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PEOPLE VS.

QUINTOS

Criminal Law; Rape; To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the


Revised Penal Code (RPC), it only needs to be shown that a man had
carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another.
To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs
to be shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually
assaulted another, under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force,
threat or intimidation; b) The victim is deprived of reason; c) The victim is
unconscious; d) By means of fraudulent machination; e) By means of grave abuse of
authority; f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or g) When the victim is
demented. In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court
about the fact, the manner, and the circumstances of the male accuseds sexual
intercourse with her over a period of days. She was also able to positively identify
the accused, when asked.

Same; Same; The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of


rape.The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape. This
court previously characterized the presence or absence of lacerations as a trivial or
inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the essential fact of the commission of
rape. The presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a
conviction. An accused may be found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or
inexistence of lacerations. The absence of lacerations is not a sufficient defense.

Same; Same; Regardless of the relationship between two individuals,


forcing carnal knowledge upon another is considered rape, more so when
the victim is incapable of giving consent due to her mental capacity.
Accuseds argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases
wherein the main element is lack of consent. Regardless of the relationship between two
individuals, forcing carnal knowledge upon another is considered rape, more so when the victim is
incapable of giving consent due to her mental capacity. Even married couples, upon whom the law
imposes the duty to cohabitate, are protected from forced sexual congress.

PEOPLE VS. CRISOSTOMO

Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; When the offended party is under 12
years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory rape as it departs
from the usual modes of committing rape.When the offended party is under
12 years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of
a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim
does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years. In this
case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape.
AAA testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie
down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of AAA, inserted
his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the
time of the rape, AAA was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that
she was born on April 4, 1993. AAAs testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes who found AAA to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.

Same; Same; Rape by Sexual Assault; The gravamen of the crime of rape
by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital
or anal orifice.We agree with the CA that AAAs uncertainty on whether it
was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not
lessen her credibility. Such uncertainty is so inconsequential and does not
diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts.
This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. [T]he gravamen of the crime of rape
by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal
orifice. In any event, inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair
her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not
alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. We also held in People v.
Piosang, 697 SCRA 587 (2013), that [t]estimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age,
AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x

PEOPLE VS. JUMAWAN

Criminal Law; Rape; The law reclassified rape as a crime against person
and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity.In 1997, R.A. No.
8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law
reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the laws most
progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality
of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz.: Article 266-C. Effect of
Pardon.The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband
who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not
be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term man in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without
regard to the rapists legal relationship with his victim.

Same; Same; Marital Rape; In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as


marital rape due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the
consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital
rape under the general definition of rape.The explicit intent to outlaw
marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress
on the laws progenitors, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of
qualms on tagging the crime as marital rape due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include
and penalize marital rape under the general definition of rape.

Same; Same; Same; The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine
jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man
against his wife within or outside the family abode.The paradigm shift on
marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which
regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed
by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz.: Violence against
women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts: A. Physical Violence refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm; B. Sexual violence refers to an act which is sexual
in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as
a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victims body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser; b) acts causing
or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion; c)
Prostituting the woman or child. Statistical figures confirm the above
characterization. Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal violence are the most
common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-
married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence
by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary
rights over his wifes body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional
role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to
achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such
measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always
obligatory or at least, presumed. Another important international instrument on
gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the
CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified marital rape as a
species of sexual violence.

Same; Same; Same; A man who penetrates her wife without her consent
or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines,
as a State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its accompanying
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353. A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled
her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a
property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity
equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the
Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate
conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society. It is true that the Family Code, obligates the
spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as
expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

Same; Same; Same; The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy
between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.The delicate
and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each others feelings
at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wifes absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the courts
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently. People vs. Jumawan, 722 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 187495 April
21, 2014

CRUZ VS. PEOPLE

Same; Same; Frustrated Rape; As the evolving case law on rape stands,
rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the
requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced
due to causes independent of the perpetrators will. Obviously, the
offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of
his victim.It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990), the
Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927), whereby the
offender was declared guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a stray
decision for not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case
law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility,
considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrators will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose
from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment
all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing
more to be done by him.

Same; Same; Attempted Rape; In attempted rape, the concrete felony is


rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having
carnal knowledge.In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but
the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge.
If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in
its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is
to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent,
being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be
through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for
attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the
female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt
acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being
thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in
People v. Dominguez, Jr., 636 SCRA 134 (2010): The gauge in determining whether
the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act
of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the
interruption.

Same; Same; As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for as long as they remained equivocal or of
uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could
determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.We
clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced
attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have
related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter,
whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime.
Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an
attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting up of
the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for
himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that
evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to
rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code
for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent
really was.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Attempted Rape; It is obvious that the


fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offenders intent to lie with the female.It is obvious
that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
is the offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is
indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted
rape is committed, therefore, when the touching of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only
through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching
the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is committed.
Same; Same; Elements of.Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential
elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or
lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene,
lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to
moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.

Same; Rape; The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless
he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.The intent to commit rape
should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of
it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration
of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997), where the accused
was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts,
by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned
[complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however,
[he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that
is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away. The accused was held liable only
for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape is not apparent from
the act described, and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not
inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the
act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties; Pursuant to Article 336 of the


Revised Penal Code (RPC), the petitioner, being guilty of acts of
lasciviousness, is punished with prisin correccional.Pursuant to Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is
punished with prisin correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances,
prisin correccional is imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from
arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prisin correccional which ranges from
one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate
sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one day of prisin correccional, as the maximum. Cruz vs.
People, 737 SCRA 567, G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ENRIQUE QUINTOS Y BADILLA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of giving consent
to a sexual act. Children, either in chronological or mental age, are incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.

This case involves accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla who was charged with rape allegedly committed against AAA,
a mental retardate1 (intellectually disabled2).

Two informations were filed against accused. Pertinent portions of which read:

A. Crim. Case No. 07-0873 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 266-B, 9th paragraph,
RPC)

That on or about the 25th day of October 2007, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into the mouth of one [AAA], through force,
threat, or intimidation, and against her will and consent, thereby debasing, demeaning and degrading her intrinsic
worth and dignity.3

B. Crim. Case No. 07-0874 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code)

That on or about the 26th day of October, 2007, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], when she is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious or asleep, and against her will and consent, thereby debasing, demeaning and
degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity.

