[G.R. No. 133568.
July 24, 2000] The prosecution presented police officers Venusto Jamisolamin and Joselito
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BETTY CUBA y
LUBON a.k.a. "Betty," CESAR SANTOS y LUCIA a.k.a. "Cesar,"
SALVACION CAPARAS y DE CASTRO a.k.a. "Cion," accused.
SALVACION CAPARAS y DE CASTRO a.k.a. "Cion," accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant Salvacion Caparas y De Castro a.k.a. "Cion" (hereafter
CAPARAS) seeks the reversal of the 23 March 1998 decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70944,
finding her guilty of the crime of illegally transporting and selling marijuana
under Section 4, Art. II of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The other accused, Betty Cuba y
Lubon a.k.a. "Betty" (hereafter BETTY) and Cesar Santos y
Lucio a.k.a. "Cesar" (hereafter CESAR) were acquitted.
CAPARAS, BETTY and CESAR were indicted under an information[2] filed on 2
May 1997, with the violation of Section 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The accusatory
portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 29th day of April 1997 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport and distribute any prohibited drug, did then and
there wilfully and feloniously transport, deliver, and offer for
sale 39, 735.00 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited
drug to poseur-buyer SPOIII VENUSTO T. JAMISOLAMIN, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At their arraignment on 14 May 1997,[3] each of the accused entered a plea of
not guilty.
Dominguez. By virtue of the agreement and admissions during the pre-trial,
the testimony of Forensic Chemist Alexis Guinanao was dispensed with.
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies of the accused
BETTY, CAPARAS, and CESAR.
The narration of facts and evidence presented by both the prosecution and
defense as summarized by the trial court in its decision is hereby
quoted verbatim:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
On June 2, 1997, the prosecution and the accused stipulated
on the subject matter of the testimony of the forensic analyst,
Alexis Guinanao, to the effect that on April 30, 1997, he
received a letter-request (Exh. "A") from a certain Supt. Pedro
Ongsotto Alcantara addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services stating therein the request for the examination of
specimens marked as Exhs. "A", "B", & "C" which were duly
received by the said laboratory. The parties further stipulated
that the forensic analyst, upon receipt of the said specimens,
conducted an examination and the result of which were stated
down in his Initial Laboratory Report dated April 30, 1997
(Exhs. "B" to "B-4). He likewise prepared his Physical Science
Report No. D- 277-97 (Exh. "C" to "C-3") indicating his findings
that the submitted specimens, namely: one (1) blue plastic
bag labeled "DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES" containing fourteen (14)
bricks of marijuana, which had a total weight of 15, 445.00
grams (Exhs. "D" to "D-14"); one (1) box labeled "LUCKY ME
PANCIT CANTON" containing twelve (12) bricks of marijuana,
with a total weight of 11, 880.00 grams (Exhs. "E" to "E-12");
and one (1) box labeled "MAGGI RICH MAMI" containing
thirteen (13) bricks of marijuana, with a total weight of 12,
420.00 grams (Exhs. "F" to "F-12") were all found positive to
the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug; that the specimens
examined in the Initial Laboratory Report were the same
specimens and results/findings in the Physical Science Report.
Finally, the parties stipulated that the specimens submitted by
the Chemist were each wrapped in newsprint and further
placed inside big boxes labeled as MAGGI RICH MAMI and
LUCKY ME PANCIT CANTON and a blue shopping bag labeled as
DUTY-FREE PHILIPPINES.
Aside from the above stipulations, the prosecution presented
SPO3 Venusto Jamisolamin and P/Insp. Joselito Dominguez,
both from the Narcotics Group Command, Central Narcotics
District at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, whose testimonies
may be summed up as follows:
After receiving and verifying the information from their civilian
informant that a certain female supplier/courier is capable of
delivering big bulks of marijuana in Metro Manila, P/Supt.
Pedro Alcantara instructed Team Leader Bravo, P/Insp. Joselito
Dominguez, to conduct a possible test-buying operation and
surveillance which designated SPO3 Venusto Jamisolamin as
the poseur-buyer. Thus, on April 18, 1997, P/Insp. Dominguez
availed of a room at West Avenue Hotel in West Avenue,
Quezon City, as evidenced by the Official Receipt dated April
18, 1997 (Exh. "H") in preparation to the initial meeting
between the female supplier/courier accompanied by the
civilian informant and Jamisolamin, the poseur-buyer. The
following day at around 8:30 in the morning, the civilian
informant and a certain woman by the name of Cion arrived
and she was introduced to Jamisolamin. After the negotiation,
Jamisolamin and Cion reached an agreement wherein Cion
would deliver 30 to 50 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops
within 10 days at P1,000.00 per kilogram. On April 27, 1997,
sometime in the afternoon, the civilian informant called up
P/Insp. Dominguez and informed him that Cion and a certain
female supplier/owner will only be bringing around 41 kilos of
marijuana stuff and that they will be coming from Baguio City.
Since they were scared of commuting by bus, P/Insp.
Dominguez instructed the informant to use his white Nissan
Sentra car for their transportation. Thus, P/Insp. Dominguez
proceeded to Baguio City together with SPO3 Jamisolamin and
PO3 Rolando Duazo using a red car. While in Baguio City,
P/Insp. Dominguez was in constant communication with the
civilian informant pertaining to the loading of the marijuana
inside the white car. When informed that the car was already
loaded with the stuff, P/Insp. Dominguez, in company with the
other two police officers, started tailing the white car. From
Baguio City to Quezon City, the team tailed the white car and
with the woman, Cion, the supplier of drugs named Betty
Cuba, her four-year old son, and the courier Cesar Santos as
passengers. The white car arrived at the West Avenue Hotel at
around 4:30 in the afternoon and they were met by SPO3
Jamisolamin. Cion alighted from the car and a short
conversation took place between SPO3 Jamisolamin and Cion.
Not long after, Cion opened the trunk of the car and showed
the marijuana stuff to SPO3 Jamisolamin. Upon seeing and
confirming that indeed there was marijuana stuff inside the
trunk of the car placed in a shopping bag of Duty Free
Philippines that contained 14 bricks of marijuana leaves (Exhs.
"D" to "D-14") and in a big box labeled "Lucky Me Pancit
Canton" that contained 12 bricks of marijuana leaves (Exhs.
"E" to "E-12") and a second box labeled "Maggi Rich Mami"
that contained 13 bricks of marijuana leaves (Exhs. "F" to "F-
13"), SPO3 Jamisolamin immediately gave a pre-arranged
signal to his team by lighting a cigarette. Heeding the signal,
P/Insp. Dominguez and a certain PO3 Duazo approached the
car and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. After
which, they effected an arrest on the persons of Salvacion
Caparas alias "Cion", Betty Cuba and Cesar Santos for illegal
possession of a prohibited drug. On the other hand, the little
boy believed to be the child of Betty Cuba was freed for
humanitarian reason. Thereafter, the police officers executed
their affidavit of arrest (Exhs. "G" to "G-2").
EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
The defense presented accused Betty Cuba, the alleged
supplier, accused Salvacion Caparas, the alleged middleman;
and accused Cesar Santos, the alleged courier; to rebut the
allegations thrown against them, and their testimonies may be
summarized as follows:
On April 28, 1997, Cesar Santos met a neighbor named Soso
at the market and the latter asked if he knew somebody who
can sell cheap vegetables to him. Since Santos knew
Salvacion Caparas or Aling Cion for short, Santos accompanied
Soso to her. After the introduction and negotiation, they closed
a deal. The following day at around 7:00 in the morning, Aling
Cion visited the house of Betty Cuba, a vegetable
and tocino vendor, to see the latters sister Melba since they
 were intending to go to the Trading Post. However, since her
sister Melba was not around Beta Cuba agreed to go with her
since they would be passing by Tarlac. Thus, Betty and her son
accompanied Salvacion. They boarded in a waiting car with
three males who were unknown to Betty. The three male
passengers were later identified as Cesar Santos, Soso and a
certain Jessie. As they proceeded to Tarlac, an old maroon car
suddenly crossed their path. Two unidentified men alighted
from the old car and approached them. After a few
conversations, Soso and Jessie stepped out of the car, took a
tricycle and went away. On the other hand, the two
unidentified men boarded the white vehicle and proceeded to
Manila while the old maroon car was tailing them. However,
they stopped at McArthur Highway at Tarlac, Tarlac and the
men went behind and opened the trunk of the car. After 30
minutes, they boarded the car again and proceeded straight
to NARCOM Office at Kamuning, Quezon City for investigation.
After 30 minutes, they were called in the office again and were
compelled to admit ownership over the seized marijuana stuff
which were placed on the table. When they refused ownership,
they were whisked into the detention cell and were charged
with the instant case.[4]
The trial court found sufficient evidence that CAPARAS committed the crime
charged and is guilty thereof. Per testimony of poseur-buyer Jamisolamin,
CAPARAS agreed to sell marijuana for a price of P1,000.00 per kilo and to
deliver the contraband at the designated time and place. Their agreement
was consummated on 29 April 1997 when, on such date, CAPARAS arrived at
West Avenue Hotel, Quezon City, and showed to Jamisolamin the stack of
marijuana loaded at the trunk of her car.[5]
The trial court struck down CAPARAS defense of denial because of the
positive and forthright assertions of the witnesses for the prosecution who,
being peace officers, were presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner.[6]
However, the trial court was unconvinced of the criminal culpability of BETTY
and CESAR as there was no competent evidence to show that the former was
the supplier and that the latter participated in the loading and selling of the
forbidden merchandise. The trial court did not give credence to the
prosecutions theory that the accused conspired in the commission of the
illicit activity as it considered the character of evidence against them purely
speculative.
Thus, in the decision of 23 March 1998, the trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, Salvacion Caparas y De Castro a.k.a. "Cion," GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec.4,
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and, there being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the fine of P500, 000.00.
The period within which the accused Salvacion Caparas y De
Castro a.k.a. "Cion" was detained at the City Jail shall be
credited to her in full as long as she agrees in writing to abide
by and follow strictly the rules and regulations of the said
institution.
The other two accused, Betty Cuba y Lubon a.k.a. "Betty" and
Cesar Santos y Lucia a.k.a. "Cesar" for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, are
hereby ACQUITTED. The said two accused are hereby ordered
released from detention unless they are being detained for
another charge or lawful cause.
The bricks of marijuana (Exhs. "D" to "D-14"," Exhs. "E" to "E-
12" and Exhs. "F" to "F-13") are hereby forfeited in favor of the
government. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the said marijuana
to the Dangerous Drugs Board for safekeeping until the final
disposition of this case.
The accused Salvacion Caparas y De Castro is hereby ordered
to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
CAPARAS filed a notice of appeal on 7 April 1998.[8] We accepted the appeal.
In her Appellants Brief, CAPARAS assails the trial courts judgment of
conviction because there was no showing that a sale of prohibited drug took
place. In support thereof, she argues that the prosecution has failed to
establish that money or specifically "marked money" was paid or exchanged
hands between her and the supposed poseur-buyer. She theorizes that in a
contract of sale the payment of the contract price is essential to consummate
the transaction. In this case, considering that there was no payment made,
the contract of sale was not consummated and inevitably the accused-
appellant can not be convicted for the illegal sale of prohibited drug.
The prosecution prays that the conviction of CAPARAS be affirmed. It asserts
that the undisputed facts on record sufficiently established that on 29 April
1997 CAPARAS transported and delivered the marijuana to poseur-buyer
Jamisolamin. Her argument that the non-payment of the purchase price
precludes the consummation of the transaction which thereby justifies her
acquittal is untenable. Under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, the law punishes the sale, transportation and
delivery of prohibited drugs. It is inconsequential that no payment of money
was made to the seller, CAPARAS, by the poseur-buyer, Jamisolamin. Stated
differently, it is not a requisite to be convicted under the aforementioned law
that the drug traffickers act of selling is coupled with the actual payment in
money of the agreed consideration since the act of offering to sell a
prohibited drug is per se punishable by law. At any rate, it cannot be disputed
that a completed sales transaction transpired between CAPARAS and the
poseur-buyer Jamisolamin since there was an agreement for the former to sell
and deliver 39 kilos of marijuana for a cost of P1,000.00 per kilogram and the
latter to buy the marijuana at the agreed price. There was, therefore, a
concurrence on the minds of the parties on the object and cause which
thereby perfected the contract of sale.
The appeal is without merit.
CAPARAS was charged with and convicted of the offense of transporting,
delivering and selling prohibited drug defined and penalized under Section 4,
Art. II of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The section reads:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. -- The penalty of reclusion
perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Under this Section the act of selling or acting as broker in a sale of marijuana
and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime.[9] More specifically, it
punishes the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by
the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller.[10] It has been
consistently ruled that the absence of marked money does not create a
hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of the
dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the
transaction is presented before the court. In every prosecution for the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and indispensable is the submission
of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the
poseur-buyer.[11] Thus, contrary to the theory of CAPARAS, proof of actual
payment of money is not an indispensable requisite to support a conviction
for sale of prohibited drug. What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.[12]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the fact of sale. The
poseur-buyer Jamisolamin declared that on 19 April 1997 CAPARAS agreed to
sell and deliver bricks of marijuana at P1,000 per kilo. On 29 April 1997,
CAPARAS, pursuant to said agreement, transported marijuana from Baguio
City and delivered the same to Jamisolamin in Quezon City.[13] The articles
seized from CAPARAS per results of the forensic examination were found
positive for marijuana.[14]
The conviction of CAPARAS is therefore unassailable. He was caught red-
handed or flagrante delicto of the prohibited articles. The incriminatory
evidence on record adequately established her guilt beyond moral certainty
for the sale, transport and delivery of marijuana.
It is apropos to mention that CAPARAS had not at anytime put in issue the
validity of her arrest and the seizure of the contraband from her possession.
Neither did CAPARAS raise as an issue the identity of the prohibited articles
proffered as incriminatory evidence against her. CAPARAS relied heavily on
her defense of denial in that she had not at anytime agreed to deliver or
cause the delivery of the marijuana to police officer Jamisolamin. She denied
her meetings with him in spite of the positive and forthright testimony of the
latter on this point. Moreover, the insinuation that she was allegedly framed-
up for the purpose of extorting a large sum of money is unsubstantiated and
cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of her criminal complicity.
At the bottom then of CAPARAS assignment of error is the issue of credibility
of witnesses. On this point, prudence and practical considerations dictate
that we, in the absence of a compelling reason showing that the trial court
overlooked certain significant facts which if considered would suffice to alter
the result of the case, hesitate to lightly set-aside its evaluation and
assessment on the credibility of witnesses inasmuch as such undertaking is
well within the province of the trial court.[15] Finally, we find no cogent reason
to be wary about the truthfulness of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who are police officers and thus have in their favor the
presumption that they have performed their duties in a regular manner.[16]
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of 23 March 1998 of Branch 95,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70944
convicting SALVACION CAPARAS y CASTRO is hereby AFFIRMED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon
he was tried.
The presentation of the testimony of the first witness for the prosecution,
Forensic Chemist Demelen Dela Cruz of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), was dispensed with, as the defense entered into a stipulation with the
prosecution concerning the following facts: (1) that 229.7 grams of a white
crystalline substance was submitted to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division
for laboratory examination to determine if it was methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu; (2) that a forensic examination was performed by the
witness on the substance submitted; (3) that the substance was found to be
positive for shabu; and (4) that the substance was the same 229.7-gram
substance submitted for forensic examination by NBI Agent Timoteo
Rejano. Accused-appellant denied, however, that the shabu had been seized
from him.[3]

