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TodealwithChina,Indianeedstoreturntostrategic Cooperation:AttainingNew
Heights
TWITTER fundamentals
YOUTUBE Redefiningtheties
P. Stobdan
March 21, 2017 Tradebloc:Canwetrust
China?
Indias ties with China are seemingly becoming more complicated by the day.
Despite the dialogue held recently at the strategic level, the continuing stalemate SinoIndianTiesCriticalfor
EmergingStrategicSystemic
over both the proposal at the UN to designate JeM Chief Masood Azhar as a global
terrorist and Indias entry into the NSG are visibly deepening suspicions that may HuJintao'sIndiaVisitBoosts

snowball into other areas where the two countries entertain misgivings about SinoIndianRelations

each other. In the coming months, other critical issues like Chinas Belt and Road
Initiative, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC, and possible changes in the
BRICS format could cause more diplomatic frictions.
Clearly, the mechanisms in existence for the last two and half decades to deal
with bilateral issues have outlived their usefulness. The iterative approach and
improved economic ties are not helping to build trust. Instead, the step-by-step
dispute-handling model generates more friction-points fuelling domestic
outrage and suspicion. Consequently, the first-ever strategic dialogue ended
nettling each other.
To counter Indian tactical moves, the Chinese were quick to employ tactical ploys TheArthasastraina
by raising legally tenable points of seeking solid-evidence to prove Azhars TransculturalPerspective:
ComparingKautilyawith
direct links with al Qaeda, which are required to proscribe him under the UN SunZi,NizamalMulk,
1267 regime. The Foreign Secretarys fairly ambiguous answer, that the burden BaraniandMachiavelli
of proof is not on India, explained the elusive nature of the Azhar issue that the
Chinese had carefully worked on. Similarly, by citing a lack of consensus,
required under the 1267 rule-procedure, China tried to put India on the spot.
Indias qualified response a body of world opinion is in favour of censuring
Masood Azhar and that Beijings is a minority voice explained the tenuousness
of the case from a legal perspective. Terming the NSG case as a multilateral
issue and asserting that Beijing alone isnt blocking Indias bid are again a
typical Chinese way of fudging the issue.
FiftyYearsoftheOuter
The Chinese are known for their mastery in the art of denial and deception. They SpaceTreaty:Tracingthe
have merely used the Beijing meeting to convey a bigger message that Journey

Washington is no longer important in settling the global agenda, a fact that New
Delhi should acknowledge. Recall Beijings dig at Washingtons "outlier" comment
NSG membership cannot be a farewell gift for countries to give to each other.
Worse, Beijing hasnt closed the matter. The hint that it retains an open
approach on Indias application should be read as a message China is willing to
strike a deal. But, China can deny even these messages if the trajectory of Indias
future policy shifts further towards aligning with America.
Both New Delhi and Beijing are deeply aware about the need to reset the terms of
engagement. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar repeatedly reminded about the need
for moving away from the current disjointed approach to pursuing a deeper
strategic model of engagement in order to start the process of building trust. But
the attempts of both countries to do so has faltered over differing perceptions
and political signals on what strategic dialogue actually implies.
Apparently, Indians comprehend the term strategic as enlarging the scope of
consultation on the state of the global affairs, Afghanistan being the recent case.
This is a faulty assumption tried earlier in 2008, when Manmohan Singh and Wen
Jiabao called for common approaches to deal with global challenges such as

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climate change. But the experiment failed to remove the adversarial image that
each held of the other.
The Chinese, on their part, take a philosophical approach to the word strategic;
that is, to create conditions for sprouting shared values and trust; to achieve
something of value rather than confining it to matters of contemporary
convenience or as a means to find instant solutions to problems. Strategic trust
for them is de rigueur for relationship-building. Beijing was seen conveying
emphatically: do not always use strategic forums for achieving tactical goals,
because their great master Sun Tzu suggested tactics without strategy is the noise
before defeat.