Accused pleaded not guilty in both cases.4

Upon motion, the Regional Trial Court consolidated the two cases on March 6, 2008. 5

The prosecution established that at the time of the incident, AAA was intellectually disabled. 6 She was 21 years old
with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months.7 She had an IQ of 38.8 This was based on the testimony of National
Bureau of Investigation clinical psychologist Brenda Tablizo.

Brenda Tablizo testified that she had been with the National Bureau of Investigation for 33 years at the time her
testimony was taken. In handling rape cases, they have a procedure, which involves interviewing [the victim],
giving [the victim a] psychological battery of tests and then . . . [an] in-depth interview. . . .9 With respect to this
particular case, Brenda Tablizo administered the standard intelligence scale, and projective test.10 She
conducted the standard intelligence scale to determine the mental and emotional capacity of the individual.11 She
also gave AAA a draw-a-person test.12

According to Brenda Tablizo, the purpose of the tests was to have a general assessment of the mental and
emotional capacity of an individual and . . . to determine mental illness. . . .13 These were the standard tests used
to evaluate mental competence.14 She conducted the tests on the day AAA was referred to her by the Philippine
National Police on December 5, 2007.15

AAA testified that in October 2007, accused, who was her neighbor, went to her house to watch television. 16
Accused followed her when she went to the bathroom.17 In the bathroom, accused removed his shorts and
underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.18 AAA did not want to have intercourse with the accused, but
she did not tell the accused to stop.19 During the trial, AAA pointed to a man in yellow shirt as the man who
followed her in the bathroom.20 She identified his name as Enrique Quintos.21

A similar incident happened the next day. While AAA was sleeping, accused removed her undergarments, as well
as his own undergarments.22 Accused then laid on top of her and, again, inserted his penis into her vagina. 23 AAA
also recalled that on a different day, accused kissed her and held her breasts. 24 There was also one Thursday night
when accused forced AAA to take his penis inside her mouth despite her protests. 25

Based on the medico-legal report dated November 5, 2007, there was evidence of lacerations in AAAs hymen that
were not self-inflicted.26

Accused claimed that he did not rape AAA.27 He was in a romantic and sexual relationship with AAA.28 However, he
ended this relationship when he got his now common-law wife pregnant. 29 He insisted that AAAs charges were
fabricated because of AAAs inability to accept that he ended their relationship. 30

On September 9, 2009, the trial court issued a judgment finding accused guilty of two counts of rape. 31 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 07-0873, accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla @ Eric is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B,
9th paragraph and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years of prision correccional as
the minimum penalty to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum penalty.

2. In Criminal Case No. 07-0874, this Court likewise finds the said accused GUILTY of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua

For each count or rape, accused is ordered to pay complainant [AAA] P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of P250,000.00 for two (2) counts of rape. Costs against
the accused.

Accused appealed the trial court decision before the Court of Appeals. 32

On March 23, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming with modification the trial courts decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated, the appealed judgment finding accused appellant guilty of two counts of Rape
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that in Criminal Case No. 07-0873, accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. The award of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000 to P30,000 for each count of
rape

All other aspects of the fallo of the assailed Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch 202 of Las Pinas
City on September 9, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 07-0873 and 07-0874, stand. 33

The Court of Appeals found that AAAs testimony was credible and sufficient to convict accused. 34 Her simple
recollection of the acts done to her by accused-appellant evinces sincerity and truthfulness. . . . A woman with a
mental age of that of a six year old child [as testified to by a National Bureau of Investigation psychologist] could
not possibly concoct an accusation as serious as rape against . . . accused or at any one for that matter.35 The
Court of Appeals also considered the medical evaluation finding evidence of five-day-old (or less) lacerations. 36

The Court of Appeals ruled that accuseds denial and alibi could not prosper because he was not able to
demonstrate the impossibility that he was present at the crime scene when the incident happened. 37

On the alleged lack of resistance from AAA during the alleged assault, the Court of Appeals ruled that since an
intellectually disabled person cannot give consent, carnal knowledge with her is rape under the law. 38 Moreover,
accused did not show proof that would substantiate his claim that he was in a relationship with AAA. 39 In any case,
the existence of a romantic relationship does not justify such force upon a party.40

The Court of Appeals modified the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. 07-0873 to 10 years of prision mayor.
The Court of Appeals removed the additional one day imposed by the trial court.
On April 11, 2012, accused, through the Public Attorneys Office, filed a notice of appeal of the Court of Appeals
decision dated March 23, 2011.41

Both the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and accused, through the Public Attorneys Office,
manifested their intent to dispense with the filing of supplemental briefs. 42

The issue in this case is whether accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

In the accuseds brief filed before the Court of Appeals, accused argued that the trial court overlooked material
loopholes43 in AAAs direct testimony that could discredit her.44 These include AAAs failure to disclose that accused
employed force or intimidation against her. She never mentioned that accused was in any occasion carrying a
deadly weapon, uttering threats, or subjecting AAA to physical violence. 45 Force and intimidation are elements of
the crime of rape under Article 355, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7659. 46

Accused also emphasized that AAA did not offer resistance or attempted to flee despite accuseds lack of weapon to
intimidate her.47 She did not tell accused to stop when accused allegedly removed her undergarments. 48

Accused pointed out the closeness of the houses in the locality.49 The incident also happened in broad daylight
inside AAAs house where she lived with six other family members. 50 These circumstances made it improbable for
AAA not to make an outcry.51

Moreover, the prosecutions act of having to recall AAA to the witness stand so that she could testify to 1) the
alleged threats that accused made to her and 2) the alleged fact that she wept after the incident reflects the
weakness of AAAs initial testimony.52 It was clearly an attempt to make out a stronger rape case.53 She could
have alleged those if it were true in her sinumpaang salaysay and during her direct testimony.54

Lastly, accused argued that he and AAA were sweethearts who were engaged in sexual intimacies, and the charges
against him were mere responses to their break-up.55

We affirm accuseds conviction.

Trial courts are in the best position


to evaluate witnesses credibility

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAAs testimony to be credible and convincing. 56 There is no
reason to disturb this finding.

The observance of the witnesses demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-examination, and during the
entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps
establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial
provides judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and microexpressions
that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These
important aspects can never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.

Hence, [t]he evaluation of the witnesses credibility is a matter best left to the trial court because it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Thus, the Court accords great respect to
the trial courts findings,57 more so when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.58

The exception is when the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that
could have affected the outcome of the case.59 No such facts were overlooked or misconstrued in this case.

II.

The intellectual disability of the witness


does not make her testimony incredible,
especially when corroborated by other
evidence

When a victims testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes the elements of the crime, it may be enough basis
to convict an accused of rape.60

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:


Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;


b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person (Republic Act No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997).

Thus, to be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be shown that a man
had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;


b) The victim is deprived of reason;
c) The victim is unconscious;
d) By means of fraudulent machination;
e) By means of grave abuse of authority;
f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or
g) When the victim is demented.

In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court about the fact, the manner, and the
circumstances of the male accuseds sexual intercourse with her over a period of days. She was also able to
positively identify the accused, when asked. Thus:

Q: When accused followed you to the bathroom what happened?

A: He removed his short and underwear, Maam.

Q: And, what did he do after he removed his short and underwear?

A: He inserted, Maam.

Q: What did he insert?

A: His penis, Maam.

Q: And, where did he insert his penis?

A: In my vagina, Maam.

....

Q: And, what happened on that another incident?

A: On a Tuesday he kissed me on the lips and held my breast, Maam.

Q: And, after that incident on a Tuesday, what else happened?

A: On a Thursday he waited on me downstairs when it was already dark, Maam.

Q: What did you do on that Thursday incident?

A: He let me swallowed, Maam.

Q: Who in particular let you swallowed something?

A: Eric, Maam.

Q: Are you referring to Eric the same accused who repeatedly inserted his penis into your vagina?

A: It is him, Maam.
....

Q: Who let you swallow that something?

A: Eric, Maam.

Q: Please point to Eric if he is in this Courtroom.

RECORD: (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow shirt and when asked his name answered,
Enrique Quintos.)

Q: And, you said that the accused made you swallowed. What is that thing that he made you swallow?

A: His penis, Maam.

Q: What did you do when he made you swallowed his penis?

A: He forced me, Maam.

Q: And by forcing you, what action did you make with regard to his act of making you swallow his penis?

A: I told him, I do not like it, Maam.

Q: And, did you in fact, able to swallow his penis?

A: Opo, isinubo po sa akin, Maam.61 (Emphasis supplied)

It was established by clinical psychologist Brenda Tablizo, however, through examinations and interviews, that AAA
was intellectually disabled with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months. Pertinent portions of Brenda Tablizos
testimony are reproduced as follows:

Q: In handling rape victim cases, what do you usually do with regard to them?

A: We usually do a certain procedure like interviewing them, giving them psychological battery of tests and then we
still do the in-depth interview, maam.

Q: In this particular case . . . what kind of examination did you conduct upon her?

A: I administered the standard intelligence scale and projective test, maam.

....

Pros. Sion: Madam Witness, will you please be more precise in informing this Honorable Court on the various tests
which you conducted upon the person of the victim. . .?

Witness: I conducted the standard intelligence scale to determine the mental and emotional capacity of the
individual, maam.

Q: Other than that kind of test, what other tests were conducted upon the victim?

A: I also gave her the draw-a-person test and battery of tests, maam.

Q: What were the purposes or the goals of these kinds of tests conducted upon the said victim?

A: The purpose of all these tests is to have a general assessment of the mental and emotional capacity of an
individual and also these tests determine mental illness, maam.

Q: These kinds of tests that you resulted to which you employed upon the victim, are these tests the standard
method being used all over to be able to specifically evaluate the mental competence and incompetence of a
certain person?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: For how long did you conduct this psychiatric examination upon the said victim?

A: I conducted the tests on the same day when the victim was referred to me, maam. I started it in the morning
until late in the afternoon. And we also asked for the victim to come back.

Q: So, for how much time was required for you to completely terminate and fully satisfied that you have completed
this neuro-psychiatric examination upon the said victim?

A: For exactly one week, maam.

Q: As a result of the examination that you conducted upon the victim, what was the findings which yielded from
said examination?

A: In the conclusion which I made, it was found out that the victim is suffering from mental retardation, her IQ is
38 and her mental age is 6 years and two months, maam.

Q. How old was the victim at that time that you conducted this psychiatric examination?

A: She was 21 years old, maam.62 (Emphasis supplied)

AAA's mental condition does not make her testimony incredible as long as she can recount her experience in a
straightforward, spontaneous, and believable manner. In People v. Monticalvo, this court said the following:

Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it
is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capable and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of
the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded
and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such
crime at the hands of the accused.63

AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed that there were lacerations in her hymen
that were produced by a blunt object. The testimonial evidence is bolstered by the presence of these lacerations.
Together, they produce a moral conviction that accused committed the crimes charged.

The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape. This court previously characterized the
presence or absence of lacerations as a "trivial or inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape."64 The presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a conviction. An
accused may be found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence of lacerations. The absence of
lacerations is not a sufficient defense.

However, the presence of lacerations may be used to sustain conviction of an accused by corroborating testimonies
of abuse and documents showing trauma upon the victim's genitals.

In this case, the medical evidence of lacerations supported AAAs testimony that she was sexually abused. It was
not necessary to convict accused, but it strengthened AAA's testimony and the moral certainty that accused was
guilty of the crimes charged.

III

The existence of a relationship


between accused and the victim
does not negate rape

Accuseds argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases wherein the main element is
lack of consent. Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing carnal knowledge upon another is
considered rape, more so when the victim is incapable of giving consent due to her mental capacity. Even married
couples, upon whom the law imposes the duty to cohabitate, are protected from forced sexual congress.

Rape, as now defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, does not make a distinction with regard to an
accused's relationship with the victim. It only requires that sexual congress be forced by a man upon another
person. Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262 recognizes that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may be
raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts by stating that committing acts of rape
against these persons are considered violence against women. Republic Act No. 9262 provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. -- As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child . . . which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse. . . .

....

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harrassment, acts of lasciviousness . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Further, we discussed marital rape in People v. Jumawan.65 We said:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

....

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines,
as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A.
No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse
with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in
a sexual act without her full and free consent.66

IV

Absence of resistance does not, by


itself, establish consent

Accuseds allegation that AAA did not resist his advances was belied by AAAs testimony that accused threatened
the lives of her mother and siblings.67 This is intimidation that could explain AAAs alleged lack of resistance.

In any case, resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. It need not be shown by the prosecution. Neither is
it necessary to convict an accused. The main element of rape is lack of consent.

Consent, resistance, and absence of resistance are different things. Consent implies agreement and
voluntariness. It implies willfulness. Similarly, resistance is an act of will. However, it implies the opposite of
consent. It implies disagreement.

Meanwhile, absence of resistance only implies passivity. It may be a product of ones will. It may imply consent.
However, it may also be the product of force, intimidation, manipulation, and other external forces.

Thus, when a person resists anothers sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that that person does
not consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of consent. Sexual congress
with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or psychologically
through threat or intimidation. It is rape.

Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may imply
consent, there are circumstances that may render a person unable to express her resistance to anothers sexual
advances. Thus, when a person has carnal knowledge with another person who does not show any resistance, it
does not always mean that that person consented to such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape.

Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when a man has carnal
knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or intimidation. It enumerates at least four
other circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking advantage of a persons deprived reason
or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent machination; (3) by taking advantage of a persons age (12 years of
age) or demented status; and (4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen
even in circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.

Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is unconscious, deprived of
reason, manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or mental age.

The circumstances when rape may be committed under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code should be defined
in terms of the capacity of an individual to give consent. An unconscious person cannot rationally respond to
stimuli or perform acts such as giving consent or offering resistance because he or she is either unaware, asleep,
or in a coma.

Meanwhile, when a person is a victim of fraudulent machination or manipulation, such as when she is induced to
have carnal knowledge to treat a persons disease that he or she does not really have, she is not in full control of
his or her decisions. He or she acts without full or with false knowledge of the circumstances from which he or she
bases his or her actions. Therefore, any consent he or she gives is either false or not his or her own. Any lack of
resistance may not be interpreted as voluntariness.

The term, deprived of reason, is associated with insanity or madness. A person deprived of reason has mental
abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist,
make decisions, and give consent.

The term, demented, refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called dementia. Dementia refers to
the deterioration or loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking, and social condition, which
impairs ones independence in everyday activities.68

We are aware that the terms, mental retardation or intellectual disability, had been classified under deprived of
reason.69 The terms, deprived of reason and demented, however, should be differentiated from the term,
mentally retarded or intellectually disabled. An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of
reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. 70 However, his or her maturity
is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired
conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. 71 Because of such
impairment, he or she does not meet the socio-cultural standards of personal independence and social
responsibility.72

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and
giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of
giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them
the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of
the mind. Hence, a persons capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult
activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining
whether a person is twelve (12) years of age under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in
accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or
the mental age if intellectual disability is established.

In all the above circumstances, rape is ensured because the victim lacks the awareness or presence of mind to
resist a sexual abuse. The unconscious, the manipulated, the reason-deprived, the demented, and the young
cannot be expected to offer resistance to sexual abuse for the simple reason that their mental statuses render
them incapable of doing so. They are incapable of rational consent. Thus, sexual intercourse with them is rape.
No evidence of force, intimidation, or resistance is necessary.

In this case, the victim, AAA, is intellectually disabled, with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months at 21 years of
chronological age and an IQ of 38 at the time of the incident. Her capacity to give consent is only that of a 6-year-
and 2-month-old child. She is incapable of giving rational consent to a sexual act. Any sexual intercourse with her,
regardless of her relationship with accused and the presence or absence of resistance, is considered rape.
In People v. Butiong,73 this court said:

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act.
Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. 74

Similarly, in People v. Monticalvo,75 this court said:

The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent. . . .

. . . [F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances. Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a
mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary as a
mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proved are the facts of sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.76

For the same reason that AAA was incapable of giving her consent, forcing her to take ones genitals inside her
mouth is rape under Article 266-A(2) regardless of the existence of or lack of consent.

The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as these define the
manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the
other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into
the mouth of another person, the damage to the victims dignity is incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has
been associated with negative psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-
destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. 77 Hence, one experience
of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.

The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order.78 Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished
was wrong.

Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one experience of
rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally
degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a persons will and body. In terms of penalties,
treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful
constitutionality.

However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this case.
Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice
but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim.

The victims mental incapacity need


not be alleged in the information in
order to convict an accused of the
crime of rape as long as evidence
established such incapacity

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is punishable
by reclusion perpetua.

The information charging accused of this crime lacked the allegation of any mental disability on the part of AAA.
This is not necessary to convict accused of the crime of rape provided that sexual congress and mental incapacity
and, therefore, the incapacity to give consent, are proved by clear and convincing evidence.

However, to qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-(A)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, an allegation of the victim's intellectual
disability must be alleged in the information. If not alleged in the information, such mental incapacity may prove
lack of consent but it cannot increase the penalty to death. Neither can it be the basis of conviction for statutory
rape.

In this case, the elements of sexual congress and lack of consent were sufficiently alleged in the information. They
were also clearly and conveniently determined during trial. The fact of being mentally incapacitated was only
shown to prove AAA's incapacity to give consent, not to qualify the crime of rape.

Thus, the Court of Appeals is correct in affirming the trial courts decision to impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and not death in Criminal Case No. 07-0874.

Article 266-B also provides that rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is punishable by prision mayor. Applying
Act No. 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering that there were no attending circumstances that
should be considered, accuseds penalty in Criminal Case No. 07-0873 should be within the range of penalty next
lower to [prision mayor] or prision correccional in its maximum period as minimum, and prision mayor in its
medium period as maximum. Prision correccional in its maximum period has a range of 4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 6 years. Prision mayor in its medium period has a range of 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Since the
penalty imposed by the trial court exceeds by one day the allowable penalty for the offenses committed, the Court
of Appeals was correct in removing that excess.

This court had not hesitated to increase the awards of damages in crimes of utter heinousness and depravity.79
Thus, we increase the awards for moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to ?100,000.00 each,
and for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla guilty of two counts
of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
Criminal Case No. 07-0874, without possibility for parole in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. 80 For Criminal
Case No. 07-0873, accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum. The awards for moral damages, civil
indemnity, and exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.00 each for each count of rape or a total of
P600,000.00, with an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until satisfaction of the award.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee


vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant.
1

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"[T]he trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to he highest respect absent a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case." 2

On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832
3

which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
4

City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.

In three separate Informations, appellant was charged with rape committed as follows:
5

Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)

That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act
of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same into the
genital orifice of "AAA," a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the
6

vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)

That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act
of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same into the
anal orifice of "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the perianal region of the said
anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)

That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] "AAA",
a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the same occasion that the Accused raped said minor, the
accused did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette, against her will and
consent.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial conference was terminated
7

upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.

Factual Antecedents

The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:

The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x x x playing x x x
with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which x x x was just below their
house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her
father located in their house x x x and where accused was employed. While "AAA" was at the house of
accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said
accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took his
clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have
illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, 2001,
pp. 10-12.)

"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughters birth certificate (Exhibit "B") which stated that
she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the
Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit "M") and testified
that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was
possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victims skin.
Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the
same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on April 8, 1999.
(TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-17)

"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of "AAA" in bringing the victim to
the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a doctor also examined "AAA" and
confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to the
Womens [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)

On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his brother-in-
law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of accused when the
latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same
day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the latter worked in the night shift
schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victims father. (TSN February 3, 2006 pp. 6-
8)

When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of his brother-in-
law that it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date and time stated in the information as
his night shift work schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur. Accused added that he knew
of no reason why the family of the private complainant would pin the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17,
2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)

In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAAs" body, the defense presented a
supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7 years
old when she and two other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" the son of accused were
burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999. This Joel "Liit"
supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAAs" body. Marys exact
words were to the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA"." 8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY of all offenses
stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the following:

a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information # 99-16236, accused is to suffer


the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and is ordered to pay the victim "AAA" civil indemnity of P30,000.00, moral damages
of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 for each of the two Criminal Informations.

b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal Informations.

SO ORDERED. 9

Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the trial court in its
10

Order dated February 2, 2009.


11

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY FOR THE
CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN RELATION TO R.A. NO. 7610)
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 12

Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court erred in finding "AAAs"
1awp++i1
testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in
burning her private parts. Appellant argued that "AAA" never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety
13

despite her alleged traumatic experience. Appellant also alleged that "CCCs" testimony should be
14

disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents happened. He opined that "CCC"
15

influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit against him which bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant
concluded that these "inconsistencies and contradictions" are enough to set aside the verdict of
conviction imposed upon by the RTC. 16

However, the CA gave short shrift to appellants arguments. The CA rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read thus:

"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (8) years and one (1) day of
17

Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape by sexual assault; and

(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA Seventy-Five Thousand
pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all the costs of suit."

SO ORDERED. 18

Hence, this appeal which the CA gave due course in its Resolution of January 6, 2011. In a
19 20

Resolution dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
21

briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court that
22

it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already exhaustively discussed and refuted all
the arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a Manifestation In
Lieu of Supplemental Brief praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision based on the
23

pleadings submitted.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual assault
and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphases
supplied)

When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years." In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the
24

elements of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made
her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," inserted his penis into
her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six
years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAAs" testimony was
corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.

Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts of rape by
sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAAs" genital orifice
1wphi1

causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into
"AAAs" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.

We agree with the CA that "AAAs" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that
was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential
and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the
essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
persons genital or anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair
25

her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape." We also held in People v. Piosang that
26 27

"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellants argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her
traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that people
react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral response
when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act
nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAAs" reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAAs" reactions, it did not diminish the fact that she was
raped by appellant or that a crime was committed. 28

We also agree with the CA that "CCCs" efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be equated with
ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find "CCCs" efforts to seek justice for her niece who was raped
more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we disregard "CCCs" testimony, appellants
conviction would still stand. We agree with the observation of the OSG that "CCCs" "testimony actually
had no great impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that she was
the one who accompanied the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to the Pasig General Hospital and
thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Womens desk." 29

On the other hand, appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed against
"AAAs" positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he admitted
that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA". His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the
same is self-serving and deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded the
testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellants brother-in-law, who claimed that appellant was at his
house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted, his house is near the house of "AAA"
hence there was no physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC
observed that Oletins testimony did not "prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to state that the private
prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling and laughing when answering
questions propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brother-in-law
was facing."30

Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 99-16237) is
death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was
committed on April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant
31

but without eligibility for parole. The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
32

On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is punishable
by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no other aggravating
33

or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision mayor as minimum, to
34

reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one
35

(1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.

As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the
award of moral damages must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. As 36

regards Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault), the CA
likewise properly awarded the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages, for each count. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of rape by sexual
assault must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, all damages
37

awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is
increased to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to P30,000.00 for each count. In
addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to
provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely.
He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and
wrong."1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review of the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353,
2 3

which affirmed the Judgment dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in
4

Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their
5

four (4) children as they put up several businesses over the years.
6

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at
7

3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, finding probable
8

cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information
be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-
668 and Criminal Case No. 99-669. The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as
9 10

follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s
will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant
11

filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated August 19, 1999. On even date,
12 13

the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 14

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information averring that the name of the private
15

complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit
dated November 15, 1999, attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7,
16

1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
2000. Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:
17

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of
the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with
pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a
year of courtship. When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later on,
20 21

they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the
rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. 22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters
observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who
23

actively managed the businesses. 24

She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective. 25

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Three 26

of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her. In 1998, KKK stayed in
27

Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure
28

supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day. 29

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in
30

1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he
would threaten her into submission. 31

In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She
was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a
woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of
providing a good future for the children. 32

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu
City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back
in Cagayan de Oro City. 33

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family
store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to
the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the
living room. OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come
34

with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. 35

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-
appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy
are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed." 36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the
bed.37

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his
fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well. 38

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he
pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
39 40

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to
41

wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK
continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well." 42

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas 43

were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me," MMM woke up 000
44

who prodded her to go to their parents' room. MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her
45

parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs
46

and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. Since
47

she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then
kicked it. A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go
48

downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered
the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to
Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]" 49

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls'
bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from the
50

room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards
the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to
go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. 51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened. KKK relayed: "[Y]our father
52

is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let
her rest."53

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK
and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK
decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered.

"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children. He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00."
54

She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room. 55

He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed
56

and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she
defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to
57

Mama because we are in front of you." 58

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have
sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened,
the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with
the creaking bed. 59

The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties.
He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what
you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex." 60

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside
her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as
he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the
masters' bedroom. 61

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked.
MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon
entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma,
what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have
sex with him even if I don't feel well. "
62

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to
know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high
school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.

Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and
efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill
managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com. 63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October
12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City
and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com. 64

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him,
on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks
of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00
p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-
appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the
other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de
Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three
men brought the damaged truck to Cugman. 65

The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-
appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in
their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30,
1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88. Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
66

allegations. 67

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He
was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech,"
because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him.
When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and
would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out. 68

Bebs, KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly
69

addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK. 70

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez
and three other priests. Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them
71

about it because he trusted her. 72

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was
listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume
of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with
the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter
took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she
had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and
ugly.
73

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-
appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened. Thereafter,
74

KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February
18, 1999. 75

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight
76

and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld
as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their
own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-
marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised
on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-
appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate
charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant
[P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 77

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the
78

Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not
prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative
declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No.
8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the crime
because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of
and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and
intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable
to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with
the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of
KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a
wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical
injuries told her about it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the
decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 79

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire,
80

they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion dated September 4, 2009, the appellee,
81

through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the
accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the
alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of
going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police
authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.
82

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection


The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a
woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her. 83

