CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
G.R. No. 101789. April 28, 1993.
BHAGWAN RAMNANI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BUENAVENTURA
J. GUERRERO, as Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133,
SPOUSES CENON G. DIZON and JULIETTE B. DIZON, respondents.
On March 13, 1990, the spouses Juliette Dizon and Cenen Dizon filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati against the spouses Josephine Anne Ramnani and
Bhagwan Ramnani for the collection of a sum of money representing the alleged
unremitted value of jewelry received by Josephine from Juliette on consignment basis.
Josephine Ramnani submitted an answer with counterclaim 2 in which she alleged inter
alia:
(a) That although she did receive pieces of jewelry worth P934,347.00 from Dizon, the
latter had likewise received from her jewelries worth P1,671,842,00, including cash and
unpaid checks in the amount of P159,742.50;
(b) That she paid Dizon P50,000; and
(c) That Dizon still owes her P787,495.00;
The trial court set the case for pre-trial on August 14, 1990, 3 but the Ramnanis did not
appear. Consequently, they were declared in default. 4 On September 12, 1990, they
filed a motion to lift the order of default, but this was denied on November 20, 1990.
On October 26, 1990, conformably to the default order, evidence of the Dizon spouses
was received ex parte. On January 28, 1991, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered
judgment against the Ramnanis, holding them liable to the plaintiffs in the amounts of
P884,347.00, representing the principal obligation plus legal interest thereon from March
13, 1990, until fully paid; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. They were also required to pay P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs
of the suit.
The Ramnanis filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that a "personal
obligation contracted by the wife without the consent of the husband (was) being made
enforceable against the spouses' conjugal partnership despite absence of any allegation
and proof that the same redounded to the benefit of the family as required by Article 121
of the Family Code." 7 The motion was denied on April 11, 1991.
On April 29, 1991, Bhagwan Ramnani filed a petition for certiorari before the respondent
Court of Appeals imputing error to the trial court:
(1) in denying the motion to lift order declaring petitioner as in default despite a clear
showing of a meritorious defense;
(2) in not considering petitioner's reason for failure to attend pre-trial as excusable
neglect.
In a decision dated May 10, 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding
that certiorari was not the proper remedy. 9
The respondent court said:
Petitioners alleged that the respondent court erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction in assigning its Branch Clerk of Court as
the hearing commissioner for the purpose of the ex parte reception of plaintiffs' evidence
(par. 19, Petition); that the questioned Decision failed to specify whether defendants are
solidarily or only jointly liable (par. 20, Petition); and that petitioner had a valid and
meritorious defense (par. 21, Petition). These are matters that could very well be
ventilated in an ordinary appeal. It should be stressed that the writ of certiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be legally used for any other purpose (Silverio vs.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527). Mere error of judgment cannot be a proper subject of
the special civil action for certiorari (Zapata vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 56). Further, it is a
settled rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an perform the function of an
appeal (People vs. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415).
The petitioner has come to this Court to challenge that decision. He avers that the Court
of Appeals erred in upholding the refusal of the trial court to set aside the order of default
and the default judgment thereafter issued.
The basic rule is found in Section 2, Rule 20, viz: "A party who fails to appear at a pre-
trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default."
As held in Lina v. Court of Appeals, 10 the remedies available to a defendant in the
regional trial court who has been declared in default are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
1

answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a
meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
The first remedy was adopted by the petitioner but his motion to lift the order of default
was denied. According to the trial court:
Defendants' non-appearance is inexcusable. It is unbelievable their former lawyer did not
explain to them the mandatory character of their appearance. Their invocation of the
deteriorating health of defendant Josephine necessitating her trip abroad for appropriate
medical treatment, is unavailing. There is no medical certificate to attest such illness.
Besides, at the time of the hearing of the motion on October 19, 1990, counsel for the
defendants admitted that Josephine had not yet arrived from the States, despite their
averment in their motion she would "only be back late September or early October of this
year." This only indicates her light regard of her duty to appear in court. Moreover, the
other defendant Bhagwan Ramnani did not submit any other plausible explanation for his
absence in the pre-trial.
A satisfactory showing by the movant of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect is an indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a judgment of
default or the order of default. After going over the pleadings of the parties and the
decision of the respondent court, we find that the motion to lift the order of default was
properly denied for non-compliance with this requirement.
The defendants were less than conscientious in defending themselves and protecting
their rights before the trial court. They did not pay proper attention and respect to its
directive. The petitioner has not shown that his and his wife's failure to attend the pre-trial
hearing as required was due to excusable neglect, much less to fraud, accident or
mistake.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The petitioner insists, however, that they had a meritorious defense which the trial court
should not have disregarded. A meritorious defense is only one of the two conditions.
Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the private respondents did owe
Josephine Ramnani P900,000, as alleged in the counterclaim, that circumstance alone is
not sufficient to justify the lifting of the order of default and the default judgment. The
obvious reason is that a meritorious defense must concur with the satisfactory reason for
the non-appearance of the defaulted party. There is no such reason in this case.
The appropriate remedy is an ordinary appeal under Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court providing in part as follows:
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38.
In questioning the dismissal of its petition by the respondent court, the petitioner invokes
the case of Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Hontanosas, 11 where the
Court sustained the challenge to an order of default in a petition for certiorari rather than
in an ordinary appeal, which was held as not an adequate remedy.
That case is not applicable to the present petition. Certiorari was allowed in that case
because the petitioner was illegally declared in default. The Court held that, first, the
petitioner could not be compelled to attend an unnecessary second pre-trial after it had
indicated at the earlier pre-trial that there was no possibility of an amicable settlement;
second, the pre-trial was premature because the last pleading had not yet been filed at
the time; and third, there was insufficient notice of the pre-trial to the petitioner. In the
case at bar, no such irregularities in the pre-trial have been alleged by the petitioner.
As we held in Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC:
It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often is it overlooked, that the special civil
action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. The reason for the rule is simple. When a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari.
2
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Even on the supposition that certiorari was an appropriate remedy, the petition would still
fail because it has not been clearly shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to set aside the default order and the default judgment. We have
held in many cases, including Pahilanga v. Luna, 13 that:

It is within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of default and to permit
a defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary
period for the filing of the answer has expired, but it is not error, or an abuse of
discretion, on the part of the court to refuse to set aside its order of default and to refuse
to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for the delay in the filing of the
answer. In motions for reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the
burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being excused from not filing the
answer within the reglementary period as provided by the Rules of Court, otherwise,
these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure would be rendered
meaningless. Unless it is shown clearly that a party has justifiable reason for the delay
the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor.

The above doctrine is applicable to the inexcusable neglect of the herein petitioner and
his wife to appear at the pre-trial hearing duly scheduled and of which they were properly
notified.

We must, however, moderate the award of damages by the trial court as we feel it is
rather harsh upon the petitioner. In the exercise of our discretion, we hereby reduce the
moral damages to P20,000.00 and the attorney's fees to P10,000.00, and disallow the
exemplary damages. The rest of the award is approved.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified, with costs

against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

3

G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners, vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO
NODA & CO., LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second
Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for
certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting private
respondents' motion for new trial.
The issue in this case is whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be
extended.
Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the
period for appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform
period of fifteen days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where
the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a
notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no longer required except in
appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in
these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on
appeal is required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal
bond shall be required for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly
states, to avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under
the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice.
However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the
petition for certiorari and ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to
set aside the judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect,
and, consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be
granted.
In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a
motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not
authorized or is not in order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been
dismissed on the basis of the original decision in this case.
After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the
Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the
original decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is
that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they
availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the
law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a
pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and
since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final
disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order.
Hence, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on
this point, as follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya
vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA
753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the
original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a
motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20,
1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period
for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals,
June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973,
53 SCRA 228).
4
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of, and to set aside, the decision of August
5, 1985 is granted and the petition is dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

