Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Consciousness
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Free Will
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Series Editor
David J. Chalmers, Australian National University
Simulating Minds
The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Alvin I. Goldman
The Senses
Edited by Fiona Macpherson
David Hodgson
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3
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1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Preface ix
Introduction 3
The problem of free will and responsibility 3
Compatibilism 4
Haldanes argument 5
How I will proceed 6
1. Foundational Beliefs 10
Can I be certain that I exist? 10
The need for language 14
Experiences and the external world 15
Foundational beliefs 18
3. Plausible Reasoning 37
Formal and informal reasoning 37
Induction 40
Bayes Theorem 43
Illustration of Bayes Theorem 45
Levels of cognitive processes 48
Core assertions about plausible reasoning 53
vi Contents
9. Indeterministic Free Will 153
Will and responsibility 154
Comparison with Kane 159
Agent-causation 162
Compatibilism 166
Assessment of compatibilism 171
Does luck swallow everything? 173
More about luck 177
Core assertions about indeterministic free will 179
Contents vii
Where are we going? 240
Can more specic beliefs be supported? 243
Potential for evil and good 244
Core assertions about the big picture 246
Appendix A
Why Bayes Theorem Works 249
Appendix B
Against Fundamentalism: Biblical Morality 251
Abraham and Isaac 251
The Passover 252
The Promised Land 253
The New Testament 253
References 255
Index 261
viii Contents
Preface
In my previous book The Mind Matters, published in 1991, I argued that our conscious
mental processes make a contribution to our decisions and actions over and above the
contribution made by physical processes of our brains. That book supported the view
that human beings do have free will in a robust and indeterministic sense; but left
much unsaid about what that contribution was.
In following years, I published articles in which I sought to develop and clarify my
ideas about free will, and also to relate them to questions about our responsibility for
our actions and the justication of retributory punishment in criminal law.
The idea at the heart of the present book, namely that conscious beings can respond
appositely to whole feature-rich experiences that do not engage with laws or rules of
any kind, was rst developed at some length in an article entitled Three Tricks of Con-
sciousness published in Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2002. Parts of chapters 5
and 6 of this book are derived from that article.
In 2007 I wrote a short article in which I attempted a systematic summary of my
thinking about free will, with a view to answering Galen Strawsons very persuasive
argument (referred to in chapter 9 of this book) against the very possibility of free will
and responsibility. This article was published by Times Literary Supplement in July of
that year under the title Partly Free.
It occurred to me that this article could provide a framework for a book bringing
together ideas I had been developing since 1991, and I set about writing a book based
on the article.
As with my previous book, much writing was done on my forty-minute train
journeys to and from my workplace. In addition, I was able to take a period of long
leave from my judicial work in 2009. One month of this was spent as a visiting
fellow at the Philosophy Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at the
Australian National University. There I greatly beneted from discussions with
David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, Declan Smithies, Michael Titelbaum, Martine
Nida-Ruemelin, Noa Latham and others, and also from discussions at seminars I
gave there.
ix
The book was also helped by very detailed comments from two reviewers for Oxford
University Press. I am also grateful for comments from Alan McCay, Jeff Gordon and
Julia Roy.
My greatest debt is to my wife Raewyn, without whose encouragement and support
I could not have undertaken this project and brought it to completion.
x Preface
Rationality
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Consciousness
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Free Will
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Introduction
In Red, the nal lm of Krzysztof Kieslowskis Three Colours trilogy, neighbours throw
a stone through a retired judges window, and the judge muses, I wonder what Id do
in their place. After a pause, he says, The same thing. The girl whos with him asks,
Youd throw stones? The judge replies, In their place, of course. And that goes for
everyone I judged. Given their lives, I would steal, Id kill, Id lie. Of course I would.
And he explains why his life took the course it did: All that because I wasnt in their
shoes, but mine.
Is it the case, as this exchange suggests, that everything we do is the inexorable play-
ing out of the role in life given to us by our genes and our circumstances, by nature and
nurture? Or is it the case that we have real alternatives and real choices about what we
do, so that our actions and our lives are not entirely determined by the luck of our
genes and circumstances, but are inuenced by decisions we can freely make and for
which we are truly responsible?
The problem of free will and responsibility is as old as philosophy itself, and has been
the subject of countless books and articles. There are those who think this problem is
now resolved, because science shows that we human beings are physical systems that
change over time in accordance with the laws of nature that govern all physical systems,
and thus cannot do other than as determined by those laws. According to these views,
whatever we do is either the inevitable product of our genes and our circumstances, or
of chance occurrences, or of some combination of the two; and there can be nothing in
our genes or circumstances (or indeed in chance or the laws of nature) for which we can
be ultimately responsible. Thus, everything ows from things that happened before we
were born or are otherwise outside our control, so that we cannot have free will in any
meaningful sense and cannot be truly responsible for our decisions and actions.
Some who think along these lines claim that these views provide a sympathetic ac-
count of human conduct, which humanely avoids the judgmental approach of blam-
ing people for their wrong actions (which, on these views, they cant help doing). They
say in particular that criminal conduct should properly be regarded as an illness to be
3
treated rather than wrongdoing to be punished, and that any idea of retribution is
based on primitive urges for revenge and should be abandoned.
I disagree with these views. In this book I set out a systematic and cumulative argu-
ment for the view that, while the engagement of our genes and our circumstances with
laws of nature makes an enormous contribution to the way we are and the way we
behave, we nevertheless do make real decisions that are not themselves wholly deter-
mined by that engagement and/or by chance, but are in a fundamental way truly down
to us. I argue that these choices are inuenced by input from our conscious experiences
that is not determined by laws or rules of any kind, but rather is the exercise of a capac-
ity that our consciousness gives us; and that we can thereby be partly responsible not
only for what we do, but also for the way our own characters turn out.
I will also suggest that the idea of retribution is far from primitive and inhumane, but
is rather a foundation of human rights. In short I say that if we do not punish people
because they are guilty, there is less reason to refrain from punishing people if and because
they are innocent. If it is regarded as acceptable that government ofcials treat citizens in
any such manner as appears to be most benecial, irrespective of whether persons so
treated have done anything to deserve that treatment, the way is left open for practices
like putting political dissidents into prisons or mental asylums. Respect for human rights
requires that, with limited exceptions, governments refrain from interfering with the
freedom of citizens unless the citizens have acted in breach of a publicly stated law, in
circumstances where they are responsible for the breach and can fairly be regarded as de-
serving punishmentin which case it becomes permissible to impose punishment that
is reasonably proportionate to the criminality of the conduct in question.
I also believe that, to make the most of life, one needs to recognise ones own respon-
sibility for ones own conduct and (at least partially) for ones own character. Denial of
responsibility does not necessarily result in fatalism, but it is not (I contend) conducive
to efcacious aspiration for virtue and achievement, or resolution to seek them in
ones own life.
COM PATI B I LI S M
So far Ive written as if there are just the two stark alternatives of (1) views denying free
will and responsibility and (2) views, such as that advocated in this book, asserting our
capacity to make decisions that are not wholly determined by engagement of our genes
and circumstances with laws of nature (or by some combination of such engagement
and chance). However, there is also a third class of views, to the effect that free will is
compatible with determinism: according to these views, it is fully consistent with our
having free will and responsibility that our decisions and actions be wholly determined
by engagement of our genes and circumstances with laws of nature.
HALDAN ES ARGU M E NT
One of the traditional arguments in favour of free will is the argument attributed to
biologist J. B. S. Haldane to the effect that we cant have reasonable grounds for believ-
ing determinism to be true, because if determinism were true we would simply believe
whatever we were caused to believe by deterministic processes, which govern our be-
liefs just as they govern everything else.
Two difculties with this argument have been recognised.
One is that it assumes that reasonable grounds for belief cannot be deterministic,
whereas it might be thought that our abilities to perceive accurately and to draw rea-
sonable inferences depend for their reliability upon processes that unfold regularly in
accordance with laws of nature and/or rules of logicthat is, on processes that are
deterministic. Thus, it can be argued, determinism supports the reasonableness of our
beliefs rather than the reverse.
The other is that the argument is purely negative: it doesnt give any positive reason
to believe in free will. Certainly, the argument doesnt explain how or why indetermin-
ism or free will could provide any sounder basis than determinism for reasonable
belief. It may be contended that to suggest any basis for reasonable belief other than
deterministic law-governed processes is to appeal to something mysterious or even
magical, a black box of which no explanation can be given.
This book may be regarded in part as a reworking of this traditional argument, in a
way that deals head-on with these two difculties.
As regards the rst difculty, I carefully consider the nature of human rationality, and
I argue that essential to this rationality is the ability to engage in plausible reasoning; that
is, in reasoning in which the premises or data do not entail the conclusions by virtue of
applicable rules for good reasoning, but rather support them as a matter of reasonable
albeit fallible judgment. And I offer an explanation as to how that kind of reasoning
could work in a way that is reasonable yet not determined by rules or laws of any kind.
Introduction 5
As regards the second difculty, I argue that there are very strong grounds for accept-
ing that human beings have the ability to make reasonable decisions about what to do
and what to believe (and to deny this would be to make all intellectual endeavours
pointless). Careful consideration of this ability shows that it requires both conscious-
ness and also the capacity to make choices that are reasonable yet not determined by
laws or rulesso that we have every reason to believe that we have this very capacity,
and thus that we have free will. I also suggest this capacity is no more mysterious than
consciousness itself.
My conclusion is that free will, so understood, is necessary for the ability that we ac-
tually have to make reasonable decisions, and thus is necessary if there is to be any
point to intellectual endeavours.
HOW I WI LL PRO CE E D
So in this book I argue that its reasonable to believe we have free will, in the sense that
we make real choices that are not themselves wholly determined by our genes and
environment and/or by chance, but are in a fundamental way truly down to us. Of
course, scientic discoveries about how the world works and how our brains work are
relevant to this view, and some would say they are incompatible with it; and I will
have regard to these discoveries. But my argument will take account also of wider
considerations.
Basic to my argument are the ideas (1) that in order to arrive at reasonable and justi-
ed beliefs we must use the abilities we have that are best able to produce such beliefs
and such justication; and (2) that these abilities are captured by the concept of ratio-
nality, which I understand as not being limited to intellectual ability but as including
all those perceptual, intellectual and emotional capabilities by use of which we can (at
least sometimes) make reasonable decisions about what to believe and what to do.
In relation to many questions it is rational to rely on the scientic method of formu-
lating and testing hypotheses, in order to arrive at reasonable beliefs about the world;
but it is important to appreciate that, although this method is a very important and
reliable way to arrive at reasonable beliefs, it is not the only way. For one thing, as I will
show, the scientic method itself presupposes the truth of some prior beliefs; and be-
liefs based on the scientic method cannot be more reliably true than the prior beliefs
on which the validity of the scientic method depends. I will argue that these prior
beliefs have rational support that does not depend on the scientic method.
Rationality is thus more fundamental than the scientic method; and it is also wider,
in that it can be applied to questions that cannot be addressed by the scientic method,
such as questions as to the nature of rationality itself, and also moral questions about
how we should conduct ourselves and what things we should value.
Introduction 7
And I support this proposal by an original argument of mine, to the effect that in our
conscious experiences we grasp and respond to whole feature-rich gestalts, which do
not as wholes engage with any applicable laws or rules.
In chapter 6, I consider in more detail how the grasp of gestalts contributes to rea-
sonable decision-making, in particular (1) by non-human animals that have conscious
experiences somewhat like ours, (2) in making aesthetic judgments, and (3) in plausi-
ble reasoning generally. My conclusion is that indeed our reasonable decision-making
utilises conscious experiences in which we grasp and respond to whole feature-rich
gestalts in ways that are not determined by laws or rules.
Having reached that point, in the next two chapters I consider how this conclusion
stands with science in general and neuroscience in particular.
In chapter 7, I consider whether the general picture of the world suggested by the
physical sciences is compatible with my conclusion. I argue that the best contemporary
physical theories support two propositions favourable to my position, namely that
causation is not local and that the world is not deterministic. I also argue that the so-
called block universe view, denying reality to the passage of time and suggesting an
unchanging (and in that sense deterministic) universe, is not reasonably tenable.
In chapter 8, I give an account of how the brain could work consistently with my ap-
proach, and consider whether this is compatible with what neuroscience tells us about
the brain. To the extent that neuroscience seems to leave no room for any contribution
from conscious experiences over and above their neural correlates, I contend this is a
manifestation of current neurosciences inability to give a satisfactory account of con-
sciousness generally, and does not count strongly against my approach.
In the next three chapters I discuss how my views on conscious decision-making
support ideas about free will, responsibility and retribution.
In chapter 9, I draw together my conclusions about free will and responsibility.
I distinguish my position from other views generally favourable to free will, including
views that free will is compatible with determinism, and views that suggest it is a spe-
cial kind of causation, called agent-causation, that gives us free will; and I show how my
position answers the luck swallows everything argument against responsibility.
In chapter 10, I further advance my support for ideas of retribution by developing the
idea that we can justly be praised or blamed (and even punished) for what we do, con-
sidering whether there can be any truth in value judgmentsbecause if there is not, how
could it be truly just to praise or blame anyone for anything? I also consider whether
we have the capacity to make reasonable judgments about these matters. In chapter 11,
I give reasons why I contend it is important to maintain ideas of responsibility and
retribution in the criminal law.
Finally, in chapter 12, I consider what my approach to free will suggests about our
universe and ourselves, concluding that our universe is not one of blind pitiless indif-
Introduction 9
1
Foundational Beliefs
Like Ren Descartes in the seventeenth century, I would like to start my enquiry with
something I can be absolutely certain about. Descartes asked himself what he could
not doubt, and answered to the effect that he could not doubt that he was asking this
question, leading him to be certain about both his thinking and his existence: I think
therefore I am.
As a young university student, I was quite impressed by the argument that the one
thing I could be certain about was my own existence and experiences, and that every-
thing else, including the existence of a world independent of me, and the existence of
other persons who also had experiences somewhat like mine, was uncertain, supported
at best by inconclusive inference. But I never embraced the view (called solipsism) that
I and my experiences are all that there is; and I never believed that there was any real
doubt about the existence of the outside world and other people, because I thought
the inference that these things existed was pretty strong. But I also thought this line of
argument tended to support Descartess starting point.
Later on, I realised that Descartess argument could not establish very much about
the nature of the I that was said to be doing the thinking and that therefore existed.
Certainly it could not establish that I was an immaterial soul or self, distinct from my
body, or something that could survive the death of my body. I still felt sure that for
there to be thinking there had to be a thinker; but I saw no compelling reason why the
thinker had to be non-material, or even had to persist beyond any particular occasion
of thinking.
So I came to accept Descartess premise I think as supporting no more than that
thinking is going on by something, with the possibility that this something could have
no more substance or longevity than the particular thinking in question.
Later again, I came to the view that even this formulation cannot be a satisfactory
starting point as the most certain of my beliefs. This is because its truth is conditioned
on the truth of certain assumptions, so that one cannot justiably be more certain
about this formulation than one is about those assumptions. There are two main rea-
sons for this.
10
First, this formulation distinguishes something doing the thinking from the thinking
itself, and thus presupposes that there is a thinker, albeit possibly an ephemeral one,
which is not itself merely part of the thinking. But perhaps the apparent thinker is
mere illusion, or a construction that is part of the thinking or at least not distinct from
the thinking. Perhaps there is no subject of experience that can be distinguished in a
satisfactory way from the content of the experience. This idea can be traced back to
Humes view of the self as a bundle of perceptions, and nds recent expression in the
views of people like the philosopher Daniel Dennett1 to the effect that our notion that
there is a self doing the thinking is a device selected by evolution to help the brain make
sense of its own processes. Now I disagree with these views, but they need to be ad-
dressed on a rmer basis than is appropriate at this stage of the enquiry.
Second, and more fundamentally, even the formulation thinking is going on by
something is an assertion the full signicance of which can be appreciated only
through a quite sophisticated understanding of the language in which the formulation
is expressed; so that the truth of this assertion is conditioned on the truth of assump-
tions about the correct use of this language and the correct use and meaning of expres-
sions within this language. How can I be certain that thinking is going on by something,
unless I have sufcient understanding of this expression to appreciate precisely what it
does assert and what it doesnt assert? This in turn requires an understanding of the
relevant language and how it is used. It could be argued that all that is necessary is to
understand just a few simple concepts; but while I will argue that some concepts are
sufciently simple not to raise questions concerning subtleties of language use, I con-
tend that the assertion thinking is going on by something does not have that kind of
simplicity. It raises difcult questions about exactly what thinking is (as distinct from
other kinds of mental activity), and exactly what it is for thinking to be by something.
These questions can be explored only through careful use and understanding of the
relevant language. And language presupposes a community of language users, and
practices as to the use of language by that community. So a belief that thinking is going
on by something cannot be justiably held with any more assurance than a belief that
there is a language in which words thinking and by something have a place and a
meaning.
The same considerations apply, perhaps with greater force, to the assertion I think,
because of difcult problems, mentioned above, associated with the meaning and sig-
nicance of I. That is, in addition to the problems raised by the question whether
there is a thinker of any kind distinct from the content of the experience, there are
problems raised by the question of exactly what is this I, what is the subject of
experience.
1
Dennett (2003), 24555.
Foundational Beliefs 11
So far in this chapter, Ive been explaining why something like Descartess I think
therefore I am is not my most certain belief. What then is my most certain belief? I will
set to one side beliefs that there is something rather than nothing and that things happen:
the beliefs I am concerned with are beliefs with some content about what it is that exists
and what it is that happens, and about how and why things exist and happen. The
belief of this kind of which I am most certain is:
Of course, Ive expressed this belief in the English language, and this expression
depends on there being such a language and on appropriate use of the words con-
scious, experiences and occur. But the idea expressed can be considered as quite a
primitive idea not depending on subtleties of language use. Understanding of the idea
does not presuppose sophisticated understanding of language use concerning prop-
erties of conscious experiences or kinds of conscious experiences or the existence of an
experiencer, or concerning distinctions between types or modes of occurrences.
Im not absolutely certain that non-human animals have conscious experiences,
although (as will appear shortly) I rmly believe that at least mammals and birds do.
Assuming that they do, I believe there is a sense in which an animal knows that an expe-
rience it has is occurring, for example that a pain it feels is occurring, even though of
course it could not express this in language. It is in that general sense that I am certain
above all else that conscious experiences occur.
When I feel a severe pain, I am certain that this pain is occurring. Whether it is
correct to call it pain, or to say it is my pain, or even my conscious experience, are
matters depending in part on language and its correct use; and I cannot justiably be
more certain about these things than I am about the existence of language and of lan-
guage users, and about the way language is used by them. But so long as I dont attempt
to categorise types of conscious experience, and so long as I dont attempt to identify
an experiencer, my belief in the occurrence of a pain that I feel can be considered as an
acceptance of an idea that does not depend on subtleties of language use; and taken in
that sense, my belief that conscious experiences occur is more certain than any other
belief I have. And while I have selected pain as my rst example of conscious experi-
ences, the conscious experiences, of whose occurrence I am certain, extend to the
whole range of conscious sensory, perceptual, cognitive and emotional occurrences
that make up my ongoing conscious experiencing (although, I repeat, I do not include
the categorisation of these experiences as part of this most certain belief).
Of course, the questions of what is consciousness, and what is its place in the world,
are extremely difcult and controversial questions; but in this most basic belief I am
not asserting anything about these questions. I am merely saying, about such conscious
Foundational Beliefs 13
I believe there is a sense in which an animal can know that an experience it has is
changing, for example that sound it hears is not constant, even though of course it
could not express this in language. It is in that general sense that I have high certainty
that some conscious experiences change; and I would challenge anyone to come up
with any reason for doubting this.
So I give as my second belief:
This too might be considered trite, vague and general; but I think it too is important,
particularly because it is not adequately accommodated or explained by a prominent
scientic view about the universe and nature of time. I will return to this in chapter 7.
TH E N E E D FOR LANGUAGE
Now, once I attempt to go beyond the beliefs that conscious experiences occur and that
some conscious experiences change, I nd I cannot formulate and consider beliefs in
any useful way without drawing distinctions that need to be identied with some pre-
cision in language. There is a sense in which I, like non-human mammals and pre-
linguistic human beings, can have quite complex beliefs about the world that do not
depend on their being expressed in language. For example, a lion may believe in the
existence of its prey that it sees, and a baby may believe in the existence of a toy it is
grasping, and these beliefs would not depend on language. But for me to achieve
anything constructive in formulating my beliefs, and even in thinking about them,
I have to use language and use it correctly; and this in turn depends on my having
an understanding of how language is used by a community of language users.
My experience of life, my interactions with other people, my observations of their
use of language, and my own use of language, give me strong reasons to believe in the
existence of language and in the existence of communities of language users, of one of
which I am a member. There is no good reason for me not to believe in these things,
and this belief is necessary if I am going to make sound progress in expressing or even
thinking about my beliefs. So I think it is reasonable to place next in my hierarchy of
fundamental beliefs the following:
1.3. There is language, and there are communities of language users, of one of which I am
a member.
This belief does not say much about the characteristics of members of the language
community that includes me, other than that they have the ability to use the language
1.4. My community of language users consists of human beings, a species of animal life,
and I am a human being.
1.5. The actual experiences that give me certainty that conscious experiences occur are
experiences that I have, and other human beings also have experiences of the same general
kind.
There also seem to be many features of the world in which we human beings live that
are expressed and described in language, but are not themselves experiences of human
beings, although they seem to be objects of experiences and potentially causative of
experiences.
Foundational Beliefs 15
There is a vast philosophical literature concerning the place of conscious experiences
in the world and their relationship with other aspects of the world; and there are many
possible views.
One, called idealism, is to the effect that everything that exists is a kind of conscious
experience or somehow reducible to conscious experience. Another, called materi-
alism or physicalism, is to the effect that everything that exists is physical (of the nature
of matter, energy and the like), and that conscious experiences are correctly consid-
ered as just one way of regarding or describing certain physical things or states or
processes. Both of these views are species of monism, which holds that there is one
basic mode of existence. Other views fall into the broad category of dualism, which
holds that there are two basic modes of existence, that of conscious experience (or the
subjective) and that of the physical world (or the objective), the latter of which can
cause conscious experiences but is fundamentally distinct from conscious
experiences.
There are two broad kinds of dualism: the dualism of substance associated with
Descartes, drawing a distinction between immaterial souls or selves which have expe-
riences, and material brains and bodies and other things that dont; and dual aspect
theories, according to which at least some things or systems may have both a material
or physical aspect and also a mental or experiential aspect. And within dual aspect the-
ories, there are those that in effect say that there is a dual aspect to everything (panpsy-
chism) and those that say that the capacity for experience is an aspect only of things
like the central nervous systems of humans and animals, and thus has emerged only
with the development of such systems.
And there are other theories that may be considered as denying all the above; in
particular, theories saying that the physical and the experiential are manifestations of
something else common to both (neutral monism), some of which assert that the dis-
tinction between the physical and the experiential is just one of many distinctions of
similar importance that can be drawn concerning what exists.
Table 1.1 shows the general relationship between these views.
Some of the distinctions between some of these views are not sharp. In particular,
there are versions of panpsychism that recognise gradations of the experiential aspect
of things, from the full consciousness of human beings down to some minimal con-
sciousness or potential for consciousness, and these versions can come very close to
emergence theories. And the distinction between neutral monism and dual aspect the-
ories is also not sharp, lying mainly in the degree of emphasis given to the distinction
between the physical and the experiential.
I cant attempt to resolve the differences between these views at this stage of my
enquiry or with the assurance required here. But I can make two preliminary observa-
tions about them, and express three further beliefs that I hold with high condence.
Monism Dualism
1.6. There is a world external to the conscious experiences of individual human beings,
features of which are accessible in common by human beings and describable in
language.
Foundational Beliefs 17
1.7. Our language may describe at least some of these features by reference to how these
features seem to normal human beings, and this may not adequately describe how they are
in themselves, independently of any experience of them by us.
Second, I am certain that human beings who are awake and functioning normally have
conscious experiences like mine, and I believe with high condence that other mammals
and also birds have the capacity for conscious experiences somewhat like mine, because
of their similarities to human beings in physical constitution, origins and behaviour. I
believe with decreasing condence that much the same is true of reptiles, amphibians,
sh and invertebrates. I think it unlikely that either plants or more primitive forms of life
have that capacity. I believe with very high condence that anything that is not alive, such
as a rock, does not have conscious experiences in the same sort of way as humans and at
least some other animals have experiences. Thus with high condence I believe:
1.8. Some entities or systems (including humans and some non-human animals) have
conscious experiences more or less like mine, and some (including rocks) do not.
This is not an outright rejection of panpsychism. I am not asserting that there could not
be some primitive experiential aspect to non-living things, merely that they are not con-
scious in the sense of having experiences that are in any way similar to the experiences
that human beings have, and that (I believe) some non-human animals also have.
There are some scientists and philosophers who contend that some non-living sys-
tems, such as computers, are or may be conscious in this sense. In chapters 4 to 6 I
will argue for views indicating that computers, in their present form, could not be
conscious; and that the exponential increases in computing power that are expected
to occur in coming years will not make them conscious. So in that crucial respect, I
suggest, computers are more like rocks than like human brains.
FOU N DATIONAL B E LI E FS
Foundational Beliefs 19
2
Truth and Rationality
In the previous chapter, I put belief in the existence of language and language users
towards the top of my list of beliefs, because there were strong reasons for this belief
and because this belief was necessary for any useful consideration and elaboration of
beliefs about the world. Much the same applies to my belief in truth and rationality.
I am aiming for an understanding of free will and responsibility, an understanding that
includes beliefs about these topics that are as close as possible to the truth: otherwise,
so it seems to me, the whole enterprise would be empty. And I can be condent that my
beliefs are true or close to the truth only if they are supported by reason, and if I believe
in the reliability of reason. If I did not believe in reason, and in particular in my own
rationality, I could have no sound basis for condence in any of my beliefs; and again,
there would be no point in my addressing these questions.
TR UTH
I am aiming for true beliefs, and I am expressing my beliefs as assertions in the English
language. What is it that makes such assertions true or not true?
For a start, I accept what is called the minimalist statement of what truth is, to the
effect that an assertion such as x is y is true if x is y: I do not think this much can rea-
sonably be denied. But more needs to said about truth, because the minimalist state-
ment does not answer the question, what is it for x to be y? Is it something about a
reality that can be distinguished from the assertion x is y, or is it rather that the asser-
tion itself is justied in some way other than by its relationship to some other reality?
And if the latter, is there something universal about the relevant justications, or are
they relative to different times and places and interests? There is an enormous philo-
sophical literature on the topic of truth, and it is beyond the scope of this book to
discuss it in detail;1 but I think it important to my overall case to make it clear what my
views on truth are.
1
A useful summary of some of the issues can be found in Blackburn (2005).
20
My basic position is that what can make an assertion true is its relationship to reality,
albeit that in some cases the reality itself may be dependent on or partly constituted by
our theories, our concepts, and our language. Of course, we can justiably believe that
an assertion is true only if it is justied by reasons that support the existence of the ap-
propriate relationship to reality; but I say that it is this relationship to reality that can
make the assertion true, and that while other justications may support the reason-
ableness of belief in the assertion, they are not constitutive of its truth.
What then is the relevant relationship to reality? It is sometimes said that it is corre-
spondence with reality. I agree with this, but only if correspondence with reality is un-
derstood in a particular way. Consistently with the minimalist statement of what truth
is, I say that an assertion is true if what it asserts is fact or reality (something that is
and/or was the case, and/or occurs and/or occurred): truth, I say, is correspondence with
reality, with the required correspondence being one of assertion or meaning.
2.1. Truth is correspondence with reality by way of meaning; that is, an assertion is true
if what it asserts is fact or reality.
This assertion could be taken as implying that the phenomenon described occurred in
Sydney itself, and that it did so by reason of the movement of the sun rather than the
rotation of the Earth; and to the extent that it was so taken it would be false. But gener-
ally it would not be taken that way and, assuming the phenomenon did occur at the
time asserted, the assertion would be recognised as unambiguously true.
But language is not limited to dealing in a straightforward way with everyday mat-
ters; and when language is applied to other than everyday matters, truth may only be a
1. The Magna Carta was the foundation for the development of democracy in England.
2. The Magna Carta has nothing to do with democracy: it was just a document resolving
particular disputes between the monarch and members of the aristocracy.
In each case, what is asserted is not a straightforward occurrence or state of affairs, but
rather ideas that themselves depend on language, interpretation and evaluation. In
relation to assertions like these, correspondence with reality is not a straightforward
matter, but depends in part on reasonableness in use of concepts and in interpretation
and evaluation; so that there may be a large grey area where statements are not unam-
biguously true or not true. The view can be taken that, although these two statements
are contradictory, there is an element of truth in each of them.
However, by 1930 it was clear that photons and electrons displayed wave-like properties
under some experimental arrangements and particle-like properties under other exper-
imental arrangements. There was no single concept in our language that adequately
expressed what they were; and the best description that could be given of them in ordi-
nary language was that they were in a sense both waves and particles. This apparent
inconsistency did not prevent this from being the description in ordinary language that
was closest to the truth; and according to the pioneering quantum physicist Niels Bohrs
principle of complementarity, such inconsistent descriptions were acceptable in cases
where the incompatible properties could not be displayed simultaneously.
Where (as with many philosophical issues) an assertion is about matters remote
from the practical situations that were the main concerns of language users as language
evolved, our language may be less than fully adequate to express the reality of the
matter, so that the application of the concepts of truth and falsity becomes problem-
atic. This may be so in relation to matters such as consciousness and free will, the
topics of this book.
It is probably so in relation to matters such as the nature of our existence, the exis-
tence and role of any superhuman consciousness or intelligence or purpose, the exis-
2.2. Where assertions are about ideas or interpretations or evaluations, or where lan-
guage is inadequate to express the reality under consideration, truth may be a matter of
degree; and sometimes reality can best be expressed by poetry or metaphor, or even by a
number of inconsistent metaphors.