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of
obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her
84

daughter's virginity. 85

If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely
using his property.86

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to
become the property of her husband. If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her
87

from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous. 88

From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power
and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture. 89

A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family. 90

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes
one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will. 91

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory
that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:

[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent
and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 92

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife. In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the
93

wife of the perpetrator." 94

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty promulgated in 1857. The
95

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the
victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis. 96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape
97

his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her. 98

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of
married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws. 99

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the
husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or
a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation. 100

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape.
101

The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales
which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and
property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the
marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most
frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable.
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the
bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply
consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed
as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her
own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual
intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property
of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x
x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or]
in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x." (Citations omitted)
102

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act
without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when
the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in
104

case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse.105

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first
106

major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of
promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns. The country also
107

committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all
appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate
legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical
realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;

xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the
1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the
stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it
109

from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive
proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A.
No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital
rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under
Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now
marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal
profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law
that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that
prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is
now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide
for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and
she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is
why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this
jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep
the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a
husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point,
under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is
all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided
for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference
committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the
penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the
wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the
sanctity of marriage. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
110

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second
paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will
notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just
cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up?
That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital
rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x.
That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with
rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge
by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot
apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of
rape. It is all the same definition x x x.

xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first
proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.


HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x
x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a
husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus
Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the
women and they would understand that it is half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are
just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does
not negate. 111

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to
place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force
or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are
separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change
the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the
husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I
don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This
do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse
against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they
have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape
114

within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family
abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to
do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the most
common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married
women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence. 115

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief
before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were
theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He
argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and
that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife. 116

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been
superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to
achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women. One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape
117

cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of
sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in
118

enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital
rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts,
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children
in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to
women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (Emphasis ours)
119

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her
wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife
is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he
120

accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and
free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
121

It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual
122

intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by
123

force or coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge
124

for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our
laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to
engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an
essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
125

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the
crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
126

discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 127

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three
forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without
a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all
rape victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by
herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give or
128

withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in
case she refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women do
129

not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or
elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of
judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter
evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify
them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently
if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of
guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary
policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction
meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all
courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the
victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with
human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.131

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest
respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or
certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be
disturbed on appeal. 132

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings
and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on
six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal
examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998.
He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order
not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances
due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held
her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She
reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He
flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling
episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters
were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their
conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up.
MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room
and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK
begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex." But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's
134

legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left
the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." 135

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the
victim's consent to the sexual congress. 136

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both
of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he
wanted to have sex."

Q So, what did you do after that?

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

xx xx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is
stronger than me.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137

(Cross-Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he have
sex with you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.

Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A No, Sir.

Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?

A No, only on the breast level. 138

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex."

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A It was tom.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me. 139

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then
resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual
moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously
demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the
children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be
stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's
husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of
KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of
consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the
person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear
to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped
his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was
resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden
to prove resistance much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
140

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to
bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the
desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused
had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.
141 142

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact
of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do
143 144

not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent.
145

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy, the evidentiary circumstances of which are,
146

however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak,
inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied
based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical
violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent. Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible,
147

spontaneous and forthright.


The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM and
148

OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony
with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying:
"Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity on me" on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant
149

went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her
for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was
prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a
brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom
where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not
feeling well. "

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's
bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get
out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The
girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-
appellant to stop.

Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force
and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on
October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will.

Failure to immediately report to the


police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to
the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual
assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 150

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the
accused-appellant. 151

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape
cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor
Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting
the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that
it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often
dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and
positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it
underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court. 152

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated
by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have
entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3
Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank. 153

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the
letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also
did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He
likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's
supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it
unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of
whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of
extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to
extricate himself out of this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense
failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant
with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially
admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent
with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who
had no improper motive to testify falsely. 154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the
place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the
two places. 155

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling
com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant
failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de
Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from
Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. Thus, it
156

was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were
committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her
two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify
against the accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is
extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of
KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in
accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims
without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent. 158

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place. Considering that the crime
1wphi1

committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount
is P50,000.00 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
159

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imperative. 160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against
her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his
wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by
his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield.
He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital
purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation
and never sexual coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a
tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place
to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of
damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110436 June 27, 1994

ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsianlo for petitioner.

The Solicitor Generalfor the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:

The present original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks the reversal of the Orders issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14252, dated February 17, 1993 1 and May 12, 1993, 2 denying petitioners
Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

The facts are summarized in the Memorandum of public respondents as follows:

1. The Government Service Insurance System (the GSIS, for short) filed two separate criminal
complaints against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public official who used to be the President
and General Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President of the Manila Hotel, for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The first complaint against petitioner was filed with the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (the OSP, for short) and docketed as OSP-88-02028 while the second, which
involved the same set of facts, was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (the
PCGG, for short) but which was later endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-0-
91-0986. . . .

2. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG where petitioner duly submitted his counter-
affidavit. As a consequence of said investigation, an Information was filed with the first Division of the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14134, charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. . . .

3. During the proceedings before the OSP, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The OSP, however,
denied the motion and filed with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan an Information charging
petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents (Articles 171 and 315 of the Revised
Penal Code), docketed as Criminal Case No. 14252. Petitioner was deemed by the OSP to have waived
his right to submit a counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. . . .

4. As a result of the filing of two informations with respondent Sandiganbayan involving the same
accused (herein petitioner) and the same set of facts, Criminal Case No. 14252 was consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 14134 which was pending before the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan. . . .
5. Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the consolidated cases against petitioner to the
Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation inasmuch as:

a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14134 was ordered dismissed in compliance with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, which declared
null and void the preliminary investigations conducted by the PCGG in all criminal cases involving
matters which were the subject matter of civil cases earlier filed; and

b) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 was correctly assailed by petitioner as having been filed
without the proper preliminary investigation. . . .

6. During the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner
submitted his counter-affidavit and supporting documents. After the completion of said investigation,
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo of the Office of the Ombudsman prepared a Resolution dated February
11, 1992, which recommended the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252. . . .

7. Respondent Ombudsman, however, despite the above recommendation of the investigating prosecutor
ordered the prosecution to proceed under the existing Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 on his
observation, viz:

Let us not do the defending for the accused. The explanations offered are too strained
to be believed. At best they are matters of defense for the accused to prove at the
trial.

