REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR.

and
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO
FACTS: A claim for reconveyance was filed against respondents by petitioner Presidential Commission
on Good Government. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for leave to file interrogatories.
Petitioner then filed a motion to strike out the interrogatory for being queer, weird and procedurally
bizarre as it is improper and irrelevant. The Sandiganbayan refuted such motion for leave to file
interrogatories and impelled Tantoco and Santiago to amend their interrogatories such that it primarily
required factual details relative to the specific assertions of PCGGs amended complaint.
Sandiganbayan admitted such amendment, which PCGG opposed mainly on the ground that the
interrogatories dig into evidentiary matters.

ISSUE : Whether or not evidentiary issues may be delved into in interrogatories.

HELD : If the ultimate facts are alleged in general terms or "not averred with sufficient definiteness
trial, a bill of particulars seeking a more definite statement may be ordered by the court upon motion.
A bill of particulars is, however, limited to creating more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a
pleading. Its function is not to supply evidentiary matters. Such matters may be inquired into before
the trial. It is the purpose of the law that the parties before the trial should discover for themselves of
all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
adversaries; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through depositions.

Neypes v Court of Appeals rule 1

FACTS : Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private
respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal and, on the 15th day thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the
notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on
July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was
the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16,
1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal
of the Motion for Reconsideraiton.
HELDTo standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42,
Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice
of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies.

Neypes v Court of Appeals rule 41

FACTS : Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private
respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the
grounds that the action had already been prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of
the order of dismissal in March 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter, filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court dismissed in July. Five days after receiving the courts
decision, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late, which was received by the petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but this, too, was denied in September 3, 1998. The petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA, where the petitioners claimed that they
had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period
to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal
of the Motion for Reconsideraiton.
HELDTo standardize the appeal periods and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule
40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that
petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M.
BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO rule 1
FACTS : Davao Light & Power Co., filed a complaint for damages against private respondent
Francisco Tesorero before the RTC praying for damages in the amount of P11,OOO,OOO.OO.
Instead of filing its answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that:
(a) the complaint did not state a cause of action;
(b) the plaintiff's claim has been extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and academic;
(c) there was non-joinder of indispensable parties; and
(d) venue was improperly laid.
Of these four grounds, the last mentioned is most material in the case at bar. The trial court
issue a Resolution dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of improper venue. The
plaintiff being a private corporation, undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiff's principal
place of business as alleged in the complaint, and which for purposes of venue, is deemed as
its residence. Conversely, in the defendant's motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that
the plaintiffs principal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and another
Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the plaintiff with the NAPOCOR.
The motion on the ground of improper venue was granted and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment, denied
due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was proper.

HELD: It is private respondent's contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and not Cebu
City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its residence is in
Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the
action for damages. It cannot be disputed that petitioner's principal office is in Cebu City, per
its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws.
Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented. He is a complete stranger
to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that
he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose
benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired.
We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by
petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is
in Davao City, should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Moreover,
there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on
such representation by petitioner.

YANG v. VALDEZ rule 60

FACTS: Respondent Spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante (Respondents for brevity) applied
for a Writ of Replevin (Writ for brevity) against Petitioner to recover possession of two (2)
Isuzu-cargo trucks (trucks for brevity). Respondents alleged that they had actual use and
possession of the trucks but the same were illegally detained by Petitioner and even
succeeded registering it in his favor.
Respondent judge granted the Writ and rejected the counter-bond of Petitioner by being filed
out of time. Petitioner contended that the replevin bond was defective for it was merely an
undertaking of the Respondents bondsmen to pay the sum of P560,000.00, and that no
tangible security such as cash, property or surety was placed thereby at the disposal and
custody of the court. Moreover, Petitioner contended that Respondents are not the registered
owners of trucks and thus, the Writ should not have been issued.
ISSUE: Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Writ.
HELD: NO. The judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The sufficiency of a bond is a
matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must approve the bond. It
is not necessary that the obligation of the bond be supported by cash or personal property or
real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. A sworn
declaration as found in this case is sufficient. A bond can be merely a written obligation under
seal, commercial matter, secured by a mortgage on real property, the mortgagee may be the
obligee or a third party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the principal obligor
under the bond. This Court finds the Respondents need not be holder of the legal title over
the property because under Rule 60, Section 2, it suffices that he is "entitled to the
possession thereof.
This Court also finds that the counter bond that the Petitioner offered was really filed out of
time. Under Section 5, Petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the
plaintiff" require the return of the property; Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days
after the taking of the property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in character
and command the judge to disapprove the counter-bond if not complied. In the instant case,
the trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on January 7, 1985. Petitioner's counter
bond was filed on January 25, 1985. Clearly, the counter bond was filed beyond the mandated
periods to file the same.