Professional Documents
Culture Documents
[client name deleted]
Do you foresee any trouble at the moment between ethnic groups like the Shan
State army and the Wa people? Or between the ethnic groups and the government?
Things seem to be quiet ahead of elections. There repo0rts that a wave of Rohingya
refugees is scheduled to arrive in Malaysia ahead of the elections because while they
are allowed to vote the government does not want them to. That's their argument.
Can you ecommend reading for ethnic groups around Mandalay, Magway and Shan,
in Burma particularly the latest in terms of ethnic disputes and trouble.
ANSWER: The Kokang problem was related to the SPDC’s attempt to integrate
military forces into national army prior to elections. This would affect Wa and Shan.
Wa have got out of methamphetamines, Shans have moved in a big way. It all
depends on what the Tatmadaw does.
Suggested background source material:
Martin J. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books,
1999. 2nd Edition.
Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948. Chiang Mai:
Silkworm Press, 1999.Chapter 9, 338‐353.
Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy. Hong Kong: Review
Publishing Company, 1989.
Ian Holliday, “National Unity Struggles in Myanmar: A Degenerate Case of
Governance for Harmony in Asia,” Asian Survey (May/June 2007), 47:3, 374‐392.
Burma (Myanmar)
Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma. Penguin Books, 1997.
The Burma Fund, Summary Report: Shaping Civil‐Military Relations in Burma:
Learning Lessons from ASEAN. Washington, D.C.: The Burma Fund, 2002.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘Burma: Soldiers as State Builders’, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.,
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 413‐429.
2
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘Cracks in the Edifice? Military‐Society Relations in Burma Since
1988’, in Morten Peterson and Emily Rudland, eds., Burma: Strong State/Weak
Regime. Sydney: Crawford House, 2000. 22‐51.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘Democracy in Burma: The Lessons of History’, NBR Analysis (May
1998), 9:3, 5‐26.
Mary P. Callaghan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘Junta Dreams or Nightmare? Observations of Burma’s Military
since 1988’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (1999), 31:3, 52‐58.
Mary P. Callaghan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘On Time Warps and Warped Time: Lessons from Burma’s
“Democratic Era”’, in Robert Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998., 49‐67.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘The Sinking Schooner: Murder and the State in Independent
Burma, 1948‐1958’, in Carl Trocki, ed., Gangsters, the State and Democracy in
Southeast Asia. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998., 17‐37.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘State Formation in the Shadow of the Raj: Violence, Warfare and
Politics in Colonial Burma’, Southeast Asian Studies(March 2002), 39:4, 513‐536.
Mary P. Callaghan, ‘When Soldiers Kill Civilians: Burma’s Crackdown in 1988 in
Comparative Perspective’, in Audrey Kahin and James Siegel, eds., Southeast Asia
Over Three Generations: Essays Presented to Benedict Anderson. Ithaca: Southeast
Asia Program, Cornell University, 2003. 331‐346.
Neil A. Englehart, ‘Is Regime Change Enough for Burma? The Problem of State
Capacity’, Asian Survey (July/August 2004), 45:4, 622‐644.
Richard M. Gibson and John B. Haseman, ‘Prospects for Controlling Narcotics
Production and Trafficking in Myanmar’, Contemporary Southeast Asia (April 2003),
25:1, 1‐19.
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than, eds., Myanmar:
Beyond Politics to Social Imperatives. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2005.
Ian Holliday, ‘National Unity Struggles in Myanmar: A Degenerate Case of
Governance for Harmony in Asia’, Asian Survey (2007), 47:3, 374‐392.
Ian Holliday, ‘Rethinking the United States Myanmar Policy’, Asian Survey
(July/August 2005), 45:4, 603‐621.
International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid
Relations, Asia Report No. 161, October 20, 2008.
International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar After the Crackdown, Asia Report No.
144, January 31, 2008.
International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces, Asia Briefing,
27, September 2002.
3
Stephen McCarthy, ‘Prospects for Justice and Stability in Burma’, Asian Survey
(May/June 2006), 46:3, 417‐436.
Donald M. Seekins, ‘Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime’,
Asian Survey (May/June 2004), 45:3, 437‐452.
Josef Silverstein, ‘Burma’s struggle for democracy: the army against the people’, R. J.
May and Viberto Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific.
Bathurst: Crawford House, 1998. 69‐87.
Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: The Organisational Development of the
Armed Forces in Myanmar. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1998.
Maung Aung Myoe, ‘The National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia (August 2002), 24:2, 371‐384.
Maung Aung Myoe, Officer Education and Leadership Training in the Tatmadaw: A
Survey, Working Paper No. 346. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
2000.
Andrew Selth, Burma and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Working Paper No. 334.
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999.
Andrew Selth, Burma’s Order of Battle: An Interim Assessment, Working Paper No.
351. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000.
Josef Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977.
Ashley South, ‘Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia (August 2004), 26:2, 233‐255.
David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2001.
Robert Taylor, ‘Burma’, in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military‐
Civilian Relations in South‐East Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985., 13‐
49.
Robert H. Taylor, ‘The Military in Myanmar: What Scope for a New Role?’, in Viberto
Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1991., 139‐152.
Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma. London: c. Hurst & Company, 1987.
Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Burma: The “New Professionalism” of the Tatmadaw’, in
Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical
Perspectives. Honolulu: East‐West Center, 2001. 163‐178.
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, ‘Preconditions and Prospects for Democratic
Transition in Burma/Myanmar’, Asian Survey (May/June 2003), 43:3, 443‐460.
Michael Aung‐Thwin, ‘Parochial Universalism, Democracy Jihad, and the Orientalist
Image of Burma: the New Evangelism’, Pacific Affairs (Winter 2001‐2002), 74:1, 483‐
505.
Justin Wintle, Perfect Hostage: A Life of Aung San Suu Kyi. London: Hutchinson, 2007.
4
Military Rule in Burma
(Drugs and Security Annex)
Professor Carl Thayer
Background
• Pre‐colonial – Crown Service
Group
• Colonial: BriGsh Indian Army
• World War 2 – BriGsh
recruitment from hill tribes
• Burmese naGonalism –
lowland Burman
Force ComposiGon
BriGsh Burma Army 1941
Force
Size
Percent
Regular Army
9,879
35.3%
Garrison Coys
1,391
0.49%
Auxiliary
3,368
12.0%
Territorial
3,272
11.7%
Frontier
10,073
36.0%
Total
27,981
95.5%
Ethnic MinoriGes:
Kachin‐ G, FF, RA
Shan‐ G
Chin‐ FF, G, RA
Karen‐ A, FF, RA
A= Auxiliary, G = Garrison, FF =
FronGer Force, RA = Regular Army
Ethnic ComposiGon
BriGsh Burma Army (all forces) 1941
Ethnic Group
Number
Percent
Burmans
3,742
13.4%
Karens
4,782
17.1%
Kachins
2,125
7.6%
Chin
2,607
9.3%
Shans
1,080
3.8%
Indians
10,259
36.7%
Chinese
368
0.01%
• AnG‐Fascist People’s Freedom League
(AFPFL) anG‐BriGsh naGonalist movement
– PoliGcal PBF officers joined AFPFL
– Communists expelled October 1946
• People’s Volunteer OrganisaGon (PVO)
– Paramilitary force allied to AFPFL
• July 1947 Aung San assassinated
• Independence January 4, 1948
Burma: Civil War, 1948‐52
Praetorianism
• March 1948 Burma Communist Party revolts
• Socialists and communists split over
appointment of Minister of Defence
• 3 army ba_alions muGny, join communists
• Largest PVO unit goes underground
• December 1948 Karen NaGonal Defence
OrganisaGon revolts
Burma Civil War, 1948‐52
Praetorianism
• February 1949 1st Kachin Rifles muGnies and
seizes Mandalay briefly
• 50‐60% of all government troops now in a state of
rebellion
• Government crisis (March 1949)
– socialists quit AFPFL government
• 10,000 KMT troops enter Burma
• Senior Karen officers who remained loyal were
relieved of their commands by General Ne Win
Burma: Civil War, 1948‐52
• Burmese military forced to be self‐reliant
– Army takes over control of many districts,
engages in civic acGon