The alleged character of the funds involved being confidential and requires no
auditing is totally immaterial. It could even explain why this anomaly was
committed. . . .

8. Petitioner thus filed with respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information, dated September 17, 1992, wherein he prayed ". . . for the production of (the) record of the
preliminary investigation), and that the information be quashed outright or the disapproval of the
Ombudsman set aside, or in the alternative, that the Office of the Ombudsman be ordered to conduct
further proceedings, particularly the handwriting analysis prayed for by the petitioner which would
establish who committed the alleged falsification. . . .

On February 17, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution dated February 15, 1993,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. is DENIED for
lack of merit. . . .

10. A Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 12, 1993, of the aforequoted Resolution was filed by
petitioner . . . .

11. On May 12, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. of this Courts Resolution
dated February 17, 1993 is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .

12. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition. 3

Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:


1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsmans approval of the order dismissing
the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor;

2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in wanton disregard of
petitioners right to due process;

3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money
received by petitioner was a cash advance; and

4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.

We do not find the instant petition to be impressed with merit as to warrant the extraordinary writs prayed for.

The information filed against herein petitioner charging him with estafa through falsification of public documents and for
which he stands to be tried before respondent court alleges:

That on or about or during the period from March 26, 1984 to May 11, 1984, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, at the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
Roman Cruz, Jr., then President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and likewise President of the Manila Hotel, hence a public official having been duly
appointed/elected and qualified as such, taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit, committing
an offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Manila
Hotel Invoices, Transportation, Charge, Cash, Budget for Food and Drinks vouchers in the aggregate
amount of P350,000.00 and then make it appear that the GSIS management and staff had a five-day
coordination meeting at the Manila Hotel from March 23 to 30, 1984 at the cost of P350,000.00, for which
reason the GSIS paid/issued its check with No. 039511 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of
P350,000.00 which check was deposited to the account of the Manila Hotel, and thereafter cause the
Manila Hotel to issue its check with No. 007272 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of P350,000.00
payable to Roman Cruz, Jr. or himself, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that there was
no such five-day GSIS management and staff coordination meeting conducted/held at the Manila Hotel;
and further thereafter convert and appropriate to his own personal use and benefit/deposit the said check
to his own personal account with the Far East Bank and Trust Co. the said check/amount of P350,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of the GSIS and/or Manila Hotel and/or the government in the said amount
of P350,000.00. 4

I. Petitioner initially submits that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the
information considering that the Ombudsmans disapproval of the order dismissing the complaint did not state the factual or
legal basis therefor, in violation of the cardinal rules set forth in Ang Tibay, et al. vs. CIR, et al. 5 The submission is
premised on the theory that said rules apply to a preliminary investigation which is to be considered
quasi-judicial in nature. Petitioner avers that it is the duty of the Ombudsman to assess the evidence and
defenses of the respondent in deciding a case, a failure wherein constitutes a violation of ones right to
due process of law. He further claims that "while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support the decision. The Ombudsman in this case not only failed to decide right but has nothing at all to
support his decision." 6

Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Office of the Ombudsman is not exercising quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
powers because "it does not act as a court" when it conducts preliminary investigation of cases falling under its jurisdiction.

It is settled that the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which is defined as "an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," 7 is, like
court proceedings, subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. This is
because, a preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. As we held
in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al.: 8

. . . It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person
undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due process.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is that the person who
presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial
court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information
may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A
preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act
becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence,
and a decision is rendered thereon.

The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a


preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge.
While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and
must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer.

In the present case, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated in that respondent Ombudsman failed to
assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioner in disapproving the recommendation for dismissal of the case by
the investigating prosecutor, and his ruling is not supported by the evidence on record. The argument is specious.

His submission that he was deprived of his right to due process hinges on the erroneous assumption that the order of the
Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is lacking in any factual or legal basis. Such a conclusion, however,
stems from the fact that said order did not entail a discussion of the rationale for the Ombudsmans action.

It may seem that the ratio decidendi for the Ombudsmans order may be wanting but this is not a case of a total absence of
factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually involved here is merely a review
of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his study and analysis of the complaint, counter-
affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not
conducting anew another investigation but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given
by the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of
the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating
prosecutor in making a review of the latters report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own
findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his
findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists,
the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or
state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation. 9

With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating
prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable
cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.
As aptly pointed out by respondent court in its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, "to the
Ombudsman, the narration of facts by Prosecutor Tamayo, . . . demonstrated adequate cause to prosecute the accused
Cruz." 10 Furthermore, public respondents, in their Memorandum, correctly observed that "(f)rom the tenor
of respondent Ombudsmans statement, it is clear that he agreed with the findings of facts of the
investigating prosecutor but disagreed with the latters conclusion on the import and significance of said
findings. On the basis of the findings of facts of the investigating prosecutor, which were not disputed by
petitioner, respondent Ombudsman believed that there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime had been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof." 11

Petitioner argues that the indication of disapproval by the Ombudsman which consists merely of two paragraphs fails to
point out the issues and relevant facts and is consequently whimsical, capricious and arbitrary. Such proposition is
fallacious. The mere fact that the order to file an information against petitioner consists only of two paragraphs is not
sufficient to impute arbitariness or caprice on the part of the Ombudsman, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his
discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or
oppression. He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor because he sincerely believed that there is
sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This is an exercise of the Ombudsmans power based upon constitutional mandate,
and the courts should not interfere in such exercise.

The rule is based not only upon the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complaint. 12

II. Petitioner next avers that the error of respondent court in not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary
investigation is two-fold. First, it was in violation of the constitutional right against arbitrary arrests because probable cause
was not "personally determined by the judge," considering that the records of the preliminary investigation were not elevated
to the judge for examination. Second, it was in violation of petitioners right to due process of law since he was deprived of
the opportunity to examine the evidence against him and prepare his defense.

On the first issue, petitioner relies on the ruling in Lim, Sr., et al. vs. Felix, et al. 13
which held that

If a judge relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination
is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The conduct of a preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of
a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or one for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The first aspect of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The
second kind of preliminary investigation, which is more properly called preliminary examination, is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge. 14

For the latter, in the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause. 15
Coming now to the case at bar, contrary to petitioners thesis, respondent court, in its resolution promulgated on February
17, 1993 denying petitioners motion to quash the information, found the existence of probable cause after making a
deliberate and exhaustive review of the facts obtaining in the case. Thus:

All of the above logical process, which is supported both by the finding of fact in the Resolution and by
admissions in the Motion of the accused, lead to the conclusion that probable cause exists against
accused Roman Cruz, Jr., for acts described in the Information in the instant case.

