3/25/2017 CostaRicasChallenge:MaintainingInternalSecuritywithoutanArmy|InstituteforDefenceStudiesandAnalyses

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CostaRicasChallenge:MaintainingInternalSecuritywithoutan
TWITTER Army
Managingthe3MsofMilitary
Readiness
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Sanjay Badri-Maharaj OptimisingStressinSub
March 23, 2017 ConventionalWarfare

On 1st December 1948, Costa Rica (pop. 4.5 million), under the leadership of TheHumanElementin

President Jos Figueres Ferrer, abolished the Costa Rican army.1 Figueres, leader MilitaryEffectiveness:A
SystemsApproach
of the Social Democratic party had emerged victorious in a 44-day civil war
during which time his forces based in part around the 700 strong Caribbean EnhancingSoldiers

Legion defeated Communist guerillas and the Costa Rican army and established CapabilityforCounter
InsurgencyOperations
an 18-month old provisional junta known as the Junta Fundadora (Founding
Junta). This junta enacted a series of far reaching reforms to Costa Ricas social
and political structure before voluntarily demitting office (paving the way for
democratic elections).
One of the most far reaching reforms was the abolition of the army which was
later enshrined in Article 12 of the Costa Rican Constitution which states:2
The Army as a permanent institution is proscribed.

For the vigilance and conservation of the public order, there will be the
necessary forces of police.
TheArthasastraina
Military forces may only be organized by a continental agreement or TransculturalPerspective:
for the national defense; one and the other will always be subordinate ComparingKautilyawith
SunZi,NizamalMulk,
to the civil power: they may not deliberate, or make manifestations or BaraniandMachiavelli
declarations in an individual or collective form.

This single step, never altered by successive governments, has ensured that Costa
Rica, unique among the countries of Central America, has never been plagued by
the bane of civilian or military dictatorships in its political history post-1948 and
has been viewed as having established strong democratic and constitutional
credentials supported by independent institutions.3 Through the darkest days of
the Cold War when guerilla movements, insurgencies and death-squads plagued
many of its neighbours, Costa Rica remained a bastion of stable democratic
governance that served as a peacemaker and mediator with its neighbours. FiftyYearsoftheOuter
SpaceTreaty:Tracingthe
Journey
Yet Costa Rica is far from immune to the security challenges that plague South
and Central America. The country has become a major hub for transnational
crime and drug cartels, moving away from merely being a transit point to
becoming a storage and collection point for Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.
Colombian cartels ship drugs to Costa Rica where they are stored and then
retrieved by such groups as the Mexican Sinaloa cartel.4 With rival Mexican cartels
sensing opportunities in a country which lacks an army or a large cadre of
paramilitary police and which is mindful about the rights of its citizens, the
courts and security establishment of Costa Rica are facing an unprecedented
challenge.5
It should be noted that while Costa Rica faces no serious threat of external
aggression, it does have a border dispute with its northern neighbour Nicaragua.
Nicaraguan troops have established a camp on Portillos Island which was deemed
to be within Costa Rican territory by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a
ruling issued on 16th December 2015.6 The new incursion led to Costa Rica
approaching the ICJ with a fresh complaint in January 2017.7 However, even this
apparent territorial violation has sparked no moves in Costa Rica to develop any
sort of viable military capability. This is in perhaps in recognition of the fact that
the country would always be overwhelmingly outmatched by the large and well-
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equipped Nicaraguan army but is perhaps more a reflection of Costa Ricas view
that this dispute is one which should be settled through the arbitration
mechanisms of the ICJ.
Costa Ricas Southern border with Panama is free from such disputes but the
peaceful relationship between the two countries as well as a border that has little
by way of demarcation has made this frontier a major route for narcotics and
human trafficking.8 The thinly spread Policia de Fronteras are unable to do much
more than token patrols along this frontier with a free flow of people legal and
illegal being nearly impossible to halt.
With no tangible external threat, it is understandable that Costa Rica has felt no
need to break with its antipathy towards military forces. What is puzzling is the
decision not to develop paramilitary police forces to deal with the scourge of
narcotics trafficking and the epidemic of violence that inevitably follows. Costa
Ricas decision not to adopt this approach was a conscious one and done with
due regard to the countrys concern to preserve the civilian identity of its police
force. Indeed, a decree by then President Oscar Arias in 2008 to allow the police
to carry automatic weapons was nullified by the courts.9 Costa Rica is therefore
unique among its neighbours in having neither an army nor a fully militarised
police force.
Since the abolition of the army in 1948, the closest Costa Rica came to
reestablishing any form of military force was during the 1980s when, in response
to the turmoil in neighbouring Nicaragua, the then Civil Guard provided the
nucleus for two USSF-trained border rapid reaction battalions (Relampago, and
Binicio Battalions). 10 These two Rapid Intervention Infantry Battalions were
followed by a third (Batalln Frontera Sur).11 The Costa Rican Guardia Civil had
some M113 APCs, 1 UR-416 APC and 2 M3A1 armoured cars but these have not
been seen in use for close to three decades.12 Old 20mm anti-aircraft guns that
were briefly deployed to counter aerial incursions by the Sandinista regimes air
force have long been discarded. In the aftermath of the Nicaraguan conflict
(which ended in 1990), Costa Rica began a major overhaul of its Guardia Civil and
the resulting formation continues to shoulder the security burden of that
country.
In 1996, the Costa Rican Fuerzas Publica (FP - Public Force) was formed under the
Ministerio de Seguridad Publica (MSP). The FP has grown into a force that
combines police, coast-guard, air surveillance and quasi-military functions. With
a strength of some 12,600, the FP has incorporated the old Civil Guard, the Rural
Guard and the two border security battalions.13 The FP principally functions as a
police force and within the region, it enjoys a good reputation for professionalism
and while not immune from corruption, is noticeably less so than its counterparts
in the rest of Central America.14 The general human-rights environment in Costa
Rica is much better than anywhere else in Central America and despite some
lapses, the FP is not viewed as a predatory force by the Costa Rican population
Nonetheless, the FP suffers from chronic shortages of equipment and despite
strenuous efforts to improve and sustain training, the FP is still under-
resourced.15 It is noteworthy that the FP is roughly as large as the Mauritius
Police Force which is responsible for a population three-times smaller than Costa
Ricas.
Military capabilities of a very modest degree are retained by the successors of the
two border security battalions which are now constituted into the Policia de
Fronteras which comprises seven border security companies distributed between
the Southern and Northern Commands.16 While usually clad in variations on
police apparel, the Policia de Fronteras have been known to don military-style
camouflage and carry assault rifles and machine guns while being supported by a
limited number of 60mm and 81mm mortars. While the Policia de Fronteras has a
small but effective riverine force, it lacks organic air support.
The Policia de Fronteras also has control of Costa Ricas small air and naval
components. The latter, termed the Servicio de Vigilancia Area (SVA Air
Vigilance Service) has 13 light liaison-cum-transport aircraft and two helicopters.
Some of the aircraft were seized from narcotics traffickers and while useful
assets, none of the SVAs aircraft have specialized surveillance equipment.17 The
shortage of helicopters is an acute problem given the inaccessibility of some

