The Aftermath of the First Major Earthquake in India: Bhuj Earthquake

Satya Sapath Roy1 and Jamshaid Sawab1

1
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Houston, Texas

Abstract
Approximately 70 Km east of the city of Bhuj, Gujarat, India, occurred a 7.7 magnitude earthquake. The
damage was spread over a 400 Km region. The earthquake caused extensive liquefaction and slope failure
over ten of thousands of square kilometers. Over 13,800 lives were lost, and around 167,000 persons were
injured during this incident. About 90 percent of the deaths were in the Kachchh district. Over 230,000 one
and two story masonry houses collapsed, and over 980,000 more were damaged. Several hundred RC
structures collapsed including some 11-story buildings. This paper presents the details of the Bhuj
earthquake including but not limited to geologic and tectonic setting, seismicity, ground motion, ground
failure and damage to structures. The focus has been made to delineate the faults in the structural design
and detailing and the shortcomings of the design guidelines.

1. Introduction and Overview

On January 26, 2001, one of the most destructive earthquakes ever to strike India occurred in the Kachchh
region of Gujarat State in western India (Figure 1.1). The earthquake occurred at 8:46 am, local time on a
Friday morning, during a national holiday in honor of Indias Republic Day celebrationmany businesses,
schools, and government offices were closed. Official magnitude estimate for this event from the U.S.
Geological Survey is 7.7 on the moment (Mw) scale. Damage was spread over a radius of 400 kilometers
from the earthquake epicenter (Figure 1.2). The extent of earthquake damage was immense. The large
magnitude of the earthquake combined with the poor construction quality contributed to large-scale damage
to the building stock and a high number of casualties. In Table 1.1 the outline information that was available
on the extent of damage is collated [1].

Figure 1.1: Location of the January 26, 2001, Figure 1-2: Detail map of the Kachchh district [1]
Mw 7.7 Bhuj earthquake in northwestern India [1]

Table 1.1 Extent of Damage [1]

Type of damage Extent
Number of casualties 13,800+
Number of injured 167,000
Estimated cost 5 billion US$
Number of buildings destroyed ~ 300,000

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 Number of buildings damaged ~ 700,000
Number of earth dams damaged 14
Area involved in landslides ~ 10,000 km2
Area involved in soil liquefaction ~ 10,000 km2

2. Geologic and Tectonic Setting

2.1. Geology of the Region
The geology of the Kachchh and Saurashtra regions is presented in Figure 2.1. From Figure 1 we can see
that near the town of Bhuj (closest town to the epicenter), there are Sandstones and Shales formed in the
Late Cretaceous to Jurassic periods. The sandstones are widely used in the construction of low-rise
buildings. In Figure 2.2 the presence of the Sandstone formations is confirmed in a highway cutting. South
of Bhuj there are deposits of Marl and Limestones. As we move further south towards the Gulf of Kachchh,
we find Basalts. In Figure 2.2 the presence of the Igneous Basalt is confirmed at the site of excavation.
However, in the coastal regions such as Kandla port, there are recently deposited loose sands. [1]

Figure 2.1 Geological map of Kachchh and Saurastra regions

Figure 2.2 Excavation and highway cuttings confirm the presence of Igneous Basalt and Sandstone
formations in Kachchh [1]
2.2. Tectonic Setting
The tectonic framework of northern India is dominated by two main features: 1.) the stable continental
craton of peninsular India; and 2.) the collision zone where India and Asia converge along the Himalaya
plate boundary zone. The Indian subcontinent is moving northward at a rate of 53 to 63 mm/year colliding
with the Asian plate which is also moving northwards but at only half the rate (Burgmann et al., 2001). This
relative plate velocity gives rise to an intercontinental collision forming the Himalayan mountains and

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creating eastward and westward movement of large crustal blocks away from the Himalayan region. The
rate of contraction across the Himalayan Frontal Fault System and the western boundary of the plate is
about 20 to 25 mm/year. The compression resulted in heavy faulting and folding in the Kachchh region as
seen in Figure 2.3 [3].
2.3. Faults in the Kachchh Region
The principal faults in the region are the east-trending Katrol Hill fault, Kachchh Mainland Fault, Island
Belt fault, Allah Bund fault, and Nagar Parker fault (Figure 2.4). The 2001 earthquake is known to have
occurred on the Kachchh Mainland Fault. The location of the epicenter of the current earthquake is marked
on the Kachchh Mainland fault. This fault becomes discontinuous to the east. There are other minor faults
between the KMF and Katrol Hill faults. The 1819 earthquake with a similar magnitude of 7.9 to the current
earthquake occurred on the Allah Bund Fault. The magnitude of 7 earthquakes of 1956 near Anjar occurred
on the Katrol Hill Fault [3].

