Rule 126: Search and Seizure

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It concerns the public at

large as distinguished from ordinary civil action involving the right of private
persons and may only be applied for in furtherance of public prosecutions.
Power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in
the exercise of their judicial functions.
GR: Application for search warrant shall be filed before any court within
whose territorial jurisdiction a crime has been committed.
o XPNS:
a) Within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known.
b) Within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
In both exceptions, filing requires compelling reasons
stated in the application.
c) Shall be made only in the court where the criminal action is
pending, if the action has already been filed.
In cases of heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of firearms, the following are authorized to act on all application
for search warrants involving the above crimes:
a) Executive and Vice Executive Judges of RTC of Manila and QC
Filed by PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, REACT-TF
Application for search warrant is heard ex parte.
Property subject of search warrant is personal property, not real property.
Requisites for valid search warrant:
a) Must have probable cause in connection with one specific
offense;
b) Presence of probable cause to be determined by the judge
personally;
c) Determination by judge must be made after an examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce;
d) Must specifically describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines
Inherent in the courts power to issue, is the power to quash warrants already
issued, if he finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable cause
exists.
Aside from examination under oath, the examining judge has to make
searching questions and elicit answers of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce in writing and to attach them to the record.
The prevailing doctrine is that the warrant must sufficiently describe the
premises to be searched so that the officer executing the warrant may, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.
The provision requiring a particular description of the items/things to be
seized is designed to prevent general searches and avoid a seizure of a thing
not described in the warrant and also so nothing is to be left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.
While the rule requires it necessary to express the name or give some
description of a party subject of a warrant, the principle does not prevent the
 issue or service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. Best
possible description, sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served,
by stating his occupation, personal appearance and peculiarities to indicate
clearly the proper person on whom the warrant is to be served.
The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities.
General description allowed only when a more specific description is not
available.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed. Sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control and possession of
the property sought to be seized.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow officers to search a place not described in the
warrant because the place not describes is what the officers had in mind.
A search warrant shall be valid for 10 days from its date. Thereafter, it shall
be void. (S10, R126)
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure id purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
LAWFUL ARREST:

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and right of the arresting officer to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also
within the permissible area within the latters reach or within the area of his
immediate control.
A search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is not limited to things related
to the reason for the arrest.
The validity of the warrantless search must be limited to and circumscribed
by the subject, time, and place of the arrest.
o As to subject: sanctioned only with respect to the person of the
accused, and the things that may be seized from him are limited to
dangerous weapons, or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense
o As to time and place: contemporaneous with the arrest, must have
been conducted at about the time or immediately thereafter and only
at the place where the suspect was arrested.
A search warrant is not needed in a buy-bust operation because here the
accused is caught in flagrante delicto.
o The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental
to a lawful arrest under S13, R126.
o Absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality
of the buy-bust operation.
Plain View Doctrine:
a) Prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area;
b) The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
 c) Immediately apparent to the officer that what he saw may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Terry Search: Stop and Frisk
o Limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a
genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.
o Terry Search has a limited scope and is not a full arrest.

CASES:

Worldwide Web Corp v. People:

1. A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that
bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

2. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized.

3. In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were
being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they
were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision.

4. To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its
telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search
warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a
d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or
routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment
such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records
to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

Microsoft v. People:
1. Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge
who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the
applicant and his witnesses. For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve
great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon
proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason.
2. n this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA, since
there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The CA
sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had "no personal
knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of the warrants may be
 justified," and the applicants and the witnesses merely relied on the screen
shots acquired from the confidential informant.
3. The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were
able to verify the information obtained from their confidential source. The
evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant
and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.
Obanda v. People:
1. To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application
based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witnesses. This is
the substantive requirement for the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the
judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to
examine the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of "searching
questions and answers" in writing and under oath. The warrant, if issued,
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.

2. In Century Chinese Medicine Co. v. People, we held that the determination of

probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Lucas v. Lucas:
1. Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order?
2. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures
which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that
a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and
a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance
of a court order for blood testing.
3. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
 the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Te v. Breva:
1. Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition
was fatal. The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of
the People of the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, to wit.
2. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool issued under the States police
power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of
the Philippines.

RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Without a prior arraignment, the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy.

If the accused had not been arraigned, he cannot be tried in absentia.
Duty of court before arraignment:
o Inform accused of right to counsel
o Ask him if he desires to have one
o Must assign counsel de officio to defend him unless accused is allowed
to defend himself or has employed counsel of his choice
The insistence of accused to be arraigned without representation is no reason
for the judge to accede readily to his wishes.
Before arraignment and plea:
o Move for bill of particulars
o Suspension of arraignment in the following cases:
Suffering from unsound mental condition (Court is mandated to
order the confinement of an accused who is mentally unsound
into an asylum or hospital)
There exists a prejudicial question
There is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor
which is pending at either the DOJ or Office of the President.
Period of extension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Jurisprudence is clear that with the arraignment of the
accused, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the
appeal or petition the same because the petitioner had
already waived or abandoned the same.
o File Motion to Quash
o Challenge the validity of arrest or legality of the warrant issued or
assail the regularity or question the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge.
The arraignment constitutes a waiver of the right to PI or
reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of
probable cause.
Amended information:
 o Substantial Amended Information- Where accused already arraigned
and subsequently, the information was substantially amended, an
arraignment on the amended information is mandatory because the
accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him.
If he is not arraigned and is convicted under the second
information, the conviction constitutes reversible error.
o Amended in Form- no need for another preliminary investigation and
retaking of the plea of the accused
o In substitution of information- another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the information.
Accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial.
Must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused
with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty.
Arraignment shall be held within 30 days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided by a special law or an SC Circular.
o Excluded in computation:
Time of the pendency of a motion to quash
Time of the pendency of a BOP
Other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
Sec. 7 Speedy Trial Act:
o Arraignment shall be held within 30 days from the filing of the
information or from the date the accused has appeared before the
justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date
last occurred.
o Where a plea of not guilty is entered, accused shall have 15 days to
prepare for trial.
The arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall
not affect the validity of the proceedings.
The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter
his plea.
Offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for the
following purposes:
o Plea bargaining
o Determination of civil liability
o Other matters requiring his presence
In case offended party fails to appear despite due notice, the court may allow
the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone.
A plea of NOT GUILTY shall be entered, aside from an ACTUAL plea of not
guilty, if:
o He refuses to plead
o Makes a conditional plea
 o When he pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence in which case
the guilty plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall
be entered
The accused, by entering a plea of not guilty, submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
If the plea is of guilty is based on a mere request to be meted a lesser
penalty: Not a conditional plea.
As a rule, a plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guiltan admission of all
the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances alleged.
o But conclusions of law are not admitted by a plea of guilty because
conclusions of law are not facts.
o Also not included in the admission are those circumstances disproved
by evidence.
Plea Bargaining: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense:
o The lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged;
o The plea must be with the consent of both the offended party and the
prosecutor.
The consent of offended party will not be required if said party,
despite due notice, fails to appear during the arraignment.
o The acceptance of plea bargain is not a matter of right of the accused
but a matter of discretion addressed entirely to the court.
o When to plea bargain?
During Pre-Trial
At arraignment
After arraignment
After his prior plea is withdrawn
Court may also consider it during trial proper, and even after
prosecution has rested its case
o No need to amend complaint or information.
o A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for the purpose of double jeopardy
o Plea of guilty to lesser offense is not considered as mitigating.
Plea of guilty to a capital offense
o Judge must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of his plea
o Shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and precise degree of
his culpability
o Accused may present evidence in his behalf.
When accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive
evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.
When there is an improvident plea of guilty, it does not mean that the case
should be remanded to the trial court. Only appropriate when the appellants
guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction.
Production and inspection of material evidence in possession of the
prosecution shall be allowed upon motion of the accused with notice to the
parties.
CASES:
1. Taglay v. Judge Daray:
The necessary implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts
after the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the Information was
filed against petitioner on November 19, 2001. Thus, the MCTC is already
bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as the same no
longer falls under the coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC
should have done was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that the
Information filed with the MCTC cannot be used as a basis for the valid
indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a Family Court, because
there was no allegation therein of private complainant's minority. To
proceed to trial before the RTC on the basis of the Information filed with
the MCTC would be an exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the
Information constituting a jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured.
There is no po
int in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the
basis of a valid conviction.
The Information filed with the MCTC must thus first be amended and
thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending the filing of such Information, the
RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not acquire jurisdiction over
the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid
Information.
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue
raised that she should have been arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled
that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,
including its decision, are null and void.
Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings
conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void.
Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid
Information filed with the RTC.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least
to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against
him. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment
cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise,
absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the
trial court.
2. People v. Galvez:
Proper Procedure When the Accused Pleads Guilty in a Case Involving a
Capital Offense
 In People v. Aranzado, the Court, citing Section 3, Rule 11617 of the
Rules of Court, set the following guidelines for receiving a plea of guilt
in a case involving a capital offense:
"(1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea:
(2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability;
and
(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires."
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a
"searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt
and full comprehension thereof. He asked no questions on the subjects
mentioned in Aranzado. His purported compliance with Alicando was
more like a monologue, or a warning at best, rather than a searching
inquiry. He did not inquire into appellant's personality profile -- age,
socio-economic status or educational background. His Honor did not
even require an answer to his question on whether appellant realized
that the death penalty would result from the latter's plea. No response
from appellant was given or recorded.
A plea of guilt is improvidently accepted where no effort is made to
explain to the accused that, in a case involving a capital offense, such
plea may result in the imposition of the death penalty.The same is true
when the requirements in Aranzado are not satisfied. Recently, in
People v. Bernas, the Court set aside a death sentence and remanded
the case to the trial court, because the Aranzado guidelines on how to
conduct a "searching inquiry" had not been followed.

