CIR vs.

San Roque

Facts:
San Roque filed for tax refund and issuance of tax credit certificate for creditable
input taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on March 2003. Because of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenues inaction concerning the claims, San Roque filed
a Petition for Review of said case with the Court of Tax appeals on April 10, 2003, 13
days after filing the said case with the BIR. On December 10, 2003, Deputy
Commissioner Bunag issued a BIR ruling citing a 2002 Court of Appeals decision in
CIR vs Hitachi Computer Products Corporation which stated that the claim for refund
with the Commissioner could be pending simultaneously with a suit for refund filed
before the CTA. Before the issuance of the BIR Ruling, on 10 December 2003, no
administrative practice by the BIR that supported simultaneous filing of claims. Prior
to the ruling, the BIR considered the 120+30 day periods mandatory and
jurisdictional (120 days for the Commissioner to act on the case + 30 days to
appeal the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals). Before the BIR ruling, the actual
practice was to contest simultaneous filing because of SEC 112 OF National Internal
Revenue Code which expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to
decide the taxpayers claim (+ 30 days to appeal the decision to Court of Tax
Appeals). On October 6, 2010 the courts adopted the Aichi doctrine, which again
reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional. San Roque
attests that the 120-30 mandatory and jurisdictional rule reinstated in the latest
doctrine should only be applied PROSPECTIVELY and therefore not affect them
because the law cannot take away the consequences of their acts when the
administrative practice of NOT observing the 120+30-day rule was valid at the time
they were executed. They claim that their acts fell under the doctrine of OPERATIVE
FACT.

Issue: Whether or not San Roque Power Corporations actions be considered valid by
virtue of the doctrine of Operative Fact despite being violative of the 120-day
mandatory and jurisdictional rule of SEC 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Ruling: San Roque Power Corporations actions should not be considered valid by
virtue of the doctrine of Operative Fact. For the operative fact doctrine to apply,
there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law or executive
issuance, which is invalidated by the court. In the present case, however, there is no
such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court, only a BIR
Ruling that is ADMINISTRATIVE in nature. Moreover, at the time of the filing of the
case, the administrative practice was to contest simultaneous filing of cases in the
Court of Tax Appeals and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The 120+30 day
mandatory and jurisdictional rule was in fact the LAW, under SEC 112 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. San Roque Power Corporation cannot claim good
faith in observance of an administrative PRACTICE as the reason for which their
actions should fall under the doctrine of operative fact. They can only claim good
faith in the observance of administrative RULINGS. An administrative practice, not
formalized into a ruling, will not suffice because a mere administrative practice may
not be uniformly and consistently applied, as stated in SEC 246 of the Tax Code.
PEOPLE vs BALBAR
Facts: Defendant-Appelle Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
complainant school teacher Ester Gonzales was conducting her classes. Without
warning, he allegedly placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye.
Shocked, Gonzales instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to flee. He allegedly
brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued her, catching up with her
before she was able to get out of the room. Balbar embraced her again while still
holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor which caused slight physical
injuries to the complainant. Direct Assault upon a Person in Authority (criminal case
no 823) and Acts of Lasciviousness (criminal case no 841) were filed to the Court of
First Instance of Batangas. The court ruled that the act at least constitutes unjust
vexation instead of direct assault for the reason that the element of knowledge of
the accused that the victim is a person in authority is absent. Accordingly, there was
no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority.

Issue: Whether or not the ignorance of the defendant constitutes ignorance of fact
or ignorance of law.

Ruling: The mere knowledge of the defendant that the complainant is a teacher and
that she was in her classroom performing her duties, sufficiently alleges that he
knew the fact that she was a person in authority. By express provision of law
"teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in
authority" The complainants status as a person in authority being a matter of law
and not of fact, could not excuse non-compliance in accordance with Article 3
Ignorance of the law excuses no one in compliance therewith. Hence the court
Wherefore, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for direct assaults
hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits;
and with respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the
same is hereby affirmed.
GODOFREDO MORALES v. SKILLS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AND/OR MAHER DAAS
AND MARIVIC DAAS AND/OR WALLAN AL WALLAN G.R. No. 149285 August 30, 2006

FACTS:
On 1 September 1997, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent Skills
International before the NLRC claiming that he was illegally dismissed from service
by his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner sought the payment of the
following: unpaid salaries for one and one-half months; refund of his plane fare;
illegal deductions; attorneys fees and litigation expenses; and moral and exemplary
damages. The complaint was amended on 2 October 1997 to implead respondents
Maher Daas, MarivicDaas, and Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner likewise sought the
payment of these items: the six and one-half months unexpired portion of his
contract; refund of the amount of 5,000.00 Saudi Riyals allegedly deducted from his
salary; unpaid overtime pay and medical care. Petitioner alleged that his
employment was illegally terminated on 14 April 1997 in gross violation of the
Constitution and of the Labor Code. Respondent Skills International alleged that it
previously deployed petitioner for work abroad in April 1995 until he came home in
July 1996. Later on, petitioner met his new employer at respondent Skills
Internationals office in Malate, Manila. Respondent Skills International, however,
clarified that petitioners new employer, Wallan Al Wallan, was not its accredited
principal. This being the case, it argued that petitioner did not have any cause of
action against it because as a recruitment agency, it could only be held solidarily
liable with the employer if the latter is an accredited principal of the agency.
Respondent Skills International also averred that petitioners deployment was
processed under the BalikManggagawaprogram of the government so that he could
immediately return to work abroad. Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision
dismissing the case for lack of merit stating that if there was anyone liable for
petitioners illegal dismissal, it was none other than his foreign employer, Wallan Al
Wallan.Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved
against him prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the
Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals dismissed his Petition for
Certiorari.The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner failed to present any basis
to support his argument that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
resolving the case in favor of respondent Skills International. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied; hence, the present recourse where
petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Skills International was the one responsible for
his deployment abroad.

HELD: NO. The petition must fail. This indubitably raises a question of fact which is
not a proper subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is axiomatic that in an
appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.In this case, the issues
brought for our consideration calls for the reexamination of the evidence presented
by the parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and
the Court of Appeals erred in their respective evaluation of the same. This we
cannot do without blurring the difference between a question of fact and a question
of law a significant distinction as far as the remedy of appeal by certiorari is
concerned. Factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. This
is so because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial
agencies from presiding over matters falling within their jurisdiction. So long as
these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not
disturb the same. In the instant case, the alleged Employment Contract, Annex "A"
for the complainant (herein petitioner) appears to be one which is not perfected by
herein parties, because said contract does not bear the signatures of the
respondents or any of their authorized representatives. It only bears the signature
and thumbmark of the complainant. On its face, the Employment Contract readily
shows that respondent agency has neither participated nor is it a [privy] to any
party who executed the contract binding it to the terms and conditions of the same.
Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the
[respondents] that they neither participated in the contract of employment of
complainant (Annex "A" for the complainant) nor were they privy to the terms and
conditions appearing therein. The evidence submitted are not sufficient to hold
respondent agency liable. The copy of the receipt for the alleged placement fee was
not issued by the respondent agency but by the employer of complainant which is
not its accredited principal another fact which was never controverted by the
complainant. This being the case, complainant has no cause of action against herein
respondent and therefore, his money claims could not prosper in the instant case. It
is clear that petitioner utilizes the Balik-Manggagawa program of the government
whenever it is convenient for him. Thus, he availed himself of said program in order
to fasttrack his deployment abroad and yet now that said Info Sheet is being used
against him, he claims that he could not have been processed as a balik-
manggagawa as defined by law. We simply cannot countenance such trifling regard
for the law by awarding to petitioner the money claims he is seeking in the present
case. As for the medical examination result which petitioner belatedly presented
before the Court of Appeals, the law clearly requires that there should first be a job
order relating to an existing overseas position before a worker shall be subjected to
a medical examination. In this case, as petitioner is the one insisting that a job order
exists, he bears the burden of producing the same. After all, the rule is settled that
he who alleges must prove. Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS BM No. 2540 September 24,
2013 EN BANC

Facts:
Petitioner Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took and passed
the same years bar examinations and took the Attorneys Oath, failed to sign the
Attorneys Roll. After more than 30 years of law practice, he filed the instant Petition
on February 2012 praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Petitioner said that he was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys because he
misplaced the notice given to him and he believed that since he had already taken
the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is not urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting
clarificatory conference on the matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the
instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and
utter lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys

Held: Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from
the practice of law. The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of
Attorneys because such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. However, the Court
cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of inaction. His justification of
his action, that it was neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
and an honest error of judgment was opposed by the Court. A mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences. Although an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he could no longer claim it
as a valid justification by the moment she realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record. His action of continuing the practice of law in spite of
his knowledge of the need to take the necessary steps to complete all requirements
for the admission to the bar constitutes unauthorized practice of law. Such action
transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
The Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty similar to suspension by allowing
him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of the Resolution and
to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by the Court.