One fears that the Chinese may have a point here. Most nations normally devise
clear strategic objectives for achieving certain specified goals only then do they
think about specific tools to be employed for tactical execution. But Indian
diplomacy seems unable to step away from the totally wacky habit of adopting a
narrow tactical pursuit devoid of strategic thinking. In fact, the habitually
employed surfeit of political tactics without their strategic positioning leads to
abject confusion and inappropriate actions efforts then draw a blank.
Clearly, a return to the strategic fundamentals then becomes a necessity. The fact
that India and China never tried to evolve a framework to guide their relationship
ever since the 1954 Treaty of Panchsheel became redundant after 1962 remains a
deficiency. A good example to emulate is the top-down waterfall approach,
espoused by Russia and China to lower tensions between them which led to the
desired windfall results in the last two decades. In fact, the old Indo-Soviet model
was not a bad sustainable strategic tie, though the context in which it was framed
was different.
The problem is that India lacks Sinologists to read the Chinese mind. It hasnt
invested enough in developing a hard understanding of Chinese historical,
political and economic system, as compared to the kind of efforts made to learn
about the Western world. This leads us to understand China the way we want to
understand it. We always want our signals to be perceived by the Chinese in the
manner in which we want them to be perceived. In contrast, the Chinese claim
their 2,000 year long experience of understanding the Indian mind, style of
thinking and their moves. As a result, signals sent by the Chinese do not often
come out clearly to us. Seemingly, the disparity in understanding each other cant
be bridged by our mastery in using English phrases only.
A framework is certainly needed and the dialogue process is definitely a good
way for trust building. An honest attempt to build a new paradigm of India-China
trust should be grounded on shared historical and cultural awareness of each
other, as also on the collective wisdom of ordinary citizens on both sides. This
may prove to be an effective evolutionary way.
Surely, India should be careful not to fall into Beijings habitually applied Sino-
centric rule of courtship considered as the cornerstone of building a strategic
relationship a leverage they are now using for penetrating new markets in Africa
and elsewhere.
For now, Indias mode of diplomacy requires a change. It should avoid giving
ambiguous and conflicting signals to China which result in causing collateral
damage to relations. For example, the play of shadowy games, especially the use
of superfluous Cold-War era cards of Tibet and Taiwan, do not squarely match
with Chinas ability to pin down India either directly or indirectly. A serious cost-
benefit analysis is needed of a policy that is seemingly easy to exercise but
deleterious and self-defeating in reality. For, every empty posturing by India is
being countered by China by bleeding India through Pakistani terrorists. In
contrast, Indias reciprocal ability to inflict damage even in nearby Tibet, leave
aside several thousand miles away in East Asia, remains untested. The ground
reality is that the wide power asymmetry, especially the widening imbalance in
trade totalling USD 50 billion is creating an asymmetrical interdependence which
is fraught with high risk.
Our over enthusiasm to embrace the US and a propensity to see everything
through an anti-China lens may be compelling Beijing to work against India in the
regional and global arena.

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The Chinese, on the other hand, are behaving with much savoir-faire to win over
countries in our neighbourhood by displaying respect combined with easy
familiarity through soft-power.
India need not see China as an object of disdain in perpetuity a narrative often
sold by the West. India and China have their own historical points of connections.
They neednt look for new symbolisms. In fact, minus the superficial rift, the
ground is extremely fertile for a strong understanding to grow. Take the case of
Yoga practices, spreading like wildfire in China. It is perhaps not the incongruity
factor of any sort but the unvarying narrative sustained by the West, further
reinforced by our false sense of ego, that prevents India from forging a pragmatic
equation with China.
Instead, India should seek to reconcile with China, though, of course, without
compromising on its core interests. It is time to engage in a dialogue process not
just for enhancing strategic trust but also to think more cunningly about how to
benefit from Chinas riches, by gaining access to Chinese credit and technology,
and securing markets for Indian products. Of course, the Chinese also need to
reformulate their thinking on the nature of Indias rise in the system.
Realistically speaking, we should not find too ominous Chinas rise and its
assertion. Its rise is no different from the rise of other major powers like the US,
USSR and even Great Britain in the past. It is possible that future rising powers,
including India, might have to assert in a similar manner for achieving their
strategic objectives. But for India to emerge as a global power of any reckoning, it
has to start realizing that a narrow tactical pursuit devoid of strategic thinking
will lead to nowhere.
We need to reframe our terms of relationship with China; rethink our own
posture; rescue ourselves from experiencing a delusion of grandeur and instead
persevere to emerge as a confident and aspiring regional power.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords:India-China Relations

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