INTHE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND September Term 2014 No. 2594 STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Appellant v JUDITH C. CHAMBERLAIN Appellee APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY (THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL F. HARRIS, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant schamberlaindocs|Page STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . 0.0000 e eee ee seve dl QUESTIONS PRESENTED 3 L. Did the judge err by not recusing himself? .... . . vee DB Il. Did the Circuit Court err using its contempt powers?... . . . « dB TIL. Did the Circuit Court deny Mr. Chamberlain’s due process right to be heard on the matter of attorneys’ fees? 6. eee ee 22 IV. _ Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees? . 24 v. bees 28 VI. _ Did the Circuit Court err when it set the amount necessary for the defendant to purge himself from the contempt charges? . . VIL. Did the Circuit Court err when it denied the stays of judgment? .. . . . 31 STATEMENT OF FACTS . .4| STANDARD OF REVIEW... 0000200205 beens 12| ARGUMENT eee Sod on dsdeGoadsouguo000G 13) Screen em cacaceteccte etcetera AFFIDAVT TABLE OF CONTENTSSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO MD. RULE 8-504 (a) (9)... eee eee 35 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... . 6... - 55+ TEXT OF STATUTES & RULES BLE OF CITATIONS Cases Andy's Ice Cream, Inc. v, City of Salisbury, 125 Md.App. 125, 137, 724 A.2d 717 (1999)... 13 Attorney Gen. v, A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 25 A2d 749, 752 (1979) Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Allison, 349 Md. 623, 635, 709 A.2d 1212 (1998). . . 26 Barnes v. Rosenthal Toyota, Inc., 126 Md. App 97, 105, 727 A.2d 431 (1999) . 13, 24, 26 Bausch & Lomb Ine. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Md. 566, 590-91, 735. A.2d 1081 (1999). 0 eee 24 Black v. Fox Hills N. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 90 Md. App. 75, 83,599 A.2d 1228 (1992). . . 24| Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 526 A. 2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987)... . . « 25 Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 8.Ct. 2252 (2009)... - se. 13, 14,15 Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) . .. 2B Creative Dev. Corp. v. Calhoun, 34 Md. 279, 367 A.2d 566 (1976)... - 31 Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. at 681, 141 A. 387 (1928)... eee eee 21 Dixon v. DeLance, 84 Md. App. 441, 451, 579 A.2d 1213 (1990) Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md. 475, 489, 77 A.2d 305 (1950)... . . . 20) Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253 (1942) .3l Eakle v. Smith, 24 Md. 339 (1865)... 002 23 Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 654, 659 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1995)... 2... s+ 13] iiEdwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131, 137, 220 A.2d 547 (1966)... 2.6 - ++ 200 17 Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374, 435 A.2d 445, 447-448 (1981)... +++ 29, 30 Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 591, 510 A.2d 573, 579 (1986)... 22 ee eee 14 Garcia v. Foulger Pratt Dev., Inc., 155 Md. App. 634, 677, 845 A.2d 16 (2003). . 13, 27 Hamilton v. McAuliff, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976) Hammond y. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471 (1950). 6... eee ee Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 416, 529 A.2d 1372, 1377 (1987) . Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 45 (1983). . - - eee eee ce aeeeee et 25 Herd v. State, 37 Md.App. 362, 365, 377 A.2d 574, 576 (1977)... ee eee 29 Hess Constr. v. Bd. of Educ., 341 Md. 155, 159, 669 A.2d 1352 (1996)... . 24 Hess v. Chalmers, 33 Md. App. at 545, 365 A.2d 294 (1976)... 6. 0 eee 27 Inlet Associates v. Harrison Inn, 324 Md. 254, 596 A.2d 1049 (1991)... +. + 27 Inre Murchison, 349 U.S. 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955)... 6.2 ee ee eee 13, 14, 18 Inre Turney, 311 Md. 246, 533 A.2d 916 (1987)... 22-22 ee ee vee. 12 Insel v. Solomon, 63 Md. App. 384, 398, 492 A.2d 963 (1985)... . - cies 26 Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 107, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993)... oe ees 18) Johnson v. Baker, 84 Md. App. 521, 538, 581 A.2d 48 (1990) . Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Mad. at 420, 216 A.2d at 917 (1966) Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983)... 6.22 ee Jones v. State, 342 Md. at 523, 677 A.2d at $91 (1998)... 2... vee 29 Legal Aid Bureau, Inc, v. Bishop's Garth Assocs. Ltd. P ship, 75 Md. App. at 224, 540 A.2d 1175 (1988)... . « beeen eal ee 27 Liteky v. United States, 114 8.Ct. 1147 (1994)... . « , ee ee 18 Lynch v, Lynch, 342 Md. at 520-529, 677 A.2d at 589-594 (1996)... eee 29) Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. at 465-466, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Bd.2d (1971). . . 14 Mendelson v. Mendelson, 541 A.2d 1331 (1988)... 00.02 . 24,22, 2! Middendorf’v. Baltimore Refrigerating and Heating Co..IBUSC.401......02 0005 bed ha scecdonaonce Ret Ree Setctctccstccti eset ctcsersr ce cecesececeseseseseaes Maryland Rule 1-341. Maryland Rule 2-324. 0.2000 eee Maryland Rule 2-632........... Lee eee fee ee Maryland Rule 8-422.......0..005 hoes e cee efeeee Maryland Rule 16-813... 2... 0.20.0 Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409... .. 2.2.2... Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act §3-403............ Annotations Black’s Law Dictionary (297 Ab. 9th Ed. 1991)... 2.22. ee ee ‘The Federalist, No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) on, 2000 Cumulative Maryland Rules Commentary, (Second E¢ Supplement), at p.25. eee NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY Sec eee cements ese vi 25ig Rds 782A 1047 C191) 31 Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke and Hill, 81 Md. App. 463. 480, 568 A.2d 856 (1990) ee 23) Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 550 A.2d 959 (1988)... 2.2.2. ++ +26 O'Donnell v. MeGann, 310 Md. 342, 345, 529 A.2d 372 (1987)... . . - - oe Oliver v. Hays, 121 Md.App. 292, 306, 708 A.2d 1140 (1998). 2... ee 3 Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 2\ Md. App. 621, 320 A.2d 585 (1974)... 5 2. 31 Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 159 (1998)... . - Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977) Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. at 364, 464 A.2d at 237 (1983)... 2. 21 Seney v. Seney, 97 Md. App. 544, 631 A.2d 139 (1993)... 02.22 eee 26,27 Sheets v. City of Hagerstown, 204 Md. 113, 124, 102. A.2d 734 (1954)... . « 0) State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 729-30, 298 A.2d 867, 877 (1973)... . - 19,29 Stevenson v, Lanham, 127 Md. App, 597, 612 (1999) 2... 22s eee eee ee 25 Talley v. Talley, 317 Md. 428, 434-35, 564. A.2d 777 (1989)... 22. nr) Tumey v. Ohio, 273, US. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L-Ed. 749 (1927)... 2. es 4 United States v. Shipp, 203 US. 563 (1906)... eee 20) United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)... 20 Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002)... 0... 2226s 12 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) 2. IS Zdravkovich v. Bell Atl-Tricon Leasing, 323 Md. 200, 209, 592 A.2d 498 (1991)... 23 8621 LTD. v. LDG, Inc., 169 Md. App. 214, 900 A.2d 259, 169 (2006)... . 2-2. 32] Statutes & Rules Maryland Constitution, Article 24... 2... eee Pee 416 1G United States Constitution, Fourteenth Ammendment fees 13]Statement of the Case To date, this case provides evidence a party can initiate and maintain absolutely meritless litigation to unjustly enrich themselves by applying legal duress to achieve what could otherwise not be legitimately achieved. The mountains of evidence in this case negates the well-established principle that trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly, as well as be impartial participants in the legal process. The record requires those presumptions to be abandoned from the outset, In 2013, Ms. Chamberlain, the Appellee in this case, filed a Complaint to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement and Consent Order of August 31, 2011, and for Declaratory Judgment. On its face, this legal action was devoid of merit. Though titled a “Complaint to Enforce”, Ms. Chamberlain identified no breach of contract which needed] enforcement, Furthermore, by seeking a declaratory judgment on a single, clear and) unambiguous sentence contained within a college education provision in a Marital Settlement Agreement, Ms. Chamberlain was attempting to convince the Court to re- write this sentence in the contract. ‘After 7 months of litigation, including countless motions, extensive discovery, al summary judgment hearing, and an additional lawsuit being filed seeking to increase} child support despite the “child” having been emancipated by age (and already receiving, contractual support to age 23), Ms. Chamberlain admitted to the Court that the only issue| for which she sought relief had become moot and asked for the case to be dismissed. Mr| Chamberlain, the Appellant here, filed a reply which agreed the only issue before the Court had become moot, also requested the case be dismissed, but sought legal fees as the; litigation had been maintained more than 4 months after the issue had become moot. On April 18, 2014, the Circuit Court proceeded with a declaratory judgment hearing in the complete absence of jurisdiction. The evidence of this is incontrovertible. Both parties had declared the only issue before the Court to be moot, and it was proven t be moot prior to the trial judge electing to proceed. The record clearly shows thanumerous and prejudicial errors subsequently occurred during the trial. After the trial judge halted the proceedings and directed the parties’ attorneys into an in chambers discussion, Mr. Chamberlain’s attorney abdicated his defense. Mr. Chamberlain was then coerced into placing an oral agreement on the record purportedly to settle the non- existent controversy. In the subsequent weeks, the trial judge denied a motion requesting a mistrial, ignored a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, then modified and unilaterally signed a contract between the two parties to settle the matter, without Mr. Chamberlain’s consent, in the form of a Consent Order. Mr. Chamberlain appealed. While questions of the validity of the June 5, 2014 Consent Order were under review by this Court, Ms. Chamberlain filed a petition to hold Mr. Chamberlain in| contempt for failing to comply with its terms. Mr. Chamberlain sought to have the| Consent Order vacated (being void for lack of jurisdiction) and the contempt hearing) cancelled (this Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of the order at the time). ‘After the trial judge denied this relief, Mr. Chamberlain filed a motion for recusal. The trial judge refused to recuse himself, found Mr. Chamberlain in contempt, ordered him to pay Ms. Chamberlain's legal fees, and imposed sanctions. Mr. Chamberlain sought to stay the enforcement of these two judgments. Despite posting a supersedeas bond with] the Court for the smaller judgment, and explaining he did not have the financial resource: to post a bond for the larger judgment, both stays were denied by the trial judge. When Mr, Chamberlain did not purge himself, the trial judge entered judgments against