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parts of the country and the potential need for rapid deployment of forces to
such regions.
The Costa Rican Servicio Nacional de Guardacosta (SNG National Coastguard
Service) comprises 10 obsolete patrol boats, the most capable of which are 3 82-
foot Point-class cutters.18 This modest force will receive a significant boost in
capability when two Island-class 110-foot vessels are transferred from the United
States in 2017.19 While the larger vessels of the SNG can be armed with 0.50-cal
M2HB heavy machine guns and/or 20mm Mk68 Oerlikon cannon, it was revealed
in 1995 that none of the personnel assigned to the vessels knew how to operate
the weapons. It is not known whether this situation has changed.20
Augmenting these units are two elite police special operations units - Comisaria
9 - Unidad de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Unit), and Comisaria 5
- Unidad Tactica de Policia (Police Tactical Unit). The former is largely American
trained while the latter has close training ties to the Chilean Carabineros.21 These
units are akin to elite riot control and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams
and provide support to the FP constabulary units which, while armed, do not
normally carry automatic weapons.
Outside the MSP and under the control of the countrys Departamento de
Inteligencia y Seguridad (DIS - Department of Intelligence and Security) is Costa
Ricas elite Unidad Especial de Intervencin (UEI - Special Intervention Unit) which
is a company-sized commando unit with a high standard of training and
equipment.22 Despite its militarised nature, the Costa Rican government seeks to
downplay its capability and insists it is a police rather than a military unit.23 Yet
the UEI has an excellent regional reputation and is one of the regions finest
special forces units and exercises regularly with their Central and North American
counterparts where it has consistently proven to be a capable outfit.
As has been noted, Costa Rica is facing a major challenge from violent
transnational organised crime largely linked to the trade in illegal narcotics.
Though the country registered a decline in homicides between 2010 (527) and
2012 (407), by 2014 that figure had increased to 471.24 This prompted calls for
the establishment of a dedicated unit to combat organized crime but to date this
has been limited to the 50 strong Policia de Control de Drogas. This unit relies
heavily on support from other units in particular the Policia de Fronteras and
the SNG to deal with the dual threat of Colombian and Mexican cartels using
Costa Rica as a transit, storage, collection and trans-shipment point.
In recognition of these challenges, Costa Rica boosted its security budget by 123%
between 2006 and 2012.25 However, unlike its neighbours, Costa Rica declined to
deploy its elite and/or militarised police units in anything more than a
supporting role with the FP constabulary bearing the brunt of the fight against
organised crime. This has been accompanied by aggressive social programs in
local municipalities aimed at conflict resolution and providing training and
employment opportunities.26 Whether this enlightened approach will produce the
desired results is as yet an open question but what is not in doubt is that Costa
Rica is intent on maintaining a demilitarised approach to internal security
challenges, maintaining at all times the countrys reputation of being a stable and
democratic country with an enviable reputation for the protection of the human
rights of its nationals.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
IDSA or of the Government of India.

1. Abolicin del Ejrcito Guias Costa Rica at http://guiascostarica.info/acontecimientos/abolicion-del-

ejercito/ (Accessed 22nd February 2017)
2. Costa Rica 1949 (rev. 2011) Constitute Project (English Translation of Costa Rican Constitution) at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011?lang=en#38 (Accessed 22nd
February 2017)
3. Costa Ricas Democracy a Role Model for Central America Democracy Chronicles at
https://democracychronicles.com/costa-ricas-democracy/ (Accessed 22nd February 2017)
4. D. Marin, Costa Rica Becomes Hub of Drug Cartels Latin America Herald Tribune at
http://laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=349013&CategoryId=23558 (Accessed 22nd February 2017)
5. N. Miroff, Costa Rica struggles to maintain its 'pure life' as drug cartels move insocia The Sydney
Morning Herald, 31st December 2011 http://www.smh.com.au/world/costa-rica-struggles-to-
maintain-its-pure-life-as-drug-cartels-move-in-20111230-1pfju.html (Accessed 22nd February
2017)
6. L. Arias,The Hague Court: Territory disputed with Nicaragua belongs to Costa Rica Tico Times 16th
December 2015 at http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/12/16/hague-court-calero-island-belongs-costa-

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rica (Accessed 22nd February 2017)
7. L. Arias, Costa Rica sues Nicaragua over military camp near border Tico Times 16th January 2017 at
http://www.ticotimes.net/2017/01/16/costa-rica-border-dispute-hague (Accessed 22nd February
2017)
8. Z. Dyer, On patrol with the Costa Rican Border Police Tico Times 27th June 2016 at
http://www.ticotimes.net/2016/06/27/costa-rica-border-police (Accessed 22nd February 2017)
9. E. Fieser, Costa Rica doubles down on security Christian Science Monitor, 8th February 2014 at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2014/0208/Costa-Rica-doubles-down-on-security
(Accessed 22nd February 2017)
10. C. Caballero Jurado & N. Thomas Central American Wars: 1959-1989(London, Osprey: 1990), p.33
11. J. A. Montes Small Arms of the Costa Rican Paradise Small Arms Review at
http://www.smallarmsreview.com/display.article.cfm?idarticles=2814 (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
12. A. English, Regional Defence Profile: Latin America (London, Janes: 1988), p. 116
13. Fuerza Publica Ministerio de Seguridad Publica at
http://www.seguridadpublica.go.cr/direccion/fuerza_publica/ (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
14. Costa Rica Country Profile, The International Security Sector Advisory Team at the Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces updated 2nd February 2015 at
http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Costa-Rica-Country-Profile (Accessed
23rd February 2017)
15. Costa Rica: An Army-less Nation in a Problem-Prone Region Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2nd June
2011, http://www.coha.org/costa-rica-an-army-less-nation-in-a-problem-prone-region/comment-
page-1/ (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
16. Op.cit. n. 11
17. Servicio de Vigilancia Area Ministerio de Seguridad Publica at
http://www.seguridadpublica.go.cr/direccion/vigilancia_aerea/ (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
18. E. Wertheim, Combat Fleets of the World: 16th Edition (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press: 2013),
pp.145-146
19. Z. Dyer, US donates $19 million to Costa Rica Coast Guard Tico Times 22nd June 2016 at
http://www.ticotimes.net/2016/06/22/us-donates-19-million-to-costa-rica-coast-guard (Accessed
23rd February 2017)
20. Op.cit.n.11
21. Ibid.
22. S. Blaskey, Costa Rican special operations unit participates in regional war games Tico Times 9th
August 2014 at http://www.ticotimes.net/2014/08/09/costa-rican-special-operations-unit-
participates-in-regional-war-games (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
23. R. Beckhusen, Costa Rica Doesnt Have a Military? Not So Fast War is Boring 10th August 2014 at
https://warisboring.com/costa-rica-doesnt-have-a-military-not-so-fast-499b5d67e160#.ol3ebb9ep
(Accessed 23rd February 2017)
24. Z. Dyer, Costa Rica's Public Security Minister calls for new organized crime unit after spike in killings,
Tico Times 15th October 2015 at http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/10/15/security-minister-calls-new-
organized-crime-unit-killings-spike-costa-rica (Accessed 23rd February 2017)
25. Op. cit. n.9
26. Ibid.

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