Nature and Teaching in Plato's "Meno"

Author(s): Daniel T. Devereux

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1978), pp. 118-126
Published by: BRILL
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 Natureand Teachingin Plato's Meno
DANIEL T. DEVEREUX

In a controversialpassagein the Meno, Socratesarguesthatvirtuecannot

be taught (89 c-96 c).1 Such a view is hard to squarewith the thesis that
virtueis knowledge,and for this reasonthereis a longstandingdebateover
whetherSocrates'argumentis meantseriously.2In this paperI shall try to
determine exactly where Socratesstands on the question whethervirtue
can be taught,as well as on the moregeneralquestionof how mencome to
possessvirtue. What I shall contributeto the debate is not a new answer,
but fresh evidence. I believe Socrates' argument cannot be properly
understoodwithoutseeing its connectionswith otherpartsof the dialogue.
In the firsttwo sectionsof the paper I examine Socrates'discussionof the
theoryof recollectionas it relatesto the concept of teaching.I arguethat
one of the purposesof Socrates'discussionis to draw a contrastbetween
two conceptionsof teaching.In the final section of the paper I show how
the contrast between the two conceptions of teaching is essential to
understandingSocrates'claim that virtuecannot be taught.

I
After a barrageof Socraticrefutations,Meno's confidence in his knowl-
edge of the natureof virtue is shaken(80 a-b). The mainobstaclestanding
in the way of a fruitfulphilosophicalinquiryseems to have been removed.
Since they are both in a state of ignorance,Socratessuggests that they
conductajoint searchfor the natureof virtue.Meno, however,thinksthat
sucha searchwould be utterlyfutile.How can they searchfor somethingof
which they are ignorant?If they don'tknowwhatthey are lookingfor,how
will they recognizeit if they do in fact stumbleupon it?
The targetof Meno'schallengeis the idea of Socraticinquiry.He is not
questioningthe possibilityof passingfroma stateof ignoranceto a stateof
knowledgewith respectto some subject,but ratherthe possibilityof doing
thiswithoutthe aid of someonewho alreadyknows.3In otherwords,Meno
is claimingthatit is impossibleto learnwithouta teacher.Socratescounters
Meno'sclaim with an argumentfor its antithesis.In his discussionof the
theoryof recollection,he arguesthatit is not only possibleto learnwithout
a teacher,but that it is not possibleto learnin any otherway. All learning

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consistsof drawingknowledgefrom oneself, and thereis no such thingas
teaching.4 Socrates attempts to demonstrate this claim by questioning
Meno's slave boy about a problemin geometry.
There are two particularpoints about Socrates' response to Meno's
challenge which are puzzling. First of all, his claim that there is no such
thing as teachinggoes well beyond what is needed to meet the challenge.It
would be enough simply to establishthat it is possible to learn withouta
teacher.Nor is this claim requiredby the theory of recollection;there is
nothing about the theoryitself which entails the impossibilityof teaching.
Why, then, does Socrates make such an extreme and implausibleclaim
when it is neither required by Meno's challenge nor by the theory of
recollection?
A second puzzlingpoint concernsSocrates'questioningof the slave boy.
By answeringa seriesof questionsthe boy eventuallyarrivesat the solution
to the geometrical problem. Socrates describes what has happened by
sayingthat the boy recollectedthe solutionwithoutthe aid of any teaching
(85 d). In the courseof the questioningSocratesturnsto Meno a couple of
times and says, "Do you notice, Meno, that I am not teachingthe boy, but
simply asking questions"(82 e, 84 c-d). In each case Meno agrees with
Socrates.Now this is a very odd way of describingwhat is actuallyhap-
pening. It.is clear that Socratesalreadyknows the solution to the geome-
tricalproblem.It is also clearthathis knowledgeplaysan importantpartin
his questioningof the boy in so far as it enableshim to lead the boy step by
step to the solution.5It would thereforebe perfectlynaturalto describe
what Socrates is doing as teaching the boy a bit of geometry. And yet
Socratesclaims, and Meno agrees,that he is not teachingthe boy.
A simple solution to both of these puzzles is providedby the following
supposition:one of the purposesof the recollectionpassage6is to bringout
the narrownessof Meno's conception of teaching (and learning),and to
contrastthis conceptionwith a verydifferentone: "Socratic"teaching.The
narrownessof Meno'sconceptionof teachingis broughtout by showingin
the course of the questioning that the only thing which he counts as
teaching is directly telling the pupil the answers to questions. Socrates
deliberatelyuses the term "teaching"in such a narrowsense in order to
indicatethis featureof Meno'sconceptionof teaching.7
The verydifferent,"Socratic",conceptionof teachingis revealedby two
aspectsof the recollectionpassage.First,thereis Socrates'accountof what
happensin any case of learning.Learningis a processof drawingknowl-
edge fromoneself, not obtainingknowledgefrom someone else. If thereis
such a thing as teaching,it must be an activitycongruentwith this account

