World Development Vol. 35, No. 9, pp.

1481–1488, 2007
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
0305-750X/$ - see front matter
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.05.016

Editorial

Introduction to the Special Issue on ‘‘Property Rights,

Collective Action, and Local Conservation of Genetic
Resources’’
PABLO EYZAGUIRRE
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy

MONICA DI GREGORIO
Development Studies Institute, London, UK

and
RUTH MEINZEN-DICK *
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA

1. INTRODUCTION More specific dangers of reduced biodiversity

Genetic diversity of crops and livestock plays
a key role in sustainable agricultural practices.
On farm management of biological diversity
not only provides the means of subsistence for
many of the rural poor (Anderson, 2003), and
risk management mechanisms against emerging
pests and diseases (Di Falco, 2003) and against
climate change (Almekinders & Louwaars,
1999), but it also facilitates the satisfaction of
evolving tastes and preferences of consumers
(Brush, 1999). Moreover, biological diversity
is an important input into many locally sustain-
able, indigenous technology systems and an
important asset for future genetic improve-
ments (Drucker, Smale, & Zambrano, 2005).
There is a rich knowledge base about genetic
resource conservation (Smale, 2005; Wood &
Lenné, 1999). Evidence indicates that loss of
biodiversity can reduce food security (Shand,
1997; Thrupp, 1998) and increase economic
risk, threatening the viability and sustainability
of many agricultural systems (Smale, Hartell,
Heisey, & Senauer, 1998; Smale, Meng, Bren-
nan, & Hu, 2003; Di Falco & Perrings, 2005;
Pearce and Moran, 1994).
1481
include increased vulnerability to insect pests
and diseases, negative effects on nutrition due
to decline in the diversity and nutritional qual-
ity of foods, reduction in possibilities for crop
adaptation and new uses for future generations,
and loss of local knowledge about diversity, all
of which can directly threaten the present and
future livelihoods of rural communities (Altieri,
1987; Brush, 1999; Fowler & Mooney, 1990;
IIED, 1995; Perrings, Mäler, Folke, Holling,
& Jansson, 1995; Vallve, 1993). A number of
studies have documented the loss of animal
genetic diversity (FAO, 2000; Hall & Ruance,
1993; Hammond & Leitch, 1996; Rege, 1994,
1999), and among the main causes of diversity
* We would like to thank Patricia Zambrano for com-
ments on an earlier draft and all participants of the
conference on Property Rights, Collective Action, and
Local Conservation of Plant Genetic Resource, orga-
nized by the System-wide Program on Collective Action
and Property Rights, and hosted at the International
Plant Genetic Resource Institute in Rome in 2003, for
their contributions and enlightening discussions. Final
revision accepted: May 6, 2006.
1482 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
loss they indicate specific management practices
as crossbreeding and replacement of exotic
breed, changes in market demand and urbani-
zation, climatic variables as drought, and social
and political determinants as wars and famines
(Rege & Gibson, 2003). Loss of agricultural
biodiversity or ‘‘agrobiodiversity’’ has also
been documented for specific crops, but it is
more difficult to quantify and measure overall
agrobiodiversity loss (Drucker et al., 2005;
Smale, 1998). In the State of the World’s Plant
Genetic Resources (FAO, 1998), nearly all of
the 150 country reports stated that genetic ero-
sion 1 is taking place and poses a threat to the
future of agriculture. But systematic data on
genetic erosion in crops are scarce and better
measurement techniques are needed. The main
reasons given for loss of agrobiodiversity are
the replacement of local varieties by modern
varieties (FAO, 1998), market integration, and
industrialization of agriculture including agro-
processing and marketing requirements (Di
Falco, 2003; Drucker et al., 2005).
Studies investigating the trade-offs between
agricultural development and conservation of
biodiversity have generally had mixed results.
Findings tend to be specific to location, period,
and cropping system (Heisey, Smale, Byerlee, &
Souza, 1997; Smale et al., 1998; Widawsky &
Rozelle, 1998). Especially in developing coun-
tries local conservation of plant and animal
diversity occurs in local socio-economic,
cultural, and ecological niches that are not
occupied by modern varieties and breeds
(Anderson, 2003; Brush, 1999; Brush & Meng,
1998; Tripp, 1996; Thrupp, 1998).
Investigating institutional aspects of local
conservation of local plant and livestock genet-
ic diversity can help shed light on social and
economic factors that may determine different
patterns of agrobiodiversity loss or mainte-
nance. To date, there has been little investiga-
tion of institutional aspects of local plant
genetic resources conservation; and what has
been done has been largely focused on formal
institutions for conservation such as genebanks
or formal intellectual property regimes (IPR).
Studies surrounding intellectual property rights
(IPR) have mostly been applied to the devel-
oped country setting. Research on the practices
and institutions of farmers’ informal seed sys-
tems where most of the world’s agrobiodiversi-
ty is maintained and exchanged has been scarce
(Drucker et al., 2005). Other fundamental insti-
tutions as informal property rights to plants
and germplasm in the form of seed or vegeta-
tive planting material, property rights to land
and other related natural resources as well as
institutions of collective action, have mostly
been ignored. 2 Nonetheless, plant genetic re-
sources provide the bases of many livelihood
strategies for poor farm households and com-
munities, This special issue addresses the dual,
and often inter-related, roles of property rights
and collective action for local-level manage-
ment and conservation of genetic resources in
developing countries.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF PLANT AND
ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES
While any individual plant seed or animal re-
source has the physical characteristics of a pri-
vate good, the germplasm contained in the
resource has the public good characteristic of
being ‘‘nonrival’’ (Di Falco & Perrings, 2005;
Heisey et al., 1997), meaning that information
itself is not diminished by its use. Maintaining
crop and animal diversity therefore produces
a public good (Smale & Bellon, 1999), with
long lasting effects over generations. Moreover,
as indicated by Brush (this issue) the informa-
tion contained in germplasm, especially of
plant genetic resources, is not directly observed.
This aspect represents an obstacle to adoption
that breeders, farmers, and livestock owners
need to overcome.
Property rights to germplasm refer to the
information contained in genetic resources
and its public good characteristics. As with
other public goods there is a tendency of under-
provision, which affects conservation. How-
ever, because germplasm of cultivated plant
varieties and domestic livestock results from
collective activities over generations, it is diffi-
cult to trace flows, exchanges, and contribu-
tions to germplasm. Because of this, assigning
exclusive (e.g., individual) ownership can lead
to misappropriation of benefits (Brush, this
issue).
With respect to in situ conservation, it is nei-
ther possible to develop nor to conserve genetic
diversity information separately from the phys-
ical good (plant or animal). Since property
rights to the physical plant or animal affect
the incentive to manage the asset, they also
influence development of germplasm and bio-
diversity conservation. Moreover, comple-
mentary resources such as agricultural land,
grazing land, forest, and water affect the ability
of farmers and herders to reap the benefits from
 PROPERTY RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LOCAL CONSERVATION
both the physical and the informational com-
ponents of the genetic resource. Thus, access,
management rights, and control rights to com-
plementary resources also affect the benefit
flows from genetic resources, and may hamper
or foster conservation of diversity. Finally, be-
cause germplasm is often not directly observa-
ble, farmers, herders, and other rural people
need mechanisms to reduce uncertainty and
the risk of acquiring germplasm different from
what they want. Social networks of trust and
informal collective action can reduce uncer-
tainty and costs of acquiring this information
(Badstue et al., this issue; Dennis et al., this
issue).
This special issue provides a collection of
seven papers addressing three main aspects
related to property rights and collective action
in in situ conservation of genetic resources. Five
papers were presented at the International
Workshop on Property Rights, Collective Ac-
tion, and Local Conservation of Genetic Re-
source. Two further papers are invited papers.
The workshop was organized by the CGIAR
System-wide Program on Collective Action
and Property Rights (CAPRi) 3 in collabora-
tion with the International Plant Genetic
Research Institute, which also hosted the
conference in Rome. Around 40 researchers
from CGIAR centers, national research part-
ners, and a number of experts in the field
contributed to the conference.
The first paper by Eyzaguirre and Dennis
presents an overview on important institutional
factors affecting local conservation of genetic
diversity. While much research has been
undertaken on IPR arrangements for genetic
resource innovation tied to biotechnology,
considerable genetic diversity is found within
local farming systems (Brookfield, 2001; Coo-
mes & Ban, 2004). In these systems innovation
and conservation of genetic resources is linked
to livelihood strategies. Incentives for local
innovation and in situ conservation are affected
by a variety of social, economic, and political
factors. This paper identifies IPR systems,
property rights to land and other complemen-
tary resources, collective aspects of resource
management, and seed exchange mechanisms
as some of the main institutional determinants
of diversity of local genetic resources. It states
that further research on genetic resources
should be undertaken within a broader ‘‘devel-
opment and sustainable livelihoods context’’
(Eyzaguirre & Dennis, this issue). First of all,
there is the need to document and investigate
1483
how complex social structures affect incentives
for local biodiversity conservation. Property
rights to land and other resources, including
informal ones, are part of the social and institu-
tions structure affecting incentives for local
innovation and conservation. The study of so-
cial aspects of seed exchanges and of collective
institutions for the management of plants and
animals provides valuable information on the
role of collective action and informal institu-
tions in conservation of genetic diversity. With
respect to proprietary regimes, not only effi-
ciency aspects, but also equity aspects need to
be investigated, especially if our concern is to
improve livelihood strategies and reduce vul-
nerability. The recognition that overlapping
legal systems—formal, and informal, interna-
tional, national, and locally devised—and the
need to accommodate traditional resource
management practices within formal proprie-
tary regimes, both call for approaching genetic
resource regulation from a legal pluralism
perspective (Wiber, 2005).
The other papers of this special issue cover
more in detail the three main and interrelated
themes highlighted in the first paper, which
were also the main focus of the conference:
• Theme 1: Challenges and implications of
IPR regimes for local knowledge, farmers’
rights, and local conservation of genetic
resources.
• Theme 2: The role of property rights to
plants and animals and to complementary
resources for local genetic conservation.
• Theme 3: The role and characteristics of
collective action for conservation of plant
and animal genetic resources.
3. CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS
OF GENETIC RESOURCES IPR REGIMES
FOR LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, FARMERS’
RIGHTS, AND LOCAL GENETIC
CONSERVATION
The first theme refers to a critical assessment
of the most established area of investigation in
genetic resource conservation, namely IPR re-
gimes. It addresses the tensions between the
‘‘collective regime’’ characteristic of local devel-
opment and in situ conservation of plant and
animal genetic resources, and current IPR re-
gimes. It also considers the likely effects of
IPR on local knowledge, on the ability of rural
populations to conserve local genetic resources,
as well as on the distribution of benefit streams.
1484 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Any proprietary regime on genetic resources
should be based on the recognition that collec-
tive efforts underlie the development of plant
and animal genetic resources, as well as that
the benefits of fairly decentralized, but nonethe-
less interconnected, breeding activities are usu-
ally shared as a common resource. There are
also inherent dangers of assigning individual
or exclusive rights to genetic resources. Brush
(this issue) reminds us that even more than
for other natural resources as land and water,
the difficulty to trace and separate individual ef-
forts to develop plant varieties or animal breeds
and individual contributions to conservation of
genetic diversity requires mechanisms able to
recognize the ‘‘common heritage’’ characteristic
of farmers’ breeding practices.
Not only customary forms of development
and conservation of genetic resource, but also
high input production system, can be disrupted
by unsuitable international protection regimes.
Salazar et al. (this issue) present evidence from
high potential areas, where modern cultivars
have entered farmers’ breeding systems. In
these cases, often modern varieties are used to
further develop and maintain locally preferred
traits. The interlinkages between public, pri-
vate, and farmers’ breeding systems also poses
serious challenges to devising recognition and
protection mechanisms for germplasm obtained
by a variety of sources. Salazar et al. (this issue)
indicate that the same applies to collective
innovation resulting from participatory breed-
ing practices, which explicitly involve different
actors with different tasks. Devising mecha-
nisms to protect local development and conser-
vation that recognize the role of collective
efforts is not an easy matter. What is certain
is that IPR regimes that are not able to recon-
cile these aspects will transmit distorted incen-
tives that may play against efforts to conserve
locally preferred varieties.