– Army makes substanGal claim on naGonal budget
for internal security leading to army’s
independence from government
• Post‐1952 civil war confined to remote areas
– Army does fighGng
– PoliGcians conGnue to bicker
Military Professionalism and
SubjecGve Civilian Control
• Shake‐out of civil war led to smaller and
more experienced officer corps
– Officer corps now more cohesive ethnically
Burman
– Army restructured on basis of non‐ethnic
ba_alions
• Defence Services Academy established
– Code of corporate solidarity and subservience
to central civilian control under the
consGtuGon
Burma: Background
• 1952 ElecGons won by AnG‐Fascist People’s
Freedom League (AFPFL)
• Socialist ideology guided policy
• Growing poliGcal‐economic crisis
• 1956 AFPFL’s electoral support declines
• AFPFL leadership splits
• Amnesty policy towards guerrilla groups
• Crisis and government deadlock
Burma:Background
• 1958‐60 caretaker government General Ne
Win replaces U Nu as Prime Minister
– Military Staff Council replaces Cabinet
– Massive reshuffle of government and public
service posts, military assumes wide authority
– ConsGtuGon observed
• Crisis overcome
• NaGonal elecGons held 1960
– U Nu’s facGon of AFPFL wins 159 of 237 seats
Burma:Background
• Return of civilian government results in
parliamentary deadlock
• Ethnic minoriGes demand more autonomy or
even separaGon
• Civil‐military fricGon develops
– Police removed from army
– Army economic administrators to resign commissions
• FacGonalism emerges in military over role in
poliGcal and economic ma_ers
• General Ne Win reorganises top army leadership
Burma: March 1962 Coup
• General Ne Win heads
caretaker government
1958‐60
• Returns power to
elected civilian
government
• ConGnued poliGcal‐
economic crisis
• Seizes power
PoliGcal Overview
• 1962‐74 RevoluGonary Council
– General Ne Win
• 1974‐88 Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
(renamed Union of Burma 1989)
• 1988‐97 State Law and Order RestoraGon
Council
• 1997‐ State Peace and Development Council
PoliGcal Overview
• The most durable military rule in the world
– Armed Forces or Tatmadaw (1962‐2009)
• Two naGonal security crises = state‐building
– Kuo Min Tang (KMT) crisis, 1950‐53
– Pro‐democracy Uprising, 1988
• ContradicGon between military as the
government and as an insGtuGon = fissures
Caretaker government, 1958‐60
• ‘The NaGonal Ideology and the Role of the
Defence Services’ (October 1958)
– order and stability, restoraGon of peace and rule of
law, democracy (anG‐communism), socialist
economy
• ‘Dharma in Danger’ (1959)
– Use of Buddhism to oppose communism
• Defence Services InsGtute
– banking, department stores, construcGon, mariGme
shipping, fishing
Coup d’etat March 1962
Born 1910 – died 2002
1941 one of Thirty Comrades
1946‐48 CO 4th Burma Rifles
1949‐72 Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Prime Minister 1958‐60, 1962‐74
Head RevoluGonary Council 1962‐74
President Socialist Republic of the
Union of Burma 1974‐78
Chairman Burma Socialist Programme
Party 1962‐88
General Ne Win
RevoluGonary Council, 1962‐74
• Military under Ne Win replaces civilians
• ConsGtuGon suspended
• Parliament dissolved
• PoliGcal parGes banned
• ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’ (1962)
– Central command economy
– EliminaGon of foreign ownership in business
RevoluGonary Council, 1962‐74
• Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)
– Leninist‐style poliGcal party 1962
• ‘The System of CorrelaGon of Man and His
Environment’ (1963)
– BSPP ideology codified
• 1963 Amnesty offered to communist and
ethnic minority insurgents
• 1964 poliGcal parGes banned
From RevoluGonary Council to
Union of Burma
• BSPP transformed into mass party 1971
– Civil administraGon in hands of PM and Cabinet
– Ne Win reGres from the military
– Power shi] from Army command to party secretariat
• New ConsGtuGon 1974
– People’s Councils – 4 year term
– Increasing ri] between ‘civilians’ and regular military
officers over power arrangements naGonally and in
