[No.L17144.

October28,1960]
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN,
LEONZ.GUINTO,JR.,VICENTEL.PERALTA,FAUSTINOTOBIA,
LORENZOG.TEVES,JOSEJ.ROY,FAUSTODU
864
864 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
GENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN
ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNANDEZ, ,and EUGENIO S.
BALTAO,intheircapacityas'membersoftheSpecialCommitteecreated
byHouseResolutionNo.59,respondents.
1. 1.
CONSTITUTIONALLAW;CONGRESS;PARLIAMENTARYIMMUNITYOF
MEMBERS,NOTABSOLUTE.Whileparliamentaryimmunityguarantees
thelegislatorcompletefreedomofexpressionwithoutfearofbeingmade
responsibleincriminalorcivilactionsbeforethecourtsoranyotherforum
outsideoftheCongressionalHall,however,itdoesnotprotecthimfrom
responsibilitybeforethelegislativebodyitselfwheneverhiswordsand
conductareconsideredbythelatterdisorderlyorunbecomingamember
thereof.Forunparliamentaryconduct,membersofCongresscanbecensured,
committedtoprison,suspended,evenexpelledbythevotesoftheircolleagues.
2. 2.
ID.;ID.;PARLIAMENTARYRULES;FAILURETOCONFORMTORULES,
EFFECTOF.Parliamentaryrulesaremerelyprocedural,andwiththeir
observance,thecourtshavenoconcern.Theymaybewaivedordisregardedby
thelegislativebody.Consequently,merefailuretoconformtoparliamentary
usagewillnotinvalidatetheactiontakenbyadeliberatebodywhenthe
requisitenumberofmembershaveagreedtoaparticularmeasure.
3. 3.
ID.;ID.;POWEROFCONGRESSTODETERMINEDISORDERLY
BEHAVIOUROFMEMBERS;SEPARATIONOFPOWERS.TheHouseof
Representativesisthejudgeofwhatconstitutesdisorderlybehaviour.The
courtswillnotassumeajurisdictioninanycasewhichwillamounttoan
interferencebythejudicialdepartmentwiththelegislature.
4. 4.
 ID.;ID.;ID.;PERSONALATTACKUPONCHIEFEXECUTIVE
CONSTITUTESDISORDERLYBEHAVIOUR.TheHouseof
RepresentativesoftheUnitedStateshastakenthepositionthatpersonal
attacksupontheChiefExecutiveconstitutesunparliamentaryconductor
breachoforder.Andinseveralinstances,ittookactionagainstoffenders,even
afterotherbusinesshadbeenconsidered.
5. 5.
ID.;ID.;POWEROFCONGRESSTOSUSPENDITSMEMBERS.Whileunder
theJonesLaw,theSenatehadnopowertosuspendappointivemember
(Alejandrinovs.Quezon,46Phil.,83),atpresentCongresshastheinherent
legislativeprerogativeofsuspensionwhichtheConstitutiondidnotimpair.
865
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ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory relief and/or
certiorariandprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunction.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
A.Padilla,F.A.RodrigoandT.T.Quiazon,Jr.,forpetitioner.
AntonioY.dePioinhisownbehalf.
F.S.Abeleda,A.B.Fernandez,E.S.BaltaoandTeclaSanAndresZiga
intheirownbehalf.
C.T.VillarealandR.D.Bagatsingasamicicuriae.
BENGZON,J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this

Courtaverifiedpetitionfor"declaratoryrelief,certiorariandprohibition
withpreliminaryinjunction"againstCongressmanSalipadaK.Pendatun
and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members 01 the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentaryimmunity;healsoasked,principally,thatsaidmembersof
thespecialcommitteebeenjoinedfromproceedinginaccordancewithit,
particularlytheportionauthorizingthemtorequirehimtosubstantiatehis
chargesagainstthePresident,withtheadmonitionthatifhefailedtodo
so,hemustshowcausewhytheHouseshouldnotpunishhim.
ThepetitionattachedacopyofHouseResolutionNo.59,thepertinent
portionsofwhichreadasfollows:
"WHEREAS,on the 23rd dayof June, 1960,the Honorable SergioOsmea, Jr.,
MemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesfromtheSecondDistrictoftheprovinceof
Cebu,tookthefloorofthisChamberontheonehourprivilegetodeliveraspeech,
entitledAMessagetoGarcia;'
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second
DistrictofCebustatedthefollowing:
*******