It is partly for this reason that I believe some philosophical controversies are arid: for
example, disputes about whether the world really consists of facts not things, as the
young Wittgenstein asserted, or whether it really consists of states of affairs, or pro-
cesses, or events. In relation to these matters, the question is not so much truth as such,
but rather the relative merits of different categorisations, each of which may have
advantages and disadvantages.
However, ideas and language can develop, and this may in time allow more accurate
expression of what were previously mysteries. To some extent this has occurred with
quantum mechanics, as understanding has improved; although there are still para-
doxes for which our language seems to be inadequate. So:
2.3. Developing understanding may extend the range of language, so that it can better
express more of reality.
R E LATIVITY OF TR UTH?
Problems such as those I have been discussing have led some writers to argue that it is
pointless to postulate some reality outside our assertions to which our assertions cor-
respond if they are true, because reality itself is so much shaped and constituted by our
ideas; and therefore these writers reject correspondence theories of truth, and adopt
relativistic views of truth.2 Generally, these views are something like the models
For a persuasive and moderate version of this approach, see Putnam (1981), 4954; and a more
2
2.4. Relativistic views of truth must be rejected because they are self-refuting, and make
rational appraisal of beliefs impossible.
RATIONALITY
As well as giving human beings the capacity to nd out about the world and to make
reasonable decisions about what to believe, I contend that rationality also gives us the
capacity to make reasonable decisions about what to do. I believe with high condence:
I dont think many people will seriously dispute this, although later in this chapter
I will consider an argument to the contrary effect.
We all live our lives in the belief that we have this ability, and our experiences of
our own decisions and those of other people generally conrm this. Of course ev-
eryone makes mistakes, and people do and believe silly things; but generally reasons
for this can be found, reasons that are consistent with the existence, in most persons
at least, of the ability to make reasonable decisions. Most importantly, while it is
often appropriate to question the rationality of particular beliefs or ways of reason-
ing, the whole enterprise of formation and justication of beliefs must depend on ulti-
mate condence in rationality. Any intellectual enquiry must assume that those
engaged in the enquiry have the ability to make reasonable decisions about what to
believe. The rejection of this assumption would make all intellectual endeavours
pointless.
In saying this, I am not of course saying that what we believe always depends on deci-
sions we make. In many respects, we believe things without making any decisions to
believe them, and we may be quite unable to make a decision to believe otherwise: in
those cases, belief is not a matter of decision at all. What I am saying is that when there
are inconclusive reasons supporting a belief, and particularly when there are reasons
for and against a belief, we do make decisions as to what conclusion is to be drawn, and
thus as to what to believe about the particular matter in question. This happens often
in my work as a judge. I have to come to a decision as to what happened between the
parties to a case, and there is often conicting inconclusive evidence about this. When
I make my decision as to what is established by the evidence, I come to have beliefs
about the happening of various events, beliefs that I may hold with varying degrees of
assurance. I dont think it can be denied that these beliefs are the result of decisions
made by me, on the basis of the evidence I have heard.
Ultimately my condence in my beliefs must depend on my condence in my own
rationality; but then, my own rationality can also give me condence in the rationality
and reliability of other human beings. In relation to matters that I cannot perceive for
myself, or cannot understand, it may be very reasonable to believe things just because
they are asserted by those who appear to be in a position to know them, particularly if
there is a consensus among these persons.
2.8. The scientic method of experimentation is a very reliable method for arriving at
well-supported beliefs, but it is not the only way beliefs can have rational support.
3
See Cleland (2002).
FALLACI E S AN D B IAS E S
Before leaving my discussion of truth and rationality, I should acknowledge that there is
extensive psychological research (much of it based on pioneering work of Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky)4 showing that in some respects people generally reason rather
badly, in fairly predictable waysthat various cognitive illusions, biases, and fallacies
pervade human reasoning. I will briey discuss some of these results, and also look at an
example5 of philosophical arguments that have been advanced on the basis of these
results against ordinary human rationality, and even against truth as a cognitive virtue.
I will start with two well-known psychological experiments.6
The rst illustrates the conjunction fallacy: the failure to recognise that the likeli-
hood of a conjunction of events or states of affairs can never be greater than the likeli-
hood of any element of that conjunction. This is the famous case of Linda.
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.
Experiments were conducted in which subjects were asked to rank, in order of prob-
ability, a number of statements about Linda. Perhaps the most telling result concerned
142 subjects, asked to rank in order of probability the statements Linda is a bank teller
and Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Eighty-ve percent
ranked the latter as more likely.
The second is an example of a selection task. Subjects were presented with four cards like
those shown in gure 2.1, with one half of each card masked; and were asked to determine
which of the cards they needed to see fully in order to answer decisively whether or not it
was true that, for these cards, if there is a circle on the left there is a circle on the right.
In one experiment, only ve out of 128 university students gave the correct answer,
namely (a) and (d). The two most common wrong answers were that one must see (a)
and (c), and that one need only see (a).
4
A useful collection on this is Kahneman et al. (1982).
5
In Stich (1990).
6
Given in Stich (1990), 47.
Figure 2.1 A selection task, with the masked part of each card shown in black
There are many more categories of pervasive error that have been researched: I will
give a list of some of them.7
1. Hindsight illusion: the tendency to overestimate what could have been anticipated
by others, to view what actually happened as inevitable, and to misremember ones
own contrary predictions.
2. Overcondence and underqualication: the tendency to be overcondent about ones
judgments, particularly in relatively difcult tasks and in areas where one is not
qualied.
3. False-consensus bias: the tendency to believe that ones own behaviour and responses
are typical and appropriate.
4. Framing bias: the tendency for logically inconsequential changes in how problems
are stated to dramatically affect preferences and choice.
5. Salience and vividness: the tendency to overvalue aspects of ones environment that
are salient or vivid.
6. Conrmatory evidence bias: the tendency to ignore information that would discon-
rm held beliefs or expectations.
Now this research does show that there are deciencies, fallacies, and biases in much
human reasoning. Undoubtedly human reasoning does not always, as good reasoning
should do, comply with all rules of logic (I will use that word here in a wide sense as
including probability theory and mathematics, where these are relevant). Nor does it
always take into account relevant biases.
However, the considerable literature on this research tends itself to overlook a vital
point, which I will discuss in the next chapter. It is impossible to conduct all reasoning
by using rules of logic, aided by observation. In much signicant reasoning, the most
important steps (both in selecting premises and in moving from premises to conclu-
sions) depend on our instinctive informal rationality. Use of rules of logic will help
avoid error, but in realistic situations these rules often cannot of themselves support
non-trivial conclusions.
7
Taken from Sharp (1995), 8693.
Some writers have been tempted by the Wittgensteinian idea that epistemic assess-
ments must come to an end with the criteria embedded in our ordinary concepts
of cognitive evaluation. But surely this is nonsense. Both our notions of epistemic
evaluation and (more important) our cognitive processes themselves can be evalu-
8
Stich (1990).
9
Stich (1990), 2021.
1. As I will argue in the next chapter, there are not and (I believe) never will be purely
formal and/or empirical criteria for good reasoningso in any ultimate assessment of
reasoning we have to fall back on some kind of instinctive informal rationality, albeit
one that has regard to our vulnerability to fallacies and biases and that is assisted by such
processes as peer review and debate. This is essentially what I understand to be the
Wittgensteinian idea that Stich dismisses as nonsense; but his own suggestion that there
be instrumental evaluation is put forward by him (along with all the contentions in his
book) for appraisal by his readers on the basis of arguments that appeal to just this
instinctive informal rationality. That is, Stich does not in his own arguments appeal to
instrumental evaluation of his ideas, but only to the general rationality of the reader.
2. The instrumental evaluation of cognitive processes that Stich advocates depends
upon assessments both of the efcacy of those processes to produce certain states of
affairs and of the values of such states of affairs and of alternatives. If Stich is to be
consistent, then these assessments themselves, and every step in these assessments,
have to be measured, not against the criterion of truth or even of rationality, but against
the very same criteria of efcacy and valuesand so on ad innitum, unless at some
stage there is an appeal to what can be accepted as true on the basis (at least in part) of
our instinctive informal rationality. If it be said that Stich is insisting on instrumental
evaluation only of notions of epistemic evaluation and of our cognitive processes, not
of every step in making these instrumental evaluations or of other more everyday
enquiries, then I would point to his rejection as nonsense of the idea that epistemic
assessments must come to an end with the criteria embedded in our ordinary concepts
of cognitive evaluation: this commits Stich to instrumental evaluation all the way
down, and Stich does not suggest that everyday enquiries are exempted from his stric-
tures and his proposal. And if it be said that Stich does not propose instrumental
assessment of values, but merely an appeal to values we happen to have, the problem is
not reduced: the questions of what are the values we happen to have, and indeed who
are the relevant we, must on his view be subject to the same instrumental evaluation,
As an illustration of all this, consider a criminal trial in which a person has been
charged with murder, and it can be accepted (on the basis of overwhelming evidence)
that the victim was killed by being shot once at close range by a person who was the
only other person in the vicinity.
2.9. Rationality is fallible, and needs to be subject to scrutiny and debate in order to
minimise errors, fallacies and biases; but ultimate reliance on ordinary human rationality
is justied and is necessary for all intellectual endeavours.
2.1. Truth is correspondence with reality by way of meaning; that is, an assertion is true
if what it asserts is fact or reality.
2.2. Where assertions are about ideas or interpretations or evaluations, or where lan-
guage is inadequate to express the reality under consideration, truth may be a matter of
degree; and sometimes reality can best be expressed by poetry or metaphor, or even by a
number of inconsistent metaphors.
2.3. Developing understanding may extend the range of language, so that it can better
express more of reality.
2.4. Relativistic views of truth must be rejected because they are self-refuting, and make
rational appraisal of beliefs impossible.
2.5. Rationality is to be understood as extending to all those capabilities that contribute
to reasonable human decision-making.
2.6. I and other human beings are rational, particularly in having the ability to make
reasonable decisions about what to believe and what to do.
2.7. My condence in my beliefs depends ultimately on my condence in my own ratio-
nality, but my rationality gives me good reason for condence in things asserted by those
in a position to know them, particularly where there is consensus.
2.8. The scientic method of experimentation is a very reliable method for arriving at
well-supported beliefs, but it is not the only way beliefs can have rational support.
2.9. Rationality is fallible, and needs to be subject to scrutiny and debate in order to
minimise errors, fallacies and biases; but ultimate reliance on ordinary human rationality
is justied and is necessary for all intellectual endeavours.
I have set out reasons why I believe in ordinary human rationality, and why I believe
that this rationality is a necessary basis (and assumption) of all intellectual endeavours,
including philosophy and science. In this chapter, I argue there are not and never will
be purely formal criteria for good reasoningso that in any ultimate assessment of
reasoning and beliefs we have to fall back on some kind of instinctive informal ratio-
nality. This is a precursor to my argument in later chapters that our rationality depends
at least in part on conscious processes that are neither random nor wholly determined
by rules of any kind.
An important aspect of our rationality is that we reach and justify conclusions as to
what to believe and what to do on the basis of reasons, some of which serve as the
premises or data on which our conclusions are based.
In some cases, the relationship between a conclusion and the premises or data can be
expressed in terms of precise and conclusive rules; so that the conclusion can be reached
and justied mechanically, in the sense that it can be reached and justied as deter-
mined exactly by engagement of the rules with the premises or data which, along with
the rules, constitute the reasons for the conclusion.
This kind of reasoning is called formal reasoning or algorithmic reasoning. The most
obvious examples of formal reasoning are to be found in the elds of logic, probability
theory, mathematics and articial intelligence (although I do not of course suggest that
all reasoning in these elds is formal reasoning). Given the premises or data, no ele-
ment of judgment is involved in this kind of reasoning; and although the rules in ques-
tion here are rules of inference or computational rules rather than the laws of nature
investigated by physicists, we know that machines, whose operations are for practical
purposes wholly determined by laws of nature, can be constructed in such a way as to
give effect to these rules of inference. Indeed, all the operations of computers can be
considered as being in a sense processes of formal or algorithmic reasoning.
However, most human reasoning is not of this type, on the surface at least. Most
human reasoning is not overtly algorithmic: it does not overtly proceed precisely as
37
determined by rules of logic and/or probability and/or mathematics, or any other rules
that could be incorporated into a computer program. When we are trying to make a
reasonable decision as to what to believe or what to do, very often the reasons we see
for and against alternative beliefs or actions are inconclusive, and there is an apparent
gap between reasons on the one hand and decisions about what to believe and what to
do on the other.1 A decision then cannot be made by overt mechanical application of
precise and conclusive rules, but rather requires the exercise of reasonable albeit fallible
judgment. This kind of reasoning is called informal reasoning or plausible reasoning;
and most of the reasoning we encounter in everyday life, as well as in scientic and
philosophical writings, is of this kind.
To the extent to which there are rules operating overtly in this kind of reasoning, they
are generally not the precise conclusive rules of formal reasoning, but rather are rules
that apply ceteris paribus (other things being equal) and thus can give way to opposing
considerationswith no exact specication of what opposing considerations would
be sufcient to defeat them. Such rules are one example of what have been called2 the
soft constraints of factors relevant to human decision-making.
Clear examples of plausible reasoning supporting decisions as to what to believe can
be found in the judgments given by judges in deciding the facts of court cases they have
heard. Very often, there are contemporary documents that to some extent record what
happened, and there is sworn oral evidence given by witnesses in court. There may be
conicts between oral evidence given by different witnesses, and some or all of this evi-
dence may conict to a greater or lesser extent with contemporary records. Opposing
accounts of what people did may appear to conform to how one would expect people
to behave in the circumstances in question, or to deviate to a greater or lesser extent
from such expectations. The behaviour of the witnesses in giving their evidence may
give an impression of honesty or dishonesty, or of good or poor memory. Evidentiary
conicts of these kinds are not, and I say cannot be, resolved by explicit formal reason-
ing. The conicting considerations are inconclusive and of different kinds, and there is
no way in which a judge can overtly apply precise rules of formal reasoning to them in
such a way as to determine a conclusion. And yet, I contend, reasonable albeit fallible
decisions are made.
Much the same applies to decisions as to what to do. These decisions may require
decisions as to what to believe, but they may also require resolution of motivational
reasons, that is, a determination as to which desire or inclination is to be followed.
David Hume contended that reason has a very limited role in this latter process, being
limited to (1) determining beliefs about facts on which desires may be based and (2)
1
Cf. Hodgson (1999), 2056, and Searle (2001), 1317.
2
Horgan and Tienson (2006).
3.1. An important part of our rationality is the ability to engage in plausible reasoning,
in which premises or data do not entail conclusions by virtue of applicable rules but rather
support them as a matter of reasonable albeit fallible judgment.
Plainly, plausible reasoning is required for many matters that science cannot address;
but also, importantly, the scientic method itself depends heavily on plausible reason-
ing. It depends on plausible reasoning at least in (1) the formulation of hypotheses to
be tested, (2) the devising of experiments to test them, and (3) the selection of which
unrefuted hypotheses should be provisionally accepted (because although experiments
Plausible Reasoning 39
can refute general assertions about the world, they cannot give them positive support
without the aid of plausible reasoning).
The second of these three areas requiring plausible reasoning may be considered as
being distinct from the other two, as it is concerned with practicalities and techniques
more than with questions of what to believe. The rst and third of them are more di-
rectly concerned with questions of what to believe, and are interdependent: they give
rise to the problem of induction, which I will consider in the next section. I will suggest
they mean that one cannot reasonably be any more condent about the truth of any
general assertion about the world than one is about the reliability of the plausible rea-
soning necessary to support it.
So I say:
3.2. If plausible reasoning could not support reasonable decisions about what to believe,
science would be impossible.
I N DUCTION
One important aspect of plausible reasoning is the ability to reason by induction, that
is, the process of supporting general statements, such as hypotheses or theories stating
laws of nature, by reference to particular or singular statements, such as reports of
observations or experiments.
If one seeks to justify the assertion All ravens are black by reference to numerous
observations of black ravens and no observations of ravens that are not black, that is
an example of induction or inductive inference. Most actual uses of induction are
more complex than this, but they all involve the same basic process. The experimental
or observational evidence for any scientic hypothesis or theory, if expressed as state-
ments, comprises a large number of particular or singular statements, which are par-
ticular instances that follow from the hypothesis or theory.
However, it is not merely experimental or observational evidence that may make it
reasonable to believe that a hypothesis or theory is true or approximately true. For one
thing, there are other criteria for selecting hypotheses or theories that may reasonably
be accepted, such as the criteria of simplicity, explanatory content, and coherence with
other theories. These criteria are the subject not of denite and conclusive rules that
could be used in formal reasoning, but rather of ceteris paribus rules or soft con-
straints appropriate for the reasonable but fallible judgments of plausible reasoning.
The application of criteria like these is required for the formulation of hypotheses to
be tested, the rst of the three areas referred to above where the scientic method de-
pends on plausible reasoning (which may also be considered as one type of abductive
reasoning, referred to later). As pointed out by Hilary Putnam, selection of that kind is
3
Putnam (1979), 352.
4
Goodman (1965), chap. 3.
5
In Hempel (1965), 1120.
Plausible Reasoning 41
Goodmans new riddle, many reasons can be given why it is reasonable to regard the
observation of a black raven as giving some support to the hypothesis All ravens are
black but the observation of a red pen giving no support to it; but Hempels point is
that it is not possible to identify rules the mechanical application of which determines
when there is conrmation or what is the strength of that conrmation.
All the above is additional to another problem of induction identied by David Hume
in the eighteenth century, namely that it depends on an assumption that the future will
resemble the past.6 A similar point was made by Karl Popper7 in terms of an innite
regress: if there is a principle of induction that can, in combination with particular
statements, justify general statements, then this principle must itself be a general state-
ment, requiring a principle of induction to justify it, giving rise to an innite regress.
Both Hume and Popper also applied their argument to inferences from particular
statements to the probability of general statements. As Popper points out (par. 81), a
statement that a hypothesis is probably true cannot be derived from particular state-
ments unless the latter are combined with some principle of induction which is itself
accepted as true or probably true; so there is still an innite regress.
Popper suggested one way of dealing with this problem, namely to say that the
method of science is that of conjecture and refutation; and that science can justify the
rejection of general statements about the world, but cannot give even the slightest posi-
tive support to the truth of such statements.
One difculty with this approach is the theory-laden character of particular observa-
tions: it is now generally accepted that we see (and hear and feel) the world as we do in
part because of our beliefs about the world and our consequent expectations.
Apparently, according to Popper, we have to take general beliefs on faith unless and
until they are refuted; but Popper offers no way of choosing what to believe from the
vast range of conicting unrefuted general statements about the world. And this in
turn would suggest that, in so far as our particular observations depend on relevant
general beliefs, we cannot rely even on our particular observations.
Another difculty is that Popper does not show how or why his own general asser-
tions, including those about the scientic method, should be given any higher status
than that of an unrefuted scientic conjecture; and thus as assertions whose truth has
(and can be given) no positive support whatsoever.
I think most of us accept, contrary to Popper, that science gives us good reason to
believe that certain general statements about the world are probably at least approxi-
mately true; and that the progress of science delivers closer approximations and greater
probabilities. But the arguments about induction show that this can only be by way of
6
Hume (1748), 57.
7
Popper (1959), 29.
3.3. Induction does provide good grounds for believing that some general statements
about the world are probably at least approximately true, but only by way of informal
plausible reasoning.
3.4. Induction and other forms of plausible reasoning cannot be reduced to any kind of
algorithmic process overtly using discovered or invented rules for good reasoning.
BAYE S TH EOR E M
Notwithstanding arguments of the kind outlined above, over the centuries there have
been arguments to the effect that plausible reasoning can be formalised. Indeed, some
people have claimed that plausible reasoning must be capable of being formalised if it
is to be relied on: its been said that if a conclusion does not follow from premises or
data on the basis of rules of logic or other rules of good reasoning, then it is not sup-
ported by them at all.
The basis of the most signicant attempts to formalise plausible reasoning, whether
by way of induction or otherwise, is Bayes Theorem, an equation of probability theory
devised in the eighteenth century by the Reverend Thomas Bayes. Bayes Theorem is
soundly based on plausible axioms of probability;8 and it concerns the effect of par-
ticular pieces of evidence on the probability of a hypothesis.
8
See Robertson and Vignaux (1993), and appendix A to this book.
Plausible Reasoning 43
One has to start with three prior probabilities, that is, probabilities prior to determin-
ing the effect of the evidence: the prior probability of the hypothesis itself; and the prior
probabilities of the piece of evidence in each of two supposed circumstancesrst, if
the hypothesis is true, and second, if the hypothesis is not true. Then, the theorem gives
a formula according to which the evidence changes the probability of the hypothesis.
Although the theorem can be expressed in various ways, I think it is easiest to under-
stand and apply if it is expressed in terms of odds (rather than direct probabilities) and
what have been called likelihood ratios.
Let us suppose that, prior to taking account of some evidence, the probability that a
hypothesis is true is 0.6 and the probability that it is not true is 0.4, so that the odds
that it is true rather than not true prior to taking account of the additional evidence,
called the prior odds, are 6:4. Let us suppose that there is then evidence, the probability
of which if the hypothesis is true is 0.8, and the probability of which if the hypothesis
is not true is 0.6. (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 1: the evidence could
in fact be very probable or improbable whether the hypothesis is true or not.) This evi-
dence gives what is called a likelihood ratio, in favour of the hypothesis being true, of
8/6. The odds version of Bayes Theorem then says that you multiply the prior odds by
the likelihood ratio, and this will then give you the odds that take into account the evi-
dence, called the posterior odds. In this case, the posterior odds are 6:4 8/6, that is, 8:4
or 2:1. Odds of 2:1 give a probability of 2/3 or 0.67 (to two decimal places).
In this case, then, the evidence has increased the probability that the hypothesis is
true from 0.6 to 0.67.
So, Bayes Theorem can be stated as follows:
1. Odds are a measure of the comparative probabilities of a hypothesis and its negation
such that odds of x:y for a hypothesis give probabilities of x/ (x + y) for the hypoth-
esis and y/ (x + y) for its negation.
2. Prior odds are the odds as between the hypothesis and its negation prior to taking
into account the further evidence.
3. Posterior odds are the odds as between the hypothesis and its negation after taking
into account the further evidence.
4. Likelihood ratio is the ratio between the probability of the further evidence if the hypoth-
esis is true and the probability of the further evidence if the hypothesis is not true.
Bayes Theorem can be applied successively as further pieces of evidence are consid-
ered: the order of application is immaterial. The posterior odds after each application
of the theorem become the prior odds for the next.
All this can usefully be illustrated by an example, based upon a simplied version of
the facts of a decided court case, namely the New South Wales Court of Appeal deci-
sion in Stewart v. Ng [1999] NSWCA 387.
In that case, the defendant performed a tubal ligation on the plaintiff in 1993. In 1995,
the plaintiff became pregnant. She sued the defendant, claiming inter alia that the op-
eration was performed negligently. There was evidence, which we may assume the
Court accepted, that the failure rate for properly conducted operations was about 1 in
350. There was also evidence that the defendant was a distinguished surgeon, and evi-
dence from the defendant that the operation was performed correctly. The trial judge
found for the defendant, and this decision was upheld on appeal. Although Bayes
Theorem was not explicitly applied by either court, the facts can be used to illustrate
how the theorem works.
Plausible Reasoning 45
The hypothesis to be tested was that the operation was not performed properly, and the
alternative hypothesis was that it was performed properly. Because the defendant was
a distinguished surgeon, one could start with the view that, if nothing else whatever
was known about the operation, there was a high probability that it was performed
properly. One might suppose that a distinguished surgeon would get such an opera-
tion right at least 99 times out of 100, and so might take the prior odds against the
hypothesis to be 1:99.
One piece of evidence about the particular operation was that the plaintiff became
pregnant after two years. The probability of this happening if the operation was not
performed properly we might take to be high, let us say 9/10 or 0.9. The probability of
it happening if the operation was performed properly was very low, the gure given in
evidence being 1/350, or about .00286. The likelihood ratio provided by this evidence
in favour of the hypothesis was thus 9/10 1/350, or 315/1. Multiplying the prior odds
by the likelihood ratio, we get odds of 315:99 in favour of the hypothesis. The probabil-
ity of the hypothesis, taking into account just this rst piece of evidence, thus becomes
315/414 or about 0.76.
Accordingly, if there were no evidence whatsoever about the particular operation,
perhaps because no one had any recollection of it, one might come to the conclusion
that it was more probable than not that the operation was not performed properly, so
that the civil onus of proof was discharged in favour of the plaintiff.
But there was also the evidence from the defendant himself that this particular op-
eration was performed properly.
I note that, if this evidence had been based solely on the defendants usual practice,
rather than specic recollection of the particular occasion, this may have had little
signicance, because the defendants usual practice may already have been taken into
account in assuming the prior odds of 1:99 against. However, if the Court found the
evidence of practice impressive, this might possibly justify adjusting the prior odds;
and if the prior odds were adjusted to something approximating to 1:315, the Court
might nd the civil onus not discharged.
In this case, however, the evidence of the defendant was that he did specically recall
the particular operation, and that he recalled demonstrating all the steps in it to his
Plausible Reasoning 47
conducted operations of about 1 in 350 was actually given in evidence in the case, and
presumably had some reasonably sound basis. However, the other numbers used by me
(the initial odds of improper operation of 1:99, the probability of pregnancy of 9/10 for
an operation not performed properly, and the likelihood ratio of 1/4 provided by the
eyewitness account) are no more than educated guesses; and the pertinent comment
can be made that a judge could have no more condence in guesses like these than in
an overall judgment as to whether it was shown, more probably than not, that the op-
eration was not properly performed.
This illustrates, as suggested earlier, (1) that an informal estimating of prior proba-
bilities is a pre-condition for applying Bayes Theorem; (2) that we generally cannot
make estimates of prior probabilities with the condence of accuracy that would be
required if we were to have condence in the conclusion given by Bayes Theorem; and
thus (3) that Bayes Theorem cannot avoid the need to rely on our informal
rationality.
The example also illustrates what I think are two benets of this kind of reasoning.
First, even if, as is sometimes the case, the educated guesses concerning prior odds
and likelihood ratios are on no sounder ground than a judgment as to the overall
result, the process of applying Bayes Theorem will at least disclose whether or not
there is consistency between all ones educated guesses and ones judgment. If inconsis-
tency were disclosed, then it would be necessary to reconsider each of the guesses and
also the judgment, because at least one of them must be wrong; so that an error may
thus be discovered and corrected.
Second, use of Bayes Theorem is a way of ensuring that one is not misled by spuri-
ous arguments based on statistics. In this case, it might have been contended that the
failure rate statistics of 1 in 350 were more than sufcient to discharge a civil onus of
proof. The process of applying Bayes Theorem will cause one to consider what other
material there is pertinent to the ultimate question for decision, and the theorem pro-
vides a framework for bringing all the material together.
3.6. Bayes Theorem can promote consistency among various estimates of probability,
and combat spurious arguments based on statistics.
Arguments of the kind Ive briey set out here have been developed at length by
the philosopher Hilary Putnam, leading him to the following conclusion, with which
I concur:9
9
Putnam (1983), 198; Putnam (1981), 174200.
I dont think the rst part of this statement should be controversial: certainly I have
not found any answer to Putnams case in support of it. But most scientists and scien-
tically minded philosophers would I believe dismiss the possibility raised in the
second part.
They maintain that the world, including human beings, changes over time either
precisely as determined by laws of nature, or else randomly within probability param-
eters precisely determined by laws of nature; and the processes that constitute rational
decision-making by human beings must proceed in the same way as other processes.
On this view, what gives rationality to these processes is that they occur in brains whose
structure and operations have been selected by trial and error over millions of years of
evolution, and thus have proved themselves to be conducive to the survival and repro-
duction of the organisms that had them; so that they can reasonably be considered as
being adapted to the formation of reasonable beliefs about the world and reasonable
decisions about what to do. Human rationality could then be formalised by sufcient
specication of the relevant properties of one or more highly rational human brains
and of the laws of nature that determine their processes, and/or (if, as seems a reason-
able assumption, these processes are of the nature of computational information-pro-
cessing) by sufcient specication of the computational systems instantiated by these
brains and the computational rules of these systems.
There have been important developments of this line of thought, based on David
Marrs identication of three levels of cognitive processes,10 which Marr named (1) the
computational level, (2) the algorithmic level, and (3) the implementational level.
The rst (top) level is that of the task given to and performed by the cognitive pro-
cess. In the case of a computer, it would include the input of a task into the computer,
and the computers display of the outcome of computation; while in the case of a
person, it would include the explicit reasoning of that person. Marrs naming of this
level as the computational level might be considered inappropriate, in that it is not the
level at which computational programs are applied. This top level could perhaps better
be called the overt level: it might be likened to a swan that is visible gliding across the
water, while the lower levels might be likened to the swans legs that are furiously pad-
dling out of sight beneath the surface. In the case of human cognition, this level can be
identied with the level of conscious reasoning.
The second (middle) level is that of algorithmic information processing, exem-
plified by the running of programs of computer software. It is the level at which
10
Marr (1982).
Plausible Reasoning 49
computational algorithms are put into effect, so as to process information in ac-
cordance with the rules of the programs being run. Marr himself, and also many
philosophers,11 have conceived of this level as operating as one or more digital
discrete-state systems, that is, systems having discrete successive well-defined rule-
determined states (like digital computers); and sometimes the notion of algorith-
mic information processing is considered as limited to systems of that kind.
However, some philosophers12 have contended that, if Marrs three-level analysis is
applied to human beings, the so-called algorithmic level could be operating as one
or more analog systems, that is, systems changing continuously as determined by
rules engaging with continuous variables (like, for example, the weather), rather
than having discrete successive states as with digital systems. Accordingly, if the
terminology of the algorithmic level is retained, in my view it needs to be under-
stood in a broad sense, as extending to analog systems of that kind.
The third (bottom) level is that of physical implementation, exemplied by the hard-
ware of computers and the physical brains of human beings, on which, on this ap-
proach, the middle-level programs run. For cognitive systems to work, the programs of
the middle level must be compatible with the hardware of the bottom level, and must
also be suited to performance of the tasks carried out at the top level.
