Belief in God, Proper Basicality, and Rationality

Author(s): John V. Apczynski

Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer, 1992), pp.
301-312
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 Journal of the American Academy of Religion. LX/2

Belief in God, Proper

Basicality, and Rationality
John V. Apczynski

FOR MUCH OF the modem era in the English-speaking world, the

dominant tendency in philosophical speculation regarding religion was
to consider religious matters, particularly religious beliefs, in terms of
their most general characteristics. Within such intellectual presupposi-
tions one could attempt to isolate a special class of experiences called
"religious" and, by means of analyzing its universal components or con-
stituents, to determine the meaning or significance or usefulness of reli-
gious life (James) or even to provide evidence for some general (i.e., not
"highly ramified") beliefs (Davis). Typically this form of intellectual
inquiry required that one focus on what were considered to be the core
elements of religious beliefs without a concern for any particularizing
qualities upheld by a religious tradition, so that, for example, the issue of
"theism" could be analyzed apart from distinctive Jewish or Christian
claims about God (Swinbume).
The philosophy of religion, so conceived, offers the decided advan-
tage of encouraging and promoting technically brilliant analyses of the
logic or linguistic practice of religious thinkers and theologians. In fact
it has engendered its own field of inquiry with a commonly accepted
body of literature and range of problems. An unfortunate and unin-
tended consequence of this philosophical heritage, however, is that this
method of inquiry tends to overlook or ignore the historical contexts of
positions to such an extent that sometimes one is led to wonder whether
issues discussed have any relevance to the believers whose lives are
informed by the tradition (Kaufmann).
Such a characterization seems to pose an initial dilemma to the phi-
losopher of religion: either strive for clarity at the expense of the partic-
ularities of a tradition or acknowledge the diversity of religious practice
with the concomitant degree of ambiguity in analysis (Kolakowski:11-
13). In this essay I shall attempt a preliminary sketch defending the

John V. Apczynski is a Professor in the Department of Theology at Saint Bonaventure University,

Saint Bonaventure, NY 14778.

301

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302 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

view that the recent discussions provoked by Alvin Pla

with Nicholas Wolterstorff, William P. Alston, and Georg
among others) regarding the status of claims about belief i
propose a way through this dilemma. My intuition is that
overall strategy ought not be understood to consist solely i
his arguments. Rather we ought to take him at his word an
the fact that he is attempting to retrieve and operate within a
intellectual tradition.
My suggestion, in other words, is that we understand Pla
claiming that inquiry needs to be understood as operating
torical tradition. In the particular case of trying to un
rationality of belief in God (or the lack thereof), Planting
refers to his position as a "Reformed" epistemology, by w
self-conscious attempt to think about the rationality of b
from a perspective informed by the Calvinist herita
1984:16-17).
Before proceeding further, I should clarify a bit how I am
the claim that inquiry is carried on within a historical tr
taking this in the way it has been recently articulated and
Alasdair MacIntyre.1 For MacIntyre, standing within a tr
defending or modifying its claims to truth in the face of alter
tions is a rational process. This unequivocally does no
rationality operates by comparing the claims of the tradi
uninterpreted "nature" or "essence" or reality as it might
neutrally or absolutely or normatively independently of an
lectual tradition.
The importance of indicating this at the outset is to dis
reading of Plantinga's program from the sort of interpreta
by J. Wesley Robbins. According to this interpretation, Pl
Christian philosophy to represent a non-conventional c
reality. Christian philosophy in effect is the accurate repr
the "nature" of inquiry. Accordingly it need not be argue
indeed the basis of all our other claims to truth, including
ones. This interpretation obviously is informed by a versio
tism espoused by Richard Rorty (Robbins:540-42). I am co
this is a complete misreading of Plantinga on this questio
1989). Furthermore I suspect that the principal concern o

IMaclntyre's specific intent is to try to indicate how the rational grounds of

within historical traditions. Clearly, though, he assumes a broader applicability
describes; at least I am taking his position in this more comprehensive manner.

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Apczynski: Belief and Proper Basicality 303

the probability that Plantinga may very well have an imp

cal" or "neo-orthodox" (as opposed to "liberal" or "revi
logical agenda lurking beneath his proposal (Robbins:5
probably correct about this, but as I shall indicate below t
pose a significant theoretical problem for the case I am
Keeping this interpretative context in mind, let us
examine Plantinga's proposal, which is comprised of two
nents. The first is to expose the epistemological presupp
standard modem challenge to belief in God. Plantinga
"evidentialist objection to belief in God," which holds tha
is irrational because of insufficient evidence to support
1984:24ff). Plantinga's strategic move here is not to
evidentialist objection by providing what he takes to be s
dence to overcome some version of it, as some believers
asking what is presupposed in the evidentialist challenge
that it presumes that, if it is to be accepted as rational,
must be dependent upon some other propositions which
provide sufficient evidence. It is this necessary relationsh
God to supporting claims presumed by the evidentialist
Plantinga's Calvinist heritage leads him to question. H
other words, is this: "Why must belief in God be so dep
The point Plantinga is making can be clarified by observ
the evidentialist claim presumes that the noetic structur
person is foundationalist (Plantinga 1984:47f).2 This is to
any rational noetic structure some beliefs will function fo
the sense that they are not based on any other beliefs. A
other beliefs are held rationally to the degree that they ar
the basic beliefs. Connected with this understanding of th
ture is the further claim that any belief purported to be b
certain conditions (Plantinga 1984:55ff.). Speaking very g
can say that a classical foundationalist holds that in order
be properly basic it must be self-evident, evident to the sense
ble, or some combination of these. The problem with th
observes, is that the classical foundationalist claim is sel
incoherent if it is taken to be basic; where it is not so tak

2This is at least generally the case. An evidentialist objector may conceivably b

then would need to specify why a believer's noetic structure does not exhibit th
ence and if it does not why the belief thought not coherent with God's exi
rejected. Plantinga's basic point of the inability of establishing a non-controve
apply here also (63).

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304 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

the classical foundationalist program has failed because it

able to produce any generally acceptable criterion of prop
(1984:59ff.). Hence, when posed within these classical foun
parameters, the evidentialist objection, that belief in G
properly basic, collapses.
This, then, is the first element of Plantinga's pr
Reformed heritage has led him to question the evidentialis
such a way that he has been able to make a reasonable
exclusion of belief in God as properly basic is without
Indeed I believe it is fair to say that Plantinga's argum
exclusion of the belief in God's existence from one's ep
foundations on the basis of classical foundationalist claims has failed
because of its self-referential incoherence and its inability to provide a
non-controversial criterion of proper basicality-has been generally
accepted in the American philosophical community.
The second major component in Plantinga's proposal, however, is
highly controversial. Again relying on insights derived from his
Reformed heritage, Plantinga moves beyond his negative conclusion just
outlined to the positive affirmation that belief in God is indeed properly
basic (1984:73). That is, when Calvin affirms that there is something
like a "natural instinct" in human beings to know God, Plantinga inter-
prets this to mean that because of such a direct, though obscured (by
sin), "awareness of divinity" (1984:65) in our consciousness, it is per-
fectly reasonable for a Christian to believe in God without basing that
belief on any other more fundamental beliefs.
I suspect that many find this move a problem because it appears to
be too easily made, and thus arbitrary or "groundless." The unease
might be expressed in this way: the demonstration that a classical
foundationalist position cannot logically exclude the belief in God from
a believer's noetic foundations does not in itself entitle anyone to put it
there.

I would submit, however, that to interpret Plantinga's overall project

in this way is to fail to appreciate that he is standing in a specific histori-
cal tradition and that this stance entitles him to make this second move
in his overall project. To express such a reservation, in other words, is
to signal one's commitment to an alternative historical tradition, one
that we might term, following MacIntyre (370-403), post-Enlightenment
liberalism. This tradition today is characterized by an allegiance to an
internationalized language with minimum commitments to any particu-
lar social community (save perhaps the modem research university) and
with loose ties to any particular set of contestable beliefs. Since it is

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Apczynski: Belief and Proper Basicality 305

detached from all substantive criteria of truth and ra

to place all alternative positions (or "texts") int
effectively neutralizes the conception of truth and
torical tradition from which someone like Plantin
less to say, the distortion produced by reading Pla
of its historical context would go unnoticed by th
liberal tradition (Maclntyre:384-85).
My contention that Plantinga is best understoo
proposal that belief in God is properly basic from
lectual heritage may be supported now by conside
himself tries to explain and defend his project. A c
inga's project might seem vulnerable is that it is "
think that it is simply based on faith to the exclusion
to, reason, but this is simply false. Plantinga clearly a
God, when properly basic, is a foundational comp
ual's noetic structure, and it can be such if our mi
Anyone who refuses to accept that a knowledge o
of our rational capacities is simply urging a differ
son (Plantinga 1984:90). What is at stake here,
rationality in opposition to irrationality, but of tw
tions of rationality. Any resolution that might be
level requires an analysis of assumptions and co
with such conceptions of rationality as they ar
respective historical traditions of inquiry.3
In a similar manner Plantinga's argument that
dependent on other more fundamental beliefs migh
atic or at least puzzling insofar as he insists that b
less does have grounds (1984:78-82). His point her
say about perceiving a friend, is properly basic onl
any other belief and is held by a person under th
tions that confer justification. Analogously, unde
tions, say, discerning the glory of God in creatio
God4 is properly basic precisely because of the gr
act of discernment. Some may fault Plantinga for t

3This is attempted, implicitly, by Mark R. Talbot. Instead of hist

though, Talbot speaks of "epistemic sets," without any explicit consid
torical setting.
4Plantinga acknowledges that in a technical sense only beliefs su
properly basic and that the belief "that God exists" is only necessaril
basic beliefs. Throughout this essay we have followed Plantinga's lead
ably, since this usage has no substantive effect on the argument.

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306 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

ing that his appeal to justifying conditions assumes neutra

epistemological criteria which in turn can be compared dire
without the mediation of any community of faith (Phillip
insistence may be interpreted as inconsistent: either Plan
that there is some cognitive common ground (between a b
non-believer) that serves as a foundation for belief or he
nonfoundationalist who simply cannot appeal legitimately to
ing conditions (Matteo:268-72).
These criticisms seriously misrepresent Plantinga's posi
they fail to appreciate the role of a historical tradition in the
human knowledge. Plantinga compares the justifying
claims function in belief in God to beliefs about percep
memories, persons, and the like. Given the appropriate ci
one simply "sees" (non-inferentially) a tree. A person does
an inference from the circumstances, which would functio
tional beliefs about these basic circumstances, to the perc
which then would be known as dependent upon these
beliefs about the circumstances (Cooke:273-75). It is clear that for
Plantinga circumstances that provide conditions allowing certain beliefs
to be properly basic include the intellectual tradition of historical com-
munities. Dwelling in such intellectual traditions allows us to discern
natural (as opposed to magical) causation in events or the "hand of
God" (as opposed to "social conditions" or "chance") guiding our lives.
There is nothing more startling to this on the perceptual level than the
fairly widespread conviction that all facts are "theory-laden." And on
the theological level it represents a fairly common Christian conviction,
expressed already by Clement of Alexandria and later by Augustine, that
faith brings with it its own forms of intelligibility.5 Thus it appears that
the underlying point at issue is the function of historical traditions in
inquiry. This challenge to Plantinga, I would contend, comes from a
tradition of inquiry-contemporary liberalism-that holds either that
rational grounds must be accessible independently of any tradition or
else that they are not rational or they are not grounds. Plantinga, to the
contrary, holds that even though "grounds" are discerned in a tradition
of inquiry, they still function rationally.
The validity of this conviction is supported by Plantinga's analysis of
the role of argument for a believer (1984:82-86). Since a properly basic

5For a contemporary analysis and defense of this claim that a historical community may be the
bearer of a cultural heritage promoting particular forms of reality-apprehensions, see Edward Farley
(1975 and 1982).