[G.R. No. 130836. August 11, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL
MONTANO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
262, Pasig City, finding accused-appellant Arnel C. Montano guilty of violation
of Art. III, 15 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P2 million and the costs of the suit.
The information[2] against accused-appellant alleged
That in the afternoon of (the) 22nd of January, 1996, in the municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly sell, distribute and/or deliver 229.7 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which is a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license and/or legal authority to
sell, distribute and/or deliver the same.
The prosecution presented evidence showing that the shabu had been
seized from accused-appellant, thus:
C.
Sometime in the second week of January 1996, NBI Agent Timoteo
Rejano received a tip from a female confidential informant that the accused-
appellant was engaged in the distribution of shabu in Taguig, Metro Manila.
[4]
Agent Rejano and the informant, therefore, conducted a test-buy operation
on January 18, 1996 at accused-appellants residence at 104 N. P. Cruz St.,
Barangay Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.[5] When they arrived at the place, the
female informant went inside the gate as Agent Rejano stayed behind. After
thirty minutes, the informant asked Agent Rejano to come in, and the two
then proceeded along a roofed alley with concrete walls on both sides. They
entered a second gate where a store with a long bench was located. A
woman, whom Agent Rejano came to know was accused-appellants mother,
tended the store.
At the gate, the informant introduced Agent Rejano to accused-appellant
as a Chinese drug-user and a big-time buyer of shabu. While Agent Rejano
waited at the store, the informant went with accused-appellant in front of the
latters house about 15 meters away and transacted business with him on the
porch. Agent Rejano saw them sniffing something while seated on the metal
chairs. After thirty minutes, the informant returned to Agent Rejano and
secretly told him that she already had the stuff from the accused-
appellant. Thereafter, they left and returned to the NBI office in Taft Avenue,
Manila.
The stuff was submitted for forensic examination and was found to
be shabu. After Agent Rejano reported to his superiors what transpired during
the operation, he was directed to conduct with the informant another test-
buy operation on the accused-appellant in order to gain the latters trust and
confidence. The plan was eventually to make him sell a larger amount
of shabu to them.[6]
On January 19, 1996, Agent Rejano, together with the female informant
and another intelligence agent, returned to accused-appellants house to
purchase more shabu. Again, it was the informant who transacted with
accused-appellant while Agent Rejano and the intelligence agent stayed at
the store. After half an hour, the informant returned and discreetly told them
that she had with her the stuff from accused-appellant and that the latter was
willing to deliver 200 grams of shabu on January 22, 1996. Then, they left.
Upon arriving at the NBI, Agent Rejano made a request [7] for the forensic
examination of the crystalline substance purchased from accused-
appellant. Forensic Chemist II Emilia Andeo-Rosaldes issued a certification,
[8]
dated January 19, 1996, stating that the substance submitted was shabu. [9]
On January 22, 1996, a team of NBI agents proceeded to Taguig, Metro
Manila aboard three vehicles. About 100 meters away from the target area,
the buy-bust team, composed of Agent Reynaldo Esmeralda, Agent Regner
Peneza, and the informant, took a tricycle to accused-appellants house, while
the rest of the NBI operatives waited for a signal at a distance. Accused-
appellant and his mother met the buy-bust operatives. The informant
informed accused-appellant that they already had the money and were ready
to buy 250 grams of shabu. Accused-appellant then led the group to an alley
towards the kitchen outside his house. The informant introduced Agent
Peneza as her husband and Agent Esmeralda as the bodyguard of her
employer, the Japanese financier. Accused-appellants mother then served the
group some snacks, consisting of leche flan and softdrinks. Accused-appellant
left them and, after a few minutes, returned with Hector Tinga. Accused-
appellant told the group to follow him. Accused-appellants mother was left
behind. They passed through a dark narrow alley leading to an enclosed
space at the back of accused-appellants house. Tinga brought out two plastic
packets of a white crystalline substance and handed them to accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant gave the packets to the informant who tested
the contents by burning a small amount using an improvised tooter.When the
informant confirmed that the substance was shabu, accused-appellant asked
for the money.
Agent Esmeralda handed accused-appellant bundles of P100 bills. While
the accused-appellant and Tinga were counting the money, Agents
Esmeralda and Peneza announced the arrest and handcuffed the
two. Esmeralda radioed the other members of the NBI team to proceed to the
area.[10] After the team secured the house, Agent Auralyn Pascual served the
search warrant to the mother of accused-appellant.With two barangay
officials as witnesses, the NBI agents recovered from the search, besides the
two packets of white crystalline substance, a tooter, a burner, aluminum foil,
a pair of scissors, and a match. [11] The items were listed in the
inventory of articles seized which was signed by Agent Pascual and attested
to by the barangay officials.[12] Agent Pascual gave the mother of the
accused-appellant a copy of the inventory.
The NBI team brought accused-appellant and Tinga to NBI Taft where
they were booked and their photographs and fingerprints taken. [13]The two
packets of white crystalline substance, [14] marked as AM-1 and AM-2
respectively, and the improvised tooter[15]seized during the search were
forwarded to the forensic chemistry laboratory for examination. [16] Accused-
appellant and Tinga were brought to the Department of Justice for inquest
and then detained at the NBI Taft. The report on the forensic examination
showed that the crystalline substance, weighing 229.7 grams,
was shabu. The tooter, however, was negative for shabu.[17] Later, the
Department of Justice, through Prosecutor Ferdinand Abesamis, issued a
Resolution, dated February 1, 1996,[18] recommending the filing of an
information only against accused-appellant on account of the insufficiency of
evidence against Tinga.[19]
Accused-appellant denied that there were test-buy operations conducted
on him on January 18 and 19, 1996. His version of the incident is as follows:
In the afternoon of January 18, 1996, while he was cleaning the
passenger jeepney he was driving, a woman arrived and introduced herself
as Solly. As she was looking for the residence of Hector Tinga, accused-
appellant pointed to her the direction to the said house. After a few minutes,
Solly returned and told him that the gate was closed. She requested him to
fetch Tinga. Accused-appellant said he acceded to the request and that, after
a while, Tinga came to meet the stranger. According to accused-appellant,
Solly told him that she and Tinga met in a nightclub in Ermita, and that she
worked for a Japanese employer. Accused-appellant said that he got
interested, because he wanted to work abroad, and the stranger might be
able to help him get employment overseas.
Accused-appellant testified that, on January 22, 1996 at around 2 p.m.,
Solly returned to his house with her husband and the bodyguard of her
Japanese employer. They proceeded directly to the dirty kitchen of his house
without knocking at the unlocked gate. Accused-appellant said he did not
inquire into the purpose of their visit because he assumed it was about his
application for overseas employment. They allegedly assured him that they
would help him. He introduced them to his mother, who served them leche
flan and softdrinks. Then, his mother left to fetch his children and his nephew
from school. After eating, Solly and her companions moved to the garden,
also inside the compound. Solly requested him to call Tinga. He was about to
go, but he saw Tinga coming. Accused-appellant assumed that they agreed to
meet at his house.After greeting Tinga and telling him that Solly was waiting
for him in the garden, he went inside the kitchen to wash the dishes used by
his visitors. Tinga and the visitors went inside his house and joined his
children in watching television. Accused-appellant asked Tinga if he could
help him in securing an overseas job and Tinga told him he would. He claims
that he went out to get an electric fan for his visitors but, when he returned,
he saw them already in the storage room at the back of his house. He stated
that he saw Tinga handing two bags of shabu to the bodyguard, who turned
out to be NBI Agent Esmeralda. According to accused-appellant, he told Tinga
and the visitors that he might be implicated in the transaction, and that his
mother would get angry because she did not know that they were
transacting shabu in his house. They assured him, however, that they would
take care he did not get involved in the deal. Then, he saw Sollys husband,
whom he later learned was Agent Peneza, handing over a bag of money to
Tinga. It was then that the NBI agents identified themselves and ordered him
and Tinga, at gun point, to lie face down on the floor. He and Tinga were
handcuffed. He allegedly said, Iyan na nga ba ang sinasabi ko tapos ito pa
ang mapapala ko, kawawa naman ako. Accused-appellant claimed he was
kicked and was told that he would be taken care of.
Aurora Montano, accused-appellants mother, arrived and found her
grandchildren running around. One of them told her that accused-appellant
was handcuffed and lying face down on the floor. When his mother saw him
and the NBI agents, she exclaimed, Bakit ganito ang nangyari? Akala ko ba
tutulungan ninyo ang anak ko, ngayon ito pa ang mapapala namin. The NBI
agents repeated to his mother that they would take care of him. Then,
another group, presumably with the NBI team, arrived and took pictures of
them. Accused-appellant and Tinga were brought out of the storage
room. Still another group arrived with the barangay chairman, showed his
mother a search warrant, and conducted a search on the house. According to
him, nothing was recovered from his house. He and Tinga were taken to the
NBI office for fingerprinting. Again, he was told that he would be taken care
of. He and Tinga were detained separately at the NBI Taft. Later, he said he
was surprised to learn that Tinga was released. Subsequently, he was
transferred for detention to MMRC, Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan.[20]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant testified that Solly approached
him on January 18, 1996 because there was nobody else at that time she
could ask for direction to Tingas house. [21] He said he was not investigated at
the NBI office but was only asked by Agent Esmeralda as to who was the
owner of the shabu.[22]
Aurora Montano, accused-appellants mother, also testified for the
defense. She stated that, on January 18, 1996, she was at their house taking
care of her grandchildren, but she denied that they had visitors that
day. Likewise, she denied having any visitor at their house on January 19,
1996. According to her, on January 22, 1996 at around 2 p.m., she went out
of the house and saw her son, two men, and a woman seated on the bench of
their dirty kitchen along the passageway. She described the passage as 140
meters long, 2 meters wide, six feet in height, with concrete walls on both
sides, a roof, and three gates. According to her, the dirty kitchen was located
40 meters from their house and 100 meters away from the first gate. Her son
introduced her to the visitors and requested her to prepare some snacks for
them. She overheard them talking about a recruitment agency in Japan. She
remembered one of them was named Boyet. After serving them leche flan
and softdrinks, she said she went out to fetch her grandchildren from
school. When she arrived, her son and his companions were not in
sight. Then, a group of around twenty armed persons arrived and kicked their
main and middle gates, shouting shabu, shabu. She told them there was
no shabu in the house.After driving these people away, she went inside to
look for her grandchildren. Some of them were at the back of their house
where their storeroom was located. She went to the storeroom through
another passage and found her son and Tinga with their arms raised. The
visitors were also there and introduced themselves as NBI operatives. The
other NBI agents arrived after a few minutes. Her son and Tinga were brought
to the porch and handcuffed. Afterwards, another group arrived with the
barangay chairman and showed her a search warrant. They conducted a
search throughout the house but they allegedly did not find anything. Then,
the two were taken to the NBI office in Taft Avenue.[23]
 On cross-examination, she testified that she did not know the reason
why her son, Tinga, and their visitors went to their storage room on January
22, 1996. She did not even notice them going there but only found out that
they did when she went and saw her grandchildren in the storeroom. She
testified that nobody could enter the storeroom without her sons
permission. Aurora Montano admitted that she knew Tinga was
selling shabu but claimed that she could not forbid her son from associating
with Tinga because they were neighbors. She said she was surprised why
Tinga was released while her son remained in detention and was the only one
charged in court. She stated that Tinga is the cousin of Congressman Dante
Tinga.[24]
On August 29, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision,[25] the dispositive
portion of which reads:[26]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Arnel C. Montano
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, in relation to Section
20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, (b) pay a fine in the amount of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00), and (c) pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him:
(1) despite its findings that the prohibited drug subject matter of (the) case
did not originate from appellant but from
Hector Tinga; (2) despite the fact that he was singled out for prosecution in
violation of his right to equal protection of laws; and (3) on the basis of an
alleged buy-bust operation when it was shown to have been resorted to
harass, extort and abuse.[27] In the alternative, he prays that this Court find
him guilty as an accomplice only, because he merely handed to the poseur-
buyers the drug which Tinga produced.[28]
We find these contentions without merit.
First. This Court has held that the elements necessary for the
prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.[29]
Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, the evidence for the
prosecution establishes these elements beyond reasonable doubt. NBI Agents
Esmeralda and Peneza positively identified accused-appellant as the person
who, together with Tinga, sold to them two plastic packets of a white
crystalline substance.[30] Accused-appellant was thus caught in flagrante
delicto in the buy-bust operation conducted by the NBI. Thecorpus delicti of
the crime charged, i.e., the 229.7 grams of shabu, was duly established
before the trial court.[31] In fact, accused-appellant, through his counsel, even
admitted the same.[32] He delivered the drug to the buy-bust team and
payment for it was made. The fact that the drug originally came from Tinga is
immaterial. As held by this Court, proof of ownership of the drug is not
necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases. It is sufficient that it was
found in accused-appellants possession.[33]
Indeed, from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it cannot be
denied that accused-appellant had possession of the 229.7 grams ofshabu. It
was he who delivered the same to the NBI operatives after it was handed to
him by Tinga.[34] After making the delivery, he and Tinga asked for the
payment.[35]
Second. Accused-appellant invokes the defense of alibi. He claims that
he went out of his house to get an electric fan and only witnessed the illegal
transaction after his return and that he was merely implicated by the
arresting officers.
This defense is uncorroborated. Accused-appellants mother testified that
she too was out of the house at the time the buy-bust operation was being
conducted and that, when she came back, she saw her son and Tinga already
under arrest.
We have consistently held that the defense of alibi, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is weak, self-serving, and without weight in
law, and thus undeserving of consideration by the courts. It cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the prosecution witnesseswho have no
reason or ill motive to testify falsely against the accused-appellant. [36] In this
case, the testimonies for the prosecution are consistent, unequivocal, and
replete with details of the transaction with accused-appellant, and, therefore,
merit our full faith and credence.[37]
Third. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties in
favor of the arresting officers had not been sufficiently controverted by
accused-appellant; hence, this Court is bound to uphold the same.[38] Except
for his self-serving statements, accused-appellant failed to present evidence
to establish that the buy-bust operation was resorted to harass, extort and
abuse. In a vain attempt to establish his inculpability, he even questioned the
validity of his arrest on account of the absence of a warrant. The fact,
however, is that accused-appellant was apprehended in flagrante
delicto during a buy-bust operation against him and his arrest falls within the
ambit of Rule 113, 5(a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on arrests without
a warrant. Indeed, this Court has already ruled that a buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means
of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. [39] The validity of the arrest
in this case must be sustained.
buy-bust team. It is undeniable that accused-appellant directly participated in
the illegal sale of the shabu. Consequently, his conviction must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 262, Pasig
City is AFFIRMED in toto.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable Secretary of
Justice for whatever action he may deem necessary to take in the case of
Hector Tinga.
SO ORDERED.

Fourth. Nor is there merit in accused-appellants assertion that, because G.R. No. 143944 July 11, 2002
of the release of Hector Tinga, he is entitled to an acquittal. No principle of
equality justifies setting free a man who is otherwise guilty just because his
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
co-conspirator escaped prosecution. Accused-appellants guilt is
vs.
not dependent on whether or not Tinga was similarly charged with the same
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
offense. As discussed above, the evidence against accused-appellant
sufficiently establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PUNO, J.:

However, it cannot be denied that Agents Peneza and Esmeralda

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 27, 1999 of the
testified that Tinga, who brought out the sachets from his pocket and counted
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542,
the purchase money with accused-appellant, also directly participated in the
finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond
sale. What should be done, therefore, is to let a copy of the decision be given
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
to the Department of Justice so that it may review its resolution in the case of
64252 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Hector Tinga.
perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.1wphi1.nt
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held guilty merely as
an accomplice. This cannot be done. Art. 18 of the Revised Penal Code
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information
defines an accomplice as a person who, not being a principal in the
which reads, thus:
commission of a felony, cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts. On the other hand, Art. 17 thereof provides
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
that principals are: (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
act; (2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (3) those
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs
it would not have been accomplished.[40]
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly
known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was indeed a principal in the
corresponding license or prescription.
commission of the crime charged in this case. Though it was Tinga who
produced the two plastic packets of shabu, it was accused-appellant who
delivered the same to the buy-bust team. He was the one who asked for
payment, who received the same, and who counted it in the presence of the
 Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
RA 7659."3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland
passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about
3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of
Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of
her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other
members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section.4 The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of
the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent,
he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by
two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The
accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a
brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately
reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused
beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance.5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio
Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the
Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the
seized items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag6 and eight (8) small
plastic packs of white crystalline substance.7 When asked about the
contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a
certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in
Iligan City.8 The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the
coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the
PAOCTF Headquarters,9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were
sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory
examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the
substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams.10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at
about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex"
Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by
Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches
to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He
boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full
of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and
brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of
Macapudi.11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999,
as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and
positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of
the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were
conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom
he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that
he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back
to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his
baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage
and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing
sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the
security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage,
but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was
not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly
opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside
which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given
to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y
Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999
until the present, the period of such preventive detention shall be
credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
 The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of
errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG
CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT
OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM."14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the
Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends thatPeople
v. Marti15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is
deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution.16Evidence acquired in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Whenever this
right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search
and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this
Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State."19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by
the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search
and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered
as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in
the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and
until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is
not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the
same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to
possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged.21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.22 The first two elements were
sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with
the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,23 this Court has
ruled that to warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be
with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together
with the possession or control of such articles.24 It has been ruled, however,
that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.25 Hence, the burden
of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge
or animus possidendi.26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony,
uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the
trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the
absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal.27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to
deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant
admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected.28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him
and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear.
He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for
fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would
be confiscated,29 but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and
also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.30
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch
06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher
Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124346. June 8, 2004]
YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by

Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated February 28,
him.31 To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and
1995 of the Court of Appeals [2] affirming with modification the
convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a
decision[3] dated January 18, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented
City, Branch 109, convicting herein appellant Yolly Teodosio of violation of
no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended.
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really
exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex
Appellant was charged with selling and delivering regulated drugs in an
Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall
Information that read:
selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to
prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person
That on or about the 6th day of August 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and
Yolly Teodosio Y Blancaflor, without authority of law, did then and there
acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to another
accused."32
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it
Contrary to law.[4]
is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be
fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court
that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or During his arraignment on August 19, 1992, appellant pleaded not guilty.
intent to possess the same.1wphi1.nt
 The prosecution presented the following witnesses: SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong,
SPO1 Emerson Norberte, Julita de Villa and Marita Sioson.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that, after four days of
surveillance on the house of appellant, at around 8:00 p.m. on August 5,
1992, Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team from the PNP Regional
Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant who was
suspected of peddling regulated drugs known as shabu (methamphetamine
hydrochloride). The team was headed by SPO1 Emerson Norberte and
composed of SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong, SPO3 Roberto Samoy, SPO3 Pablo Rebaldo
and SPO1 Rolando Llanes.[5]
About midnight, the team and their informer proceeded to the appellants
house in Solitaria Street, Pasay City. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the informer
entered the open gate of appellants compound and walked to his apartment
while the rest of the team observed and waited outside. At 12:10 a.m., the
informer introduced Inciong to the appellant as a shabu buyer. Appellant told
them that a gram of shabu cost P600. When Inciong signified his intention to
buy, appellant went inside his apartment while Inciong and the informer
waited outside. A few minutes later, appellant came out and said Swerte ka,
mayroon pang dalawang natira (You are lucky. There are two [grams] left).
When Inciong told appellant that he only needed one gram, the latter gave
him one plastic packet. In turn, Inciong handed to appellant P600 or six
pieces of P100 bills earlier treated with ultraviolet powder. After verifying the
contents of the packet as shabu,[6] Inciong gave the signal to the other police
officers who witnessed the transaction. After introducing himself as a police
officer, Inciong, together with his companions, arrested appellant.[7]
The marked money bills,[8] the other packet of shabu[9] recovered from
appellants right front pants-pocket and the buy-bust shabu were brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination by forensic chemists Julita de Villa
and Marita Sioson. Appellant was also taken to the said laboratory to
determine the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. The results were
positive in appellants hands, the marked money bills and the right front
pocket of his pants.[10] The buy-bust shabu and the contents of the other
packet recovered from appellant were also confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride. [11]
For his defense, appellant, a driver by profession, claims that police
officers raided his house without a search or arrest warrant. When they found
no drugs, they took a bag containing a large sum of money. To support his
defense, the following witnesses were presented: the appellant himself,
Ulysses Ramos (appellants neighbor), Marilyn Teodosio (appellants wife) and
Paul Teodosio (appellants 10-year-old son).
Appellant, Marilyn Teodosio and Paul Teodosio alleged that, on August 5,
1992, they were sleeping in their bedroom on the second floor of their
apartment when they were suddenly awakened by a noise downstairs.
Appellant went down and, while on the third step of the stairs, he met three
policemen on their way up. Their guns were pointed at him. One of the three
inquired from him where he kept his shabu but he denied having any. The
three then searched appellants room on the second floor but did not find
any shabu. Instead, they took an overnight bag from a locked cabinet which
they forcibly opened. The bag contained $7,260 and approximately P40,000
belonging to the appellants niece who was scheduled for a heart operation.
After appellant was arrested by six police officers, he was dragged, slapped
and punched in the stomach. As he was being forcibly taken out of his
apartment, SPO3 Samoy fired a gun near his ear. On their way to his
detention cell in Bicutan, Taguig, his hands were handcuffed behind his back.
Appellant felt and saw the police officers rubbing P100 bills on his hands.[12]
Defense witness Ulysses Ramos testified that, after the arrest of
appellant, his wife called for police assistance. Two police officers responded
while appellants son Paul took pictures [13] of the broken door and their
ransacked apartment. Thereafter, his wife and Marilyn Teodosio went to the
police station and formally reported the incident.[14]
On January 18, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which read:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Yolly Teodosio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) violation of Section 15, Art. III of RA
6425 as amended and hereby sentences him to life imprisonment.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride is hereby forfeited in favor of the
government and the Clerk of Court of this Branch is hereby ordered to
transmit the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board thru the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Pasay City, January 18, 1993.[15]
 In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who were officers of the law without
any ill-motive to testify falsely against him. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, there was a presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions. The trial court gave no credence to the claim that the police
officers stole a bag containing a large sum of money, considering the failure
of appellants niece to file a case or even complain against the officers. Also,
for the reason that they were biased witnesses, the trial court junked the
claim of appellants wife and son that the police officers illegally raided their
apartment.
Ramos testimony was given little weight because he did not actually see
the police officers go in and out of the apartment. Furthermore, the trial court
dismissed appellants claim of a frame-up because this defense, like alibi,
could be fabricated with facility and was therefore an inherently weak
defense unless proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also
wondered how the appellant could have seen the officers rubbing money on
his handcuffed hands behind his back. It also took note of the fact that the
appellant, a driver by profession, attempted to cover up his ownership of the
190 square-meter lot and the three-door apartment thereon worth
about P300,000.[16]
In view of the imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment, the appeal
was originally brought to us. However, the Second Division of this Court
ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals in accordance with
our ruling in People vs. Simon y Sunga [17] wherein we held that RA 7659
which amended RA 6425, effective December 31, 1993, should be given
retroactive application in so far as the amended and reduced imposable
penalties provided therein are favorable to the appellant. Section 17 of RA
7659[18] states that the penalty shall range fromprision
correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending on the quantity of the drug. In
the present case, the amount of shabu sold by appellant was only 0.73 gram,
thus the penalty of reclusion perpetua could not be imposed. Such being the
case, the appeal should have been filed in the Court of Appeals and not in
this Court because we can only exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
[19]
The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated February 28, 1995, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant but modified the penalty
imposed, as follows:
Finally, even as We agree on the findings of the lower court on the guilt of the
appellant for a Violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act 6425, as
amended, considering the application of Section 17 of RA 7659, the penalty
imposed should be reduced to Ten (10) years of Prision Mayor, as minimum,
to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification of the penalty, as above indicated
(sic), the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects. No
pronouncement as to costs.[20]
Agreeing with the factual findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
gave more weight to the prosecutions claim that the entrapment operation in
fact took place outside the appellants apartment. The appellate court gave
no merit to appellants assertion that no warrant was secured despite four
days of surveillance. It described as minor the appellants observations of
alleged inconsistencies in the prosecutions version of events.
Hence, this appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
MATERIAL AND UNDISPUTED FACTS IN ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDING THAT THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
OR WARRANT OF ARREST TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE RESIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.
II
BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS EITHER PROCURED FROM AN ILLEGAL WARRANTLESS
RAID OR FABRICATED BY THE RAIDING POLICEMEN.
III
THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT SUBJECTION OF PETITIONER TO ULTRA-VIOLET POWDER TEST WITHOUT
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS VIOLATIVE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
 IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SAD TO SAY, DISREGARDED AND
IGNORED THE INHERENT AND NATURAL BIAS AND PREJUDICE OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE, HER HONOR, JUDGE LILIA LOPEZ, AGAINST PERSONS CHARGED OF
(SIC) DRUG OFFENSES AS DULY NOTED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN PEOPLE
VS. SILLO, 214 SCRA 74.
V On the other hand, appellant insists he was framed up for possession
THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL BASED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO WARRANT CONVICTION. [21]
In short, appellant insists that the police officers forcibly entered and
searched his house without a warrant. When they did not find any regulated
drug, they instead took a bag containing a large sum of money. They also
showed their brutality by slapping him and punching him in the stomach.
Thereafter, they framed up appellant by wiping ultraviolet powder on his
palms.
We affirm appellants conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are to be respected
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative,
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings.
[22]
Such findings carry even more weight if they are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in the case at bar. The alleged flaws pointed out by appellant are
not enough for us to reverse the factual findings of the courts a quo.
The police officers were clear and categorical in their narration of how
the entrapment operation was conducted. SPO1 Inciong, acting as a poseur-
buyer, was introduced by the informer to appellant in front of the latters
apartment. Thereafter, appellant went inside his apartment and came back
with two packets of shabu. Inciong handed to appellant six pieces of P100
bills treated with ultra-violet powder in exchange for one packet of shabu.
Immediately after, Inciong gave the signal to the other policemen who then
entered the compound and effected appellants arrest. Recovered from
appellant was the other packet of shabu and the six pieces of marked money.
The tests conducted on these pieces of evidence, appellants hands and right
front pants-pocket showed that appellant was the same person who sold the
drugs to police officer Inciong.There was strong evidence therefore, certainly
beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant was engaged in drug-dealing.
The elements of the crime were duly proven. In the prosecution of the
offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is material is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[23]
of shabu after the search in his apartment produced no illegal drugs.Frame-
up, a usual defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the
Court with disfavor since it is an allegation that can be made with ease. For
this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the arresting policemen
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[24]
However, appellant was unable to prove he was the victim of a frame up.
First, appellant failed to show any motive why the police officers would
illegally raid his house. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by the persons in authority was never overcome.
Second, if indeed they broke into his apartment and took an overnight bag
containing a hefty amount, appellant or any of his family members should
have filed a criminal complaint against the supposed malefactors but they did
not. This weakened the defenses story that the police officers stormed and
robbed appellants apartment. Third, appellant testified that, after the search
for shabu proved futile, the police officers dragged and slapped him, and
punched him in the stomach. However, appellant never filed a case for
physical injuries against the arresting officers. No medical certificate was
presented to show his alleged injuries. He never even complained about it to
anybody.
To prove his allegation that the arresting officers raided his apartment,
appellant quoted officer Inciongs testimony that his (Inciongs) informant
introduced him to Yolly Teodosio specifically at the house of Yolly Teodosio.
Appellants argument is misplaced. The preposition at merely signifies that
Inciong was within the vicinity of appellants apartment. There is nothing in it
from which we can infer that Inciong entered appellants abode. Moreover, the
statement must be taken in conjunction with the rest of his testimony which
unequivocally showed that the transaction happened in front of the door of
appellants apartment, not inside.
 Appellant also cites in his defense the police blotter of the Investigation
Branch of the Pasay City Police Station:[25]
It was learned that on or about 11:45 p.m. 05 August 1992, a group of RPIU
Operatives headed by SPO3 Emerson Norberte went inside the room of 421-C
Apartment by forcing to open it and the owner / occupant was brought with
them, who was identified as YOLLY TEODOSIO.
Unfortunately for appellant, the police blotter does not support his
version because entries in police blotters, although done in the regular
course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the
truth stated in such entries and should not be given undue significance or
probative value. They are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Sometimes they
are based on partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay,
untested in the context of a trial on the merits.[26]
Appellant furthermore points out the discrepancies in the testimonies
and the joint affidavit of arrest executed by officers Inciong and Norberte.
First, the affidavit stated that the second packet of shabu was recovered from
appellants pants-pocket but the officers testimony in court was that it was
recovered from appellants hands. Second, the affidavit stated that the
informer acted as the poseur-buyer but the policemen testified in court that
Inciong was the poseur-buyer.
The established rule is that discrepancies between the affidavit of a
witness and his testimony in court do not necessarily discredit him because it
is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. Besides, the testimonial
discrepancies may be due to the natural fickleness of memory; this in fact
tends to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[27]
In an attempt to weaken the prosecutions case, appellant also cites
several inconsistencies in the narration of events.
According to appellant, SPO1 Norberte testified that it was SPO1 Inciong
who knocked at the door, contrary to Inciongs own testimony that it was the
informer who knocked at the door. This is, however, a minor matter that does
not affect the substance of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Minor variances in the details of a witness account, more frequently than not,
are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood and they often bolster the
probative value of the testimony.[28]
Also, according to appellant, the prosecution witnesses testified that the
total weight of the confiscated shabu was 2 grams but its actual weight was
only 0.73 grams. It must be remembered that during the drug deal, it was
appellant who led officer Inciong to believe that each packet of shabu he was
selling weighed 1 gram. Inciong, under the circumstances, had no
opportunity to verify the actual weight of the drug. Thus, the discrepancy did
not in anyway weaken the credibility of Inciongs testimony that appellant was
selling a prohibited drug.
Appellant likewise attacks SPO1 Norbertes credibility. Norberte claimed
that he wrote the serial numbers of the marked money bills after the
operation; however, he later declared that he listed the numbers in the
logbook before the buy-bust operation. There is no contradiction. Norberte
never said that he wrote the serial numbers after the operation. On the
contrary, what he said was that he wrote the numbers prior to the buy-bust.
[29]
Appellant likewise points out several instances of improbable behavior in
the prosecutions version of the facts. Appellant believes it is not a discreet
and wary behavior of a pusher to bring two packets of shabu after closing a
deal for only one packet with an unknown, newly-introduced buyer. Likewise,
it is unnatural for a drug pusher to shout while being arrested. His natural
tendency is to hush things up so as not to attract the neighbors attention.
Appellant also swears that he could not have held the money bills because
the traces of the powder were only in the thumb and forefinger. This means
that he held some sort of a cylindrical object but not money. Moreover, it was
unnatural for SPO1 Inciong to be the poseur-buyer instead of the informant
considering the caution practiced by pushers in selling only to customers
known to them. And, contrary to standard procedure, the police officers did
not issue any receipt for the shabu and money bills confiscated from
appellant. Lastly, the police authorities had four days to secure a search and
arrest warrant but they did not get one.
We dismiss all of appellants observations as pure nonsense and inanity
that did not in anyway affect the clear and unequivocal testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. No physical or testimonial evidence was presented
during the trial to support his allegations. If there was anything such
gratuitous statements proved, it was that appellant appeared to be extremely
familiar with the intricacies and practices of drug dealers.
As to his allegation that he never held any money bills treated with ultra-
violet powder, we note his failure to rebut the unimpeached testimony of
forensic chemist Julita de Villa that the yellow ultraviolet powder in the
money bills was the same yellow powder found in his fingers.
His argument that the prosecutions case was weakened by the fact that
the police officers did not issue a receipt for the confiscated drugs and money
bills, is stretching things too far. Issuing such a receipt is not essential to
establishing a criminal case for selling drugs as it is not an element of the
crime.
On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but
did not get one, the evidence was that the four-day period was not enough to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. All that the police
authorities knew about appellant was the information gathered from the
informer and their surveillance of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was
needed considering that the mission was not a search but an entrapment. An
arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Court.[30] Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is
valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the
person arrested (appellant in this case) committed a crime in the presence of
the arresting officers.[31]
On another constitutional issue, appellant alleges that his right against
self-incrimination was violated when he was subjected to ultra-violet powder
test without the presence of a lawyer. We disagree. In People vs. Gallarde,
[32]
we held that:
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, et al., 154 SCRA 513
[1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs.
Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 [1999])
Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled
to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his
body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145
[1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil.
735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints;(U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42
Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, et al., 86 Phil. 244 [1950])
Appellant also questions the impartiality of Judge Lilia Lopez who
allegedly had an inherent bias against persons facing drug charges. We
seriously doubt the fairness of the accusation. Nevertheless, it is now too late
for the appellant to raise this defense because the good judges impartiality
was never questioned during the trial and the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, no evidence was presented on any specific act manifesting
partiality against appellant.
We now determine whether the appellate court imposed the proper
penalty on appellant. In the 1994 case of People vs. Simon y Sunga,[33]the
proper penalties for drug-related crimes under RA 6425, as amended by RA
7659, were clarified. The appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua if the
quantity of the drug weighs 750 grams or more. If the drug weighs less than
250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional; from 250 grams
to 499 grams, prision mayor; and, from 500 grams to 749 grams, reclusion
temporal.[34]
Since appellant was caught selling 0.73 grams of shabu only, the proper
penalty should be no more than prision correccional. There being neither
generic mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed in its medium period. And applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor. No fine is
imposable in this case because appellants penalty is not reclusion
perpetua or death.[35] Pursuant to our jurisprudence on the sale of less than 1
gram of shabu,[36] we therefore impose the penalty of 6 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum to 4 years and 2 months ofprision correccional as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 28, 1995 of the Court of
Appeals convicting herein appellant Yolly Teodosio for the sale of 0.73 grams
of shabu is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of
imprisonment imposable on appellant should be the indeterminate sentence
of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 151314. June 3, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIAM BANDANG y
SALAMAT, ADING SALAMAT & RAKIMA ABUBAKAR, appellants.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of regulated drugs requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction. In a buy-bust operation,
such as in the case at bar, what is important is the fact that the poseur-
buyer received the shabu from the appellants and that the same was
presented as evidence in Court. In short, proof of the transaction suffices.[1]
This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 21, 2001 of the
[2]
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Manila in Criminal Case No. 00-182559
finding Mariam Bandang, Ading Salamat and Rakima Abubakar, appellants,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling shabu, in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and imposing upon them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ofP500,000.00.
The Information filed against appellants reads:
That on or about May 3, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell or offer and/or attempt for sale,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 100.43 gram; 100.83 gram; 102.80
gram; 100.70 gram; 107.21 gram; 102.92 gram and 101.65 gram or with a
total weight of 716.54 grams of white crystalline substance contained in
seven (7) transparent plastic sachet known
as shabu containingmethylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated
drug.
Contrary to law.
On May 31 2000, appellants, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty[3] to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented
two witnesses, namely: PO1 Olga Carpentero and PO2 Jigger Noceda.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following: In the
morning of May 2, 2000, the Narcotics Group Intelligence Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was notified by
an informant about the drug trafficking activities of appellants Mariam
Bandang and Rakima Abubakar near the Arlegui Bridge, Quiapo, Manila. The
PNP organized a team composed of PO1 Olga Carpentero, as the poseur-
buyer, and Police Senior Inspector Crisostomo Mendoza, as the team leader,
to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operation.[4] On the same day, PO1
Carpentero and the informant proceeded to Arlegui Bridge on board a car and
were at the place between 3:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The informant
introduced PO1 Carpentero to appellants as a prospective buyer of 700 grams
of shabu. Appellants told PO1 Carpentero that it costs P490,000.00. When
they asked her if she has the money, PO1 Carpentero replied that she will
come back the following day with the money. [5] Appellants then told PO1
Carpentero to be at the place at around 5:30 in the afternoon.[6]
PO1 Carpentero reported the incident to her superior who, in turn,
organized two teams - the buy-bust team and the back-up team. [7] They
prepared boodle money in two bundles consisting of cut papers. They then
placed two five hundred genuine bills on top of each bundle, wrapped and
placed them in a blue transparent plastic bag. PO1 Carpentero placed her
initials on the two genuine five hundred peso bills.[8]
On May 3, 2000, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, the teams proceeded
to Arlegui, Quiapo, Manila on board three vehicles. The informant went to the
house of appellant Abubakar, leaving PO1 Carpentero alone in the car. After a
little while, the three appellants came out of the house and went inside the
parked car. They sat on the back seats, while the informant and PO1
Carpentero on the front seats.
Once inside the car, appellant Abubakar asked PO1 Carpentero if she has
the money. When she said yes, appellant Bandang got the black shoulder bag
from appellant Ading Salamat and gave it to PO1 Carpentero. She then
opened the black shoulder bag and saw seven (7) transparent plastic
sachets[9] containing white crystalline substance.[10] Thereupon, she handed
the bundles of boodle money to appellant Abubakar and immediately pressed
the button of the hazard lights of the car. The blinking of the hazard lights
indicated that the deal was consummated. PO1 Carpentero then introduced
herself as a police officer and arrested the three appellants. Simultaneously,
the two teams rushed in and arrested [11] them and confiscated[12] the seven
plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance. PO2 Jigger Noceda
recovered the boodle money from appellant Abubakar. Then the arresting
police officers brought appellants to Camp Crame for investigation.
[13]
Thereafter, they were detained in the City Jail of Manila. [14] The substance,
with a total weight of 716.54 grams, was submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. It was positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.[15]
The prosecution dispensed with the direct testimony of Cirox T. Omero,
PNP forensic chemist, considering that the prosecution and the defense
stipulated that: (1) he conducted the laboratory analysis of the 716.54 grams
of white crystalline substance; (2) that he stated in his initial Laboratory
Report[16] and his Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 [17] that the substance is
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu, and; (3) the seven
(7) plastic bags of shabu has been identified.[18] Nonetheless, Omero
presented to the trial court the specimen and it was identified by PO1
Carpentero as the same white crystalline substance contained in a black
shoulder bag handed to her by appellant Bandang. [19] Upon order of the trial
court,[20] it was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory, through Omero, for
safekeeping.
All the appellants raised the defenses of alibi and frame-up.
Appellant Bandangs testimony is as follows: she is a manicurist and a
former resident of Quiapo, Manila until she transferred to Taguig, Metro
Manila in 1994. At the time of the incident, she was in a sidewalk
store in Elizondo Street, Quiapo, Manila rendering manicure service
to her old customers.[21] She was with her mother, appellant Ading
Salamat, and her one year old child. On her way to another customer,
she met appellant Abubakar.[22] At that point she saw two men being chased
by another two. Then, the two men behind suddenly accosted and ordered
appellants Bandang and Abubakar to board a vehicle. [23] Appellant Bandang
shouted at her mother, who was a few meters away from her, to take
care of her child. When her mother came near, they also dragged her
inside the vehicle which sped away. The two men forced appellants to identify
the two men being chased, but they could not do so. Thereafter, they were
brought to Camp Crame.
When cross examined, appellant Bandang denied having met the
prosecution witnesses before they arrested them (appellants) on May 3,
2000.[24] She also claimed that she saw appellant Abubakar for the second
time when they were arrested.[25] She also narrated that they were
arrested inside their house,[26] contrary to her direct testimony that
she was along a sidewalk at Elizondo, Quiapo.
Appellant Salamat corroborated the testimony of her daughter
appellant Bandang.[27] When cross-examined, she declared that when she
was arrested, she inadvertently left her grandchild on the sidewalk. The
people there, however, were able to trace her residence, hence, they
entrusted the child to her relatives.[28]
Appellant Abubakar gave the same version in the course of her
testimony.[29]
On December 21, 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoings, herein accused Mariam Bandang y
Salamat, @ Joharra, accused Ading Salamat y Guna and accused Rakima
Abubakar y Usman (Abubacar) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the Violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to paragraphs (e),
(f), (m), (o) of Section 2, Article I and in relation to Sections 20 & 21, Article IV
of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659. The three accused shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by
law. They are ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00
The preventive imprisonment of the accused since their arrest at the buy-
bust operation held on May 3, 2000 should be credited in their favor.
Forensic Chemist-Police Inspector Cirox T. Omero of PNP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Crame, Quezon City is hereby ordered to immediately submit the
confiscatedshabu weighing 716.54 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride to the Chairman of the Dangerous Drugs Board, Champ
Building, Bonifacio Drive, Intramuros, Manila, for proper disposal pursuant to
Paragraph (b), Section 36 of R.A. 6425, as amended.
Also send a copy of this decision to the Chairman of the Dangerous Drugs
Board of the aforesaid address; the Warden of the City Jail, Manila; to Forensic
Chemist Cirox T. Omero of the PNP Laboratory Service, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and to Police Superintendent Pancho Adelberto M. Hubilla of PNP
Narcotics Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Hence, this appeal, appellants ascribing to the trial court the following
assignments of error:
By appellants Bandang and Salamat:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN
DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALIBI.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE.[31]
By appellant Abubakar:
I
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED- delivery of the goods.[36] We quote PO1 Carpenteros clear and straightforward
APPELLANT HEREIN ALBEIT CLEAR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO account of the transaction, thus:
PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED;
PROS. GURAY:
II
Q So what did you do on May 2, 2000?
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
A I, together with the confidential informant proceeded to the place
APPELLANT HEREIN ON THE BASIS SOLELY OF THE STIPULATION
where the duo, one alias Joharra and Rakima operate their illegal
OF FACTS IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF JULY 6, 2000, WHICH PRE- transaction.
TRIAL ORDER ALTHOUGH SIGNED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HEREIN WAS HOWEVER, NOT SIGNED BY COUNSEL.[32] Q And where was that place.

The Solicitor General counters that: (a) all the elements of the crime of A Near the Arlegui Bridge, sir.
illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established by evidence beyond
Q And where is that Arlegui Bridge located?
reasonable doubt; (b) that appellants defense of alibi and frame-up must fail
because they did not present convincing evidence that it was physically A In Quiapo, sir.
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed; and (c) that the lack of signature of counsel for appellant xxx
Abubakar in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is immaterial since Q What time did you reach that place?
the prosecution had adequately proven the offense charged.[33]
A Between 3:00 to 5:00 p.m., sir.
We affirm the assailed Decision.
xxx
Q And upon arrival at Arlegui bridge in Quiapo, Manila, on that particular
I. Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence date on May 2, 2000, what happened next?
A Our confidential informant went to the place of Rakima and when he
came back, he had a companion, one alias Joharra and the one
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be Rakima.
proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug was presented as evidence; [34] and (3) that the buyer and Q When the informant, together with this Rakima and Joharra arrived at
seller were identified. A review of the records of this case reveals that the the place, what happened next?
prosecution has proven all these elements.
A Our confidential informant introduced me to them as a buyer.
A. The Fact of Sale was
Q After the confidential informant introduced you as a buyer, what did
Established
Rakima and Joharra tell you, if any?
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires A She said if I have money. First they asked how much Im going to buy
merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the or purchase. Then I told them that I only have P500,000.00.
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. [35] In the present case,
this was sufficiently proven by PO1 Carpentero, theposeur-buyer. She gave a THE COURT:
detailed account of how the sale took place, from the initial negotiation to the
Q Why did you say only?
eventual delivery of the dangerous drugs. On May 2, 2000, she and the
informant closed the deal with appellants Bandang and Abubakar for the A Because they said that one kilo of shabu is worth P700,000.00.
purchase of the 700 grams ofshabu at P490,000.00; and that the next day,
the three appellants delivered to her the 700 grams of shabu for which she xxx
paid them the boodle money. Definitely, the testimony of PO1 Carpentero as Q What is the quantity that you told the drug pusher that you are going
the poseur buyer clearly established the consummation of the sale. Settled is to buy?
the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a
buyer and his offer was accepted by appellants and the dangerous drugs A I said that I am going to purchase three kilos of shabu.
delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the
xxx
Q And what was the reply? PROS. GURAY:
A They said that the shabu costs P700,000.00 per kilo, sir. Q What time did you arrive at the target of operation?
xxx A At around 5:30 in the afternoon.
Q What was your response? Q When you arrived at Arlegui, Quiapo, Manila, what particular place in
that area did you position yourself?
A I told them that Im going to buy only 700 grams of shabu because my
money was only P500,000.00. A Near the bridge of Arlegui.
Q 700 grams? Q And who was with you in that particular place?
A Yes, sir. A None, sir. Im the only one inside the car.
Q How would you know that 700 grams would costs P500,000.00. Q And who arrived with you in that place? Who was with in that place?
A No, sir. They cost P490,000.00. A Our back up team, sir.
xxx THE COURT:
Q You were told? Q How about in the car that you rode in? Who was with you inside that
car when you arrived in the area of operation?
A Yes, sir.
A At first, sir, our driver and the confidential informant?
Q That 700 grams would cost P490,000.00.
Q So there were three of you?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
Q This driver is also a police operative?
Q And after telling them the amount of shabu that you would buy, what
did they tell you, if any? A Yes, sir.
A They asked if I have the money in my possession. Q And where did the back up team position themselves?
Q And what did you tell them? A At the distance that is visual to us.
A I answered that I did not have the money. But I would go back the Q You said that when you arrived at the place inside your car was the
following day. driver and your confidential informant. Where did they go after you
arrived at the place?
Q And did they agree?
A After we arrived at the place of the operation, the driver parked our
A Yes, sir. car and he alighted and joined the members of the back up team
Q After that, where did you proceed? while the police informant went to the house of the suspected drug
pushers.
A We proceeded at our office in Camp Crame, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
Q And what did you do there?
Q And did the confidential informant come back afterwards?
A I reported about the transaction, sir, to our chief.
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did your chief instructed you to do, if any?
Q And who was with the confidential informant when that informant
A And he designated Police Senior Inspector Mendoza to make a team to came back?
form a back up team for the buy bust operation.
A Together with him was one alias Joharra and one Rakima and the old
xxx woman.
THE COURT: A Rakima asked me if I have the money.
Q So there was three with the informant? Q What was your response?
A Yes, sir. A I told her that I have the money.
Q Namely? Q Then what transpired next?
A Alias Rakima, Mariam Bandang alias Joharra. A The one alias Joharra got the black shoulder bag from the old
woman and she gave it to me.
Q And the third?
Q And after the bag was handed to you, what did you do with
A A woman, an old woman. the bag?
Q So all in all there were how many women? A I opened it and I examined it and I saw seven transparent
A Three, sir. plastic bag or sachets containing white crystalline
substance.
Q All these persons were women?
THE COURT:
A Yes, sir.
Q Suspected shabu?
PROS. GURAY:
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they carrying, if any?
PROS. GURAY:
A An old woman is carrying a bag, a black shoulder bag.
Q What happened with the money which you said was asked by
Q And when these three persons you mentioned arrived at the place Rakima if it was already with you?
were you positioned yourself, what happened next?
A I showed her the money.
A When they arrived I asked them to enter the car.
THE COURT:
Q And did they enter the car?
Q Wait. Wait. When did you show the money? Was it before or
A Yes, sir. after the black shoulder bag was handed to you?

THE COURT: A After the shoulder bag was handed to me.

Q Where were you seated at the time? Q After you received the shoulder bag, you showed the money?

A At the driver seat, sir. A Yes, sir. I examined first the contents of the bag.