him. Ms, Chamberlain, an Alabama resident, has now initiated enforcement action against Mr, Chamberlain, a Colorado resident, to collect from those judgments in Maryland. ‘Subsequent to these judicial actions, and seemingly in contradiction to decades o: settled law, this Court affirmed all actions of the Circuit Court regarding the April 18; 2014 hearing, (See #719 September Term 2015). While the Court of Appeals initially declined to review the matter, reconsideration of that decision is currently pending beforg that Court, Notwithstanding the unpublished opinion, a cursory review of the evidenesubstantiates the allegations the Circuit Court clearly had no jurisdiction', completely ignored the most compelling evidence showing the lower court failed to comply with clear law during the proceeding, and the “Consent Order”, modified and unilaterally signed by the trial judge, and missing consideration and essential terms, was in fact voidable and a facially invalid contract. Questions Presented 1. Did the judge err by not recusing himself? Il. Did the Circuit Court err using its contempt powers? Ill. Did the Circuit Court deny Mr. Chamberlain’s due process right to be heard on the matter of attorneys’ fees? TV. _ Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees? V. _ Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion in the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded? VI. Did the Circuit Court err when it set the amount necessary for the defendant to purge himself from the contempt charges? VII. Did the Circuit Court err when it denied the stays of judgment? + This Court’s affirmation the circuit court had jurisdiction to preside over the April 18, 2014 hearing (#719 September Term 2015) directly contravenes decades of settled law in this State. Withdrawal of a motion for dismissal based on a declaration of mootness does not un-moot the issue. This infers the party withdrawing the motion for dismissal can confer jurisdiction on the court to hear the moot issue. A party cannot confer jurisdiction ona court. Secondly, the “outstanding lingering controversy” identified by this Court was declared “not ripe” by the Appellee herself, and the evidence is incontrovertible that the adult son had not begun college, no payments were due, and the issue of college payments was not ripe. It is settled that the circuit court cannot sit and determine future or hypothetical rights. A court cannot confer jurisdiction on itself. 3Statement of Facts Mr. Chamberlain sought to have the the April 18, 2014 hearing declared a mistrial on May 16, 2014. (E-44). This motion provided evidence the Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and had committed numerous errors during the subsequent hearing. Having more fully researched the settled law concerning jurisdiction, Mr. Chamberlain subsequently sought an outright dismissal of the case by filing a Motion to Dismiss on June 4, 2014. (E-56). This motion provided substantial evidence and legal citations showing the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the April 18, 2014 hearing. The trial judge denied the motion requesting a declaration of mistrial (E-64), ignored the motion to dismiss, and modified and unilaterally signed what was purported to be a mutually agreed upon contract to end the litigation in the form of a Consent Order on June 5, 2014. (E-65). Mr, Chamberlain appealed the courts jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and the validity of the Consent Order. (E-146-205). Mr. Chamberlain requested a stay of the June 5, 2014 Consent Order during the pendeney of the appeal. (E-68). This motion again provided incontrovertible evidence] the Court had acted without subject matter jurisdiction. ‘The request to stay the Consent| Order pending appeal was conditionally denied by the Court, however it was noted that i Mr. Chamberlain filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of the judgment ($7,000.00) plus $2,000.00 advanced appeal court costs, the Court “may” consider another request fo a stay. Mr. Chamberlain did not have the financial resources to comply with the terms of the June 5, 2014 Consent Order, or post the supersedeas bond in the greater amount. Once Mr. Chamberlain failed to comply with the terms of the Consent Order a: imposed by the Circuit Court, Ms. Chamberlain requested the Court hold Mr, Chamberlain in contempt. (E-31). Mr. Chamberlain opposed this effort, seeking to hav the order vacated and the contempt hearing cancelled. (E-73). Again, the Cireuit Courtwas provided with unrefuted and indisputable evidence proving there was no live controversy before the Court on April 18, 2014, that without jurisdiction the June 5, 2014 was void, therefore the Order should be vacated and the contempt petition dismissed until this Court weighed in on the matter, This motion was denied by the trial judge. (B-83). ‘Afier the Court scheduled a 30 minute show cause hearing for the contempt charges (E-72), Mr. Chamberlain requested the hearing be cancelled until the appellate court made a determination on the legality of the June 5, 2014 Consent Order, or, at a minimum, allow more time than the currently allotted 30 minutes to present a defense to the contempt charges. (E-80) The trial judge denied this request. (E-87). Mr. Chamberlain then filed motions secking the trial judge's disqualification, as| well as asking the Court to reconsider its denial of the request to vacate the order and cancel to contempt hearing. (E-88, E-84). Mr. Chamberlain argued the trial judge had| determined he had acted within his jurisdiction, that the Consent Order he signed on June) 5, 2014 was lawful, and had reaffirmed this belief multiple times over the previous, months. It followed that the same judge could not hear the same evidence which would, be presented in defense of the contempt charges and arrive at a different conclusion, ‘Additionally, Mr. Chamberlain asserted the trial judge had a personal interest in the outcome of the contempt hearing, as well as a financial interest should it be found that he acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. (5-88, E-289-290). Lastly, Mr. Chamberlain made a strong case that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the string o' decisions, seemingly in contravention to clear and settled law, amounted to actual bias which exceeded constitutional thresholds requiring mandatory recusal. (E-94, E285-289). ‘The parties, one a resident of Alabama and the other a resident of Colorado, arrived in Maryland for the 30 minute hearing before a Master, only to have the hearin; rescheduled based on the inadequate amount of time which had been scheduled. Despit Mr. Chamberlain’s insistence a day long hearing would be necessary to provide the tim necessary to present a defense to the charges, the Court determined a three hour hearingwas necessary and appropriate. The contempt hearing was rescheduled for that amount of time in the following month. (E-93). ‘The trial judge ignored Mr. Chamberlain’s request for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his motion to vacate the order. He then set a hearing for the motion to recuse to be held concurrently with the previously scheduled hearing on contempt (E-104), The Appellant sought to have these hearings bifurcated as the Court had already determined the contempt hearing required three hours and adding a recusal hearing to that limited amount of time would deprive Mr. Chamberlain of his due process right to be heard and present a defense to the contempt charges. (E-105). The trial judge refrained from ruling on the matter. ‘At the commencement of the recusal/contempt hearing, the trial judge expressed doubt about seeking enforcement through contempt proceedings, directly stating that} breach of contract was the appropriate cause of action and that attomeys’ fees would be} inappropriate (B-234-238): ‘The Court: (misidentified in transcript as Ms. Warren) And all the - - because Ij checked the docket before we came in to try and get a better idea of what we were suppose to be doing here today. The docket reflects that we're here on the motion for recusal and on the show cause hearing. The contempt? Ms Warren: Correct. ‘The Court: Which, preliminarily, I need to ask you why did - - why is this aj contempt case? I can’t do much under the law. I cannot put him in] jail. Ms, Warren: Uh - huh. ‘The Court: This is a college tuition situation, Ms. Warren: Uh - huh.‘The Court: Ms. Warren: ‘The Court: Ms. Warren: ‘After some other discussion, the issue of using contempt vice filing suit continues: Ms. Warren: ‘The Court: Ms. Warren: ‘The Court: ‘Ms. Warren: The Court: Once required mandatory recusal. (E-239-302). Incontrovertible evidence the Court had acte in the clear absence of jurisdiction was extensively presented. (E-243-262). More evidence of Chamberlain’s motions without ever reading it, or was less than truthfiul when he claime It’s not - - I mean, it’s not child support or alimony. The young man whose tuition is at issue is over 18 - - so this is a straight contract action. ‘Your honor, it is a contempt case, because we - - What if I were to find him in contempt? What do you suggest I could do? Your Honor, you could enter a judgment. The Court has broad authority, even in a general civil contempt situation that isn’t directly related to child support ot alimony. ‘What we are requesting, Your Honor, is some assistance from the Court on collecting the monetary relief that my client and the Defendant agreed to - - He works. You could have filed in the District Court and gotten a/ judgment, Probably had it resolved by now. don’t know that we could have done that. Why? The other issue, too, is my client has been consi attorneys’ fees not just on this contempt - - ently incurring) Yeah, but that’s my point, If you're filing a procedure that’s not reall going to effectuate your purpose, how can you justify your attorneys” fees? the hearing commenced, Mr. Chamberlain presented evidence which bias was presented showing the trial judge either denied one of Mrto have no knowledge of the motion’s content? (E-295-296). Evidence was presented that proved the succession of judicial decisions which contravened clear and settled law could not have been simple errors, but rather predetermined action. Simple errors would have been corrected once identified. (E-44, E-56, E-239-302). And evidence was presented that showed how implausible it was for the judge to have combined both the recusal hearing and the contempt hearing if there was any possibility he would actually recuse himself. Had the trial judge recused himself, the parties would have been forced to come to Maryland for a third time for the contempt hearing, (E-242-243, E-280-283). The| judge himself is on record for stating he did not need to be fair to preside over a proceeding, apparently undeterred by a constitutional mandate that all citizens have al right to come before a “fair tribunal”: The Court: So if that was your best argument, that I was not fair to you, I have to deny the motion. It’s just - - it’s not even a close call. This is not what recusal is} about.” (E-310). Mr. Chamberlain informed the Court that one of his primary defenses to the| contempt charges was that a party could not be held in contempt for disobeying an| unlawful order. (E-88, E-289-290), He further questioned the implausibility the hearing! could be fair if presenting this defense to the same judge who had numerous times determined he had acted within his