This identication of three broad levels of cognitive systems does not of course ex-
clude the identication of further levels within these three levels. Within the bottom
level, for example, a distinction can be drawn between the level of microphysical pro-
cesses described by quantum mechanics, and the level of larger-scale physical events
such as the transition of a transistor from one of two states to the other of them, or the
ring or non-ring of a neuron of a human brain. Within the middle (algorithmic)
level, distinctions can be drawn between the level of machine language, that is, of pro-
grams in a code that correlates directly with events at the level of implementation; the
level of assembly language, that is, of programs using convenient coded abbreviations
to designate chunks of the code of machine language; and the level of compiler lan-
guage, that is, of programs in which words of a natural language are used to designate
the steps of a program.13 On some views of human cognition, it is at a level like that of
compiler language, within the algorithmic level of cognition, that representations of
things in the world are processed in accordance with computational rules.
On the basis of this three-level approach, it can be contended that even if, in human
reasoning, what happens at the top (overt) level cannot be formalised as a process that
complies strictly with precise exceptionless rules, this is nevertheless consistent with
11
Such as Jerry Fodor: see Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
12
Such as Terry Horgan: see Horgan and Tienson (1996).
13
See Hofstadter (1980), 29099.
14
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
15
Oaksford and Chater (1998), 29.
16
Horgan and Tienson (1996), (2006).
Plausible Reasoning 51
On the other hand, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn have argued17 to the effect that,
even if connectionism obtains at the level of implementation, human cognition must
be classical at the algorithmic level, because only classical digital architecture can ac-
commodate appropriately organised representations of the world. Daniel Dennett18
argues that results supporting the connectionist paradigm have actually been produced
by virtual neural networks simulated on standard digital computers, and that digital
approximations of analog connectionist systems have all the powers necessary for the
explanation of human cognitive processes. And Roger Penrose19 contends that digital
systems are more reliable, in that they do not require 100 percent accuracy in recording
and transmitting information (and thus are not subject to the instability and magni-
cation of inaccuracies to which analog systems are subject); and he too points out that
digital systems can simulate analog systems (including if necessary their instability and
inaccuracies) to any desired degree of approximation.
It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into the relative merits of the classical
paradigm and the connectionist paradigm; and indeed it may be that the operation of
the human brain is in fact neither exclusively digital nor exclusively analog. A common
feature of all these approaches is that where there are inconclusive reasons operating at
the top level of human cognitive processes, a single outcome is achieved by virtue of
rule-determined processes at lower levels, the relevant rules being computational rules
operating at the algorithmic level and laws of nature operating at the implementa-
tional level. According to these approaches, what may appear to be a conscious rational
judgment, resolving inconclusive reasons, is an expression of conclusive rule-deter-
mined processes at lower levels: the explanation as to why inconclusive reasons are
resolved in one way rather than another is provided by those rule-determined pro-
cesses, with no further efcacy in relation to that resolution being accorded to the
conscious processes at the top level. The argument of this book, however, is that it is
more reasonable to accept that conscious processes at the top level make a positive
contribution to the resolution of inconclusive reasons, a contribution that is not wholly
governed by rule-determined processes at lower levels. Thus I will contend that, while
human rationality can be partly explained in terms of evolution-selected rule-deter-
mined processes at the algorithmic and implementational levels, it cannot be fully ex-
plained in terms of rule-determined processes of any kind, whether they be analog or
digital or some combination of the two.
The main arguments of this book will focus on positive reasons for this view, rather
than upon purely negative arguments like that of the Haldane argument referred to in
17
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
18
Dennett (2003), 1067.
19
Penrose (1989), 17074, 18182, 403.
3.1. An important part of our rationality is the ability to engage in plausible reasoning,
in which premises or data do not entail conclusions by virtue of applicable rules but rather
support them as a matter of reasonable albeit fallible judgment.
3.2. If plausible reasoning could not support reasonable decisions about what to believe,
science would be impossible.
3.3. Induction does provide good grounds for believing that some general statements
about the world are probably at least approximately true, but only by way of informal
plausible reasoning.
20
Cf. Nagel (1997), chap. 7; Plantinga (1993), chap. 12.
Plausible Reasoning 53
3.4. Induction and other forms of plausible reasoning cannot be reduced to any kind of
algorithmic process overtly using discovered or invented rules for good reasoning.
3.5. The application of Bayes Theorem depends on the reasonableness of estimates of
prior probabilities, and thus the theorem cannot eliminate the need for informal
rationality.
3.6. Bayes Theorem can promote consistency among various estimates of probability,
and combat spurious arguments based on statistics.
3.7. Human rationality cannot be formalised without formalising complete human per-
sonality, and possibly not even then.
The previous chapter showed (1) that an important part of our rationality is the ability
to engage in plausible reasoning, in which premises or data do not entail conclusions
by virtue of applicable rules but rather support them as a matter of reasonable albeit
fallible judgment; and (2) that plausible reasoning cannot be reduced to any kind of
algorithmic process overtly using discovered or invented rules for good reasoning.
However, there was left open the question whether plausible reasoning might never-
theless be achieved wholly by brain processes which unfold as determined by laws of
nature and/or computational rules, and which are rational because the structures sup-
porting these processes and any computational systems they instantiate have been se-
lected by evolutionary trial and error.
In this and the next two chapters, I argue against this possibility, contending that our
consciousness contributes to our rational decision-making in ways that are not wholly
determined by laws or rules of any kind.
I start in this chapter by saying something about consciousness, and identifying three
characteristic features of conscious processes that I will contend contribute together to
decision-making: namely, subjectivity, qualia and unity. Then I argue that conscious
experiences must have a role to play in our decision-making, and that this role is not
one that could be performed by rule-determined processes. In the following two chap-
ters, I give an account of just what I contend this role is.
DUAL AS PECTS
It is necessary for me rst to say a little more about consciousness and its general rela-
tionship to brain processes. This is another topic that has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical writing and controversy, to which I cannot do justice in this
chapter. However, it is important to my case to make it clear what my own position is
on some signicant issues.
It will be recalled that my most fundamental beliefs included beliefs that con-
scious experiences occur; that the actual experiences that give me certainty that
conscious experiences occur are experiences that I have, while other human beings
55
also have experiences of the same general kind; and that there is a world external to
the conscious experiences of individual human beings, features of which are acces-
sible in common by human beings and describable in language. Now, human brains
are a part of the world external to the conscious experiences of individual human
beings, so a question is raised as to the relationship between the brain of a person
(which is part of the objective external world) and the conscious experiences of that
person (which are not part of the objective external world).
Science has progressively explained more and more of what happens in terms of the
operation of laws of nature in the objective external world; and this has made it impos-
sible for me to believe in a dualism of substances, according to which human beings
have immaterial minds, distinct from their physical brains, which have conscious ex-
periences and make choices and initiate actions. (I elaborate on this in chapter 8.)
However, I believe that a living human brain is not just a physical object, but is rather
an entity with two distinct aspects, namely a physical or objective aspect as a brain, and
a mental or subjective aspect as a conscious mind: that is, I adopt a view that can be
classied as a dual aspect theory, within the classication outlined in chapter 1.
Thus I say that a living human brain is properly considered as being a brain-and-
mind, a physical-and-mental entity rather than a purely physical entity. I believe also
that the processes that constitute conscious experiences have both a physical or objec-
tive aspect as physical occurrences in the persons brain (occurrences that are features
of the objective external world), and a mental or subjective aspect as the persons
conscious experiences (occurrences that are not features of the objective external
world). And I believe that much the same is true of the brains of those non-human
animals that have conscious experiences.
Dual aspect views of this kind have been strongly challenged by various arguments
and points of view.
One general line of argument is to the effect that there is nothing special about the
distinction between conscious experiences and objective occurrences: while it is true
that some processes can be at once both conscious experiences and also physical occur-
rences in the persons brain, it is also true that other processes can be at once (for ex-
ample) both the digestion of food and also molecular occurrences in a persons
stomach. In both cases, it is said, there are just different levels of description of the
same thing, in the same sort of way that the same occurrences can be both global
changes in a physical object (such as increasing heat or transition from a solid to a
liquid state) and changes in the behaviour of molecules of the object (such as increas-
ing speed).1
1
Cf. Searle (1984), 2122.
2
Nagel (1974), (1986).
3
Supported in Stoljar (2006).
4.1. There is a fundamental distinction between two aspects of the processes that consti-
tute the conscious experiences of human beings, namely a mental or subjective aspect (as
conscious experiences) and a physical or objective aspect (as physical occurrences in the
brain).
4
P. S. Churchland (1986); P. M. Churchland (1990).
5
Dennett (1991), 7284.
Conscious experiences have three characteristic features that could be relevant to their
causal role, and that seem quite different from causally relevant features of physical
occurrences: namely, subjectivity, qualia and unity.
First, subjectivity. Conscious experiences are experiences had by a conscious subject,
and indeed can reasonably be considered as being constituted by the interdependent
existence of a subject and the contents of the experience.6 They are not like objective
features of the world, equally available for observation by anyone in a position to ob-
serve them. When I have an experience of pain, only I feel my pain: my pain is the
content of an experience of which I alone am the subject; and while other people may
know from my behaviour and from surrounding circumstances that I am in pain, the
pain itself is not available for experience or observation by others.
Second, qualia. Some conscious experiences have features or qualities that go beyond
the causally operative physical features that seem to give rise to them: the look of colours,
the feel of pain, and so on. Experiences of that kind have been called qualia (the plural
of the Latin word quale, meaning what sort or what kind), because such experiences have
a particular quality that distinguishes them from other kinds of experiences, and also from
physical processes including the brain processes that are associated with the experiences.
Thus, an experience of the colour green has a quality quite different from an experience of
the sound of a violin, or even from an experience of the colour blue; and there seems to be
nothing about wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, or physical brain processes caused
by visually encountering them, that captures or explains the actual look of a blue sky.
And third, unity. A conscious experience is a unity in the sense that many features are
experienced all-at-once by the subject. This is particularly striking in the case of visual
experiences, in which a subject is aware of many features of an observed scene, and
generally grasps them all-at-once in a whole unied experience or gestalt. How this
happens, when different features such as shapes and colours are processed by different
parts of the brain, is itself something of a mystery, which has been called the binding
problem of consciousness.
6
Cf. Honderich (1987), 445.
4.2. Conscious experiences have three characteristic features that could be relevant to
their causal role, namely subjectivity, qualia and unity.
In the next section I will consider subjectivity in more detail, and then I will go on to
consider qualia and unity.
S U BJ ECTIVITY
In discussing experiences in chapter 1, I was not at that stage prepared to state, as one of my
most certain beliefs, that conscious experiences necessarily had a subject, even an ephemeral
subject that might last no longer than each experience. However, it will be recalled that I
soon came to refer to experiences that I have and experiences that other persons have; and in
fact I have no doubt that experiences of the kind that are the object of my most certain
beliefs are experiences had by someone or something. This is part of my understanding of
what a conscious experience is: for example, I take the concept pain to refer to pain as felt
by someone or something, and the same is true of other concepts referring to conscious
experiences. It could be that my understanding of the correct use of language is wrong in
this respect (but I dont think it is), or that language in this respect enshrines a misconcep-
tion (but I dont think it does, and Im not aware of any good argument that it does).
So:
4.3. A conscious experience always has a subject that has the experience, and is consti-
tuted by the interdependent existence of the experiencing subject and the content of the
experience.
In the case of human beings, the subject is, I believe, generally best thought of as the
person or human being having the experience, in his or her capacity as an experiencing
subject. In ordinary use of language concerning subjects of experience, it is generally a
person as a whole (or animal as a whole) that is identied as the subject: we do not say
that a persons brain has this or that experience, but that the person has this or that
experience.
But when one closely considers just what the subject of experience is, questions arise as
to whether it is, exactly, the whole human being or animal, or something other than this.
We tend to think of a persons conscious experiences as somehow going on inside
that persons head, not least because of the way such experiences are associated
with brain processes. (I will say more about this later.) This gives rise to a (falla-
cious) tendency to look for a subject of experience that is something other than the
4.4. In the case of human beings, the subject is the human being, in his/her capacity as
an experiencing subject; but this reserves judgment on what it is about human beings that
gives them this capacity, on problematic cases such as dissociative states or hypnosis or split
brains, on whether such a conscious subject can exist in another form, and on questions of
control.
QUALIA AN D U N ITY
7
Bennett and Hacker (2003).
Now I agree that to see an object is not to see an internal picture of the object, pri-
marily because that characterisation involves misuse of the word see; but I contend it
is beyond any doubt that we do see objects via privately experienced images con-
structed by our brains, which are part of the contents of our conscious experiences.
I look at the setting sun just before it disappears below the horizon. In my visual eld,
there is something that is orange and apparently circular. What is it? Bennett and
Hacker would say it is the sun itself, not an image of the sun. However, if it is literally
the sun itself, it is not the sun as it is when there is this something in my visual eld, but
as it was eight minutes earlier. Suppose the sun disintegrates during this eight-minute
period. Then, if the orange something is literally the sun itself, rather than some kind
of image or visual representation of the sun, the sun both exists (it is right there, right
now) and does not exist (it has disintegrated) at the time when I am aware of the
orange something. Further, the events or processes that are constitutive of there being
this something in my visual eld are much more closely linked to events or processes
in my brain than to the most relevant events or processes on the sun: the latter events
or processes took place 150 million kilometres from me and eight minutes earlier.
The orange something must surely be an image of the sun constructed by my brain,
though not in the sense of a picture of the sun that would itself have to be seen. Indeed,
it would not be correct to say that I see this image, and it is not any kind of thing that
exists independently of being part of my conscious experience. It is unlike a picture in
that it is immediately present to me, and in that its existence is entirely dependent on
my existence as an experiencing subject immediately acquainted with it. But it is an
image nonetheless, in the sense that it is not the sun itself but rather is a visual repre-
sentation to me of the sun.
Suppose that prosthetic eyes are developed, and that the output from these eyes to
the optic nerves can be articially controlled by computational processes (not depend-
ing on light entering these eyes) so as to be indistinguishable from the output that re-
sults from actually looking with these eyes at the setting sun. The person using these
eyes will then undoubtedly have a visual experience of the setting sun (of the nature of
virtual reality), through what can reasonably be called an image of the setting sun,
constructed by the persons brain from the processes articially induced in the persons
optic nerves. And if so, it cannot be doubted that when the person actually looks at and
sees the setting sun, so that similar processes are induced in the optic nerves by the
light from the sun entering the eyes, the persons brain constructs a similar image of
the sun and it is by means of that image that the person can see the sun.
4.5. The content of a conscious experience can, in the case of accurate perception of
features of the world, include features that can in a sense be considered features of the
part of the world so perceived; but this content is not itself the part of the world perceived,
and the subject of the experience exists interdependently with and has sole access to this
content.
I have expressed the view that conscious experiences are the same occurrences as cer-
tain processes in a persons brain, and this is in fact a prevalent view among neurosci-
entists and philosophers.
It is reasonable also to believe that there are law-compliant correlations between the
physical and the mental aspects of the brain processes that constitute conscious experi-
ences; that is, that there are regularities, which could be considered laws of nature of a
kind, such that physical brain processes of a particular type Xp are associated with cor-
responding conscious experiences of a particular type Xe, such as feeling a stabbing
pain or seeing something blue.
In perception, for example, there are physical processes linking an object of percep-
tion with brain processes, and ultimately with the conscious experiencing of the object;
and although the content of the experience is no doubt affected by the interests and
expectations of the experiencer, the reliability of perception must depend on types of
conscious experiences being linked in a lawful fashion with types of features of per-
ceived objects, through types of physical processes occurring in the brain.
That is not to say that the links and correlations between physical brain processes
and conscious experiences must always be simple and straightforward. I have referred
to David Marrs three-level analysis of cognitive processes; and consistently with that
analysis, there may be one set of laws linking processes at the bottom level of physical
implementation with processes of the middle algorithmic level, and another set of laws
linking processes at the algorithmic level with the conscious processes of the top overt
level of cognition. And just as the same computer program can run on different hard-
ware, it may be that some conscious experiences are correlated by such laws directly
with computation-like programs of the brain at the middle level, rather than with
physical brain processes at the bottom level. Thus, similar conscious thoughts had by
different people (say, thinking about Vienna) might be correlated by such laws with
similar processes of computation-like programs in their brains; but the processes of
those programs might in turn be correlated by further laws with different physical
4.6. There are types of physical processes in the brains of humans and other animals that
correlate with types of conscious experiences, in accordance with laws of nature.
This view is also a prevalent view among neuroscientists and philosophers; and it is
associated with what is called the supervenience of the mental on the physical, according
to which what mental processes occur depends in a lawful fashion upon what physical
processes occur. I do not altogether agree with this understanding of supervenience. I do
accept that there is no change in mental processes without a corresponding change in
physical processes. But as will be seen, I contend it is no more correct to say that what
mental processes occur depends upon what physical processes occur, than it is to say
that what physical processes occur depends on what mental processes occur; so that it
is better to assert correlation between the physical and the mental than to assert that
one depends on the other.
A distinction can be drawn between two broad classes of laws correlating types of
brain processes and types of conscious experiences.
First, there must surely be laws that correlate types of physical brain processes with
types of individual features of conscious experiences, such as feelings of pain or visual
experiences of a colour; so that whenever a person has, say, a visual experience of the
colour blue there are types of processes occurring in the persons brain. It seems,
for example, that there are types of patterns of neural activity that correspond with
visual experiences of various kinds, and other quite different types of patterns of neural
activity that correspond with feelings of pain. Thus, a pattern of type A could corre-
spond with a green patch in a certain part of the visual eld, a pattern of type N could
correspond with a vertical edge in another part of the visual eld, and so on.
These laws thus link types of qualia with types of brain processes that are at least
necessary (if not sufcient) for the existence of those types of qualia; and they could be
called qualia laws. There has been some progress in the attempt to identify what types
of brain activity correspond with what types of conscious experience; but this has
generally been in terms of such things as location in the brain, connections to other
parts of the brain, relationship to sensory inputs and motor outputs, rates of neural
8
Cf. Hilary Putnams version of the theory of mind called functionalism: see Putnam (1975), xii
xiv, 292300.
Having outlined some views about conscious experiences, I can now come to the main
points to be made in this chapter, namely that conscious experiences can contribute
positively to human rationality, and in particular to plausible reasoning; and that it is
most unlikely that this positive contribution is precisely as determined by laws or rules
of any kind.
Our brains undoubtedly have a prodigious capacity for unconscious information-
processing, by means of brain processes that do not require or depend upon any con-
scious experiences.
I remember this being brought home to me some years ago when I rst looked at a
random dot stereogram through coloured spectacles. At rst I just saw the random
dots somewhat blurrily arranged on a at surface; but then gradually I came to see in
stark clarity what appeared to be a spiral shape rising from the page towards me. Plainly
I had not consciously worked out which dots matched which, or what spatial congu-
ration the matched dots indicated: it had all been done by unconscious processes of my
brain, which must have required very elaborate computations.
Of course, much the same thing happens all the time in our ordinary visual percep-
tion. Not only are there the computations that give us three-dimensional vision, but
also there are the elaborate computations that provide stability of viewed scenes de-
spite voluntary movements of head and eyes. And similarly, there are elaborate
4.7. The judgment that is required for plausible reasoning is generally a judgment that is
addressed and adopted consciously.
9
Sacks (1986), 185203.
10
Cf. Penrose (1987), 26667.
11
Minsky (1985), 42.
Before leaving this topic, I should mention that there has in recent years been some
psychological research into the relative merits of conscious and unconscious decision-
making. A paper published in 200613 suggested that choice in complex matters should
be left to unconscious thought, but this suggestion has since been strongly contested;14
and the superiority of careful conscious reection over intuitive snap decisions in the
type of reasoning with which I am most familiar, namely judicial decision-making, is
I believe well established.15
12
Kahneman et al. (1982).
13
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006).
14
See for example De Wall et al. (2008); Newell et al. (2009).
15
See for example Guthrie et al. (2007).
TH R E E QU E STION S
If one accepts, as I think one should, that conscious experiences do make a positive
contribution to our decision-making, three questions arise:
1. What is that contribution; that is, just what is it that conscious experiences contrib-
ute to decision-making that is not done by unconscious processing?
2. What is it about conscious experiences that enables them to make this contribution?
3. How do conscious experiences make that contribution?
So far as Im aware, leaving aside suggestions of the general kind to be made in this
book,16 no plausible answers to the rst two of these questions have ever been sug-
gested by scientists or philosophers (indeed, there has hardly ever been any serious
consideration given to these questions); and one of the aims of this book is to provide
and develop plausible answers to them. Scientists and philosophers have suggested a
plausible answer to the third of these questions; and although I agree with some as-
pects of this answer, it is generally developed in such a way as to preclude plausible
answers to the rst two questions.
16
Similar ideas are hinted at in Abelson (1988), Penrose (1989), 40925: Penrose (1999), 10317; and
particularly in Kauffman (2009).
4.9. Scientists and philosophers have offered no plausible suggestions as to what is it that
conscious experiences contribute to decision-making that is not done by unconscious pro-
cessing, or what is it about conscious experiences that enables them to make this
contribution.
It might be thought that the view that the physical world is closed to non-physical
causal inuences has some support from the notion, referred to earlier, that there
are psycho-physical laws that correlate the experiential and the physical aspects of
brain processes, so that an experience of the type Xe occurs whenever a physical
brain process of the type Xp occurs. Thus, if physical processes of type Xp have a role
in determining what happens, in accordance with laws of nature, then it might be
thought that the corresponding conscious experiences of type Xe must have the
same role, in accordance with the same laws of nature plus the laws linking Xp and
Xe, without affecting the causal closure of the physical. I will explain in the next
chapter why I say that, despite my acceptance that there are psycho-physical laws
correlating the experiential and the physical aspects of brain processes, the experi-
ential aspect can and does have a causal input that could not be provided by the
physical aspect.
17
See for example Hofstadter (1986), 654.
18
Turing (1958); and see also Copeland (2002).
19
Humphrey (1983).
20
Dennett (2003), 24255.
21
Baars (1997).
4.10. If plausible reasoning proceeded precisely as determined by rules of any kind, there
could be no positive role for a persons conscious experiences in that reasoning.
4.1. There is a fundamental distinction between two aspects of the processes that consti-
tute the conscious experiences of human beings, namely a mental or subjective aspect (as
conscious experiences) and a physical or objective aspect (as physical occurrences in the
brain).
4.2. Conscious experiences have three characteristic features that could be relevant to
their causal role, namely subjectivity, qualia and unity.
4.3. A conscious experience always has a subject that has the experience, and is consti-
tuted by the interdependent existence of the experiencing subject and the content of the
experience.
4.4. In the case of human beings, the subject is the human being, in his/her capacity as
an experiencing subject; but this reserves judgment on what it is about human beings that
gives them this capacity, on problematic cases such as dissociative states or hypnosis or split
brains, on whether such a conscious subject can exist in another form, and on questions of
control.
4.5. The content of a conscious experience can, in the case of accurate perception of
features of the world, include features that can in a sense be considered features of the part
of the world so perceived; but this content is not itself the part of the world perceived, and
the subject of the experience exists interdependently with and has sole access to this
content.
4.6. There are types of physical processes in the brains of humans and other animals that
correlate with types of conscious experiences, in accordance with laws of nature.
As I argued in the preceding chapter, there is not, and I contend cannot be, any expla-
nation in terms of rule-determined processes of the positive contribution of conscious
experiences to our decision-making. In this and the next chapter I offer and support a
specic and straightforward proposal as to what this contribution is:
To expand a little:
TH E ARGU M E NT OUTLI N E D
I will begin with a statement of the basic argument for this proposal, and then I will
examine aspects of it in more detail.1
In the previous chapter I suggested there are psycho-physical laws correlating physi-
cal and experiential aspects of brain processes, so that there must be a sense in which
any information carried by the experiential aspect is also carried by the physical aspect.
However, it is important to appreciate that the information as carried by the experien-
tial aspect is combined into unied experiences or gestalts: as mentioned earlier, a
characteristic feature of conscious experience is that it is a unity in the sense that many
features are experienced all-at-once by the subject, notably in the case of visual experi-
1
This original argument of mine was rst raised in Hodgson (2001), and has been developed in
Hodgson (2002b), (2007a) and (2007b).
79
ences, in which a subject grasps all-at-once many features of an observed scene in a
whole unied experience or gestalt. I say that these gestalts, in which many features are
combined all-at-once, have informational content that is manifested and made avail-
able for use only in conscious experiences.2
5.3. Gestalts experienced by a subject, in which many features are combined all-at-once,
have informational content that is manifested and made available for use only in con-
scious experiences.
In developing the argument in this and the next chapter, I will make it clear why I say
these gestalts have this informational content, and why I say this informational content
can be used. My contention will be:
5.4. Feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences generally do not as wholes engage with
laws or rules of any kind, but can nevertheless as wholes have a causal inuence because
subjects of experience can respond appositely to them.
This account treats the processes of our brains as including some processes that have
both a physical and an experiential aspect, but it holds that the role of these processes
in the unfolding of events is not wholly determined by physical laws engaging with
their physical aspect. It proposes:
5.5. The physical aspect of conscious processes does, in conformity with physical laws,
restrict what can happen to a limited spectrum of possibilities; but in response to the expe-
riential aspect of these processes, the subject of the experiences can control what does
happen within this spectrum of possibilities.
My account does not require a self or soul distinct from the brain, which has some
input into what happens. Rather, it proposes that the physical-and-experiential system
of the brain-and-mind has the capacity to use information carried in experiences in a
way that corresponding information carried in physical processes cannot be used, and
that generally is not wholly determined by laws of nature or pre-existing computa-
tional rules. My proposal is that the physical-and-experiential system constituted by
2
As will be seen, this additional informational content goes beyond the additional information,
what red looks like, obtained by Frank Jacksons Mary when for the very rst time she sees something
red: see Jackson (1982). That information, considered in isolation, could engage at least indirectly with
whatever laws of nature engage with its neural correlates. Whats important about the additional infor-
mational content Im referring to is that its constituted by combinations of features that do not as
wholes engage with laws of nature.
5.6. While laws and rules can apply to individual unique circumstances, they engage
with features of these circumstances only in so far as each of these features is of a type or
class, and/or is a variable quantity.
Laws and rules link categories (say, X, Y, Z, etc.), where these categories are types or
classes of things or features, and/or mathematical variables. In the case of computa-
tional rules, X may be a potentially recurring situation in a computational program,
and Y may be the consequential operation to be undertaken in that situation.
I readily accept that some simple gestalts, such as a visual experience of a basic shape,
may be of a type or class such that there could be evolution-selected computational
rules engaging with them; but I say that this could not generally be true of whole fea-
ture-rich gestalts of the kind we normally experience, such as visual gestalts compre-
hending many features of an observed scene, or auditory gestalts of a unique musical
performance. And it is these particular gestalts of our ordinary experience on which I
am focussing in this discussion. Applicable computational rules could engage with
these gestalts in so far as they exemplify simple gestalts of a type or class but, leaving
aside certain exceptional circumstances to which I will come, I contend they could not
otherwise engage with and support apposite responses to whole feature-rich gestalts of
our ordinary experience.
Although I am not here considering laws of a legal system, these laws also, while ap-
plying to unique circumstances, generally engage only with types or classes of persons
or places or occurrences, and prescribe types or classes of legal consequences. Occa-
sionally, a statute law species what is to happen in a particular named place or at a
named event or even to a named person; but this is exceptional, and for the most part
5.7. Human beings make aesthetic and other judgments in response to whole gestalts of
conscious experiences, which do not as wholes engage with relevant rules.
I should also here explain how these answers are consistent with the idea that there are
psycho-physical laws that correlate the experiential and the physical aspects of brain
LAWS AN D R U LE S
So that is the essence of the argument. Because of the importance to the argument of
the role of laws and rules, I will now look at laws and rules in more detail.
There appear to be regularities in the way that processes unfold in the world, and it
is common to regard these regularities as reecting laws of nature that govern or con-
strain what happens in the world. These laws have not yet been, and may never be,
formulated with precision by scientists, and those laws that have been formulated are
often expressed as relations between variables rather than in terms of what causes
what; but it is generally assumed that there exist laws, to which the formulations of
science approximate, and which are causal in the sense that, in their totality, they con-
strain what changes occur in the world, either deterministically or by restricting these
changes to some range or spectrum of alternatives.
I think it is a matter of convenience whether one considers these laws as being in
some sense distinct from the properties of the features of the world with which they
engage, such as mass, electric charge, spatial separation, direction, motion, and so on,
or as being inherent in the features themselves or in the matter, energy, elds, and so
on, which display these features. But however one regards the laws, it seems clear that
one feature they must have is generality: in order that they be laws, they must be such
as to engage with features that the different states of affairs or objects or processes or
events to which they apply may have in common and/or with mathematical variables.
Life occurs on a virtual [and potentially innite] checkerboard. The squares are
called cells. They are in one of two states: alive or dead. Each cell has eight pos-
sible neighbours, the cells of which touch its sides or corners.
If a cell on the checkerboard is alive, it will survive in the next time step (or
generation) if there are either two or three neighbours also alive. It will die of
overcrowding if there are more than three live neighbours, and it will die of
exposure if there are fewer than two.
If a cell on the checkerboard is dead, it will remain dead unless exactly three of its
eight neighbours are alive. In that case, the cell will be born in the next generation.
Given an initial conguration of live and dead cells, everything that happens in the
game is determined unequivocally by these basic rules, which may be considered as
analogous to the laws of physics.
Features on a larger scale than the one-cell-and-eight-neighbours scale dealt with by
the rules may be causally efcacious in the sense that they are part of initial conditions
that are modied by the rules engaging with constituent elements of these features, so
as to produce further larger-scale features; but they do not themselves engage with the
basic rules so as to bring about changes. This is true even of features that appear to
unfold in accordance with larger-scale rules, because their causal efcacy in bringing
about changes is only through their properties at the one-cell-and-eight-neighbours
scale. For example, there is a ve-cell pattern called a glider (see gure 5.1) which, after
four generations in which no other live cells are encountered, results in an identical
pattern displaced diagonally by one cell.