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Apczynski Belief and Proper Basicality 307

belief may be grounded not incorrigibly or self-evi

gently in the presence of certain conditions, it follo
individual may apprehend, or the tradition may pre
tions inappropriately. If an argument or other beliefs
accepts are presented in such a way that they appear
in God, then she must, if she is to remain rational, t
conditions into account. Plantinga's analysis of th
how a variety of factors complicate it. This is not sur
nize that this is not a neutral process of inquiry des
subject matter or accepting the same standards. Rat
first would characterize the claim in her own terms.
of preliminary strategy would be sufficient to defen
the believer's claim, even though it might appear alto
ing or even fallacious to an unbeliever. If the defeat
more profound and the believer were exceptionally
ever, the measures of evaluation inherent within her ow
lead the believer to question whether her tradition h
respond to the questions or theses of the rival traditi
tion the believer may recharacterize her tradition in
the other hand she may come to recognize the rationa
rival tradition and cease being a believer. But in eith
opment was to respond rationally to challenges on th
by the competing traditions.6
Having outlined and suggested a way for defendin
posal regarding the proper basicality of belief in
flowing out of his reliance on the Reformed traditio
find in this suggestion additional resources for movi
tion of the most troubling aspect of his proposal. Wh
someone to take any belief as properly basic? Is the
might function as a criterion of proper basicality?
cannot be identified, would not Plantinga's proposal
practically anything to be properly basic? Plantinga
cial issue under the humorous heading of the "Great
tion (1984:74-78)-a tactic that obscures as much as it
at stake. Needless to say, Plantinga dismisses out of h
of the Great Pumpkin for proper basicality. I would
mary reason-and the one that is obscured by the ch

6See MacIntyre (166-7) for his characterization of the resolution of c

stages in the thought of Aquinas as it dealt with the Augustinian and
traditions.

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308 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

ple-is that there is no real historical community nurtu

beings to take the Great Pumpkin as properly basic-Linus
while disciple Sally notwithstanding. All along Planti
guided in his critique of evidentialism and classical foundat
conception of rationality and human inquiry formed in p
Reformed tradition. To affirm then that his position "is on
subjectivism by the deus ex machina device of calling upon
of believers as the ultimate court of appeal on questions co
propriety of taking certain beliefs as properly basic"7 (Ste
miss entirely the overall texture or context of his argumen
Plantinga's position on assessing potential candidates
basicality is that, since no logically coherent universal crite
or is likely to be produced, we ought to arrive at such a cri
tively" or "from below" and test it by relevant examples
Since diverse epistemic communities would appeal to diver
ples for assessing criteria of proper basicality, how is Plant
tion to be interpreted at this point? We could treat all co
cretieria for proper basicality neutrally, so that they could
stemic par. If we are not to be turned into relativists, how
inventory is still in need of a criterion to assess these com
dates for basic beliefs; and so this tactic would be of no h
tively, we might try to set up overlapping epistemic sets
discern common features that would lead to a fairly unifie
proper grounds of rationality. But any criterion developed
ner would have to be applied "from above" and, though p
tened," would undoubtedly encounter the same sorts of diff
particular epistemic communities as any "universal" crite
Apparently Plantinga's insistence on developing criteria fo
cality "from below" or "inductively" should be taken to m
reflective persons have to identify and examine the conditi
basicality that inform and guide them as members of spec
communities of inquiry (Hanink:17-20).
Plantinga's position, I am arguing, is that dwelling in a
tradition of inquiry provides each person with the criteria for
that serve as the grounds for knowing. We arrive at these

7Steuer notes here that Plantinga's "definition" of proper basicality does not ref
tion. Nonetheless Plantinga does argue that a criterion of proper basicality m
inductively from the practice of communities (1984:76).
8In Macintyre's terms (370-88) Steuer would be attempting to translate Planting
a universal language, thereby failing to discern its particularities-including i
belief in God as outlined above.