PROS. GURAY: Q Yes. And when you saw the suspected shabu inside, what did
you do next?
Q Where did they position themselves?
A They asked for the money and they showed it to me and
A At the back seat. handed the xxx plastic sachets.
Q How about he confidential informant? Where did he or she position Q So before handling the boodle money, you showed it first to
himself or herself? her?
A Beside me, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to tell the court that the three occupied the back seat? Q And you handed it to her?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q When they were already inside the car what transpired next? xxx
 PROS. GURAY:
Q Then what transpired next after that?
A When the transaction was finished I pushed the hazard
button.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
Q And what did these blinking of hazard lights signify?
A To signify our pre-arranged signal, sir.
THE COURT:
Q What did it signify?
A That the transaction was done, sir.
Q That the transaction was consummated?
A Yes, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
Q Then after that, what happened?
A Our arresting back up team rushed in and then they effect the arrest?
THE COURT:
Q How about you? What did you do?
A I identified myself as a police officer and we are arresting
them for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.[37]
The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by PO2
Noceda[38] and by PO2 Gabarda in his joint affidavit of apprehension.
[39]
Notwithstanding the searching cross-examination by the defense counsel, PO1
Carpentero and PO2 Noceda did not deviate from their direct testimonies. PO2
Noceda reinforced PO1 Carpenteros testimony when he affirmed that he
confiscated seven sachets containing white crystalline substance at the scene of
the crime; and that he recovered the boddle money from appellants.
That appellants knew that what they sold and delivered to PO1 Carpentero
were dangerous drugs is evident from the narration of both witnesses that when
they asked appellants whether they have license to carry or sell shabu, the latter
merely replied no.[40] They did not refute that the substance they delivered to PO1
Carpentero was shabu.
B. The Corpus Delicti was
Presented in Court
The seven sachets of shabu presented before the trial court as Exhibits J-1 to
J-7 were positively identified by PO1 Carpentero as the very same shabu sold and
delivered to her by appellants, thus:[41]
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
For the record, Your Honor, the forensic chemist brought to court
the specimen contained in a black shoulder bag which has been
marked as Exhibit J for the prosecution.
Q For the record, may I now confront the witness with a
shoulder bag and its contents. Madam Witness, will you
step down and examine these small plastic bags or sachets
containing white crystalline substances and tell the court
what relation has these seven bags containing plastic
sachets to the specimen which you said were handed to you
by the accused in this case on May 3, 2000?
A These are the ones that were inside the bag when alias
Joharra handed to me. These are all the seven sachets
contained in the bag that was handed to me.
PROS. GURAY:
For the record, these plastic bags had been marked already
as Exhibits J-1, J-2, J-3 up to J-7.
Q And will you please examine the black shoulder bag and tell
us what relation has this with the shoulder bag which was
handed to you by the accused?
A This bag is where they put the seven sachets, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
For the record, the black shoulder bag containing the seven
plastic sachets which were earlier marked as Exhibit J-1 to J-
7 has been already marked as Exhibit J for the prosecution.
[42]
That the seven sachets of white crystalline were indeed shabu is shown
by the Initial Laboratory Report and the Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00,
[43]
prepared by Cirox T. Omero, PNP forensic chemist, which both
yield POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine hydrocloride.
Appellant Abubakar submits that she was erroneously convicted because
the parties Stipulation of Facts regarding the corpus delicti cannot be used
against her considering that her counsel, Atty. Enriquez, did not sign it. We do
not agree. First, her conviction is not based solely on the Stipulations of
Facts. In Fule vs. Court of Appeals,[44] we ruled that while the omission of the
signature of the accused and his counsel indeed renders a stipulation of facts
inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution is not without remedy. What the
prosecution should do is to submit evidence to establish the
elements of the crime instead of relying solely on the supposed
admission of the accused in the stipulation of facts. In the present
case, this is what the prosecution did.
 Appellant Abubakar now argues that the Initial Laboratory Report and the A When she came back, sir, she has another old lady, sir.
Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 are inadmissible for being hearsay because
Q My question is, when she left before the third lady who, was
Omero, the PNP forensic chemist, did not testify. This is a non-
with them? Who was with Joharra?
sequitur conclusion. In People vs. Uy,[45] we ruled that a forensic chemist is a
public officer and as such, his report carries the presumption of regularity in A One alias Rakima, sir.
the performance of his function and duties.Corollarily, under Section 44 of
Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the Q And will you please point to Rakima if she is in court?
performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein A Siya po.
stated. Omeros reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline substance
were positive formethylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu are, therefore, THE COURT:
conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case.
Q Yung tinuro tumayo. Witness pointing to another woman who
Second, it must be stressed that Atty. Enriquez raises his objection to the answered by the name of (stop), anong pangalan?
Initial Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 only now. He ACCUSED ABUBAKAR:
should have objected to their admissibility at the time they were being
offered. Otherwise, the objection shall be considered waived and such Rakima Abubakar po.
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and
admissible evidence.[46] The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the xxx
admissibility of certain documents, if not urged before the court PROS. GURAY:
below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Q And you also testified that after Rakima and Joharra left for a
few minutes, they came back with another woman and this
woman you said was the one carrying the black shoulder
C. Positive Identification of bag. If that woman is in court, will you be able to point to
the Appellants as the her?
Sellers
A The old woman there, sir.
THE COURT:
PO1 Carpentero and PO2 Noceda positively identified appellants as the
peddlers of the confiscated shabu. PO1 Carpentero testified: Yung tinuro tumayo. Pangalan po ninyo?

Q Madam Witness, who among the three accused handed to you this ACCUSED SALAMAT:
bag containing the plastic sachets?
Ading Salamat po.
A One alias Joharra.
THE COURT:
Q And again, will you point to the person alias Joharra if she is in the
court room? Witness pointing to an old woman who answered by the
name of Ading Salamat. Maupo ka na.
A The one wearing a red shirt.
xxx[47]
THE COURT:
PO2 Noceda also identified appellants, thus:
Q Witness pointing to a woman who answered by the name of
(stop), pangalan? PROS. GURAY:

A Mariam Bandang po, sir.
Q And you testified earlier that before these specimen contained in a
black shoulder bag was handed to you by alias Joharra who gave
her name as Mariam Bandang, she left for a few minutes with
another suspect. Who was that suspect who was with Joharra when
they left for a few minutes?
Q Mr. Witness, you earlier told the Court that you were part of the buy
bust operation that was conducted on May 3, 2000. Who were the
target of your buy bust operation?
A A certain Joharra and Rakima, sir.
Q If that Joharra and Rakima are in court, will you be able to
recognize them?
 A Yes, sir. of shabu. Appellants themselves admitted that prior to their arrest, they did
not know the police officers.
Q Will you be able to point to Rakima?
Furthermore, appellants failed to show any motive why PO1 Carpentero
A Siya po.
and PO2 Noceda would falsely impute a serious crime against them. Without
THE COURT: proof of such motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
Yung tinuro tumayo. Witness pointing to a woman who shall prevail over their self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been
answered by the name of? Anong pangalan mo? framed.[54] Like alibi, we view the defense of frame-up with disfavor as it can
ACCUSED RAKIMA: easily be concocted and it is one of the most hackneyed line of defense in
dangerous drug cases.[55] For this claim to prosper, the defense must
Rakima Abubakar po. therefore adduce clear and convincing evidence.[56] In this aspect, appellants
miserably failed.
PROS. GURAY:
Q And if this Alias Joharra is in court, will you please point to
Appellants defense of denial and alibi must likewise fail. As between their
her? mere denial and their positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. For the defense
THE COURT: of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at
such a period of time and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
Yung tinuro tumayo. Witness pointing to another woman
the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.
who answered by the name of? Pangalan? [57]
These requirements of time and place must be strictly met.
ACCUSED BANDANG:
[58]
Appellants failed to establish that it was physically impossible for them to
be at Arlegui Bridge, Quiapo, Manila on May 3, 2000 at about 5:30 oclock in
Mariam Bandang po. the afternoon. What is clear from the evidence is that they were at Elizondo
THE COURT: Street, Quiapo, Manila, a stones throw away from Arlegui. It bears emphasis
that their testimonies as to their whereabouts during their arrest
Sige, maupo ka na.[48] were inconsistent. Appellant Bandang narrated during her direct testimony
that she and appellant Abubakar were in a sidewalk store in Elizondo Street,
All the elements necessary for the conviction of appellants for illegal sale Quiapo, Manila when they were suddenly accosted by the police officers. On
of dangerous drugs have been proved by the prosecution, thus: cross-examination, she contradicted herself and claimed that she and
(1) The shabu was in fact delivered by appellants to PO1 Carpentero, appellant Abubakar were arrested inside their house. [59] For her part,
the police poseur-buyer.[49] appellant Salamat stated that the police forcibly dragged her and her
daughter, appellant Bandang, inside a vehicle and it was only then that she
(2) The object of the sale was the 716.54 grams of shabu valued saw appellant Abubakar.[60] Meanwhile, both appellants Salamat and
at P490,000.00.[50] Abubakar were silent on appellant Bandangs claim that the apprehending
policemen demanded hush money from them. Undoubtedly, the
(3) The buyer was PO1 Carpentero and the sellers were herein
inconsistencies in appellants testimonies weaken their defense. They reveal
appellants.[51]
concocted stories and a web of lies.

