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BAYAN V ZAMORA (PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT v
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any
external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This
resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse
of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under the provision cited, the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly
concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective
is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit
challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law
is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that
they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke
the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this
case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds
are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have
no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess
the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any
direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they
cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of
standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit
in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of
Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present
action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside
the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.

2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art.
XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves
the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by
a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding
to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All
treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation
or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that
applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence
of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US
troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
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involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of
votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere
transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of
structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes
no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in
Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is
made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the
argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign
military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the
VFA. The proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and
facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not
refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats
them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different
situations are contemplated a military treaty the subject of which could
be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any
of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25,
Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA
effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No.
18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16
Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty
means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words
used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard,
has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and
the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal
expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance
of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation
the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify
is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent
on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to
be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2,
Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with
all nations.
APRIL 11, 2002
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law,
Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties
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Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999,
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started
arriving in Mindanao to take part in "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise
is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts
hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-
Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11,
2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the
operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is
based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and
impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact
specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1
and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of
locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of
direct personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and
substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they

have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question
based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act,
this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent
basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject
only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance
placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of
this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31
SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of
international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal
rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise
dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which
it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor
Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule
of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is
intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute
an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the
general rule.
The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that way to
give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives
legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent
of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that
combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one
subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
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The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I
stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except
in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that
in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the
United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves
only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered
opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated
in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all
other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a
party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec.
2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this
case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on
Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign
troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations
arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that international
law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means
imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to
national legislation.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence,

"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not
allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of
Article VIII: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower
courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the State
Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when
it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited /
from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
REVISITING THE JENNIFER LAUDE MURDER CASE
Metro Manila (CNN Philippines) Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, a 26-year-
old Filipino transgender, would have married German fianc Marc
Sueselbeck this year. But that would not happen.
Last October 11, 2014, Laude was found dead in the bathroom of a motel
room in Olongapo City neck blackened with strangulation marks and
head rammed into a toilet.
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The man who allegedly left her in that state was U.S. Marine Lance Cpl.
Joseph Scott Pemberton.
This timeline, as pieced together by court decisions and investigators from
interviews with witnesses, traces the events from the night of Jennifer
Laude's death until the last days before the court promulgates verdict
(December 1, Tuesday) as to whether Pemberton murdered Laude.
October 11, 2014
Laude, 26, met a "white foreigner" at Ambyanz Disco on Magsaysay Drive
in Olongapo City while having a drink with her friend, Mark Clarence
Gelviro a.k.a. Barbie.
Laude agreed to go to a motel with the foreigner she just met at around 10
p.m. and the two headed to Celzone Lodge in Olongapo City. Barbie also
tagged along.
While Barbie was in another room with a different companion, Laude and
her American acquaintance stayed in Room 1.
Later that night, Laude was found dead naked with her head submerged
in the motel room's toilet.
The man who allegedly left her in that state was Pemberton, a member of
the U.S. Marine Corps 2nd Battalion-9th Marines of the West Pacific
Express.
October 15, 2014
Marilou Laude, Jennifer's sister, filed a murder complaint against
Pemberton, who reportedly remained in Subic, Olongapo City.
October 17, 2014
The Philippine National Police (PNP) and Regional Crime Laboratory Office
officially released a report confirming that Laude died due to asphyxia.
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) delivered a subpoena for
Pemberton to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Pemberton reportedly remained

