EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO G.R. No.

195229,
October 9, 2012, Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and
had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for
the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official
from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 2010
cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion
on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the
Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and
thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then
Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the
permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to
the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En
Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and
had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption;
and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count
of falsification to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in
Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1
December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that
resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of
whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.
HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was
never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo,
the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 681 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."
All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely
nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor,
disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to
any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the
judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code,
temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office. The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of
the principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
1 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was
never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes
cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo,
who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the
highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in
the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of
votes.
Petition dismissed.
Magno vs Comelec
Post under Disqualification from office , Moral Turpitude , Political Law Case
Digests

Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualificationof Nestor Magno
as mayoraltycandidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001
elections on the ground that the latter was previously convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.

COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running
for the position of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
as follows:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidateand to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of his

sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his five-
yeardisqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
Likewise, he claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is the law applicable to the case, not the
Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads:
 Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving

moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
xxx

Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998
when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-
yeardisqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government
Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was qualified to run in the 2001
elections.

Issue: Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral

turpitude

Held: Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness,

or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.

However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently

depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this
case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements of
the crime of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by

himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is hisofficial duty to do;
and

4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes

isconnected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an
unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.

Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: What law should apply in the case?

Held: The Local Government Code.

The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local Government
Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case
of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail,
being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to
have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government
Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40
of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of the OEC.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law
entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter
is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature to reduce
the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two
years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of
the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude,

petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001
elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to
Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Petitioners disqualification ceased as of March 2000. (G.R. No. 147904,
October 4, 2002)
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DAN ERASMO, SR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012

FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated
to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to
return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a
sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the
same village where he lived and maintained a fish pond.
He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election
Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos name in the COMELEC
voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of
Jalosjos name from the official voters list. The MTC denied Erasmos petition.
He appealed to RTC but RTC upheld the MTC decision. On November 28, 2009
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the
requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the
Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because he failed
to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Subsequently, Jalosjos
won the elections
ISSUE: Whether or not Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency
requirement
HELD:
Jalosjos complied with the 1-year requirement. It is true that his domicial was
Quezon City, his domicile of origin, the place of his birth. However, his
domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there
at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country
for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia,
clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there.He has since lived nowhere
else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
As to the issue that he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile as he was living in his
brothers house, the court said that a candidate need to have a house in a
community to establish residence. It is sufficient that he rents a house or in
the house of a friend or relative. Only 2 important things must be proved:
actual physical presence and an intention of making it his domicile. Jaloslos
was able to prove the two requirements. Hence, he is qualified.
Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:

Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies
(COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for
President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called
"Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star
general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be
having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be
written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles
corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No.
Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec
can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the
qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have
the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's
act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this
constitutional provision?

CASE DIGEST

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.

Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he
is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president,
he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he
has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a

privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the

Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.
Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public
service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on
the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be

subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation
of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note
joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every
step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both

legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is
in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an

international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap,
who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII,
Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen
of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least
forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.