The rules of the game dictate that the state of any cell in any generation is wholly
determined by the state of that cell and the eight adjoining cells in the preceding gen-
eration; so the rules do not in fact engage with the glider pattern as such. Of course, the
glider pattern is itself causally efcacious in the sense that it is modied by the rules
engaging with constituent elements of the pattern so as to produce further glider
3
Levy (1993), 52.
patterns; but there is nothing in the game itself that recognises or responds to a glider as
such, either as cause or effect.
An outside observer may recognise a glider, and may construct a rule that a glider
will continually move diagonally across the checkerboard, progressing by one cell every
four generations, unless it encounters any other live cells. This chunking of the ve live
cells of the glider, and their adjacent dead cells, provides an observer with a useful de-
scription of what is happening, and may help the observer to understand and predict
the games unfolding; but the glider pattern itself is not causally efcacious in bringing
about any changes in accordance with the basic rules of the game, because efcacious
causation of this kind is entirely at the one-cell-and-eight-neighbours scale. The glider
pattern does not as a whole engage with the basic rules.
However, it has been shown that the Game of Life, on a sufciently large scale and
given sufcient time, can operate as a computing machine, capable of solving any com-
putable problem.4 And if the game is set up so as to operate as a computer, there is then
a role in the unfolding of the game for the chunking of cells, as in the glider pattern.
Computers run in accordance with programs that operate at levels higher than the
level of basic physical causation in computers, or the one-cell-and-eight-neighbours
level of the Game of Life; and elements of the programs must then be represented by
and engage with larger-scale features of the system, meaning in the case of the Game
of Life features such as gliders and other larger-scale patterns that can arise in the
game. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the same program can be realised and run
on different systems, and so to that extent the programs may be considered as operat-
ing independently of the basic rules of the Game of Life. In that sense, the rules of the
program may fairly be considered as having their own efcacy and signicance, and
also as being independent of the two basic laws of the Game of Life.
However, the rules of the program would never require or permit anything to happen
otherwise than in accordance with the basic rules of the Game; and these rules them-
4
Poundstone (1987), 197217.
5
Readers may detect here an echo of Searles Chinese room: see Searle (1984), 3138.
5.8. In rule-determined systems, any features that are not types or variable quantities
engaging with laws or rules cannot contribute to the determination of what happens,
except as being aspects of initial conditions that are modied by the operation of laws or
rules on features that are types or variable quantities.
When I think about our conscious processes in comparison with computational pro-
cesses or with the Game of Life, it strikes me that consciousness seems to involve two
very important tricks, that have no place in computational processes or in the Game
of Life.
First, there is the qualia trick, the trick of associating certain types of neural processes
with certain types of subjective qualitative experiences or feelings. It seems, for exam-
ple, that there are types of patterns of neural activity that correspond with visual expe-
riences of various kinds, and other quite different types of patterns of neural activity
that correspond with feelings of pain. Thus, a pattern of type A could correspond with
a green patch in a certain part of the visual eld, a pattern of type N could correspond
with a vertical edge in another part of the visual eld, and so on.
This rst trick on its own may not seem to have great causal signicance: just as the
type of neural pattern corresponding to a visual experience of green has general fea-
tures that can engage with constraining laws (like the state of individual cells and their
eight neighbour cells in the Game of Life), so also the corresponding visual experience
of green may have general features that could be appropriate to engage with such laws
(like a glider in the Game of Life). I will suggest that it is in combination with the
second trick that the qualia trick could have enormous signicance.
So second, there is the chunking trick. Consciousness also has the trick of bringing
together a multitude of general qualia into a particular global experience that is had by
a particular subject. As mentioned earlier, this trick is associated with what is called the
binding problem of consciousness: how it is that information carried by processes in
distinct parts of the brain is brought together into a unied conscious experience.
Ap: pattern a in region x Ae: red patch in bottom left of visual eld
Bp: pattern b in region y Be: white patch in bottom right of visual eld
Np: pattern n in region z Ne: vertical edge in top right of visual eld
If, as I think likely, the relationship between items on the left and items on the right
is a kind of identity (in the sense that both are aspects of the one process), rather than
item on the left causing item on the right, then all items on the right could have effects
in accordance with laws or rules through their correspondence with items on the left:
the items on the right would in that respect be like gliders in the Game of Life, that is,
features that might be regarded as themselves engaging with laws, but might also be
regarded as having effects through lower-level features with which they correspond.
But I contend that this would not generally be the case for the bottom item on the
right. There could not plausibly be a law of nature as to what happens when the gestalt
experience (Ae + Be + + Ne + . . . ) occurs: such an experience has gestalt features
which are neither quantitative nor sufciently simple and commonly occurring to
engage with laws of nature. And these gestalt features would generally not engage with
computational rules, at least unless they had previously been grasped and responded
to. Thus, any engagement with laws or rules by such an experience must generally be
And that means it must be an engagement that does not operate through any features,
produced by the chunking of the qualia, which do not engage with laws or rules.
I am not saying, as writers like Donald Davidson6 have done, that there can be no rigor-
ous application of general laws to any mental events. I accept that, to the extent that even
qualitative features of conscious experiences have generality, they could engage with and
be rigorously governed by such laws. Rather, I say that what precludes rigorous applica-
6
Davidson (1970).
1. What is it that distinguishes conscious processes (those cognitive processes that are
conscious experiences) from non-conscious processes (those cognitive processes
that are not conscious experiences)?
2. Do conscious processes function in decision-making differently from non-con-
scious processes, and if so how?
3. Do conscious processes make a contribution to decision-making beyond that made
by non-conscious processes?
4. If no to question 3, what is the explanation for the extensive cognitive resources
expended in providing executive summaries in conscious experiences, and for the
feelings that give us conscious motivation?
5. If yes to question 3, what is this contribution, and what is it about conscious experi-
ences that enables this contribution to be made?
6. If, as Horgan and Tienson contend, the top level of cognitive processing proceeds
in accordance with soft constraints of ceteris paribus rules that do not determine
the outcome of the processing, whereas the dynamical system operating at lower
levels does determine the outcome, what if any contribution does the top level
make to cognitive processing and what explanation is there for its existence?
7. If (as seems clear) aesthetic judgments depend in part upon an appreciation of the
whole aesthetic object and of relationships of constituent features of the object
with the whole, can such judgments occur without a contribution from the grasp-
ing of a gestalt of the whole of such an object, that is additional to the grasping of
constituent features?
8. If (as seems clear) there could be no pre-existing laws or rules engaging with a gestalt
of the whole aesthetic object when it is rst created, how can a grasping of a gestalt
of the whole of such an object contribute to an aesthetic judgment about it?
98
not determined by laws or rules, it is not one that could be achieved by non-conscious
information-processing.
My suggestion is that the capacity to respond in this way to particular and perhaps
unique combinations of circumstances is advantageous, even though it must also be
fallible because its reliability is not assured by any rules or laws. This advantage ex-
plains why consciousness has been promoted by evolutionary processes. Thus:
6.1. There is a positive role for a persons conscious experiences in decision-making, be-
cause these experiences contribute to decision-making through gestalt experiences to which
the person can respond appositely, even though these experiences do not engage as wholes
with applicable laws or rules.
In previous essays on this topic Ive confessed that I cant explain how we can respond to
gestalts in ways not determined by laws or rules (because this would require a far greater
understanding of consciousness than is available at present), and Ive contented myself
with the assertion that our ability to do so is supported by the very fact that we do experi-
ence whole feature-rich gestalts all-at-once, and by many other reasons. In this book, I
want to say more about how we can do thisthat is, to give at least the beginnings of a
plausible account of how processes that are not rule-determined can contribute to rea-
sonable decisions, an account that does not appeal to anything magical or miraculous.
EVOLUTIONARY OR IGI N S
The rst question I ask is, in what ways could an all-at-once grasp contribute to rea-
sonable decision-making?
I do not suggest that animals other than human beings have free will and responsibil-
ity for their actions: I believe this requires the rational self-consciousness and capacity
for language that only human beings have. But I do suggest that the ability to grasp
whole feature-rich gestalts all-at-once and to respond to gestalts so grasped is a feature
of all consciousness; and I do believe some animals other than human beings have
consciousness, with the three characteristic features mentioned earlier. I believe this is
almost certainly true of mammals and birds, and is probably true of reptiles, amphib-
ians, shes and at least some molluscs (such as octopuses, squids and cuttlesh). Ac-
cordingly, there should be an account of how the ability to respond to a grasp of
feature-rich gestalts could be an evolutionary advantage to animals such as these.
My suggestion is that consciousness gives organisms that have it an advantage in
being able to use conscious experiences in determining what to do, that is, in making
judgments resolving the question What is to be done?, rather than merely responding
automatically to stimuli. Making those judgments may require judgments resolving
6.2. Conscious organisms make judgments resolving the question What is to be done?,
rather than merely respond automatically to stimuli.
6.3. Making such judgments may require judgments resolving three associated questions:
(1) the factual question How are things?, (2) the value question How should things be?,
and (3) the practical question What can I do about it?
6.4. Conscious organisms generally use their conscious experiences in addressing these
questions.
1
I think Hume-like approaches are also erroneous in suggesting a sharp distinction between judg-
ments as to how things are and judgments as to how things should be. I contend that judgments as to
how things are and judgments as to how things should be are often inextricably intertwined, and also
that judgments as to how things should be are amenable to reason, as are judgments as to how things
are. I will say more about this in chapter 10.
6.5. The ability to grasp and respond to gestalts helps an organism to check the accuracy
of its information, to be selective about the information it has, and to extrapolate from
information it has to other information relevant to how it should act.
6.6. In particular, this ability assists the organism to make judgments about what is
signicant in the information it has, and thereby (1) to disregard things that arent impor-
tant and (2) to draw inferences, for example through analogies with other situations it has
encountered, about further relevant matters.
In the case of judgments made by human beings, I think the importance of the all-at-
once grasp of feature-rich gestalts is most obvious in the case of aesthetic judgments,
such as judgments as to the merits of an artistic work or a piece of music or literature.
1. There are the complex pre-conscious processes that are necessary in order that
one have a conscious experience of the work. In the case of the visual arts, there are
all the pre-conscious processes that produce the appearance of a viewed object or
scene, not merely processing its conguration but also coordinating data from both
eyes so as to give depth, and compensating for eye movement so as to give stability.
These pre-conscious processes also include the processes that enable ones memory
In addition to these unconscious processes, there are also subjective conscious pro-
cesses that seem to be involved in the making of a judgment. In saying this, I am not of
course asserting that these subjective conscious processes are wholly distinct from ob-
jective brain processes: as noted earlier, I believe that the conscious processes and their
neural correlates are best considered as two aspects of the same processes.
1. When a judgment is made about an artistic work, the work is generally, for some
time at least, present to consciousness. One doesnt appraise a painting without actu-
ally seeing it and consciously taking it in, and one doesnt appraise a musical perfor-
mance without hearing it and attending to it.
2. Such judgments generally involve some emotions that are consciously felt. I have
said that there must be unconscious processes that give rise to emotions involved in the
judgment, but I would maintain that at least some of these emotions are present to
consciousness as the judgment is made.
3. If the judgment is a carefully considered and articulated judgment, there are gener-
ally conscious thoughts that take place in which one formulates and assesses reasons
for the judgment. Whether these conscious thoughts add anything to their neural cor-
relates and other non-conscious processes, and if so how, is a moot point, on which I
hope this book sheds some light; but I think it is undeniable that such conscious
thoughts do occur.
Many of the processes I have mentioned as taking place in aesthetic judgments engage
with laws of nature and/or computational rules and are thereby constrained by them.
It is reasonable to accept that pre-conscious processes underlying the experience of
seeing or hearing, and underlying emotional feelings, are computation-like processes
that proceed in accordance with the constraints of laws or rules which engage with the
general features of the objects, states of affairs and processes involved. Further, the re-
lationship between the neural correlates of elements of the conscious experiences, and
these conscious elements themselves, seems to be law-like, so that general features of
2
See generally Dutton (2009).
1. Part of the aesthetic merit of an impressionist painting, in addition to its own in-
trinsic beauty, is that it exaggerates evanescent lighting effects in such a way as to
convey truths about the way things are, truths that are not conveyed by precise photo-
graphic images.
2. Language evolved in everyday dealings among people, and its ability to convey with
precision the way things are and the way things should be is incomplete, especially in
relation to matters remote from the matters of common interest to people involved in
the development of language. The conveying of truths about such matters can often
only be by way of allusion, analogy and metaphor; and the capacity of a literary work
to do so can be the subject of aesthetic judgment.
6.7. Human judgments of aesthetic merit of a work often involve judgments of beauty,
and also judgments of truth, especially truth that is other than direct and literal; and these
judgments are assisted in the ways referred to in assertions 6.5 and 6.6.
Of course, one important aspect of the aesthetic merit of works of art or music or
literature is that they engage our emotions, and it might be thought that this must be
by way of pushing emotional buttons based on our evolutionary origins, rather than
by way of conscious judgments. I accept that this is an important part of the story;
but I contend that a substantial part of our emotional responses to these works
comes from our understanding of what the works are conveying, which in turn de-
pends on judgments of the kind Im considering, based on all-at-once grasping of
feature-rich gestalts.
I will not take this matter further here. Im not attempting to develop a comprehen-
sive theory of aesthetics, but merely to indicate how the grasp of gestalts may contrib-
ute to aesthetic judgments, in ways that are substantive, yet are neither magical nor
such as to displace the rule-based information-processing that must also contribute to
such judgments.
PLAUS I B LE R EASON I NG
Much of what Ive said about the use of gestalts by conscious organisms and about
aesthetic judgment can be applied to human plausible reasoning generally. My conten-
tion is that our conscious experiences of feature-rich gestalts contribute to plausible
reasoning, in ways such as those previously outlined; for example, in assisting us to
make judgments as to what is signicant in information we have, and in supporting
judgments that information given by the senses is accurate information about things
that are real.
I suggest that judgments as to what is signicant in information we have enable us (1)
to make reasonable generalisations from particular observations, (2) to draw reason-
able conclusions from analogies, and otherwise (3) to draw reasonable inferences from
information we have as to matters additional to that information.
The use of analogy and the drawing of inferences based on similarities have been
attacked by some philosophers. For example, Nelson Goodman in his article Seven
Strictures on Similarity3 contended to the effect that the concept of similarity is either
hopelessly vague or else superuous. His seventh stricture (at 25) was Similarity cannot
3
Goodman (1970).
4
Hodgson (1996b).
5
Damasio (1996), at 17374.
6
Penrose (1999), at 10317.
7
See generally Penrose (1994).
CONCLUS ION
I accept that my account of how conscious processes that are not rule-determined can
contribute to reasonable decision-making is far from complete, and that it leaves many
questions unanswered. In particular, I have not gone far in explaining how or why
these contributions can be apposite.
The contributions to decision-making by unconscious processes can generally be ap-
posite because they come from physical structures selected by evolution for how they
change through engagement with laws of nature, and for how they can thereby give
effect to useful computational procedures; whereas, it may be asked, if conscious pro-
cesses are not determined by laws or rules of any kind, exactly what is it about them
that can make their contributions apposite?
I have suggested that conscious experiences assist conscious subjects in making judg-
ments about such things as signicance of information, relevance and sufciency of
approximations, and resolution of inconclusive reasons. It may be said that Ive given
no account of how conscious experiences can give this assistance: how is signicance
8
Hadley (2010).
6.9. Human beings can make decisions that are reasonable albeit not determined by pre-
decision circumstances and laws of nature.
6.1. There is a positive role for a persons conscious experiences in decision-making, be-
cause these experiences contribute to decision-making through gestalt experiences to which
the person can respond appositely, even though these experiences do not engage as wholes
with applicable laws or rules.
6.2. Conscious organisms make judgments resolving the question What is to be done?,
rather than merely respond automatically to stimuli.
6.3. Making such judgments may require judgments resolving three associated questions:
(1) the factual question How are things?, (2) the value question How should things be?,
and (3) the practical question What can I do about it?
6.4. Conscious organisms generally use their conscious experiences in addressing these
questions.
6.5. The ability to grasp and respond to gestalts helps an organism to check the accuracy
of its information, to be selective about the information it has, and to extrapolate from
information it has to other information relevant to how it should act.
6.6. In particular, this ability assists the organism to make judgments about what is
signicant in the information it has, and thereby (1) to disregard things that arent impor-
tant and (2) to draw inferences, for example through analogies with other situations it has
encountered, about further relevant matters.
6.7. Human judgments of aesthetic merit of a work often involve judgments of beauty,
and also judgments of truth, especially truth that is other than direct and literal; and these
judgments are assisted in the ways referred to in assertions 6.5 and 6.6.
6.8. The grasp of gestalts contributes to human judgments as to what information is
signicant (promoting reasonable generalisations, reasonable use of analogies, and rea-
sonable inferences generally), as to whether information given by the senses is accurate
and whether something experienced relevantly or sufciently approximates to an objective
or ideal, and as to how to resolve incommensurable reasons; and it thereby assists under-
standing of areas of intellectual concern.
6.9. Human beings can make decisions that are reasonable albeit not determined by pre-
decision circumstances and laws of nature.
The plausible arguments presented so far might have to give way if science were
strongly against them. In this chapter and the next, I argue that science is far more ac-
commodating of free will than is often supposed.
In this chapter I will be focussing mainly on the implications of science for determin-
istic views about the universe, and I will also say something about non-local causation
(I will explain later) and about time.
I take determinism to be the doctrine that everything that happens is xed (deter-
mined) in advance. Broadly, there are two versions of determinism, which can be as-
serted either independently or in combination. One has it that earlier circumstances
and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances. This version found classic
expression in the writings of the eighteenth-century French mathematician Pierre
Laplace. The other has it that past, present and future all exist tenselessly in an un-
changing block universe, in which the passage of time is merely apparent and nothing
can ever be other than it is. This version is considered by many scientists and philoso-
phers to follow from relativity theory, which treats time and space as interdependent
dimensions in a reality of four or more dimensions, in which every event of the past,
present and future has a location in an unchanging space-time continuum.
The rst version directly contradicts the conclusion, from my arguments so far, that
human beings can make reasonable decisions that are not determined by pre-decision
circumstances and laws of nature. The second version also directly contradicts this
conclusion, in that decisions are determined by the pre-decision circumstances alone
(the existence of the unchanging block universe), so that the reference to laws of nature
becomes superuous. In addition, the second version is hard to reconcile with any idea
of human beings making decisions, that is, of human decision-making being efcacious
in determining what happens.
Of course denial of determinism does not of itself give any positive support to ideas
of free will: the point has often been made that, to the extent that quantum mechanics
suggests indeterminism, it merely suggests randomness, which is inimical to free will
rather than supportive of it. And there are respectable philosophical views that deter-
minism is in any event compatible with free will. However, the account of free will that
114
I am giving is inconsistent with determinism, so it is important to my account to show
that determinism is probably false; and I set out to do this in this chapter.
A LAWFU L U N IVE R S E
I will start by briey considering the support given by science to the rst version of
determinism.
As suggested in chapter 5, there are compelling reasons to believe in the existence of
laws of nature, and in particular laws that constrain what states of affairs can exist in
the world and how those states of affairs change over time. The existence of these laws
is also supported by the scientic method of conjecture and refutation: this method
presupposes the existence of laws, because it depends on the assumption that similar
experiments will produce similar results, in accordance with relevant laws that
determine that this happens; and the resounding success of this method conrms this
presupposition on which it is based.
Particularly over the last four hundred years, one of the main projects of science has
been to discover and formulate these constraining laws; and this endeavour has re-
sulted in the formulation of laws that approximate ever more closely and with ever
more assurance to these actually existing laws, and in ever-increasing knowledge and
understanding of how things happen in the world.
A starting point for me is Descartes, who postulated that everything in the world,
apart from the immaterial minds or souls of human beings, was subject to the con-
straint of laws of nature, thus excluding, even from animals, states or activities that
were not subject to the constraint of these laws; so that a central project for science was
to discover these laws and to explain the world by reference to them.
This idea had powerful expression later in the seventeenth century in the physics of
Isaac Newton. Newtons three laws of motion were proposed as applying without ex-
ception to all physical matter, and they suggested that, given the position and motion
of any piece of matter at one time and the forces acting on it over a period following
that time, its positions and motion during that period were uniquely determined.
Newtons law of gravitation gave rules determining the quantity and direction of the
force of gravity at any point. Formulation of similar rules for all other forces would
then, apparently, complete a scheme according to which all changes over time of physi-
cal systems are determined by universal laws of nature.
Newton did not spell out what that might mean for the physical matter of the
human brain or for the dualism of Descartes. However, the eighteenth-century French
mathematician Pierre Laplace pointed out that, under the Newtonian scheme, initial
conditions plus laws of nature determined the future, which could thus be exactly
calculated by a being with sufcient information and intelligence; and he made no
7.1. There are laws of nature that constrain what states of affairs can exist in the world
and how those states of affairs can change.
7.2. The laws that scientists have so far formulated approximate ever more closely and
with ever more assurance to those laws.
7.3. Science has accumulated extensive knowledge and understanding of how things
happen in the world, by reference to the laws that have been formulated.
However, to the extent that Newtonian physics and later developments might be
thought to suggest that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely deter-
mine later circumstances, this version of determinism is strongly contradicted by an
important part of twentieth-century science, namely quantum mechanics (QM). QM
strongly suggests that laws of nature do not uniquely determine how initial conditions
change over time, but generally leave open a spectrum of possible outcomes. It thereby
undermines an argument sometimes put1 that the physical world must be closed to
non-physical affectation, because otherwise there would have to be some kind of
mental force operating alongside the known physical forces. In fact the spectrum of
possibilities left open by QM are all consistent with the operation of known physical
forces, so that any selection between them would not require the application of any
force.
QM is also at odds with relativity theory, in that QM establishes that initial condi-
tions and laws of nature can have effects non-locally, that is, can have effects that
cannot be explained by inuences communicated at light speed or less. It thereby
renders highly dubious the deterministic block universe view suggested by relativity
theory, and also renders possible and plausible the existence of causal inuence by
non-local processes such as those that appear to be involved in conscious
experiences.
I will expand on both these matters in the following sections.
1
This unsound assertion is made for example in Horgan (2001).
QM is part of mainstream science, but it has implications that are subversive of many
views that are considered as scientic by many scientists and philosophers. I tried to
acquire some understanding of QM in the 1980s when I was writing my previous book,
The Mind Matters,2 and the more I understood QM the more I was amazed by its im-
plications. It still seems to me that these implications are not appreciated by most
philosophers, or indeed even by scientists in other elds, and that it is for this reason
that QM has had surprisingly little impact on the way most scientists and philosophers
think about the world.
I cannot hope to express adequately here the implications of QM, but I will try to
give some idea of why I believe they are signicant. The implications of particular
importance for this book can be identied as indeterminacy, non-locality, indetermin-
ism and observer-participation.
According to QM, the subatomic constituents of matter are of such a character that
they do not have determinate position and motion, so that there is an irreducible inde-
terminacy in their position and/or motion that is not just a reection of the impossibil-
ity of making accurate simultaneous measurements of position and motion. Rather, it
is a matter of objective fact that, say, an electron cannot be in a precise location unless
it is in a state such that its motion is wholly indeterminate (that is, it could be moving
in any direction, at any speed), and cannot have precise motion unless it is in a state
such that its position is wholly indeterminate (it could be anywhere); and that in gen-
eral terms, the more closely the state of the electron limits its location the less closely it
limits its motion.
This relationship is expressed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, according to
which the product of indeterminacies of position and momentum must always be at
least of the order of Plancks constant h, a very small quantity of a physical variable
called action. Because h is so small, the indeterminacies of position and motion of
objects that we can observe are undetectable; but the fact remains that relatively large
indeterminacies exist in the position and motion of the protons, neutrons and elec-
trons that make up their constituent atoms.
Even more extraordinary is the non-locality inherent in QM systems, which contra-
dicts the locality of causation (explained in the next paragraph) postulated by the
theory of relativity.
According to the theory of relativity, space and time are combined into a continuum
called space-time, and anything that happens at any location in space-time can neither
affect nor be affected by events with space-like separation from itthat is, events at
2
Hodgson (1991).
3
Einstein et al. (1935).
4
Aspect et al. (1982); Hodgson (1991), 36369.
5
Such attempts are associated particularly with David Bohm; but in his last comprehensive state-
ment of his position, Bohm himself did not embrace determinism: Bohm and Hiley (1993), 32123. One
deterministic interpretation of QM is the many-worlds interpretation: in Hodgson (2002a) I explain
why I believe that interpretation is untenable. I will refer later to a more recent attempt, by Gerard t
Hooft, to reconcile QM with determinism.
7.4. Science does not support the view that laws of nature uniquely determine how ini-
tial conditions change over time, but rather supports the view that they generally leave
open a spectrum of possible outcomes.
7.5. Locality of causal inuences, assumed by Einstein, has been decisively refuted.
TH E FR E E WI LL TH EOR E M
As mentioned earlier, despite the generally held view that QM shows that the uni-
verse is not deterministic, there have been attempts to reconcile QM with determin-
ism. A theorem recently propounded6 by Princeton mathematicians John Conway
(as mentioned earlier, the inventor of the famous Game of Life) and Simon Kochen
(one of the originators of the Kochen-Specker paradox of QM, to which I refer later),
which Conway and Kochen call the free will theorem, strongly supports the view that
there can be no such reconciliation.
The free will theorem supports a powerful challenge to the scientic credentials of
determinism, by showing, on certain well-supported assumptions, that two corner-
stones of contemporary science, namely (1) acceptance of the scientic method as a
6
Conway and Kochen (2006), (2009).
They then discuss the Kochen-Specker paradox of QM, to which I will return. They
note the curious fact about QM (referred to earlier) that the results of remotely sepa-
rated observations can be correlated; and they note that in particular it is possible to
produce a pair of twinned spin 1 particles (by putting them into the singleton state of
total spin zero) that will give the same answers to the above squared spin measure-
ments in parallel directions. And they then state their second axiom:
They then refer to the assumption that experimenters are free to choose between pos-
sible experiments (explaining this as meaning that their choice is not a function of the
past); and they go on to state their third axiom:
7
Merali (2006).
The Free Will Theorem. The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the
response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is freethat is to say, is not a
function of properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than this
response with respect to any given inertial frame.
Before giving my informal explanation of the theorem, I will say something about the
axioms.
The rst two axioms are well-supported conclusions of QM. Both of them follow
from the mathematics of QM, and have experimental support in that they have been
extensively tested and never falsied.
Spin is a property of particles of matter dealt with by QM, of the same nature as
polarisation of light; and according to QM, some particles of matter are such that
measurements of the squares of their (components of) spin in three orthogonal di-
rections (directions at right angles to each other) are always 1 or 0, and always add up
to 2. That is, they always give the results 1, 0 and 1 in some order, as stated by the SPIN
axiom.
The TWIN axiom deals with properties of pairs of such particles that have been cor-
related in a particular way by interaction between them and then have moved far apart
in such a way as to preserve the correlation. In such a case the mathematics of QM
indicates, and experiments have conrmed, that when experimenters measure the spin
of these particles the results are correlated in the way stated by the TWIN axiom, even
if the experiments have space-like separationthat is, even if the experiments are per-
formed at times and places such that no signal travelling at light speed or less could
pass between them in either direction.
I interpret the assumption in the MIN axiom that, because the experiments per-
formed by A and B are space-like separated, particle as response is independent of Bs
choice, and particle bs response is independent of As choice, as meaning that the infor-
mation as to what choice B makes and the information as to what choice A makes is not
available to particle a and particle b respectively before their response; and so interpreted,
this assumption is a consequence of relativity theory that, as noted above, has not been
refuted by Bells Theorem and the Aspect experiments.
Conway and Kochen commence their proof of the theorem by relying on a version of
the Kochen-Specker paradox, which shows on the basis of the SPIN axiom that the
result of measurement of spin in as little as 33 possible directions cannot exist prior to
and independently of measurement. This can be illustrated by gure 7.1, a gure cre-
ated by Jasvir Nagra, which he explains as follows:8
Imagine a cube that snuggly surrounds a sphere. On each face of the cube, we
inscribe a circle and inside each circle we draw a square that touches the circle
at the squares four corners. We divide each such square into four smaller squares
and mark the following points on the cube.
We get 33 points (9 points per face 3 faces + 1 point per edge 6 edges) on the
cube in this way. These represent 33 directions of measuring a particle.
8
Quoted from Nagra (2005).
I M PLICATION S
Although the authors called their theorem the free will theorem, it does not directly
support any conclusion about free will. Its conclusion (that the outcomes of the mea-
surements are not xed in advance) follows if it is the case both that the experimenters
can measure spin in any direction (at least in the sense the choice of direction is not a
function of the past in any way that correlates the choice to the particles or the other
experimenter), and that (in accordance with the axioms) laws of nature correctly spec-
ify features of the outcome in the event that any such measurement is made.
In order to avoid the conclusion and thus to save determinism, without rejecting the
well-established assertions of the SPIN and TWIN axioms, it would be necessary to
claim that it is not the case that the experimenters can measure spin in any direction in
the sense set out above.
However, the causal antecedents of whatever it is that determines which measure-
ments are made by each experimenter may be effectively independent of each other
and of the causal antecedents of the particles being measured, at least unless there is a
thoroughgoing conspiracy of nature at work. For example, the directions of the
7.6. The Conway/Kochen free will theorem conrms that science does not support
determinism.
This conclusion follows in a straightforward way in relation to the rst version of de-
terminism I identied at the outset, namely that earlier circumstances and the laws of
nature uniquely determine later circumstances. The theorem shows that, on the basis
of the axioms, if it is the case that experimenters can measure spin in any direction,
then prior to measurement being made, existing circumstances and the laws of nature
can do no more than determine correlated probabilities for various outcomes. Accord-
ingly a deterministic version of QM would require either that one or more of the
axioms must be rejected or else that experimenters are somehow prevented from
making those measurements that would contradict the laws of quantum mechanics;
and that in turn would require the conspiracy of nature referred to earlier.