Figure 2.3 Location and tectonic setting of the Figure 2.4 Major tectonic features of Gujarat and
January 26, 2001, Mw 7.7 Bhuj earth quake in adjoining regions: 1. Nagar Parker fault; 2. Allah
northwestern India Bund; 3. Island Belt; 4. Katrol Hill fault; 5. Gulf of
Kachchh
2.4. Seismicity and Seismic Zonation
In the previous section, we have seen that the Kachchh region of Gujarat has been seismically active in the
recent past, with major earthquakes in 1819 near Allah bund and 1953 near Anjar. The region of Kachchh
is identified as a high seismic risk area in the IS1893 building code for India. The seismic zonation map of
India is shown in Figure 2.5, and the Kachchh region is marked as Zone V, the highest risk on a scale of 1
to V. Ahmedabad, on the other hand, is classed as Zone III in this Figure. In Table 2 the Seismic coefficient
values suggested in the Indian Building code IS 1893 are presented. For the Kachchh region, an appropriate
seismic coefficient would be 0.08 i.e. the design horizontal acceleration magnitude may be taken as 0.08g.
For Ahmedabad, this value would be 0.04g. From the near field records, it is seen that the magnitude of
ground accelerations in Ahmedabad was 0.11 g which is very much higher than the value suggested by the
Indian Building code. It must be pointed out that the factors given in the Indian Building code include a
reduction factor as they are applicable to quasi-static design [2].
2.5. Strong Motion Data
The Bhuj earthquake was a big earthquake and is comparable in terms of magnitude and energy released to
the great 1906 San Francisco earthquake. It was an opportunity to collect valuable strong motion data.
Despite the fact that the Kachchh region is known to be seismically active, very little instrumentation was

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located in this region. There are various Indian organisations including higher education institutes that
establish and maintain the strong motion arrays.

Figure 2.5 Seismic zonation map downloaded from the Geological Survey of India [2]

This activity could be better co-ordinated so that strong earthquakes such as the 2001 event can be recorded
at multiple sites. There was one strong motion recording station near Bhuj located near the Katrol Hills
which did not function well during the earthquake. The only other strong motion recording was in the
Passport Office building in Ahmedabad set up by the University of Roorkee. The recordings from this site
were published on the web (www.rurkiu.ernet.in) and are presenting in Figure 2.6. The acceleration traces
seen in this figure are not clear and some amount of interpretation is needed. The peak ground acceleration
was estimated to be 0.11 g in Ahmedabad. This is quite large considering the distance of Ahmedabad from
the epicentre (nearly 160 miles away) and is 2.75 times bigger than the design values for this region.

Figure 2.6 Accelerations measured in the Ahmedabad passport office (courtesy University of Roorkee,
India) [4]

3. Geotechnical Effects & Ground Failure

It was also seen that the peak ground accelerations in Ahmedabad city were about 0.11g, while those in the
epicentral region would have been much higher. The strong accelerations in the epicentral region caused

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widespread liquefaction and much spectacular damage. The local media carried stories and images of water
jets are gushing out of the ground after the earthquake and potable water turning into saline water (Times
of India, 6th February 2001, India Today 12th February 2001). These aspects will be considered in this
section [3].
3.1. Cyclic behavior of sand and Liquefaction
The stiffness of soil is a function of the effective stresses in the soil. The effective stress ' is linked to the
total stress and the pore water pressure u as seen in Eq.1.
= u (1)
When the sand in question is fully saturated, and the application of the cyclic shear stress is rapid, as, in the
case of an earthquake loading, the tendency of the sands to undergo volumetric strains is exhibited as a
change in pore water pressure. Thus, saturated loose sands that wish to undergo a volumetric contraction
will exhibit a generation of positive pore water pressure, while dense sands will exhibit the generation of
negative pore water pressure. Thus, in the loose saturated sands, as the pore water pressure, u increases the
effective stress ' comes down, lowering the stiffness of the soil. If the increase in pore water pressure is so
high that the effective stress ' falls to a near zero value, we say that the soil has fully liquefied. In this state
the soil has no strength and any structure founded upon it will simply sink in or rotate [3].

Table 2.1 Horizontal seismic coefficient for different seismic zone [2]
Serial number Zone No. Horizontal seismic Seismic zone factor
coefficient (Ah)
1 v 0.08 0.4
2 iv 0.05 0.25
3 iii 0.04 0.2
4 ii 0.02 0.1
5 i 0.01 0.05

3.2. Sand Boils / Sand Blows

Liquefaction in the Rann of Kachchh is to be expected as this region is known to have a shallow water
table. One of the tell-tale features of liquefaction is the occurrence of sand boils. In Figure 3.3 and 3.4 we
can see the large size of sand boils. Also, the presence of moist sandy soil was noticed in the center of the
boiled region more than ten days after the earthquake. This was unusual given the ambient temperature of
the region during the day (35o~40o C). One possibility may be that the liquefied soil had flowed for up to
several days after the main earthquake. This continual presence of high pore water pressure has been
observed in past earthquakes, particularly in the mud flows observed in the Redondo Beach area after the
Northridge earthquake of 1994 which continued for a long time after the main event. The largest sand blow
documented near Kandla is 15 m long, 10 m wide, and 20 cm thick [3].

Figure 3.1 Phenomenon of liquefaction Figure 3.2 Map showing the liquefaction features

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3.3. Lateral Spreading
One of the effects of liquefaction on the gently sloping ground is lateral spreading. As the soil stiffness is
reduced owing to the increase in pore water pressure during an earthquake, the soil in the sloping ground
can start to spread laterally. In the epicentral area, lateral spreading was responsible for damage to many
water wells and pipelines. If the slopes are steep and provided that the excess pore water pressure is retained
sufficiently long, the sloping ground can suffer a flow slide. These flow slides tend to result in movement
of the ground by several hundreds of meters. There were no examples of flow slides due to the general
flatness of the Kachchh area with only gentle slopes. However, manmade slopes such as railway
embankments have shown such failures as seen in Figure 3.5. Also, parallel cracks in the ground due to
lateral spreading is found in some area is shown in Figure 3.6 [3].

Figure 3.3 Sand boil near Lodhai village Figure 3.4 Silt blow in Great Rann of Khadir
Island

Figure 3.5 Lateral spreading of a railway Figure 3.6 Parallel cracks in the ground due to
embarkment lateral spreading

4. Structural Damage
4.1 Roads & Bridges
As per Roads and Buildings (R&B) Department of the Government of Gujarat, 900 km of roadways and
over 500 bridges were damaged in the January 26, 2001, earthquake.

4.1.1. Roads
Types of damages roads sustained include:
Longitudinal cracks along the central carriageway and shoulders of elevated road embankments.

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 Transverse cracks between the bridge spans and the roadway.
Longitudinal/transverse cracks along ground fissure lines crossing the road system.
Settlement/uplift of the road at some locations. [1]

4.1.2. Bridges
Due to poor construction, a harsh environment (monsoons, typhoons, saline groundwater, hot, dry weather)
and little maintenance, bridges of the area were in a substandard condition prior to the earthquake. Most
highway bridges are constructed of stone masonry or reinforced concrete, while the railway bridges
included some steel superstructures as well. Damages include movement, damage and collapse of piers,
abutments and wing walls; cracking of main girders; disintegration of bearing pedestals; damage to
elastomeric bearings; the collapse of parapet walls; damage to pier caps; the collapse of approach
embankments; and displacement, movement or breakage of reinforced concrete Hume pipes. Earthquake
damage to bridge structures can be attributed to the lack of seismic design and detail of both old bridges
and bridges under construction [1].

4.1.2.1. Four Bridges Site

Simply supported spans are considered vulnerable to unseating and collapse. In this case, it was clear that
the short end span was only saved from collapse by the presence of the stepped pier top (Figure 4.1).
Because the internal span hit the stepped bearing shelf, it caused the pier top to move with the spans and
avoided loss of support. It was only when the abutment was viewed at deck level (Figure 4.2) that the full
failure mechanism became clear. The approach slab which was supported on the ballast wall was pushed
back relative to the embankment. The first pier had also been shifted towards the river by the flow of
liquefied soil. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrates some other types of defects to the bridge [1].

Figure 4.1 Collision of deck with pier upstand, Figure 4.2 East abutment had moved forward,
wing wall has forward relative to abutment, marks ballast wall had collided with end of deck, and
on pier and abutment show about 500 mm filled had settled
settlement of soil

Figure 4.3 Tilted ballast wall Figure 4.4 Deck has crushed into the ballast wall

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4.1.2.2. Rudra Matha (Khari) Bridge
This bridge is probably no more than 10 - 15km from the epicenter. The structure was completed in 1966
and carries the highway over a lake. It has 10 simply supported spans of 55 feet (16.8m) supported on
reinforced concrete A-frame piers which are built into capping slabs on top of approximately 4m diameter
well caissons (see Figure 4.5). Given its proximity to the epicenter, this structure performed remarkably
well and suffered only minor damage, which can be summarized in the figures below [1].

Figure 4.5 View of the Rudra Matha bridge Figure 4.6 Settlement behind north abutment and
missing section of parapet

Figure 4.7 A pier bearing pedestal had fractured Figure 4.8 Flexural cracks in the columns and shear
cracks in the beam to column joints
4.1.2.3. Surajbari Bridges
The Old Bridge: The old bridge (Figure 4.9) was opened to traffic in the late 1960s. It has 37 spans of
32.2m giving an overall length of 1191m. It suffered significant damage in an earthquake due to lack of
ductility, damage to bearings, shear failure of the hinges, and significant ground movement and
liquefaction. Damage to the bridge indicates that there was both longitudinal and transverse movement of
the bridge superstructure and substructure (Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.12). During the earthquake, all
bearings under the superstructure of this bridge have been damaged (Figure 4.11). Due to liquefaction and
ground movement, some piers moved, and associated spans shifted on bearing supports. The pounding
effect of the in-span of the bridge is shown in Figure 4.12 [1].

Figure 4.9 Old Surajbadi bridge Figure 4.10 Damage to the bearings

8
 Figure 4.11 Relative longitudinal movements Figure 4.12 Pounding at the in-span joint caused
between pier and superstructure the spalling of concrete

The New Bridge: The New Surajbadi Highway Bridge, parallel to the old one, was nearly complete (two
spans were still to be completed) at the time of the earthquake. The New Surajbadi Highway Bridge consists
of cast-in-place concrete tee-beam girders. It has 39 simply supported girder-slab superstructure spans, each
of 32.2 m. The bridge was designed for a static horizontal seismic coefficient of 0.09g. The damage
occurred on this bridge during the earthquake has been depicted in the following figures [1].

Figure 4.13 New Surajbari bridge Figure 4.14 Severely strained elastomeric
bearings

Figure 4.15: Pounding between ends of adjacent Figure 4.16: Poor bond between the epoxy-
spans caused some damage coated rebar and the adjoining concrete

4.2. Damage to Dams and Ports

Dams: The State of Gujarat is an arid, desert-like area, and the greater Kachchh region averages less than
35 cm of annual rainfall. Thus, the government of Gujarat maintains a large number of small- to moderate-
size earthen dams and reservoirs to provide water for both drinking and agricultural use [1].

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Ports: As we have seen with bridge foundations, ports and harbors and related structures are particularly
vulnerable to liquefaction, given their proximity to water fronts and the associated high water tables. The
Bhuj earthquake has provided examples of the damage that could befall ports and harbors. Some of the
damage types occurred in the ports are shown in the figures below [3].