jurisdiction and that his order was lawful. (E-44, +56, E-73, E-289-290). Mr. Chamberlain presented evidence which focused on objective standards and mandatory recusal (E-94, B-265, 292-294) while the trial judge focused on subjective standards and discretionary recusal criteria, (B-306-311). Mr. Chamberlainy contended the trial judge had predetermined the outcome of the contempt hearing supporting this contention by reciting the evidence regarding jurisdiction and th 2 The judge claimed to be unaware when he unilaterally signed the Consent Order that Mr. Chamberlain did not give his consent to the purported agreement. Yet that same day he had denied a motion alleging lack of jurisdiction, duress, coercion and an explicit denial of consent by Mr. Chamberlain. Having declared he reads “everything that cross [his] desk”, these assertions cannot be truthfully reconciled. (E-294-295) 8unlawfulness of the Consent Order, identifying that the trial judge had affirmed his positions on these issues numerous times, and offered that it would be impossible that the judge could hear the same evidence once again and now arrive at a different conclusion. Mr. Chamberlain was unequivocal in stating the judge’s previous rulings and re- affirmations of those rulings proved he could not fairly preside over a defense which would use the same evidence, legal authority and legal reasoning, and that this denied him the right to present his defense to a fair and impartial tribunal. (E-239-302). The trial judge dismissed this argument, stating: “. . .all I heard were allegations of imparti with not one scintilla of factual backup. . ..” (H-306-307). Ms. Warren acknowledged “the Court had set us in for three hours” and the trial judge acknowledge the limited time by stating “if we're not finished by 4:30, we come back. I’m not going to cut anybody short on time.” (E-312). Because the trial judge had) decided to hold the recusal hearing contemporaneously with the contempt hearing, and had ignored Mr. Chamberlain’s motion to bifurcate the issues into separate hearings, the| hearing could not be completed and was re-scheduled a third time to allow for closing! arguments the following month. (E-93). When finally concluded on February 5, 2015, the transcript of the contempt! proceedings definitely revealed (1) the Circuit Court acted in the clear absenee o| jurisdiction by presiding over a hearing facially absent a live controversy, (2) the oral agreement which was coerced from Mr. Chamberlain during that hearing, which was memorialized by the trial judge on June 5, 2014 was null and void, and (3) the law is settled that a party can only be held in contempt for disobedience to a “lawful” order o1 writ, (The evidence presented is so extensive, only a de novo review of the transcrip could adequately highlight the wealth of evidence supporting the contention that th Order which Mr. Chamberlain disobeyed was facially void. Significantly, based on minimum of 8 separate excuses for hearing the case, all of which had no legal foundatior whatsoever, and he trial judge own admission that the issue was moot at the beginnin;of the hearing, the record reflects the trial judge had little understanding of his ictional authority. ( E-418-423, E-427, E-432, E-435, E-437, E-455 and E-429 ju where the trial judge stated: “When Mr, Schaeffer and Mr. Brown informed me that even though the matter that was on my docket that day was really moot. ..”) Additionally, Mr. Chamberlain clearly articulated why the Circuit Court could not se its contempt powers to enforce the “consent order” in question as it was a settlement agreement to end litigation that “absent an agreement by the parties”, the Court could not impose. (E-436-449).. The trial judge declared Mr. Chamberlain’s defense to be “extremely unpersuasive”, the cases cited to be irrelevant, that “nothing that would affect the validity of the consent agreement” was presented, among other admonishments. Mr. Chamberlain was found to be in contempt and sanctioned in the amount of $14,000.00. ‘The overt bias of the trial judge was never more visible and his mindset more apparent than when the he declared: “I couldn’t find you in contempt if that order was invalid, so T find it to be a valid order.” (E-461). This Freudian slip was directly analogous to the trial judge’s previous “cart before the horse” methodology when he claimed that a coerced agreement three hours into a proceeding he held without jurisdiction “waived” the jurisdictional issue. (The Court: “But it was not moot, because you all entered into an agreement afier| all that happened.” (Underline and italics added.) (E-427, See also E-429, E-432). This sanction was set after Mr. Chamberlain had testified extensively concerning his financial inability to comply with the Consent Order ot purge himself: The Court: “So| you had the ability to comply with this order.” Answer: “No, Your Honor (E-359); “.. | and I didn’t have the $7,000 per semester or $14,000 per year - -” (E-362); “I paid) $50,761 in taxes in 2013, $60,000 in alimony, $18,000 in contractual support, almost] $4,000 in student loans for the girls, $23,266 in the minimum debt payments on all the} debt this has caused, and I reduced my morigage by almost half by leaving Maryland and| going to Colorado. . . | only paid $28,000 in mortgage interest.” (B-363); The Court: “So) 10then you admit that you have the ability to pay the expenses that you agreed to pay in April? You just haven’t paid them, is that correct?” Answer: “I do not have money to pay those expenses. No.” (E-372); The Court: “Well, you know what you made in °14, You got year-to-date stubs. Answer: “What I have is an attomey saying I possess sufficient means to comply with your order - - and I have printouts of all my balances and all my loans that I printed out this week showing I have zero.” (E-373); “I operate day to day, paycheck to paycheck.” (E-374); “I only have one copy of all the balances of every account and all my debt. Would you like me to put it in the record or should I read it?” ‘The Court: “The evidence is closed.” (-386); “Your Honor was surprised I didn’t bring financial information. I brought financial information. I don’t have money to pay for the order. I don’t have money to purge myself. I don’t have any money. This is the evidence that I can present to the Court if the Court is going to review it.” (E-386); The Court “Your financial situation is really no different today than it was a year ago.” Answer: “It’s different and worse every day.” (E-386-387). ‘After arbitrarily asking if Mr. Chamberlain had “income over $100,000”, the trial judge acknowledged he understood he heard testimony concerning “other expenses” but| then found Mr. Chamberlain in contempt and sanctioned him $14,000.00 without referencing any evidence which showed he had the financial ability to comply. (E-458). ‘Afier presenting substantial evidence in defense to the contempt charges, the trial] judge declared “I further find more than ample evidence to grant attorneys’ fees.” (B-462). As Mr. Chamberlain asked to be heard on the issue of fees which had just surfaced, the trial judge threatened to have him removed from the courtroom. (E-462-463). A further sanction for attorneys’ fees was imposed on Mr. Chamberlain in| the amount of $3,600.00. (E-463). Despite opposing counsel specifically secking| attorneys’ fees pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341 (E-450) the trial judge provided the following) legal reasoning for the award of fees (E-463): "1“T was talking about counsel fees and the factors that I have to consider under Family Law Article, needs and resources of the parties, justification for the proceedings, and/or Rule 1-341, which is either frivolous, unmeritorious cause of action or a frivolous, unmeritorious defense to an action “After listening to your arguments and listening to the evidence in this case, there’s really been no justification legally for defending this action. I think her attorney’s fees are reasonable, so I’'m making an award of $3,600 in counsel fees.” The record is devoid of any hard financial data being utilized to ensure Mr. Chamberlain could purge himself despite that data having been offered as evidence to the Court but rejected. (E-386). The record is also replete with testimony regarding an inability to comply with the order or the purge amounts. This appeal followed. Despite Mr. Chamberlain filing a supersedeas bond to stay the award of counsel fees during the pendency of the appeal, and not being financially able to obtain a} supersedeas bond to stay the contempt sanctions, both the Circuit Court and this Court denied both stays as well as requests for reconsideration. (E-40, E-126). Being unable to purge himself, and having received no relief from the Court, the sanctions were reduced to judgments on May 8, 2015 (E-128, E129) and enforcement} action began soon thereafter. (E-42). Argument Standard of Review Md. Rule 8-131(c) provides that when an action has been tried without a jury, "the| appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside} the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due} regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The deference shown to the trial court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard| does not, of course, apply to legal conclusions. When the trial court's order "involves an| interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must} determine whether the lower court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo) 12standard of review." Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md, 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002). When a judge fails to recuse himself after allegations of bias, prejudice or lack of impartiality are alleged, that decision will only be overtumed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. In re Turney, 311 Md. 246, 533 A.2d 916 (1987). Failure to recuse based on statutory criteria is reviewed under the principles of statutory interpretation. When interpreting the application of Maryland statutory and case law, the Court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are "legally correct” under a de novo standard of| review. Early v, Early, 338 Md. 639, 654, 659 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1995). Appellate courts should not give the lower court deference when reviewing "[pJure conclusions of law." Oliver v. Hays, 121 Md.App. 292, 306, 708 A.2d 1140 (1998). Instead, it must be determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Andy's Ice Cream, Ine. v. City of Salisbury, 125 Md.App. 125, 137, 724 A.2d 717, cert. denied, 353 Mad. 473, 727 A.2d 382 (1999). ‘The Appellate Court reviews “a circuit court's determination whether a party maintained or defended an action in bad faith or without substantial justification under al clearly erroneous standard, Garcia v. Foulger Pratt Dev., Inc., 155 Md. App. 634, 677, 845 A.2d 16 (2003); Barnes v. Rosenthal Toyota, Inc., 126, Md. App. at 105, 727 A.2d 431 (1999). If the Court finds a claim was defended without substantial justification, it then has to determine whether to award sanctions. On appeal, this determination is under ‘an abuse of discretion standard. (NIEMEYER & SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY at 59 (3d. ed. 2003); Barnes, supra, 126 Md. App. at 105, 727 A.2d| 431. 