ELECTION LAW

CASE DIGEST
(Batch 1)
Montejo vs Comelec
G.R. NO. 118702, March 16, 1995

Facts:
The petitioner here, Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads
for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte,
on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.The province of Leyte with
the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San
Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. By virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959,
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince. Said section spelled out the
municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba,
Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a
regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd
district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district
to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

Respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of

the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed
resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and
the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:
Whether or not the Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 promulgated by COMELEC is valid or
not (transfer of municipalities from one legislative district to another).

Held:

Yes. The court found that Sec. 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC
was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding
the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to
the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as
the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has
so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in
the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the
territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

Sema vs Comelec
Citation: G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Facts:

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending
ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections,
COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA
201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a
legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be
a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended
that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the
legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative
district is not affected and so is its representation.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.

Held:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create
Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and
that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that
in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the
other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts
is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
Bagabuyo vs Comelec

Facts:

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was
passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the
validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC
from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2 district was
nd

created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit.

Held:

The local government units are political andcorporateunits.As a political subdivision, a

local government unit is an instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government.
As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as anagency of the community in the
administration of local affairsand the mediums through which the people act in their corporate
capacity on local concerns.In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the
consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries
of local government units through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or

reapportionment and the division of a local government unit.Historically and by its intrinsic nature,
a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local
government unit where the apportionment takes place.Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies
to the division of a province, city, municipality orbarangayunder the Local Government Code
should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.

Macalintal vs Comelec
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Facts:
A case was filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking to
declare that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must
be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi
vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.

The Solicitor General filed an answer citing Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives wherein the Court held that the term "residence" has been understood to be
synonymous with "domicile" under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have
only one "domicile" but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other
temporary; and that the definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to
absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC which reiterates the Courts ruling in
Faypon vs. Quirino, the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent
residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution?

Held:
The court ruled in negative.
The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit
required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to
go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that
the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
"provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent
residence in another country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for
as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Mastura vs Comelec
225 SCRA 493

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first
district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen
objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground
that the same was allegedly tampered. Upon examination, the COMELEC found that, indeed, such
Certificate of Canvass had been tampered with. Consequently, issued a resolution ordering its
annulment and creating a new set of Municipal and Provincial Boards of Canvassers to recanvass
the votes. The petitioner argued that the resolution was issued precipitately and prematurely
considering that some other documents which he considered necessary for the resolution of the
issue was yet to be produced and examined. He filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Implementation of
the resolution but this was denied. After the recanvassing, Dilangalen emerged as the winner and
was thereafter proclaimed.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in annulling the Certificate of Canvass and creating new set of canvassers.

Held:

It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its
inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the
disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered
with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene
and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the
members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings
should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment
of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control
over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers.
Domino vs Comelec
G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts:
The case is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the
Resolution of 6 May 1998[1] of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter
COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for
representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs
motion for reconsideration.

On 25 March 1998, petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in that he
had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.

On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy against Domino.

According to respondents, Domino is not a resident nor a registered voter of the province of
Sarangani.

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack
of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet
become final and executory.

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.

On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6
May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998.

Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.

The candidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the case and said that
she should be declared as a winner since Domino was disqualified from running for the position.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
the petitioner.

2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 1998 election

Held:

1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false representations as to the
material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy including the residence requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed
place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The
petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24
Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by
leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The
lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however,
it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his
original domicile.
Japzon vs Comelec
G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009

Facts:
Both Japzon and TY were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. Ty acquired the highest
number of votes and was declared Mayor.

A petition was filed by the petitioner, Japzon before the COMELEC to disqualify and/or to
cancel Tys (respondent) Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation that
he was a resident of Samar for one year before the day of the elections.

Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, eventually
migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty may have applied
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, but he never actually resided in Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the
date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160. Japzon argues that when Ty
became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin. Ty did not establish his
residence in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.

Issue:

Whether or not Ty (private respondent) has complied with the one -year residency
requirement for elective positions.

Held:
Yes.
Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the
14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in
which he garnered the most number of votes.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship,
and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute
would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino
taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.

 Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax
jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections.

Japzon maintains that Tys trips abroad indicate that Ty had no intention to permanently
reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC First
Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty
did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said
trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.There is no basis for
this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could
be considered a resident thereof. The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty
was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at
least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections.