In relation to the other version of determinism, the block universe, the position may
seem less clear. It could be said that the block universe theory does not involve any
particular view as to how earlier states are causally linked to later states, and that the
circumstance that outcomes would have been different if earlier circumstances had
been different, that is, if experimenters had made different measurements, is entirely
unremarkable. But the block universe view still relies on the scientic method to estab-
lish laws of nature linking events in different parts of the universe; and given that the
axioms are taken as holding good in the block universe, there would be no explanation,
which did not involve a conspiracy of nature, as to why measurements never falsify the
rst two axioms. Rather, the position would be that the laws of QM reected in the rst
two axioms do not in fact hold good in the block universe, but they are never
TI M E AN D TH E B LO CK U N IVE R S E
I have suggested that the free will theorem counts against the determinism of the block
universe view as well as against rule-based ideas of determinism. However, relativity
theory does support the idea of four-dimensional space-time and does support plau-
sible arguments that time does not pass; so I should say something more about this.
Relativity theory states, and experiments have conrmed, that the measurements of
the passage of time (and indeed also mass and distance) are not independent of motion.
Indeed, it seems clear that acceleration of an object to a high speed will cause time to
9
t Hooft (2007).
10
t Hooft (2001), (2007).
7.7. The rate at which time passes for an object is affected by acceleration of the object.
Relativity theory also supports the view that there is no inertial (non-accelerating)
frame of reference that has any priority or greater validity than any other, such that the
time order of events with space-like separation according to that frame of reference has
a better claim to truth or validity than their time order according to other frames of
reference. Events within the past light cone of an event are unambiguously in its past,
and events within the future light cone of an event are unambiguously in its future; but
events with space-like separation from an event may be in its past or in its future or
simultaneous with it, depending on the motion of the frame of reference from which
the assessment is made.
There is tension between relativitys denial of simultaneity of space-like separated
events, except in relation to specied frames of references, and the non-locality of
quantum systems discussed above. And plausible suggestions can be made as to a
preferred universe-wide frame of reference, for example that which coincided with
the motion of the centre of mass of the universe immediately following the Big
Bang and has not been accelerated since. However, even if one accepts that there is
no preferred frame of reference, none of this contradicts the idea that time really
passes, or that sense can be made of the present, as well as of the past and the future;
and an account can be given, consistently both with relativity theory and with the
indeterminism suggested by QM and conrmed by the free will theorem, denying
the existence of an unchanging block universe and according reality to the passage
of time.
On this account, the universe is real but developing and changing; so any question
about the state of the universe or its features is imprecise unless it has reference to a
particular stage or particular stages of that development. If that reference point is an
event that occurs at a particular time at a particular place, then:
1. as regards the past light cone of the event, denite answers can be given as to what
the state of the universe and its features were, because in those regions the state of
the universe and its features are xed;
I suggest it is not helpful to ask whether, with reference to such reference point, any
state of the universe or any of its features is real. The changing universe is real, on any
reasonable understanding of the word; but once one has given answers to questions
about the state of the universe and its features in accordance with the above three sug-
gestions, it does not add anything meaningful to say whether or not they are real: the
word real just does not have a sufciently precise meaning. To the extent that this may
seem unsatisfactory in relation to the third category of cases, it should be remembered
that the extent of indeterminacy in that category in realistic situations is minimal: the
time it takes for a signal at light speed to travel from one place on Earth to any other
place on Earth is less than one twentieth of a second, so any indeterminacy as to the
state of the universe or its features in any place on Earth with reference to any event on
Earth will not extend beyond one-tenth of a second.
The above account can also give content to the word now that is consistent with
relativity theorys denial of preferred frames of reference. On that basis, now can have
a precise meaning only with reference to an event at a particular time at a particular
place; and would have some indeterminacy in relation to regions of space and time
with space-like separation from it. The word now in fact has most application with
reference to conscious experiences of human beings; and answers to questions con-
cerning what is the state of the universe now and what features does the universe have
now will be in accordance with the above analysis.
It will be recalled that QM supports not only indeterminism, but also non-locality,
and it asserts that some events are non-local in that they occur to, and involve instan-
taneous change to, systems that are spread out in space. In order that the above account
be consistent also with this non-locality, some modication is required. I would sug-
gest the following provisional modication.
In relation to such a non-local event, there would be past and future light cones
referable to each location in time and space where an instantaneous change takes
place in the non-local system; and the above analysis would suggest that, with refer-
ence to such a non-local event, (1) what is xed are those regions of space and time
within all of these past light cones, (2) what is merely within a spectrum of possibili-
ties determined by prior circumstances and laws of nature are those regions of space
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my con-
sciousness, crawling upward along the lifeline of my body, does a section of the
world come to life as a eeting image in space which continuously changes in
time.
11
Weyl (1949), 116.
7.8. Our experiences of the passage of time cannot be dismissed as illusions, and science
has provided no coherent account of how they could be mere illusions.
7.1. There are laws of nature that constrain what states of affairs can exist in the world
and how those states of affairs can change.
7.2. The laws that scientists have so far formulated approximate ever more closely and
with ever more assurance to those laws.
7.3. Science has accumulated extensive knowledge and understanding of how things
happen in the world, by reference to the laws that have been formulated.
7.4. Science does not support the view that laws of nature uniquely determine how ini-
tial conditions change over time, but rather supports the view that they generally leave
open a spectrum of possible outcomes.
7.5. Locality of causal inuences, assumed by Einstein, has been decisively refuted.
7.6. The Conway/Kochen free will theorem conrms that science does not support
determinism.
7.7. The rate at which time passes for an object is affected by acceleration of the object.
7.8. Our experiences of the passage of time cannot be dismissed as illusions, and science
has provided no coherent account of how they could be mere illusions.
By the end of the twentieth century, science had gone a long way towards carrying
into fruition the project of discovering laws of nature and explaining the world by
reference to these laws, in accordance with Descartess postulate that everything in the
world, apart from the minds or souls of human beings, was constrained by laws of
nature.
However, at the same time science had also challenged Descartess exemption of
human minds or souls from such constraints. Descartes had contended that immate-
rial human minds were unconstrained by laws of nature in making choices and initiat-
ing actions, and that they gave effect to these choices and actions by inuencing the
physical brain through the pineal gland. However, that view became increasingly un-
tenable, as developments in nineteenth- and twentieth-century science showed that
the making of choices and initiating of actions was associated with and (at least) much
affected by highly complex brain activity, which was subject to the constraints of laws
of nature.
Prior to Darwin, the exemption of human minds from the constraints of laws of
nature might have been supported by an argument based on the argument from design,
advanced to prove the existence of God as Creator. Just as a watch suggests a watch-
maker, the argument went, so the plethora of complex and beautifully adapted life-
forms suggests a Creator. We could not believe that a watch had come into being by
chance, simply by the operation of impersonal laws of nature; and likewise we could
not believe that a mouse (say) had come into being by chance. This argument could be
developed to support the exemption of human minds from the constraints of laws of
nature, as follows. The creation of animals thus apparently involved a kind of causa-
tion in the world, through the activity of a Creator that was not constrained by imper-
sonal laws of nature. The Creator, making human beings in its own image, could have
endowed human minds with some capacity for the same kind of causation; so that, just
as the activity of the Creator was not constrained by laws of nature, the same could be
true also of the activity of human minds.
133
That kind of argument was undermined by Darwins theory. It showed how, starting
from initial conditions which could be thought simple enough not to require a de-
signer or Creator, the operation of laws of nature could have given rise to life as we
know it, in all its complexity and variety and beautiful adaptation. It also offered a
plausible explanation of our behavioural characteristics, on the basis solely of causa-
tion conforming to the constraints of laws of nature; that is, a plausible explanation of
how the appearance of purpose and choice could have arisen in systems which in fact
change over time in accordance with laws of nature. Darwin thus gave us reason to
question our feeling of freedom and ability to choose, and reduced the weight of this
feeling as an argument against the universality of causation through the constraints of
laws of nature.
The idea that human minds are exempt from the constraints of laws of nature was
thoroughly undermined in the twentieth century, in particular by the recognition of
the importance of unconscious processes in our behaviour, continuing progress in
neuroscience, and the emergence of the cognitive sciences.
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, the work of Sigmund Freud high-
lighted the fact that much of our motivation is unconscious; and since then, it has
been impossible to maintain a view of human agency as a matter of wholly conscious
decisions based on wholly conscious motives. Whatever one thinks of Freuds partic-
ular theories, he did thereby change the understanding of the human mind. And the
nature and extent of unconscious motivation has been further explored throughout
this century, showing not merely that much of our motivation is unconscious, but
also that we have a tendency to rationalise our conduct by (unconsciously) fabricat-
ing, and then believing, plausible but untrue stories to explain why we did what
we did.
Over recent years huge advances have been made in neuroscience and in the cogni-
tive sciences. Much is now known of the details of physical processes of the brain, and
how those physical processes correlate with different types of experiences and actions.
Together with physical investigation of the brain, the cognitive sciences have thrown
light on its functional organization, giving insights into how the physical events of the
network of neurons can give rise to sensation, perception, memory, problem solving,
emotions, and actions.
As mentioned earlier, these developments have made it impossible for me to believe
in a dualism of substances, involving a distinction between (on the one hand) immate-
rial minds or souls that have conscious experiences, make choices and initiate actions,
and (on the other hand) material things, including brains, that dont. That kind of
dualist theory raises the question, exactly what are the respective contributions of the
brain and the mind to choices and actions? If one postulates that the minds willing of
intentional actions is given effect to by the physical brain, this raises the question
8.1. Our brains are constituted by the same physical elements as other physical objects,
and are constrained by laws of nature as are other physical objects.
8.2. Our choices and actions are to a considerable extent the product of activity of our
physical brains constrained by laws of nature, and much of our motivation is unconscious
or barely conscious.
8.3. The physical sciences can accommodate the existence of unied conscious experi-
ences, corresponding with events in widely separated regions of the brain, having effects,
not determined by rules, in one or more of those regions.
A GE N E RAL PICTU R E
Ive outlined what I contend is the role of gestalts in our conscious decision-making;
and this provokes the question of how our brains could work so as to make this role
possible. I will commence my answer with a general picture of how I say conscious
processes and physical processes could work together.
I accept that laws of nature constrain the processes of our brains, as they constrain
other physical processes. I accept also that our brain processes carry out information
processing that unfolds in accordance with computational rules selected by evolutionary
trial and error. However, what I say is that, in those cases where there is a contribution
from conscious decision-making, these laws and rules do not determine a unique result.
As shown in the previous chapter, currently accepted physics makes it most unlikely
that physical laws of nature determine unique outcomes; and I contend that, once one
puts aside prejudice against causation that is not rule-determined, there is no strong
reason to think that physical laws do not, in cases of conscious decision-making, leave
scope for effective contributions from responses to experiences of gestalts. And as re-
gards computational rules, they too can allow for outcomes in which there is a spec-
trum of probability-weighted alternatives, for example by means of what is called fuzzy
logic and/or the application of rules of probability, including Bayes Theorem.
My contention is:
8.4. If it were possible to abstract physical brain processes and/or computational infor-
mation-processing from the totality of conscious decision-making, they would give the
appearance of producing probability-weighted spectra of outcomes, which include the
actual outcomes of the conscious decision-making.
However, I nd implausible the idea that there are just occasional discrete selections
consciously made between discrete alternatives thrown up by unconscious processes:
this too strongly suggests a conscious subject, distinct from the physical brain, which
does something magical. I prefer the idea of a conscious subject, not distinct from
8.5. Rather than conscious subjects making discrete conscious choices between alterna-
tives thrown up by unconscious processes, they use both conscious experiences and rule-
determined processes together, on a continuous basis, to steer a course within spectra of
possibilities left open by laws of nature and computational rules.
One argument against the efcacy of conscious experiences is that advanced by Daniel
Dennett1 to the effect that it would require a central headquarters in the brain, a so-
called Cartesian theatre, where conscious experiences occur and can have an effect on
brain processes; and there is no such location.
Dennetts arguments against the existence of any such central headquarters are to my
mind convincing, and I agree there is no such thing. For one thing, it seems clear that
the content of conscious experiences has contributions from processes occurring in
different regions of the brain: for example, it seems clear that shapes and colours are
processed in different parts of the brain, and it does not seem that there are further
brain processes in any more localised region of the brain that bring the results of these
separate processes together. Indeed, the content of conscious experiences often has
such a richness and complexity as to make it unlikely in the extreme that it could be
supported by anything less than extensive and complex processes, which could not
plausibly be conned to any one small region of the brain. I accept that consciousness
is distributed through the brain, as Dennett contends.
However, I suggest that this supports the efcacy of conscious experiences, rather
than the reverse.
I have previously referred to the binding problem of consciousness, the problem of
how it is that features processed in different parts of the brain are brought together
into a unied experience in which they are experienced all-at-once by the conscious
subject. The expression all-at-once is of prime importance here, because in many
cases there is not the slightest element of successiveness in the experience of these fea-
1
Dennett (1991), 10139.
8.6. There is no localised Cartesian theatre where conscious experiences occur, and the
solution to the binding problem must probably be found in the non-local nature of quan-
tum systems.
On the other hand, the great success of neuroscience in explaining much of the opera-
tions of the brain in terms of physical law-governed processes, and the great success of
the cognitive sciences in explaining much of the functioning of the brain in terms of
computational information-processing, may be considered as counting strongly
against any non-rule-determined input from conscious experiences.
I referred earlier to huge advances that have been made in neuroscience and in the
cognitive sciences.
At the level of the individual neurons of the brain, a great deal is now known
about what causes them to re or not re; how electrical signals are transmitted
within neurons and then passed across the synapses to other neurons by means of
chemical transmitters; and how all this is affected by the chemistry of the brain.
Much is also known about the patterns of connections between the neurons of the
brain. Areas of the brain associated with particular functions have been identi ed:
neuroscientists know broadly what effects on brain function and behaviour will
follow from injury to specic areas, and with the aid of brain-scanning techniques
they can observe what regions of the brain are active when particular tasks are being
undertaken.
Along with physical investigation of the brains operation, the cognitive sciences have
thrown light on its functional organization, giving insights into how the physical events
of the network of neurons can give rise to sensation, perception, memory, problem
solving, emotions, and actions. The brain is considered as an information-processing
2
Dennett (1991), Part III, especially 389: cf. Hodgson (1996a).
1. What is it about the indeterminism of QM that could make room for indeterminis-
tic rational choice?
2. Could brain processes plausibly be affected by quantum indeterminism and/or
non-locality?
3. Is there any inconsistency between the notion of rational indeterministic choice and
the randomness and statistics suggested by QM?
Dealing rst with question 1, standard QM allows for the possibility of indetermin-
ism in the development of a system over time in two ways: rst, in the determination
of what measurements of the system are to be made, and second, in the outcomes of
measurement of the system (reductions of the quantum state).
As mentioned earlier, standard QM postulates two processes by which physical sys-
tems change: deterministic development over time that alters the probabilities of out-
comes of various measurements that could be made of the system (process 2), and the
indeterministic occurrences of possible outcomes when observations or measurements
occur (process 1, the reduction of the quantum state).
The determination of what measurements are to be made on a quantum system is
not prescribed by the laws of QM, and that determination does affect how the system
under consideration changes. Indeed, the determination of when measurements are to
be made can substantially affect the probabilities of outcomes. For certain systems,
3
Sudbery (1986), 19293.
4
Stapp (2009).
5
Schnapf and Baylor (1987), 35.
6
See Penrose (1994), Stapp (1998), Eccles (1994), and Jibu and Yasue (1995).
7
In Stapp (1993), chap. 6.
8
Stapp (1998), 8.
9
Stapp (1998), 10.
Thus, Stapp argues, whereas classical physics has no room for consciousness and offers
no possibility of any explanation of or role for consciousness, the picture of the world
provided by QM incorporates consciousness in a natural and parsimonious way.
The late John Eccles, a prominent neuroscientist and Nobel laureate, advanced a
hypothesis that focuses on the triggering of the discharge of neurotransmitters, giving
rather more anatomical detail than Stapp.10
As is well known, the neocortex of the human brain contains thousands of millions
of nerve cells called neurons. Each neuron consists of a body or soma, bres called
dendrites through which signals are received from other neurons, and a bre called an
axon through which it sends signals to other neurons. The axon itself ends in many
branches, and these branches terminate in synaptic knobs or boutons, each of which
closely abuts the surface of a spine from a dendrite, or of the soma of the receiving
neuron: each such area of functional contact is called a synapse. When a neuron signal
reaches a bouton, discharge of neurotransmitters (or exocytosis) may occur, the prob-
ability of such occurrence being of the order of 0.25. If exocytosis occurs, neurotrans-
mitters cross the synaptic space or cleft to the receiving neuron, and there make an
excitatory or inhibitory contribution to the ring of that neuron. Whether or not a
neuron res will depend upon the total of such contributions, through all the synapses
of its dendrites and soma, which may number several thousand for a single neuron.
Something like one-half of the neurons of the neocortex have pyramid-shaped
bodies and dendrites ascending from their apexes towards the surface of the brain. As
they ascend, these dendrites become closely grouped in bundles or clusters, which
comprise dendrites from about 70 to 100 neurons. The dendrites from each neuron
have something like 2,000 spine synapses, some as many as 5,000; so that each cluster
has over 100,000 spine synapses. Eccles contends that these clusters of dendrites, which
he calls dendrons, are basic anatomical units of the cortex.
Eccles gives close consideration to the structure and contents of the pre-synaptic bou-
tons. Each bouton generally contains something like 2,000 vesicles, quantal packages of
neurotransmitter molecules, with each vesicle containing about 5,000 to 10,000 mole-
10
Eccles (1994).
11
Seife (2000).
12
Hameroff and Hagen (2000).
13
Stapp (2000).
My own conclusion is that arguments to the effect that there is no room in brain pro-
cesses for any indeterminist input from conscious experiences, and that those pro-
cesses could not be affected by quantum indeterminism or non-locality, are not strong.
It is true that current mainstream neuroscience does not suggest that unied conscious
experiences can have effects on brain processes, and does tend to suggest that indeter-
minism associated with quantum physics occurs at too small a scale to accommodate
such effects. But this is precisely why mainstream neuroscience fails to account for or
accommodate conscious experiences, and through lack of understanding of them
minimises their signicance; so these things are indicative of limitations of mainstream
neuroscience rather than inefcacy of conscious experiences.
8.7. It has not been shown that neurons and other working parts of the brain are too hot,
too massive and too wet to be materially affected by any quantum indeterminism or non-
locality.
14
See http://www.quantumbionet.org/eng/index.php?pagina=107.
8.8. Even if it were the case that the statistics of rational decision-making (if it were pos-
sible to calculate them) did not completely accord with those indicated by QM, this would
not be a violation of physical law but an indication of a limitation on its applicability.
15
Mele (2009) contains excellent discussions of examples such as these, generally supporting my
contentions here.
16
Libet et al. (1983).
17
Libet et al. (1979).
18
Gazzaniga (1988), 1114.
19
Wegner (2002), 74.
8.1. Our brains are constituted by the same physical elements as other physical objects,
and are constrained by laws of nature as are other physical objects.
8.2. Our choices and actions are to a considerable extent the product of activity of our
physical brains constrained by laws of nature, and much of our motivation is unconscious
or barely conscious.
8.3. The physical sciences can accommodate the existence of unied conscious experi-
ences, corresponding with events in widely separated regions of the brain, having effects,
not determined by rules, in one or more of those regions.
8.4. If it were possible to abstract physical brain processes and/or computational infor-
mation-processing from the totality of conscious decision-making, they would give the
appearance of producing probability-weighted spectra of outcomes, which include the
actual outcomes of the conscious decision-making.
8.5. Rather than conscious subjects making discrete conscious choices between alterna-
tives thrown up by unconscious processes, they use both conscious experiences and rule-
determined processes together, on a continuous basis, to steer a course within spectra of
possibilities left open by laws of nature and computational rules.
8.6. There is no localised Cartesian theatre where conscious experiences occur, and the
solution to the binding problem must probably be found in the non-local nature of quan-
tum systems.
The arguments of the previous chapters have supported the view that human beings
make decisions as to what to believe and what to do that are not pre-determined by
prior conditions and laws of nature, yet are not random but are apposite responses to
circumstances facing them; so that these decisions can be both indeterministic and
rational. These chapters have addressed the two major difculties facing an account of
indeterministic free will and responsibility, namely how to make sense of rational cau-
sation that is neither deterministic nor random, and how to reconcile that kind of
causation with what science tells us about the world. What I want to do in this chapter
is to complete my account of indeterministic free will and responsibility, to relate that
account to other views generally favourable to free will, and to show how my account
deals with objections to free will and responsibility based on arguments about luck.
The points I developed in chapters 5 and 6 were that, in making these decisions, per-
sons respond appositely to gestalt experiences that are too feature-rich to engage as
wholes with laws of nature and generally do not engage with computational rules, so
that the response is not determined by laws or rules of any kind. I would add now that
each person also has a particular combination of features; and just as it is reasonable to
accept that the content of experiences can as a whole contribute to the persons re-
sponse, I suggest it is also reasonable to accept that the person, the subject of the experi-
ences, can also as a whole contribute to the response. That is, I suggest that both the
content and the subject of experiences are not mere aggregations of general features
and/or mathematical variables with which laws of nature can engage, but are particu-
lar combinations of features which as wholes contribute to outcomes in ways that are
not determined by laws or rules.
In chapters 7 and 8, I have outlined how these contributions may be accommodated
within what science tells us about the world. I suggested that the indeterminism and
non-locality that are features of QM could allow room for an input from the conscious
aspect of conscious processes of the brain-and-mind, while at the same time I sug-
gested that this should not be taken to be an input that is discrete from and indepen-
dent of the non-conscious or physical aspect of these processes. The picture I am
suggesting is of rational decision-making by conscious subjects (persons), which
153
cannot be broken down into component parts, but which occurs within constraints
prescribed by the combination of the physical aspect, considered in isolation, and the
laws of nature.
While chapter 8 focussed on decisions by human beings, I do say, consistently with what
I wrote in chapter 6, that the brains of animals that have conscious experiences somewhat
like ours must also in a similar way permit of input from the conscious aspect of their con-
scious experiences. This gives rise to the question of when and how consciousness, and thus
this kind of contribution to what happens in the world, rst emerged. I do not suggest that
consciousness appeared suddenly at some stage in the evolution of life, for example with the
earliest birds or the earliest mammals. If it were the case that it is only in birds and in other
mammals that there is consciousness similar to ours, then I would suggest that in earlier
forms, such as reptiles, amphibians and sh, there must be a kind of proto-consciousness.
To use an expression of neuroscientist Susan Greeneld,1 I say that consciousness comes
with a dimmer switch, rather than just an on-off switch. I think that is true of our own ex-
perience, and that it is also true of the way consciousness emerged in evolution.
This gives rise to the further question of exactly when it was that the dimmer switch
of consciousness rst began to move from the off position. Was it when life-forms with
a nervous system rst emerged, or was it at some other time? This in turn engages the
issue of panpsychism versus emergence, referred to in the introduction. My position
on this is that there must always have been, in the universe, the potential for the emer-
gence of consciousness; but that there could only be anything like the actual begin-
nings of the consciousness that we enjoy when the existence of co-ordinated systems
of considerable complexity made it possible that there be inputs into what happened
that were neither rule-determined nor merely random. Scientists studying complex
systems refer to the occurrence of self-organisation in such systems, generally without
making it clear whether or not this kind of behaviour is simply the working out of
rule-determined behaviour in these systems. It may be that the very beginnings of our
consciousness can be traced back to some kind of self-organisation in complex sys-
tems, which might have been either before or after the rst emergence of life.
WI LL AN D R E S PON S I B I LITY
There is little more I can usefully say on those questions, and I now wish to say some-
thing about the will that I say is free, to some extent at least, and about responsibility.
John Searle has identied three gaps that exist between a persons reasons for ac-
tions and the actual carrying out of actions:2 (1) between reasons and prior intention
1
Greeneld (1999).
2
Or, as I put it in Hodgson (1999), areas in which reasons do not include a clincher and thus fail to
be conclusive. See Searle (2001), 6263.
9.1. Rational and non-random yet indeterministic processes are operative in the adop-
tion of beliefs relevant to action, and also in putting these beliefs into effect by deciding to
act and proceeding to do so.
I have said that the subject of conscious experiences is the person, the physical-and-
mental system that is the human being; and my contention is that if free will with re-
sponsibility is to be attributed to anything, it is to each person or human being.
It is I think widely accepted that most adult human beings, when conscious and
not in an abnormal mental state, can rationally make decisions about what to do,
about whether these decisions are to be put into effect, and about whether to carry
them through to a conclusion; and that the making of these decisions causes the
person to do something rather than do something else or do nothing. In that sense,
persons are widely regarded as having the capacity to recognise and respond to
good reasons, as rationally controlling their own conduct, as being free to do one
thing rather than another, and as being responsible for doing one thing rather than
another.
However, a problem arises when one considers in depth what a person is and how
decisions are made. It can be contended that persons are constituted by physical matter
undergoing physical processes that unfold in accordance with laws of nature, and that
the decisions made as to what to do and so on are just the working out of these physical
processes; so that in truth the person has no more free will to do one thing rather than
9.2. We have free will in a robust sense because (1) alternatives are truly open, albeit
limited by the engagement of prior conditions (including our own physical-and-mental
state) with laws of nature, (2) the occurrence of one of the alternatives is not random but
the result of our selection between them on rational grounds, and (3) we put our selection
into effect by voluntary action.
9.3. We also have responsibility in a robust sense because (1) we make rational decisions
and put them into effect, (2) factors outside our control at the time do no more than limit
I also contend that decision-making is a process, and that for some decisions it can be
considered a process extending over substantial periods of time. In those cases, the way
a person steers within spectra of possibilities at earlier stages of the process may sub-
stantially affect the spectra of possibilities available at later stages; and thus a persons
responsibility for ultimate outcomes is not limited to responsibility for the course
taken towards the end of the process but may extend, for example, to possibilities lost
because of the course taken at earlier stages.
My discussion so far has focussed on free will and responsibility for normal adult
human beings. It will be recalled that in chapter 6 I suggested that some non-human
animals can respond appositely to whole feature-rich gestalts, so that for those ani-
mals as well as humans such responses make a contribution to decisions and actions
that is not random yet not determined by engagement of rules with pre-decision or
pre-action circumstances. Thus, one of the requirements for my robust account of
free will is satised.
However, I suggest that for free will as generally understood, and particularly for
responsibility, there is a further requirement, namely the self-conscious rationality of
human beings. I accept that some non-human animals have the capacity to make
reasonable decisions on matters relevant to their survival and reproduction, some
have a capacity for self-awareness, and some have motivation with considerable simi-
larities to moral reasons that weigh with human beings (care of offspring, altruism
towards fellow animals, and so on). However, they do not have the exible all-purpose
rationality of human beings, supported by (and perhaps dependent on) a exible all-
purpose language.
The requirements for fully-edged free will and responsibility can usefully be con-
sidered in relation to the development of children. I would suggest that, from the time
they rst exercise some control over their actions, infants respond to feature-rich ge-
stalts; and thus for them, no less for than for non-human animals, such responses
make a contribution to decisions and actions that is not random yet not determined by
engagement of laws or rules with pre-decision or pre-action circumstances. Rational-
ity sufcient to support some responsibility gradually emerges, perhaps sufcient after
a few years to make a parents moderate discipline not merely useful but to some extent
deserved. However, the prefrontal cortex (the area of the brain associated with a per-
sons judgment abilities) develops only gradually, and is said not to be fully developed
until the early twenties; so even when a person is as old as eighteen, rationality and
responsibility is not yet complete.
My account of free will and responsibility is indeterministic, and it does not depend on
any sharp distinction between causation by events and causation by agents. It may
clarify my position if I now relate it to other ways in which philosophers have in recent
times sought to maintain ideas of free will and responsibility. I will start by comparing
my views with those of Robert Kane, perhaps the most prominent contemporary pro-
ponent of indeterministic free will. I will then look at views falling under the general
description of agent-causation, and then at views that maintain that free will and re-
sponsibility are compatible with determinism.
Kanes position is most fully developed in his 1996 book The Signicance of Free Will.
However, key elements of his position are usefully summarised in a 2002 article,3 to
which I will refer initially.
Central to his conception of free will is what Kane calls ultimate responsibility, one
element of which is that nothing for which the agent is not responsible should be a
sufcient cause of the decision or act in question.4 According to Kane, ultimate respon-
sibility requires not just that the agent could have done otherwise in respect of some
relevant act, but also that the agent could then have acted voluntarily, intentionally, and
rationally in more than one way. This need not be the case in respect of the very act
responsibility for which is in question, so long as it is the case in respect of acts in the
past by which the agent formed his or her present character, from which the act in
question issued. Kane calls these self-forming actions.
3
Kane (2002b) at 40817.
4
A similar idea has been expressed by Michael McKenna in this way: an agent is an ultimate source
of her action only if no conditions external to her are sufcient for her action. See McKenna (2009),
pars. 2.2, 5.3.4.
1. The contention that, prior to a choice being made, an agents reasons are character-
istically inconclusive, inter alia because they are incommensurable; and that it is the
agents choice or decision which resolves the issue. Kane endorses the idea of incom-
mensurability (at 167); and (at 133) he postulates that, in situations where an agent
has to choose between alternative courses of action and has reasons or motives sup-
porting each alternative, the agent makes one set of reasons or motives prevail over
the others by deciding.
2. The contention that what the physical perspective can only treat as a chance occur-
rence may correctly be seen from the mental or experiential perspective as an agents
choice. Kane says (at 147) that from the physical perspective, free will looks like chance,
since from a physical perspective, there is just an indeterministic chaotic process
with a probabilistic outcome; whereas experientially considered, the process is the
agents effort of will and the single outcome is the agents choice.