3. Spouses Trinidad v. Ang:

Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
 follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the
DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the
petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed.
This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH

Failure to assert any ground of a MTQ before a plea to the complaint or

information shall be deemed a waiver of any objections.
o Accused filed a MTQ but failed to allege the ground in said motion
Failure of accused to interpose an objection on the ground of duplicity of the
offense charged in the information constitutes a waiver.
Grounds not waived:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged
c) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
d) Double jeopardy
When MTQ is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for
petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their MTQ.

CASES:
1. Antone v. Boronilla:
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) There is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) There is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express consent.
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the
accused on account of an order sustaining a motion to quash.49 More
specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint
against petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an
offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now
 substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure]
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to
dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly
sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such
judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek
to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first
valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a
subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because
matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the
facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the
respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule
that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
2. Villareal v. Aliga:
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the
accused in double jeopardy.
RULE 120: JUDGMENT
1. Ola v. People:
It is true that under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. However, petitioner must
be reminded that what she assails are interlocutory orders and it has already
been ruled by this Court that the above constitutional provision does not
apply to interlocutory orders because it refers only to decisions on the merits
and not to orders of the court resolving incidental matters.
2. Morillo v. People:
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the
aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal
 or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from
appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the
ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not
decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's
guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The
appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that
none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court's
jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such
dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may
be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.
3. Rodriguez v. People:
It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal
cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment of
conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the
trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt
of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.

Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice
an accused who must be accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in
civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within which to file an
appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a
conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If the
Court has accorded litigants in civil casesunder the spirit and rationale in
Neypesgreater leeway in filing an appeal through the "fresh period rule,"
with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases
which involve the accuseds "sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by
the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
RULE 122: APPEAL
1. Ramirez v. People:
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the period when an appeal from a judgment or final order in a criminal case
should be taken, viz:

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from
the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
 In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was
promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within
fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner
filed with the RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond
three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more than a year
later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her
motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction
has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.13 Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the
petitioners motion inasmuch as by the time the petitioner filed the same, the
appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
The Court has already stressed that "the right to appeal is not a natural right
and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the
same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the
right to appeal is lost."14
2. Sanchez v. FEBTC:
3. Villareal v. Aliga:
4. Domingo v. Colina: