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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.77242October18,1988

ROMEOZOLETA,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLESECRETARYOFLABOR,FRANKLINDRILON,SSCMULTISERVICESCECILIA
CURAMENG,SALVADORCURAMENGandJUANCHOGONZALES,respondents.

GANCAYCO,J.:

When, through his own negligence, the counsel of record fails to give his official address to a quasijudicial
tribunalhearingacaseinvolvinghisclient,issaidtribunaljustifiedinservingnoticeofacopyofitsOrderuponhis
client?Intheeventthatneithercounselnorclientactedseasonablythereafter,doesthesaidfinalOrderthereby
becomeexecutory

ThesearetheprincipalissuespresentedbythisPetitionforCertiorari.1

Sometime in February, 1984, petitioner Romeo Zoleta applied for overseas employment at an employment
agencyknownasSSCMultiservices,Inc.Thisagencyisownedandoperatedbyprivaterespondents,spouses
SalvadorandCeciliaCurameng.Petitionersoughtemploymentasadriver.

Acting favorably upon the said application, the agency required the petitioner to pay around P13,500.00 to
shoulderthecostoftheprocessingofhispassport,amedicalcheckupandothermatters.Petitionerpaidthesaid
amount.

In due time, the petitioner was asked to leave for Kuwait on April 6, 1985. Immediately before his departure,
private respondents Juancho Gonzales, who was the accountant of the agency, gave the petitioner his
correspondingtraveldocuments.Thetraveldocumentsshowedthathewasbeingsentoverseasbyacertainfirm
knownasRoyalServicesUnlimited,Inc.andthathewastoworkabroadasacarpenter.Hewasalsoadvisedthat
hewouldbetravellingasatourist.

Things,however,didnotworkoutwellforthepetitioner.WhenhearrivedinKuwait,helearnedthattherewasno
suchjobforhimthere.

He was unemployed for about a week until he found a job as a carpenter for the Ballast Nedam Foundation.
Unfortunately, his employment lasted for only two months. His employer terminated his employment on the
groundthathisstayinKuwaitwastemporaryincharacter.Joblessanew,thepetitionerstayedwithsomefriends
untilhecouldfindanotherjob.WhenhelearnedthatprivaterespondentSalvadorCuramengwasinKuwaitatthat
time, he requested the latter to have him repatriated. Said private respondent denied the request and instead
convincedthepetitionertoremaininKuwaituntilhecouldbegivenanotherjob.

Uncertainabouthisfutureinaforeignlandundersuchcircumstances,thepetitionerreturnedtothePhilippines
onOctober5,1985.Hepaidforhisownplanefareamountingto162Kuwaitdinars.

The petitioner sought redress from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) by filing a
complaintforviolationofArticles32and34(a)oftheLaborCodeandthePOEArulesonoverseasemployment
recruitment against the employment agency, the Curameng spouses and Juancho Gonzales. In the complaint,
petitionerallegeshewasthevictimofillegalrecruitmentandthathewaschargedexcessivefees.Hesoughtthe
refundofwhathespentforhisapplicationincludinghisplanefare.

The Labor Arbiter assigned to the case scheduled a conciliation conference/ hearing for the purpose of settling
theproblem.Whilebothpartiesweredulynotifiedofthesaidconference,onlythepetitionerappeared.
The said conference/hearing was postponed on several occasions all upon the repeated requests made by the
office manager of the employment agency. These postponements notwithstanding, the private respondents still
failedtoappearforthehearing,eitherinpersonorthroughcounsel.Again,thehearingwaspostponed,thistime
forNovember21,1985.

The petitioner and the private respondents, through counsel Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura appeared at the
conference scheduled on November 21, 1985. Atty. Azura was furnished a copy of the complaint filed by the
petitionerandwasgiventendaystofileanAnswertothesame.Accordingly,thehearingwasresettoDecember
10,1985.

Once again, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the conference scheduled on
December10,1985.Theydidnotevensubmittherequiredanswertothecomplaint.Petitionerwastheonlyparty
present. Thus, the conference was reset anew to December 18, 1985. However, on said date neither private
respondentsnortheircounselappeared.Hence,thePOEAconsideredthecasesubmittedforresolution.

On June 3, 1986, or about five months thereafter, POEA OfficerInCharge Honesto L. Cueva issued an Order
directing the private respondents to refund to the petitioner the sum of P13,500.00 for his actual expenses and
the 162 Kuwait dinars covering his plane fare. The said Order also suspended the authority of the employment
agencytoengageinoverseasemploymentrecruitmentforaperiodofthreemonths.

InasmuchasAtty.AzurafailedtogivethePOEAhisofficialaddress,noticeofthesaidOrderwasfurnishedthe
privaterespondentsthemselvesonJune12,1986.

OnJuly16,1986,Atty.Azurafileda"MotionforReconsiderationand/orReliefFromJudgment"stressingtherein
thathedidnotreceiveacopyoftheOrderdatedJune3,1986.ThepetitioneropposedthesaidMotiononthe
groundthatPOEAOrderdatedJune3,1986hadalreadybecomefinalandexecutory.

On August 11, 1986, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The Order of denial was
receivedbytheemploymentagencythroughitsofficemanageronAugust13,1986.

In the meantime, the private respondents engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Pedro N. Tanchuling.
Thereafter,theprivaterespondents,throughAtty.Tanchuling,broughtanappealtotheofficeofthethenMinister
ofLaborandEmploymentwhereintheyobtainedarestrainingorderagainstthePOEA.Nevertheless,afterdue
hearing,thethenMinisterAugustoS.Sanchezliftedtherestrainingorderissuedearlierandaffirmedtheaction
takenbythePOEA.

TheprivaterespondentssoughtareconsiderationoftheOrderofMinisterSanchezonthegroundthattheywere
denieddueprocessoflawbythePOEA.Actingonthereconsiderationrequested,MinisterSanchezreversedhis
previousOrderandissuedanotherone,thistimeinfavoroftheprivaterespondents.

Hence, the instant Petition. The petitioner alleges herein that the then Minister, now Secretary of Labor and
Employment2committedagraveabuseofdiscretioninreversingafinalandexecutoryOrderofthePOEA.Asinstructed
bythisCourt,theprivaterespondentsfiledtheirCommentonthePetition. 3TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralalsofiledits
Commentbutittookthesideofthepetitioner.4

In support of the view that the POEA Order dated June 3, 1986 had become final and executory, the Solicitor
General points out that notice of the said Order was properly served upon the private respondents themselves
becauseAtty.AzurafailedtogivehisofficialaddresstothePOEA.CitingSection8,RuleIIIofthePOEARules
andRegulationswhichsetsa(10)dayreglementaryperiodforpursuinganappealfromorareconsiderationofa
questionedjudgmentofthePOEA,theSolicitorGeneralcontendsthattheprivaterespondentshadten(10)days
from June 12, 1986, the date the private respondents received notice of the POEA Order, to seek a
reconsiderationof,orpursueanappealfrom,thesaidOrder.TheSolicitorGeneralconcludesthatsincenoaction
wastakenbytheprivaterespondentswithinthesaid10dayreglementaryperiod,thePOEAOrderdatedJune3,
1986hadbecomefinalandexecutory,beyondthepoweroftheMinisterofLaborandEmploymenttomodify.

ConsideringthisadverseopinionoftheSolicitorGeneral,theDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentfileditsown
CommentandSupplementalCommentonbehalfoftheSecretary,prayingthereinforthedismissaloftheinstant
Petition. 5 The said Comment states, among others, that the notice to the private respondents themselves is not a valid
noticeand,therefore,thePOEAOrderdatedJune3,1986cannotbeconsideredfinalandexecutory.

Weresolvethecaseinfavorofthepetitioner.

Itiswellsettledthatnoticetocounselisnoticetotheclient. 6Ontheotherhand,noticetotheclientdoesnotamount
tonoticetocounsel.7ThereasonforthelatterruleisexplainedinJ.M.JavierLoggingCorporationv.Mardo,8towit
 ...whereapartyappearsbyattorney,noticetotheformerisnotanoticeinlaw,unlessserviceupon
thepartyhimselfisorderedbythecourtxxx.Thisruleisnotameretechnicality,butonefoundedon
considerationsoffairplay.Apartyengagesanattorneyofrecordpreciselybecauseitdoesnotfeel
competenttodealwiththeintricaciesoflawandprocedure.Furthermore,asthepartydirectlyserved
wouldhavetocommunicatewithitsattorneyandturnovertohimthenoticereceived,thenetresult
wouldbetonoticeablyshortentheusableperiodfortakingtheproperstepsrequiredtoprotectthe
party'sinterests.

Thus,whenapartyisrepresentedbyhiscounselinaparticularcase,noticeofproceedingsmustbeservedupon
thecounseltoconstitutevalidnotice.

Inthecaseatbar,theprivaterespondentswereassistedbytheircounsel,Atty.Azurawhenthecasewaspending
beforethePOEA.However,saidcounselfailedtoinformthePOEAabouthisofficialaddress.IfAtty.Azurahad
been diligent in attending to his duties as counsel, he would not have overlooked such elementary matter as
givinghisexactaddresstothePOEA.Attheveryleast,heshouldhavefiledhisanswerwhichthePOEArequired
ofhimwhereinagainhisaddressascounselwouldbestated.Nevertheless,itwasonlywhenhelearnedofthe
Order adverse to the interests of his client that he decided to do something. Such irresponsibility of counsel
cannotbecountenanced.

TheinactionofthesaidcounselplacedthePOEAinadilemma.ThePOEAhadtochoosebetweenresolvingthe
pending case or waiting indefinitely for the private respondents or their counsel to appear. It made the light
decisionbyresolvingthecase.TheimportantconsiderationthatwasapparentlytakenintoaccountbythePOEA
wasthattheinterestsofjusticewouldbejeopardizedifthecasewereundulyprotracted.Afterresolvingthecase,
the POEA had no choice but to serve notice of the Order dated June 3, 1986 upon the private respondents
themselves.Consideringthecircumstancesofthiscase,i.e.,theearnestdesireofthepetitionertoprosecutehis
complaintdespiteseveralpostponementsrequestedbytheprivaterespondents,thetroublehehadtogothrough
in Kuwait, and the inexcusable negligence of the counsel for the private respondents, the action taken by the
POEA is obviously justified. We, therefore, hold that the notice upon the private respondents themselves of the
questionedorderconstitutesvalidnoticeinlawonaccountofthecircumstancesobtaininginthiscase.Thisisan
exceptiontothegeneralrule.

Theprivaterespondentscannotclaimadenialofdueprocessoflaw.Theyhadeveryopportunitytopresenttheir
sidebutfailedtodoso.Intheapplicationoftheprincipleofdueprocess,whatissoughttobesafeguardedisnot
lackofpreviousnoticebutthedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.9

SincetheprivaterespondentsreceivednoticeofthePOEAOrderdatedJune3,1986onJune12,1986,theyhad
ten(10)daysfromthatdatewithinwhichtoseekareconsiderationoforpursueanappealfromthesaidOrder
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the POEA. As the private respondents took no action within the said
reglementary period, the POEA Order dated June 3, 1986 had become final and executory and as such, the
MinisterofLaborandEmploymenthadnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheappealmuchlesstoreverseor
modifythesaidorder.

Accordingly,WeholdthattherespondentMinisterofLaborandEmploymentactedwithoutjurisdictioninreversing
thePOEAOrderdatedJune3,1986whichhadalreadybecomefinalandexecutory.Thewritofcertiorarisought
inthisPetitionmust,therefore,issue.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order issued by the public respondent Minister of Labor
andEmploymentonDecember29,1986isherebySETASIDEandanotherisherebyrenderedrevivingtheorder
ofthePOEAdatedJune3,1986.Costsagainsttheprivaterespondents.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,Cruz,GrioAquinoandMidialdeaJJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1WhilethePetitioniserroneouslycaptioned"PetitionforReview,"theCourtnonethelessresolvedto
treatthesameasoneforcertiorariunderRule65onaccountofthejurisdictionalissuesraised
thereinandtheotherreliefssought.

2MinisterSanchezwassucceededbySecretaryFranklinDrilon.

3Pages96to99.

4Rollo.Pages75to91,Rollo.
 5Pages117to121and127to132,Rollo.

6Palancav.AmericanFoodManufacturingCo.,24SCRA819(1968).

7J.M.JavierLoggingCorporationv.Mardo,24SCRA776(1968).

8Supra,atpage779.

9Sumadchatv.CourtofAppeals,111SCRA489(1982).

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