3. The contention that the problem of free will is closely interlinked with the problems
of consciousness and of the indeterminism disclosed by QM. Kane asks (at 148),
How can a physical process of the brain be at the same time a consciously experi-
enced effort of will?; and suggests that this is just part of the mystery of how neural
rings in the brain could be conscious mental events. And (at 15051) he suggests it
is also implicated with the general problem of indeterminacy-in-nature introduced
by quantum physics.
5
Kane (1996).
6
Notably Hodgson (1991), 13335, 38994; (1999).
Some differences between our positions may be seen as matters of emphasis. Kane fo-
cuses on decisions about what to do, whereas I link free will with plausible reasoning
about what to believe, as well as to other decisions about what to do. Kane also focuses
on those cases where an agent is torn between alternatives, whereas I would cast the net
somewhat wider, as extending to cases where the agent sees the reasons as pretty clearly
favouring one alternative rather than another: as I pointed out earlier, four decisions
each of which had a prior probability of 0.7 can bring about a result with a prior prob-
ability of 0.24.
I think the most important difference between our positions lies in what I see as an
absence in Kane of an explanation of how it is that the occurrence of one of the pos-
sible alternatives rather than the other, which looks like chance from a physical per-
spective, can be a voluntary, intentional, and rational choice between them. He says, in
the case of his businesswoman example, that whichever alternative is chosen is ratio-
nal, because it is supported by the reasons for that alternative, and it is also voluntary
and intentional, because it is chosen and made to happen by her.
Kane adopts what he calls a teleological intelligibility theory, according to which free
actions can be made intelligible in terms of reasons and motives, and explanations in such
terms are causal explanations. He says that his account assumes that choices can be pro-
duced by reasons or motives of the agent, and that this is both needed to account for ra-
tional agency and also an assumption shared by compatibilist accounts of free agency.7
I agree with this; but it seems to me that Kanes development of this approach falls
short in relation to the selection between the alternatives open to the agent. He claims
in effect that there is a non-arbitrary judgment by the agent that one set of reasons
should prevail over the other set of reasons, but Kane gives no explanation from the
experiential perspective of why or how such a judgment occurs or what makes it non-
arbitrary. Certainly, he makes no suggestion as to how the agents reasons could explain
which way the judgment goes: he does not point to any reasons, beyond the closely
balanced reasons supporting each alternative, that explain why one and not the other
prevails. I think this also creates a difculty for him in explaining the ultimate
responsibility of the agent for the choice. Kane does not suggest there is any relevant
indeterminism operating in the occurrence of the reasons or the felt strength of their
7
Kane (2002b), 416, 42426.
AGE NT-CAUSATION
One way in which some philosophers have sought to maintain notions of free will and
responsibility is by suggesting a distinct kind of causation that is operative in decisions
and actions of human beings, called agent-causation. A recent explanation of agent-
causation is given by philosopher Randolph Clarke in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy,9 as follows:
8
Smilansky (2002b), 504 n. 1.
9
Clarke (2008).
Clarke goes on to identify difculties with this approach, including its denial that
events such as the agents having certain reasons cause free decisions or actions.
There is indeed a tension between the agent-causal view that agents not events
cause free decisions and actions, and the commonsense understanding that an
agents having reasons for decisions and actions does contribute causally to the
happening of the decision or action. Different exponents of agent-causal views have
sought to resolve this tension in different ways. For example, Timothy OConnor
suggests:10
Clarke also identies other difculties for agent-causal views, including (1) its denial
that any event prior to the decision or action causes it, suggesting that what happens
can only be by luck or chance; and (2) the implausibility of the notion that decisions
or actions happen precisely when they do without some event that brings them about
at that time. These difculties are I think particular examples of a more general dif-
culty with agent-causal views, namely the inscrutability of the origins of decisions and
actions, according to these views: once one has identied the occasion for a decision or
action, the possible outcomes, and the propensities towards different outcomes, it ap-
pears there is nothing that can be said as to why one or other outcome occurred, apart
from saying it was caused by the agent.
It is useful here to see what Kane says about agent-causation.
Kane says that his own account does postulate agent-causation,11 in the sense that
the agent causes free decisions by making one set of reasons prevail over the other. He
says however that this does not make his view an agent-causal view, of the kind es-
10
OConnor (2005).
11
Kane (2002b), 42728.
9.4. Conscious decisions and actions are caused indeterministically by the totality of the
relevant unconscious and conscious processes, including the conscious subjects choice
taking into account consciously held reasons.
12
Fischer (2006), at 129.
13
Werking (2009).
COM PATI B I LI S M
As mentioned in the introduction, the view that free will and responsibility are com-
patible with determinism is advocated by many philosophers, perhaps a majority of
contemporary philosophers who have addressed the problem. It is not central to my
case in this book to dispute this view, because I am relying principally on the positive
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were
born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the conse-
quences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
This argument makes use of what has been called the transfer of powerlessness princi-
ple, which in effect says that because we are powerless to change events of the remote
past and are powerless to change laws of nature, we must also be powerless to change
anything that is a necessary consequence of (and uniquely determined by) those events
14
van Inwagen (1983), 16.
15
Frankfurt (1983).
16
For other examples see Fischer (2002) 281308.
17
Fischer (2002) 3067. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) gives a strong and detailed exposition of this
approach.
There are in turn two broad responses to this argument. One is to the effect that the
problem can be avoided by adjusting the facts, for example by proposing a fail-safe
device that detects prospective changes of mind and cuts in before there is a change of
mind by A, so that even this possible alternative is eliminated. The other is to say that
this kind of icker of freedom (as Fischer puts it)18 is insufciently robust to ground
moral responsibility, which must accordingly be based on the reasoning processes that
actually occurred rather than on the availability of such a tenuous alternative.
2. There have also been a number of arguments19 advanced that build on the idea that
if a persons conduct were to be caused by manipulation of the persons brain by an-
other person, it would be that other person (and not the manipulated person) who was
responsible for the conduct. These arguments go on to suggest that there is no differ-
ence relevant to responsibility between a persons pre-decision state caused partly by
manipulation, and a persons pre-decision state caused wholly by genes and environ-
ment. If the person is not responsible in the former case, there is no good reason for
holding that the person is responsible in the latter case.
18
Fischer (2002) 28890, 298303.
19
Such as the four-stage argument, the zygote argument, and so on: these arguments are helpfully
identied and discussed in Fischer (2008).
20
Peter Strawson called it panicky metaphysics: Strawson (1982).
9.5. Compatibilism depends for its plausibility on an assumption that control of conduct
and responsiveness to reasons is provided consciously, but gives no account of how, consis-
tently with determinism, this is possible.
Responsibility has been challenged by Galen Strawsons luck swallows everything ar-
gument,21 which has some similarity to the direct argument referred to earlier, but
does not depend explicitly on determinism being true and has greater focus on what
are the actual causal springs of our conduct:
Strawson builds on this argument to suggest that all we do is a matter of luck: luck
swallows everything. Our genetic and environmental backgrounds are pure luck, so far
as we are concerned, everything about our conduct depends on the pure luck of our
genes and environment, and people cannot be responsible for what is just a matter of
luck.
My contention will be that this argument does not run against my account of free
will and responsibility, because my account gives an interpretation of step 1 of the ar-
gument such that step 2 is not supported. By contrast, a compatibilist approach asserts
21
See Strawson (1996), (1998) and (2002).
22
Kaye (2007).
Thus my approach ts well with a commonsense approach of saying that people with
a reasonable capacity for decision-making and control of actions are responsible for
their wrong actions, but that this responsibility may be mitigated if there can be iden-
tied signicant factors outside their control, such as genetic disadvantages and/or
hard social conditions, which have contributed to the occurrence of these wrong ac-
tions. If a person is affected by factors such as these, it can be subjectively harder for
that person to exercise correctly the capacity to recognise and respond to good rea-
sons and to control conduct, so that failure to do so is less blameworthy (and success
9.6. The sense in which it is true that we do what we do because of the way we are is that
(a) the way we are plus our circumstances plus laws of nature provide alternatives, incon-
clusive reasons, and unconscious tendencies, and also the capacity to decide between the
The constraining effect of the way we are is limited to determining alternatives, reasons
and unconscious tendencies. Subject to that, our decisions are not constrained by any
distinguishing features of the way we are (and thus are not constrained by anything
that is due to the luck of our genes and environment), and to this extent we are truly
responsible for them.
And I also contend:
9.8. We do become partly responsible for the way we are, as our decisions, for which we
are partly responsible, come to supplement the effects of genes and environment on the way
we are.
There is no doubt that we can train ourselves to have capacities and capabilities, and
that (more generally) our decisions and actions can affect our characters. Thus, while
our genes and early environment enormously affect the way we are, decisions and ac-
tions for which we are partly responsible can also do so. And this means in turn that we
can become partly responsible for the way we are, as our choices, for which we are
partly responsible, come to supplement (by way of self-forming decisions and actions)
the effects of genes and environment on the way we are.
So I say that while our different genes and different environmental backgrounds
make life a handicap event, most of us have some capacity to modify our handicaps
and, within limits, to make our own luck and to shape our own lives.
In addition to Galen Strawsons argument, there are other arguments to the effect that
exercises of indeterministic free will must be a matter of luck.23
The essence of these arguments is captured by the replay argument suggested by
Peter van Inwagen (2000). It is supposed that God repeatedly replays the history of
the universe, starting from a time just before a person decides whether to do action A
or action B in an exercise of indeterministic free will. Since the pre-decision circum-
stances do not uniquely determine the outcome of the decision, it must be that in
some of these replays the person will do action A, while in other replays the person
23
See for example N. Levy (2008), McCall and Lowe (2008), and Levy and McKenna (2009).
9.1. Rational and non-random yet indeterministic processes are operative in the adop-
tion of beliefs relevant to action, and also in putting these beliefs into effect by deciding to
act and proceeding to do so.
9.2. We have free will in a robust sense because (1) alternatives are truly open, albeit
limited by the engagement of prior conditions (including our own physical-and-mental
state) with laws of nature, (2) the occurrence of one of the alternatives is not random but
the result of our selection between them on rational grounds, and (3) we put our selection
into effect by voluntary action.
9.3. We also have responsibility in a robust sense because (1) we make rational decisions
and put them into effect, (2) factors outside our control at the time do no more than limit
alternatives, give rise to reasons and determine how they appeal, and give rise to uncon-
scious tendencies, and (3) while those factors reduce our responsibility at the time, they do
not eliminate it.
9.4. Conscious decisions and actions are caused indeterministically by the totality of the
relevant unconscious and conscious processes, including the conscious subjects choice
taking into account consciously held reasons.
9.5. Compatibilism depends for its plausibility on an assumption that control of conduct
and responsiveness to reasons is provided consciously; but gives no account of how, consis-
tently with determinism, this is possible.
9.6. The sense in which it is true that we do what we do because of the way we are is that
(a) the way we are plus our circumstances plus laws of nature provide alternatives, incon-
clusive reasons, and unconscious tendencies, and also the capacity to decide between the
alternatives on the basis of the reasons; and (b) what we do is what we decide in exercise
of that capacity.
9.7. That leaves us at least partly responsible for what we do, even if we were not respon-
sible for the way we are.
9.8. We do become partly responsible for the way we are, as our decisions, for which we
are partly responsible, come to supplement the effects of genes and environment on the
way we are.
It will be recalled that in the introduction, I disputed the contention that ideas of
blame and retribution for wrongdoing should be abandoned, and I suggested instead
that the idea of retribution is a foundation of human rights. My arguments so far have
supported the view that we do have free will and responsibility for our actions in a
robust sense. As a further step in my support for ideas of retribution, I now want to
develop the idea that people can be justly praised or blamed, or rewarded or punished,
for what they do.
The idea that it is just to do these things requires that what people do can truly be
right or good, and thus deserving of praise or reward, or wrong or bad, and thus deserv-
ing of blame or punishment. All this raises the question of the status of value judg-
ments about such things as justice, right and wrong. Can such judgments be true? And
if so, does their truth consist merely in conformity with some artefact of human evolu-
tion and culture (such as a surrounding climate of ideas about how to live),1 or rather
in conformity with some objective reality that is not just an artefact of human evolu-
tion and culture? It is important for me to say something about these questions, if only
because my contention is (1) that it is just to impose punishment to an extent that is
deserved by reason of wrong conduct, for which a person is responsible, and (2) that the
person in question should accept it as being just. The signicance of these assertions is
much affected by the status of the value judgments included in them.
The position I will very briey support in this chapter is that the wrongness of some
conduct does not consist solely in its relationship with some artefact of human evolu-
tion and culture, and similarly that the imposition of deserved punishment is just in a
sense that is not wholly dependent on some artefact of that kind. My contention is that
value judgments like these may be true and, consistently with what I wrote in chapter
2, that this truth consists in correspondence, by way of meaning, with reality; and that
in this case the reality is an objective reality that is not merely an artefact of human
evolution and culture.
1
See Blackburn (2001), 1.
180
A DI FFE R E NT PH I LOSOPH ICAL APPROACH
2
Blackburn (2001), 29.
3
See generally Damasio (1996).
The assertion that we know things with perfect certainty from within our own moral
perspective begs the questions who are this we and why should we (or anyone) be
satised with what is known from within the moral perspective of this unidentied
group. The best answer to the rst question, implied but not explicitly given by Black-
burn, must be that we are all those presently existing people in a community who are
willing, through giving and receiving reasons, to seek a common point of view. The
content of ethics for that community must then come down to such ethical views as
may be held in common by all of these people (or perhaps a majority, or perhaps
some elite?), including their willingness to seek a common point of view through the
giving and receiving of reasons; but with no further basis available for appraising
whatever happens to appeal to them (presumably, on the basis of their genes and
culture).
Now I accept that views held about such things as right and wrong by such people
provide evidence for what is right and wrong, and are to be respected. But to say, as
Blackburn does, that these views are constitutive of what is right and wrong, seems to
me plainly mistaken.
For one thing (at least unless Blackburn were to acknowledge as a Reason an absolute
and objective prescription to seek a common point of view through the giving and
receiving of reasons, which he does not do), it would make Blackburns questions about
progress pointless and his judgments about those questions baseless: on his view there
is nothing, outside the views that happen to be held by different people at different
times in different communities, by which to judge progress.
And surely, this would not be the view of the people in question, apart from such of
them as may be persuaded by philosophical arguments of the kind Blackburn ad-
vances: surely they would hold that, in their activity of seeking a common point of
view through giving and receiving reasons, they are seeking to nd answers to ques-
tions of what is right and wrong, and not by that activity themselves creating and im-
posing otherwise non-existent answers to these questions.
Further, Blackburns view is not, I suggest, in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of words such as right and wrong, which convey an appeal to reasons or standards that
do not consist merely in the activities or views of any particular group of people, how-
ever contemporary, numerous or well-motivated that group may be. In my contention,
Blackburn gives no sound basis for adopting a view that is contrary to ordinary lan-
guage useand indeed, I suggest, contrary to his own language use when he talks of
In my experience, most human beings regard some conduct as wrong and other con-
duct as right. Our ideas about rightness and wrongness raise the possibility that there
may be some features of the world of the nature of natural imperatives, which exist
objectively and call for compliance by us whether we recognise them or not, and
whether we like it or not.
There are strong arguments against the existence of such natural imperatives.
They have no place in the scientic view of the world. They cant be the object of
straightforward observation or experiment. In so far as human moral opinions and
behaviours can be observed, these opinions and behaviours can be given an explana-
tion in terms of human evolution and culture. Although most human beings regard
certain conduct as wrong and other conduct as right, there are wide and seemingly
irreconcilable differences of opinion as to what conduct is wrong and what conduct is
right, differences that can be seen as pointing strongly against the existence of universal
objective natural imperatives.
Furthermore, it can be asked, how could the existence of such imperatives bind us,
particularly when there appears to be little justice associated with any supposed natu-
ral imperatives? The fact that often the innocent suffer and the guilty prosper can be
seen as discrediting any idea that there are such imperatives, or that we need to obey
them.
And yet, after taking all these things into account, I rmly believe that at least some
conduct is wrong, in a sense that appeals to an objective reality that is beyond human
evolution and culture. This is partly because of the universality of appeals to right and
wrong (even by those who purport to deny that these can be any more than artefacts
4
A good example is Gibbard (1990); and Blackburns views are developed in Blackburn (1998).
As for objection 2, the fact that there can be explanations of morality in terms
of human evolution and culture may be seen as suggesting that the mere existence of
moral opinions and behaviour is not of itself a strong argument for the existence of
true moral imperatives; but the possibility of such explanations does not itself count
strongly against other arguments for the existence of such imperatives.
As for objection 3, I do not think differences of reasonable opinion on what conduct
is wrong and what conduct is right are irreconcilable. This is partly because I contend
there can be resolution of the conict between those views of morality that say that
what is important is what consequences our actions have, and those that say that some
things are wrong (dishonesty, injustice, etc.) independently of their consequences.
I will elaborate on this later.
And as for objection 4, I do not say that moral imperatives should be obeyed just
because they somehow exist as imperatives or laws: rather, I say there are compelling
reasons (indeed, Reasons with a capital letter) why we should act in certain ways, which
may conveniently be expressed and summarised in terms of imperatives or laws. That
is, we should do the right thing not just because there is some kind of law saying we
should, but because the reasons for doing so are compelling; and are compelling even
though justice is not assured; and appreciation of these reasons, by persons with rea-
sonable intellectual and emotional capacities, carries with it a feeling of obligation to
give effect to them. This too I will revisit later.
So I will contend:
10.2. Wrongness of certain behaviour is not just an artefact of human evolution and
culture: there are natural imperatives.
I cannot in this chapter fully develop a theory of ethics and value judgments. I will give
the barest outline of my thinking on the subject, so that it can be taken into account in
considering my position concerning responsibility and retribution. I will begin by pro-
posing what I contend to be plausible candidates to be natural imperatives, and briey
giving reasons, in addition to their intrinsic plausibility, why I believe them to be so.
AB SOLUTE I M PE RATIVE S
What I suggest as the most basic imperative is the imperative to do the right thing and
not to do the wrong thing. (I will take this as including an imperative, applying where
one either does not do the right thing or does not know what it is, to do what is more
As I have indicated, the third of these imperatives does not require that one give equal
weight to the interests of each person, and it does not require that there never be action
contrary to the interests of other persons. It leaves open, to be determined rationally by
having regard to other considerations, that one may prefer ones own interests, or the
interests of particular persons, over the interests of other persons; and also that one
PR I MA FACI E I M PE RATIVE S
I dont think any other imperatives, with more specic content, can be absolute. They
can conict, and where they do, at least one must give way; and the outcome must be
determined by application of the second of the absolute imperatives. So I believe these
imperatives are prima facie only.
Some of these imperatives apply at all times and to all our actions, so that it is always
wrong not to comply with them unless there is justication for not doing so, justica-
tion which generally must be based on other imperatives. These generally applying
prima facie imperatives may be expressed and grouped in different ways, but I think
most would be covered by the following.
The rst four of these imperatives are suggested by the basic imperative to act out of
care for all persons, although of course they are not themselves absolute, because they
can conict with each other. Other similar imperatives such as act kindly, act loyally,
act cooperatively, act tolerantly, and so on, could be added; but I think they are suf-
ciently included by implication in those I have stated. For example, the imperative to
act justly requires that one make a fair contribution to any cooperative project from
which one takes benets.
The fth of these imperatives is perhaps less clear. For most people, I think, life is a
positive, something valuable and worth having, or at least is capable of being so. For
these people at least, an appropriate attitude to life is to welcome it, to embrace it, to
The rst of these is self-explanatory. It is similar to the rst of the generally applying
imperatives, but has less universal application: I do not think it is reasonable to expect
people to trying to do good all the time, although it is reasonable to expect them to be
willing to take advantage of at least some of the opportunities to do good that present
themselves from time to time.
The last imperative, Improve oneself, is suggested by the basic imperatives. It requires
one to enhance ones own ability to do the right thing, rationally determine what is the
right thing, and do good. It requires the cultivation of virtues associated with the seek-
ing of truth, particularly in so far as the truth is relevant to ones own actions; and of
virtues associated with readiness, willingness, and ability to put decisions rightly made
into effect, and also to enlarge ones opportunities to do good. Thus it requires us to try
to become, in our rational deliberations, both interested (inquisitive, enthusiastic, self-
reliant, diligent, tenacious, and so on) and disinterested (balanced, fair-minded, self-
critical, open to appreciation of our own strengths and limitations, concerned for truth
not self-promotion or self-justication, willing to admit error, duly respectful of other
opinions, and so on). And it requires us to enhance our capacity to give effect to our
decisions and to do good, for example by improving our practical skills and courage
and sympathy, combating laziness, guarding against giving undue weight to our own
interests, and so on.
With those suggested natural imperatives in mind, I can return to the two questions
left for further consideration, namely whether there are irreconcilable differences be-
tween reasonable opinions concerning moral questions, and whether moral impera-
tives can really be binding.
One basic area of disagreement between apparently reasonable moral views, that
could be considered to be irreconcilable, is that between views to the effect that the
right act is always that which has the best consequences (the act-utilitarian or act-
consequentialist criterion for rightness of actions), and views to the effect that at least
some acts are right or wrong independently of their total consequences, for example
killing innocent people, being dishonest, being unjust.5 Even within views to the effect
that the right act is that with the best consequences, questions of justice raise differ-
ences that may be considered irreconcilable, notably those between views that regard
the totality of whatever is of value as being the test of what consequences are best, and
views that regard the distribution of whatever is of value among persons affected as also
being important (and in that case, there are further difculties in how distribution is
to be weighed against totality).
5
There are other views falling within the general description of utilitarianism, which appeal to the
consequences of adopting and supporting moral rules, rather than the consequences of individual acts.
These views exist in many different forms involving many complexities and many different implica-
tions (see for example Regan 1980), and generally they do not involve the stark conict with other
moral views that is raised by act-utilitarianism. I will not here address them specically: however, I note
that they are all subject to the second difculty I identify for act-utilitarianism, namely the indetermi-
nacy of hypothetical and future consequences.
6
Sidgwick (1874).
7
Smart (1961).
8
Hodgson (1967).
In particular cases, natural imperatives will often give a reasonably clear answer as to
what action is right and what action is wrong; but sometimes they will not do so, and
there may remain reasonable differences of opinion on the matter. In such cases, I be-
lieve the appropriate attitude is not to condemn those with views that are different
from ones own, but to engage in constructive debate to see if agreement can be reached;
and if despite all reasonable efforts differences remain, the only reasonable position is
one of tolerance. It may be that in some particular cases, there is in fact no single cor-
rect answer.
10.7. Reasonable differences of opinion on moral issues are possible, and when they occur
the appropriate response is constructive debate and tolerance.
WHY B E MORAL?
Turning to the second question left for further consideration, whether natural im-
peratives can really be binding, I do not appeal to the existence of God as a reason
why we should be moral and obey natural imperatives. So far in my discussion, I
have not given any reason to believe in God or anything like God; and it will be seen
in chapter 12 that such belief as I have in anything like God depends in part on my
belief in morality, rather than vice versa. Similarly, I do not support morality by any
idea of ultimate justice being accorded in conformity to how well or badly we have
followed natural imperatives.
It has been said that if there is no God, then everything is permitted. I disagree pro-
foundly with that. If our moral obligations depended on Gods commands, and noth-
ing else, I would see no reason, other than prudential reasons, to obey those commands.
It could be said that, because God created us, we owe God gratitude and obedience; but
then either the obligations of gratitude and obedience must themselves depend on
Gods command, or they must be based on some imperative that does not consist en-
tirely in Gods command. If the former, then it is a bootstrap exercise; and if the latter,
then moral obligation depends on something in addition to Gods command.
Somewhat similar considerations are raised by the question of justice. If perfect jus-
tice were considered necessary for the existence of natural imperatives, these impera-
tives would depend on breaches being punished and compliance being rewarded
precisely to the appropriate extent. But then prudential and moral considerations
would coincide exactly, and the need to have moral considerations weighing along
with and sometimes against prudential considerations would disappear. Whereas
10.8. We should comply with natural imperatives, not because they are commands of
God or the universe or because justice is guaranteed, but because of the reasons underlying
them.
So far Ive been arguing that questions of right and wrong can be matters of truth and
reality, not merely of human evolution and culture. I now suggest that questions of
good and evil can also be matters of truth and reality. Just as some actions are right, in
the sense of to be done, and some are wrong, in the sense of not to be done, so also
some things are good, in the sense of to be approved of (and so admired, promoted,
sought after, etc.), and some things are bad (or evil), in the sense of to be disapproved
of (or abhorred). And here I mean good or bad in an absolute sense, not merely good
or bad of their kind, like a good car or a bad apple, or good or bad because of their
consequences or tendencies.
I will not attempt to give a fully worked-out account of what things are good in this
sense, or to present substantial arguments justifying the views I express here.
10.9. Some things are good in themselves, such as right actions, persons disposed to act
rightly, unselsh love and human ourishing; and some things are bad in themselves, such
as wrong actions, persons disposed to act wrongly, hatred and human suffering.
A further reason why I believe that values (right, wrong, good, bad) are not mere
artefacts of human evolution and culture, but have a basis in a further objective
reality, is my belief that beauty or (more generally) aesthetic merit can be more
than such an artefact. I accept that personal taste and cultural context are impor-
tant factors in aesthetic judgments; but I do not believe this detracts from the abso-
lute worth of the beauty of the natural world, and that (for example) of Rembrandts
paintings, Shakespeares plays and poetry, and Bachs music. So I believe that the
richness and beauty of life and the natural world are good, and so also are the
richness and beauty of superior aesthetic creations of human artists, writers and
musicians.
For those who are capable of creating things of high aesthetic merit, to do so con-
forms to a number of natural imperatives, including Act in a life-afrming way, Do
good, and Improve oneself. The extent to which this could justify non-compliance with
other natural imperatives would be a matter for reasonable judgment.
I believe:
10.10. Things of beauty or (more generally) aesthetic merit are good in themselves, and
for those capable of creating such things it is prima facie right to do so.
So far, I have argued that there are objectively existing moral requirements, and have
set out what I suggest to be the basic moral imperatives. I suggest that these impera-
tives do not depend upon their being adopted or implemented by the practices or laws
10.11. There are good moral reasons for generally complying with community practices
and laws, having to do with respect, fairness, reasonable expectations and stability.
However, there can also be good moral reasons for not complying with some commu-
nity practices, and even for not complying with some of a communitys laws, although
in the case of laws additional considerations come into play. These reasons arise in two
main areas, namely where the practice or laws are unjust or unreasonable or otherwise
decient, and (at least in the case of practices) where variety may be preferable to dull
uniformity.
Where there are deciencies in practices that are not laws, there is generally no pro-
cedure for changing the practices other than conduct and advocacy. If it is indeed the
case that the practices are unreasonable, it must follow that the rst reason for compli-
ance does not apply: but the other three could still do so, and the advantages of non-
compliance in particular cases and of promoting desirable change would need to be
weighed against these reasons.
10.12. The reasons for complying with community practices may be outweighed, particu-
larly in the case of practices that are unjust or unreasonable or otherwise decient, and in
the case of practices that are mere lifestyle choices.
LEGAL SYSTE M S
Where a community has a functioning legal system, which is a reasonably just and ef-
fective system, the moral reasons for general compliance are very strong.
The four reasons I identied above in relation to community practices apply with
particular force. Laws have generally been stated or enacted on the basis of considered
opinions reached by relevantly qualied people as to their justice and appropriateness.
The contribution of such a legal system, and of general compliance with it, to the suc-
cessful functioning of a community is very great indeed; and the unfairness of taking
the benet of compliance by others, without complying oneself, is substantial. Most
members of the community order their lives in the reasonable expectation that laws
will generally be complied with, and thus are susceptible to signicant harm when
these expectations are not fullled. A great deal of cooperation and coordination of
effort that is very benecial to the community depends on the fullment of these rea-
sonable expectations. And the weakening of a legal system through signicant non-
compliance has the potential for very great harm.
There is also the further consideration that most reasonably just and effective legal
systems provide mechanisms for changes to be made to particular laws; so that where
10.13. If there is an established legal system that is reasonably just and effective, there are
strong moral reasons for obeying the laws of that system.
But this is not to say that there can never be moral justication for not complying
with some laws of such a legal system.
Some breaches of some laws may be considered de minimis, for example where a
pedestrian disobeys a trafc light when it is clear that there is no trafc anywhere in the
vicinity and no possibility that anyone could be put at risk.
More signicantly, there may be circumstances in which it is morally justied to break
a law in a way that is not de minimis, on the ground that this particular law is unjust or
otherwise bad and that deance of it is an appropriate course to have it changed. Because
there are legal ways to change laws, this course would generally be morally permissible
only if other reasonable attempts to have the law changed have failed; and because the
objective is to have the law changed, the breach of it should be open and peaceful.
However, I believe this course would not be morally permissible for persons who
have undertaken to uphold the law, such as a judge. For such people, in a system that is
reasonably just, the importance of compliance with the law is such that, deliberate
breaches, other than de minimis breaches, could be morally justied only in extreme
circumstances.
10.14. If there is a law in a reasonably just legal system that is unjust or otherwise bad,
change should be sought within the system, but there may be circumstances in which it is
morally permissible to seek such a change by openly breaching the law.
Generally, I believe it is morally permissible to disobey the laws of such a system only
where the moral reasons supporting that course are strong, for example where great
harm would be caused by complying with the law in particular circumstances.
10.15. Apart from cases of de minimis breaches, it is morally permissible to disobey the
laws of a reasonably just legal system only if there are strong moral reasons to do so.
If there is a legal system in place that is not reasonably just, the moral reasons for com-
plying with it are less strong and are more readily displaced. If the system is sufciently
unjust, moral reasons may support attempts to overthrow the system and replace it;
and it may even be morally wrong for people such as judges to participate in the system
at all. I cannot here go deeply into these issues.
I have argued there truly are moral imperatives breach of which can justly deserve
blame or punishment. It might be said, however, that I have assumed that people who
may be subjected to blame or punishment are aware of what is morally required of
them: it cannot be just to blame them or punish them for not complying with require-
ments of which they are unaware.