"Thepeople,Mr.President,havebeenhearingofuglyreportsthatunderyour
unpopularadministrationthefreethingstheyusedto
866
866 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
getfromthegovernmentarenowforsaleatpremiumprices.Theysaythateven
pardonsareforsale,andthatregardlessofthegravityorseriousnessofacriminal
case,theculpritcanalwaysbebailedoutforeverfromjailaslongashecancome
acrosswithahandsomedole.Iamafraid,suchananomaloussituationwouldreflect
badlyonthekindofjusticethatyouradministrationisdispensing.***
WHEREAS,thechargesofthegentlemanfromtheSecondDistrictofCebu,if
made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of the
President,whichistheonevisiblesymbolofthesovereigntyoftheFilipinopeople,
andwouldexposesaidofficetocontemptanddisrepute;***
Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen
MemberstobeappointedbytheSpeaker be, andthesame herebyis, createdto
investigatethetruthofthechargesagainstthePresidentofthePhilippinesmadeby
HonorableSergioOsmea,Jr.,inhisprivilegespeechofJune23,1960,andforsuch
purposeitisauthorizedtosummonHonorableSergioOsmea,Jr.,toappearbeforeit
tosubstantiatehischarges,aswellastoissuesubpoenaand/orsubpoenaducestecum
to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers
beforeit,andifHonorableSergioOsmea,Jr.,failstodosotorequirehimtoshow
causewhyheshouldnotbepunishedbytheHouse.Thespecialcommitteeshall
submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournmentofthepresentspecialsessionoftheCongressofthePhilippines."
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged: first, the
Resolutionviolatedhisconstitutionalabsoluteparliamentaryimmunityfor
speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionableconduct;andthird,afterhisallegedlyobjectionablespeechand
words,theHousetookupotherbusiness,andRuleXVII,sec.7ofthe
RulesoftheHouseprovidesthatifotherbusinesshasintervenedafterthe
Memberhadutteredobnoxiouswordsindebate, heshallnotbeheld to
answertherefornorbesubjecttocensurebytheHouse.
Althoughsomemembersofthecourtexpresseddoubtsofpetitioner's
causeofactionandtheCourt'sjurisdiction,themajoritydecidedtohear
thematterfurther,andrequiredrespondentstoanswer,withoutissuingany
preliminaryinjunction.Evidentlyawareofsuchcircumstance
867
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al.
with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent
adjournmentofthelegislativesession,thespecialcommitteecontinuedto
performitstask,andaftergivingCongressmanOsmeaachancetodefend
himself,submitteditsreportonJuly18,1960,findingsaidcongressman
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the
House approved on the same daybefore closing its sessionHouse
ResolutionNo.175,declaringhimguiltyasrecommended,andsuspending
himfromofficeforfifteenmonths.
Thereafter,onJuly19,1960,therespondents(withtheexceptionof
CongressmenDePio,Abeleda,SanAndresZiga,FernandezandBaltao)1
filedtheiranswer,challengedthejurisdictionofthisCourttoentertainthe
petition,defendedthepowerofCongresstodisciplineitsmemberswith
suspension,upheldHouseResolutionNo.175andtheninvitedattentionto
the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18,1960, the
Committeewhose members are the sole respondentshad thereby
ceasedtoexist.
 ThereisnoquestionthatCongressmanOsmea,inaprivilegespeech
delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
againstthePresidentwhicharequotedinResolutionNo.59,andthathe
refusedtoproducebeforetheHouseCommitteecreatedforthepurpose,
evidencetosubstantiatesuchimputations.Thereisalsonoquestionthat
forhavingmadetheimputationsandforfailingtoproduceevidencein
supportthereof,hewas,byresolutionoftheHouse,suspendedfromoffice
foraperiodoffifteenmonths,forseriousdiorderlybehaviour.
ResolutionNo.175statesinpart:
"WHEREAS,theSpecialCommitteecreatedunderandbyvirtueofResolutionNo.
59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of
seriousdiorderlybehaviourformakingwithoutbasisintruthandinfact,scurrilous,
malicious,recklessand
______________

1These,exceptCongressmanAbeleda,sharetheviewsofpetitioner.

868
868 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
irresponsiblechargesagainstthePresidentofthePhilippinesinhisprivilegespeech
ofJune23,1960;and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and
degradedthedignityoftheHouseofRepresentatives:Now,Therefore,beit
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives, That Representative Sergio
Osmea,Jr.,be,asheherebyis,declaredguiltyofseriousdisorderlybehaviour;and
***."
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
wordsspokenintheHouse,heoughtnottobequestioned;(2)thathis
speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined
therefor,theHousehadlostthepowertodosobecauseithadtakenup
otherbusinessbeforeapprovingHouseResolutionNo.59.Now,hetakes
the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution,tosuspendoneofitsmembers.
 Section15,ArticleVIofourConstitutionprovidesthat"foranyspeech
or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives"shallnotbequestionedinanyotherplace."Thissection
wastakenorisacopyofsec.6,clause1ofArt.1oftheConstitutionof
the United States. In that country, the provision has always been
understoodtomeanthatalthoughexemptfromprosecutionorcivilactions
for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless,bequestionedinCongressitself.Observethat"theyshallnot
bequestionedinanyotherplace"thanCongress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a
memberresponsible"forwordsspokenindebate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a f
undamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democraticworld.Asoldasthe
869
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OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
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English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representativeofthepublictodischargehispublictrustwithfirmnessand
success"for"itisindispensablynecessarythatheshouldenjoythefullest
libertyofspeech,andthatheshouldbeprotectedfromtheresentmentof
everyone,howeverpowerful,towhomtheexerciseofthatlibertymay
occasionoffense." 2 Suchimmunityhascometothiscountryfromthe
practicesofParliamentasconstruedandappliedbytheCongressofthe
UnitedStates.Itsextentandapplicationremainnolongerindoubtinsofar
asrelatedtothequestionbeforeus.Itguaranteesthelegislatorcomplete
freedomofexpressionwithoutfearofbeingmaderesponsibleincriminal
or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
CongressionalHall.Butitdoesnotprotecthimfromresponsibilitybefore
thelegislativebodyitselfwheneverhiswordsandconductareconsidered
bythelatterdisorderlyorunbecomingamemberthereof.IntheUnited
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was
censuredforusingthefollowinglanguageontheflooroftheHouse:"A
monstrosity,ameasurethemostinfamousofthemanyinfamousactsof
theinfamousCongress."(Hinds'Precedents,Vol.2,pp.798799).Two
othercongressmenwerecensuredforemployinginsultingwordsduring
debate.(2HindsPrecedents,799801).Inonecase,amemberofCongress
was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but
invokedhisparliamentaryprivilege.TheCommitteerejectedhisplea.(3
Hinds'Precedents123124.)
Forunparliamentaryconduct,membersofParliamentorofCongress
havebeen,orcouldbecensured,committedtoprison 3,suspended,even
expelledbythevotesoftheircolleagues.Theappendixtothisdecision
amplyattests
_______________

2Tenneyvs.Brandhove,341U.S.367.

