People vs Ordonio

Facts:Antonio and Rufo were special policemen; Ordoinio was their sergeant. Ordonio killed Antonio and Rufo Lajera
using a carbine which was witnessed by several people. They testified that Ordonio became angry because Rufo was
asking a permission to go to town which the former didnt agree. Rufo was then disarmed by Ordonio by taking his
gun. Ordonio then took its magazine out and gave it to one of the witnesses. Later, Ordonio ordered Ganal and Umala
to accompany Rufo to the town. Atonio, the brother of Rufo, insisted that he wanted to accompany his brother because
he didnt know what will happen to him as he was unarmed and being escorted. Upon hearing it, Ordonio uttered a
curse and immediately shot Antonio. Rufo was then subsequently shot by Ordonio. During the investigation, it was
found out that although the brothers have their respective magazine, it was impossible for them to use the same as
Rufos magazine was not attached to his gun, on the other hand, albeit there was magazine in the gun of Antonio, it
was safe-lock. Ordonio, as a defense, testified kthat he shot Antonio and Rufo because the two pointed their gun to
him

Issue: Whether or not the defense od Ordonio is tenable?

Ruling: The testimonies of Feliciano Ganal and Manuel Umala, testifying for the prosecution, have proved conclusively
that the prosecution's version is the true one. The insignificant errors or discrepancies on minor details in their
testimonies do not affect their truthfulness. As in this case, such error and discrepancies, honestly committed, rather
show sincerity. They are natural concomitants to human limitations. As the sun, although appearing to us as the
greatest miracle in the universe, is not spotless, human beings cannot absolutely be free from faults. This is true even
with the choicest paragons of the human species.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The truth of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, supported by the unbiased testimony of the chief of
police of Lupao, Bruno Arimbuyutan, to whom the accused said that he killed the two brothers because they would not
comply with his orders, is corroborated by a witness for the defense, Juan Zarate, who went to the scene immediately
after hearing the shots and to whom the accused said that he killed the two brothers because they tried to fight him,
and that the accused did not tell him that the deceased pointed their guns at him. According to his testimony, it is not
credible that the deceased could have aimed their guns at the accused because Rufo Lajera's carbine was unloaded,
so much so that the magazines were taken from his pockets, and, while Antonio Lajera's carbine had a magazine, the
gun was locked and could not be fired without being unlocked first. .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, supported by Juan Zarate, a witness for the defense, there is
only the wholly uncorroborated testimony of the accused which, on the other side, has not given any reasonable
motive why the deceased brothers would have wanted to aim their guns at him.

People vs Riveral l

Rolando Rivera was convicted of Rape by the trial court for allegedly raping his own daughter. The crime of rape
happened as testified by Erlanie, the daughter of Rolando, when her parents brought her sister Zaira to the hospital
and her mother decided to stay with her sister while her father went home. That night, she was awaken by the kiss of
his father. She then tried to resist her father by pushing and kicking him but the latter succeeded in removing his
underwear and having carnal knowledge with her. Her father then threatened him that if she tell it to anyone, hes
going to kill her mother and sister. Because of that, Erlanie didnt immediately tell it to anyone. But she then, in the
presence of her mother, told her aunt and grandmother about it. Later on, she underwent a medical examination
which proved that there had been a laceration and that she became pregnant as a result of the intercourse. However,
due to her continuous bleeding, the pregnancy was aborted. An information was then filed against Rolando. During the
trial of the case, when the counsel of Rolando failed to appear, the court appointed a counsel de oficio for him. The
said counsel de oficio didnt cross-examined Dr. Barin, the one who made the medical examination of Erlanie. There
was also an instance, wherein the question imposed by the counsel of Rolando during cross-examination was not
allowed by the court as said question was allegedly not relevant to the case despite the insistent of his counsel that
such question was aimed to discredit Erlanie. The trial court then convicted Rolando. Rolando questioned the ruling of
the trial court contending that his right too counsel has been violated.

Issue: whether or not the court failed to observe the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.

Ruling:Right of confrontation: The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of
the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule
115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. [27] The cross-examination of a witness is
essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him.[28]

The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the
admissibility and relevance of evidence.

In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness
supposedly committed by accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility. There was,
however, no showing on his part how these questions had any bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth of
her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant into committing
mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that accused-appellants counsel could later use to possibly put
complainants credibility, not to mention her character, in question.

Right to counsel: Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the motion of Atty. Bansil for
postponement because he was biased against him. Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de oficio was not
familiar with the facts of his case and was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr. Barin.

While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his
option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the States and the offended partys
right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the
accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney
declines to represent the accused for a valid reason. [41]

The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because
his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously
been granted several postponements.

Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barins
testimony on direct examination was simple, containing primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal
laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require considerable study and extraordinary preparation
on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary
to cross-examine Dr. Barin.

Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, accused-appellant has not indicated what questions
his counsel wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well be that these questions do not exist at all and that the
importance given by accused-appellant to counsel de oficios failure to cross-examine the witness is
exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the victim, together with the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element of rape. [43] The primordial issue in this case remains to be whether
the complainants testimony, not Dr. Barins, established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape.

Docena-Caspe vs Bugtas

Facts: An administrative case was filed against Judge Bugtos for granting a bail bond to the accused in a criminal case
without a hearing. The said case stemmed from a criminal case wherein the predecessor of Judge Bugtos, Judge
alvarez granted the accused in the said case a bail while the latter were at large. Subsequently, one of the accused
was apprehended. The provincial prosecutor then filed before the RTC, now presided by Judge Bugtos, a motion that an
alias warrant be issued against the other accused and that both accused be not allowed to bail. Thereafter, the
accused. filed a motion to allow him to bail on the account that the said murder was committed at the time wherein
the death penalty was suspended. The said request was denied. The accused then filed a motion for reconsideration.
Judge Bugtos asked for the comment of the prosecution. However the latter failed to file a comment. The said motion
for reconsideration for a bail was then granted without conducting a hearing based solely on the fact that a bail was
previously granted by his predecessor.

Issue: whether or not a bail may be granted without conducting a hearing

 Ruling: Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. [10] Under the present rules, a hearing is required in
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. [11] It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in
cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. [12]

In Santos v. Ofilada,[13] it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution
in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing.

Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the prosecution to
the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the prosecutions failure to file
a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.

It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge,
he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.[14] To make things worse, respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the
fact that the same appears to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused
was at large. In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the
basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has
yet to be curtailed.[15]

In Basco v. Rapatalo,[16] the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail
is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition
should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. [17] A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a
text or statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.[18]

In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions motion praying that the
accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the
accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. [19]

The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the
Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his
passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. [20]