II. The Defenses of Frame-up, Denial and Alibi

III. Presence Of Conspiracy

In a last ditch effort to secure an acquittal, appellants claim that they

We also affirm the trial courts finding that there was conspiracy among
were victims of frame-up[52] and extortion. Appellants defense must fail.For a
the three appellants. Their conduct during the entrapment reveals a common
police officer to frame them up, he must have known them prior to the
design or a community of interest among them. [61] The clear fact is that they
incident.[53] This is not the situation here. The informant had to introduce PO1
acted in concert in committing the crime, thus: (a) appellant Salamat carried
Carpentero to appellants before she could negotiate with them the sale
the black shoulder bag containing the seven sachets of shabu; (b) appellant
Abubakar asked PO1 Carpentero if she was ready with the
money; (c) appellant Bandang handed the black shoulder bag to PO1
Carpentero; and (d) appellant Abubakar received the boodle money from
PO1 Carpentero. All these acts clearly demonstrate the presence of
conspiracy. The existence of a conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence because it may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a
common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of
the crime.
IV. Penalty
The penalty prescribed under Section 15 of Article III, in relation to
Section 20 and 21 of Article IV, of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, for unauthorized sale of 200 grams or more
of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride is reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. In
the case at bar, as the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death consists of two
(2) indivisible penalties, appellants were correctly meted the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law,
conformably with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code that when there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that
courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; and in fixing
the amount in each case, attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means
of the culprit.[62] In view of the quantity of shabu confiscated in this case, we
find no reason to disturb the trial courts imposition of fine in the amount
of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 00-182559 is
AFFIRMED.
[G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY TING
UY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the September 16, 1996 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Branch XVII,
Manila) finding Jerry Ting Uy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was charged on July 24,
1998 for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act in two separate Informations
which read:
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-166675
That on or about July 21, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control white crystalline substance
contained in three (3) separate self-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing
one thousand five hundred ten point eight grams (1,510.8 g) known as
SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-166676
That on or about July 21, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute white crystalline substance contained in a self-sealed transparent
plastic bag weighing five hundred five point six gram (505.6 g) containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both Informations. A
joint trial was thereafter conducted.
The record shows that at around 3:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1998, a
Chinese-Filipino police informant went to the Western Police District
headquarters at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila to inform the police officers
assigned at the Drug Enforcement Unit thereat that a certain Jerry Ting Uy
was engaged in illegal drug activities in Sta. Cruz, Manila. PO3 Luis Chico
asked the police informant to contact appellant and to negotiate with him for
the purchase of shabu. Around 4oclock that same afternoon, the police
informant called appellant but was informed that shabu was not yet
available. The police informant again called up appellant at about 5oclock in
the afternoon, and they agreed that appellant would deliver half a kilo of
shabu to the informant for P200,000.00 at Severino Street, near the corner of
Remigio Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at 6:30 in the evening of that same
day. This information was recorded in the police blotter. Police officers, led by
SPO2 Rodolfo Rival, then planned a buy-bust operation for the entrapment of
appellant. Eight genuine P500.00 bills, marked with the letter C, were
prepared. These marked P500.00 bills were then placed at the top and at the
bottom of four bundles of bogus money. The police designated PO3 Chico to
be the poseur-buyer.
At around 6 oclock in the evening, 13 police officers, including PO3
Chico, and the police informant left the police station and proceeded to the
designated meeting place. Except for PO3 Chico and the police informant
who waited at the meeting place, the rest of the police officers positioned
themselves strategically in various places along Severino Street. Ten minutes
later, appellant arrived on board a green Mitsubishi Lancer. Appellant stopped
in front of the police informant and PO3 Chico, rolled down the window of his
car, and talked to the police informant in Chinese. The police informant then
told PO3 Chico to board appellants car.PO3 Chico slid into the front passenger
seat while the police informant sat at the backseat of the car. Appellant then
asked for the payment of half a kilo of shabu.PO3 Chico handed the marked
money to appellant. Appellant reached down under his seat, took a plastic
bag and gave it to PO3 Chico. When PO3 Chico opened the plastic bag, he
saw a transparent plastic bag containing substance which he suspected to be
shabu. At this point, PO3 Chico introduced himself as a police officer and
immediately arrested appellant. PO3 Chico then retrieved the marked money
from appellants lap. Thereafter, PO3 Chico inspected the space underneath
the drivers seat and found three more plastic bags containing suspected
shabu. After Chicos arrest of appellant, SPO2 Rival arrived and informed
appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was then brought to the WPD
headquarters. The marked bills of money and the four plastic bags seized
from appellant were handed over to SPO2 Benjamin Nuguit, who then turned
over the same to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory
examination.
The very next day, NBI Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen issued a
certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above-date at 4:05 p.m. one PO2 Gene Nelson Javier
of the DES, DID, NPD, U.N. Ave., Manila submitted to his Office for laboratory
examination/s to wit:
1. White crystalline substance contained in a self-sealed transparent
plastic bag marked LPCV- 1 and
Net weight of specimen = 505.6 grams
2. White crystalline substance contained in three (3) self-sealed
transparent plastic bags marked JTU-1 respectively.
Total Net Weight of specimen = 1,510.8 grams
All placed in a red plastic bag.
Examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE
RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE. XXX
(P. 47, Record.)
In his defense, appellant claimed that he is a victim of frame-
up. Appellants brief narrates the version of the defense as follows:
At about 2 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1998, appellant deposited
money in a bank at Masangkay Street near the Metropolitan Hospital in
Manila. When appellant was about to board his car after coming from the
bank, two vehicles blocked his way (p. 4, tsn., Feb. 9, 2000). Police operatives
in civilian clothes, approached appellant and demanded P200,000 without
telling him the reason (pp. 55-6, id.). When appellant told them that he could
not produce the money, he was made to board one of their vehicles,
blindfolded and taken to a house. While inside a room, the police operatives
warned him that they would implicate him for drug pushing if he did not
produce the money demanded. But appellant responded that he did not have
money (pp. 7-9, id.). Later, he was taken at a police station where he was
investigated and locked up in a cell (pp. 10-12, id.).
Alex Cruz, while selling buco at about past 2 oclock in the afternoon of July
21, 1998 at the corner of Masangkay St. and Recto Ave., saw from about 20
meters distance, men in civilian clothes alight from their vehicles which
suddenly blocked appellants vehicle, appellant alight from his vehicle and
board one of their vehicles (pp. 3-17, tsn., Nov. 18, 1990.
Appellant was booked and arrested for violation of Sections 15 and 16, Article
III of RA 6425, as amended, committed on or about 6:30 p.m. of July 21, 1998
as per report of SPO2 Rodolfo Rival Jr. dated July 22, 1998 (p. 9, Rec.). a joint
affidavit (Exh. F, pp. 6-7, Rec.) was executed on July 22, 1998 by police
officers Rodolfo Rival Jr., Luis Chico, Gene Nelson Javier with seven (7) others,
wherein they narrated how the buy-bust operation transpired wherein
appellant was apprehended allegedly for illegal sale and possession of shabu.
(Appellants Brief, pp. 7-9.)
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on July 6, 2000, the decretal
portion of which reads as follows;
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 98-166675, the accused, Jerry Ting Uy, is
hereby convicted of the crime of Violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425 as
amended involving 1,510.8 grams of shabu and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, plus the
costs.
In Crim. Case No. 98-166676, the accused, Jerry Ting Uy, is likewise,
convicted of the crime of Violation of Section 15 of R.A. 6425 as amended
involving one half kilogram of shabu and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, plus the costs.
The shabu recovered from the accused in the two cases is forfeited in favor of
the government and is ordered turned over the Dangerous Drugs Board for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
Appellant now assails his conviction, raising the following as errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS PO3
CHICO, THE ALLEGED POSEUR-BUYER, ON APPELLANTS SALE AND
POSSESSION OF SHABU DURING A BUY-BUST OPERATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PRESENT THE CHINESE INFORMANT
AS A WITNESS AS A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH RENDER DOUBTFUL
THE TESTIMONY OF PO3 CHICO ON AN ALLEGED BUY-BUST
OPERATION.
III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO APPELLANTS DEFENSE THAT HE WAS A
VICTIM OF A FRAME-UP IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL EXTORTION
ATTEMPT BY POLICE OPERATIVES.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS
INADMISSIBLE THE THREE BAGS CONTAINING SUSPECTED SHABU
AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-166676 FOR BEING
ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE IN A WARRANTLESS ARREST.
V. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN SAID CASES.
This Court has carefully examined the record of this case, and finds no
justification to come to conclusions different from those made by the trial
court.
Appellant was arrested by virtue of a buy-bust operation conducted by
the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of
their criminal plans. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and
which has consistently proven itself to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers. Thus, unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by improper
motives or were not properly performing their duties, their testimony on the
operation deserves full faith and credit (People vs. Chua Uy, G.R. No. 128046,
March 7, 2000).
In this case, the evidence shows that it was the police informant who
initially contacted and arranged a drug deal with appellant. At the pre-
arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Chico, who posed
as a buyer of shabu. PO3 Chico handed marked money to appellant as
payment for half a kilo of shabu.Appellant was then arrested when he handed
a plastic bag containing shabu to PO3 Chico.
The trial court found that PO3 Chico testified in a frank, spontaneous,
straightforward, and categorical manner. His testimony was unflinching even
during cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Chicos
testimony was corroborated on its material points by PO2 Gene Nelson Javier,
another member of the arresting team. As has been repeatedly held by the
Court, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution
witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary (People vs. Guiamil,, 277 SCRA 658 [1997]). As correctly noted
by the trial court, there was no evidence presented as to any ill motive on the
part of prosecution witness PO3 Chico which would affect the credibility of his
testimony. PO3 Chico and the other law enforcers involved in the buy-bust
operation would, thus, have in their favor the presumption that they regularly
performed their duties. Absent any showing of palpable error or arbitrariness,
as is the case at bar, the Court has no choice but to accord great respect to
and to treat with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of witnesses.
The defense, in its efforts to establish the innocence of appellant, claims
that it is incredible for a drug peddler to agree to sell his wares without first
checking on the possibility of entrapment, given that drug peddlers pursue
their nefarious activities with utmost caution. We are not
persuaded. Nowadays, drug pushers have become increasingly daring,
impudent, and even openly defiant of the law. If drug peddlers are
meticulously cautious in carrying out their illicit trade, drug abuse would not
have grown to such alarming proportions as it has today and would certainly
not pose a serious threat to society. The stark reality is that these
unscrupulous drug pushers perform their illegal activities without fear of
apprehension and unmindful of the risk of entrapment; in fact, they are only
concerned with the swift disposal of their goods. Thus, we have found in
many cases drug pushers selling their prohibited wares to any and all
prospective customers, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public
places, even in the daytime (People vs. Requiz, 318 SCRA 635 [1999]).
Likewise, it is appellants view that the testimony of the police informant
is indispensable in this case. This is not so. The failure to present the
informant does not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses
for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their
testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration
would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when the poseur-
buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug (People vs. Chua, Uy,
supra; People vs. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193 [1997]).
Further, appellants defense of frame-up does not convince. In drug-
related cases, the claim that the accused has merely been framed-up by law
enforcers for selfish motives is quite often raised by the defense. Such
defense, however, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for
it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. For this claim to prosper,
the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing (People vs.
Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 [1997]). Appellant, regrettably, has miserably failed
to substantiate his allegations in this respect.
Similarly, appellants claim that he was arrested by the police in order to
extort from him the amount of P200,000.00 is not worthy of belief. Aside from
his bare assertions, no evidence was presented to establish such as
fact. Moreover, if the arresting police officers indeed tried to extort money
from appellant, he could have filed the proper charges against the erring
police officers. The fact that no criminal or administrative charges were filed
by appellant against the arresting police officers bolsters our conclusion that
the alleged frame-up merely exists as a figment of appellants imagination.
In the same vein, appellants contention that the 1,510.8 grams of shabu
seized from him is inadmissible in evidence must also be rejected. The
Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial
warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not
absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made without warrant and
the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4)
the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs.
Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]).
Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was
incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.
A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful
arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and
the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his
reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or
of escaping (People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the three plastic bags containing a total of
1,500 grams of shabu were seized inside the car where appellant himself was
arrested. PO3 Chico, in this regard, narrated:
COURT:
Q: You arrested him?
A: Yes, Sir, and I recovered the buy-bust money on the lap of the accused.
Q: At the time the accused was on the drivers seat?
A: Yes, Sir, then my police companions came and they arrested the
accused. Upon examination of the underneath of the drivers seat, I
also recovered three plastic bags also containing suspected shabu.
(tsn, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-18.)
Given this scenario, it became advisable, if not necessary, for the police
officers to forthwith undertake a search of the car, the same being within the
area of immediate control by appellant.
In sum, in Criminal Case No. 98-166676, this Court is convinced that the
prosecutions evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, to wit:
(1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor (People vs. Uy, G.R.
No. 129019, August 16, 2000). In this case, the identities of the seller and the
buyer have been established. Appellant was positively identified in open
court as the seller of the 505.6 grams of shabu by PO3 Chico himself who
acted as the poseur-buyer. The delivery of the shabu to the poseur-buyer, as
well as appellants receipt of the marked money have also been sufficiently
shown by the testimony of prosecution witnesses PO3 Chico and PO2
Javier. What is material and indispensable in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited or regulated drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer (People vs. Khor, 307
SCRA 295 [1999]).
There is likewise no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu
in Criminal Case No. 98-166675 was proved beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant knowingly carrying with him 1,510.8 grams of shabu - without legal
authority -at the time of the buy-bust operation. The elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug (Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400
[1997]). All these circumstances are present in the case at bar.
Finally, pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 7659,the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall sell or possess 200 grams or more of shabu. Appellant, in
this case, was caught selling 505.6 grams of shabu, and possessing 1,510.8
grams of the same substance.Since no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crimes, the trial court was
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P500,000.00 in each of the two criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121572. March 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL ELAMPARO
Y FONTANILLA, accused-appellant. E-xsm
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,[1] convicted
appellant of the crime of illegal possession of drugs, imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay a fine of
P9,000,000.00.
As summarized by the solicitor General, the facts of this case which we find
to be supported by the records are as follows:[2]
"On February 12, 1995, at about 5:00 in the morning,
prosecution witness Police Officer Romeo Baldonado, while
attending to his duties as supervising policeman of the
Kalookan Police Station, received a report from an informant
that some people are selling shabu and marijuana somewhere
at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 3;
TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 3). Said informant stated that he himself
succeeded in buying said drugs (ibid., p. 3).
Hence, Police Officer Baldonado formed a buy-bust operation
team with himself as team leader and Police Officers Ernesto
Andala, Ronielo Reantillo and Bismark Gaviola as members
(TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 4). Said team proceeded to the area
reported to at Progreso P. Gomez, Bagong Barrio, Kalookan
City at around 5:45 in the morning of the same day (ibid., p.
3). Ky-le
Upon arrival at the area, prosecution witness Gaviola, together
with the informant asset stood at the corner of P. Gomez
Street, Bagong barrio, Kalookan City, since the said spot was
identified to be the market or where the buyers of marijuana
await a runner (seller). Thereafter, a runner later identified to
be Erwin Spencer approached the poseur-buyer, Gaviola, who
was asked Iiscore ba kayo (TSN, April 5, 1995, p. 22). Having
answered, Iiscore kami, Spencer then left and returned after
five minutes with the marijuana (ibid., p. 22). Gaviola then
handed over the marked money and arrested Spencer, but
who freed himself and ran (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 7).
Then, the buy-bust team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a
bungalow-type house with steel gate (ibid., p. 8). Having
trapped Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked
him and recovered the marked money (ibid., p. 9). The police
officers likewise found appellant repacking five (5) bricks of
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table
inside the houses sala (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 7). Appellant
was then arrested and he confessed that the source of the
marijuana was Benguet (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 10).
Spencer and appellant were later taken to the precinct where
they were delivered to the inquest fiscal for further
investigation (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 8). The arresting officers
then executed an affidavit on the incident and made a request
for the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct
examination of the drugs seized (TSN, May 3, 1995, p. 2). The
NBI Report confirmed the drugs seized to be marijuana
weighing five (5) kilos (ibid., p. 3)."
On February 15, 1995, the City Prosecutor charged appellant with the crime
of illegal possession of drugs under the following Information:[3]
"That on or about the 12th day of February 1995 in Kalookan
City, M.M. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without having been authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control 5.208 kgs. of
Marijuana, knowing the same to be a prohibited drugs (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW." Ky-calr
On March 1, 1995, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a
plea of not guilty.[4]
During trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses (1) PO2 Bismark
Gaviola, the poseur-buyer, (2) SPO2 Romeo Baldonado, one of the police
officers who took part in the buy-bust operation, and (3) Juliet Gelacio
Mahilum, a forensic chemist at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Mahilum testified that she conducted three types of examination on the five
(5) bricks of marijuana flowering tops (chemical examination, microscopic
examination, and chromatographic examination) and that each of the five (5)
bricks gave positive results for marijuana.[5]
For the defense, appellant and Angelo Bernales, a boarder at appellants
house, testified. Their version of the incident is as follows:[6]
 "JOEL ELAMPARO y FONTANILLA, the accused herein, gave a
very different version of the incident. At around 6:00 to 7:30 in
the morning of February 12, 1995, he was at their house when
somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the same
and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He
went out and saw Erwin Spencer with handcuffs and being
held by an arresting officer. He likewise sighted PO3 Bismark
Gaviola holding a big box. When he persistently questioned
Erwin Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting
officers got mad at him prompting them to likewise bring him
to the police station where he was detained. The arresting
officers demanded the amount of P15,000.00 for his release.
He remained in jail as he refused to accede to their demand.
On the other hand, Erwin Spencer was released two (2) days
after they were jailed for the latter gave money to the police
officers. (TSN, pp. 1-8, May 9, 1995). Calr-ky
ANGELO BERNALE (sic), a student, testified that he is renting a
small room at the accused (sic) house located at No. 2 P.
Gomez St., Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City. On February 12,
1995, at about 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning he was
about to go out of the accused (sic) house to bring breakfast
to his father when he sighted Erwin Spencer in handcuffs, in
the company of three policemen one of whom was holding a
box. Then he saw the policemen knocked at the door of the
accused (sic) house. Shortly thereafter, the accused was taken
away by the policemen."
After trial, the court rendered its decision,[7] disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused
JOEL ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS,
pursuant to Section 17 of the Death Penalty. With Costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant now contends that the trial court erred
in -[8]
I. GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING THE THEORY
OF THE DEFENSE.
II. FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 [SHOULD BE SEC. 8] OF
R.A. 6425.
III. CONTENDING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
MINORITY. Jjs-c
In his brief, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He
contends that it is highly unusual for arresting officers to act on an
information of an unknown source without confirming the veracity of the
report, and that it is incredible that a peddler of marijuana would be so
brazen as to approach total strangers and offer to sell them marijuana.
Appellant insists that he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana
because he failed to pay the police officers the amount of P15,000.00 for his
release, unlike Spencer, who paid said amount. Appellant assails the legality
of his arrest inside the house of his father for failure of the apprehending
officers to secure a search warrant. Lastly, appellant contends that if found
guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be
appreciated in his favor.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that further
surveillance was unnecessary because the police "asset" had personal
knowledge of the open buying and selling of "marijuana" in the area, having
purchased his "marijuana" a few hours before reporting the matter to the
police. Appellant also misrepresented himself in saying that Spencer was
released without charges considering that a separate investigation was
conducted against the latter. The OSG contends that appellants arrest was an
incident to a lawful hot pursuit made against Spencer. Appellant, in the
course of the pursuit was surprised in plain view to be repacking the five (5)
bricks of marijuana. The OSG concedes, however, that the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in favor of
appellant.
Considering the assigned errors and the foregoing contentions, we find that
here the issues pertain, first, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses;
second, the validity of appellants arrest; and third, the correctness of the
penalty imposed by the trial court.
As to the first issue, it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility of
witnesses is within the province of the trial court which had an opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor during their testimonies. Unless
the trial court overlooked substantial facts which would affect the outcome of
the case, we accord the utmost respect to their findings of facts. As
compared to the baseless disclaimers of appellant, the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief, coming as it
does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.[9]Esm
Appellants claims that it is highly suspect that Spencer would offer to sell
marijuana to total strangers. However, in many cases, drug pushers did sell
their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they strangers or not, in
private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, some drug
pushers appear to have become exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the
law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer
and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement
as well as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs.[10] As
found a quo, it was the consummated sale between PO2 Gaviola and Spencer
which led to the eventual arrest of appellant.
As to the warrantless search, Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution
prohibits a search and seizure without a judicial warrant. Further, Section 3
thereof provides that any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example, Section 12 of Rule 126,
of the Rules on Criminal procedure, provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches
and seizures have also been judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to
a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.[11]marinella
Considering its factual milieu, this case falls squarely under the plain view
doctrine. In People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 710-711 (1999), we held that
"Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye
and hand and its discovery inadvertent."
When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PO2 Gaviola, he
instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy-
bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house without
a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once
inside the house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-
bust money from him. They also caught appellant
inflagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on
top of a table. PO2 Gaviola testified as to the circumstances of appellants
arrest as follows [12]
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, JR.
Q: Now how were you able to enter the house?
PO2 GAVIOLA: nigel
A: Because the door was already open.
Q: When you entered the house, what happened inside the
house?
 A: We saw Joel Elamparo, sir. He was then repacking five (5)
bricks of marijuana wrapped in a newspaper.
Q: Where was it placed, this five (5) packed (sic) of marijuana?
A: It was placed on top of the table, sir.
Q: Was Joel Elamparo alone when you saw him repacking
these five (5) bricks of marijuana?
A: He has some companions in the house, his wife, 2 other
women, his father and there was one man there who was a
boarder.
Q: Now you said that you saw Joel Elamparo repacking five
bricks of marijuana, now who was his companion in repacking
the same?
A: He was alone, sir.
Hence, appellants subsequent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as it is
within the purview of Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
..."
Section 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante
delicto arrests.[13] Here two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating the he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[14] Thus,
when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were
not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. ella
Although the caption of the Information charges the appellant with violation
of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659,[15] otherwise known as the death penalty law, which refers to the
sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited
drugs, the body of the Information charges appellant with the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of Article II of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659. We have held that it is not the designation of
the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein
which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[16]Appellant having been fully apprised of the elements of the
crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, he may properly be convicted
of the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
In drug cases, the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is determinative of
the imposable penalty. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section
17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that when the quantity of indian hemp or
marijuana is 750 grams or more, as in this case, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978,[17] was only 17 years, 1
month, and 3 days old, at the time of the commission of the crime on
February 12, 1995. Beginning with our decision in People v. Simon,[18] and
reiterated in a number of decisions thereafter, the Court has recognized the
suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
the Dangerous Drugs Act after the amendment of the latter by Republic Act
No. 7659. Appellant being a minor over fifteen and under eighteen at the
time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13 (2) of
the Revised Penal code. Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. Applying the provisions of Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code which prescribes the rules for graduating penalties, the
imposable penalty on appellant is the penalty next lower in degree
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale. The penalty next lower in degree than reclusion
perpetua is reclusion temporal. There being no generic mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision mayor. No fine is imposable in this case, for it is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
[19]
alonzo
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch
121, in Criminal Case No. C-48478 (95) finding appellant JOEL ELAMPARO Y
FONTANILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession
of drugs is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, and seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148547 PEOPLE V EMPLEO
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the
Decision[2] promulgated on 19 June 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59269. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution and Order of
Judge Marcial G. Empleo (Judge Empleo) of the Regional Trial Court
of Dipolog City, Branch 9 (trial court), directing the prosecutor to amend the
two Informations filed by filing only a single Information.
The Facts
On 6 October 1999, a search warrant[3] was issued for the search and seizure
of shabu and paraphernalia at the room rented by private respondent
Dante Mah (private respondent) at the LS Lodge located at the corner
of Quezon Avenue and Mabini Street inDipolog City.
During the search, the police officers seized the following from private
respondents room:
1. Thirty-two small plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules
believed to be shabu, weighing 2 grams;
2. Six big plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules believed to
be shabu, weighing 4.4 grams;
3. One roll/stick of dried Indian hemp (marijuana) leaves weighing 0.2 gram;
and
4. One small plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules believed to
be shabu, weighing 0.05 grams.[4]
Police Superintendent Virgilio T. Ranes, Dipolog City Chief of Police, filed two
criminal complaints for violation of Section 8, Article II and Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425[5] (RA 6425), as amended, against private
respondent. After preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Rodrigo
T. Eguia filed two Informations before the Regional Trial Court in Dipolog City:
Criminal Case No. 9272
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor of Region 9 accuses DANTE MAH
y Cabilin of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III
of R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That on October 6, 1999 at 10:30, more or less
at corner Quezon Avenue
and Mabini Streets, Barra, Dipolog City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowing fully well that unauthorized possession
and control of regulated drug is punishable by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and control
Thirty Two (32) pieces small plastic sachets and
six (6) pieces big plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, weighing a total of
6.4 grams, without any legal authority to
possess the same, in gross Violation of Section
16, Article III, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 9279
INFORMATION
The undersigned State Prosecutor of Region 9 accuses DANTE
MAH y Cabilin alias Dodoy Mah of the crime of Violation of
Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
committed as follows:
That on October 6, 1999 at 10:30 in the
morning, more or less, at
corner Quezon Avenue
and Mabini Streets, Barra, Dipolog City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
 Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowing fully well that possession and use of
prohibited drugs is punishable by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and control One (1)
roll/stick dried marijuana leaves, without legal
authority to possess the same, in gross
Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon his arraignment on 28 October 1999, private respondent pleaded not
guilty to the two charges.
On 17 February 2000, private respondent filed a motion[8] to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 9279. Private respondent alleged that the single act of possession of
drugs committed at the same time and at the same place cannot be the
subject of two separateInformations. Since the prosecution already filed
Criminal Case No. 9272, then the filing of Criminal Case No. 9279 is
tantamount to splitting a single cause of action into two separate cases.
The prosecution opposed the motion, claiming that unauthorized possession
of marijuana and shabu are punishable under Section 8, Article II and Section
16, Article III of RA 6425. Hence, these acts constitute two separate and
distinct offenses with separate penalties.[9]
In a Resolution[10] dated 3 April 2000, Judge Empleo directed the prosecutor to
file only a single Information. The Resolution reads in part:
It is to be noted that the stuffs, SHABU and Marijuana Leaves are all
prohibited and regulated drugs. But what is important is that the search and
seizure was done at one time, the same place and at one occasion. Hence,
there could be no two crimes committed, regardless of the two kinds of
prohibited/regulated drugs that were confiscated from the accused. There is
in this case a clear case of splitting one single criminal act into two separate
crimes.
Considering, however, that the penalty of this kind of offenses are based on
the number of grams of the regulated/prohibited drugs, instead of having
these cases dismissed, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dipolog City is
hereby directed to amend its information by filing one single information.[11]
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,[12] arguing that violation of
any of the provisions of RA 6425 constitutes a separate and distinct offense.
The prosecution maintained that private respondent cannot be charged with
violating Articles II and III of RA 6425 in one Information because that would
be tantamount to charging him with more than one offense in a single
Information. The trial court denied the motion in an Order[13] dated 2 May
2000.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition. Hence this petition.
Meanwhile, in an Order[14] dated 12 May 2000, the trial court suspended
further proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 9272 and 9279 pending resolution
of the petition. However, in a Resolution[15] dated 27 April 2004, the trial
court, upon private respondents motion, dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 9272
and 9279 for unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the cases which
is violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.[16] Upon the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued an Order[17]
dated 17 June 2004, setting aside its Resolution dated 27 April 2004 and
reinstating Criminal Case Nos. 9272 and 9279, with the proceedings still
suspended pending outcome of the appeal in the Supreme Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision promulgated on 19 June 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Order and Resolution of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the
filing of only one Information is proper because only one violation was
committed possession of dangerous drugs as penalized by RA 6425. The
Court of Appeals ruled that:
In the case at bar, such intent to possess is the possession of a dangerous
drug, however, without regard to the kind of substance involve[d], since both
pertain to dangerous drugs, provided it will be duly established during trial, it
shall make the accused liable for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As
the possession of the dangerous drugs happened at the same time, same
occasion, same place, it cannot be denied that only one violation [was]
committed under the Dangerous Drugs Act, which is the possession of
dangerous drugs. It is not controverted that at the time of the apprehension,
what was found in his possession were [a] marijuana and shabu. We shall not
discount the fact that the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure
point to none other but a single intent to possess a dangerous drug; not to
mention that there is only one occasion, as compared to other cases wherein
the alleged offense happened on different occasions, that with respect to the
latter situation clearly it may not be said [that] there is only one intent. It can
be inferred from the action of the accused and the surrounding circumstances
that there was clearly one act intended by the former to perpetrate; it is
apparent, that the accused seems to have a single intention, which is his
intention to possess the said dangerous drugs. Thus, not just because it
involves two different kinds of dangerous drugs make the said act to
constitute two offenses. As has been repeatedly said by this Court, dangerous
drugs refer to both prohibited and regulated drug.
xxxx
Petitioner contends that since there are two acts of possession, one is
possession of a prohibited drug and the other is possession of a regulated
drug, for that reason, there are two separate offenses that the accused may
be held liable for. Petitioner puts forward the argument that it is immaterial
that the marijuana and shabu were seized in the same place and on the same
occasion. Petitioner further asserts that since two separate provisions of
the Dangerous Drugs Act were violated, concomitantly, herein private
respondent may be held liable for two distinct crimes under the said law. We
hold otherwise. A careful look into the Dangerous Drugs Act would show that
it specified the manner of commission of the particular acts that would
amount to a violation of the said law, and one of which is the possession or
use of a prohibited or regulated drug. Although the law has provided for
two separate articles covering the possession or use of a prohibited and a
regulated drug, it does not mean that there are two separate offenses that it
speaks of. What the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes is the specific act of
possession or use of dangerous drugs, among others, regardless of the fact
that it is a prohibited or a regulated drug.[18] (Emphasis in the original)
The Issue
The main issue in this case is whether the prosecution should file only one
Information for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order and Resolution of the trial court that
the prosecution should file only one Information. The Court of Appeals held
that where possession of both prohibited and regulated drugs occurs at the
same time, on the same occasion, and in the same place, only one offense is
committed under RA 6425, which is possession of dangerous drugs.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling. Such interpretation
dilutes the severity of the crimes committed. RA 6425 does not prescribe a
single punishment for the various offenses enumerated in the law. On the
contrary, RA 6425 enumerates the punishable acts and its corresponding
penalty. RA 6425 also specifies the particular drugs and the corresponding
quantity in the imposition of penalty. For instance, under Section 20 of RA
6425, as amended, the minimum quantity of marijuana and shabu for
purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For
marijuana, the quantity must be 750 grams or more while forshabu, it is 200
grams or more.