3Kilbournvs.Thompson,103U.S.189;Hissvs.Barlett&Gray.468,63Am.Dec.768,

770.
870
870 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the
traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
againstitsmembers, includingimprisonment,suspensionorexpulsion. It
mentionsoneinstanceofsuspensionofalegislatorinaforeigncountry.
Andtocitealocalillustration,thePhilippineSenate,inApril1949,
suspendedasenatorforoneyear.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United
Statesshallapplyinasupplementarymannertoitsproceedings.
Thisbringsupthethirdpointofpetitioner:theHousemaynolonger
takeactionagainstme,heargues,becauseaftermyspeech,andbefore
approvingResolutionNo.59,ithadtakenupotherbusiness.Respondents
answerthatResolutionNo.59wasunanimouslyapprovedbytheHouse,
thatsuchapprovalamountedtoasuspensionoftheHouseRules,which
accordingtostandardparliamentarypracticemaybedonebyunanimous
consent.
 Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspend the
operationofitsRules,itmaynot,however,affectpastactsorrenewits
righttotakeactionwhichhadalreadylapsed.
Thesituationmightthusbecomparedtolaws4extendingtheperiodof
limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had
lapsed.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshasupheldsuchlawsas
againstthecontentionthattheyimpairedvestedrightsinviolationofthe
FourteenthAmendment(Campbell vs. Holt,115U.S.620).Thestates
hold divergent views. Atany rate, courts havedeclared that "the rules
adoptedbydeliberativebodiesaresubjecttorevocationmodificationor
waiverat
______________

4RulesRulesoftheHousehavenottheforceoflaw,buttheyaremerelyinthenatureof

bylawsprescribedfortheorderlyandconvenientconductoftheirownproceedings.(67
CorpusJurisSecundum,p.870)
871
VOL.109, 871
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has been said that
"Parliamentaryrulesaremerelyprocedural,andwiththeirobservance,the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislativebody."Consequently,"merefailuretoconformtoparliamentary
usagewillnotinvalidatetheaction(takenbyadeliberativebody)whenthe
requisitenumberofmembershaveagreedtoaparticularmeasure."6
ThefollowingisquotedfromareporteddecisionoftheSupremeCourt
ofTennessee:
"Therulehereinvokedisoneofparliamentaryprocedure,anditisuniformlyheld
thatitiswithinthepowerofalldeliberativebodiestoabolish,modify,orwaivetheir
ownrulesofprocedure,adoptedfortheorderlyconductofbusiness,andassecurity
againsthastyaction."(Bennetvs.NewBedford,110Mass,433;Holtvs.Somerville,
127Mass.408,411;CityofSadaliavs.Scott,104Mo.App.595,78S.W.276;Ex
parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N.Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of
Lowell,196Mass.220,230.81N.E.977,124Am.St.Rep.543,12Ann.Cas.1109;
CityofCorinthvs.Sharp,107Miss.696,65So.888;McGrawvs.Whitson,69lowa,
348,28N.W.632;Tuellvs.MeachamContractingCo.145Ky.181,186,140S.W.
159, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Taken' from the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville,78SouthWesternReporter,p.584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman
StanberyofOhio,whoinsultedtheSpeaker,forwhichActaresolutionof
censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the
argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks.(2Hinds'Precedentspp.799800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct f or which Osmea may be
disciplined,manyargumentsproandconhavebeenadvanced.Webelieve,
however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour,notonlybecausetheConstitutionhasconferredjurisdiction
______________

567CorpusJurisSecundum,p.870.

6SouthGeorgiaPowervs.Bauman,169Ga.649;151S.W.515.

872
872 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depictedinblackandwhiteforpresentationto,andadjudicationbythe
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmea's conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
therebyhaveassumedappellatejurisdiction,whichtheConstitutionnever
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The
theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
demandsinsuchsituationaprudentrefusaltointerfere.Eachdepartment,
ithasbeensaid,hasexclusivecognizanceofmatterswithinitsjurisdiction
andissupremewithinitsownsphere.(Angaravs.ElectoralCommission,
63Phil.,139.)
"SEC.200.JudicialInterferencewithLegislature.Theprincipleiswellestablished
thatthecourtswillnotassumeajurisdictioninanycasewhichwillamounttoan
interferencebythejudicialdepartmentwiththelegislaturesinceeachdepartmentis
equallyindependentwithinthepowersconferreduponitbytheConstitution.***
"Thegeneralrulehasbeenappliedinothercasestocausethecourtstorefuseto
interveneinwhatareexclusivelylegislativefunctions.Thus,wherethestateSenateis
giventhepowertoexpelamember,thecourtswillnotreviewitsactionorrevise
evenamostarbitraryorunfairdecision"(11Am.Jur.,Const.Law,sec.200,p.902.)
[ItalicsOurs.]
TheabovestatementofAmericanlawmerelyabridgedthelandmarkcase
ofCliffordvs.French.7In1905,severalsenatorswhohadbeenexpelledby
theStateSenateofCaliforniaforhavingtakenabribe,filedmandamus
proceedingstocompelreinstatement,allegingtheSenatehadgiventhem
nohearing,norachancetomakedefense,besidesfalsityofthechargesof
bribery.TheSupremeCourtofCaliforniadeclinedtointerfere,explaining
inorthodoxjuristiclanguage:
_______________

7146Cal.604;69L,R.A.556.