local areas
• 1981 Ne Win steps down as President
Collapse of Ne Win Regime
• July 1988 BSPP Extraordinary Congress
– Ne Win and other top leaders resign
– MulGparty elecGons promised
• Student demonstraGons in Rangoon 8‐8‐88
Tatmadaw intervenes ‐ thousands killed
• September 18, 1988 Tatmadaw seizes
power in name of State Law and Order
RestoraGon Council (SLORC)
State Law and Order RestoraGon Council
• MarGal Law under SLORC
– General Saw Maung named chairman
– 1974 ConsGtuGon suspended
– Declares mulGparty general elecGons will be held
• ParGal Economic reforms
– Open market, correct financial weakness
• ‘BurmanisaGon’ – Myanmar, Yangon
State Law and Order RestoraGon Council
• OpposiGon NaGonal League for Democracy
sweeps 1990 elecGons
– Military’s NaGonal Unity Party does poorly
• Military refuses to accept results
– Aung San Suu Kyi placed under 5‐year house
arrest
– Mass detenGon of opposiGon leaders
– Pro‐democracy supports flee to border area
2nd Major TransformaGon
• 2nd phase of military transformaGon and
state‐building
• SLORC had to re‐build collapsed regime
– Stability and order highest priority
– Military used to reassert central control over
poliGcal, economic and administraGve power
2nd Major TransformaGon
• Ministry of Defence reorganized – 1990
• Command and Control reformed
• Bureau of Special OperaGons created
– Control over most combat units
• New army garrisons
• New naval bases and air staGons
• Military industrial base expanded
• Privileges: health, welfare, educaGon
2nd Major TransformaGon
• From 186,000 to 370,000 (1988‐1996)
– Two mobile light infantry divisions
– Specialised engineer, armour and arGllery units
• US $1 billion force modernizaGon program
– 140 new combat aircra]
– 30 naval vessels
– 170 tanks, 250 APCs
– Rocket launch systems, anG‐aircra] arGllery, infantry
weapons, telecommunicaGons surveillance equipment
State‐Building
• Office of Strategic Studies (OSS)
– IniGate and coordinate policies: economy, drug trade,
ethnic minority affairs, foreign relaGons
• Regional Commands (N = 12)
– Day‐to‐day authority over economic and poliGcal affairs
– Eliminate poliGcal dissent, dismantle older socialist state
and party organs
– Effect new administraGve and economic arrangements
– Amassed enormous wealth and power
State‐Building: Finance
• Military spending 40%‐60% of naGonal budget
• So] loans from China
• Off budget sources:
– Foreign exchange profits
– Tax on opium and methamphetamine trade
• Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd.
– Jointly owned by Directorate of Defence Personnel (40%)
and reGred and acGve duty military (60%)
– Registered capital US $1.4 billion
– Largest indigenous firm– gem trade and all foreign
investors
DeclaraGon 10/92 April
24, 1992
General Saw Maung
SLORC Chairman 1988‐92
Rivals
General Than Shwe General Khin Nyunt
Military Commander Secretary One
General Khin Nyunt, Secretary‐1
• NegoGated ceasefires with ethnic
minoriGes
• 1994 created Office of Strategic
Studies (OSS) in MOD
• Advocated Myanmar’s entry into
ASEAN
• Set up PoliGcal Affairs Commi_ee
(18 Sept 1998) to guide poliGcal
transiGon
• Author of 7 Step Road Map for
DemocraGc TransiGon (Aug 2003)
End of MarGal Law (1989‐92)
• June‐July 1992 SLORC iniGates dialogue with poliGcal
parGes
• 534 poliGcal prisoners freed
– But high profile leaders among 1,500 sGll held
• Aug 1992 UniversiGes and colleges reopened
– Lecturers and teachers re‐trained
• 10 Sept 1992 curfew ended
• 2 Oct 1992 Commission for NaGonal ConvenGon
convened
NegoGated Ceasefires 1989‐95
• Wa • Kayah
• Kokang • Arakanese
• Palaung • Kachin Independence
• Lisu OrganisaGon
• Akha • Mon
• Pa‐O • Karenni
• Shan State Army • [16 groups by 1995]
• Shan (other) • [17 groups by 2001]
From SLORC to SPDC
• Asian Financial Crisis (July 1997‐)
• State Peace and Development Council (Nov 1997)
– Purge of most corrupt Cabinet members
– Regional Commanders kicked upstairs to ministerial
posiGons in Rangoon