Anderson and Centonze (this issue) indicate
that, with regard to plants and animals that
are bred to adapt to specific agroecological
niches, the disruption of local knowledge sys-
tems can considerably increase the vulnerability
of people. As a consequence the likelihood to
fall into poverty increases. National and inter-
national policy regimes necessarily simplify
and generalize institutional systems, and thus
increase the risk of disenfranchisement, in par-
ticular of weaker subgroups of the population.
Groups that are already socially marginalized,
as often women are, experience higher risks of
dispossession. The imposition of uniform pro-
tection systems thus also increases the likeli-
hood of misappropriation. This not only risks
penalizing individuals and groups, but is in fact
likely to be perceived as unjust and ethically
problematic. Brush (this issue) indicates that a
related risk is the possible tendency toward
concentration of control over genetic resource
by private entities.
While Brush highlights the importance to re-
tain the ‘‘common heritage’’ characteristic of
local customary systems of development and
local conservation of plant genetic resources,
Salazar et al. (this issue) look at new forms of
proprietary rights as possible mechanisms to
maintain free use and effective benefit sharing
of farmers’ breeding efforts derived from the
use of modern cultivars. The importance of
investigating the complexity of social structure
shaping conservation indicated by Eyzaguirre
and Dennis becomes evident under the second
theme of the conference.
4. LOCAL CONSERVATION OF GENETIC
RESOURCES, PROPERTY RIGHTS TO
PLANTS AND ANIMALS AND TO
COMPLEMENTARY RESOURCES
The second theme of this special issue ad-
dresses the relationship between local conserva-
tion of genetic resources and property rights to
plants, animals, and complementary land-based
resources. Apart from IPR regimes, in situ
development is also affected by property rights
to the physical plant or animal as well as to
property rights to land. These co-determine
the amount and distribution of benefits accru-
ing to breeders and users and thus affect not
only incentives to conserve genetic resources,
but also people’s livelihoods and vulnerability.
Howard and Nabanoga (this issue) investi-
gate the complex and gendered nature of infor-
mal property rights arrangements around plant
genetic resources in Baganda, Central Uganda.
Their discussion of ‘‘plant tenure’’ highlights
weaknesses of the common property literature
as well as of the IPR debates. The first often as-
sumes that rights to plants are mainly derived
from rights to land. Although control over land
can and often does affect control over plants,
these can be distinct regimes in customary
knowledge systems. On the other hand, the
IPR debates often neglect the broader context
in which plant genetic resources are embedded.
The paper presents a general framework for the
study of plant tenure, which distinguishes
 PROPERTY RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LOCAL CONSERVATION
proprietary arrangements that are attached to
species, parts of species, or landscapes, and
regulation of specific uses by certain people,
under specific rules of use, for specific periods.
This framework is then applied to investigate
the gendered and multifaceted plant tenure
arrangements in Baganda.
Although traditional local practices can be
very resilient and adaptable to changing exter-
nal realities, and can in some cases also contrast
them effectively, they can also be threatened by
new legal institutions as the introduction of IPR
regimes. Failure to take into account the com-
plexity of plant tenure can endanger rights and
entitlement protected under customary regimes,
especially rights of women to specific niches,
rights not directly linked to land, and derived
rights. Detailed investigation on the distribution
of traditional knowledge and of property rights
among different social groups not only enables
one to understand local systems, but can also
design new proprietary systems that reduce the
likelihood of misappropriation.
The paper by Anderson and Centonze (this
issue) looks specifically at the consequences of
animal genetic erosion for the poor. Both crop
and animal genetic resources held by the poor
living in marginal climatic environments main-
tain important adaptive characteristics crucial
to mitigating shocks and sustaining livelihoods.