Australian law takes the robust approach that ignorance of the law does not excuse
breaches of it; although the law also provides a defence of insanity if an accused person
proves that, by reason of a disease of the mind, he or she did not know that what he or
she was doing was wrong.
I contend this is a reasonable approach. Most adult human beings have the capacity
to make reasonable value judgments, so that they have the capacity both to apprehend
the existence of moral obligations and to feel appropriate motivation to conform to
them; and they can properly be regarded as at moral fault if they break laws because
they do not appreciate that it is wrong, for example, to harm or cheat other people
without strong justication, or to take the benet of compliance by other people with
the laws of a community while not giving others the benet of ones own compliance.
And the last point makes it reasonable to expect that people accepting the advantages
of living in a community will take reasonable steps to ascertain what is required of
them by the laws of that community.
It may be said in addition that even those who (unreasonably) dont accept there are
moral obligations binding on themselves are, in a reasonably just legal system, given a
fair opportunity to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law: the laws are
made public, as are the possible consequences of not complying with them, and pun-
ishment is applied only to those who are proved to have breached the public laws by
their voluntary actions.
There are however people who, because of mental abnormality, are not capable of
appreciating moral and legal requirements. The law is justied in dealing humanely
with those people, as well as those who are unable to appreciate what they are doing or
to control their conduct, so as to prevent them being an unreasonable danger to them-
selves or others, without regard to questions of responsibility and desert.
10.17. Most adult human beings have the capacity to make reasonable judgments
about what actions are right or wrong, and failure to do so is not an excuse for wrong
actions.
10.1. Questions concerning the existence and content of natural imperatives can be the
subject of rational enquiry.
10.2. Wrongness of certain behaviour is not just an artefact of human evolution and
culture: there are natural imperatives.
10.3. The overriding and exceptionless natural imperatives are:
a. Do the right thing and dont do the wrong thing.
b. Rationally determine what is the right thing and what is the wrong thing.
c. Act out of care for all persons.
10.4. The generally applying prima facie natural imperatives are:
a. Do no harm.
b. Act justly.
c. Act honestly.
d. Full commitments.
e. Act in a life-afrming way.
10.5. The occasional prima facie natural imperatives are:
a. Do good.
b. Improve oneself.
10.6. The available area of reasonable disagreement about natural imperatives is not
such as to count strongly against their existence.
10.7. Reasonable differences of opinion on moral issues are possible, and when they occur
the appropriate response is constructive debate and tolerance.
10.8. We should comply with natural imperatives, not because they are commands of
God or the universe or because justice is guaranteed, but because of the reasons underlying
them.
10.9. Some things are good in themselves, such as right actions, persons disposed to
act rightly, unselsh love and human ourishing; and some things are bad in them-
selves, such as wrong actions, persons disposed to act wrongly, hatred and human
suffering.
10.10. Things of beauty or (more generally) aesthetic merit are good in themselves, and
for those capable of creating such things it is prima facie right to do so.
10.11. There are good moral reasons for generally complying with community practices
and laws, having to do with respect, fairness, reasonable expectations and stability.
10.12. The reasons for complying with community practices may be outweighed, particu-
larly in the case of practices that are unjust or unreasonable or otherwise decient, and in
the case of practices that are mere lifestyle choices.
10.13. If there is an established legal system that is reasonably just and effective, there are
strong moral reasons for obeying the laws of that system.
In previous chapters of this book, I have argued for a particular account of free will and
responsibility, challenging the view that what we do is the inexorable playing out of
roles given to us by our genes and environment, and supporting the view that our vol-
untary actions are in a fundamental way our own free choices and our own responsibil-
ity. In this chapter, I will be considering what these arguments suggest as to appropriate
responses to wrongful or harmful conduct; and I will focus on what are the appropriate
responses of a legal system, and in particular a system of criminal law, to conduct of that
kind. My main concern will be the question of retribution in punishment.
As with a number of other topics, I do not propose to enter in depth into the exten-
sive literature dealing with topics such as the justication of criminal punishment: my
objective is rather to consider the implications in this area of my arguments concern-
ing free will and responsibility.
I have argued in previous chapters for the views that most adult human beings do, in
a substantial sense, have free will and responsibility for their actions; that they have
the capacity to make reasonable judgments about what conduct is right and what
conduct is wrong; that such judgments concern matters of truth and reality, not
mere artefacts of human evolution and culture; and that failure to make reasonable
judgments about what actions are right or wrong is not an excuse for wrong actions;
and accordingly I contend that it is generally reasonable and fair to hold people re-
sponsible for their wrong conductso that responses such as blame, criticism, ex-
pectation of apology and/or remorse, and so on, may be justied. And if the
206
wrongdoer is oneself, it may be appropriate that one experience feelings of guilt and
that one apologise and express remorse to persons affected, as well as resolving to do
better in future.
When the wrongdoing is serious, and particularly when some substantial harm is
done by it, more substantial adverse responses may be appropriate. Four broad kinds
of possible responses to conduct that is seriously wrong and/or harmful may be identi-
ed, namely revenge, punishment, reparation and non-punitive treatment.
1. in Australia and in most countries with similar legal systems, for most types of cases
where substantial harm can be caused by negligent conduct, insurance is either
compulsory or at least common; and
2. negligence can generally be considered a wrong for which a person is responsible,
because exercise of care is under our control, as is the undertaking of tasks for which
we do not have appropriate skill (so that moral responsibility is wholly absent only
in cases where there is no lack of care but only lack of skill, and also no lack of care
in the persons judgment that he or she did have adequate skill for the task being
undertaken).
OVE RVI EW
The criminal justice system in my country Australia, and also in other countries
with similar legal systems, including the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, is generally regarded as serving two broad types of purposes, which are
together considered as justifying the imposition of restraints or other detriments
on offenders: retributive, backward-looking purposes, and consequentialist, for-
ward-looking purposes. These purposes guide the development of the criminal law,
and inform decisions as to when to impose such restraints or detriments and what
they should be.
The former (retributive) purposes are based on the idea that a person who has acted
criminally deserves to be punished for this conduct, and that it is just that appropriate
detriment be inicted on that person. And the idea that a person deserves punishment
for criminal conduct presupposes that the person is truly responsible for it, and is not
deprived of that responsibility because the conduct was the inevitable outcome of
things outside the persons control, such as genes and environment.
The latter (consequentialist) purposes involve no such ideas. They simply look to the
good consequences that imposition of detriment on offenders may be expected to have,
notably:
So:
11.1. The criminal justice system serves two broad types of purposes: retributive, back-
ward-looking purposes, and consequentialist, forward-looking purposes.
11.2. Retributive purposes are based on the idea that a person who has acted criminally
deserves to be punished for this conduct; and consequentialist purposes look to the good
consequences that imposition of detriment on offenders may be expected to have.
It will be seen that the consequentialist purposes to some extent support the response
I have classied as non-punitive treatment, as well as the response I have classied as
punishment: in particular, restraint of the offender and reform of the offender, consid-
ered in isolation, could be undertaken as non-punitive treatment. However, the conse-
quentialist advantages of restraint and reform are not, in Australia and in countries with
similar systems, generally considered as sufcient to justify compulsory treatment to
those ends, except as incidental to punishment that is justied as retribution. In general,
the imposition of punishment and/or compulsory treatment in individual cases is con-
sidered to be appropriate only if it is justied as fair retribution for criminal conduct.
There is, as I have said, a school of thought that retributive purposes of the criminal
law should be abandoned or at least de-emphasised, which has recently been given
some impetus by developments in neuroscience.1 There are two main strands to this
contention.
1. First, it is argued that the real responsibility for criminal conduct lies in the genes
and circumstances of the criminal, and free will and responsibility are illusions; and
that accordingly it cannot be just to impose punishment on the basis that a person
deserves it by reason of responsibility for criminal conduct. On this approach, crime
is an illness to be treated rather than wrongdoing deserving punishment, and retri-
bution can be no more justiable than revenge.
2. Second, it is contended that the application of retributive ideas subjects people to harsh
and inhumane treatment, which is not justied by any good consequences that might
1
See for example Greene and Cohen (2004), and material on Thomas Clarks website http://www.
naturalism.org/.
Some who support these views contend that punishment should be abolished alto-
gether, while others, probably the majority, contend that punishment should be strictly
as justied by consequentialist considerations alone.
The position I support in this chapter is that there are good reasons for retaining
retribution as a guiding purpose of criminal law, both as a general basis for determin-
ing when detriment is to be imposed on citizens and as an important and limiting
factor in determining what detriment is to be imposed.2 These reasons include what
I contend is the fairness and reasonableness of retribution, having regard to the earlier
chapters of this book, as well as the following considerations.
2
See Hodgson (2000).
I turn now to the way the criminal law of Australia, and other countries with similar
legal systems, gives effect to ideas of responsibility and retribution.
In the rst place, this can be seen (1) in the general doctrine of mens rea or guilty
mind, (2) in the mental element involved in the very denition of many offences, and
(3) in various defences based on factors affecting mens rea.
3
(1843) 8 ER 718.
4
Discussed by the High Court of Australia in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30.
It will be seen from the above discussion that ideas of responsibility and retribution
operate as restrictions on the application of State compulsion to citizens: they dene
circumstances in which the application of State compulsion is permissible (namely,
when guilt of an offence, including mens rea, is established beyond reasonable doubt),
and also set limits to that compulsion.
11.3. The criminal law proceeds on the basis that most adult human beings for most of
the time have the capacity (a) to make reasonable judgments about what actions are right
and what actions are wrong, and (b) to act in accordance with those decisions.
11.4. Those that do have this capacity are treated as being responsible for their voluntary
actions in breach of the criminal law, justifying punishment up to an extent considered
proportionate to the criminality of what they have done.
11.5. Those that do not have this capacity are treated paternalistically, with a view to
achieving best outcomes for them and the community.
11.6. The capacity to make reasonable judgments, and to act in accordance with them,
varies extensively in degree within the group that has this capacity; and also circumstances
in which people nd themselves can make it more or less difcult for them to exercise this
capacity and to conform to the requirements of the law.
11.7. This variability does not exclude responsibility justifying retributive punishment,
where there is voluntary breach of the law by persons judged to have the capacity referred
to above, but can properly be taken into account in determining the degree of blamewor-
thiness for illegal conduct, and thus in determining the extent of punishment.
11.8. Otherwise, the application of State compulsion to citizens requires strong
justication.
As mentioned earlier, some who oppose retribution contend that punishment should
be abolished altogether, while others, probably the majority, contend that punishment
should be strictly as justied by consequentialist considerations alone.
An example of the former is the philosopher Derk Pereboom. Pereboom8 contends
that we do not have free will of the kind required for moral responsibility, and that
accordingly criminal punishment cannot be justied as retribution for wrongdoing.
8
Pereboom (2001), 17486; (2002), 47981.
9
Pereboom (2001), 17677.
10
See Greene and Cohen (2004), 1783.
11.9. There are good reasons for retaining retribution as a guiding purpose of criminal
law, both as a general basis for determining when detriment is to be imposed on citizens
and as an important factor in determining what detriment is to be imposed.
11
For example, Smilansky (2002a).
12
Morse (2000).
13
Moore (1997).
11.10. The capacity to grasp and be guided by good reasons is a reasonable basis for ret-
ribution and justice, but this capacity depends on conscious decision-making not readily
explicable by compatibilist views.
14
This approach was advocated by the jurist Herbert Hart: see Lacey (2007), 237.
15
Murphy and Brown (2007).
16
See Hodgson (2005).
I do not suggest that the use of retributive principles by Australian and similar legal
systems is ideal and cannot be improved. I expect that science (and in particular neu-
roscience) will make signicant contributions to the development of the criminal law.
However, I do suggest that this should not be to the prejudice of the application of
retributive principles in punishment.
It is to be expected that increasing knowledge of how the brain works will assist in
devising programs for rehabilitation of offenders and programs for addressing genetic
and environmental factors contributing to criminal conduct, and will contribute to the
development and implementation of educational strategies to discourage criminal con-
duct. However, I contend that central to both rehabilitation and education is belief in
and acceptance of personal responsibility for conduct, and recognition and acceptance
of appropriate moral standards of right and wrong. If science were permitted to under-
mine belief in and acceptance of personal responsibility for conduct and/or belief in the
importance of moral considerations, then this would be highly counterproductive.
To the extent that science assists in identifying brain conditions that involve particu-
lar risks of criminal behaviour, and in devising methods to minimise these risks, this
could properly be taken into account in determining what sentence to pass on a person
who has committed a criminal offence (up to the limit considered proportionate to the
criminality of the offence), and in guiding the treatment of that person during the
period of that sentence. And it could properly provide a basis for offering voluntary
treatment to persons who have not committed an offence. However, for reasons I have
given, I would oppose its being used to justify detention and/or compulsory treatment
of persons who have not yet committed any criminal offence, other than (subject to
strict limitations) persons shown through mental abnormality to lack capacity to rec-
ognise and respond to good reasons for conduct and to control their conduct accord-
ingly, and also shown for that reason to be a danger to themselves or others.
One currently operating example of what I see as an appropriate interplay of re-
tributive principles and science is the use of special procedures in the case of property
offences prompted by drug addiction. Addiction is not generally regarded as elimi-
nating responsibility for crimes undertaken to satisfy a craving for drugs; and accord-
ingly, I suggest that crimes committed by reason of addiction should properly be
treated as wrongdoings to be punished, in accordance with principles I have discussed.
11.11. Science can be expected to make signicant contributions to the development of the
criminal law, but it should not do so in such a way as to put an end to the application of
retributive principles in punishment.
11.1. The criminal justice system serves two broad types of purposes: retributive, back-
ward-looking purposes, and consequentialist, forward-looking purposes.
11.2. Retributive purposes are based on the idea that a person who has acted crimi-
nally deserves to be punished for this conduct; and consequentialist purposes look to
the good consequences that imposition of detriment on offenders may be expected to
have.
11.3. The criminal law proceeds on the basis that most adult human beings for most of
the time have the capacity (a) to make reasonable judgments about what actions are right
and what actions are wrong, and (b) to act in accordance with those decisions.
11.4. Those that do have this capacity are treated as being responsible for their voluntary
actions in breach of the criminal law, justifying punishment up to an extent considered
proportionate to the criminality of what they have done.
11.5. Those that do not have this capacity are treated paternalistically, with a view to
achieving best outcomes for them and the community.
11.6. The capacity to make reasonable judgments, and to act in accordance with them,
varies extensively in degree within the group that has this capacity; and also circumstances
in which people nd themselves can make it more or less difcult for them to exercise this
capacity and to conform to the requirements of the law.
11.7. This variability does not exclude responsibility justifying retributive punishment,
where there is voluntary breach of the law by persons judged to have the capacity referred
to above, but can properly be taken into account in determining the degree of blamewor-
thiness for illegal conduct, and thus in determining the extent of punishment.
I have now completed the main argument of this book. It supports an original concep-
tion of the interplay of rationality, consciousness and free will, which happens to be
very much in accord with common sense, and which is consistent with and coheres
well with what science has actually established about the world. However, this concep-
tion is very different from what is widely thought to be the scientic view of the world,
which treats the world as changing precisely as determined by laws of nature, or as
determined by some combination of these laws and chance; and it does have wider
implications for an overall picture of the workings and signicance of the world. In
particular, it is relevant to whether one takes what might be classied as a physicalist
view of the world, and also to what is to be made of religious thinking and attitudes.
In this nal chapter, I want to explore these implications. In many respects, what I say
is highly speculative; but I think it is important to show that there are rational alterna-
tives to physicalist and mechanistic views of the world, on the one hand, and non-
rational religious views (and especially non-rational fundamentalist views) on the
other. So I believe a brief exploration of these issues, in the light of the arguments of
this book, is an appropriate nale to it.
Science has developed quite a comprehensive account of our origins, beginning with
the Big Bang about thirteen billion years ago. This account tells of the evolution of the
universe from that beginning and of the emergence and evolution of life, in terms of
the matter and energy and laws of nature that have existed since the Big Bang.
Very briey, an account is given of how the simplest atoms, atoms of hydrogen, were
formed, how irregularities in the distribution of matter coalesced into stars, how progres-
sively more complex atoms came to be cooked by nuclear processes in the stars, and how
planets including our Earth came to be formed. Then, on our Earth about four billion years
ago, simple life-forms emerged; and from these life-forms evolution produced, through
random mutations and selection on the basis of success in proliferation of genes, myriad
life-forms including those now existing on our planet. We are one of those life-forms.
230
The account science gives of this history in terms of matter and energy and laws of
nature, and in terms of natural selection for proliferation of genes, is extremely de-
tailed, persuasive and comprehensive; and so far as it goes and subject to what I say
later about potentialities, I believe it is substantially correct. However, this account has
the limitations noted in earlier chapters, that it gives no account of consciousness,
values or free will; and of course, it does not explain its own raw materials of the Big
Bang, matter, energy and laws of nature.
12.1. The scientic account of our origins, in terms of matter and energy and laws of
nature, is substantially correct, so far as it goes; but it gives no account of consciousness,
values and free will, and it cannot explain its own raw materials.
Further developments of the scientic account can be expected to provide more ac-
curate formulations of laws of nature, further explanations of constraints concerning
what exists and how it can change, and fuller accounts of how life emerged from non-
life and how evolution proceeded. While these developments may give deeper explana-
tions of the Big Bang and of matter, energy and laws of nature, I do not expect they will
ever completely overcome the limitations I have identied.
Even if scientists nd and formulate a single law that accurately expresses a basic
law of nature that underlies and explains all other laws of nature, and which con-
strains what things can exist and how they can change, this would still leave unex-
plained why there is this law and why there is anything on which this law operates.
More importantly, it would not explain consciousness, values and free will: con-
sciousness and free will because, in my belief, they involve more than matter and/or
energy and/or anything else existing and changing as determined by laws of nature,
and values because they cannot be investigated by the scientic method of conjec-
ture and refutation.
Consistently with this, I also suggest that consciousness, and particularly rational con-
sciousness such as that of human beings, is very important in the existence and func-
tioning of the universe. There is of course a sense in which conscious systems like
human beings may be small beer in the cosmic scheme of things, as has been suggested
by the philosopher J. J. C. Smart;1 namely, in terms of physical quantities like size, mass,
energy, distance, and so on. Yet even in purely physical terms, size isnt everything; and
it is widely accepted that the human brain is the most complex physical system known
in the universe. More importantly, I think there is a vast difference between a universe
without observers and a universe with observers. Although I dont agree with those
idealist thinkers who say that we can only conceive of a universe as observed, so that an
unobserved universe is inconceivable, I do say that a universe without observers would
be pointless in a way that our universe is not. In addition, there is the possibility sug-
gested by QM and outlined above that participation of observers is an essential feature
of our universe; and there is also the view of many thinkers that our universe happens
to be ned-tuned in just such a way as to permit the emergence of conscious intelli-
gence. I think it is reasonable to believe that consciousness is very important in the
scheme of things.
In the case of human beings, a new system that has the capacity to experience and re-
spond to aspects of the universe comes into existence each time a new person comes
into existence, and it does so regularly, in very similar physical circumstances. So it is
reasonable to accept that there are laws that mediate the emergence of these systems, to
the effect that a system having such and such characteristics will be conscious and thus
will have the capacity to experience and respond to what is experienced. These laws
would not be of the same kind as the laws of nature that simply constrain what can exist
and what changes can occur.2 Rather, they would mediate the emergence of conscious
systems and empower them to bring about changes in ways that are not simply the
effect of constraining laws engaging with pre-change circumstances, with or without
randomness, but are selected by the system.3
1
Smart (2005) at 62.
2
I have called these laws C-laws or laws of constraint: Hodgson (2001).
3
I have called these laws E-laws or laws of empowerment: Hodgson (2001).
I have suggested in earlier chapters that the changes that conscious systems can make
are not simply as determined by constraining laws, but nevertheless are apposite re-
sponses to aspects of the universe that are grasped by the systems; and this raises the
question of how these systems can determine just what the responses should be. In the
case of human beings, I have suggested that they make choices by exercising the infor-
mal rationality exemplied by what I have called plausible reasoning; and while I am
condent about the informal rationality of human beings, for the reasons I gave in
chapters 2 to 6, and while I have given some account of how I understand that informal
rationality works, it is still puzzling what it is that can render choices, which are not in
accordance with laws or rules, other than arbitrary or capricious.
I believe the explanation must lie in the existence of principles that provide guidance
to conscious systems in responding to what they grasp, but without prescribing pre-
cisely what that response is to be. (If they did prescribe an exact response, they would
be no different from constraining laws; and in any event, I have argued that conscious
systems respond to gestalts with which general rules or laws do not engage, so that laws
of nature cannot prescribe these responses exactly.)
I have already suggested that there are natural imperatives and values of goodness
and beauty embedded in the universe; and what I now suggest is that these imperatives
and values are associated with principles that provide some kind of pull or attraction
or call upon conscious systems, and thereby give guidance to these systems in deter-
mining responses.4 The more primitive the conscious system, I suggest, the more in-
denite would be its grasp of these imperatives and values, and the more indenite
would be the pull or attraction or guidance that they provide.
In the case of human beings (and perhaps also other mammals and birds), one im-
portant aspect of their responses to their experiences concerns judgments they make
as to what to believe; and this would appear to require guidance not just towards what
is right and/or good and/or beautiful, but also towards what is true. It is, I believe, the
pull or call of this value that is in play when we exercise techniques of our informal
rationality, such as making judgments that have regard to incommensurable reasons
and/or to analogies that do not depend on identity or quantitative assessment of
common features.
4
I have called these principles G-laws or laws of guidance: Hodgson (2001).
12.4. There are laws or principles, which are associated with natural imperatives and
with values of goodness and beauty and truth, and which provide guidance to conscious
systems by pulling or calling them to these imperatives and values.
12.5. Religious beliefs can and should be subject to rational scrutiny to no lesser extent
than other beliefs.
A further reason for circumspection in adopting religious beliefs follows from another
belief I stated in chapter 2, namely my belief, included in my assertion 2.7, that lan-
guage may be inadequate to express the reality under consideration, and my associated
belief that this is so in relation to matters going beyond the practical situations that
were (it may be surmised) the main concerns of language users as language evolved.
Religious issues are largely remote from matters of everyday experience, and from mat-
ters that can be investigated scientically. They are also issues in relation to which
language may well be inadequate. Accordingly:
A view held by some scientists and others as to the nature of the universe has been elo-
quently expressed by Richard Dawkins:5
The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there
is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind
pitiless indierence.
On this view, all our ideas, feelings and values have a complete explanation in a com-
bination of laws of nature and Darwinian selection. They require no more than this to
account for their existence, and they are no indicator that there is any more to the
universe than the raw materials on which the laws operate and the products of that
operationthese products including ourselves, our ideas, our feelings and our values.
What Ive written in earlier chapters shows why I do not accept this view.
My basic belief concerning the existence of conscious experiences means that I am
looking for a conception of the universe in which conscious experiences have a place;
and for reasons given in chapter 4, a conception of the universe as fully explained by
the operation of laws of nature on physical things, events and states of affairs does not
explain conscious experiences, or allow for any non-trivial place or role for conscious
experiences. A satisfactory conception of the universe requires at least the possibility of
an explanation of how it initially included the potential for the emergence of conscious
experiences and, once they have emerged, of what is their place and role in the work-
ings of the universe. These explanations are excluded by the conception of the universe
suggested by Dawkins.
Further, as explained in chapter 2, I believe in the existence of rationality which is not
wholly explicable in terms of processing of information in accordance with laws of
nature and/or computational rules; and as explained in chapters 4 to 6, I believe that at
least part of the explanation for this is that subjects of experience can respond ratio-
nally to whole conscious experiences (gestalts) in ways not wholly determined by the
operation of constraining laws. These views give informal rationality and conscious-
ness a substantial role in the working of the universe, and require a conception of the
universe that is consistent with their having such a role.
5
Dawkins (1995), end of chap. 4.
12.7. The universe is not one of blind pitiless indifference but one in which values of
goodness and beauty are embedded and which is in some sense benevolently creative.
WH E R E D O WE COM E FROM?
There is a very large and very beautiful painting by Paul Gauguin in the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts, called Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We
Going? It is the one work that I remember clearly from my visit there a few years ago,
and that would draw me back again. The painting depicts people at various stages of
life in a sumptuous Tahitian landscape: on the right a baby and three young women,
on the left another young woman and an old woman apparently near to death, and in
between two boys taking fruit, a man scratching his head in puzzlement, and women
in intimate conversation and contemplation. There are animals and birds, and a stone
idol. The painting suggests that, yes, we are human beings in a world of earth and water
and plants and animals, but it also conveys a powerful feeling of spirituality and other-
worldliness. And it conveys the mystery of the three questions of its title.
My discussion in this book has covered most of what I can usefully say about Gauguins
central question, What are we? Is there anything I can say about his other two questions?
Part of the story of where we come from is that told by science; but what the scientic
story misses is those features of the universe I have been considering in this chapter.
Some of what I think are crucial features of the universe that are disregarded by the
scientic story are:
1. its suitability for supporting a capacity to grasp and respond to features of the uni-
verse, and (possibly) its dependence upon that capacity for its existence otherwise
than as mere potentialities;
2. the role of consciousness in the existence and functioning of the universe;
3. the embedding in the universe of natural imperatives and values of goodness,
beauty and truth; and
4. what I believe to be the caring creativity of the universe.
The other general limitation of the scientic account that I noted was that it could not
explain its own raw materials. There is force in the argument, put by some scientists, that
explanations for our existence in terms of creation by God is not satisfactory because it
seeks to explain the existence of something for which we can give some explanation by
reference to something for which we can give no explanation whatever; and that the
12.8. We are the product of a universe in which the capacity to grasp and respond to its
features is important, in which natural imperatives and values of goodness, beauty and
truth are embedded, and which is caringly creative; and the nature of which can be illu-
minated by the metaphors and allegories of religion.
WH E R E AR E WE GOI NG?
Turning to Gauguins third question, Where are we going?, it is pertinent rst to con-
sider whether there is any purpose to our existence.
I have not embraced the idea that we are the creation of a person-like God existing
in or separate from the universe, and the ordinary concept of purpose suggests a pur-
pose held by a person or at least something person-like. Further, even if a person-like
God had some purpose in mind for us in bringing us into existence, it is not clear that
this of itself would mean that we must or should recognise and adopt Gods purpose
as our own purpose.
However, I have supported the view that we are the product of a universe in which
natural imperatives and values of goodness, beauty and truth are embedded and which
is caringly creative, and the nature of which can be illuminated by the metaphors and
allegories of religion. In those circumstances, I think it is not unreasonable to believe
there is some purpose to our existence, in the sense of a purpose (in some extended
meaning) of this caring and values-embedded universe, and/or in the sense of a pur-
pose that we, as a matter of morality, should adopt as our purpose.
12.9. There is some purpose to our existence, in the sense of a purpose of a caring and
values-embedded universe and/or in the sense of a purpose that we, as a matter of moral-
ity, should adopt as our purpose.
One possible such purpose was suggested earlier in this chapter, in the requirement for
a universe of interest that aspects of it be grasped and responded to; and this suggests
12.10. Our purpose may be to experience and respond to and appreciate the universe,
and to enrich the universe by contributing to the creation, ourishing and appreciation of
what is good and beautiful, and possibly also to prepare for and/or enhance some other
kind of existence.
12.11. There may be some mode of existence beyond our lives on this Earth, having regard
to the nature of the universe as value-embedded and caringly creative, the transcendent
qualities of some works of art and music and of some persons, and the idea that there
should be some kind of justice for undeserved suffering.
However, I think it is unlikely in the extreme that there is anything like a straightfor-
ward survival of death of individual persons, either as disembodied spirits or through
reconstitution of the body and brain or through reincarnation. If I were to survive
death either as a disembodied soul or in a reconstituted body, what version of me
would this be? Would it be me as I was in the prime of life, whatever that may be, or as
I was just before death, perhaps suffering from senile dementia? What I am, at any time
of my life, is very much bound up with my physical and psychological make-up at that
particular time; and I cannot identify any particular subject of my experiences that can
be separated out from the various ways I have been at different times of my life.
These considerations apply even more strongly against any notion of reincarnation
as a different person or animal. The character traits of any other person or animal
would be those constituted by the physical and psychological make-up of that person
or animal, and I cannot make any sense of how I, or any aspect of me, could be contin-
ued in any other person or animal.
Beyond these very general suggestions, I feel I can contribute nothing useful, so
I conclude:
It could be said I am arrogantly relying on my own ideas here, and ignoring a great
body of evidence that does make it reasonable to believe in more specic assertions
about God: the authority of holy books, the authority of prophets, the authority of
great religious institutions, the consensus of large numbers of people, and the persua-
siveness of the content of teachings of religions. And the resurrection of Jesus.
Holy books are said to be authoritative because they are inspired by God, and proph-
ets are said to be authoritative because they are in communication with God. Such
arguments are agrantly circular, seeking to prove the existence of a God that inspires
holy books and communicates with prophets, by means of these supposed inspirations
and communications. They are also highly implausible. There is no good reason to
think that either the authors of holy books or the prophets were other than human
beings like us, relying for their beliefs on their own perceptions and reasoning. If
people today claim to be authoritative sources of religious truth because they are in-
spired by God or because they are in communication with God, their claims are rightly
regarded with scepticism. I see no reasonable basis for any different view concerning
the authorship of holy books or the authority of prophets.
Ive heard it suggested that it is reasonable to accept that the Christian Bible is the
word of God, unless and until the contrary is proved. But well-documented internal
inconsistencies in the Bible, and the existence the holy books of other religions convey-
ing quite different messages, take away any rational basis for assuming that the Bible
has the imprimatur of the one true God, and thus as being literally true, unless and
until the contrary is proved. Having regard in addition to the circumstance that the
Bible was written by human beings like us, I say that the only reasonable course is to
assess its credibility in the same way as that of other ancient texts and other holy
books.
As regards the authority of religious institutions and the consensus of large numbers
of people, these may have been factors supporting the reasonableness of beliefs in his-
torical times when there was a broad consensus on religious beliefs throughout whole
communities, a consensus that was also in accord with the teachings of highly respected
religious institutions which had a monopoly on learning and scholarship in those
communities, and when there was little if any means of knowing much about other
communities and institutions. But today we know there is no consensus, and no good
reason for giving particular weight to views promulgated by any particular religious
institutions: there are believers and non-believers, and among believers and religious
institutions there are different and conicting belief systems. And what we now know
about the history of great religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church
can only inspire suspicion of their reliability as sources of religious wisdom.
12.13. On rational scrutiny, no current religion can be accepted as literal and unambigu-
ous truth, such as could make different beliefs false; but all great religions may qualify as
metaphors with degrees of truth.
I suggest in appendix B that some Old Testament stories have the potential to inspire
evil. And history shows that acceptance of the literal truth of religious beliefs has
indeed inspired great evil. Particularly has this been so when the acceptance of the lit-
eral truth of a belief system of a religion has involved the belief that those with differ-
ing views are wrong and to be condemned.
Obvious historical examples are the Crusades and the Inquisition. In the former,
wars were started because of a belief that a particular part of the world should not be
in the hands of people with beliefs different from those of the aggressors. In the latter,
people were imprisoned, tortured and killed for professing beliefs different from those
of ofcial church teachings.
There are also more contemporary examples, some of which cannot be dismissed as
mere aberrations of extreme minorities.
I understand that it is a not uncommon belief among Muslims that it is appropriate that
Muslims who renounce their faith should be severely punished, or in some cases even
killed, and I also understand that there are places where this is put into effect. This view
does not seem to be strongly condemned by the majority of inuential Muslims. Certainly
it should be so condemned, and inuential Muslims who are in any position to do so
should be denouncing such an evil belief and striving to ensure that it is eliminated.
There are still people in the Middle East who believe that there is part of the world
that has been given by God to a particular group of people in which they are included,
and that forceful disposition of other people from that land has been and is not only
6
Dawkins (2006), 25557.
12.14. Practice of any particular religion on the basis that it is literally and unambigu-
ously true, that different beliefs are false, and that people with different beliefs are to be
condemned, is not rationally justied and has the potential for great evil; but practice of
religion not as providing literal truth, but as one way of relating to what is good, beautiful
and benevolently creative about the universe, can be valuable.
12.1. The scientic account of our origins, in terms of matter and energy and laws of
nature, is substantially correct, so far as it goes; but it gives no account of consciousness,
values and free will, and it cannot explain its own raw materials.
To supplement what I said about Bayes Theorem in chapter 3, I will try to convey some un-
derstanding of its validity, and of how and why it works, with reference to my example from
that chapter; rst, with some attempt at rigour, and then, in a more simple and intuitive way.
The former exercise uses tables.
We start with a table based on the likelihood ratio given by the rst piece of evidence, namely
the occurrence of the pregnancy. This sets out the probabilities of that event (pregnancy) oc-
curring or not occurring, conditional in each case upon the truth of the hypothesis (improper
operation) or its negation (proper operation), with one column dealing with each of these two
assumptions.
Each column adds up to 1, because for the gures within each column it is assumed that the
hypothesis dealt with in that column is true, giving it probability 1. However, we know that
the two hypotheses cannot both be true; and we have assumed that the odds between them,
prior to taking the evidence into account, are 1:99 against the improper operation. So to arrive
at the absolute probabilities for the rst piece of evidence and its negation, prior to it being
ascertained whether pregnancy occurs or not, one should adjust this table so that it shows the
correct probabilities for the hypothesis and its negation, rather than the probabilities based on
the impossible assumption that both alternatives are true.
The probability of the improper operation, reecting the prior odds, is 1/100, while that of
the proper operation is 99/100. So to get to the absolute probabilities for the rst piece of
evidence and its negation, we make proportional adjustments to the rst column so that the
gures add up to 1/100 rather than 1 (that is, we multiply each gure by 1/100), and to the
second column so that the gures add up to 99/100 rather than 1 (that is, we multiply each
gure by 99/100). This gives the conditional probabilities shown in table A.1.
We see from the rst row of table A.2 that the total probability of pregnancy following the
operation is 9/1000 + 99/35,000, that is (315 + 99)/35,000 or 414/35,000; and we see from the
second row that the total probability of no pregnancy following the operation is 1/1,000 +
34,551/35,000, that is, 34,586/35,000. These probabilities add up to 1, as they should.
What happens to these gures when it is ascertained that the pregnancy in fact occurs?
The probability represented by the total of rst row of table A.2 becomes 1, and the proba-
bility represented by the total of second row becomes 0. That means that, without altering
the proportions, the total of the rst row should be adjusted to 1 instead of 414/35,000, and
the total of the second row becomes 0. To do this, we must multiply each entry in the rst
row by 35,000/414, and each entry in to second row by 0. In that way, we get a new table, the
rst row of which shows the adjusted probability of the hypothesis, having regard to the
evidence.
That is, the pregnancy that has in fact occurred has a probability of 315/414 of having oc-
curred in association with an improper operation, and a probability of 99/414 of having oc-
curred in association with a proper operation.
249
Table A.1 Conditional Probabilities of Evidence
All this amounts to the same thing as getting a likelihood ratio of 315/1 (the ratio between the
two entries in the rst row of table A.1) and multiplying it by the prior odds of the hypothesis
1:99 (reected in the totals of the columns in table A.2), giving posterior odds of 315:99, and
thus probabilities of 315/414 and 99/414 as shown in the rst row of table A.3. This accords
with the result of the rst stage, when I originally discussed this example.
The same process can then be repeated with the second piece of evidence (the eyewitness
accounts), with the result indicated earlier.
One can also give a simple and intuitive account of the whole process, in this case using the
eyewitness evidence rst. The initial odds against an improper operation are assumed to be
1:99. The eyewitness evidence makes it four times more unlikely that the operation was im-
proper, so the adjusted odds are 1:396 against. The statistical evidence makes it 315 times more
likely that the operation was improper, so the nal odds are 315:396 against, giving a probabil-
ity for the improper operation hypothesis of 315/711 or 0.44.
In chapter 12, I contended that religious fundamentalism has the potential for great evil, and
cannot be supported by reference to the authority of holy books. Here, I support that conten-
tion by considering one example of a holy book, the Christian Bible, and suggesting that its
authority is undermined by what I see as the gross immorality of many of its stories.
I will illustrate this by rst considering a story that is common to three great religions, Juda-
ism, Christianity and Islam, namely the story of Abraham and Isaac; and I will then consider
two other stories from the Old Testament. And then I will go on to consider whether the au-
thority of the Bible can be restored by its account of Jesus, because of the persuasiveness of
some of his moral teachings and the evidence for the resurrection.
The immorality of these and other accounts in holy books is I suggest a powerful reason to
reject religious fundamentalism. It is also a matter to be taken to heart by believers who are not
fundamentalists. When I received my non-fundamentalist Christian education, I was told that
the New Testament gave a better picture of God and morality than the Old, but stories such as
those I consider below were presented to me as stories of Gods dealings with his special
people, and I was given no warning of their gross immorality.
AB RAHAM AN D I SAAC
In the Old Testament story of Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 22), God tells Abraham to offer his
son for a burnt offering. Abraham builds an altar, prepares wood for a re, ties Isaac up, lays him
on the altar, and takes a knife to kill him. Only then, an angel tells Abraham not to harm Isaac,
and Abraham sees a ram caught in a thicket; and Abraham sacrices the ram instead of his son.
This story is generally presented as an example of meritorious sacrice and obedience to
God, carrying also the message that even if what God requires seems difcult to understand,
God will make sure it turns out for the best. To my mind, its message about both God and
Abraham is abhorrent, and has the potential for great evil.
About God, it says that God expects obedience to Gods command to kill an innocent child,
where there is no discernable reason for this except that it would please God (!) to have the
child killed and to have obedience shown in this way; that God expects followers to respect a
God who would be pleased to have an innocent child killed for no better reason than this; and
that God would without good reason subject an innocent child to a terrifying ordeal.
About Abraham, it says that he had respect for such a God to the extent that he would, on
the basis of such a capricious order, kill an innocent child. And that is quite apart from the
point that Abraham, as a human being with no more than our capacities for perception and
reasoning, could not have had any reasonable basis for believing in the existence of a God who
would have such expectations or issue such an order, or for believing that such an order had
actually been issued to him.
251
Even if Abraham had seen a great face in the sky speaking to him and had heard the words
spoken, it would have been more reasonable for him to believe this was a dream or hallucina-
tion than to believe that a God, conceived of as good, would have such expectations and would
issue such an order. And even if Abraham was justied in believing that what he saw and heard
was not a dream or hallucination, the reasonable conclusion for him to reach would have been
that this supernatural phenomenon was a manifestation of evil not of good.
Its been suggested that Abrahams willingness to sacrice the child he loved is admirable.
But that assumes Isaac was Abrahams to sacrice; whereas in truth no person belongs to an-
other in that way. It has also been suggested that killing an innocent child is not wrong if God
has commanded it. But that assumes it is Gods command that makes things right or wrong;
whereas, as I have argued, there would be good moral reasons to obey Gods commands only
if morality had force independently of Gods commands. And this suggestion also ignores the
point that human beings only have their perception and their reasoning to ascertain whether
there is a God and if so what its commands are; and reason is strongly against there being a
God who would issue such commands.
So this story is about a God unworthy of respect, and an Abraham who was prepared to do
something grossly immoral, to kill an innocent child, for no good reason that he could have
apprehended. And it has the potential to inspire great evil in its message, apparently accepted
by some people today, that it is OK to kill innocent people if you believe God has told you to.
TH E PASSOVE R
Another story in the Old Testament recounts how God killed all the rstborn children of a
group whose ruler Pharaoh was oppressing the Israelites, in order to induce Pharaoh to free
them.
In Exodus 11, Moses predicts that God would kill all the rstborn of Egypt, from the rst-
born of Pharaoh that sitteth upon his throne, even unto the rstborn of the maidservant that
is behind the mill. Exodus 12 tells of how God went ahead and did this, avoiding killing any
Israelites by passing over houses where blood had been placed on the lintel and the two side
posts. The morality of the God depicted in this Passover story, who kills children (including
the rstborn of the maidservant that is behind the mill) to put pressure on a leader to achieve
a worthy political outcome, seems no different from the morality of suicide bombers and
other Islamist terrorists.
Its been said that what God did was a last resort, to free good people from enslavement by
bad people, after the Egyptians had been given every chance to act on less extreme incentives.
But suicide bombers regard their objectives similarly, and what is most appalling about them
is not their objectives, but their targeting of innocent and powerless people, people like the
rstborn of the maidservant behind the mill. And this attempted justication of what God is
said to have done in the Passover story conrms the implication from the story that Christians
and Jews, like the Israelites, are good, with God on their side and with just causes against bad
people, causes for which it must surely be right to act as God acted.
Its also been said that God moves in mysterious ways, and we should not presume to judge
God. But God (accepting this concept) gave us the ability to reason about moral issues; and as
I said earlier, we cannot assume the Bible is inspired by God. The fact that the Bible, which is
supposed to enlighten us on moral issues, contains messages so plainly contrary to reasonable
morality, is a powerful reason for thinking its vision of God is in places a awed one, created
by fallible human beings.
TH E N EW TE STAM E NT
Finally, there is the Bibles account of Jesus. There is much about the teachings of Jesus that
suggests extraordinary moral insight, and the resurrection, if it occurred, would be strong evi-
dence for his divinity; so that (it might be said) at least the New Testament, as the primary
account of the life of Jesus and his teachings, must be considered as authoritative.
The New Testament presents Jesus as having given central importance to caring about other
human beings, over and above complying with particular rules of behaviour, however well-
entrenched those particular rules may be; and as including among the human beings about
whom one should care not just ones friends but also ones enemies. It presents him as a person
who was particularly concerned for the lowliest of society. It presents him as attacking hypoc-
risy and self-righteousness, and recommending that those condemning the behaviour of
others should have regard also to their own shortcomings. I do not know if these ideas were
entirely new with Jesus; but I dont believe they were widely held views at the time, and they
seem to me to be wholly admirable.
And then there is the resurrection. The Bibles accounts of various parts of the story are
second- or third- or fourthhand; but they have some historical credibility. In addition, there is
the extraordinary history of a religion growing from the apparent defeat and death of its
founder, which leads one to look for an explanation of how the early followers of Jesus were
able, against all odds, to promulgate the divinity of Jesus and the idea that his death and resur-
rection were for the salvation of humankind.
But for me this is not enough to show that the Bible can be considered authoritative in its
account of Jesus or his resurrection.
1
I do not mean here to be critical of everyone who celebrates the Passover. What I am objecting to
is the combination of acceptance of the Bible story of the Passover as literally true, or as conveying
some substantial truth about Gods dealings with humankind, and unqualied celebration. I think
celebration of the surrender of Japan in 1945 should be tempered by acknowledgment of the killing of
innocent people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and in that case, it is arguable that what was done was the
least of the available evils. By contrast, on the Bibles account of the Passover, Gods resort to terrorism
(as opposed for example, to either not hardening Pharaohs heart, or targeting Pharaoh and his army)
was gratuitous. The Bibles account of Jesus giving instructions for the Last Supper suggests no reserva-
tions either about the understanding of the Passover suggested by the Biblical account of it, or about its
morality so understood.
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References 259
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Index
261
Churchland, Paul 58, 255 Damasio, Antonio 110, 182, 255
Clark, Thomas 211 dangerousness 203, 215, 219, 221
Clarke, Randolph 162164, 255 Darwin, Charles 116, 133134
classical paradigm 5152 Davidson, Donald 94, 255
Cleland, C. E. 28, 255 Dawkins, Richard 9, 237239, 245, 255
climate of ideas 181 deception 194
cognitive science 134, 140141 decision-making 27, 3739, 49, 55, 6877, 84,
Cohen, J. 211, 221, 256 109112, 136, 153154, 158, 166, 169, 172; see
colour 6263, 67, 87, 138 also judicial decision-making
commitment 190, 194, 199, 201 defences to crime 213214
community practices 198201 degrees of responsibility 173176, 215
compatibilism 45, 114, 156, 166175, 223224 degrees of truth 2224, 35
compiler language 50 deliberation 137
compulsory treatment 209211, 225 dendrites 144
computational level see overt level Dennett, Daniel 11, 52, 58, 76, 138140, 255
computational rules 37, 4952, 55, 7376, 81, Descartes, Rene 10, 12, 16, 115, 133, 183
88, 91, 93, 136137, 153 deserving 4, 180, 203, 207, 213, 222
computers 18, 5051, 7172, 75, 8384, 9092; desires 3839, 100, 181182
see also chess-playing computers determinism 8, 114128, 167168, 171172,
concentration 137, 149 223224
conrmation 4142 deterrence 210, 219, 221223
connectionism 5152 De Wall, C. N. 71, 255
conscious causation 164 differences of opinion (as to morality) 185,
conscious contribution (to decision- 187, 192196
making) 7077, 79113, 135138, 144150, digestion 5657
153, 156158, 224 digital systems 5052
conscious control 165, 172173, 224 Dijksterhuis, A. 71, 255
conscious experiences 1218, 5674, 131132, 139 diminished responsibility 214215, 227
consciousness 7, 29, 5577, 135, 141, 230231, dimmer switch (of consciousness) 154
237240 direct argument 168, 172
consequence argument 167168, 172 discrimination against women 199
consequentialism see utilitarianism dissociative states 61
consequentialist purposes (of DNA 117
punishment) 210213 dual aspects 1617, 5558, 72, 80
conspiracy of nature 126128 dualism 1617, 134135
constraint (laws of) 234235 duress 214
content (of experience) 11, 57, 59, 62, 65 Dutton, Denis 105, 255
control (of conduct) 157, 162, 165, 169, 222;
see also conscious control Eccles, John 143145, 255
Conway, John 89, 121128, 255 efcacy (of consciousness) see conscious
Copeland, B. J. 75, 255 contribution (to decision-making)
correspondence theory (of truth) 21 effort 137
court cases 3435, 4548 Einstein, Albert 116, 119, 255
Crick, Francis 117 electromagnetism 116
crime as illness 34, 210211 embryos 195
criminal law 159, 206228 emergence 1617, 154
Crusades 244 emergentism 95
262 Index
emotion 26, 104, 108, 182 Gershwin, George 8284, 103
empowerment (laws of) 234235 gestalts 8, 59, 7985, 98112, 136137, 139, 153,
ethics 181187 156158, 237
ethnic cleansing 253 Gibbard, Allan 185, 256
event-causation 159, 164 gliders 89, 92, 94
evil 195, 197198, 238, 244246, 251253 global workspace 7677
evolution 6970, 75, 99102, 116, 133135, God 133, 177178, 196197, 233, 238240,
147, 187 243245, 251253
executive summaries 70, 96 Gdel, Kurt 182
exocytosis 144 Gdels incompleteness theorem 110
expectations 200201 Golden rule 189
extended detention 217218 Goodman, Nelson 4142, 256
external world 17, 5657, 6266, 232 goodness 107, 180, 191, 197198, 235236,
238241
fail-safe device 168170 Greene, J. 211, 221, 256
fallacies 2931, 53 Greeneld, Susan 154, 256
fallibility (of reason) 3031, 38, 69, 99, 101, 182 guidance (laws of) 235236
family 194 guilt 207
fatalism 4, 171 gut feelings 110
ne-tuning (of universe) 238 Guthrie, C. 71, 256
Fischer, John 165, 169171, 174, 255256
icker of freedom 170 Hacker, Peter 6365, 255
Fodor, Jerry 5052, 256 Hadley, Robert F. 111, 256
folk psychology 59, 226227 Hagen, S. 145
forces 115117 Haldane, J. B. S. 5, 5253
formal reasoning 37, 4950; see also Hameroff, Stuart 143, 145, 256
computational rules, logic, rules of handicaps 177
inference hard social conditions 174176, 215
Frankfurt, Harry 168, 256 harm 190, 201
Frankfurt-type cases 169170 Hart, Herbert 224
free will 8, 112, 153179, 180, 206, 230231 hatred 198
free will theorem 121128, 172 heat 56, 116
free wont 149 heaven 242, 254
Freud, Sigmund 134 Heisenberg uncertainty principle 118, 143144
friends 194 hell 242, 254
functionalism 67 Hempel, Carl 4142, 256
fundamentalism 230, 245246, 251254 Hiley, Basil 120, 255
fuzzy logic 136 Hodgson, David 38, 79, 118, 119, 120, 140, 154,
160, 194, 212, 224, 234235, 256
Game of Life 8992, 94, 108 Hofstadter, Douglas 50, 256
gap (between reasons and decisions) 38, 155 Holocaust 253
Gauguin, Paul 239240 holy books 243244; see also Bible
Gazzaniga, Michael 149151, 256 homunculus 61
genetic and environmental causes of Honderich, Ted 59, 256
crime 221222, 225 honesty 190, 193194, 198, 199, 201
genetic disadvantages 174176, 215 Horgan, Terry 38, 5051, 75, 9596, 117,
genocide 245 256257
Index 263
human beings 1518, 154 Kahneman, Daniel 29, 71, 257
human rights 212213 Kane, Robert 159164, 166, 257
Hume, David 11, 3839, 42, 100, Kant, Immanuel 17, 182
181183, 257 Kasparov, Gary 75
Humphrey, Nicholas 76, 257 Kauffman, Stuart 72, 257
hypnosis 61, 150 Kaye, A. 174, 257
hypotheses 3841 killing 195
kindness 190, 198
idealism 1617 Kochen, Simon 121128, 255
ignorance of the law 203 Kochen-Specker paradox 121122, 124
illusions 13, 131132
images 6465 Lacey, Nicola 224, 257
immorality (in Bible) 244246, 251254 language 7, 1115, 2124, 69, 107
imperatives (natural) 185192, 235236, 238 Laplace, Pierre 115116
implementational level 4952, 66, 7374 laws 7988, 9496, 198201; see also laws of
incommensurability (of reasons) 3839, nature, legal systems, psycho-physical
160, 224 laws, rules
inconclusive reasons 3839, 160, 224 laws of nature 37, 55, 7374, 8588, 93,
indeterminacy 118, 120, 130, 194 114117, 133137, 153, 155157, 167
indeterminism 118120, 141148, 153, 194 legal systems 8182, 201203, 206, 208209
induction 4043 Leibniz, Gottfried 183
inevitability 156 Les Demoiselles dAvignon 8384, 103,
informal reasoning see plausible reasoning 105106
information 7980, 82, 95, 98; see also levels of cognitive processes 4952, 6667,
informational content 7374, 96
informational content 80, 98 levels of description 5657
Inquisition 244 Levy, Neil 177, 257
insanity 35, 214 Levy, S. 89, 257
inscrutability (of reasons) 163165 Libet, Benjamin 148149, 257
intention 155, 214 life (and consciousness) 18, 154
intentionality 109 life-afrmation 190191
Islam 244245, 251 lifestyle choices 201
light cones 119, 129131
Jackson, Frank 80, 257 light speed 119, 123, 129130
Jesus 243, 253254 likelihood ratios 4447, 250
Jibu, M. 143, 257 locality of causation 118
jiggling tree 65 logic 181182; see also formal reasoning
joker analogy 165166 Lorentz transformation 116
Joshua 245246, 253 love 189, 198
Judaism 245246, 251254 Lowe, E. 177, 257
judgment 3739, 43, 6970, 84, 99102, 161; loyalty 190, 194
see also aesthetic judgments, luck 153, 163, 173179
decision-making
judicial decision-making 38, 71 machine language 50
justice 180, 184, 187, 190, 192, 196203, manipulation arguments 170171
208209, 213, 220222, 241242; see also many-worlds (interpretation of
unfairness QM) 120121
264 Index
Marr, David 4950, 66, 257 Oaksford, M. 51, 258
materialism see physicalism objective aspect 1617, 56
mathematical variables 81, 8587, 98 objects (of experience) 15, 6566
mathematics 110111, 181182 observer-participation 120121, 231234
Maxwell, James Clerk 116 OConnor, Timothy 163164, 258
McCall, Storrs 177, 257 odds 4447, 249
McKenna, Michael 159, 177, 257 ordinary human rationality 3036, 37, 96
meaning 21, 109 oughts 183184, 186; see also imperatives
measurement problem (of QM) 121 (natural)
measurements (of quantum overt level 4952, 66
systems) 141143
mechanisms for change 201202 pain 12, 59, 60, 62, 67, 71, 87, 139140
Mele, Alfred 148, 257 panicky metaphysics 171
melody 8283, 139 panpsychism 1618, 154
mens rea 213214 particles 23
mental abnormality 166, 203, 214215, 217, particularity (of experiences) 82, 85, 93, 95,
225227 103, 105107, 153
mental arithmetic 69, 72 particularity (of persons) 153
mental element of offences 213214 passions see desires
Merali, Z 122, 257 Passover 252, 255
microtubules 143 Pauling, Linus 117
Minsky, Marvin 70, 257 Penrose, Roger 52, 70, 72, 110, 143, 258
MNaghten rules 214, 227 Pereboom, Derk 218221, 258
monism 1617 personal identity 216
Moore, Michael 223, 257 physical causation 162, 164165
moral feelings 186, 188 physicalism 1617, 230
moral progress 183185 physical occurrences 56
Morse, Stephen 223224, 257 physical sciences 8, 114132
Moses 252 Picasso, Pablo 8384, 103, 105106
motivational feelings 7071, 96, 100, picture (worth a thousand words) 101102
158, 188 Plancks constant 118
Murphy, Nancey 224, 257 Plantinga, A. 53, 258
plausible reasoning 5, 7, 3754, 55, 69,
Nagel, Thomas 53, 57, 257 108111, 135, 182183, 186
Nagra, J. 124, 258 Popper, Karl 42, 258
natural kinds 22 Poundstone, W. 90, 258
necessity (as defence to crime) 214 practical jokes 190
negligence 209, 217 predictability 53
neural correlates (of consciousness) 6668, prefrontal cortex 158
74; see also psycho-physical laws premises (of reasoning) 37
neurons 140141 probability 4248, 137, 145, 147148, 160, 178,
neuroscience 8, 112, 133151, 182, 211, 225228 194, 249250
neutral monism 1617 programs 4951, 73, 156; see also
Newell, B. R. 71, 258 computational rules
Newton, Isaac 115117 promised land 253
non-locality 117121, 129130, 135136, promises 194
139140, 143, 146 proportionality (of punishment) 215216
Index 265
psychological present 139 responsibility 8, 112, 153179, 206228; see
psycho-physical laws 6768, 74, 79, 85 also ultimate responsibility
punishing the innocent 221 restraint (of offenders) 210
punishment 4, 180, 199, 203, 206228 retribution 8, 180, 206228
purpose (of existence) 240241 revenge 207208
Putnam, Hilary 24, 41, 4849, 67, 258 rightness (of conduct) 107, 180186, 222, 235236
Pylyshyn, Zenon 5052, 256 Robertson, B. 43, 258
rocks 18
qualia 55, 59, 6266, 76 rule-determined processes 5153, 7477, 84,
qualia laws 6768, 85 101, 104105, 224
qualia trick 9295, 105 rules 7991, 9496; see also computational
quantum entanglement 143, 145 rules, laws, rules of inference
quantum mechanics (QM) 117131, 139148, rules of inference (or of reasoning) 3739,
153, 160, 172, 182, 231234 4043, 55
Quantum Mind conference 145146 rule-worship 193194
quantum Zeno effect 142
quarantine 217, 219220 Sacks, Oliver 69, 258
Schnapf, J. L. 142, 258
randomness 34, 7475, 95, 114, 119120, science 112, 114132, 230231
141142, 147148, 172 scientic method 6, 28, 115, 121122, 127128
rationalisation 150 Searle, John 38, 56, 91, 154155, 258
rationality 5, 6, 2636, 158, 169, 182183, 186, seeing 6466
188, 236, 237; see also ordinary human Seife, C. 145, 258
rationality selection (between alternatives) 161162
Ravizza, M. 169, 256 self-defence 35, 214
reality 2025, 109, 129130, 180, 186, 197 self-forming actions 159160, 166, 177
reason (as slave of the passions) 181183; see self-organisation 154
also rationality semi-compatibilism 169
reasons 37, 155, 163164, 176, 187, 197, sexual morality 201
223224; see also inconclusive reasons Sharp, L. 30, 258
reasons-responsiveness 155, 169 Sidgwick, Henry 193, 258
reduction (of the quantum state) 121, signicance (of information) 102, 107109
141143 sleep-on-it phenomenon 70
reform 211, 222; see also rehabilitation Smart, J. J. C. 193, 234, 258
Regan, Donald 192, 258 Smilansky, Simon 162, 223, 258
rehabilitation 222, 225 soft constraints 38, 51, 9596
relativistic views (of truth) 2426 solipsism 10
relativity theory 114, 116117, 119, 122123, somatic markers see gut feelings
126, 128131 space-like separation 118119, 123127, 129130
religious belief 9, 230, 236246 space-time 114, 118119
reparation 207208 spectra of possibilities 8081, 96, 117, 130,
replay argument 177179 135, 137, 157158, 165, 176177
representations 50 spin (of particles) 122126
respect 189, 200 Spinoza, B. 183
responses to wrong conduct 206210; see split brains 61, 150151
also revenge, retribution, reparation, treat- stability 200201
ment (non-punitive) Stapp, Henry 142145, 258259
266 Index
State compulsion 212, 216218 ultimate responsibility 159162, 166, 176
statistics (QM) 142, 147148 uncaused causes 164166
steering a course 137, 157158, 178 unconscious information-processing 6877,
Stich, Stephen 24, 3234, 259 98, 112, 137
Stoljar, Daniel 57, 259 unconscious motivation 134
Strawson, Galen 173177, 224, 259 underdetermination of theory by data 41
Strawson, Peter 171, 259 understanding 72, 110
subject (of experience) 1011, 5962, 7985, unfairness 200201
92, 93, 95, 145 unity (of conscious experiences) 55, 59,
subjective aspect 1617, 56 6264, 76, 138140; see also binding
subjectivity 55, 57, 5962, 76; see also subject problem, chunking trick
(of experience) user-friendly accounts (of brain
Sudbery, A. 142, 259 processes) 76
suffering 198 utilitarianism 192, 194; see also
supervenience 67 act-utiliarianism
survival (of death) 61, 241242
synapses 144 value-embedded universe 237241
value judgments 8, 180203
Tamarin, George 245246 values 230231, 235236, 238; see also beauty,
Tegmark, Max 145 goodness, rightness, truth
template for action 143 van Inwagen, Peter 167, 259
tendencies 176177 vengeance see revenge
terrorism 245, 252 vicious circle 53
The Man I Love 8283, 103 Vignaux, G. A. 43
tHooft, Gerard 120, 128, 259 virtual reality 64
Tienson, John 38, 5051, 75, 9596, 257 voluntary conduct 214
time 1314, 2829, 128132 von Neumann, John 120
tolerance 190, 196
torn decisions 160161 Wagner, Richard 8384, 103, 106
torture 186 Watson, James 117
transfer of non-responsibility principle 168, 174 waves 23
transfer of powerlessness principle 167168 Wegner, Daniel 150151, 259
treating persons as ends 189, 213 Werking, Kip 165, 259
treatment (non-punitive) 207211; see also Weyl, Hermann 131, 259
compulsory treatment where are we going? 240242
tricks of consciousness 92; see also chunking where do we come from? 230231,
trick, qualia trick 239240
Tristan und Isolde 8384, 103, 106 will 154159; see also free will
trust 194 wisdom 198
truth 7, 2026, 3236, 107109, 180, 186, 197, Wittgenstein, Ludwig 24, 3233, 63, 182
235236, 239241 wrong conduct see responses to wrong
Turing, Alan 75, 182, 259 conduct
Tversky, Amos 29, 71, 257 wrongness 180196, 236
two-slit experiment 120
types 81, 85, 86, 92, 98 Yasue, K. 143, 257
Index 267