1. Did the judge err by not recusing himself? ‘The trial judge was required to recuse himself pursuant to the Due Process Clause| of the United States Constitution, the Maryland Constitution, and Maryland law. Failing| 13to do so was an error of law. Notwithstanding this requirement, failure to recuse himself ona discretionary basis was an abuse of discretion. While the Court could be guided by many authorities, the guidance for mandatory recusal in this case should be based on the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which, among other things, guarantees a defendant the right to come before a fair and impartial tribunal. (“It is axiomatic that a “fair tribunal is a requirement of due . 2252 (2009) quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955)). Although the Maryland Constitution contains no process.” Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. express equal protection clause, it is settled that the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Constitution, contained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, embodies the concept of equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, ¢.g., Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 416, 529 ‘A.2d 1372, 1377 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027, 108 S.Ct. 753, 98 L.Ed.2d 766 (1988); Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 591, 510 A.2d 573, 579 (1986). “The Due Process Clause also incorporated the common-law rule requiring recusal when a judge has a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case” and that “this rule reflects the maxim that ‘no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause: because his interest would certainly bias imegrity."" Tumey v. Ohio, 273, US. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). It is well settled that “no man judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” Jn re Murchison, 349) US. 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955). The Supreme Court definitively stated: “in lieu of reliance on... personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge’s determination respecting| actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do} not require proof of actual bias.” Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009), See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. at 465-466, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d (1971) 14While this case began as a declaratory judgment and culminated in a contested Consent Order, it became a case about whether the Court acted without subject matter jurisdiction. It is inarguable that one man should not be able to allegedly exceed his authority, take action in the clear absence of jurisdiction, affirm his action multiple times, then be the decision maker as to whether a person can be punished for disobeying the alleged unlawful order. This would directly equate to the judge being allowed “to be a judge in his own cause.” Furthermore, a judge who acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction is not immune to personal liability for damages resulting from his actions. (See 42 U.S.C. § 1983). This inexorably leads one to plainly see the “direct, personal, substantial [and] pecuniary interest” the judge had in this case and why he would not willingly relinquish the contempt hearing to another jurist wh after impartially hearing and weighing the overwhelming evidence supporting the allegations, would be unable to reconcile the trial judge’s actions with the law and subsequently determine the trial judge had acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has additionally identified “instances which, as an objective matter, requires recusal where ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009) quoting Withrow y. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). No lengthy inquiry is needed here to conclude the judge before whom Mr. Chamberlain would have to appear to defend against contempt charges would not have an| open mind to hear the evidence and his ruling would be predetermined. The record in this case clearly establishes the trial judge initially decided to preside over a case without| subject matter jurisdiction. Over a period of many months, the trial judge denied) numerous motions and requests for relief which contained substantial evidence to support 15this contention and explicitly challenged the validity of its subsequently issued order? Each and every time the trial judge denied or ignored these motions, he affirmed his conclusion that he did indeed have jurisdiction to preside over the hearing and the order was therefore unlawfully issued, ‘The voluminous evidence presented in these motions, which proved the Court acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction, need not be reprinted in its entirety here. Any reader who reviews these motions can only be led to conclude the judge was aware of the evidence proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that he decided to proceed, and subsequently affirmed his actions to be legally correct a multitude of times. Here, there was far more than an “appearance” of partiality or the “probability” of| actual bias should the same judge preside over a separate hearing, for a separate action, which would rely on the same defense: the judge’s own actions prove his mind was| closed to the possibility he could have acted without jurisdiction and that the order over which Mr. Chamberlain was being charged with contempt could be unlawful. Under these| circumstances, it would be patently unfair for a defendant to be forced to present a defense to contempt charges using the same evidence and the same legal reasoning that! had been summarily rejected multiple times by the same judge (that the Court lacked! jurisdiction, the order was unlawful, and he could not be held in contempt of court for disobedience to an unlawful order). Having previously determined, numerous times, his actions were within his jurisdiction and his order lawful, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge” to hear the same evidence challenging the Court’s jurisdiction and the lawfulness of his| order during a contempt hearing was “too high to be constitutionally tolerable” under the| 5 See 04/14/14 Plaintiff’s Request for Voluntary Dismissal (E-25); 04/17/14 Defendant’s Response to Voluntary Dismissal (E-25); 05/16/14 Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial (E-44); 06/04/14 Motion to Dismiss (E-56); 10/06/14 Motion to Vacate Order (E-73); 11/13/14 Motion to Revise Denial of Motion to Vacate (E-84); 12/03/14 Motion for Specific Assignment (E-94), 16circumstances of this case. After affirming his own determination he had jurisdiction to act and that his order was therefore lawful, numerous times, over the course of months, it would be inconceivable for anyone to believe the same judge would somehow have an epiphany and arrive at a contrary conclusion if presented with the same evidence and legal reasoning which formed the basis of Mr. Chamberlain’s defense to the contempt charges. The extraordinary circumstances of this case clearly tise to a “constitutionally intolerable” level requiring mandatory recusal based on the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. General guidance for judicial recusal is also found in the Maryland Constitution, Article IV Section 7, which stipulates: “No Judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or whether either of] the parties may be connected with him, by affinity or consanguinity, within such degrees as now are, or may hereafter be hereafter be preseribed by Law, or where he shall have been counsel in the case.” The “interest” referred to in Section 7 of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution refers} not just to a pecuniary interest in the litigation, but also its outcome. Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131, 137, 220 A.2d 547 (1966). It is inarguable the “interest” this judge had in| the outcome of the case exceeded the threshold defined in Article IV Section 7 o! Maryland’s Constitution. Specific statutory criteria for mandatory recusal is also found in Md. Rule| 16-813, Maryland judges are required to recuse themselves when confronted with any] criteria in the non-exclusive list found in Rule 2.11 (a), which begins by stating: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including the following| circumstances . . .” (emphasis and underline added) One of those circumstances is when a judge knows that he “is a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding (italics added). (Md, Rule 16-813 Rule 2.11 (a) (2) (©). 7De minimus essentially refers to something, or a difference, that is so little, small, minuscule, or tiny that the law does not refer to it and will not consider it. Black’ Law Dictionary ( 297 Ab. 9th ed. 1991) defines de minimus as “very small or trifling matters.” The trial judge had much more than a “de minimus” interest in this proceeding. ‘The record reflects the trial judge had an obvious “fixed predisposition” concerning the evidence which would be presented to him in the contempt hearing. “The standard that ought to be adopted for all allegations of an apparent fixed predisposition, extrajudicial or otherwise, follows from the statute itself? Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality, If a judge’s attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified. Indeed, in such circumstances, I should think that any| judge who understands the judicial office and oath would be the first to insist that] another judge hear the case.” Liteky v. United States, 114 $.Ct. 1147 (1994), While the trial judge did undertake a search for personal bias, this is but a small step in] the judicial process. Objective standards require recusal whether or not actual bias exists| or can be proved. Due process "may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between] contending parties." (See Murchison, 349 U.S., at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623). The fi lure to consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with the imperatives o} due process. Judge Harris was required to recuse himself, or at a minimum, abused his discretion by failing to do so, It is clear, both from the plain language of the rule and the, context, that if'a judge has any interest whatsoever which could be substantially affecte: by the proceeding, disqualification is mandatory. ‘The judge’s interest in this case was t avoid serious personal and professional embarrassment and financial liability should 4 spotlight be brought to bear on his actions when reviewed by a disinterested colleague i the Circuit, His exclusive focus on discretionary recusal criteria was erroneous. Whil “there is a strong presumption in Maryland, and elsewhere, that judges are impartial participants in the legal process, whose duty to preside when qualified is as strong as thei 18duty to refrain from presiding when not qualified" (Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 107, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993)), the evidence in this case negates that “presumption.” Under the circumstances as reflected in the lengthy record, mandatory recusal was required by law and the trial judge erred by not disqualifying himself. TL. _ Did the Circuit Court err using its contempt powers? Maryland law is settled that the Court's contempt powers are not to be used to enforce contractual agreements between parties. The circuit court erred when it used its| contempt powers in an effort to help one party enforce a contractual agreement against another. ‘The parties had purportedly reached a mutual agreement to settle an ongoing declaratory judgment action concerning a single sentence in a college education provision) within the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA was also a mutually} agreed upon contract between the parties that was incorporated in, but expressly not] merged with, a divoree decree in 2009. Despite ongoing challenges to the validity of the! June Sth agreement', which had been based on an oral agreement made on the record in al proceeding held without jurisdiction and then memorialized and approved by the Court in| the form of a consent order, Ms. Chamberlain requested the Court intervene and us its contempt powers to coerce Mr. Chamberlain into complying with the terms of tha agreement rather than file suit for alleged breach of contract, Ms. Chamberlain is a resident of Alabama and Mr, Chamberlain is a resident of Colorado. Had Ms Chamberlain attempted to domesticate the June 5, 2014 consent order in Colorado for enforcement purposes, that effort would be met with a credible legal challenge to its validity. 4See Mr. Chamberlain’s Pet. for Writ of Certiorari and Mot. for Reconsideration of Pet. for Writ of Cert., #133 September Term 2015, filed on June 3, 2015. (B-206, E-227) 19A comprehensive discussion about contempt of court can be found in the Court of| Appeals’ opinion in State v. Roll and Scholl. [A] civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of| private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily’ made to benefit such parties.” “At common law what in Maryland is now regarded as civil contempt probably did not exist; but rather, a process which was employed as a procedure for civil execution was used as a sanction against a party who disobeyed @ court order| issued for the benefit and advantage of another party in the proceedings.” “Holding an offending party in contempt of court was designed to vindicate the| authority and power of the court and punish disobedience to its orders.” “The conduct which precipitates the initiation of contempt proceedings is the alleged failure, in contravention of @ court order, to do that which has been! ordered done or the doing of that which is prohibited.” State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 729-30, 298 A.24 867, 877 (1973). (Underline and} italics added). It is clear that the Court’s contempt powers can be used to coerce! compliance with “court orders” to “vindicate the authority and power of the Court.” First, it should be noted that contempt can only be brought for “disobedience or >. § 401), resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.” (18 U.S. It is settled in this State that Courts are authorized use their contempt powers to compel] obedience to their “lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or commands”, — not! unlawful” orders. In determining whether the appellant was properly held to be in contempt we mus recognize a distinction which is well established in the law of contempt. This is th distinction between disobedience to or violation of an order of court which is void for_lack of jurisdiction of the court to pass the order, and disobedience to ot violation of an order which is merely erroneous due to a mistaken view of the fact or to a mistaken view of the law on the part of the court making the order, but is one which the court had. jurisdiction to pass. dn adjudication of contempt in the 0s while a finding of contempt in the second situation will ordinarily be upheld. Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md 475, 489, 77 A.2d 305 (1950); Sheets v. City of Hagerstown, 204 Md. 113, 124.102 A.2d 734 (1954). See also United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). (Underline and italics added). “It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt.” United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). The record overflows with evidence the hearing on April 18, 2014 was held without jurisdiction, the oral agreement] and subsequent Consent Order is void by law, and Mr. Chamberlain cannot be held in| contempt for disobedience to a facially void order. Notwithstanding the endorsement of the Court by a judge’s signature, the June 5, 2014 consent order was not an “order” of the Court, but identified by Ms. Chamberlain as a contract between two parties to end litigation which was purportedly created by the parties’ orally before the Court and later memorialized and submitted to the Court for| approval. “[C]ontempt is the refusal to comply with the court order, and not merely the| breach of the prior support agreement.” Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. at 364, 464 A\| 2d at 237 (1983). (Underline and italics added). This Court has clearly articulated a difference between agreements where the Court “could have” imposed or awarded terms, and agreements whose terms the Court “could not have awarded . . . but for the agreement.” See Mendelson v. Mendelson, 541 AJ 2d 1331 (1988). The latter type of support was a debt imposed by contract rather than duty imposed by judicial decree. Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md, at 681, 141 A. 387 (1928). SUCH IS THE EXACT CASE HERE. The Consent Order was restricted to issues concerning college tuition payments. No Maryland Court has the authority to “award” o1 “impose” terms concerning a father’s payment for an adult son’s college tuition “absen an agreement of the parties.” Notably, the trial judge himself stated that this is a “straigh contract action,” confirming the absence of a judicial determination or decree, an: strongly suggested enforcement of the contract should be through a breach of contract action, not through contempt. atIt is also important to highlight that the MSA, which the consent order modified, was incorporated into but not merged with the divorce decree. See Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983) *. . . where the parties intend a separation| agreement to be incorporated but not merged in the divorce decree, the agreement| remains a separate, enforceable contract and is not superseded by the decree.” The} Johnston Court also provided a demarcation between settlements imposed by a Court and| merged with a judicial decree, and those which are made between parties that are strictly} contractual in nature, which is instructive as it pertains to the Court's contempt powers: “If. . . however, a separation agreement is incorporated but not merged, then the separation agreement is not superseded by the decree. In that instance, the agreement survives as a separate and independent contractual arrangement! between the parties, but not being part of the decree, its terms cannot be enforced] by way of contempt proceedings.” In this case, the Court sought to “vindicate its authority and power” and to punish Mr Chamberlain for his failure to comply with the terms of the Consent Order. There was no} judicial determination, nor a judicial decree contained within this “order”. ‘The nature o the agreement between the parties was such that the Court would not have been able t award the terms absent the agreement between the parties. It was an error of law for the circuit court to bring its contempt powers to bear in order to assist one party in enforcing the challenged contract on the other. The June 5, 2014 Consent Order was explicit i stating “that all remaining provisions in the parties’ [MSA] and Consent Order regarding Support, Attorneys Fees and Other Relief shall remain in full force and effect, except as modified herein...” It follows that the June 5, 2014 Consent Order, like the MSA, was mutual agreement only approved and endorsed by the Court. Though the validity of that agreement is still currently being challenged, it is indisputable that both the Court an‘ Ms. Chamberlain consider the June 5, 2014 Consent Order to be a mutually agreed upor contract made orally on the record and submitted to the Court only for approval an‘ endorsement. The trial judge wrote, “the parties reached an agreement resolving all issues in this action, which is memorialized below in accordance with the transcript from th 22hearing.” (E-65). And Ms. Warren stated: “, . you have not complied with the consent agreement that was placed on the record on April 18, 2014 and memorialized in the Consent Order that was entered in June of 2014; is that correct?” (E-325). Despite the trial judge terminating Mr. Chamberlain’s defense before he could more fully develop the applicability and authority of both the Mendelson and Johnston rulings to the circumstances here, the evidence which was allowed to be presented convincingly demonstrated the Court was without the authority to use its contempt powers to enforce this contract for Ms. Chamberlain. IIL. Did the Circuit Court deny Mr. Chamberlain’s due process right to be heard on the matter of attorneys’ fees? At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the trial judge declared Mr. Chamberlain to be in contempt and sanctioned him: “So my sanction on that contempt is that within the next 30 days you pay $14,000.00 in the tuition that was already determined to be due and owing, and keep in mind when we were here three weeks ago, it was only $7,000. It’s due| now, so that, if it’s not paid within 30 days, will be reduced to a judgment.” Immediately thereafter, the trial judge began to articulate his “finding” that] attorneys’ fees should be granted, The record clearly shows in the exchange that followed, Mr. Chamberlain sought an opportunity to be heard, and specifically attempted to object to the trial judge’s imminent use of the family law articles to award legal fees in a “straight contract action” and which were specifically requested pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. The trial judge denied this opportunity and threatened Mr. Chamberlain with removal by the Sheriff should he continue to request an opportunity to be heard. Constitutional due process principles apply to the assessment of attorneys’ fees for litigation misconduct. Zdravkovich v. Bell Atl-Tricon Leasing, 323 Md. 200, 209, 592 A. 2d 498 (1991); Talley v. Talley, 317 Md. 428, 434-35, 564 A.2d 777 (1989); Johnson »: Baker, 84 Md. App. 521, 538, 581 A.2d 48 (1990), cert. denied, 322 Md. 131, 586 A.2d 23.13 (1991); Needle v. White, 81 Md. App. 463, 480, 568 A.2d 856, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990). Thus, due process requires “at a minimum, that before 5 A : ‘ 5 respond." Zdravkovich, 323 Md. at 209, 592 A.2d 498, (underline added). “The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). While a hearing is not a requirement prior to the imposition of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341 (see Johnson v. Baker, 84 Md. App. 521, 538, 581 A.2d 48 (1990)), the transcript inarguably shows Mr. Chamberlain sought an opportunity to be heard, despite his choice of words in the heat of the moment, (E-462-463).. The evidence is incontrovertible that Mr. Chamberlain was denied his constitutional due process right, and right according to Maryland law, to respond and be heard on the matter of attomneys’ fees. IV. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees? Both the trial judge and Ms. Chamberlain’s counsel confirmed the underlying litigation from which this contempt action arose was a “straight contract action,” that “it’s not child support or alimony,” and a “general civil contempt situation that isn’t directly related to child support or alimony.” It was an error of law for the trial judge to consider awarding legal fees based on the family law section where “the Court must consider needs and resources of the parties.” (E-235-239). Maryland follows the “American Rule” for attorneys’ fees. Hess Constr: v. Bd. of Educ., 341 Md. 155, 159, 669 A.2d 1352 (1996). Therefore, in “ 1¢ absence of statute, rule, or contract expressly allowing recovery of attorneys’ fees, a prevailing party in a lawsuit may not ordinarily recover attorneys’ fees.” Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut, 24Ins, Co., 355 Md. 566, 590-91, 735 A.2d 1081 (1999). “An award of counsel fees to Rule 1-341 is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ which should be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases.” Barnes v. Rosenthal Toyota, Inc., 126 Md. App 97, 105, 727 A.24 431 (1999) citing Black v. Fox Hills N. Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 90 Md. App. 75, 83,599 A.2d 1228 (1992). Ms. Chamberlain's counsel explicitly stated her claim for attomeys’ fees was based on Rule 1-341. ( -450). Any suggestion that Mr. Chamberlain’s defense against the charges of contempt were made “in bad faith or without substantial justification,” as described in Maryland Rule 1-341 is without any merit and completely unsupported by the evidence in the record. Maryland Rule 1-341 states: In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification, the court, on motion by an adverse party, may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs| of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it. Mr. Chamberlain presented two primary arguments in his defense to the contempt charges: (1) the order in question was created by the Court while acting in the clear| absence of jurisdiction, without subject matter jurisdiction, was therefore void, and that al party cannot be held in contempt for disobedience to an “unlawful order” and (2) the| Court had no authority to use its contempt powers to help a party enforce this contract. ‘These arguments were supported by the presentation of substantial case law using sound) legal reasoning. ‘To support his first argument, Mr. Chamberlain cited the following statutes and| cases: 18 U.S.C. 401; Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act § 3-403; Maryland, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409 (a) (1); Maryland Rule 2-324 (b); United States v. United Mine Workers of America (1947); Lord v. Veazie (1850); Reyes » Princ George's County (1977); Hatt v. Anderson (1983); Post v. Bregman (1998); Hammond v| Lancaster (1950); Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors 25‘Association (1979); Boyd Civie Association v. Montgomery County Council (1987); Coburn v. Coburn (1996); Stevenson v. Lanham (1999); Hamilton v. McAuliffe (1976). Each of these cases was squarely on point, provided clear authority, and substantial support for the legal argument made. To support his second argument against contempt, Mr. Chamberlain articulated the distinct difference between “judicial decrees and orders” on one hand, and mutuall agreements of parties who submit settlement agreements to the Court for approval and| endorsement, such as occurred in this case. Mr. Chamberlain cited both Mendelson v. Mendelson and Johnston v, Johnston as the settled law regarding agreements incorporated, but not merged, into divorce decrees and to explain that the law does not allow for contempt to be used to enforce the type of agreement which had been presented] to and endorsed by the Court in this case. Despite these legal arguments and the plethora of case citations which fally| supported Mr. Chamberlain’s defense against the contempt charges, the trial judge found) him in contempt and awarded legal fees by reasoning that “[alfter listening to you arguments and listening to the evidence of this case, there’s really been no justification] legally for defending this action.” (E-463). The trial judge added “. . . you cited cases that you thought were relevant. The weren’t, None of those cases are relevant on the jurisdiction, the mootness of the issue, they’re - - none of those apply.” (E-455) Zhe extensive record proves otherwise, “[I]n the context of Rule 1-341, bad faith exists when a party litigates with th purpose of intentional harassment or unreasonable delay.” Barnes v. Rosenthal Toyota| Inc., 126 Md. App 97, 105, 727 A.2d 431 (1999); Seney v. Seney, 97 Md. App. 105, 727) A.2d 431 (1999). (See also Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 550 A.2d 959 (1988) wher the Court of Appeals stated that to constitute substantial justification, the parties position should be "fairly debatable” and "within the realm of legitimate advocacy.") A trial judg must be satisfied by a preponderance of evidence that a party has acted in bad faith ani 26without substantial justification.” Aftorney Grievance Comm'n y. Allison, 349 Md. 623, 635, 709 A.2d 1212 (1998). “The phrase ‘in bad faith or without substantial justification’ should not be interpreted to mean that an asserted legal position must prevail.” (Maryland| Rules Commentary, (Second Edition, 2000 Cumulative Supplement) at p. 25). As a matter of law, a reasonable basis for believing that a case will generate a factual issue for the fact finder at trial provides substantial justification for defending an action. Insel v. Solomon, 63 Md. App. 384, 398, 492 A.2d 963 (1985). The record in this case provides clear and convincing evidence that the legitimate, well-developed and substantially supported legal defense presented to the charges o} contempt were for not for the purpose of “intentional harassment or delay,” were not, presented in “bad faith”, or, at a minimum, were “fairly debatable”, “within the realm of legitimate advocacy”, and generated “a factual issue for the fact finder at trial.” Though incomprehensible, should this Court affirm the Circuit Court's determination that Mr. Chamberlain’s defense fell so short and was so illegitimate so as to fall within Rule 1-341's criteria, it was still an abuse of discretion to award attorney’ fees as a sanction. The Court of Appeals has said: “There is an additional aspect of appellate review of a trial judge's decision award sanctions under Rule 1-341. If the judge makes the requisite finding that a litigant acted in bad faith or without substantial justification, the judge should not automatically impose sanctions. After finding bad faith or lack of substantial justification, the judge should then exercise discretion in deciding, in light of those findings, whether costs and/or attorney's fees should be awarded.” Inlet Associate: y. Harrison Inn, 324 Md. 254, 596 A.2d 1049 (1991). “Without substantial justification’ should not be interpreted to mean that the winning party is entitled to counsel fees simply because his opponen misconceived the legal basis upon which he sought to prevail." Hess v. Chalmers. 33 Md. App. at 545, 365 A.2d 294 (1976). ‘This Court has stated: “Judicial restraint is especially important when it comes to awarding attorneys fees.” Seney v. Seney, 97 Md. App. at 223, 540 A.2d 1175 (1993). 7“Maryland Rule 1-341 is not, and never was intended, to be used as a weapon to force persons who have a questionable or innovative cause to abandon it because of the fear of the imposition of sanctions. . . . No one who avails himself or herself of the right to seek redress in a Maryland court of law should be punished merely for exercising that right.” Garcia v. Foulger Pratt Dev, Inc., 155 Md. App. 634, 677, 845 A.2d 16 (2003) quoting Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Bishop's Garth Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 75 Md. App. at 224, 540 A.2d 1175 (1988). Nothing in the contempt hearing transcript can even suggest Mr. Chamberlain was| attempting to harass, delay, or in any way abuse the judicial process which would invite the sanction of having to pay attorneys’ fees. To the contrary, the record is exhaustive in| showing a legitimate, well-reasoned and thoroughly supported defense to the contempt! charges. It would be contrary to every opinion rendered by this Court and the Court o! ‘Appeals to affirm the punitive award of attorneys’ fees under the circumstances of this| case. V. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion in the amount of legal fees awarded? The trial judge awarded 100% of the attorneys’ fees requested. This is particularly] disturbing in light of the fact that the judge himself denied Mr. Chamberlain’s request for a stay on the June 5, 2014 Consent Order during the pendency of the appeal. Having, denied this stay, Mr. Chamberlain subsequently faced contempt charges for his inability to comply with the terms of the order he was challenging in the appellate court. The trial judge also denied Mr. Chamberlain’s motion requesting more than a 30 minute hearing t present a defense to the contempt charges. As soon as the 30 minute hearing commenced the following month, the Court immediately determined there was insufficient time. This resulted in the entire hearing needing to be rescheduled. After a significant amount o time spent in the courthouse that day, the Court determined a three hour hearing wa: appropriate and rescheduled the contempt hearing for the following month. The tril judge subsequently elected to combine a recusal hearing with the previously schedule 28contempt hearing, again depriving Mr. Chamberlain of the time the Court had just determined was necessary to ensure he was afforded due process and time to present his defense. This action, and the tri judge’s subsequent failure to rule on a motion to} bifurcate the recusal hearing from the contempt hearing, directly resulted in the need for! third hearing to be scheduled in order to conclude the contempt defense. The transcript of the hearings show Mr, Chamberlain provided a cogent and well cited legal defense which was interrupted numerous times by the trial judge, thereby’ causing significant delays in the presentation of that defense. A substantial portion of the! award of attomeys’ fees awarded was not related to the contempt matter, but rather to the} recusal proceedings. The recusal hearing was scheduled by the trial judge and was) concluded with no mention of Mr. Chamberlain being sanctioned for providing evidence! and testimony regarding that matter. Lastly, as the judge himself was largely responsible} for the parties having to participate in three separate contempt hearings, there is n justification for 100% of the requested fees as a sanction for contempt. This award wa: clearly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. VI. Did the Circuit Court err when it set the amount necessary for the defendant to purge himself from the contempt charges? ‘The law regarding constructive civil contempt and the setting of purges is well settled in Maryland: Ifa contempt is civil, the sanction is coercive, that is, it is designed to remedy contemptuous act or omission, by prompting conduct on the part of the contemnor. and must allow for purging. State v, Roll, 267 Md. 714, 728, 298 A.2d 867 (1973). ‘A“provision for purging” or the “opportunity for purging” relates to affording th defendant “the chance to rid him or herself of guilt and thus clear himself of thé charge.” Herd v. State, 37 Md.App. 362, 365, 377 A.2d 574, 576 (1977). [P]resent inability to comply with the court order or the purging provision is traditionally a defense in a constructive civil contempt case. Jones v. State, 35 Md. 264, 276, 718 A.2d 222, 228 (1998). 