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AND SUFFERING
The major Islamic philosophers, writes Deborah Black, produced no works dedi-
cated to aesthetics, although their writings do address issues that contemporary phi-
losophers might study under that heading. 1 The aim of this essay is to show how
classical Islamic philosophy may be studied within a framework of aesthetics. To
achieve this goal, I will bring together the metaphysics of Abu Hamid al-Ghazal
(10581111)2 and the aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer (17881860). In compar-
ing and contrasting al-Ghazal with Schopenhauer the focus will be on the underly-
ing themes common to both thinkers. The two central themes involve the issues of
suffering and knowledge. There are, in addition, five shared themes that will emerge
from the analysis to follow. The commonalities that emerge will also serve to high-
light important differences, especially with regard to presuppositions made by each
author. Importantly, though, it will be argued that due to the shared themes, Scho-
penhauers aesthetics can act as a framework to view the metaphysics of al-Ghazal
as a theory of aesthetics.
Al-Ghazal on Suffering
The source of suffering, for al-Ghazal, was located in his desire for the essence of
knowledge. Suffering for him began in his youth, when the realization dawned on
him that within his community there existed a parity among the different faiths. He
noted that the tendency was for the Christian children to grow up as Christians,
young Jews to grow up in Judaism, and young Muslims in Islam.3 This observed par-
ity subsequently had the effect of loosening the grip of tradition and conformism. Al-
Ghazal then describes an upsurge of a powerful interior force within him, desiring
only certainty about the essence of knowledge:
Certain knowledge is that in which the thing known reveals itself without leaving any
room for doubt or any possibility of error or illusion, nor can the heart allow such a
possibility. One must be protected from error, and should be so bound to certainty
that any attempt, for example, to transform a stone into gold or a stick into a serpent
would not raise doubts or engender contrary probabilities. I know very well that ten is
more than three. If anyone tries to dissuade me by saying, No three is more than
ten, and wants to prove it by changing in front of me this stick into a serpent, even
if I saw him changing it, still this fact would engender no doubt about my knowledge.
Certainly, I would be astonished at such a power, but would not doubt my knowl-
edge.
Philosophy East & West Volume 57, Number 4 October 2007 409419 409
> 2007 by University of Hawaii Press
Thus I came to know that whatever is known without this kind of certainty is doubtful
knowledge, not reliable and safe; that all knowledge subject to error is not sure and cer-
tain.4
The quest for certainty leads al-Ghazal on what is best described as an episte-
mological odyssey in search of the essence of knowledge. His journey is the subject
of his book Munqidh min al-dalal. The book, mainly autobiographical in nature, dis-
cusses the various epistemologies he encounters and subsequently rejects. The de-
sire for the essence of knowledge drives him to physical and mental paralysis. He
notes his inability to continue lecturing at Baghdad University and the eventual
onset of skepticism. The eventual solution, and perhaps cure, was what he describes
as a light from God entering his heart (an illumination event):
My disease grew worse and lasted almost two months, during which I fell prey to scepti-
cism, though neither in theory nor in outward expression. At last, God the Almighty cured
me of that disease and I recovered my health and mental equilibrium. The self-evident
principles of reason again seem acceptable; I trusted them and in them felt safe and cer-
tain. I reached this point not by well ordered or methodical argument, but by means of a
light God the Almighty cast into my breast, which light is the key to most knowledge.5
Following this illumination event, al-Ghazal then contends that the essence of
knowledge cannot be revealed through well-reasoned arguments, theology, or tradi-
tion, but is only accessible through the mercy of God. He remarks that anyone who
believes that the unveiling of truth is the fruit of well-ordered arguments is guilty of
disparaging the mercy of God.6 Consequently, suffering, for al-Ghazal, is very much
on a personal level and within the context of a believer desiring knowledge. It does
not seem that al-Ghazal at any time detaches himself from Islam or theism. His suf-
fering involves coming to terms with a belief that could count as infallible knowl-
edge. To better appreciate al-Ghazals views on the nature of the illumination event,
we need to look at his metaphysics.
Al-Ghazals metaphysics revolves around two main themes: first the distinction be-
tween the visible world and the unseen world, which is referred to as the world of
Dominion, and second the Quranic parable of light and the parable of darkness.
With regard to the first theme, the world of everyday experience is seen as a shadow
or an effect that proceeds not directly from God but from the world of Dominion (the
unseen world). It is the world of Dominion that directly emanates from God, while
the visible world exists as a secondary effect.7 Al-Ghazals emphasis is on the visible
world as being a reflection of the unseen world of Dominion. To clarify the nature of
this relationship, al-Ghazal presents an exegesis of two Quranic parables, that of
light and that of darkness. The parable of light is narrated as follows:
God is the light of the heavens and the earth; the likeness of his light is as a niche wherein
is a lamp, the lamp in a glass, the glass as it were a glittering star kindled from a blessed
According to al-Ghazal, each of the five features mentioned in the parable rep-
resents the five faculties of the human soul. David Buchman summarizes the Gha-
zalian interpretation of the five faculties:
[T]he lamp, the niche, the glass, the tree and the olive of the Light Verse are all visible,
existent things whose characteristics point to the attributes of these five faculties; senses,
imagination, reflection, the rational faculty, and the prophetic faculty.9
Furthermore, Buchman notes that al-Ghazal envisions the aim of a believer as
being the purification of the soul; thus, the greater the souls purification, the more
one is able to perceive Gods light and gain true knowledge of things. 10 Hence, for
al-Ghazal, the essence of knowledge resides in the perception of the Divine light.11
Returning for a moment to the faculties of the soul and the parable of light, I will
consider the reasoning behind al-Ghazals explanation of the soul (and its five fac-
ulties). The senses are equated with the niche, since when you consider its specific
characteristics, you find that its lights come out of numerous holes, like two ears, two
nostrils. 12 The imagery here is of the lamp being positioned within an alcove that
directs its light to illuminate the room. In the same way the five senses focus our
minds on the world around us; illumination through the senses allows the world to
be perceived and understood.