Lewis vs Comelec
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

Facts:
A petition filed by Lewis et al, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that
they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A 9225, be allowed to
avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (RA
9189). They sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter, to become eligible to
vote in future elections.

However, Comelec denied their petition, stating that they have yet no right to vote in such elections
owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. Although
R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those
who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the
reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired
their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they
are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others
under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

Held:

Yes.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently
expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the
strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of
that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise
the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
Caballero vs Comelec
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

Facts:
The petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero, and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr., the respondent
were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes
in the May 13, 2013 elections. The private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy claiming that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes. However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3,
2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Furthermore, he asserted that he did not lose his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen.

That On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the Certificate
of Candidacy of respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes, on May 14, 2013. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc but the same was denied. Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private respondent took his Oath of Office on
December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
Held:
The court ruled in negative. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner
Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not persuaded. It is true that the
petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Nevertheless, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. It is settled ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. In the case at bar, the petitioner permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he had in effect
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
More so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as
required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 , declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of the law.
 However, it does not mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The petitioner's
retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain
his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.

Atienza vs Comelec
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

Facts:
Drilon, president of the Liberal Party, announced his partys withdrawal of support for the
administration of Arroyo. On March 2, 2006 Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly
discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare
all positions in the LP's ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. He claimed that it
was illegal since the party's electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the
National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that
under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was
yet to end on November 30, 2007. Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and
NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion
could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed Drilon as president by direct
action. Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP Constitution giving LP officers a
fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other
officers already ended on July 24, 2006. Comelec annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and
ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. The election of Atienza and
the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with LP
Constitution. But, since the amendments to the LP Constitution had not been properly ratified,
Drilon's term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a
holdover capacity until new officers were elected. Subsequently, LP held a NECO meeting to elect
new party leaders before respondent Drilon's term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87
who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. That meeting installed respondent Manuel A.
Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.Eventually, LP deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-
Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.
This was pursuant to NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain
NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership
when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from
the roster of LP members. Atienza and others assailed the resolution before Comelec, but Comelec
denied their petition. Comelec observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary
action within the political party. It was an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve

Issue:
1. Whether or not Comelec can intervene in the election of LPs president Roxas
 2. Whether or not Comelec can intervene in LPs disciplinary action of Atienza and others
Held:

1. Yes. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. In Kalaw v. Commission on Elections, the COMELECs powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The
COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of
the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties. The validity of Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the
issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective
positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates
of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president
who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

2. No. The key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of Atienza and others.
from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected Roxas as LP
president. Given the COMELEC's finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of
the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers
that the NECO held. Atienza claimed that the majority of LP members belong to their
faction, but they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could
possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party
leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO
members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no
quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally
unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts
on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it
was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances,
the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.'s expulsion was purely a membership issue that
had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction.
Banat vs Comelec
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before
the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution
of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided
by the Constitution. Petition of BANAT was denied for being moot and academic. National
and Local Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning
party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution

Issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating
in the party-list elections?
Held:

1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives

cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. Yes, it is
constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.

2. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votesis
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of
 the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. In computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives

3. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of

R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.

First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats.

Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all
available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

4. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put
the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections. Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation
to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Atongpaglaum vs Comelec
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Facts:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a
petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.

Held:
No. The COMELEC did not commit an error since it merely followed the guidelines set in
the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases
back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases..

In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT
case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and
that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should
be reserved for the marginalized sectors.) The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire
the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to

include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-
defined political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.
Llamanzares vs Comelec

Facts:
Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was
adopted by Fernando Poe and Susan Roces. She eventually went abroad to study. She came back to
the Philippines, and married her husband. Then they went back to the Philippines. She became a
U.S. citizen. But, because of her FPJs death, she came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.
She ran for senator in the 2013 elections and won with the highest number of votes. Now, she
wanted to run for the presidency. But a number of individuals questioned her eligibility.

Issue:
Whether or not Poe satisfy the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes.
The following are the requisites to acquire a new domicile:
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. an intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Poe offered
voluminous evidence showing her satisfaction of the requisites; She arrived here on 24 May 2005.
Every time she travelled abroad she would always return to the Philippines. She e-mailed, starting
in March 2005 to September 2006, a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines. She e-mailed the Philippine Bureau of
Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines. She had school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years. She
had tax identification card issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy
where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family
stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed
behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home). The foregoing evidence
were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC.