respondent, on the ground that there is
no appeal in the matter of direct contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not attorney, describing the judges attitude as unjust, hostile,
vindictive, and dangerous contained in memorandum constitutes disrespectful
language towards the court?

HELD: Yes. The court held it used offensive language against the court. It is contained
in the following paragraph:
"It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum be taken for a
protest against what he believes to be unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous
attitude or conduct of the presiding Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, of this
Honorable Court in a democratic government where laws shall reign supreme
unless the same Judge wants to sabotage the present administration of the
President who is seeking the restoration of public peace and order and the faith
of the people in our Government"
That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous. The judge
may have erred in some of his rulings; but mistakes never justify offensive language.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-2217. March 23, 1950.]

 MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, as attorney for Arcadia Acacio et
al., petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, respondent.

Petitioner in his own behalf.

Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; DIRECT CONTEMPT, NO APPEAL LIES FROM ORDER OF.

No appeal lies from an order of a superior court declaring a person in direct
contempt thereof.

DECISION

BENGZON, J : p

In civil case No. 483 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "Cario, et
al vs. Acacio, et al.," Atty. Miguel R. Cornejo was (allegedly) asked by the defendants
Acacio to act as their counsel; but for his convenience he requested his companion,
Attorney Palacol, to handle it. The latter entered his appearance and acted
accordingly. On May 21, 1948, during the hearing of the case, Cornejo was presented
as a witness. Practically all the questions were objected to by opposing counsel, and
the judge, the respondent Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained almost all objections.
Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and approached the attorney's
table asking that his appearance for the defendants be noted. It was apparent he
wanted to say as counsel what he had been prevented from saying as witness. The
respondent judge told him he could not thus appear, there being already one lawyer
and no substitution of counsel had been accomplished in accordance with the rules.

A few days later, Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in which he said,

among other things, that the judge had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the extent of
advising Attorney Palacol "to fix the case because his position was hopeless," and that
the memorandum was filed as a protest against the "unjust, hostile, vindictive and
dangerous attitude of the judge." The memorandum further stated that copies thereof
had been sent to the Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the
President of the Senate.

In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge, rejecting the accusation
of partiality, stated that in accordance with his usual practice he had told Attorney
Palacol to see if the matter could be settled amicably. Then he required Attorney
Cornejo to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt on four counts,
namely, for appearing in court without being a party or attorney in the case, for using
offensive language, for misbehavior in the presence of the court and for publishing his
memorandum before it was submitted and decided by the court.

Answering the order, Attorney Cornejo expressed doubts that he would be

treated impartially because the charges of contempt had been made by the judge
himself, and reiterated his accusation that the judge had unduly anticipated his
opinion on the case in favor of plaintiffs, "demonstrating his over-anxiety to dispatch
the case" "indirectly aiding counsel for the plaintiffs" "insulting and humiliating the
undersigned attorney while on the witness stand, etc.". Then he went on to explain
away or rebut the charges made.

Immediately thereafter Attorney Cornejo repaired to this Court asking for

judgment ordering the respondent judge to admit his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in civil case No. 483, to refrain from rendering his decision in said case
until he shall have allowed the petitioner as counsel for defendants to present further
evidence, and to stop all action on the proceeding for contempt of court.

On June 7, 1948, we required the respondent to answer the amended petition

within ten days. We also resolved that upon the filing of bond by petitioner in the
amount of P200 a writ of preliminary injunction will be issued. Such writ was actually
issued on June 15, 1948.

It appears, however, that on June 5, 1948, the respondent judge decided civil
case No. 483. And on June 4, 1948, he declared Attorney Cornejo guilty of contempt
and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 or in case of insolvency, to suffer
imprisonment for ten days. It also appears that on the same day Attorney Cornejo
interposed an appeal, which was denied by the respondent, on the ground that there is
no appeal in the matter of direct contempts.

In view of these developments and of others to be indicated later on, the

petitioner now asks: (1) that the respondent be required to admit and recognize his
appearance as counsel in civil case No. 483, and that the decision in that litigation be
set aside on the ground that defendants were deprived of their right to present further
evidence through the petitioner as counsel, and (2) that the judgment for contempt be
reviewed and revoked.

On the first point it further appears that, as the injunction order proved too late,
Attorney Palacol submitted on June 23, 1948, a "petition to set aside judgment or
proceeding" seeking relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and that upon denial
thereof he appealed on July 12, 1948 to the Court of Appeals. Wherefore, it is
reasonable to expect that this question will be decided by the Court of Appeals upon a
review of the main controversy. Upon this ground, and partly because petitioner failed
to implead the opposing parties in the said civil case No. 483, this portion of the
petition may not be granted in these proceedings.

On the second point, it is settled that no appeal lies from an order of a superior
court declaring a person in direct contempt thereof. 1 Now, was the submission of the
memorandum a direct contempt? The respondent held it was (1) because Cornejo was
not an attorney in the case; (2) because it used offensive language against the court;
and (3) because it was published before it was submitted and decided by the court.
Copy of the memorandum is part of the record before us. It contains the following
paragraph:

"It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum be taken for a

protest against what he believes to be unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous
attitude or conduct of the presiding Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, of this
Honorable Court in a democratic government where laws shall reign supreme
unless the same Judge wants to sabotage the present administration of the
President who is seeking the restoration of public peace and order and the faith
of the people in our Government"

That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous. 2 The judge

may have erred in some of his rulings; but mistakes never justify offensive language.
As was said in Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 729:

"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution."

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the memorandum
had been furnished "the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, etc.", could rightly be
interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the court in the exercise of its judicial
functions.

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has been stated to show that
there was no clear abuse of the respondent's powers in declaring Attorney Cornejo to
be in direct contempt. Petition denied. No costs.
 Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayorand Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Section 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court; People vs. Abaya, 43 Phil., 247; Carag vs. Warden of
the Jail of Cagayan, 53 Phil., 85.

2.Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil., 86; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 724.
Cruz v. Cabrera , (A. C. No. 5737, October 24, 2004)

FACTS:

On July 7, 2002, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Stanley Cabrera,
charging him with misconduct in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility by
complainant, Ferdinand Cruz.

Complainant, Ferdinand Cruz, alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter
part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf
in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing
on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.

Exchange of words transpired between the parties where respondents imputations were
uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a
lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that
complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior
cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently
with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in
cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear
ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
 Respondent contends that complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade
him from appearing as a counsel for Mina family against whom the complainant had filed
several civil and criminal cases.

Complainants complaint occurred during judicial proceeding wherein the complainant

was able to represent himself and appearing in barong tagalog thus presiding judge was misled
when she issued an order, stating in todays hearing both lawyers appeared.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: No. The court held that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna
does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such
single

outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or
reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account
for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way
is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004.]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY

CABRERA, respondent.

RESOLUTI ON

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty.

Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his
own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing
on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:

. . . So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case,
replied:

You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his
appearance . . . .

Thereafter, the respondent said:

Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting

himself to be a lawyer!

To this the complainant remarked:

 "Your Honor, I'm not . . ."

Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; . . .

Respondent's imputations were uncalled for and the latter's act of compelling the court
to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before
the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having
appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent's
imputations of complainant's misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice
to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in
cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the
words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered were totally with the
intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.

Complainant claims that respondent's display of improper attitude, arrogance,

misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of
the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics
that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed
on the respondent.

In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious
scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom
complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
complainant's illegal practice of law; complainant's complaint occurred during a judicial
proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was
appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
order stating "[i]n today's hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of which, respondent
stated: "Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant)
who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer," to which complainant replied:
"The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he informed the
court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is
not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka
muna" out of indignation because of complainant's temerity in misrepresenting himself as
lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral
defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: "It
is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);"
in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina
family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were
able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by
an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:

In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz's motion to appear as counsel, the motion

is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions
under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.

Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge
Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama
yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court's
Third Division which stated among others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent
were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant's actuations and
taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the
court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part
of the complainant." Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for
lack of merit.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended

respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for
violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted
that respondent's averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic)
privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not
relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court.

Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open
court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral
Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and
No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
 Likewise respondent did not refute complainant's allegation that in 1979 he was
held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the
Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres
on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using
contumacious language in his dealing with others.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the
respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted
by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" in whatever manner it was
uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law
students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of
them.

Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court
if it was his purpose relative to complainant's appearance in court; although the
latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the
requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his

professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in
this case.

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set
aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal
of the case for lack of merit.

Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by
the Board of Governors which states:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case
heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Teodosio vs. Nava, 1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that
the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
 For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them
to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in
agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an
assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his
judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 2

In this case, the Board of Governors' resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct
does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily,
non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where
the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved
could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the
case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. 3 This case falls within the
exception.

We hold that respondent's outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. TaDSHC

Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to
the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge's impression of
complainant's appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted
that complainant is a lawyer. 4 Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent's suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It
has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the
heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the
court to condone even contemptuous language. 5

Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating

personally his cases. A party's right to conduct litigation personally is recognized
by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.

In Maderada vs. Mediodea, 6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
 This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything
during its progress from its commencement to its termination. When they,
however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance
would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting
for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to
himself."

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise
of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

. . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in

frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . .

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually

holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of
law. 7

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership
in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 8 Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 9

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He
is, however,admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an
officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1.357 SCRA 406 (2001).

2.Id., p. 412.

3.Id., pp. 412413.

4.Rollo, p. 9.

5.In re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376, 377 (1922).

6.413 SCRA 313 (2003).

7.Id., pp. 324325.

8.Reyes vs. Chiong Jr., 405 SCRA 212, 217 (2003).

9.De la Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., 407 SCRA 213, 220 (2003).

||| (Cruz v. Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, [October 25, 2004], 484 PHIL 173-183)
 CANON 9
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio
(A.C. No. 6290, July 14, 2004)

Facts:
The complainant is a former employee of the respondent in her law office. The former charged
the latter for malpractice or other gross misconduct in the office for cooperating the illegal
practice of law by her husband. The complainant submitted the following evidences: 1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office where the name of Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., the husband
of the respondent, is listed as a senior partner; 2) a Sagip Communication Radios Group
identification card signed by the respondent where her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo
Tenorio, Jr.. She added that respondents husband even appeared in court hearings. Respondent
averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to
appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did
so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false
reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination,
when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she
admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments
in her law office. During the court investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant a filed a motion to withdraw the complaint but was not acted upon by the court.
Respondent now moved for the dismissal of the case for failure of the complainant to appear in
the said case.

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law

Held:
The court held yes. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a
lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to
see that this purpose is attained, otherwise, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6290. July 14, 2004.]

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA

LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J : p

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May
2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged
the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been

falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which
states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the National
Statistics Office (NSO) 3 prove that no record of marriage exists
between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two
are stated in the birth certificates of their two children,
Donnabel Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III. 5 But in the birth
certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John
Cedric Tenorio, 7 another date and place of marriage are indicated,
namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the

respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous
affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The
respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor
Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant

alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law
by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to
the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement
"Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal
activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As
to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to
Felicisimo R.Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the
Civil Registry of Quezon City. 8Her husband has no prior and subsisting
marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied

that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory
affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was
likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name. 9 Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped
pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 10 The respondent likewise denied
that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka
lang" on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was

filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated
complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the
promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but
she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which
they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also
flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations
for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then
prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H.

Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the
complainant would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the
respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also
agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would
constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the
affiants. 11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting
(1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office 12 where the name of
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card 13 signed by the
respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even
appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law

partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in
court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to
show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-
examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners
because they have investments in her law office. 14

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio,

Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered
that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late
registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified
copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the
birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her
marriage were merely an oversight. 15

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of

Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this
disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and
misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP

Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the
charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by
respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729
20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as
counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for
failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to
prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP

Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification
consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense
in the future would be dealt with more severely. HAaDcS

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan

as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors
of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the
Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza.
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,16 we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed

by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this

disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
respondent is not yet convicted thereof.
In Gerona vs. Datingaling, 18 we held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court,
any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must
await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a
non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to
practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding

oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice
of law. 19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds

himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided
him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-

Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A.
Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted
that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. 20 That is a blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another

proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 21

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-
Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's
record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, 19.

2.Id., 9.

3.Id., 10.

4.Id., 5.

5.Id., 6.

6.Id., 7.

7.Id., 8.

8.Id., 36.

9.Rollo, 37.

10.Id., 38.

11.Rollo, 130.

12.Id., 104.

13.Id., 106.

14.TSN, 30 October 2000, 166.

15.TSN, 30 October 2000, 166.

16.Adm. Case No. 2884, 349 Phil. 7, 1516 (1998).

17.Adarne v. Aldaba, Adm. Case No. 801, 27 June 1978, 83 SCRA 734.

18.Adm. Case No. 4801, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 148.

 19.See RUBEN E. AGPALO, THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
LAWYERS, 75 (1st ed. 1991) (hereafter AGPALO).

20.TSN, 30 October 2000, 52.

21.AGPALO, 69, 78.

||

Tapay v. Bancolo
(A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013)

Facts:
Rodrigo Tapay and Anothony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration
received an order form the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft
and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia Jr., a co-employee. The
complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When
Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo
of the case filed against them, Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had
yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the complaint was not his. This
affidavit was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence
an affidavit by Richard A. Codero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. The case was
then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia the later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a
complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder. The complainants alleged that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. In their Answer,
respondents admitted that due to minor lapses Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation, Atty. Lolita A.
Quisumbing, the Investigation Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP, found
that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Profession Responsibility and
recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law.

Issues:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR

Held:
The Court held yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the complaint he filed for a former client before
the office of the Ombudsman was signed by his name by his secretary at the law office. He
likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit his tolerance which
is clearly a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the CPR. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to
sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the rules of Court, a
counsels signature serves as a certification, that (1) he has read the pleadings (2) to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief there is a good ground to support it (3) it is not interposed
for delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. Atty. Bancolo is
suspended from the practice of law for one year for violation Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the CPR.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.

RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. CHARLIE
L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo
E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder (Atty Jarder) for
violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of
Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. HICATc

The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated
14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf
of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared
that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancoloto sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004,
Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature
appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using
Atty. Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and
Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman

provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint's
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document 2and Dishonesty 3 be filed
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005

denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer,
Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo,
that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and
that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the

Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states: IaDTES

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency

of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
 SO ORDERED. 4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also

dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty.Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the
letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of
Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment

Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain
Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office,
forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,

respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed
by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty.Bancolo alleged that after
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary
of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of
their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006.
The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants' position paper dated 18 October
2006 and respondents' position paper dated 23 October 2006. AHDaET

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner

opined:

. . . . In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted

that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against
complainants' Rodrigo E. Tapayand Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents
released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of
malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule
9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent
him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed
of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this
practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of
indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices
sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippine[s'] Commission on Bar Discipline and
its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law
firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm.
As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present.
He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his
law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and
other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done
that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to
perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of

Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent
Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. HAEDCT

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND,
as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of
merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise,
Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December
2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of

Governors denied both complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court's Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-

Tenorio, 9 where we held: AacDHE
 The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the

preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the
legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court,counsel's signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007,

Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances
or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However,
Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for
the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo,
however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,
Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did
not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare
the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without
seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because

of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed
against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with
his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his
signature to a pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is
a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty.Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary
to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. AHSaTI

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice
of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of
the case against Atty. Jarder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder

for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for
violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie

L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
|||

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I.

2.Docketed as OMB-V-C-05-0207-E.

3.Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.

4.IBP Records (Vol. I), p. 14.

5.Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1612.

6.Sub-Office Report No. 0008-2005.

7.IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6.

8.Id. at 1.

9.478 Phil. 378, 389 (2004).

 10.529 Phil. 876 (2006).

11.RULES OF COURT,Rule 7, Section 3.

Tumbokon v. Pefianco
(A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012)

Facts:
Complainant referred the case of spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap to Atty. Pefianco in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamine Yap, for 20% commission, which was later
reduced to 10%, which agreement was reduced in writing. Atty. Pefianco failed to pay the agreed
commission despite his receipt of attorneys fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about
P40 million pesos. Subsequently, complainant, was informed that Sps Yap shall assume to pay
his commission after the attorynes fee was reduced form 25% to 17%. Despite demand, Atty.
Pefianco refused to pay complainant. Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived
up to the high moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife,
Milagros Hidalgo, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with
whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending
businesses without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral Pilipinas. In his defense,
Pefianco averred that he accepted the case of the spouses on a 25% contingent fee basis, and
advanced all the expenses. The letter-agreement according to him was forgery, and it was the
spouses who promised to assume the payment of Gilberts commission. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended for one year suspension from the active practice of law for violation of
the Lawyers Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1; Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 and Rule 9.02 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issues:
Whether or not Atty.Pefianco violated the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held:
Respondents defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was
belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainants
commission but passing the responsibility to Sps Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or
stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law except in
certain cases which do not obtain the case at bar. Furthermore, the respondent also admitted the
he abandoned his legal wife and cohabited with another women. The settled rule is that the
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our law. Thus, Pefianco violated the
Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01 of Canon of the CPR. The court ruled that the respondent should
be sanctioned for his actions. The court is minded that the power to disbar should be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar. The court deemed
appropriate to suspend Atty. Pefianco of one year from the practice of law.
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6116. August 1, 2012.]

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, complainant, vs. ATTY.

MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J :
p
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano
R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit
and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint, 1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to

give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees
the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda
Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate
of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter 2 dated
August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to
17% of the total estate or about P40 million. Instead, he was informed
through a letter 3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the
same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from
25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his
commission 4 which respondent ignored. aDHScI

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the

high moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned
his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four children. He
also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending
business 5 without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case

on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He
disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed
that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he
clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint. 6

In the Resolution 7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer
this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation 8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)
year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-
2010-453 9 dated August 28, 2010. Respondent moved for
reconsideration 10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141
dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of

the IBP Board of Governors. DAEcIS

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on

those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold
duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the
Code. 11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is
wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended

the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16,
1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps.
Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, 12 Canon 9 of the Code
which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he

abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he
begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as
his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been
assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity
or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. 13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding
that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not

to have been sufficiently established. A "business" requires some form
of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output
can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. 15 The lending of money to a
single person without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed as indicia that
respondent is engaged in the business of lending. THCSAE

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for

his actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and as member of the bar, 16 or the misconduct borders on
the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance, 17 which do
not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it
appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is

found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of

respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin * and Abad, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Designated member in lieu of Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1282
dated August 1, 2012.

1.Rollo, pp. 23-27.

2.Id. at 8.

3.Id. at 14.

4.Letter dated October 25, 2002, id. at 38.

5.Evidenced by the Affidavit of Jose L. Autajay dated April 19, 2003, id. at 41.

6.Comment, id. at 44-51.

7.Id. at 90.
8.IBP rollo, vol. IV, pp. 2-10.

9.Id. at 1.

10.Id. at 11-12.

11.Molina v. Magat, A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012.

12.Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads in full:

"Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon

the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to
his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a

deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement

plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing
arrangement."

13.Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1, 16.

14.I ____ having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and
I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

15.http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/business.html.
16.Tan v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011; Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., A.C. No.
4955, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 367; Garrido vs. Garrido, A.C. No.
6593, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 508.

17.Nevada v. Casuga, A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012.