29present ability to comply with either the Consent Order or the purge amount. The recor: reflects substantial testimony indicating an inability to comply with the original order, as well as an inability to meet the purge amount set by the Court. Disturbingly, the record reflects the trial judge having made his “finding” of an ability to pay without reference any financial evidence whatsoever. In fact, when Mr. Chamberlain attempted to provide financial evidence of his inability to comply, the trial judge refused to consider it. solely on the testimony provided. The testimony is substantial. It itemized annual mandatory expenses of over $78,000 in permanent alimony and contractual support [AJny party judged to be a civil contemnor must be afforded the opportunity to show a present inability to purge the contempt. Jones v State, 342 Md. at 523, 677 A.2d at 591 (1998). Normally in a constructive civil contempt action there cannot even be a finding or| adjudication that the defendant is in contempt unless the defendant has the present] ability to comply with the earlier court order or with the purging provision. Ort v. Frederick County, 345 Md. at 689, 694 A.2d at 105 (1997); Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. at 520-529, 677 A.2d at 589-594 (1996). In all civil contempt proceedings, any order imposing a penalty upon the defendant must contain a purging provision with which the defendant has the ability to comply. Moreover, the issue is not the ability to pay at the time the payments were originally ordered; instead, the issue is his present ability to pay. Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374, 435 A.2d 445, 447-448 (1981). Indeed, a finding of contempt, where there is no possibility of enforcing! compliance with the court order to which it relates, simply labels the defendant al contemnor and imputes guilt to him or her. That is a form of punishment. Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 677, A.2d 584 (1996). Where the order calls for the payment of money, the defendant is entitled to the| "opportunity to show that he [or she] had neither the estate nor the ability to pay) his [or her] obligation." Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Md. at 420, 216 A.2d at 917 (1966). There is absolutely no evidence in this case to conclude that the respondent had a With the offer of providing financial evidence being denied, the trial judge relic« 30payments for Mr. Chamberlain’s adult son, $4,000 in contractual payments for student loans, more than $23,000 in minimum payments on debt owed due to the divorce, as well] as more than $50,000 paid in taxes. (E-363). The testimony also identified Mr. Chamberlain as a head of household, married, and the father of a three year old son, (£-365). The trial judge was aware Mr. Chamberlain’s mandatory expenses were extensive and acknowledged that he understood there were other additional expenses as} well. (E-458). With this knowledge, however, the trial judge based his determination Mr. Chamberlain had the ability to purge himself because he had an “income over $100,000": The Court: You make - - you're an airline pilot, correct? You're currently employed? Mr. Chamberlain: It doesn’t matter if I - - The Court: You make - - Mr. Chamberlain: Yes, Your Honor. I am. income over $100,00; am I correct? The Court: Mr. Chamberlain: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: Okay. So where is the inability to pay? You testified you have other expenses. I understand that. (E-458) Although labeled a constructive civil contempt action, this effort was purel an attempt to use the Court to enforce an agreement between two parties rather than sug for breach of contract. Having denied Mr. Chamberlain an opportunity to submit financial evidence to prove his inability to comply with the original order or purge himself, thd Court could only make its “finding” of an ability to pay or purge on the testimony provided. That testimony demonstrably showed that Mr. Chamberlain's financial situation did not afford him the ability to comply with the order or purge himself of th contempt. The Court’s “finding” to the contrary, was arbitrary, demonstrated th previously identified bias of the trial judge, and was an error of law. 31VII. Did the Circuit Court err when it denied the stays of judgment? Maryland Appellate Courts in the past have spoken of the necessity of a| supersedeas bond in order to obtain a stay of proceedings. See Eakle v. Smith, 24 Md. 339} (1865); Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251 (1875); Middendorf v. Baltimore Refrigerating| and Heating Co., 117 Md. 17, 82 A. 1047 (1911); Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A, 2d 253 (1942); and more recently, Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 21 Md. App. 621, 320 A.2d| 585 (1974); Creative Dev, Corp. v. Calhoun, 34 Md. 279, 367 A.2d 566 (1976). Over the| years, however, this often collided with the “necessity” of granting stays without the’ posting of a bond, under certain circumstances, because justice demanded it. ‘The shift in the Court’s thinking about the requirement of po ing a supersedeas| bond was articulated by the Court of Appeals in O'Donnell v. McGann, 310 Md. 342, 345, 529 A.2d 372 (1987). Here, the Court explicitly retreated from the previous) unwavering requirement to post a supersedeas bond: We hold that the inherent power of trial and appellate courts to fix the terms and conditions for the stay of execution of judgments has not been! circumscribed by rule or statute so as to limit the discretion of the court to modify the penalty of a supersedeas bond required for the stay of execution of a money judgment. (emphasis added). ‘This Court followed that guidance, and as recently as 2006, pointed directly to the} statutes, namely, Maryland Rule 2-632 and 8-422, stating “the court had discretion t determine whether a supersedeas bond was necessary.” 8621 LTD. v. LDG, Ine., 169 Md. App. 214, 900 A.2d 259, 169 (2006). The final provision of Maryland Rule 2-632 reaffirms the Appellate Court’s inherent power: (g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions of this Rule do not limit any power of an appellate court to stay proceedings during the pendency of an, appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during th pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the statu quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. Maryland Rule 8-422 provides that “generally” an appellant may: 32“stay the enforcement of any other civil judgment from which an appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the lower court a supersedeas bond under Rule 8-423, alternative security as prescribed by Rule 1-402 (e), or other security as provided in Rule 8-424, The bond or other security may be filed at any time before satisfaction of the judgment, but enforcement shall be stayed only from the time| the security is filed.” However, provision (c) of the same rule clearly specifi that the Appellate Court has wide latitude to provide appropriate relief to this general stipulation: (©) Review of lower court action by the Court of Special Appeals. After an appeal has been filed, on motion of a party who has first sought relief in the lower court, the Court of Special Appeals, with or without a hearing, may (1) deny| the motion; (2) increase, decrease, or fix the amount of the supersedeas or criminal appeal bond; (3) enter an order as to the surety or security on the| bond, other security, or the conditions of the stay; or (4) enter an order| directing further proceedings in the lower court, (italics and underline added). No fair-minded jurist could disagree that once Mr. Chamberlain had posted al supersedeas bond in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-632 to stay the enforcement of the! attorneys’ fees, the Circuit Court had little, if any, justification for denying that stay. Furthermore, no fair-minded jurist could disagree that if the trial judge set a purge, in the face of substantial evidence the “contemnor” could not purge himself, it would be an absurd proposition to expect a supersedeas bond could be posted in an even greater amount. Yet both the Circuit Court and this Court denied, without explanation, relief from| the judgments under appeal. While the posting of a bond must be approved by the Court, the Circuit Court’ denial of the stay on the judgment for attorneys’ fees was an abuse of discretion. Th record also shows Mr. Chamberlain provided a substantial, detailed, and plausibl description of his financial inability to comply with both the Consent Order terms and thi sanctions, and it was incumbent upon the trial judge to accept the financial documents Mr. Chamberlain offered to corroborate his testimony. The trial judge’s refusal to do si 33was an abuse of discretion, as was his denial of the stay on the $14,000.00 sanction for which Mr. Chamberlain had a financial inability to post a supersedeas bond. ‘The record in this case provides unassailable evidence there was judicial disregard for the proper setting of the purge amount. ‘This was a clear error of law. Having refrained] from providing any basis for a rejection of the stays under the extraordinary] circumstances of this case, and as none can be fathomed by any reasonable person reviewing the record, denying the requested relief was clearly not reasonable and an| abuse of discretion. Conclu: There is an old adage that should guide this Court at times such as this: the State} wins when justice prevails. In this case, correcting the errors of the lower Court does not| open a house cell, does not financially harm the Appellee, but rather preserves the} status quo. The public’s confidence in the law is undermined if there is judicial disregard for adherence to settled law. That judicial disregard is inherent in the actions of the! Circuit Court under review. The law is clear, ‘The evidence is clear. What justice requires is clear. For the above reasons, based on the evidence and supported by the stated) authorities, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court: a. Find the trial judge was required to recuse himself, or in the alternative, that he abused his discretion by not voluntarily recusing himself. b. Find the Circuit Court’s use of its contempt powers in this case was an error of law. c. Find the evidence did not support the Circuit Court’s finding of contempt. d. Find the Circuit Court erred in the setting of the purge for contempt. ¢. Find the Circuit Court denied Mr. Chamberlain’s due process right to be heard on thi issue of attorneys’ fees. f. Find the Circuit Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees. 34g, Find the award of 100% of the attorneys’ fees requested was an abuse of discretion. h. Find the Circuit Court erred by denying the Motion Requesting Stay of February 5, 2015 Award of Counsel Fees. i, Find the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying the Motion Requesting Stay of February 5, 2015 Contempt Sanctions. Affidavit T do solemnly swear and affirm under the penalties of perjury that the matters and facts set forth in this brief are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Respectfully submitted, emo aoa Stephen D. Chamberlain, Appellant STATEMENT PURSUANT TO MD. RULE 8-504 (a) (9) Thereby certify that the foregoing Brief was prepared with proportional type with 1.5 spacing and Times New Roman font size 13. Secon 60 Stephen D. Chamberlain Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of