The prosecution was correct in filing two separate Informations for the crimes
of illegal possession of shabu and illegal possession of marijuana. Clearly, the
Legislature did not intend to lump these two separate crimes into just one
crime of possession of dangerous drugs. Otherwise, there would be no need
to specify the different kinds of drugs and the corresponding quantity in the
application of the appropriate penalty. Multiple offenses can be committed
under RA 6425 even if the crimes are committed in the same place, at the
same time, and by the same person. Thus, this Court has upheld rulings of
the lower courts convicting an accused charged with two separate crimes of
illegal possession of shabu and illegal possession of marijuana, even if the
crimes were committed at the same time and in the same place.[19]
Besides, in People v. Tira, we have already ruled that illegal possession
of shabu and marijuana constitutes two separate crimes and therefore,
two Informations should be filed. We held:
The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to
Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) asserts that the appellants should be convicted of violating
Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. We do not agree with the trial
court and the OSG. We find and so hold that the appellants are guilty
of two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under
Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, for their possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section
20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Although only one Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless,
they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved
by the prosecution. In this case, the appellants were charged for violation
of possession of marijuana and shabu in one Information which reads:
That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province
of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody the following:
- Three (3) pieces (sic) sachets of shabu
- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue
- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams
- Twenty-four (24) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves weighing 86.3
grams
- Six [6] disposable lighter
- One (1) roll Aluminum foil
- Several empty plastics (tea bag)
- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations
believed to be proceeds of the contraband.
without first securing the necessary permit/license to posses[s] the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The Information is defective because it charges two crimes. The
appellants should have filed a motion to quash the Information under Section
3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They
failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the
appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged.[20]
Just like Tira, this case involves illegal possession of both shabu and
marijuana. Hence, it was only proper for the prosecution to file two
separate Informations since there were two distinct and separate crimes
involved. This is in accordance with the rule that a complaint or information
must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses.[21]
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 19 June 2001 of
the Court of Appeals. We ANNUL the Resolution and the Order, dated 3 April
2000 and 2 May 2000, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9.
WeORDER Judge Marcial G. Empleo to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 9272 and 9279.
SO ORDERED.
POSIQUIT v PEOPLE
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Reynaldo Posiquit @ Chew (petitioner) assailing the Decision1 dated
April 29, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 14, 2010 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31214 which, inter alia, affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner and Jesus Saunar (Saunar) for violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
This Court notes that Saunar did not join the petitioner in filing the instant
petition. Thus, our discussion would be limited to the petitioners case.
On the strength of a Search Warrant issued by Executive Judge Romulo
Villanueva of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, the combined forces
of Albay Police Provincial Office, Liban Police Station, Polangui Police Station
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted a search on
the house of Saunar in Barangay Kinale, Polangui, Albay on September 18,
2002.
Before the search team arrived, the petitioner, Saunar, Ricardo Morada and
Myla Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) were inside Saunars house engaged in an activity
which seemed like a pot session. Upon the arrival of the search teams
vehicles in front of Saunars house, the group of the petitioner scampered
towards the back of the adjacent house. While attempting to escape, the
petitioner threw his wallet away. However, members of the search team
caught up with the petitioner and, thereupon, recovered his wallet which
contained three small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances.
Meanwhile, the other members of the search team, after showing the search
warrant to Saunar and his wife, proceeded to conduct the search. The search
yielded, among others, three small plastic sachets and one big plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances and a stick of dried marijuana leaves.
After the search was completed, the search team prepared a receipt of the
items seized which was signed by the members of the search team and
Saunar. Pictures of the seized items were thereafter taken. The petitioner and
Saunar were then brought to the police station.
The following day, SPO4 Herminigildo Caritos brought the seized items to the
Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp Simeon Ola,
Legaspi City where it was examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Josephine
Clemen. Laboratory tests on the seized items confirmed that the plastic
sachets contained a total of 3.548 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu and that the confiscated stick was indeed dried marijuana leaves
weighing 0.2869 grams.
Thus, in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 4650, the petitioner
and Saunar were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165
before the RTC of Ligao City.
The petitioner denied the allegations against him and claimed that, at the
time of the search in Saunars house, he and the group of Saunar were just
having a drinking spree. When he and Dela Cruz were about to go home, the
search team immediately arrived at the said house and pointed their guns at
them. He insisted that he ran away because he was surprised. When the
armed men caught up with him, the former boxed him on the nape and had
him handcuffed. The petitioner admitted ownership of the wallet that was
seized by the search team but denied that it contained plastic sachets
containing shabu.
After due proceedings, the RTC of Ligao City, on September 25, 2007,
rendered a Joint Judgment3 finding the petitioner and Saunar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They were then sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from thirteen years as
minimum to fifteen years as maximum and to each pay a fine in the amount
of P300,000.00. In convicting the petitioner, the RTC of Ligao City intimated
that his flight can only be interpreted as a deliberate intention of a guilty
person to prevent apprehension.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner and Saunar appealed from the said
disposition to the CA. The petitioner and Saunar asserted that the
confiscation, inventory and taking of pictures of the seized items were not
conducted in the presence of a representative from the media, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and an elected public official, contrary to Section
21 (a) of R.A. 9165. They likewise asserted that the chain of custody of the
seized items was not clearly established by the prosecution.
On April 29, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision4 affirming in
toto the September 25, 2007 Joint Judgment of the RTC of Ligao City. The CA
held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution adequately showed that
the substance confiscated was the same specimen submitted for laboratory
tests.
On the absence of a representative from the media, the DOJ and an elected
public official during the confiscation, inventory and taking of pictures of the
seized items, the CA held that the presence of the said persons becomes
mandatory only in the absence of the persons from whom the confiscated
items are taken or their representative. In any case, the CA pointed out that
the integrity and identity of the seized items still stand as the prosecution
was able to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. The petitioner
and Saunar sought to reconsider the April 29, 2009 Decision but the same
was denied by the CA in its April 14, 2010 Resolution.5
Undaunted, the petitioner instituted the instant petition for review
on certiorari asserting the following arguments: (1) the CA erred in convicting
the petitioner for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 in conspiracy
with Saunar; (2) the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
not proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) the chain of custody of the
seized items was not clearly established by the prosecution.
The petition is denied.
At the outset, this Court notes that the filing of the instant petition is
accompanied by glaring lapses on the part of the petitioner which would
warrant its outright denial.
A copy of the April 14, 2010 Resolution of the CA denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration was received by the latter on May 5, 2010. The
petitioner had, following the reglementary 15-day period from receipt of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration by the CA,6 until May 20, 2010 within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
The petitioner, by himself, filed instead with this Court a Motion for Extension
of Time to Appeal/ For Review.7 The said Motion was sent by the petitioner
through JRS, a private courier, on May 20, 2010 and was actually received by
this Court on May 21, 2010. Thus, the said Motion for Extension was filed a
day late.
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. The courts discretion to grant a motion for extension is
conditioned upon such motions timeliness, the passing of which renders the
court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was
filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to
extend.8
Also, the said motion for extension was not accompanied by a proof of
service thereof to the adverse party. In view of the foregoing, the instant
petition indubitably warrants outright denial. Nonetheless, even if we are to
disregard the said procedural lapses, the instant petition would still be
denied.
A perusal of the arguments set forth by the petitioner in support of the
instant petition would clearly show that the same only raised questions of
fact. The petition failed to show extraordinary circumstance justifying a
departure from the established doctrine that findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive on the Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. The issue on
whether the prosecution was able to establish the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and whether the prosecution was able to
show an unbroken chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs are factual
in nature and, hence, not proper subjects of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
Anent the petitioners contention that the CA erred in convicting him for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 in conspiracy with Saunar, this
Court finds the same utterly specious. First, an astute perusal of the April 29,
2009 Decision of the CA and the September 25, 2007 Joint Judgment of the
RTC of Ligao City would show that the circumstance of conspiracy was not, in
any manner, appreciated by the said courts against the petitioner. What the
said courts held was that both the petitioner and Saunar were separately
found in possession of dangerous drugs making them each liable under R.A.
9165.
Second, contrary to the tenor of the petitioners argument, the crime of
conspiracy to commit possession of dangerous drugs does not exist. Simply
put, the circumstance of conspiracy is not appreciated in the crime of
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. The
fact that the Information for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 that
was filed against the petitioner and Saunar alleged that they conspired and
helped each other is immaterial. In any case, the said Information
sufficiently alleged that the petitioner and Saunar were caught in possession
of dangerous drugs, contrary to Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is DENIED.
RA 9262
Tan GR 168852
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution[2] dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and
Kristen Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
[6]
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004.
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for
a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
[10]
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents'
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims
of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law expressio unius est exclusioalterius.[13]
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be
applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW
OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004.[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for
the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can besuppletorily applied to R.A.
No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is
not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.(Emphasis
supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262,
in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service
of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because
said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa(B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23]
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child mayinclude
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this
Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x(Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law[24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not
of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means
of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the
attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However,
conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not
a trier of facts.[26]It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since
this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can
be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be
an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March
7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.
[G.R. No. 120548. October 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO
ESCARDA, JOSE VILLACASTIN JR., HERNANI ALEGRE, and
RODOLFO CAEDO, accused.
JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, finding
accused Joselito Escarda and Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law. In its decision, the trial
court decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds both
accused JOSELITO ESCARDA and JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Viol. of P.D. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law),
and there being the presence of three generic aggravating circumstances of
[r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful entry, with no mitigating circumstances
to offset the same, as such, the accused are each sentenced to suffer,
considering the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum to
RECLUSION PERPETUA as the maximum, together with all the accessory
penalties imposed by law and to indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses,
in the amount of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their
preventive imprisonment as provided for under R.A. 6127.
Costs against both accused.
SO ORDERED.[1]
In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello
Villanueva charged accused with violation of Presidential Decree No. 533,
otherwise known as Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE
VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI ALEGRE (at-large) and RODOLFO CAEDO (at-large)
of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, (Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law of 1974), committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the first two (2) above-named accused, in company of their
two (2) other co-accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo, who
are both still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually help[ing] one
another, with intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2) female carabaos, valued in the
total amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to JOEL BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial
court are as follows:
[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the
morning in [Hacienda] Ricky, Jose Villacastin, Jr. and his group passed by his
house.[He] was still awake at that time because he was watching over his
cornfield and while doing so, he saw the two accused remove the cyclone
wire which was used as the corral for the two (2) carabaos of Rosalina
Plaza. He was able to see Jose Villacastin, Jr. cut the cyclone wire because he
was just four (4) arms length away from them and after Jose Villacastin cut
the wire, they swept it aside and untied the two (2) carabaos. After untying
the carabaos, they rode on it and proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two
(2) persons riding on the carabao whom he identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr.
together with Joselito Escarda. He awakened Rosalina Plaza who thereafter
went to Joel Barrieses, owner of the carabaos, to inform the latter that his
carabaos were stolen.
[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the
morning, in the residence of Joel Barrieses, Dionesio Himaya called her and
informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when asked who stole the
carabaos, Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose Villacastin, Jr. Before the
incident of July 29, 1987, she already knew the person of Jose Villacastin, Jr.,
because the latter always passed by their house. After she was informed of
the stealing of the carabaos, she went to the corral to check whether the
carabaos were there but discovered that the beasts were no longer there and
the cyclone wire was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose
Villacastin, Jr., stole the carabaos and she went to the 334th PC Company and
reported the incident.[3]
In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda
claimed that he was sleeping in the house of Gilda Labrador during the
incident while Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping in his house at
that time.[4] The defense version of the incident was summarized by the trial
court as follows:
Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in this case,
specifically, Jose Villacastin, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo. Neither did he
know of somebody by the name of Dionesio Himaya although he knew
somebody by the name of Gilda Labrador. In the early morning of July 29,
1987, he was working as cane cutter and hauler in the hacienda of Javelosa
located in Barrio Malubon, Sagay, Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15)
kilometers away from the house of his mother where he was residing. On July
29, 1987, he started working at 8:00 oclock in the morning and ended at
11:00. After he finished working in the field, he went to the house of his
mother where he ate lunch and rested until 3:00 oclock in the afternoon. In
the evening of July 29, 1987, he slept at the house of Gilda Labrador starting
at 7:00 oclock in the evening and woke up at 6:00 oclock in the morning of
July 30, 1987. Sometime on August 29, 1987, he left alone for the dance hall
located at Hda. Ricky to attend a dance held there because there was a fiesta
at that time. While he was at the dance hall, he was arrested by the PC
elements and brought to the 334th PC Company where he was
maltreated. He was asked whether or not he stole the carabaos at Hda. Ricky
but he denied the commission of the crime and again, he was maltreated. He
suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he made a confession before
them but did not sign the same.His injuries were not treated by a physician
because the PC would not let him go out of the jail, so, his injuries healed
while he was in jail. He did not know the names of the PC who maltreated him
and forced him to admit the loss of the carabaos at Hda. Ricky because the
maltreatment happened in the evening. Furthermore, he did not know the
complainant in this case, i.e. Joel Barrieses.
xxx
[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not know
the accused Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo because in
the early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or less 2:00 oclock to 3:00 oclock,
he had not gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo
because he was sleeping in his house which is located in Sitio Candiis. He
started sleeping at 8:00 oclock in the evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up
the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 in the morning. On August 29, 1987 at
10:00 oclock in the evening, he was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky and
while watching the dance, he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC
Headquarters in Tan-ao, Sagay, Negros Occidental. When they arrived at the
PC Headquarters, they were investigated about the stealing of the carabaos
and the PC elements wanted them to admit it. He denied what they were
accusing him of because he has not committed the crime. He does not know
of anybody by the name of Joel Barrieses. When he denied the commission of
the crime, he was maltreated and was forced to admit it and to make a
confession. They were detained for about a month at the 334th PC
Headquarters and they were transferred to the Municipal Jail of Sagay,
Negros Occidental and there was no lawyer present during his refusal to
admit the stealing of the carabaos.[5]
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible, while it disbelieved the defense of denial and alibi of accused
Escarda and Villacastin.They were found guilty as charged. However, the
charge against accused Rodolfo Caedo was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Earlier, the charge against co-accused Hernani Alegre was
dismissed on motion by the prosecution, for lack of evidence.
Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of
appeal. In their assignment of error, they alleged that the trial court erred in
convicting them of the crime charged.[6]
On November 27, 1995, we required the trial court to order the
commitment of Escarda and Villacastin to the Bureau of Corrections or the
nearest national penal institution. However, Executive Judge Renato Muez
requested that their commitment to the Bureau of Corrections be deferred
until the termination of the other criminal case [7] against them pending before
the said trial court. Further, Captain Eduardo Legaspi, Acting Provincial
Warden of Negros Occidental, also requested to hold in abeyance the
commitment of Escarda and Villacastin in view of their pending criminal cases
before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City.[8] Accordingly, we granted the
aforesaid request for deferment.[9] On August 12, 1998, they were eventually
committed to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.[10]
On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to
withdraw his appeal.[11] We required the Director of the New Bilibid Prison to
confirm the voluntariness of said withdrawal.[12] In his certification dated July
15, 1999, Atty. Roberto Sangalang, who personally examined Escarda,
attested that Escarda executed his urgent motion to withdraw appeal on his
own free will and fully understood the consequences of the same. On August
9, 1999, we granted Escardas motion to withdraw appeal.[13]
Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining
appellant, Jose Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he assigns only one error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the element of taking away of carabaos by any
means, method or scheme without the consent of the owner was not proven
by the prosecution. He also alleges that his identity was not established
beyond reasonable doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the
prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting
the certificate of ownership,[14] as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.
Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme,
without the consent of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass,
or other domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit
or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the
killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the
owner or raiser.[15]
 In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling
is the taking away of the carabaos by the accused without the consent of the
caretaker.Dionisio Himaya testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire
used as corral for the carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two
carabaos. Then, appellant rode on one carabao while co-accused Escarda
rode on the other and immediately proceeded to the canefield.[16] The taking
was confirmed by Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, who declared
that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she went right
away to the corral and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were
missing.
Appellants assertion that his identity was not positively established
deserves no serious consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya
identified appellant and Escarda as the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said
he was awake at that time as he was watching over his cornfield nearby, and
there was enough illumination from the moon.[17] He was just four arms length
away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos. He stated
that appellant rode on one carabao while Escarda rode on the other, and both
immediately went away. He said he easily recognized appellant as he knew
him long before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was the
nephew of his wife and used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness
positively identified appellant as the same person who stole the
carabaos. Appellants contention concerning lack of proper identification is, in
our view, baseless and unmeritorious.
Similarly, appellants assertion, that the prosecution should have first
presented the certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his
conviction, is untenable. It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of
cattle-rustling is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or hide
without the consent of the owner. The owner includes the herdsman,
caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of
large cattle or other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle. In this
case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the
taking away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the
owner, that the carabaos were stolen and reported the incident to the
police. Note that the carabaos ownership was never put in issue during the
trial in the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is settled that,
generally, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal.[18]
Appellants alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his
house at the time the crime occurred. He slept at 8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and
woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 A.M. As the trial court noted, it is
difficult to believe appellants claim that he slept for eleven hours straight just
like Escarda.Besides, the rule is settled that alibi cannot prosper unless it is
proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another
place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place where
the crime was committed.[19] In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate
satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime
scene at the time of the incident. Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only
a fifteen-minute walk from appellants house.
We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, unlawful entry and recidivism, without any mitigating
circumstance. The prosecution, however, failed to specify these
circumstances in the charge filed before the trial court, as now required
expressly by the Code of Criminal Procedure effective December 1, 2000 but
applicable retroactively for being procedural and pro reo.[20]
Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision, the
trial court merely mentioned that appellant was convicted for cattle rustling
under Criminal Case No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the
case at bar was being tried. It did not state that said conviction was already
final. Even the records did not show that appellant admitted his previous
conviction. As we had held before, there can be no recidivism without final
judgment.[21] The best evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the
original judgment of conviction, and such evidence is always admissible and
conclusive unless the accused himself denies his identity with the person
convicted at the former trial.[22]
P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle
under Articles 309[23] and 310[24] under the Revised Penal Code. It merely
modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under Article
310 by imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special circumstances.
[25]
Under Section 8[26] of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling
shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished
by prision mayor in its maximum period toreclusion temporal in its medium
period if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed.
In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as
the perpetrators had to cut through the cyclone wire fence to gain entrance
into the corral and take away the two carabaos therefrom. Accordingly, the
penalty to be imposed shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable on appellant is only prision mayor in its maximum period as
minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Thus, it is
proper to impose on appellant only the indefinite prison term of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years,
ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
 WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty
of violating the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days ofreclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify offended party
Joel Barrieses the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91721 July 31, 1991
CONSTANCIO ORDONIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
In an information dated July 12, 1982 before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, Constancio Ordonio was indicted of the crime of cattle
rustling committed as follows:
That sometimes in the evening of Tuesday, January 5, 1982, at
Bgy. Omanod, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the
preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with the intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, steal, and carry away
one (1) male cow, color red and white (cabang) highbreed,
more or less eleven months old, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Mr. Anastacio Pajunar.
That as a result thereof, the victim Anastacio Pajunar was
damaged and prejudiced in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
PESOS (P700.00), Philippine Currency, as the estimated cost
and value of the stolen cow.
With damages.
Contrary to law. 1 it to Pajunar should he come for it. In the meantime, he went
As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
attendant circumstances which precipitated this petition for review
on certiorari are clear.
A study of this case showed that on January 6, 1982, Anastacio Pajunar
discovered the loss of his eleven month old cow (which he pastured 100
meters from as house on January 5, 1982). He searched for it and asked
his not too distant neighbor, Constancio Ordonio, whether he had seen
it. Ordonio allegedly denied having seen it, and when Pajunar heard the
mooing of a cow, Ordonio was quick to say that was the cow he was
tending. However, Pajunar followed the direction of the sound and
discovered that it was his own cow. Ordonio insisted that it was his
brother's cow which was entrusted to him. So Pajunar tied it near
Ordonio's house and left to report the matter to the authorities.
Pajunar went to Barangay Captain Leopoldo Enumerabellon who gave
him a note for the PC. Two PC soldiers accompanied him and went with
him to the house of Barrio Councilman Leonardo Pajaron, and together
they went to Ordonio's place. He also took with him his milking cow and
upon arrival at Ordonio's place, the calf ran and approached its mother.
The PC soldiers told the wife that since Ordonio was not around, the calf
had to be entrusted to the barrio official and the wife consented. The
following day, the 7th of January, 1982, they met with sub-barangay
captain Enumerabellon. When asked why he, Ordonio was claiming the
cow, his answer was that it was his brother's cow entrusted to him But
Ordonio's wife told her husband thus, "Ne, let's just give the cow to the
real owner and we will pay the damages. 2
In his defense, the accused, Constancio Ordonio, presented a different
version.
. . . Ordonio declared that on January 6, 1982, at about 6:00
o'clock A.M., Santiago Oyhoc reported to him that he saw a
cow in his mongo and corn farm. Ordonio just wanted to drive
the cow out of his farm but Oyhoc suggested it be caught so
that it would not return So, with a rope he caught the cow and
tied it near his house. He claimed that he recognized the cow
to be Pajunar's and even left instructions to his wife to return
to Calanian about 9 kilometers from his house to sell corn.
When he returned in the evening, he learned from his wife
that they were accused of stealing the cow and that the two
 PC soldiers who came together with Pajunar and Pajaron took
the cow to place it in the custody of Enumerabellon. That very
evening too, he got a letter from Enumerabellon instructing
him to go to his place. So that on the 7th, he and as wife went
to see Enumerabellon. At Enumerabellon's house were also
the complainant, Anastacio Pajunar, barrio councilman Pajaron
and Pajunar's son. An investigation was conducted with
Ordonio and his wife saying that Pajunar owned the cow, so it
was given back to Pajunar who brought it
home. 3
In a decision dated January 26, 1988, the trial court * rendered this judgment
of conviction:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the opinion of this Court and
so holds that the prosecution has proved beyond the shadow
and doubt the guilt of accused and finds said accused guilty of
the clime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Constancio
Ordonio should be punished with a penalty next lower by one
(1) degree than that provided for the crime committed and
therefore accused Constancio Ordonio should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum to six (6)
years as maximum of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon motion of the accused on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and
against the vigorous objection of the prosecution, the trial court conducted a
new trial. This time, the defense presented Pastor Banquerigo, an 81-year-old
barrio entertainer, who substantially corroborated the account of Constancio
Ordonio. Pastor swore that on January 6, 1982, he saw Constancio take
possession of a cow and tie it near his house where it could be easily seen by
passers-by.
Unconvinced, the trial court in the Order dated August 11, 1985 5 maintained
its judgment of conviction, reasoning that upon consideration of the
testimony of Pastor Banquerigo, it found no urgent reason to disturb its
decision dated January 26, 1988. The accused took exception to the
judgment of the trial court and interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
imputing the following errors: 6
a) The lower court erred in presuming that the elements of the
crime are obtaining in the case at bar;
b) The Court a quo erred to bank merely on the weakness of
the evidence of the accused, while it failed, of its own
evidence, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt;
c) The lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and
value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the
case, and the decision is based on misapprehension of facts.
Unimpressed, the Court of Appeals ** affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court, 7 and subsequently denied the accused's motion for reconsideration
through a Resolution dated November 13, 1989.
The accused now comes before this Court, reiterating all the three errors he
assigned to the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The accused faults the decision of the respondent court for its
misapprehension of facts. The actual raking of the calf was not proven by the
prosecution, he points out. That the complainant found the calf tied in the
appellant's upland property does not make him a cattle rustler. Nor does his
supposed failure and/or refusal to tell the complainant where the cow was
even if he (the accused) knew where it was. Actually, the accused claims, he
was at that time in Calanian nine kilometers from Sta. Catalina how
could the complainant have asked him about his calf? And the mere stepping
on the rope (granting this is true) to which the calf was tied when
complainant towed it does not constitute theft of the calf either. Because if
the accused had intended to steal it why would he tie it near his house?
The accused asserts that the animal had gone astray and consequently
destroyed his plants. To prevent further damage to the plants he caught it
and tied it near his house. He thought it burdensome to report the matter to
the Barangay Captain or bring the calf to him. The complainant should not
kick up a storm over the matter as he was able to recover his calf anyway.
Besides, the accused alleges that the complainant pressed charges against
him out of spite as he and the complainant were litigants in a land dispute.
The complainant tried to "blackmail" him into abandoning the civil case in
exchange for his dropping of this case. But he (the accused) refused, so the
complainant proceeded to file this case in the trial court.
The petition must fail.
We note at the outset that in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court like
this case, review is limited only to errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals. Factual findings of the trial court which are especially confirmed by
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and can no longer be reviewed. 8 Of
course, there are well-defined exceptions, for instance, misapprehension of
facts 9 which the accused now posits.
The records however show that the respondent court, as well as the trial
court, committed no such misapprehension of facts.
Significantly, the lower courts did not anchor the conviction of the appellant
on what he alleges to have resulted in a misapprehension of facts. The lower
courts did not convict the appellant on the basis of the missing calf s having
been found tied in the accused's premises nor on his failure and/or refusal to
tell the owner the whereabouts of the calf, nor on the accused's stepping on
the rope to which the "lost" calf was tied when the complainant was towing it.
Rather, the lower courts convicted him on the basis of his actuations when
the lost calf was found in his possession. The lower courts noted the
following:
1. When complainant discovered the loss of his calf, he
inquired from petitioner whether he has seen the calf but the
latter denied having seen it. 10
2. When complainant queried the whereabouts of the calf for
the second time, accused anew denied having seen it. 11
3. When complainant eventually located the calf in accused
estate the latter refused to give the calf claiming it belonged
to his brother, Agustin. 12
4. Complainant needed the assistance of a barangay official
and two PC soldiers to dispossess accused of that calf and
eventually placed it in the custody of the Barangay Captain. 13
5. At the Barangay Captain's residence accused still insisted
that the calf belonged to his brother, Agustin. 14
The accused-petitioner had the temerity to act thus even if the calf did not
belong to him, but to the complainant as he admitted before the trial court.
But independent of the admission by the accused, complainant ownership of
the calf is further forfeited with this one important circumstance. When
complainant went to accused's house, accompanied by barangay
councilman, Pajunar, and two PC soldiers, the milking cow was brought along.
Upon arrival, the PC soldiers let loose the calf and the latter immediately ran
to the milking cow to suck on its milk. Such conduct of the calf manifests all
the signs of the young whether human or not, on finding a lost mother. 15
Section 2(c) of P.D. 533, defines cattle rustling as follows:
Sec. 2(c). Cattle rustling is taking away by any means,
methods or schemes, without the consent of the owner/raiser,
of any of the above mentioned animals whether or not for
profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It
includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide
without the consent of the owner/raiser.
Note the phraseology of the provision "taking away by any means,
methods or schemes." Thus, intent to gain may be inferred from the
deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person, the
finder knowing that the property does not belong to him. 16 In this
case, the several circumstances enumerated earlier constitute an
unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which is that the accused indeed took the calf with the
intent to appropriate it. 17 To recapitulate, the stubborn insistence of
the accused that the missing calf belonged to his brother, Agustin,
knowing fully well that it belonged to the complainant (as he later
admitted in his answers to questions of the trial court), in essence, is
cattle rustling.
In discrediting the evidence of the defense, we quote with approval the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The evidence is clear that appellant twice denied knowledge of the
calf when private complainant asked him if he has seen the missing
calf. And when the calf was finally located by the private complainant,
 the appellant stopped the private complainant from bringing the calf
home alleging that the calf belongs to his brother Agustin which was
entrusted to his care. However, after realizing that his claim can no
longer hold water because private complainant has proved his
ownership of the calf in question, appellant now avers in as testimony
that he caught the calf because it was eating and destroying his
plants and it was his intention to return the calf to the owner.
Appellant reasoned out further that he was not in his house when
private complainant went there but that it was only his wife who was
at home and with whom the private complainant talked. We are not
the least convinced of appellant's stand. To US, such a posture now
being taken by the appellant is nothing but a last and desperate
attempt to exculpate himself from liability. 18
xxx xxx xxx
[And] if it is true likewise that it was appellant's wife only with whom
private complainant talked on that day of January 6, 1982 when the
latter was looking for his missing calf because the appellant was
allegedly not at home, how come that appellant's wife was not even
presented by appellant as a witness to rebut at least the clear
testimony of private complainant that it was the appellant he talked
with that day? 19
Our thorough review of the case convinces us of the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, hence the respondent court did not commit any
reversible error in affirming the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated August
9, 1989, and its Resolution, dated November 13, 1989, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
RA 7610
G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006 DE OCAMPO vs Secretary of
Justice
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari1 assails the Resolutions dated 15 September 2000
and 19 April 2001 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice ("DOJ
Secretary") in I.C. No. 99-6254.2 The DOJ Secretary3 denied Laila G. De
Ocampos ("petitioner") petition for review of the investigating prosecutors