on board the USS Peleliu, the ship where his group was assigned to, which
was docked at the Subic Bay Port.
October 18, 2014
Barbie was placed under the Witness Protection Program.
October 20, 2014
Jennifer's fianc Marc Sueselbeck arrived in the Philippines.
October 21, 2014
Pemberton was a no-show at the preliminary investigation at the Olongapo
City Prosecutors Office. His lawyer, Rowena Garcia Flores, said that
Pemberton was not compelled by the subpoena to attend the hearing but
was asked to submit a counter-affidavit.
October 22, 2014
Pemberton was transferred via helicopter to the Joint United States Military
Advisory Group (JUSMAG) inside the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
facility in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Sueselbeck and Marilou climbed a
perimeter fence in Camp Aguinaldo in an attempt to confront Pemberton.
Barbie testified at the hearing headed by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.
USS Peleliu left at 12:45 p.m. for its base in Okinawa, Japan.
October 24, 2014
Jennifer Laude was laid to rest at the Heritage Memorial Park in Olongapo
City.
October 26, 2014
The Bureau of Immigration prevented Sueselbeck from leaving the country
due to a "pending deportation case for undesirability."
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October 27, 2014
Pemberton was still a no-show at the preliminary probe. Rowena Garcia
Flores, Pembereton's lawyer, filed a motion to "declare the absence of
probable cause for murder or any other crime." The motion is asking the
murder charge to be reduced to homicide, but it was eventually rejected by
the head of the preliminary investigation.
November 1, 2014
Sueselbeck left the country after his appeal for voluntary deportation was
granted. He promised to return despite being barred from entering the
Philippines.
November 3, 2014
Prosecutor Emilie de los Santos rejected Pemberton's plea and said the
prosecution panel would rule on probable cause after completing the
process.
November 5, 2014
Prosecutors conducted an inspection of the Ambyanz Disco and the
Celzone Lodge in Olongapo.
The Olongapo City Prosecutors Office granted the Laude family's request
for Pembertons buccal swab and fingerprints to be gathered.
Pembertons camp filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the matter.
November 18, 2014
The Supreme Court denied the Laude family's petition to intervene.
November 28, 2014
The prosecution ruled that, based on the forensic test done by local
authorities, Pemberton's DNA did not match any DNA found on pieces of
evidence gathered during the probe. Olongapo prosecutors office
submitted the Laude murder case for resolution.

December 15, 2014
The Olongapo City Prosecutors Office, headed by De los Santos, found
probable cause to file murder charges against Pemberton. No bail was
granted for the capital offense filed. The qualifying circumstances cited
were treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty.
December 16, 2014
The Olongapo Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 74 issued a warrant of
arrest for LCpl Joseph Scott Pemberton.
The Philippine government demanded custody of Pemberton. The
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) said two letters had been sent to U.S.
Embassy officials through the DFAs American Affairs Office one
transmitting the arrest order against Pemberton and the other requesting
his custody.
December 19, 2014
Pemberton surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court, according to
Laude family legal counsel Harry Roque.
Pemberton was booked, a process that included having his mugshots and
fingerprints taken and undergoing a medical exam.
Pembertons camp filed a motion to suspend proceedings at the Olongapo
Regional Trial Court due to motion for review filed before the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
December 22, 2014
Pemberton asked the DOJ to dismiss the murder case filed against him. He
also filed a motion to downgrade the case from murder to homicide.
State prosecutors asked Olongapo City RTC Branch 74 Judge Roline Ginez-
Jabalde to inhibit herself from the Laude slay case because of her links with
one of the lawyers of Pemberton. In a manifestation, the prosecutors
argued that Jabalde was the classmate of lawyer Garcia Flores, the lead
counsel for Pemberton. The defense, however, said there was still a level
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playing field as the judge's husband was a classmate of lead prosecutor De
los Santos.
December 23, 2014
Olongapo City RTC Branch 74 granted Pemberton's motion to suspend
proceedings for 60 days, or until the court "is furnished with a copy of the
resolution of appeal by petition for review filed by the accused with the
Department of Justice, whichever is earlier."
January 27, 2015
DOJ affirmed finding the existence of probable cause against Pemberton for
murder.
February 20, 2015
DOJ denied Pemberton's petition for review of the Olongapo City
Prosecutor's Office's resolution that there is probable cause against him for
murder.
February 23, 2015
The Olongapo City RTC Branch 74 automatically entered a not guilty
plea on Pemberton's behalf after he refused to enter any plea for the
murder case filed against him at his scheduled arraignment.
February 27, 2015
Laude slay case pretrial conference is scheduled.
March 10, 2015
The possibility of a plea bargain for Pemberton was taken up at the pre-trial
hearing, but Atty. Virgie Suarez of the prosecution clarified that the defense
made no offer and the prosecution did not ask for anything.
March 23, 2015

This day marked the first day of trial on the Laude murder case against
Pemberton.
The Laude family denied reports they were willing to enter plea bargain
deal with Pembertons camp. In an interview, Laude's mother Julita and
sister Marilou claimed it was only Angeles City Chief State Prosecutor
Emilie de los Santos who wanted to strike a plea bargain agreement with
Pemberton's camp.
The Laude family also submitted a letter to DOJ asking for the replacement
of De los Santos as the state prosecutor in Pembertons trial.
March 24, 2015
Trial resumed. State prosecutors presented their second witness Barbie.
The witness positively identified Pemberton in court as the person whom
she left the victim with at Celzone Lodge where the crime allegedly
happened.
April 28, 2015
Laude family sought P200 million in civil damages from Pembertons camp.
The family's lawyer Roque said the Laudes wanted P100 million moral and
P100 million exemplary as civil damages.
May 18, 2015
Dr. Reynaldo Dave, who conducted an autopsy on Laude's body, took the
witness stand during the continuation of the trial. He said the victim was
punched and strangulated before being drowned to death by her killer.
May 19, 2015
Marine Lance Cpl. Jairn Michael Rose testified that Pemberton admitted
choking Laude. He even demonstrated how they were trained in Marines to
choke and do an arm lock which was also the possible cause of Jennifers
death.
The three US Marines, Sgt. Daniel Pulido, Lance Cpl. Bennett Dahl, and Cpl.
Christopher Miller also took the witness stand against Pemberton.
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June 22, 2015
American forensic experts Jessica LeCroy and Derk Dorrien, latent print
examiners from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, revealed
that one of the three condoms and a condom wrapper recovered from the
motel room had the fingerprints of Pemberton.
George Jackson, a forensic toxicologist who examined blood samples taken
from Laude, disclosed that she was not under the influence of
methamphetamine. The test was taken due to a report that Laude was
using illegal drugs.
August 3, 2015
Some evidence of the prosecution, from reports from Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and PNP crime laboratory, were not admitted by
Olongapo City RTC Branch 74.
Meanwhile, Pembertons lawyers postponed their presentation of
witnesses.
August 17, 2015
The defense panel presented Pembertons mother, Lisa, as its first witness
in the trial. She said she still found it impossible that her son was being
tried for killing someone. She insisted her son was not a killer.
August 24, 2015
Pemberton, who took the witness stand for the first time, admitted that he
choked Jennifer Laude after learning that she was also a man.
August 25, 2015
As the last witness of the defense, forensic expert Dr. Raquel Fortun argued
that the water found inside Laude's lungs could be triggered by other
factors, such as an existing medical condition, and could not instantly be
concluded as drowning. She also said that Laude could have still been alive
when Pemberton left the motel room, which would mean no murder was
committed.
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Pemberton also testified that he dragged Laude's body into the bathroom
of the motel room in an attempt to revive her with water.

September 14, 2015

The court postponed to September 17 the oral summation and submission

of memorandum of the case, as it granted the request of Pembertons
lawyers to defer the proceedings.

October 20, 2015

The Bureau of Immigration ordered the deportation of Pemberton, deeming

him an undesirable alien. In a resolution dated September 16, 2015, the
Bureau of Immigration said Pemberton posed a risk to public interest.

November 19, 2015

Deputy City Prosecutor Misael Ladaga said Pembertons lawyers filed a

motion in court requesting for the postponement of the promulgation on
November 24, prompting Judge Roline Ginez-Jabalde to reset it a week
later (December 1).

Laude family's private counsel, Virgie Suarez, said that allegedly the three
counsels of Pemberton are not available on November 24.

November 24, 2015

The Supreme Court dumped Laude familys petition seeking to transfer the
custody of Pemberton from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo City Jail, a
regular jail.

December 1, 2015

On this day, the Olongapo City RTC Branch 74 found Pemberton guilty of
homicide and not murder in the death of Laude. He was sentenced to six to
12 years of imprisonment.