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of learning.Secondly,there is Socrates'activityof guiding the boy to the
solutionto the problem.Thisis surelyintendedas an exhibitionof a kindof
teaching compatible with the conception of learning as recollection.8
Shortlyafter the recollectionpassage,Socratessays that the terms"teach-
able"and "recollectable"may be used interchangeably(87 b-c). Herehe is
evidently using "teaching"to designate an activity compatiblewith the
theory of recollection;9i.e., the sort of activitywhich is exhibited in the
questioningof the slave boy.
The contrastbetween the two conceptionsof teachingcan be put very
simply: accordingto the Socraticconception,what is taught comes from
withinthe pupil; accordingto the narrowconception(whichis apparently
Meno's), what is taught comes from without. The idea that teaching is
essentiallythe transmissionof knowledgefromone individualto anotheris
associatedwith the sophistsin other dialogues.10I shall thereforerefer to
this narrowconceptionof teachingas "sophisticalteaching".
SinceSocratesuses "teaching"in the recollectionpassageto referonly to
sophistical teaching, we must understand his claim that teaching is
impossiblehtoapply only to this kind of teaching.The basis of the claim is
made clear by the theory of recollection.If what is learnedis in all cases
something which comes from within the learner, then the idea that
knowledgemay be transmittedfromone individualto anotheris simplya
chimaera. Socrates' argument,understoodin this way, leaves open the
possibilityof a kind of teachingwhichis basedon a correctunderstanding
of what is involvedin learning.Furthermore,it is clearfromwhat Socrates
says immediatelyfollowing the recollectionpassagethat he does not take
himselfto have provedthe impossibilityof teachingsimpliciter."

II
So far I have tried to show that one of the purposesof the recollection
passage is to draw a contrast between two conceptions of teaching,
"Socratic"and "sophistical"teaching.A second,closelyrelatedpurposeof
this passage may be discoveredby linking it with the question posed by
Meno at the very beginning of the dialogue. In its simplest form, that
question is: How do men come to possess virtue? In the recollection
passageSocratesin effect answersa questionof the same type; that is, he
offers an account of how men come to possess knowledge.In asking his
question, Meno mentions three ways in which virtue might be acquired:
teaching, nature, and practice.The parallel between the two questions
invites us to consider which of these three most closely fits Socrates'

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accountof how knowledgeis acquired.In other words,does Socrateshold
thatknowledgeis possessedby nature,or does he regardit as somethingwe
acquirethroughteachingor throughpractice?
According to the theory of recollection,knowledge is innate.12Often
when we referto a characteristicas "natural",or "possessedby nature",we
mean that it is innate rather than acquired. Thus there is a perfectly
familiar sense in which, according to Socrates' theory, knowledge is
"possessed by nature". But if what we said earlier is correct, Socrates'
guidance of the slave boy also exhibits one way in which knowledge is
teachable.And we have his own statement(at 87 c) that"knowledgeis the
only thing teachable."The recollectionpassage providessenses in which
knowledgeis bothteachableand possessedby nature;13the passagein this
way shows that teaching and nature need not be viewed as mutually
exclusiveways of coming to possesssome characteristic.
The latter point is significantbecause it appearsfrom Meno's opening
question that he does regard teaching, nature, and practice as mutually
exclusive ways of coming to possessvirtue.He does not ask, "Does virtue
come through teaching, nature, or practice, or perhaps through some
combinationof these?",but rather,"Isvirtueteachable,or is it not teach-
able, but acquiredby practice?Or is it acquiredneitherby practicenor by
teaching,but comes to men by natureor by some other means?"14Given
Meno'sconceptionof teachingas the transmissionof knowledgefromone
individualto another,it is not difficult to see why he would regardsome-
thing'sbeing teachableas incompatiblewith its being possessedby nature.
Since whateveris taughtto an individualis acquiredfrom the teacherand
does not come from within the individual,it cannot be regardedas some-
thing possessedby nature.
In the first section I argued that the recollection passage reveals the
narrowness of Meno's conception of teaching, and at the same time
provides a Socratic alternativeto that conception. In this section I have
tried to deepen the contrastbetween the two conceptionsof teaching by
focusing on the relationship between teaching and nature. On Meno's
view, if somethingis teachable,it is not possessedby nature,andconversely
if something is possessed by nature, it is not teachable.The recollection
passageprovidesan alternativeto this view by exhibitingways in which a
thing can be teachableand at the same time possessedby nature.Indeed,
on the Socratic view, if a thing is teachable, it must be "possessedby
nature"in the sense set forthin the theoryof recollection.15