Figure 4.17 Open fissure in the Figure 4.18 Failure of the Figure 4.19 Damage to the railway
upstream of the dam upstream slope of the dam line due to lateral spreading in a port

Figure 4.20 Failure of a sheet pile

Figure 4.21 Some piles had Figure 4.22 The side of the port and
wall in the port crack 40 cm below the pile customs office leans sideways about
cap in the jetty 300 mm (1 foot)
4.3. Damage to Reinforced Concrete Buildings
Reinforced concrete frame with unreinforced masonry infills is the most common structural system for RC
building in India as shown in Figure 23. The entire country has seen a boom of low to medium-rise RC
frame building construction in the past few decades.
During the real estate boom over the past two
decades has resulted in a large, privately constructed
building stock that has not been adequately
designed. All the 130 RC buildings that collapsed
during this earthquake were privately owned.
The multistory buildings affected during these
earthquake are mostly 5 stories high and many up to
11 stories. Basement stories are additional. Typical
story height ranges from 2.6 m to 3.2 m.
The soil conditions under these buildings vary
significantly. From fine sand to silt and clay. The top
layer of the soil is generally black cotton soil which
has high compressibility, shrinkage and swelling
characteristics. The underlying layer is highly Figure 4.23: Low to medium-rise RC buildings
weathered and disintegrated granite or murrum soil
which could be soft or hard. Despite the significant difference in the soil types, the typical foundation
system employed consists of shallow isolated footings.

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The system consists of three-dimensional RC frame rested on isolated footings under columns, RC slabs
and unreinforced masonry walls infilled in frame panels. Most 11 stories buildings and some 5 stories
buildings have RC structural walls forming elevator cores [1].
4.3.1. Modes of Failure
Local engineers advised that, in general, buildings were designed for gravity loads only. Poor construction
and detailing, combined with soft storey, improper configuration and short column effects, brought about
widespread collapse and/or structural damage. It was evident that there were modes of failure common to
the different areas that were investigated [3].
4.3.1.1 Soft/weak stories
Parking is often accommodated in the ground story area of the
buildings. Frame bays in the ground story are not infilled with
masonry walls. Generally, all panels are left open for parking
as shown in Figure 4.24.
The open ground story may cause: 1) Soft story effect: smaller
stiffness and cause increased deformation demand in the
frame members of the open ground story; and 2) Weak story
effect: it may have low lateral strength and cause a
discontinuity in flow of lateral seismic shear in open
Figure 4.24: Open ground stories
ground story. The RC frames with masonry infills formed
a relatively stiff and strong lateral load resisting system in the upper stories, in contrast to the columns with
few or no infill walls in the ground story. As a result, almost the entire lateral deformation is concentrated
in the ground story columns, and the upper stories moved laterally as a rigid block as shown in Figure 4.25.
Figure 4.26 illustrates another soft story building collapse in Gandhidham. The lack of continuity within
the structure is evident [1].

Figure 4.25 Open ground story Vs. bare frame

Figure 4.26 Soft story failure in Gandhidham

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4.3.1.2. Irregular structural configuration and short columns
Buildings with plan irregularities and asymmetry may experience significant torsional motions with even
slight eccentricity between the center of mass (CM) and the center of rigidity. As a result, the flexible side
of the building (the edge of the building closer to CM) experiences larger displacements than the stiff side
(the edge of the building closer to CR). If not designed to accommodate these excessive deformations, the
columns on the flexible side may fail and lead to collapse.
There is a tendency in both cities, Ahmedabad and Gandhidham, is to build the maximum possible covered
area on a plot within the available bylaws. Thus, some innovative building systems have evolved. To begin
with, since balconies are not counted in Floor Space Index (FSI), buildings have balconies overhanging in
the upper stories beyond the column footprint area at the ground story as shown in Figure 4.27.
These floating columns rest at the tip of the 1.5 m
span tapered beams that cantilever out of the ground
story perimeter columns. At the upper floor levels,
beams connect the floating perimeter columns. These
beams, together with the floating columns, support
the perimeter infill masonry walls. Sometimes, when
ground story perimeter columns are continued in the
upper stories, the beams framing between them are
eliminated to provide a beam-free slab. These
buildings with open ground story, floating columns
and randomly infilled upper stories have both in-
plane and out-of-plane irregularities in strength and
stiffness.
Buildings in the region have an irregular three- Figure 4.27 Floating columns in upper stories
dimensional frame grid owing to complex functional
requirements. Sometimes, infills of partial heights create short columns, especially around
window/ventilator openings or at balconies as shown in Figure 4.28 [1].

Figure 4.28 Short column failure

4.3.1.3. Construction joints
In the older parts of cities, it is not uncommon to see buildings being built adjoining each other without any
gap. Sometimes, at the common wall area, infill masonry is provided only in the building constructed first.
In some areas, like parts of Gandhidham, row constructions are common, with little or no space left between
adjoining buildings. At the interface between such buildings, infills are sometimes made only in one of the
two buildings. For example, as shown in Figure 29, there were no infills in the upper stories of the building
on the left. The building on the right suffered a ground story collapse [1].

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4.3.2. Analysis and Design
Often, buildings in the affected region were designed only for
gravity loads. Usually, a simplified analysis procedure is
adopted, where the beams may be treated as simply supported
on columns and the columns are designed for axial compression
due to gravity loading alone. This leads to buildings with weak
column-strong beam structural system. Furthermore, the mass
of the masonry infills is considered, but their stiffness and
strength contributions are neglected. The infills alter the
behavior of buildings from one predominantly frame action to
one of predominantly shear action as shown in Figure 4.30.
In buildings with RC walls as elevator cores, they are merely
designed to the carry vertical loads of elevators; their lateral
stiffness and strength contributions are neglected. Thus, the bare
RC frame of the building considered in design practice is
inconsistent with actual behavior. When a staircase spirals
around the elevator core, the connection between the floor slab
and the elevator core is only on the landing side of the elevator
core walls. Thus, the full advantage of elevator core walls may
not be available.
The infills are expected to significantly reduce the demand on
the RC frame members. Hence, buildings not designed for
seismic forces may withstand earthquake without collapse.
However, in buildings with an open ground story, this Figure 4.29 Construction joint failure
advantage of the infills may not be available [1].

Figure 4.30 (a) Bare frame: Predominant frame action (b) Infilled frame: Predominant shear action
The Indian seismic code IS:1893 requires that the design of appendages, like water tanks on top of
buildings, and their connections to the building be done for 5 times the design horizontal acceleration
coefficient. Often, this is not ensured.
The presence of water tanks supported on top of structures had an important effect on the behavior of the
multi-story structures. Changing the dynamics of the structure, the poorly supported tanks contributed to
several collapsed buildings. In some cases, the water tank simply fell through the building.
One particular apartment building, Mansi Tower in Ahmedabad (Figure 4.31), illustrates the result of the
effect of extra mass changing the dynamic properties of the structure. On top of the structure on the left
(collapsed), a swimming pool was added without authorization from the planning department. This addition
(not included in the original design plans) elongated the natural period of the structure causing this portion
of the structure to resonate with the long period ground motion due to the soft soils and collapse. The
structures right half (without the swimming pool, and therefore maintaining a higher natural frequency)
survived [3].

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4.3.3. Detailing
For confining concrete in the transverse direction, transverse tie
reinforcement needs to: 1.) be closely spaced to develop a tri-
axial state of stress in the core concrete in the plastic hinge
regions; and 2.) have 135 hooks with adequate hook length.
Detailing practice adopted in the affected area included neither
of these features.
The ties used in affected RC buildings are usually spaced at
200-225 mm centers and have 90 hooks of about 4 diameters
hook length. These meet requirements of the basic RC design
code IS:456, but not of the ductile detailing code IS:13920 [1].
4.3.4. Construction Practices
The ductile detailing code IS:13920 requires column bars to be
spliced in the middle-half of the story. However, in general, the
practice is to splice all column bars just above the floor slab. No
additional confining tie reinforcement is provided over the lap
length. The presence of construction joints and reinforcement Figure 4.31 Failure of Mansi Tower
congestion at locations where bending moments are maximum due to change in natural freq. [3]
under seismic shaking results in potentially vulnerable regions.
The beam depths in a building vary depending on their spans. This means that heights of columns up to the
soffit of the beams also vary accordingly. However, for construction convenience, all columns are cast up
to a common elevation (usually of about 2.1 m) above the floor. The balance height of the columns is cast
together with the slabs and beams. Thus, about 100-200 mm top portion of the column just below the beam
soffit, locally termed a topi (cap), is cast with the beam (Figure 4.32). Due to the presence of beam bottom
bars in the joint region and congestion of column reinforcement in the joint, it is difficult for the concrete
to reach the topi region. Moreover, it is not possible for the needle vibrator to reach the topi, resulting in a
weak concrete at the top of all columns with topi (Figure 4.33) [1].

Figure 4.32 Topi Region of Beam Column Joint Figure 4.33 Failure in topi

5. Social and Economic Impact

The 26th January 2001 earthquake has rocked one of the richest and developed states of India, which
contributes around 15% to the countrys GDP.
Social Impacts
80% of water and food sources were destroyed.
The obvious social impacts are that around 20,000 people were killed and near 200,000 were injured,
out of which more than 20,000 had serious injuries.

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 However, at the same time, looting and violence occurred following the quake, and this affected many
people too.
On the other hand, the earthquake resulted in millions of USD in aid, which has since allowed the
Bhuj region to rebuild itself and then grow in a way it wouldnt have done otherwise.
The final major social effect was that around 400,000 Indian homes were destroyed resulting in around
2 million people being made homeless immediately following the quake.
Economic Impacts
Total damage estimated at around $7 billion. However, $18 billion of aid was invested in the Bhuj
area.
Over 15km of tarmac road networks were destroyed.
In the economic capital of the Gujarat region, Ahmedabad, 58 multi-storey buildings were destroyed,
these buildings contained many of the businesses which were generating the wealth of the region.
Many schools were destroyed, and the literacy rate of the Gujarat region is now the lowest outside
southern India.
The area was once Indias most visited region (by tourists) outside the central cities. However, after
many of the old, historic buildings were destroyed this element of the economy was destroyed [4][5].

6. Summary
The large magnitude of the earthquake combined with poor construction quality contributed to largescale
damage to the building stock and a high number of casualties. An overview of the location of the earthquake
and the damage it inflicted on the building stock is presented in this paper. The existing faults and plate
tectonics of the Kachchh region are presented and significant earthquakes of the past are discussed. The
Bhuj earthquake had many interesting geotechnical aspects. Even though the strong motion data is rather
sketchy, the ground accelerations in Ahmedabad city seemed to be large in relation to its distance from the
epicentre of the earthquake.
Liquefaction was observed over very large areas in the Kachchh region. Liquefaction played an important
role in the damage to many civil engineering structures in the Kachchh region and to the Navalakhi port in
the Saurastra region. Earth dams in the Kachchh region have seen severe damage during this earthquake.
Liquefaction resistance measures need to be undertaken at the upstream and downstream toes of the dam
to ensure slope failures do not occur on the scale witnessed in this earthquake.
Major industrial facilities including the large petrochemical facilities in Jamnagar have performed
reasonably well. Poor construction and detailing combined with the presence of soft stories has led to many
of the failures observed in the high rise buildings. The presence of heavy structural items such as water
tanks on the building tops, which failed during the strong shaking has also contributed to some of the
failures.

7. References
[1] Learning from Earthquakes: Preliminary Observations on the Origin and Effects of the January 26, 2001 Bhuj
(Gujarat, India) Earthquake, EERI Special Earthquake Report April 2001, EERI Newsletter, Vol. 35, no. 4,
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, Ca, April 2001.
[2] IS 1893 (Part 1) [2002], Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures Part 1 General Provisions and
Building, Bureau of Indian Standard, New Delhi, India.
[3] Schweig, E. et al. [2002], The Mw 7.7 Bhuj Earthquake: Global Lessons for Earthquake Hazard in Intra-Plate
Regions Journal Geological Society of India, Vol., 61, pp. 277-282.
[4] Arya A.S. Building Damage, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in Kutch Earthquake Area of Gujarat, technical
paper for National Seminar on Disaster Management, organized by Indian National Academy of Engineering, June
20-21, 2003.
[5] www.engineeringcivil.com
[6] www.architectjaved.com

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