5.

Where the municipal mayor never denied that he received checks representing disallowed
cash advances and he, in fact, admitted that the disallowed cash advances were made under
his authority, and that he was the payee of the checks and that he received them, may it be
contended that such municipal mayor is an accountable public officer for purposes of applying
Art. 217, RPC, on malversation; why (5%)?
It may be concluded that such municipal mayor is an accountable public officer for
purposes of applying Art. 217, RPC: According to the Local Government Code, Municipal
Mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities. Public officers are accountable if
they, as part of their duties, receive public funds or property which they are bound to account for
but fail to do so. Where the municipal mayor never denied that he received the checks
representing the disallowed cash advances and he, in fact, admitted that the disallowed cash
advances were made under his authority, and that he was the payee of the checks and that he
received them, it is clear that he, as municipal mayor, received and had possession of (and
consequently was accountable for) the cash advances. Such a municipal mayor is, undeniable,
an accountable officer. Thus, as an accountable officer, he is obliged to liquidate the cash
advances. If the cash advances were disallowed, he is bound to return the same to the
government.

17. If by reason or on the occasion of robbery, both homicide and rape were committed, how is
the crime to be characterized and charged in the information?
The crime committed is robbery with homicide, aggravated by rape. This is classified as
robbery with violence, or intimidation of persons. When the violence results in homicide rape,
intentional mutilation or any other serious physical injuries, the taking of the property is robbery
complexed with any of those crimes, even if the taking was already complete when the violence
was used by the offender.

18. Discuss the requirements of the provision under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that
establishes a prima facie presumption of malversation?
The prima facie presumption under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code arises only if
there was no issue as to the accuracy, correctness, and regularity of the audit findings
and if the fact that funds are missing is indubitably established.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
If the accused has adduced evidence showing that he did not put the missing funds or property
to personal uses, then that presumption is at an and the prime facie case is destroyed

19. When, if at all, may conviction for malversation stand on the basis solely of a presumption?
Prima facie evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, can counterbalance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. An accountable public officer may be
convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily.
20. Discuss the so-called theory of absorption as applied to rebellion and explain, with
reasons, whether or not it is also applicable to (a) coup detat; and (b) sedition.

Is there a complex crime of rebellion with murder and other

common crimes?

The Supreme Court decided this question in the negative. The reason
the ruling is stated, as follows:
"One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words
Art. 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government"
and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war." These
expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely: resort to arms, restraint

Inasmuch as the acts specified in Art. 135 constitute one single crime,
follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. A
mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be
placed at a more disadvantageous position. (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99
515)
Any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as means
or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be regarded or penalized as
distinct crimes in themselves. They are part and parcel of the rebellion
itself, and can not be considered as giving rise to separate crimes that,
under Art. 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of
rebellion. Thus, the act of the rebels in ambushing and firing upon an army
patrol constitutes engaging in combat with loyal troops; taking funds and
equipment from the Provincial Treasury of Laguna is diverting public funds
their legitimate purpose; and the killings of civilians are instances of
committing serious violence. (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90)
Hernandez ruling applied.
Facts: (1) Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan were charged with the crime of rebellion
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during
period of the failed coup attempt from 26 November to 10 December
(2) The Solicitor General claimed that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for
commission of rebellion, whereas, the information against petitioners
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
in the furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General
would distinguish between the complex crime arising from an offense being
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to as the second
clause of Art. 8, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez
ruling, and the compound crime arising from a single act constituting two or
grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, in which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore,
REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH GRAVER OFFENSE Art. 135
applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course,
whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
Held: On the first option, eleven (11) members of the court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) members felt that the doctrine should be
examined. In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to
repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez, by enacting a new
provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "when
reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon
offender." (Executive Order No. 187, issued June 5,1987) In thus acting,
President in effect by legislative fiat, reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the
same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means to the commission of rebellion and that
ruling should be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion
with other common crimes on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof.
While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were
entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient
overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48 x x x.
The rejection of both options shaped and determined the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.