– Younger general officers given Regional Commands and
placed in top SPDC leadership
• New Order Indonesia a model
• Unresolved problem of poliGcal opposiGon and
lack of internaGonal support
Internal Power Struggle
Rivals
Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt SPDC
Sr-Gen Maung Aye
Secretary 1 & Head of Military
SPDC Vice Chairman
Intelligence & Office of
Army Commander
Strategic Studies
SPDC Vacancies Filled March 2002
General Shwe Mann Military
Affairs
Lt. Gen Soe Win Secretary 2 and [Gen. Maung Aye recovering
Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt SPDC Secretary 1 from surgery in Singapore]
Cabinet Reshuffle (Aug 25, 2003)
Khin Nyunt
Prime Minister
Lt. Gen Soe Win Lt Gen Thein Sein
Secretary 1 Secretary 2
7‐Point Road Map to Democracy
1. Reconvene NaGonal ConvenGon
2. NaGonal ConvenGon to draw up principles for
a new ConsGtuGon
3. Dra] a new ConsGtuGon
4. Hold a referendum for new consGtuGon
5. Hold free and fair elecGons
6. Convene Hlu_aw (parliament)
7. Form a new democraGc government
NaGonal ConvenGon ObjecGves
• Dra] principles for a ConsGtuGon
– Non‐disintegraGon of Union
– NaGonal sovereignty
– MulGparty system
• ParGcipaGon of Tatmadaw in leading role of
naGonal poliGcs of the state
• 700 delegates from 135 ethnic and funcGonal
groups convened January 9, 1993
• Suspended 1996‐2004 a]er NLD boyco_
– Reconvened May 2004
Purge of Khin Nyunt and Directorate of
Defence Services Intelligence
• Dismissed for
disobeying orders and
corruption 19 Oct 2004
• DDSI (intelligence)
purged
• Convicted by a special
tribunal on corruption
charges and sentenced to
44 years in prison
SPDC Sr-Gen Than Shwe
Chairman, Chief of State,
Leadership CIC Defence Services
31‐138 killed and 1,000‐6,000 arrested
ConsGtuGon
• CreaGon of bicameral legislature
– Chamber of DepuGes (440‐seats)
• Township consGtuencies
• 25% of seats reserved for military
– Chamber of NaGonaliGes (224 seats)
• Seven regions and seven states
• Military to select:
– Head of State, Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and
Border Development
• Referendum May 10, 2009
Cyclone Nargis, May 2, 2008
[referendum held anyway]
Major Problems
• Ethnic minoriGes entrenched in regions
– 17 negoGated cease‐fire agreements (1989‐1996)
– Ethnic groups retained their arms and now police
their own territory
– Former rebel armies now funcGon as private
security forces to protect legal and illegal
business operaGons
– Deadline for conversion of ethnic miliGas to
Border Guard under central control
• October 2009 deadline
for ethnic minority miliGas
to convert to Border
Guards under central
control
• Myanmar Peace and
Democracy Front
• Kachin, Kokang, Wa
• Karen a_acked June
• Kokang a_acked August
• A_empt by SPDC to gain
control prior to 2010
elecGons
Conclusion
• Military Fissures Centre‐Periphery
– Regional Commanders parGcularly powerful
– Emerging gap in professionalism of officer corps
• Disciplinary problems in expanded Army
– 200,000 added to ranks
– Recruitment drive based on quotas led to intake
of criminals and young toughs
• NaGonal elecGons 2010
Drugs and Security
• Drugs are used to fund criminal acGviGes
– Gun running, forgery, money laundering, bribery,
trafficking in persons
• CorrupGon of police, security, customs and
judicial officials
• Lowers quality of governance, weakens the state
• Decreases governmental legiGmacy
• Undue influence of drug lords in poliGcs
• Skews and diverts government funding
• Enables transnaGonal criminal networks
Opium ProducGon: Afghanistan,
Myanmar and Laos
Drug
Trafficking:
The Golden
Triangle –
Thailand,
Burma and
Laos
Opium ProducGon in Myanmar
Opium ProducGon in Laos
Opium
Growing Areas
in the Shan
State
The Shan State
produces 89%
of Burma’s
total opium
crop
Opium ProducGon Inside Myanmar
Shan State Army South
Chemical Drug ProducGon Factory
From opium to
morphine to heroin
Amphetamine‐Type
SGmulants (ATS)
and Heroin
Refineries in the
Shan State
Methamphetamine
ProducGon in
Burma
Methamphetamines
‘shabu’ ‘ice’ or
‘yaba’