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 III

I now wantto put these resultsto workin solvingsome difficultiesthatarise

in the concludingsection of the Meno. The first difficultyhas to do with
Socrates'argumentfor the thesis that virtue is not teachable.This argu-
ment has been a source of controversyamong commentatorsbecause its
conclusionis at odds with the Socraticdictumthatvirtueis identicalwith a
kind of knowledge.For if all knowledgeis teachable16, and if virtueis not
teachable,a necessaryconsequenceis that virtuecannot be identicalwith
any formof knowledge.In fact,knowledgecannotbe a sufficientcondition
of virtue, for if it were, virtue would be teachable.This resultis not only
inconsistentwith Socratic(and Platonic)doctrine,but also with a passage
nearthe end of the dialogue.'7
Because of these problems many commentatorshave understandably
come to the conclusion that Socrates'argumentwas not meant seriously.
But taking this view of the argumentlands us in anotherdifficulty:Why
would Socrates try to convince Meno of something which he himself
believed to be false? Given Socrates'belief that false opinion about an
importantquestion - which this surelyis - is an evil to be avoided at all
costs,'8this difficultybecomesa ratherseriousmatter.
I am going to argue that Socrates'claim that virtue is not teachableis
meant seriously,but only when understoodin a particularway. When the
claim is understoodin this particularway, it does not conflict with the
Socratic/Platonicview thatknowledgeis a sufficientconditionof virtue.It
will also becomeclearthat Socratesis not guiltyof fosteringin Meno a false
opinion about the teachabilityof virtue.
Let me begin by recapitulatingsome points made in the first section
whichmay be helpfulhere. In the recollectionpassageSocratesclaimsthat
all learning is recollection and that there is no such thing as teaching.
Anotherway of puttingthe latterclaim is thatknowledgeis not teachable.
We noted that Socrates deliberately uses "teaching" in the narrow,
sophisticalsense, and thathe did not intendto arguethatknowledgeis not
teachablesimpliciter.
In view of the contrastbetweenthe sophisticaland Socraticconceptions
of teachingdiscussedabove, it is naturalto askwhetherSocrateshasone of
these two conceptionsin mind in the argumentshowingthat virtueis not
teachable.There is a brief passage near the end of the argumentwhich
prettyclearlyindicatesthat he has in view only the sophisticalconception
of teaching. Socrates is explaining to Anytus the exact nature of their
inquiry.

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 ... not whether there are, or formerlyhave been, good men among us or not, but
whether virtue is teachable; this has been our question all along. And our inquiry
into this question amounts to this: Did the good men of our own and of formertimes
know how to transmit('nopaboivat)to another their virtue,or is it somethingwhich
cannot be transmitted or taken over from one person to another (Yjov srapaboT6V
aMp6r ov& Trr(xpoX'wrr6v
TorTovO 'a&XXw .otp' &XXov).That is the question Meno and
I have been discussing all this time.'9
By explaining the question whether virtue is teachable in terms of the
notion of transmission,Socrates gives a signal that it is the sophistical
conception of teaching which is operativethroughoutthe argument.20If
this is so, there is no need to interpretthe argumentas an attemptto prove
that virtue is not teachablesimpliciter.This argumentseems to parallelthe
earlier argumentthat knowledge is not teachable.In both cases the con-
clusion is meant to apply only to the sophisticalconceptionof teaching.
The argument, when understood in this particular way, expresses
Socrates' conviction that virtue cannot be taught in the way that the
sophistsclaim to teach it, and is thereforeseriouslymeant.But isn'ttherea
danger that Meno will misunderstandthe argumentand come awaywith
the false opinion that virtue is not teachablesimpliciter?There is no such
dangerbecause of the natureof Meno'sbeliefs. His settledopinionsprove
to be unshakeable,even under the pressureof Socraticrefutation.21Once
this becomes clear, all that Socratescan do is arguewithin the framework
of those fixed opinions. One such fixed opinion is Meno'slimitedconcep-
tion of teaching. If Socratesarguedthat virtue is teachable,Meno would
probably come away with the false opinion that it is teachable in the
sophisticalsense. If he can be persuadedthatvirtueis not teachable,he will
come away from the discussionwith a trueopinion,givenhis conceptionof
teaching.
The argumentcan be characterizedas ad hominemin the sense that it
appeals to Meno's limited notion of teaching.The reader,realizingthis,
sees that the argumentdoes not establish,and is not intendedto establish,
that virtue is not teachablesimpliciter.This argumentis thereforenot at
odds with the thesis that knowledgeis a sufficientconditionof virtue.
The short argument (at 89 a-b) purportingto show that virtue is not
possessed by nature also seems ad hominem.Socratessays that if virtue
were possessed by nature,we would be able to recognizethose who were
naturallyvirtuous in their youth, and then we could set them apartand
protect them from corruptinginfluences so that when they came of age
they might be useful to the city. But obviously this is not feasible, and
thereforevirtuecannot be possessedby nature.
A strikingfeatureof this argumentis the underlyingconceptionof what

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it is to have something by nature. It is apparently assumed that if a
characteristicis possessedby nature,all that is requiredfor its full devel-
opment is that it be protected from destructiveinfluences. Now some
characteristicswhich we call "natural"or "inborn"are undoubtedlylike
this (e.g., being wittyor having a good sense of humor),but many are not.
For instance,some individualsare naturallygifted with a talent for music
or art,but this talentwill not develop very far withouttraining.
The idea underlyingthe argumentis that if somethingis possessedby
nature,thereis no need to teach it. This narrowconceptionof what it is to
have somethingby natureis just what we would expect from Meno. We
noted earlierthat he regardsteaching and nature as mutually exclusive
ways of coming to possess some characteristic,and this is to hold that if
somethingis possessedby naturethereis no need to teach it. Accordingto
the Socratic view, on the other hand, something's being possessed by
naturedoes not ruleout its being teachable.
Since the way ""nature" is used in the argumentfits Meno'sview but not
Socrates',I suggestthat this argumentis also ad hominem.Here again the
readercan see what Meno cannot:the argumentdoes not establish,and is
not intendedto establish,thatvirtueis not possessedby naturesimpliciter.
My interpretationof these two argumentsseems to be leading to the
conclusion that virtue is teachable in the Socratic way, and that it is
possessedby naturein the way that is compatiblewith its being teachable.
I believethisconclusionis correctas an interpretationof Socrates'position
in the Meno,but it needs one importantqualification.In order to explain
this, I shallgive a sketchof the resultsof the final sectionof the dialogue.22
Since nothingbut knowledgeis teachable(87 c), if virtueis teachablein
the Socraticway, it must be some form of knowledge.But Socratespoints
out later in the dialogue that a man's goodness may rest on true opinion
rather than knowledge (97 a-c, 98 c). Knowledge is therefore not a
necessaryconditionof virtue, and virtue cannot simply be equivalentto
some formof knowledge.23
Thatwhichensuresrightconductand goodnessin an individualmay be
either true opinion or knowledge.Thereforethere would seem to be two
kindsof virtue,one equivalentto trueopinion and the otherequivalentto
knowledge.24According to Socrates,virtue which is equivalent to true
opinionis acquiredby "divinedispensation"(99 c-e).25The virtuewhichis
equivalentto knowledgewill be both "teachable"and "possessedby na-
ture"in the Socraticway of understandingthese expressions.26

Universityof Virginia

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1 Page numbers in parenthesesrefer to the Meno throughout.
2 Among those who think it is not meant seriouslyare A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and
his Work, Seventh Edition, London, 1960, 144-45, and F. M. Cornford Principium
Sapentiae, Cambridge, 1952, 160. R. S. Blucki Plato's Meno, Cambridge, 1961, 20-22)
argues that it is meant seriously. For more on Bluck'sinterpretation,see below, n. 20.
3 See J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Learning as Recollection", in Plato I: Metaphysicsand
Epistemology,ed. Gregory Vlastos, Garden City, 1971, 54.
4 See 85 d-86 b and 82 a.
s Indeed one might argue that Socratesasks such leading questionsthat thereis reallyno
difference between his "guidance" and someone's telling the boy the answers at each
stage. It is true that Socratesgenerallyindicatesthe answerhe wants by his formulationof
the question. However he leads the boy into severaltraps(82 e, 83 d-e), and his reasonfor
doing this is presumablyto get the boy to think carefullybefore answering.(Cf. Gregory
Vlastos, "Anamnesis in the Meno" Dialogue 4 (1964) 159.)
6 For the sake of convenience, I shall use "recollection passage" to refer to Socrates'
descriptionof the theoryof recollectionas well as his questioningof the slave boy (81 a-86
c).
7 Cf. Bluck, op. cit., 297: "If 'teaching'is taken in the narrowersense, as the handingout
of information in a set of propositions- the sense in which Socratesdeliberatelyuses the
word here - then the slave is, indeed, not being 'taught'."After noting that Socratesuses
"teaching"in this narrow sense, Bluck drops the matter; he does not ask why Socrates
does this.
8 Bluck says, "We might feel inclined to say that Socrateshas 'taught'the slave ... But he
has not taught him in the sophisticway, simply stating a propositionthat he mustaccept;
he has shown him, or taught him in the best modern way", op. cit., p. 296. I agree with
Bluck,but I think we may go furtherand reasonablyaffirmthat Plato intendedthe reader
to have the reactionwhich Bluck reports.
9 i trustthat the other possibility- that Socrateshas
simply forgottenwithinthe space of
a few pages his earlier claim that there is no such thing as teaching - need not be taken
seriously.
10 See, e.g., Protagoras 313 c, Republic 518 b-d, and Sophist 224 a-d.
"1 For example, he says at 87 c that the only thing taught to men is knowledge. In other
words, knowledge can be taught.
12 In one place Socratesdescribes the boy as possessing knowledge of geometrypriorto

being questioned (85 d 9-13). But he also says that what the boy has possessed all along
are opinions, which, with the proper sort of questioning and thinking, will become
knowledge (85 c, 86 a 6-8). In either case it would be natural to describe Socrates as
claiming that knowledge is innate.
13 PerhapsSocrates implies that a certain kind of practicemay also be involvedwhen he
says that through repeatedquestioning the slave boy's true opinions will be turned into
knowledge (85 c).
14 70 a 1-4. The translationis
by W. R. M. Lamb in the Loeb edition.
15 To explain: Anything which is teachable must be a kind of knowledge (87 c); all
knowledge is innate, and in that sense possessed by nature; thereforeanything which is
teachable must be possessed by nature in the same sense.
16 Socratesexplicitly affirms this at 87 c; cf. Protagoras361 b.
17 At 98 c 8-10 Socratessays that it is not only throughknowledge that men will be good,

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but also throughtrue opinion. He thus implies that knowledge is a sufficientcondition of
virtue.
18 See, e.g., Republic413 a, Protagoras345 b.
19 98 a 6-b 6. The translationis mine. Cf. Euthydemus273 d.
20 Bluck notes that the terms rrffapa8or6v and 'raparXprrrr0v
suggest the sophisticalconcep-
tion of teaching,but he contends that the argumentis not limited to sophisticalteaching
(op. cit., 21-25). He interpretsthe conclusion of the argumentas "virtueis not at present
teachableby any method."The conclusion, as he interpretsit, is not in conflict with the
Socraticdictum that virtue is knowledge because it does not rule out the possibility of
virtue being teachable at some future time. The problem with Bluck's interpretationis
that Socratesnowhere restrictshis conclusion to the present.If Socrates'use of the terms
Vapa8oTov and apaX'rr'r6vis not meant to indicate that the argumentis restrictedto the
sophistical conception of teaching, then why does Socrates emphasize them in this
passage?
21 For instance, at 86 c-d Meno repeats his opening question, rejecting Socrates' sug-
gestion that they first try to discover the nature of virtue. He still considersvirtue being
teachableas a live option, even though he seemed to accept Socrates'claim that teaching
is impossible.Socrates'successwith the slave boy (see esp. 84 a-d) is perhapsintended to
emphasizeby contrastthe "unteachability"of Meno.
22 1 should emphasize the sketchinessof what follows. It seemed desirable to give some
idea of how I think my findings fit with the concluding section of the dialogue, and yet a
detailed discussionof these matterswould not be within the scope of this paper.
23 It might be suggested that Socrates only maintains that true opinion is a sufficient
condition of right conduct(see esp. 97 b 9 - c 2), not that it is a sufficient condition of
virrtue.But at 98 c-d he says that men are good throughtrueopinion, and he tends to use
the expression"good men" to mean men with virtue (e.g., 94 b, 94 d-e). So he seems to
maintainthat true opinion is a sufficient condition both of rightconduct and virtue.
24 See Bluck, op. cit., 40-43, and A. E. Taylor, op. cit., 145.
25 On my interpretation,true opinion (and the correspondingform of virtue) should be
possessedby nature,since is innate accordingto the theory of necolection (see above, n.
12).PerhapsSocrates'point in saying that it comes by "divine dispensation"is that,given
the lack of permanenceof true opinion (97 d - 98 a), those who manage to held on to it
must be regardedas very fortunate(cf. Republic 492 a - 493 a).
26 1 am grateful to Anthony Woozley, Gregory Vlastos, John Stevenson and Robert
Bolton for helpful commentson an earlierdraft of this essay.

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