873
VOL.109, 873
OCTOBER28,
1960
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al.
"Underourformofgovernment,thejudicialdepartmenthasnopowertoreviseeven
themostarbitraryandunfairactionoftheIegislativedepartment,orofeitherhouse
thereof,takinginpursuanceofthepowercommittedexclusivelytothatdepartment
bytheConstitution.Ithasbeenheldbyhighauthoritythat,evenintheabsenceofan
expressprovisionconferringthepower,everylegislativebodyinwhichisvestedthe
generallegislativepowerofthestatehas theimplied powertoexpelamemberfor
anycausewhichitmaydeemsufficientInHissvs.Barlett,3Gray473,63Am.Dec.
768,thesupremecourtofMass.says,insubstance,thatthispower isinherentin
everylegislativebody;thatitisnecessarytoenablethebody'toperform its high
functions, and isnecessarytothesafetyof the state;''Thatitisapowerofself
protection,andthatthelegislativebodymustnecessarilybethesolejudge of the
exigencywhichmayjustifyandrequireitsexercise. '*** Thereisnoprovision
authorizingcourtstocontrol,direct,supervise,orforbidtheexercisebyeitherhouse
of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department andtherefore, inthe exercise of the power thus committedto it,the
senate is supreme. Anattemptbythiscourttodirectorcontrolthelegislature,or
eitherhousethereof,intheexerciseofthepower,wouldbean attempttoexercise
legislativefunctions,whichitisexpresslyforbiddentodo."
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our
opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although
referringtoexpulsion,theymayaswellbeappliedtootherdisciplinary
action.Theirgistasappliedtothecaseatbar:theHousehasexclusive
power;thecourtshavenojurisdictiontointerfere.
Ourrefusaltointervenemightimpresssomereadersassubconscious
hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the
legislativechamber.Nothingofthatsort:wemerelyrefusetodisregardthe
allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain.Indeed,intheinterestofcomity,wefeelboundtostatethatina
conscientioussurveyofgoverningprinciplesand/orepisodicillustrations,
wefoundtheHouseofRepresentativesoftheUnitedStatestakingthe
positiononatleasttwooccasions,that personalattacksupontheChief
Executiveconstituteunparliamentaryconductor
874
874 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
breachoforder.8Andinseveralinstances,ittookactionagainstoffenders,
evenafterotherbusinesshadbeenconsidered.9
Petitioner'sprincipalargumentagainsttheHouse'spowertosuspendis
theAlejandrinoprecedent.In1924,SenatorAlejandrinowas,byresolution
of the Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaultedanothermemberofthatBodyforcertainphrasesthelatterhad
utteredinthecourseofadebate.TheSenatorappliedtothisCourtfor
reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this
Courtheldthatinviewoftheseparationofpowers,ithadnojurisdiction
tocompeltheSenatetoreinstatepetitioner,itneverthelesswentontosay
theSenatehadnopowertoadopttheresolutionbecausesuspensionfor12
monthsamountedtoremoval,andtheJonesLaw(underwhichtheSenate
wasthenfunctioning)gavetheSenatenopowertoremoveanappointive
member, likeSenatorAlejandrino.TheJonesLawspecificallyprovided
that"eachhousemaypunishitsmembersfordisorderlybehaviour,and,
withtheconcurrenceoftwothirdsvotes,expelan elective member(sec.
18).Noteparticularlytheword"elective."
TheJonesLaw,itmustbeobserved,empoweredtheGovernorGeneral
toappoint"withoutconsentoftheSenateandwithoutrestrictionasto
residence senators * * * who will, in his opinion, best represent the
TwelfthDistrict."AlejandrinowasoneappointiveSenator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that
"suspensiondeprivestheelectoraldistrictofrepresentationwithoutthat
districtbeingaffordedanymeansbywhichtofillthatvacancy."Butthat
remarkshouldbeunderstoodtoreferparticularlytotheappointive
______________

8 Canno'sPrecedents(1936)par.2497)WilliamWillet,Jr.ofNewYork);par.2498

(LouisT.McFaddenofPensylvania).
9Constitution,Jefferson'sManualandtheHouseofRepresentativesbyLouisDeschler

(1955)p.382.
875
VOL.109, 875
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
senatorwhowasthentheaffectedpartyandwhowasbythesameJones
LawchargedwiththedutytorepresenttheTwelfthDistrictandmaybethe
viewsoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesoroftheGovernorGeneral,
whohadappointedhim.
Itmustbeobserved,however,thatatthattimetheLegislaturehadonly
thosepowerswhichweregrantedtoitbytheJonesLaw 10;whereasnow
the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a
sovereignnation,exceptasrestrictedbytheConstitution.Inotherwords,
intheAlejandrinocase,theCourtreachedtheconclusionthattheJones
Law didnotgivetheSenate thepoweritthenexercisedthepowerof
suspensionforoneyear.Whereasnow,aswefind,theCongresshasthe
inherentlegislativeprerogativeofsuspension11whichtheConstitutiondid
notimpair.Infact,asalreadypointedout,thePhilippineSenatesuspended
aSenatorfor12monthsin1949.
"TheLegislativepowerofthePhilippineCongressisplenary,subject
onlytosuchlimitationsasarefoundintheRepublic'sConstitution.Sothat
anypowerdeemedtobelegislativebyusageortradition,isnecessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise."(Veravs.Avelino,77Phil.,192,212.)
Inanyevent,petitioner'sargumentastothedeprivationofthedistrict's
representationcannotbemoreweightyinthematterofsuspensionthanin
thecaseofimprison
_______________

10TheJonesLawplaced"inthehandsofthepeopleofthePhilippinesaslargeacontrol

oftheirdomesticaffairsascanbegiventhem,withoutinthemeantimeimpairingtherights
ofsovereigntybythepeopleoftheUnitedStates."(Preamble).
11 Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to suspend as an
incident.(Burnapvs.U.S.252,U.S.512,64L.Ed.693,695.)Thisviewisdistinguishable
fromHebronvs.Reyes,104Phil.,175.(SeeGregoryvs.Mayor,21N.E.120)Butweneed
notexplainthisnow.Enoughtorelyoncongressionalinherentpower.
876
876 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
ment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper
cases,tocommitoneoftheirmemberstojail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition
intendedtopreventtheSpecialCommitteefromactinginpursuanceof
House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been
issued,theCommitteeperformeditstask,reportedtotheHouse,andthe
latterapprovedthesuspensionorder.TheHousehascloseditssession,and
theCommitteehasceasedtoexistassuch.Itwouldseem,therefore,the
case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of
course,thereisnothingtopreventpetitionerfromfilingnewpleadingsto
includeallmembersoftheHouseasrespondents,askforreinstatement
andtherebytopresentajusticiablecause.Mostprobableoutcomeofsuch
reformedsuit,however,willbeapronouncementoflackofjurisdiction,as
inVeravs.Avelino14andAlejandrinovs.Quezon.15
 At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important
questionsofpoliticallaw,theCourtthoughtitpropertoexpressatthis
timeitsconclusionsonsuchissuesasweredeemedrelevantanddecisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So
ordered.
Pars,C.J.,BautistaAngelo,Concepcin,Barrera,GutierrezDavid,
Paredes,andDizon,JJ.,concur.
_______________

REYES,J.B.L.,J.,dissenting:

IconcurwiththemajoritythatthepetitionfiledbyCongressmanOsmea,
Jr.doesnotmakeoutacaseeitherfordeclaratoryjudgmentorcertiorari,
sincethisCourt
_______________

12Seeappendixpar.VII,Cushing.