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Apczynski. Belief and Proper Basicality 309
by our reliance on them in our affirmation of beliefs we know. Even
with this, someone still may question to which particular community (o
subset thereof ) a person ought to adhere in order to ground properly her
beliefs. Is not Plantinga rather "hard-nosed" or even a bit arbitrar
about what a rational person's epistemic allegiance may be (Tilley:240)?
My contention is that he definitely is not, since his response is thor-
oughly reasonable and consistent when interpreted as I am doing: an
individual is justified primafacie in adopting the basic beliefs of the com
munity that in fact informs her beliefs on any matter. When framed i
this manner, I find it difficult to imagine any other rationally defensible
response to the question. For a Christian considering the truth of belie
in God this would require allegiance to some particular Christian
community.
Presumed throughout such an "inductive" approach to proper basi-
cality, of course, is the possibility of challenge and transformation in
person's basic beliefs. With respect to belief in God, then, the Christian
community provides relevant examples for conditions of proper basical
ity which serve as prima facie justification for the believer. Typically
Christian believer today would rely on several overlapping traditions of
inquiry with varying degrees of allegiance to each. It is easy to under
stand how such circumstances generate prima facie challenges to
believer's basic beliefs--challenges which may be the source of serious
anxiety and intellectual unrest. Yet it is precisely by being situated thu
with a commitment to a range of historical traditions with their substan-
tive claims to truth- about, say, the graciousness of God-that a perso
has the rational basis for a response to a challenge and the need for one
To put it another way, the logic of Plantinga's position holds that
... the only rational way for adherents of any tradition to approach
intellectually, culturally, and linguistically alien rivals is one that allows
for the possibility that in one or more areas the others may be rationally
superior to it in respect precisely of that in the alien tradition which it
cannot as yet comprehend. The claim made within each tradition that
the presently established beliefs shared by the adherents of that tradi-
tion are true entails a denial that this is in fact going to happen in
respect of those beliefs, but it is the possibility of this nonetheless hap-
pening which . . . gives point to the assertion of truth and provides
assertions of truth and falsity with a content. . . . (MacIntyre:388)

Alvin Plantinga is a thinker who has learned the post-modem libera

tradition as a "second first-language" and thus can speak to i
powerfully. My contention in this essay is that his efforts to call atten
tion to certain limitations of post-modem liberalism are reasonabl

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310 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

when understood as spoken by one who can stand in th

heritage of (at least) two traditions: the Reformed theologi
as well as modem liberalism as it shapes contemporary anal
phy. His arguments calling attention to the limits of the a
sophical tradition with respect to its assumptions about bel
guided by Reformed insights. I believe that when his wor
belief in God as properly basic is understood this way
between two particular traditions, Plantinga's reasoning a
grounded and wholly consistent.
I would furthermore contend that this understanding o
work opens his position to further dialogue on the theolo
well. By this I mean that Plantinga's standing within the R
tage on the matter of our belief in God in fact places him
wider Augustinian Christian intellectual tradition. It is not
for example, that some of his claims are anticipated by t
Franciscan theologian, Bonaventure, including the cla
humans "naturally" know that Gods exists (save for "defec
ing) and that the function of arguments for the existence
proof but an "exercise of the intellect" to get us to see thi
(I,1, r. 12). Indeed, since Aquinas also had to come to term
heritage we should not be surprised to find traces of it in
even on the matter of our knowledge of God.9 Calvin's app
question is thus best understood as the reaffirmation of th
the early modem era. Consequently, unless we intend t
remarkable inconsistency to Plantinga's overall position
need to fear the particular theological tradition in which h
sumably Plantinga would allow for the kind of probing and
tive dialogue with varying representatives of the Christian
on the theological level that he is engaged in on the philo
with contemporary analytic philosophy.
The aim of this essay has been to argue that Alvin Plant
that belief in God is properly basic for a Christian is ratio
ble. The primary strategy in this argument has been to in
inga's position from the vantage point of his standing in th
intellectual tradition in Christianity and to indicate how
such a particular tradition provides reasonable grounds-in
reasonable prospects-for the rational quest for truth. Any
this endeavor would lead to a modest, but important, resu

9And when we do, we ought to recognize it for the Augustinianism it is, not th
it is not (Plantinga 1984:47).

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Apczynski. Belief and Proper Basicality 311
dialogue may continue confidently and responsibly in the way indicate
by Plantinga, namely by responding to specific challenges but no
understood to come from particular traditions of inquiry that deman
appropriately shaped responses.

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