finding of probable cause against her for homicide4 in relation to Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 ("RA 7610")5 and for violation of the
same provision of RA 7610. The DOJ Secretary6 also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent Magdalena B.
Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the Womens Desk of the CPD Police
Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999. Magdalena
stated that on 4 December 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of
dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening. Ronald then
vomited, prompting Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald replied that
petitioner, who was Ronalds teacher, banged his head against that of his
classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronalds head
and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronalds continued vomiting,
Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December 1999.
The following morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed
Magdalena that Ronalds head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronalds
nose before he died on 9 December 1999.
Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged
his head against Ronalds.
During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, Assistant Quezon City
Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ("inquest prosecutor") ruled as follows:
Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of
the charges against her. The case is not proper for inquest as the incident
complained of happened on December 4, 1999. Further, we find the evidence
insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the respondent. There
is no concrete evidence to show proof that the alleged banging of the heads
of the two minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the
death of minor Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report
submitted by the respondent in this case states that said victim bears
stitches or sutures on the head due to a vehicular accident. There is no
certainty, therefore, that respondents alleged wrongdoing contributed or
caused the death of said victim.7
Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant Quezon City Prosecutor
Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng ("investigating prosecutor") for preliminary
investigation. She scheduled the first hearing on 6 January 2000.
Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan ("Erlinda"), Lorendos mother, attended the
hearing of 6 January 2000 and alleged that petitioner offered her P100,000,
which she initially accepted, for her and her sons non-appearance at the
preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the money to the investigating
prosecutor.
On 7 January 2000, Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging
incident, and Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another victim of
petitioners alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn statements with the Office
of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
On 18 January 2000, petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. Petitioner
invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence
to support the charges against her. Petitioner assailed the omission in
Magdalenas sworn statement about Ronalds head injury due to a vehicular
accident in November 1997. Petitioner pointed out the absence of damage or
injury on Lorendo as borne out by his medical certificate. Petitioner
contended that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of
Ronalds death, but the failed medical attention or medical negligence.
Petitioner also alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have
immature perception. Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death
stated in Ronalds Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation.
Ronalds Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of his death as "Cardio
Pulmonary Arrest," the underlying cause as "Cerebral Edema," and other
significant conditions contributing to death as "Electrolyte imbalance and
vomiting." The Autopsy Report, obtained by the investigating prosecutor from
the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, states the cause of death as
"Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to traumatic injury of the head."
The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioner for the offenses charged. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
[petitioner] be charged with Homicide in relation to Art. VI, Sec. 10 of R.A.
7610 and Violation of Art. VI, Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 with no bail
recommended for the Homicide since par. 6 of Art. VI of Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610
provides that:
"For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, par. 2 and 263, par. 1 Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall
be reclusion perpetua when the victim isunder twelve (12) years of age."
Bail recommended: No bail recommended Homicide, in relation to Art. VI,
Sec. 10, R.A. 7610; and Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) Viol. of Sec.
10(a) of R.A. 76108
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ.
In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating
prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda
("complainants") for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally
procuring the autopsy report. Petitioner argued that the investigating
prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and
Lorendos heads was the cause of Ronalds injury and that such was an act of
child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman
which has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office.
The Resolution of the DOJ Secretary
The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary held that
there was no bias in complainants favor when the investigating prosecutor
did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured the autopsy
report as nothing precluded her from doing so.
The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutors finding that Ronalds
injury was the direct and natural result of petitioners act of banging Ronald
and Lorendos heads. The DOJ Secretary stated that petitioner never denied
such act, making her responsible for all its consequences even if the
immediate cause of Ronalds death was allegedly the failed medical attention
or medical negligence. The DOJ Secretary held that assuming there was
failure of medical attention or medical negligence, these inefficient
intervening causes did not break the relation of the felony committed and the
resulting injury.
The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioners claim that she is innocent as held by
the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case. She
merely recommended petitioners release for further investigation since the
case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient.
The DOJ Secretary further stated that the omission in Magdalenas sworn
statement about Ronalds head injury due to a vehicular accident in
November 1997 and the absence of any injury on Lorendo are
inconsequential.
Moreover, the DOJ Secretary ruled that whether the statements of the causes
of death in the death certificate and autopsy report are hearsay, and whether
Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception, are
evidentiary matters which should be determined during trial. The DOJ
Secretary also sustained the investigating prosecutors conclusion that the
banging of Ronald and Lorendos heads is an act of child abuse.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration9 which the DOJ Secretary denied
in his Resolution dated 19 April 2001.10
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary
investigation; and
2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of RA 7610.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, the Court will address the
procedural issue raised by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG").11 The
OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule 43 is applicable to the present
case. Thus, the OSG argues that the petition should be dismissed outright for
being filed with this Court, instead of with the Court of Appeals, under a
wrong mode of appeal. On the other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the
OSG points out that the petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of
Appeals.
Based on Memorandum Circular No. 58,12 the resolution of the DOJ Secretary
is appealable administratively to the Office of the President since the offenses
charged in this case are punishable by reclusion perpetua.13 From the Office
of the President, the aggrieved party may file an appeal with the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 43.14
Even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by
petitioner, this petition forcertiorari must fail. However, considering the
gravity of the offenses charged and the need to expedite the disposition of
this case, the Court will relax the rules and finally resolve this case in the
interest of substantial justice.
Whether petitioner was denied
due process during the preliminary investigation
Absence of a clarificatory hearing
The Court rejects petitioners contention that she was denied due process
when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing. A
clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation.
Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of
the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section
3(e) of Rule 112. This provision states:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be
clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
xxx15 (emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is directory
in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive only and operates to confer
discretion.16 Under Section 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within the discretion of the
investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings to clarify
some matters.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after
petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at that
point the investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more matters
for clarification. It is only in petitioners mind that some "crucial points" still
exist and need clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these
"important" matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded
equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence
during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to
be heard.17 Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process since
she was given the opportunity of a hearing.18 She even submitted her
counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor on 18 January 2000.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits.19 Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime.20 It
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence.21 Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he
can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause based on the
parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and
resolve the case.
Obtaining a copy of the autopsy report
Petitioner argues that she was denied the right to examine evidence
submitted by complainants when the investigating prosecutor unilaterally
obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Petitioner fails to persuade us. Though the autopsy report is not part of the
parties evidence, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid the
investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the
investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a copy of the
autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of Ronalds
death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report
bolstered complainants allegations.
Moreover, there is nothing to support petitioners claim that the investigating
prosecutor was biased in favor of complainants. There are other pieces of
evidence aside from the autopsy report upon which the investigating
prosecutor based her finding of probable cause. The autopsy report is not the
sole piece of evidence against petitioner. The sworn statement of the other
victim, Lorendo, and the eyewitness account of Jennilyn Quirong, substantiate
the charges against petitioner. Petitioners failure to deny the occurrence of
the head-banging incident also strengthened complainants allegations.
Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 11222 in arguing that the
investigating prosecutor should not go beyond the evidence presented by
complainants in resolving the case. This provision applies if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed or if subpoenaed fails to submit her counter-affidavit
within the prescribed period. Such is not the case here where petitioner filed
her counter-affidavit and both parties presented their respective evidence.
Whether there is probable cause
for the offenses charged against petitioner
Existence of probable cause
Petitioner challenges the finding of probable cause against her for the
offenses charged arguing that the head-banging incident was not the
proximate cause of Ronalds death. Petitioner insists that efficient intervening
events caused Ronalds death.
We do not agree. There is probable cause for the offenses charged against
petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty of the crime.23
In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days after his
teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his head against that of his
classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records showing petitioners
specific denial of the occurrence of such act. Petitioner simply stated that
"the head-banging incident happened but [she] did not perpetrate it."24 In
effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging incident but
denies committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the
consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day confinement in the
East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break the relation of the
felony committed and the resulting injury. Were it not for the head-banging
incident, Ronald might not have needed medical assistance in the first place.
These circumstances which allegedly intervened causing Ronalds death are
evidentiary matters which should be threshed out during the trial. The
following are also matters better left for the trial court to appreciate: (a) the
contents of the death certificate and autopsy report, (b) the medical records
of Ronalds accident in November 1997, (c) the perception of witnesses
Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales, and (d) the alleged lack of medical
assistance or medical negligence which caused Ronalds death.
To repeat, what is determined during preliminary investigation is only
probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.25 As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or moral certainty.26
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the
inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges against her.
As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case but merely recommended it for further investigation since it
was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover,
petitioners active participation in the preliminary investigation without
questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioners
agreement with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further
investigation of the case.
Charges of Homicide and Child Abuse
Petitioners single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students had two
distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo. Therefore, petitioner has to face
prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For Ronalds death, petitioner is being
charged with homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code27 in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by reclusion
perpetua.28 However, this does not mean that petitioner is being charged with
the distinct offenses of homicide and child abuse for Ronalds death. On the
other hand, for her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Contrary to petitioners contention, Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 is
clear. This provision reads:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the
same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one
interpretation.29 In the present case, petitioner fails to show convincingly the
ambiguity in Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines "child abuse" as the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which includes physical abuse and
cruelty. Petitioners alleged banging of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is
clearly an act of cruelty.
In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether the
DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there is probable cause to charge
petitioner of the crimes of homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules
that the investigating prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
securing motu proprio the autopsy report and in not calling for a clarificatory
hearing. This ruling does not diminish in any way the constitutional right of
petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice dated 15 September 2000 and 19 April 2001 in I.C.
No. 99-6254. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 139346-50. July 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ABADIES y
CLAVERIA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. 0658-SPL to 0661-SPL, dated May 26,
1999, finding accused-appellant Jose Abadies guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of four counts of violation of Republic Act No. 7610 or the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,"
penalized under Section 5 (b), Article III and Section 31, Article XII thereof,
and sentencing him for each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
Accused-appellant Abadies was charged with a violation of Republic Act
No. 7610 in five separate Informations [2] which, except for the dates of
commission, are similarly worded as follows:
That on or about July 1, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with force and intimidation commit acts of lasciviousness upon
the person of his 17-year old daughter ROSALIE ABADIES Y MANUNGHAYA by
kissing, mashing her breast and touching her private parts against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other incidents were allegedly committed on July 2, 3, 7 and 26,
1997. In an Order[3] dated July 16, 1998, the trial court, upon motion of the
public prosecutor, dismissed Criminal Case No. 0657-SPL on the ground that
the crime charged appears to have been committed in Las Pias City, hence,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
During the arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty
and hence, trial ensued.
The facts show that accused-appellant has been living for the past
twenty years with his common-law wife, Catalina Manunghaya, at Bgy. Pulo,
Landayan, San Pedro, Laguna, together with their two children, Jonathan and
complainant Rosalie. The family sleeps together in one room and usually
Catalina wakes up early in the morning to buy bread. It was during these
short periods of time while Catalina was out of the house that the abuses
took place. On the dates material to these cases, complainant was 17 years
old, having been born on July 29, 1980.[4]
Complainant testified that on July 1, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., she was
sleeping in their house when she was awakened by somebody touching her
breast and other private parts of her body. She was startled to see her father,
accused-appellant, and she covered her breast with a pillow. Complainant
struggled with accused-appellant as he persisted in mashing her breast. She
could not shout as fear overcame her when she saw anger from accused-
appellants face. Accused-appellant was forced to stop only when
complainant's mother arrived from the store.Complainant did not tell her
mother about the incident for fear of accused-appellant.
The following day, July 2, 1997, at about the same time, complainant was
again jolted from her sleep by accused-appellant who was touching her
breast. She covered herself with a blanket and with her hands. She fought
accused-appellant when he tried to remove her hands.Again, accused-
appellant desisted only when complainant's mother arrived from the
store. Complainant ran to the bathroom where she shed tears.
The next day, July 3, 1997, complainant was once more roused from her
sleep by accused-appellant mashing her breast. She started to cry and asked
accused-appellant why he was abusing her. Accused-appellant simply
continued touching her. Again, he stopped only when his wife arrived from
the store.
Complainant was again awakened in the early morning of July 7, 1997 by
accused-appellant touching her breast. This time, accused-appellant
straddled her, inserted his hand inside her shorts and touched her private
part. Complainant resisted and removed accused-appellants hand. She
reached out for the blanket of her brother, Jonathan, who was sleeping beside
her in a bid to wake him up. When accused-appellant saw that Jonathan was
about to turn, he stopped. However, he warned complainant not to tell her
mother about the incident.
 On July 26, 1997, complainant was brought by accused-appellant to the
house of her stepsister in Las Pias. Nobody was in the house and strangely,
accused-appellant started to sharpen his sickle. He ordered complainant to
write a letter to her mother and revealed that he was planning to kill himself
and complainant. When complainant refused, accused-appellant forced her
inside the bedroom where he threatened complainant to choose whether he
would kill her or rape her. Accused-appellant started kissing complainant but
the latter was able to run away from him. Complainant reached their house
and saw her mother. Crying and looking very pale, she narrated to her
mother her ordeal. She likewise disclosed the past abuses of accused-
appellant. Complainant and her mother then proceeded to the barangay
office where they made a report. On the strength of their complaint, accused-
appellant was arrested.
Complainant further testified that on December 6, 1997, accused-
appellant wrote her a letter from his detention cell asking for forgiveness.
Accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi. He denies
having committed acts of lasciviousness against complainant. He testified
that on the dates of the alleged incidents, he woke up between 7:00 to 7:30
a.m.; that complainant and her mother were already preparing breakfast; and
after eating breakfast, he would leave for work. He also testified on the
reason why the charges at bar were filed against him. Allegedly, on July 26,
1997, he asked complainant what was happening to their lives as his children
were aloof with him.Complainant threatened to end her life because she felt
she was to be blamed for their problems. Accused-appellant also declared he
was too strict with his children, and even inflicts physical harm on them when
they disobey him.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant asserts that the court a quo
erred in finding the prosecution's version more credible and in convicting him
despite the implied pardon given by complainant. Accused-appellant likewise
contends that there exists no factual basis for the trial court to consider his
plea of forgiveness in his letter to complainant as an implied admission of
guilt.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
Accused-appellant stands charged with violation of Republic Act No. 7610
or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, specifically Article III, Section 5 (b) thereof which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; x x x.
The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a)
by using force or intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12
years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
[5]
The testimony of complainant that accused-appellant touched and
mashed her breasts and other private parts of her body against her will, and
that she could not shout or fight back because she was afraid of accused-
appellant, sufficiently constitute acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing
provision. Although accused-appellant was not armed nor did he threaten
complainant, his moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the
use of force or intimidation.[6]
Accused-appellant faults the trial court in giving credence to the
testimony of complainant. He contends that it is difficult to comprehend why
complainant did not shout or do anything to ask help from her brother who
was sleeping beside her. He also claims that if the charges were true, it is
inconceivable why complainant did not immediately tell her mother. The
argument is specious.
The Court has probed into the records to assess complainant's credibility
and we find that her testimony deserves full faith and credit.Complainant's
testimony was straightforward and free from contradiction as to any material
point. We also accord great weight to the findings of the trial court having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial.[7]
 Complainant's failure to disclose about her misfortune to her mother
does not destroy her credibility. Complainant explained that she did not tell
her mother about her ordeal because she was afraid of accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant admitted that his children were afraid of him
because he was very strict with them, and that there were occasions when he
would hit them with anything that he could get hold of or inflict physical
punishment whenever they disobeyed him.[8] This is enough reason for
complainant to be cowed into silence.
It is of no moment that complainant failed to shout for help while she
was being molested with her brother sleeping beside her in the same
room. Accused-appellant was complainants own father, who exercised moral
ascendancy over her.[9] Indeed, it is now hoary jurisprudence that lust is no
respecter of time and place for rape has been committed in places where
people congregate, even in the same room where other members of the
family are sleeping.[10] Moreover, we have also ruled that no standard form of
behavior has been observed when a person is confronted by a shocking or a
harrowing and unexpected incident, for the workings of the human mind,
when placed under emotional stress, are unpredictable. Some people may cry
out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others
may yet appear to yield to the intrusion.[11]
On the other hand, accused-appellant's simple denial of the crime
charged is inherently weak. It is negative evidence which cannot overcome
the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. For accused-appellants denial
to prevail, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability and
there is none.[12]
Accused-appellant further contends that there is no factual basis for the
trial court to conclude that the plea for forgiveness contained in his letter is
to be deemed as an implied admission of guilt. We do not agree.
A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily show that
accused-appellant was indeed seeking pardon for his misdeeds.Some of the
pertinent portions read as follows: "I made this letter to ask your
'forgiveness. x x x Alam mo bang sobra-sobra na ang pagsisisi ko sa ginawa
kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na hirap na ako at ang lahat ay
buong puso ko ng pinagsisisihan. Patawarin mo na ako anak. x x x." There is
no iota of doubt that accused-appellant was asking forgiveness for having
committed the acts with which he now stands charged. Settled is the rule
that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed
by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
[13]
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed
some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise.[14] Under the circumstances, accused-appellants plea
of forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.
Accused-appellant likewise contends that he was impliedly pardoned by
the complainant. He deduced the purported implied pardon from
complainants testimony that she did not disclose to her mother the dastardly
acts committed by accused-appellant on July 1, 2, 3 and 7, 1997 and that she
had not intended to file charges against him. He alleged that the present
charges were filed against him only after the Las Pias incident which
happened on July 26, 1997. Accused-appellant posits the thesis that the
failure of complainant to report the first four acts of lasciviousness is
tantamount to an implied pardon. He relies on Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness.
xxxxxxxxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. x x x.
The argument will not hold. First, the supposed pardon cannot be implied
from the fact that the complainant did not immediately reveal to her mother
her defloration. As earlier stated, it was her fear of accused-appellant which
restrained complainant from reporting the incidents to her mother. Second,
Article 344 of the RPC and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide that the pardon must be express and cannot be
based on hazy deduction.[15]
The imposable penalty prescribed under Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period toreclusion
perpetua. Section 31 (c), Article XII thereof provides that the penalty in its
maximum period shall be imposed when the perpetrator is an ascendant,
parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity. In the cases at bar, the relationship of complainant
and accused-appellant is established by the birth certificate of complainant
which shows that accused-appellant is her father. This relationship is further
supported by the testimonies of complainant and her mother, as well as that
of accused-appellant. Hence, the trial court did not err in appreciating the
generic aggravating circumstance of relationship and in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetuafor each count of lascivious conduct committed by
accused-appellant against his daughter.
It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610 provides
for the penalty of imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section 31 (f), Article XII
(Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the imposition of a fine subject to
the discretion of the court, provided that the same is to be administered as a
cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate
member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense. This
provision is in accord with Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, to which the Philippines became a party on August 21, 1990, which
stresses the duty of states parties to ensure the physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration of abused and exploited children in an
environment which fosters their self-respect and human dignity.
In the case of People vs. Jaime Cadag Jimenez[16] where a minor
victim was sexually molested by her own father, the accused was ordered to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 as cash fund for the rehabilitation of the victim and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of lascivious act
committed by the accused. Hence, in the cases at bar, the trial court
correctly imposed a fine of P30,000.00 for each count of lascivious conduct
committed by accused-appellant. In addition, moral damages should be
awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count.
As a final note, we deem it relevant to stress the escalating awareness
and concern for the protection of the rights of children. The need of children
for special protection was given recognition by the nations of the world as
early as 1924 when the assembly of the League of Nations endorsed the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (commonly known as The Declaration of
Geneva) which focused on children's welfare, specifically their economic,
psychological and social needs. Reaffirming the fact that children need
special care and protection because of their vulnerability, and the vital role of
international cooperation in securing children's rights, the General Assembly
of the United Nations adopted on November 20, 1989 the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), which incorporates the full range of human rights -
civil, political, economic, social and cultural - of children. The Convention
stresses the duty of the state to take all the necessary steps to protect
children from being sexually abused (as in rape, molestation and incest) or
exploited (forced or induced into prostitution, pornographic performances and
others).[17]It is reassuring to note that we are not lagging far behind on the
domestic front. Over the past years, Congress has enacted a number of laws
relating to the protection of children's welfare and rights, [18] while the
executive department has issued various executive orders and proclamations
in order to give teeth to the implementation and enforcement of these laws.
[19]
These international instruments and national legislation emphasize that
the primodial consideration in deciding issues and cases involving children is
the welfare and best interests of the child.[20] For its part, the Supreme Court
has issued Administrative Circular No. 23-95 enjoining trial courts to act with
dispatch on all cases involving children, including but not limited to
pedophilia, child labor and child abuse cases. To date, procedural rules
applicable specifically to cases involving children have already been
approved by the Court such as the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness,
on Commitment of Children, and on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. Our
duty does not end here though. As the highest court of the land, it is
incumbent upon us to give life to all these covenants, agreements, and
statutes by enriching and enhancing our jurisprudence on child abuse cases,
bearing in mind always the welfare and protection of children.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 93, in Criminal Case Nos. 0658-SPL to 0660-SPL, finding
accused-appellant JOSE ABADIES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
counts of violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P30,000.00, for each count,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 137790-91. April 16, 2001]THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME CADAG JIMENEZ, accused-
appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 18, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 273, Marikina City, finding accused-appellant
Jaime Cadag Jimenez guilty of two counts of acts of lasciviousness committed
against his daughter Joanna[2] as defined and punished in Art. III, 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 and sentencing him on each count to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the victim a fine in the total amount of P40,000.00 and
the costs.
The informations against accused-appellant alleged:
Crim. Case No. 97-1551-MK:
That on or about the 12th day February 1997, in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, coercion, and intimidation and with lewd
design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire or abuse, humiliate,
degrade complainant Joanna Marie Jimenez y San Pedro, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit lascivious conduct upon the
person of Joanna Marie Jimenez y San Pedro, a girl of 12 years old, by then
and there inserting his finger into the private part of said Joanna Marie
Jimenez y San Pedro, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Marikina, Philippines
March 3, 1997.[3]
Crim. Case No. 97-1577-MK:
That on or about the 2 week of November 1996, in the City of Marikina,
nd
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, coercion, and intimidation and with lewd
design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire or abuse, humiliate,
degrade complainant Joanna Marie Jimenez y San Pedro, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct upon the
person of Joanna Marie Jimenez y San Pedro, a girl of 12 years old, by then
and there inserting his finger into the private part of said Joanna Marie
Jimenez y San Pedro, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Marikina, Philippines
March 17, 1997.[4]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty[5] to the
charges, whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses, namely, Joanna Marie Jimenez,[6] SPO1 Lucymay Robles,
and Rowena Villegas[8] were presented by the prosecution. Their
[7]
testimonies established the following facts:
The victim Joanna Marie Jimenez is the eldest of five children of accused-
appellant Jaime Cadag Jimenez, a construction worker, and Nimfa San Pedro
Jimenez, housewife. She was born on January 25, 1985 (Exh. F).[9] Her family
resided at Parang, Marikina in a one-bedroom house. At night, the family
slept in the sala, which is about three meters wide, Nimfa and accused-
appellant lying beside each other, the youngest child sleeping next to Nimfa,
the second youngest next to the youngest, and so on. Joanna, being the
eldest, was farthest from her parents.[10]
Several times from August to October 1996, while his family was asleep
at night, accused-appellant carried Joanna to the bedroom and there lay on
top of her, kissed her, and fondled her breasts. Afterwards, he removed her
shorts and panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On the sixth
time, Joanna told accused-appellant that she had started menstruating on
November 5, 1996.[11] These alleged six instances of abuse are subject of a
separate criminal complaint filed by Joanna against accused-appellant.[12]
Sometime in the second week of November 1996, while Joanna, then 11
years old, was asleep at night, she was awakened by accused-appellant who
again lay on top of her, caressed her breasts and private parts, and then
inserted his finger inside her vagina. She was so afraid of her father that all
she could do was to close her eyes, occasionally opening them to see what
he was doing to her. Accused-appellant was able to abuse Joanna while her
siblings and her mother were asleep beside her.[13]
Joanna related the incident to two friends, Roselle and Hazel, who urged
her to tell her mother Nimfa, but Joanna was afraid she would not be believed
and so did not tell her mother. [14] Shortly after her 12th birthday on January
25, 1997, at about 7 oclock, accused-appellant again molested his daughter
by inserting his finger inside her vagina. [15] This time Joanna told her
classmate and best friend Eunice what her father had been doing to
her. Eunice in turn told her aunt about the incident. The latter sought the
assistance of the Bantay Bata ABS-CBN Foundation which reported the matter
to the principal of the Valeriano Fugoso Memorial School where Joanna was
studying. On February 27, 1997, a teacher of the school went to Joannas
house and told Joannas mother Nimfa about accused-appellants abuses. The
next day, Nimfa reported the matter to the Marikina City police. Joanna was
examined by Dr. Dennis Bellin, medico-legal officer of the NPC-PNP Crime
Laboratory Group at Camp Crame, whose findings are set forth in a medical
certificate he issued, dated February 28, 1997. The report (Exh. A) stated:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are
conical with light brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep
healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 7 oclock positions. External vaginal orifice
offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger
and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
....
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.[16]
Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He contended that
he could not have molested his daughter because he and his wife slept in the
sala with all their children. According to accused-appellant, he used to leave
the house for work at 4:30 every morning and come home at different times
of the day, depending on the work at the construction site. But he claimed he
was never left alone in the house with his daughter.[17] Accused-appellants
wife Nimfa, who tried to withdraw the case filed against her husband,
testified in his favor. She said that she and accused-appellant had been
married for 14 years and that he had been a good father to his children. She
said that it was impossible for accused-appellant to have molested their
daughter Joanna on February 12, 1997 because she (Nimfa) never left the
house on that day. In fact, at no time did she ever leave the house without
taking her children with her.[18]
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) in Crim. Case No. 97-1551-MK the Court finds accused Jaime Cadag
Jimenez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Article III,
Section 5, paragraph (b) of R. A. No. 7610, as amended, defined, and
penalized under the same provision, in relation to Section 31, paragraph (c)
of Article XII of the same Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be
administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, and disbursed for the rehabilitation of complainant Joanna
Marie Jimenez, plus all the accessory penalties provided for by law, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs;
2) in Crim. Case No. 97-1577-MK the Court finds accused Jaime Cadag
Jimenez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Violation of
Article III, Section 5, paragraph (b) of R. A. No. 7610, as amended, defined,
and penalized under the same provision, in relation to Section 31, paragraph
(c) of Article XII of the same Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay a fine in the amount
of P20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, and disbursed for the rehabilitation of complainant
Joanna Marie Jimenez, plus all the accessory penalties provided for by law,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY
OF COMPLAINANT JOANNA MARIE JIMENEZ WAS PUNCTURED
WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCY, IMPROBABILITY, AND
UNRELIABILITY THEREBY CAUSING GRAVE DOUBT ON THE
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
 II. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF T: Ano naman ang nararamdaman mo pagpinapasok ng papa mo ang titi niya
THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN sa pekpek mo?
INCREASING THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON HIM FROM RECLUSION
TEMPORAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD TO A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF S: Masakit po.
RECLUSION PERPETUA IN RELATION TO SECTION 13, PARAGRAPH
C, ARTICLE XII OF REPUBLIC ACT 7[6]10 DESPITE THE FACT THAT T: Ilang beses na ba ito ginawa ng papa mo sa pagpasok ng titi niya sa pekpek
BOTH CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS FAILED TO ALLEGE THE SPECIAL mo?
CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP OF THE VICTIM OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[20] S: Simula po nuong August hanggang October 1996 mga lima o anim na beses
po pinasok ni papa ang titi niya sa pekpek ko . . . .[21]
First. Accused-appellant points out the alleged inconsistencies between
Joannas testimony in court and her sworn statement, and in her testimony, But she said that one night in November 1996, accused-appellant abused her
which she claims cast doubt on Joannas credibility, to wit: in the sala of their house even as everyone, except accused-appellant and she,
was asleep. Thus she testified:
1. In her testimony, Joanna claims that accused-appellant committed the
alleged lascivious acts in the sala, while in her sworn statement, she stated FISCAL CONOS:
that accused-appellant first carried her from the sala to the bedroom where
he performed the alleged lascivious acts. Now, miss witness, sometime on the second week of November 1996 do you
remember of any unusual incident that took place inside your house?
2. During direct examination, Joanna testified that the entire family sleep in
the sala, while on cross-examination, she stated that accused-appellant WITNESS:
sleeps in the bedroom while the rest of the family sleep in the sala.
Yes, Maam.
Accused-appellants contention has no merit.
FISCAL CONOS:
Joanna said in her sworn statement (Exh. C) that accused-appellant
molested her in the bedroom of their house with reference to incidents which What was that unusual incident that took place inside your house?
took place from August to October 1996, thus:
COURT:
T: Paano ka ginapang ng papa mo?
What date is this Fiscal, November 2?
S: Hinahalikan po niya ako sa pisngi ko, tapos hinihimas niya po ang suso ko
tapos po hinahalikan din po niya ang pekpek ko. Tapos pagtulog na po FISCA1 CONOS:
sina mama at mga kapatid ko binubuhat po niya ako sa kuarto hindi po
niya sinisindihan o binubuksan ang ilaw. Pagnakahiga na po kami sa sahig Not necessarily, Your Honor, but the second week of November. This Criminal
ng kuarto inaalis niya po isa-isa ang short ko tapos ang panty ko tapos po Case No. 97-1577-MK.
dinadaganan na po niya ako na parang ginagawa ng mag-asawa.
COURT:
T: Ano naman ang pakakaunawa mo sa sinasabi mo na ginagawa ng mag-
asawa? So, the witness may answer.