13 This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for
declaratoryjudgments,and(b)availabilityofcertiorariorprohibitionagainstrespondents
whoarenotexercisingjudicialorministerialfunctions(Rule67,secs.1and2).
14Seesupra.

1546Phil.,83.

877
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OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
hasnooriginaljurisdictionoverdeclaratoryjudgmentproceedings,and
certiorari is available only against bodies exercising judicial or quasi
judicialpowers.Therespondentcommittee,beingmerelyfactfinding,was
notproperlysubjecttocertiorari.
Isubmit,however,thatCongressmanOsmeawasentitledtoinvoke
theCourt'sjurisdictiononhispetitionforawritofprohibitionagainstthe
committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel,
ResolutionNo.175)constitutedanunlawfulattempttodivesthimofan
immunityfromcensureorpunishment,animmunityvestedunderthevery
RulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives.
HouseRuleXVII,onDecorumandDebates,initssectionV,provides
asfollows:
"IfitisrequestedthataMemberbecalledtoorderforwordsspokenindebate,the
Membermakingsuchrequestshallindicatethewordsexceptedto,andtheyshallbe
takendowninwritingbytheSecretaryandreadaloudtotheHouse;buttheMember
whoutteredthemshallnotbeheldtoanswer,norbesubjecttothecensureofthe
Housetherefor,iffurtherdebateorotherbusinesshasintervened."
Now,itisnotdisputedthatafterCongressmanOsmeahaddeliveredhis
speech andbeforethe Houseadopted, fifteendays later, theresolution
(No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and empowering it to
investigateandrecommendproperactioninthecase,theHousehadacted
onothermattersanddebatedthem.Thatbeingthecase,theCongressman,
evenbeforetheresolutionwasadopted,hadceasedtobeanswerablefor
thewordsutteredbyhiminhisprivilegespeech.Bytheexpresswording
oftheRules,hewasnolongersubjecttocensureordisciplinaryactionby
theHouse.Hence,theresolution,insofarasitattemptstodivesthimof
theimmunitysoacquiredandsubjecthimtodisciplineandpunishment,
when he was previously not so subject, violates the constitutional
inhibitionagainst expostfacto legislation,andResolutionsNos.59and
175arelegallyobnoxiousandin
878
878 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
validonthatscore.Theruleiswellestablishedthatalawwhichdeprives
anaccusedpersonofanysubstantialrightorimmunitypossessedbyhim
beforeitspassageisexpostfactoastoprioroffenses(Cor.Jur.Vol.16A,
section144,p.153;Peoplevs.McDonnell,11Fed.Supp.1015;Peoplevs.
Talkington,47Pac.2d368;U.S.vs.Garfinkel,69F.Supp.,849).
Theforegoingalsoanswersthecontentionthatsincetheimmunitywas
butaneffectofsection7ofHouseRuleXVII,theHousecould,atany
time,removeitbyamendingthoseRules,andResolutionsNos.59and
175effectedsuchanamendmentbyimplication.TherightoftheHouseto
amenditsRulesdoesnotcarrywithittherighttoretroactivelydivestthe
petitionerofanimmunityhehadalreadyacquired.TheBillofRightsis
againstit.
Itiscontendedthatastheliabilityforhisspeechattachedwhenthe
Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the House only
affectedtheprocedurefordealingwiththatliability.Butwhateverliability
CongressmanSergioOsmea,Jr.thenincurredwasextinguishedwhenthe
House thereafter considered other business; and this extinction is a
substantive right that can not be subsequently torn away to his
disadvantage.Onananalogousissue,thisCourt,inPeople vs. Parel,44
Phil.,437,hasruled:
"In regard to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal
actionspertainstoremedialandnotsubstantivelaw,itistobeobservedthatinthe
Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or prescription of actions are
invariably classified as substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the
provisionsfortheprescriptionofcriminalactionsinthePenalCodeandnotinthe
LeydeEnjuiciamientoCriminal/Thisisinrealityamorelogicallaw. Incriminal
casesprescriptionisnot,strictlyspeaking,amatterofprocedure;itbarsorcutsoff
therighttopunishthecrimeandconsequently,goesdirectlytothesubstanceofthe
action.***(Italicssupplied.)
Iseenosubstantialdifference,fromthestandpointoftheconstitutional
prohibitionagainstexpostfactolaws,
879
VOL.109, 879
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
thattheobjectionablemeasureshappentobeHouseResolutionsandnot
statutes.InsofarasthepositionofpetitionerOsmeaisconcerned,the
essentialpointisthatheisbeingsubjectedtoapunishmenttowhichhe
was formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted out a
suspension of privileges, that suspension is as much a penalty as
imprisonmentorafine,whichtheHousecouldhaveinflicteduponhim
haditbeensominded.Suchpunitiveactionisviolativeofthespirit,ifnot
of the letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post facto
legislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was inflicted in the
exerciseofdisciplinarypower."The expostfacto effectofalaw,"the
FederalSupremeCourthasruled,"cannotbeevadedbygivingcivilform
tothatwhichisessentiallycriminal"(Burgessvs.Salmon,97L.Ed.[U.S.]
1104,1106;Cummingsvs.Missouri,18L.Ed.276).
TheplainpurposeoftheimmunityprovidedbytheHouserulesisto
protectthefreedomofactionofitsmembersandtorelievethemfromthe
fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of
political convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. It is unrealistic to
overlookthat,withouttheimmunitysoprovided,nomemberofCongress
canremainfreefromthehauntingfearthathismostinnocuousexpressions
mayatanytimeafterwardsplacehiminjeopardyofpunishmentwhenever
a majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting sands of
politicalexpediencysodemand.Aruledesignedtoassurethatmembersof
theHousemayfreelyactastheirconscienceandsenseofdutyshould
dictate complements the parliamentary immunity from outside pressure
enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal
interpretationandapplication.
Thevariousprecedents,citedinthemajorityopinion,asinstancesof
disciplinary action taken notwithstanding intervening business, are not
trulyapplicable.OfthefiveinstancescitedbyDeschler(inhiseditionof
Jefferson's
880
880 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia involved also
printeddisparagingremarksbytherespondent(IIIHinds'Precedents,sec.
2637), so that the debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of
CongressmenWeaverandSparkswasoneofcensureforactualdisorderly
conduct(IIHinds,sec.1657);whilethecasesofCongressmenStanbery
of Ohio, AlexLongof Ohio, andof Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II
Hinds,secs.1248,1252and1655)weredecidedunderRule62oftheU.
S.HouseofRepresentativesasitstoodbeforethe1880amendments,and
wasdifferentlyworded.Thus,intheRousseaucase,therulingofSpeaker
Colfaxwastothefollowingeffect(IIHinds'Precedents,page1131):
"Thissixtysecondruleisdividedinthemiddlebyasemicolon,andtheChairasks
theattentionofthegentlemanfromIowa(Mr.Wilson)tothelanguageofthatrule,as
itsettlesthewholequestion:
"62.IfaMemberbecalledtoorderforwordsspokenindebate,thepersoncalling
himtoordershallrepeatthewordsexceptedto"
Thatis,the"callingtoorder"is"excepting"towordsspokenindebate"andthey
shallbetakendowninwritingattheClerk'stable;andnoMembershallbeheldto
answer,orbesubjecttothecensureoftheHouse,forwordsspokenindebate,ifany
otherMemberhasspoken,orotherbusinesshasintervened,afterthewordsspoken,
andbeforeexceptiontothemshallhavebeentaken."
Thefirstpartofthisruledeclaresthat"callingtoorder"is"exceptingtowords
spokenindebate."ThesecondpartoftheruledeclaresthataMembershallnotbe
heldsubjecttocensureforwordsspokenindebateifotherbusinesshasintervened
afterthewordshavebeenspokenandbefore"exception"tothemhasbeentaken.
ExceptiontothewordsofthegentlemanfromIowa(Mr.Grinnell)wastakenbythe
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Banks),thegentlemanfromKentucky(Mr.Rousseau),andalsobytheSpeakerofthe
House, as the records of the Congressional Globe will show. The distinction is
obviousbetweenthetwopartsoftherule.InthefirstpartitspeaksofaMember
exceptingtolanguageofanotherandhavingthewordstakendown.Inthelastpartof
theruleitsaysheshallnotbecensuredthereafterunlessexceptiontohiswordswere
taken;butitomitstoaddasanessentialconditionthatthewordsmustalso
881
VOL.109,OCTOBER 881
28,1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
havebeentakendown.Thesubstantialpoint,indeedtheonlypoint,requiredinthe
latterpartoftheruleis,thatexceptiontotheobjectionablewordsmusthavebeen
taken."
ThedifferencebetweentheRulesasinvokedinthesecasesandtheRules
of our House of Representatives is easily apparent. As Rule 62 of the
UnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesstoodbefore1880,allthatwas
required to preserve the disciplinary power of the House was that
exceptionshouldhavebeentakentotheremarksonthefloorbeforefurther
debate or other business intervened. Under the rules of the Philippine
House of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes absolute if
otherdebateorbusinesshastakenplacebeforethemotionforcensureis
made,whetherornotexceptionsorpointoforderhavebeenmadetothe
remarkscomplainedofatthetimetheywereuttered.
WhileitisclearthattheparliamentaryimmunityestablishedinArticle
VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the members being
questionedanddisciplinedbyCongressitselfforremarksmadeonthe
floor,thatdisciplinarypowerdoesnot,asIhavenoted,includetherightto
retroactivelyamendtherulessoastodivestamemberofanimmunity
already gained. And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the
effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of
Congressshouldbedeprivedofthesameprotection.Surelymembershipin
theLegislaturedoesnotmeanforfeitureofthelibertiesenjoyedbythe
individualcitizen.
"TheConstitutionempowerseachhousetodetermineitsrulesofproceedings.Itmay
notbyitsrulesignoreconstitutionalrestraintorviolatefundamentalrightsandthere
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
establishedbytheruleandtheresultwhichissoughttobeattained.Butwithinthese
limitationsallmattersofmethodareopentothedeterminationoftheHouse,anditis
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurateorevenmorejust."(U.S.vs.Ballin,Joseph&Co.,36LawEd.,324325.)
882
882 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
"Courtswillnotinterferewiththeactionofthestatesenateinreconsideringitsvote
onaresolutionsubmittinganamendmenttotheConstitution,whereitsactionwasin
compliance with its own rules, and there was no constitutional provision to the
contrary."(Crawfordvs.Gilchrist,64Fla.41,59So.963)(Italicssupplied.)
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the
Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it from
recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullity of the
questioned resolutions and of all action that has been taken up in
pursuancethereof.Althoughtherespondentcommitteehasbeendisbanded
afterthecasewasfiled,thebasicissuesremainsoimportantastorequire
adjudicationbythisCourt.
LABRADOR,J.,dissenting:
IfullyconcurintheabovedissentofMr.JusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,andI
venturetoadd:
Withinaconstitutionalgovernmentandinaregimewhichpurportsto
beoneoflaw,wherelawissupreme,eventheCongressintheexerciseof
thepowerconferreduponittodisciplineitsmembers,mustfollowthe
rulesandregulationsthatithaditselfpromulgatedforitsguidanceandfor
thatofitsmembers.TherulesinforceatthetimeCongressmanOsmea
delivered the speech declared by the House to constitute a disorderly
conductprovides:
"***buttheMemberwhoutteredthemshallnotbeheldtoanswer,norbesubjectto
thecensureoftheHousetherefor,iffurtherdebateorotherbusinesshasintervened."
(RuleXVII,Sec.7,Rules,HouseofRepresentatives.)
CongressmanOsmeadeliveredthespeechinquestiononJune23,1960.
ItwasonlyonJuly8,or15daysafterJune23,1960whentheHouse
createdthecommitteethatwouldinvestigatehim.Forfully15daysthe
Housetookupothermatters.Allthatwasdone,whilethespeechwas
beingdelivered,wastohavecertainportionsthereofdeleted.Iholdthat
pursuanttoitsownRulestheHouse
883
VOL.109, 883
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
may no longer punish Congressman Osmea f or the speech delivered
fifteendaysbefore.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman
Osmeaimmediatelyafteritsdelivery,excepttohavesomepartsofthe
speechdeleted,showsthatthemembersoftheHousedidnotthenconsider
Osmea'sspeechadisorderlyconduct.TheideatopunishCongressman
Osmea,whichcame15daysafter,was,therefore,anafterthought.Itis,
therefore,clearthatCongressmanOsmeaisbeingmadetoanswerforan
act,afterthetimeduringwhichhecouldbepunishedthereforhadlapsed.
ThemajorityopinionholdsthattheHousecanamenditsrulesanytime.
Wedonotdisputethisprinciple,butweholdthattheHousemaynotdoso
inutterdisregardofthefundamentalprincipleoflawthatanamendment
takesplaceonlyafteritsapproval,or,asinthiscase,totheextentof
punishinganoffenseafterthetimetopunishhadelapsed.Sincetherule,
that a member can be punished only before other proceedings have
intervened,wasinforceatthetimeCongressmanOsmeadeliveredhis
speech. the House may not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority
opinionthattherulelimitingtheperiodforimpositionofapenaltyfora
speech to the day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With due
respecttotheopinionofthemajority,wedonotthinkthatitismerelya
ruleofprocedure;webelieveitactuallyisalimitationofthetimeinwhich
theHousemaytakepunitiveactionagainstanoffendingmember;itisa
limitation(inreferencetotime)ontheliabilitytopunishment.AsMr.
Justice J.B.L.Reyes points out,the rule issubstantive,not merelya
proceduralprinciple,andmaynotbeignoredwheninvoked.
IfthisGovernmentisaGovernmentoflawsandnotofmen,thenthe
House should observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a
memberaftertheperiodfor
884
884 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
indictmentandpunishmenthadalreadypassed.Notbecausethesubjectof
thePhilippicisnolessthantheChiefMagistrateofthenationshouldthe
ruleoftheHousebeignoredbyitself.ItistruethatourGovernmentis
basedontheprincipleofseparationofpowersbetweenthethreebranches
thereof.IalsoagreetothecorollarypropositionthatthisCourtshouldnot
interferewiththelegislatureinthemanneritperformsitsfunctions;butI
alsoholdthattheCourtcannotabandonitsdutytopronouncewhatthelaw
iswhenanyofits(theHouse)members,oranyhumblecitizen,invokes
thelaw.
Congressman Osmea has invoked the protection of a rule of the
House.Ibelieveitisourboundendutytostatewhattherulebeinginvoked
byhimis,topointoutthefactthattheruleisbeingviolatedinmeetingout
punishment for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to
declarehisrightsundertherulesimplyonthebroadexcuseofseparation
ofpowers.Eventhelegislaturemaynotignoretheruleithaspromulgated
for the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a
coordinatebranchoftheGovernmentisinvolved,shouldnotdeterusfrom
performing our duty. We may not possess the power to enforce our
opinion if the House chooses to disregard the same. In such case the
membersthereofstandbeforethebarofpublicopiniontoanswerfortheir
act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm of
conduct.
Letitbeclearlyunderstoodthatthewriterofthisdissentpersonally
believesthatvituperousattacksagainsttheChiefExecutive,oranyofficial
or citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules,
promulgatedbytheHouseitself,fixtheperiodduringwhichpunishment
maybemetedout,saidRulesshouldbeenforcedregardlessofwhomay
beprejudicedthereby.Onlyinthatwaymaythesupremacyofthelawbe
maintained.
Petitiondismissed.
885
VOL.109, 885
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
APPENDIXSUSPENSIONOFMEMBEROFLEGISLATIVEBODY
1. I.
Whateverisspokeninthehouseissubjecttothecensureofthehouse;
andoffensesofthiskindhavebeenseverelypunishedbycallingthe
persontothebartomakesubmission,committinghimtoprison,
expellinghimfromthehouseorinflictingotherpunishment.(Mason,
ManualofLegislativeProcedure,pp.402403.)
2. II.
171.(1)IfaMemberisnamedbytheSpeaker,orbythechairmanofa
committeeofthewholeHouse,immediatelyafterthecommissionof
theoffenceofdisregardingtheauthorityofthechair,orof
persistentlyandwilfullyobstructingthebusinessoftheHouse,by
abusingtherulesoftheHouse,then
(i) If the offence has been committed by a Member in the House, the Speaker
forthwithputsthequestion,onamotionbeingmade,noamendment,adjournmentor
debatebeingallowed,thattheMember(naminghim)besuspendedfromtheservice
oftheHouse;and***
(2)ThesuspensionofaMemberonthefirstoccasioncontinuesuntilthe
fifthday,andonthesecondoccasionuntilthetwentiethdayonwhichthe
House sits after the day on which he was suspended, but on any
subsequent occasion it continues until the House resolves that such
suspension be terminated. A Member suspended under this rule must
forthwithquittheprecinctsoftheHouse.(HouseofCommons,Manualof
ProcedureinthePublicBusiness,p.114.)
1. III.
Inthecourseofthedebate,Mr.NelsonW.Aldrich,ofRhodeIsland,
readthefollowingfromCushing:
"ThepowertoexpelalsoincludesinitapowertodischargeaMember,forgood
cause, without inflicting upon him the censure and disgrace implied in the term
"expulsion',andthishasaccordinglybeendone,insomeinstancesbytheHouseof
Commons.AnalogoustotherightofexpulsionisthatofsuspendingaMemberfrom
theexerciseofhisfunctionsassuch,foralongerorshorter
886
886 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
period;whichisasentenceofmildercharacterthantheformer,thoughattendedwith
somewhatdifferenteffects;forduringthesuspensiontheelectorsaredeprivedofthe
servicesoftheirrepresentative,withoutpowertosupplyhisplace;buttherightsof
theelectorsarenomoreinfringedbythisproceedingthanbyanexerciseofthepower
toexpression."(HindsPrecedentsII,Sec.1665.
1. IV.
ThesuspensionofmembersfromtheserviceoftheHouseisanother
formofpunishment.(May'sParliamentaryPractice,p.53,citedby
Hinds,p.1141,Vol.II.)
2. V.
TheLeaderoftheHousethenmovesthattheMemberbesuspended
fromtheserviceoftheHouse,andthemotionmustbeputtothe
question'withoutamendment,adjournmentordebate.'
If the member is named in Committee of the whole House by the
Chairman,thelatterimmediatelysuspendstheproceedingsandreportsthe
circumstances to the House when the Speaker has resumed the Chair.
Fromthispointmattersproceedasdescribedabove.
 IftheHouseagreestothesuspension, theSpeakeragaindirectsthe
membertowithdrawand,ifhestillpersistsinrefusingtodoso,evenwhen
summonedundertheSpeaker'sordersbytheSergeantatArms,forceis
resortedto.Ifthisisnecessary,theSpeakercallstheattentionoftheHouse
tothefact,andinsuchacasethesuspensionofthememberisforthe
remainderofthesession.Thenormalperiodofsuspensionisnowfixedat
five sitting days for the first offence and twenty for the second, the
uncompleted portion of the sitting during which the offence was
committedcountingasoneday.Thefirstoffenceistakentomeanthefirst
duringthatsession.
Amember whoissuspended isnotexemptfromservingonaPrivate
Bill Committee but, apart from this exception, suspension from the
.serviceoftheHouseofCommonsmeansexclusionfromtheprecinctsof
thePalaceofWestminster.
A member guilty of a breach of privilege or contempt may be
suspendedwithoutbeingnamed,butinsucha
887
VOL.109, 887
OCTOBER28,
1960
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,et
al.
case the motion for his suspension would be subject to debate. The
practiceof'naming'amemberwasfirstintroducedbySpeakerLenthal
(q.v.)in1941.(AnEncyclopaediaofParliamentbyWildingandLaundy,
p.366.)
1. VI.
Offenceswhicharenotsufficientlygravetowarrantimprisonmentare
punishedbyadmonitiontoreprimand,thelatterbeingthemore
seriouspunishmentofthetwo.
***MembersofParliamentwhocommitoffencesareliabletotwof
urtherpenalties:suspensionfromtheserviceoftheHouseand
expulsion.(AnEncyclopediaofParliamentbyWildingandLaundy,
p.456.)
2. VII.
 Aportionofthemajority,Messrs.L.E.McComasofMaryland,AlbertJ.
BeverridgeofIndiana,andJ.C.PritchardofNorthCarolina,
submittedviewsinfavorofsuspensionofthetwosenators.After
discussingthepowertopunishgenerally,theysubmitted:
"* * * Like Parliament, it may imprison or expel a member for offenses. The
suspensionofmembersfromtheserviceoftheHouseisanotherformofpunishment.
(May'sParliamentaryPractice53).Thisauthorgivesinstancesofsuspensioninthe
seventeenthcenturyandshowsthefrequentsuspensionofmembersunderastanding
orderoftheHouseofCommons,passedFebruary23,1880."
SaysCushing,section280: "Membersmayalsobesuspended bywayof
punishmentfromtheirfunctionsas,such,eitherinwholeorinpartorfora
limitedtime.Thisisasentenceofamildercharacterthanexpulsion."
During the suspension, says Cushing, section 627, the electors are
deprivedoftheservicesoftheirrepresentativeswithoutpowertosupply
his place, but the rights of the electors are no more infringed by this
proceedingthanbyanexerciseofthepowertoimprison.(Vol.II,Hinds'
PrecedentsoftheHouseofRepresentatives,p.1141.)
VIII. Suspension from the service of the House was a punishment
employed by the House of Commons under its power of enforcing
disciplineamongitsMembers,longbeforeitwasprescribedbystanding
orderforparticularoffenses,suchasdisregardofauthorityoftheChair,or
obstruction,anditcanstillbeimposedatthediscretion
888
888 PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Osmea,Jr.vs.Pendatun,etal.
of the House, although, of course, not under the summary procedure
authorizedbythatstandingorder(seep.471).
In1641,Mr.GervaiseHolliswassuspendedbytheHouseduringthe
session.
In1643,SirNortonKnatchbullwassuspendedbytheHouseduringthe
pleasureoftheHouse.
Fornearlytwocenturiesthisformofpunishmenthadbeeninabeyance,
nocauseofsuspensionhavingoccurredsince1692.Butatthediscretion
oftheHouseon25ofJuly1877,asaresultofpersistentobstructionby
MemberswhosupportedParnell,Mr.SpeakerBrandgavethefollowing
ruling:
"The House is perfectly well aware that any Member persistently and wilfully
obstructingpublicbusinesswithoutjustandreasonablecauseisguiltyofacontempt
ofthisHouse,andisliabletopunishmentwhetherbycensure,suspensionfromthe
serviceoftheHouse,orcommitment,accordingtothejudgmentoftheHouse"(Parl.
Deb.[1877]235,c.1814).
On20February1911,Mr.Ginnell,aMemberwassuspendedforoneweek
asapunishmentforabreachofprivilegeinpublishingaletterreflecting
ontheSpeaker'sconductintheChair.C.J.(1911)37.
In February 1880, the procedure for suspending a Member for
particularoffenseswaslaid,downbyStandingOrderNo.22(seep.471),
and suspension under this Standing Order not infrequent. (The Law,
PrivilegesProceedingsUsageofParliament,6thEd.pp.4853,Fellows
andCocks.)
IX. Resp. having entered the Chamber of the New South Wales
Assembly,ofwhichhewasamember,withinaweekafterithadpasseda
resolutionthat hebe"suspendedfromtheservice oftheHouse,"hewas
removed therefrom and prevented from reentering it:Held: the
resolutionmustnotbeconstruedasoperatingbeyondthesittingduring
whichtheresolutionwaspassed.Burtonvs.Taylor(1886),11App.Cas.
197,P.C.AUS(CopiedfromEnglishandEmpireDigest(1927)Vol.36,
p.295.)
889
VOL.109, 889
OCTOBER31,
1960
Kapunan,etal.vs.Casilan
andCourtofAppeals