The faculty of imagination is equated with the glass case of the lamp and is seen
as the organizer of rational knowledge,13 the idea being that conceptual, abstract
thought is made possible by the imagination, which also preserves a sense of coher-
ency. Similarly glass, once refined and polished, far from obstructing the light, is able
to focus and perhaps polarize the light, which may initially be chaotic in nature. The
reflective spirit of the soul is equated with a tree. It appears that the intent of al-
Ghazal here is to emphasize the use of reason and argument. The reflective spirit
allows us to use canons of reasoning in a way that allows knowledge to grow and
flourish.
The prophetic spirit is equated with the oil of the lamp.14 Like oil, the prophetic
spirit symbolizes purity, which is distilled and thus becomes a source of light. The oil
can itself be luminous or can be ignited to produce illumination. Hence, within the
soul there exists a faculty to receive Divine illumination. The rational spirit, which
acts as a source of illumination, is equated with the lamp itself; therefore it is through
the rational spirit that an apprehension of the Divine takes place. Thus, al-Ghazal
describes prophets as light-giving lamps.15 Importantly, it is the rational spirit that
has the task of selecting and adopting as exemplars those who have already been
illuminated.
According to al-Ghazal, the parable of light is meant to reveal the nature of the
soul and its path to illumination. God is seen as the Light of lights, and our journey
toward the Divine can only be through the illumination of the various aspects of the
soul. Once we have begun the journey toward illumination, we get closer to God
and the essence of knowledge. The second parable, concerning darkness, is also
Schopenhauers Aesthetics
Schopenhauers aim is to unmask the naive set of views humans are prone to hold
about the nature and attainability of happiness. The thought comes across very
clearly in Schopenhauers parable of the cloud, which describes happiness as al-
ways in the future, or else in the past, and the present may be compared to a small
dark cloud driven by the wind over a sunny plain.24 The idea is that we can see it is
brighter everywhere else, but we are always in the clouds shadow. . . . [W]e look
back on the former events and realize we were happy without appreciating it when
they were present, or we aspire to unparalleled fulfilment if only some set of events
[F]or Plato purifying the soul of its contamination by the body will bring it tranquillity of
apprehending the being itself of the eternal forms. Schopenhauers notion of freeing
oneself from the Will bears close similarity to this, as he himself recognised: when Plato
deplores the souls connection with the body and wishes to be liberated from it, Schopen-
hauer comments: we understand the real and true meaning of this complaint in so far as
we recognize . . . that the body is the Will itself.28
From the preceding exposition, we observe that both Schopenhauer and al-Ghazal
incorporate Platonic and Neoplatonic notions into their metaphysical framework.
Within the context of Islamic philosophy, Valerie Gonzalez explains that the
approach taken many Muslim philosophers, including al-Ghazal, was to incorpo-
rate Greek thought into Islamic theology. Gonzalez writes:
In bringing together the works of al-Ghazal and Schopenhauer, we find six areas
where an overlap of ideas and methodology emerges. The first shared notion is that
both thinkers acknowledge themselves to be within some form of suffering. Suffering
for al-Ghazal is due to a lack of infallible knowledge, while Schopenhauers focus is
on repression by the Will. The second shared notion is the desire for some form of
objectivity to overcome suffering. Al-Ghazal desires objectivity in terms of appre-
hending the essence of knowledge, while Schopenhauer desires objectivity in terms
of freedom from the Will. The third shared notion is the assimilation of Platonism. Al-
Ghazal uses the concept of the Platonic realm and the Platonic notion of emana-
tion. Schopenhauer uses the Platonic notion of Idea or forms. The fourth shared
notion is that through transcending the world of appearance, or ordinary conscious-
ness, we gain knowledge. For al-Ghazal an encounter with the Platonic realm was
an encounter with the mind of God (i.e., the essence of knowledge). For Scho-
penhauer the encounter with the Idea or forms was a pure form of knowing, which
results in a tranquil, Will-free contemplation.
The fifth shared notion is that of the genius and the prophet. Both al-Ghazal and
Schopenhauer posit the uniqueness of encountering the Idea or the Divine. The en-
counter is limited to a select few, who may be termed genius or prophet. Perhaps the
key shared notion is the intention of the authors to initiate a fusion of traditions.
Notes
Special thanks is due to Tamara Albertini and Robert Wicks for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
1 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), s.v. Aesthetics in Islamic phi-
losophy, by Deborah L. Black; see http://www.rep.routledge.com.ezproxy
.auckland.ac.nz/article/H020/ (accessed June 18, 2004).