S: Pinapasok po ni papa ang titi niya sa pekpek ko. WITNESS:

INANO PO AKO NG PAPA KO. HINAWAKAN PO NIYA IYUNG DEDE KO.

FISCAL CONOS: FISCAL CONOS:

What do you mean by inano po ako ng papa ko? Now, what else did the accused do to you aside from touching your breast,
touching your private part, what else did the accused do to you on the
WITNESS: second week of November 1996?

GINAPANG PO. WITNESS:

FISCLA CONOS: PINATUNGAN PO NIYA AKO.

When you said ginapang po ako ng papa ko, what do you mean by that? FISCAL CONOS:

WITNESS: Aside from that, miss witness, the accused lying on top of you, what else did
the accused do to you if you remember?
PINATUNGAN PO NIYA AKO.
WITNESS:
FISCAL CONOS:
PINASOK PO NIYA IYUNG KAMAY NIYA SA ARI KO.
Aside from that, miss witness, what else do you remember happened on the
second week of November 1996? FISCAL CONOS:

WITNESS: When you said pinasok po niya iyung kamay niya sa ari ko, what do you mean
by that?
INANO PO NIYA ANG KAMAY NIYA SA ARI KO.
WITNESS:
FISCAL CONOS:
IYUN PONG KAMAY NIYA PINASOK NIYA SA ARI KO.
What do you mean by that inano po niya ang kamay niya sa ari ko?
FISCAL CONOS:
WITNESS:
What part of his hand was inserted in your private part, if you remember?
HINAWAKAN PO NIYA IYUNG ARI KO.
WITNESS:
FISCAL CONOS:
DALIRI PO.[22]
Aside from the accused touching your private part, ari, what else did the
accused do to you, if any? ....

WITNESS: FISCAL CONOS:

 Where do you sleep?
WITNESS:
At the sala, Maam.
FISCAL CONOS:
Where did this incident happen?
WITNESS:
At the sala, Maam.[23]
There is thus no inconsistency between her sworn statement and her
testimony in court as to the place of the commission of the crime.
As to the other alleged inconsistencies in Joannas testimony, we have
already held that errorless testimonies cannot be expected from victims of
sex crimes as they might, in fact, be trying to erase from their memory the
details of their harrowing experience.[24] But as long as the testimony in the
main coincides on material points, minor inconsistencies can affect neither
the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimonies. [25] In Joannas
case, although she contradicted herself as to the place where accused-
appellant slept, the point is that as both accused-appellant and her mother
Nimfa testified, the entire family sleep in the sala.[26]
Indeed, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best performed
by the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses
demeanor during the trial. Thus, his findings on their credibility are given the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
shown that the trial judge overlooked circumstances of substance which
might have affected the result of the case.[27] Substantial matters, in criminal
cases, refer to facts which are constitutive of the crime charged.[28]
In any event, Joanna was never confronted with her prior inconsistent
statements and given a chance to explain the alleged contradictions as
required by Rule 132, 13. Thus, accused-appellant should not now be allowed
to raise this matter on appeal.[29]
Accused-appellant says that Joannas claim that he abused her in the sala
not only once but also on several other occasions is highly improbable
because his wife Nimfa and their other children also sleep in the sala. As we
have observed, however, lust is no respecter of time and place. If rape can be
committed in places where people congregate, even in the same room where
other members of the family are sleeping, [30] there is less reason to believe
that other people sleeping in the same room can serve as a deterrent for the
commission of lascivious acts.
Joannas failure to raise an alarm cannot be taken against her. As we have
said before, the law does not impose upon the victim of sexual assault the
burden of proving resistance. Moreover, reactions to such assaults are
unpredictable as people respond to violence differently. [31] Although accused-
appellant was not armed in committing sexual abuse against his daughter,
his moral ascendancy over her was a sufficient substitute for the use of force
or intimidation.[32]
Accused-appellant also adverts to the delay of seven months before
Joanna reported the numerous incidents of abuse to her relatives and friends,
thus allegedly placing her credibility in doubt. Accused-appellant contends
that a woman who has been violated would normally do anything in her
power to bring the culprit to justice once the threat to her has been removed,
but that here, Joanna kept quiet and even refused to tell her mother about
the alleged abuses committed against her (Joanna).
We do not agree with accused-appellant. The delay in reporting of rape
and other sexual assaults does not imply that the charge is not true. This
Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that most victims of sex crimes,
especially Filipinas, are reluctant to reveal to the world their harrowing
experiences and prefer to bear the ignominy and pain silently, rather than
expose their shame.[33] In addition, although Joanna did not tell her mother
her misfortune, she in fact did so to her friends, as a result of which the
Bantay Bata ABS-CBN Foundation and Joannas school prinicipal took a hand
in her case, in the process informing her mother of accused-appellants
abuse. If Joanna failed to report the incidents to her mother, it was because
she feared she would not be believed. Indeed, as it turned out, instead of
supporting her, her mother Nimfa testified in favor of accused-appellant.
[34]
Joanna had to rely on the sympathy of other people and live under the
protection of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) at
Marillac Hills.[35]
Above all, it is unthinkable for a daughter, especially one so young as
Joanna, to falsely accuse her own father if it were not true she has been
molested.[36]
 Second. Accused-appellant argues that relationship should not be
considered a qualifying circumstance as this was never alleged in the
informations. Under R.A. No. 7610, 31(c), however, relationship is not a
qualifying but only an ordinary generic aggravating circumstances and,
therefore, although it was not alleged in the information can nevertheless be
taken into account in fixing the penalty for the crime because it was
proven. Accused-appellant fails to distinguish a generic aggravating
circumstance from a qualifying circumstance. A generic aggravating
circumstance provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period, while a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the
crime.[37]
Now, the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 state:
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse: Provided,that when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; and
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
SECTION 31. Common Penal Provisions --
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum
period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian,
stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an
establishment which has no license to operate or its license has
expired or has been revoked;
It is clear from the above, that the nature of the crime does not change
when the circumstance of relationship is present. The law simply provides
that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its maximum period when
such circumstance is present, thus making the circumstance of relationship
merely a generic aggravating circumstance. The trial court, therefore,
correctly sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of lascivious conduct committed against his
daughter.
The trial court was correct in imposing a fine of P20,000.00 as cash fund
to be administered by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the rehabilitation of Joanna for each count of lascivious act
committed by accused-appellant, pursuant to Art. XII, 31(f) of R.A. No. 7610.
It was also correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Crim.
Case No. 97-1551-MK. However, it erred in imposing the straight penalty
ofreclusion perpetua in Crim. Case No. 97-1577-MK, because the lascivious
act in that case was committed in the second week of November 1996 when
Joanna was only 11 years old. Pursuant to Art. III, 5(b), as above quoted, the
penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period. There being one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be in
its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to
Art. 65 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion temporal minimum and the
maximum of which is the maximum of reclusion temporal medium.
Moreover, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be
awarded to Joanna for the acts committed by accused-appellant in the
second week of November 1996 when she was only 11 years old and in
February 12, 1997 when she was 12 years of age.[38]
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 273,
Marikina City, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
(1) In Crim. Case No. 97-1551-MK, accused-appellant is also ordered to
pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
of which is seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, and is also ordered to pay complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

(2) In Crim. Case No. 97-1577-MK, accused-appellant is hereby

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum and the maximum