The narration of facts culled from the record (as affirmed by both parties) support the narration of facts in
the Information. The superficial analysis of the admissions made above indicate that the elements of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as well as of Articles 171 and 172 thereof may probably be
established.

It is true that the Manila Hotel eventually treated the P350,000.00 as a "cash advance" to him. Accused
Cruz, however, does not claim that there were cash advances made by him as a consequence of which
he received this sum. Nor has accused Roman Cruz said that he had obtained a loan or cash advance
from the Manila Hotel for a particular purpose for which he was expected to subsequently render an
accounting. All that Manila Hotels subsequent description of this amount as a "cash advance," in fact,
says is that when it turned out that P350,000.00 could not be properly accounted for, it had to be treated
as an amount which accused Cruz had to pay back; thus, accountingwise, a cash advance.

For accused to have received such a large amount from a company of which he was the President
required him to sign a receipt which would specify clearly what he was receiving it for. If he received the
sum as a cash advance for some future expense, the Manila Hotel documents would clearly so
demonstrate. If he received it as a cash advance (against his salaries or other benefits), it would appear
as a loan in Manila Hotels books. Accused Cruz, however, has said no such thing in any of his pleadings
nor apparently has he so stated during the preliminary investigation.

In other words, accused Cruz as President of the Manila Hotel and, therefore, in a position of great
fiduciary nature received P350,000.00 in 1984 either for a non-existent reason or for a false reason.

He may have an explanation. As of this time, however, if the evidence on record is actually presented at
trial, enough evidence would exist to put accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. at peril of his liberty and would
require him to explain his side of the matter.

A case has, therefore, been demonstrated in the record and in the averment of accused Cruz himself that
the crime charged has probably been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.) 16

Petitioner would have respondent court order the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in its
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. First and foremost, as
hereinabove stated, in a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the judge personally evaluates the
This is precisely what
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause. 17

respondent court did. In resolving the issue of probable cause, respondent court made an in-depth
analysis of the findings of fact of Prosecutor Tamayo, as well as the Omnibus Motion submitted by
petitioner. The correctness of these facts was not even questioned by herein petitioner but, on the
contrary was expressly affirmed in the latters Omnibus Motion dated September 17, 1992 wherein it was
stated that "(t)he Order issued by the investigating prosecutor . . . contains a lucid narration of the
relevant facts."

The case of Lim cited by petitioner is not applicable to the present case because, in the former, a warrant of arrest was
issued by the respondent judge therein without conducting his own personal evaluation of the case even if only on the basis
of the report submitted by the fiscal. Instead, the respondent therein simply declared: "Considering that both the two
competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each
information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to
rely on the prosecutors certification in each information . . . . This is far from what actually transpired before the
Sandiganbayan as reflected by the records in this case. Hence, the ruling in Lim cannot be properly invoked.

As to the second issue, petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit:

Sec. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. The record of the preliminary investigation whether
conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.
However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record
or any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident
therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.

Petitioners prayer for the production of the record is intended not only for proper observance of the constitutional
requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge, but also to enable him to examine the evidence and
prepare his defenses and for trial.

Public respondents contend that the production of the record of the preliminary examination is not necessary since petitioner
can always resort to any of the modes of discovery available to an accused under the Rules of Court, specifically citing
Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:

Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. On motion of the
accused showing good cause and with notice to all parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise,
suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, of any written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any
investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or any other investigating officers, as well as of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case,
and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any other law
investigating agencies.

This rule refers to the right of the accused to move for production or inspection of material evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. It authorizes the defense to inspect, copy or photograph any evidence of the prosecution in its possession after
obtaining the permission of the court. A motion showing good reasons for the granting of the permission must be filed by the
defense for this purpose, with notice to all parties. 18

It will be noted at the outset that precisely, as suggested by public respondents, herein petitioner, in asking for the production
of the records of the preliminary investigation in order to enable him to prepare for his defense and for trial, is actually trying
to avail of this mode of discovery. There was good cause shown for the motion to produce the records, that is, so that they
may be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for their production, which is one of the grounds provided for under
Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

It is true that the granting of permission lies within the discretion of the court. However, respondent court in this case has
failed to sufficiently justify its refusal to have the records of the preliminary investigation produced before it so that petitioner
may use them for his defense, either in its resolutions denying petitioners Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration,
or in the pleadings and Memorandum filed by herein respondents before this Court. Consequently, we find no reason to
deny petitioner the right to avail of such mode of discovery. If only for the reason that petitioner should be given the
opportunity to inspect the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation solely for the purpose of enabling him to
prepare for his defense and for trial, this questioned resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan should be modified.

III. It is likewise contended that respondent court abused its discretion in not dismissing the information considering that, as
found by the investigating prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance for which he can only be held
civilly liable, but which civil liability has already been extinguished. Citing the case of Yong Chan Kim vs. People, et
al., 19 which held that a cash advance is in the form of a loan and, therefore, there can be no estafa
committed, petitioner argues that he only incurred civil liability for the cash advance he obtained from the
Manila Hotel. However, he contends that such liability had allegedly been extinguished when his leave
credits and other benefits were withheld, the total of which was more than sufficient to liquidate the
advance made.

Also, it is argued that petitioner was denied due process when respondent court failed to remand the case to the
Ombudsman for further proceedings for the purpose of determining the persons who actually forged the questioned
documents by conducting a handwriting analysis. This would have secured him from hasty and malicious prosecution, and
would even have led to the discovery of the true culprit, if indeed documents had been fabricated.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against
whom it is taken in jeopardy. 20

The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 21

Conformably therewith, the arguments raised by herein petitioner that the cash advance is actually in the form of a loan and
therefore no criminal liability attaches, and that respondent court should have remanded the case for further investigation to
determine the true identity of the forgers, are all matters of defense which are best presented during the trial before
respondent court for its consideration.

The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of
probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. And, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 22

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman found that there was sufficient ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of the crime
charged on the basis of the factual findings of Prosecutor Tamayo in the latters Order dated February 11, 1992 which were
arrived at after taking into consideration the evidence presented by the parties. A cursory perusal of the records of this case
will show that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, hence the same
should be considered conclusive. 23

Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the
contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through
His arguments are anchored on
falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. 24

the propriety of or error in the Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 25 Insofar as this third issue is concerned, therefore, we
find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the
granting of the writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that respondent Ombudsman is
DIRECTED to produce the pertinent records of the preliminary investigation before the Sandiganbayan at the proper
juncture of the proceedings therein and on sufficient justification therefor.

SO ORDERED.

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