This paper establishes a link between ill-defined
or missing property rights regimes and animal
genetic erosion. As traditional property rights
regimes of low external input systems are threa-
tened and weakened by new proprietary
arrangements, as well as market forces, peo-
ple’s livelihoods can also be threatened. Thus,
for example, a decline in complementary re-
source access to private land for grazing during
fallow periods, or insecurity of access to com-
mon grazing land, with consequent genetic ero-
sion and environmental impacts can be more
costly for poor herders. Poor households in
particular are often forced into decisions that
reduce genetic diversity based on short-term
livelihood priorities, rather than emphasizing
longer-term aspects of genetic resource access
and improvement strategies. Thus, as market
values dominate incentives for conservation
and affect proprietary regimes, the neglect of
option values of animal genetic diversity of
locally adapted and diverse breeds increases
genetic erosion and the vulnerability of poor
herders.
The paper also investigates traditional prop-
erty rights systems of animal genetic resources
1485
of the Raika pastoralists in Rajasthan and pre-
sents a complex picture of proprietary rights
and management practices. The paper shows
how traditional Raika property rights arrange-
ments are determined by ecological functions as
well as cultural and social structures, in a simi-
lar way as plant tenure in the case study by
Howard and Nabanoga (this issue).
5. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
CONSERVATION OF PLANT AND
ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES
The last theme of this special issue focuses on
the role of collective action and social institu-
tional mediating use and exchange of genetic
resources. Unlike management institutions of
other natural resources, collective management
of plant genetic resources is most often very
informal, decentralized, and embedded in vari-
ous local social networks. As Brush (this issue)
and Dennis et al. (this issue) suggest, this makes
exchange and development pathways difficult
to measure and document by traditional crite-
ria. The study of local informal seed systems
regarding physical and information exchanges
(Almekinders, Louwaars, & de Bruijn, 1994;
Louette, 1999; Perales, Brush, & Qualset,
2003; Thiele, 1999) is therefore crucial to pro-
vide information on the institutions that shape
conservation of plant genetic resources.
Two papers in this issue present methods and
results to investigate informal and formal seed
systems for Uzbekistan and Mexico (Badstue
et al., this issue; Dennis et al., this issue).
The first paper by Dennis et al. (this issue)
shows that local organizations and institutions
affect local seed systems via two pathways.
While some institutions and organizations can
serve as direct channels of agricultural informa-
tion and seeds for farmers, many social institu-
tions not exclusively related to agriculture also
serve as indirect sources of information on
seeds. Indirect pathways include institutions
of kinship which can be important sources for
the exchange of both ancient and modern seed
varieties. Trust relations based on social capital
and personal bonds with providers are impor-
tant criteria used by farmers to acquire reliable
information on seeds (Dennis et al., this issue).
Badstue et al. (this issue) present a case study
on genetic resource management of maize in
Oaxaca (Mexico) and do not find any specific
formal collective action institutions for the
exclusive management of seed exchanges.
1486 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
However, the paper identifies several important
organizing principles which support these dy-
namic and fluid seed systems. One main guiding
principle they identify is based on reputation of
being a ‘‘good farmer’’, which provides assur-
ance on seed quality.
As a consequence the emphasis on the inves-
tigation of formal institutions and organiza-
tions for seed transactions risks overlooking
the real locus of interaction and obfuscates sub-
tler and more complex contributions of in-
formal institutions and indirect management
channels of natural resources that result from
informal information and cultural dynamics
within local communities.
Apart from collective action for the exchange
of germplasm, collective action in the man-
agement of complementary resources is also
important for genetic conservation. Anderson
and Centonze (this issue) investigate in depth
collective management practices of the Raika
pastoralists in India. Collective access, pur-
chase of animals by an entire village, shared
shelters, and collective grazing coexist with
more informal, fluid, and more personal access
mechanisms.
The paper also uses an institutional frame-
work that investigates the links between prop-
erty rights and collective management
practices. The way collective action is orga-
nized depends, amongst other factors, on access
and management rights to both private and
common property resources and resources
complementary to livestock. As a consequence,
changes in property rights regimes will affect
NOTES
1. Genetic erosion can be defined as the loss of genetic
diversity within and between domesticated species
resulting from human reliance on a few genetically
uniform varieties of crop plants and animals, or demo-
graphic and environmental change. This can result in
increased vulnerability of agricultural species to pest and
diseases and restrict future adaptive potential and uses
of the species.
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6. CONCLUSION
In summary, the ability and the incentives to
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