August, 2015, two copies of this Appellant’s Brief, and accompanying Record Extract, was FEDEX’ed to Samuel J, Brown, Esquire, and Marietta Warren, Esquire, and M. Evelyn Spurgin, Esquire, 221 Duke of Gloucester Street, Annapolis MD, 21401, Attorneys for Plaintiff: Sern0q Stephen D. Chamberlain 35APPENDIX TEXT OF CITED STATUTES, RULES and ANNOTATIONS MARYLAND CONSTITUTION, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ARTICLE 24 Due process ‘That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or [dis-seized] of his frechold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land, U.S. CONSTITUTION, FOURTEE! (TH AMENDMENT Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 18 U.S.C. § 401 ‘Acourt of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as— (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.42. U.S.C. § 1983 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. Maryland Rule 1-341 BAD FAITH - UNJUSTIFIED PROCEEDINGS (a) Remedial Authority of Court. In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification, the court, on motion by an adverse party, may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses. including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing ‘Amemorandum in support of a motion filed for an award of costs and expenses shall comply with Rule 2-433 (e). In deciding a motion under this Rule, the court may consider the Guidelines Regarding Compensable and Non-compensable Attorneys’ Fees and Related Expenses contained in the Appendix to these Rules. (b) Statement Regarding Costs and Expenses, Including Attorneys' Fees. (1) Generally. A motion requesting an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, shall include or be separately supported by a verified statement that sets forth the information required in subsections (b)(2) or (b)(3) of this Rule, as applicable. (2) Costs and Expenses Other than Attorneys’ Fees. The statement in support of a request for costs and expenses other than attorneys! fees shall itemize the type and amount of the costs and expenses requested and shall include any available documentation of those costs and expenses. (3) Attorneys’ Fees.(A) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b)(3)(B) of this Rule or by order of court, the statement in support of a request for attorneys’ fees shall set forth: (i) a detailed description of the work performed, broken down by hours or fractions thereof expended on each task; (ii) the amount or rate charged or agreed to in writing by the requesting party and the attorney; (iii) the attorney's customary fee for similar legal services: (iv) the customary fee prevailing in the attorney's legal community for similar legal services; (¥) the fee customarily charged for similar legal services in the county where the action is pending; and (vi) any additional relevant factors that the requesting party wishes to bring to the court's attention. (B) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a statement in support ofa request for attorneys’ fees not exceeding $ 500 need not contain the information set forth in subsection (6)(3)(A)(iv) and (v) of this Rule. (c) Response. Within 15 days after the filing of the statement, the offending party may file a response. (4) Guidelines. In determining an award of attomeys' fees and related expenses in excess of $ 500 under this Rule, the court may consider the Guidelines Regarding Compensable and Non-Compensable Attorneys’ Fees and Related Expenses contained in an Appendix to these Rules. Maryland Rule 2-324 PRESERVATION OF CERTAIN DEFENSES Subject matter jurisdiction. Whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction o the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. MWMaryland Rule 2-632 STAY OF ENFORCEMENT (a) Stay of interlocutory order. On motion of a party the court may stay the operation or enforcement of an interlocutory order on whatever conditions the court considers proper for the security of the adverse party. The motion shall be accompanied by the moving party's written statement of intention to seek review of the order on appeal from the judgment entered in the action. (b) Automatic stay of judgment. Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, enforcement of a money judgment is automatically stayed until the expiration of ten days after its entry. Cross references. -- For the definition of "money judgment,” see Rule 1-202. (©) Discretionary stay of judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay enforcement of a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial filed pursuant to Rule 2-533, a motion to alter or amend a judgment filed pursuant to Rule 2-534, a motion to revise a judgment filed pursuant to Rule 2-535, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed pursuant to Rule 2-532. (@) Multiple claims, When a court has entered a final judgment under the conditions stated in Rule 2-602, the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit of the judgment to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered. (c) Pending appeal. Except as provided in this section and in section (f) of this, Rule, a stay pending appeal is governed by Rules 8-422 through 8-424. If the court determines that because of the nature of the action enforcement of the judgment should not be stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond or other security, it may center an order denying a stay or permitting a stay only on the terms stated in the order. (£) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an order or a judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the adverse party. Further procedure in the appellate court is governed by Rule 8-425.(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions of this Rule do not limit any power of an appellate court to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered, Maryland Rule 8-422 STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT (a) Civil proceedings. (1) Generally. Stay of an order granting an injunction is governed by Rules 2-632 and 8-425. Except as otherwise provided in the Code or Rule 2-632, an appellant may stay the enforcement of any other civil judgment from which an appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the lower court a supersedeas bond under Rule 8-423, alternative security as prescribed by Rule 1-402 (e), or other security as provided in Rule 8-424, The bond or other security may be filed at any time before satisfaction of the judgment, but enforcement shall be stayed only from the time the security is filed. Cross references. -- For provisions permitting a stay without the filing of a bond, see Code, Family Law Article, § 5-518 and Courts Article, § 12-701 (a) (1). For provisions limiting the extent of the stay upon the filing of a bond, see Code, Article 2B, § 16-101; Courts Article, § 12-701 (a) (2); Insurance Article § 2-215 (j) (2); and Tax - Property Article, § 14-514. For general provisions governing bonds filed in civil actions, sce Title 1, Chapter 400 of these Rules. (2) When security filed after partial execution, If a supersedeas bond or other security is filed after partial execution on the judgment, the clerk of the lower court shall issue a writ directing the sheriff who has possession of any property attached to stay further proceedings and surrender the property upon payment of all accrued costs of the execution. (3) Death of appellant. A bond or other security filed shall not be voided by the death of the appellant pending the appeal. (b) Criminal proceedings. Stay of enforcement of a judgment in a criminal proceeding is governed by Rule 4-349. Cross references. -- For provisions permitting a stay without the filing of a bond, see Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 7-109.(c) Review of lower court action by the Court of Special Appeals. After an appeal has been filed, on motion of a party who has first sought relief in the lower court, the Court of Special Appeals, with or without a hearing, may (1) deny the motion; (2) increase, decrease, or fix the amount of the supersedeas or criminal appeal bond; (3) enter an order as to the surety or security on the bond, other security, or the conditions of the stay; or (4) enter an order directing further proceedings in the lower court. (d) Continuation in Court of Appeals of previously filed security. A bond or other security previously filed to stay enforcement of a judgment of the lower court shall continue in effect pending review of the case by the Court of Appeals. On motion, the Court of Appeals, with or without a hearing, may take such action as may be appropriate, including increasing or decreasing the amount of the bond, any security on the bond, or any other security. Md. Rule 16-813 MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11 Disqualification A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including the following circumstances: The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person: is a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or is likely to be a ‘material witness in the proceeding. ‘The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or any of the following persons has a significant financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding: (c) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (a) (1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, withou participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding. vw[1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (a) (1) through (5) apply. In this Rule, "disqualification" has the same meaning as "recusal." {2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed. Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409. DISCRETIONARY RELIEF (a) In general. -- Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a court may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and if: (1) An actual controversy exists between contending parties; (2) Antagonistic claims are present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation; or (3) A party asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege and this is challenged or denied by an adversary party, who also has or asserts a conerete interest in it (b) Special form of remedy provided by statute. -- Ifa statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle. (©) Concurrent remedies not bar for declaratory relief. - A party may obtain a declaratory judgment or decree notwithstanding a concurrent common-law, equitable, or extraordinary legal remedy, whether or not recognized or regulated by statute. (@) Exception as to divorce or annulment of marriage. -- Proceeding by declaratory| judgment is not permitted in any case in which divorce or annulment of marriage is sought. (© Speedy hearing. -- A court may order a speedy hearing of an action of a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar. vilMaryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act § 3-403 Jurisdiction (a) In general. - Except for the District Court, a court of record within its jurisdiction may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. An action or proceeding is not open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. (b) Enumeration not exclusive. -- The enumeration in §§ 3-406, 3-407, 3-408, and 3-408.1 of this subtitle does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in subsection (a) of this section in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought and in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. vil