5

G.R. No. L-34007 May 25, 1979
MARCELINO BELAMIDE, ALFREDO BELAMIDE (deceased and herein substituted
by his children Rodolfo, Reynaldo, Lilian and Alfredo, Jr., all surnamed Belamide),
JOSE BELAMIDE, ANTONIO BELAMIDE, MARIA BELAMIDE, LEONISA BELAMIDE
and SALUD BELAMIDE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and BIENVENIDO MONTOYA, FRANCISCA MONTOYA and GREGORIO
MONTOYA, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (4th Division)
promulgated on June 9, 1971, affirming the amended decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite City the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
adjudicates the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-18949 situated in the
poblacion of Silang, Cavite, in favor of the applicants (Marcelino Belamide, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Patrocinia de Castro, and resident of Silang Cavite;
Alfredo Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, married to Anita Velez, and resident of
Silang, Cavite; Jose Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, married to Elisea Quiamzon
and resident of Silang Cavite; Antonio Belamide, of legal age, Filipino, single, and
resident of Silang, Cavite; Maria Belamide, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Sofronio Bayla and resident of Silang, Cavite; Leonisa Belamide, of legal age,
married to Fulgencio Reyes, and resident of Silang, Cavite; and Salud Bede of
legal age, Filipino, married to Conrado Menchavez and resident of Silang,
Cavite) and the oppositors (Bienvenido Montoya, Gregorio Montoya and
Francisco Montoya, Filipinos, of legal age, married and residents of Silang,
Cavite) in the following proportions:
Three-fourths (3/4) undivided share belongs to the applicants, and one-fourth
(1/4) undivided share belongs to the oppositors.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
issued upon proof that the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes have been
paid, or certificate of tax exemption has been issued.
Petitioners herein were the applicants for the registration of the parcel of land involved in
this case The private respondents were the oppositors allowed on Motion for a New Trial,
to file an opposition even after a decision has already been rendered by then Judge Felix
V. Makasiar, after hearing, following the issuance of a general default order. (par. 1-3,
Petition).
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
From the amended decision rendered after the new trial both parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals which found the essential facts as narrated in the decision appealed
thereto as duly established by the evidence, and quoted the same approvingly as
follows:
The next question that presents itself is when and by whom was the land in
question acquired. The oppositors allege that the acquisition was made during
the first marriage of Vicente Montoya to Martin Montoya, whereas the applicants
maintain that such land was acquired during the marriage (second marriage) of
Vicente Montoya to Jose Velardo Both contentions are not supported by any
document. However, the fact that Susana Velardo Belamide sold a portion of the
land in question (Exh. 6) to the Municipality of Silang, Cavite (for widening of the
street) on May 1933 without the intervention of, or opposition from, Hilarion
Montoya who died on December 2, 1955 (Exh. 3), coupled with the fact that
Susana Velardo Belamide has possession of the property since the death of her
mother Vicenta Montoya) in 1931 after she sold the same to the herein
applicants on July 20, 1951 (Exh. B), convince the Court that said property was
acquired during the coverture of Jose Velardo and Vicenta Montoya.
Consequently, upon the death of Jose Velardo in 1888, the one-half ()
undivided portion of the property passed by inheritance to Susana Velardo
Belamide and the other one-half () undivided portion went to Vicenta Montoya
as her share of the conjugal estate. Upon the death of the latter on February 28,
1931, her undivided one half () share of the property should be divided equally
between Susana Velardo Belamide and Hilarion Montoya, that is, each is entitled
to one- fourth (1/4) undivided share. Hence, Susana Velardo Belamide's share is
three-fourths (3/4) while Hilarion Montoya's share passed by inheritance to his
children, the herein oppositor. For this reason, the sale made by Susana Velardo
Belamide in favor of the applicants (Exh. B) is null and void only with respect to
the one-fourth (1/4) undivided portion of the property (the share of the herein
oppositors) who did not consent to the sale).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the amended decision of the Court of
First Instance, this time rendered by Hon. Jose P. Alejandro, and denied a Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners herein on June 29, 1971 (Annex E to Petition), as
well as a Motion for a New Trial (Annex F to Petition). The ground for the Motion for New
Trial was that Exhibit 8 of the oppositors (private respondents herein) which was
allegedly relied upon by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals is a
falsified document, As recited in the petition, par. 12 thereof (p. 8, Reno the falsification
consists of the following:
According to tie official records of the Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite, the name
of the father of Hilarion Montoya in the marriage column is in blank. But
6

according to Exhibit 8, the name of the father of Hilarion Montoya is Martin
Montoya. Thus, whale the official record of the civil registrar shows that
oppositors' father, Hilarion, had an unknown father, thru falsification, Hilarion
father was made to appear in Exhibit 8 as Martin Montoya. The latter false. ly
became husband of Vicente Montoya, thereby enabling private respondents to
inherit 1/4 of the land in dispute from Vicente Montoya.
It is the denial of the Motion for New Trial by the Court of Appeals which petitioners
allege to be in grave abuse of discretion, and their allegation that the Court of First
Instance, as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
Vicente Montoya and partition the property by adjudicating 1/4 pro-indiviso to private
respondents as children of Hilarion Montoya, allegedly an unacknowledged natural child
of Vicenta Montoya, and that as a consequence, the Court of Appeals, likewise, is
without jurisdiction, or acted in grave abuse of discretion, in affirming the decision of the
lower court, that petitioners came to this Court with the present petition.
1. There can be no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals in denying
petitioners' Motion for New Trial. The document alleged to be falsified (Exh. 8) was
presented in the trial in the lower court. Petitioners should have attacked the same as
falsified with competent evidence, which could have been presented, if they had
exercised due diligence in obtaining said evidence, which is Annex "A" 1 to the Motion for
New Trial (Annex F to Petition). 2 It is, therefore, not a newly discovered evidence that could
justify a new trial (Rule 37 [1-b], Rules of Court).
The new evidence would neither change the result as found by the decision. It might
prove that Hilarion Montoya was registered at birth without his father having been given,
but from the testimony of Marcelino Belamide, one of the applicants (now petitioners),
Vicente Montoya was married twice, although he did not know the first husband.
Likewise, in the opposition of private respondents (pp. 30-31, Record on Appeal) 3, it is
there alleged that the land originally belonged to the spouses Martin Montoya and Vicente
Montoya. This allegation was never contradicted. The document sought to be presented by
petitioners, as stated in their Motion for New Trial in the Court of Appeals, cannot effectively
destroy this allegation, first, because the marriage between Martin Montoya and Vicenta
Montoya could have taken place after the birth of Hilarion Montoya who was thus legitimized,
and second, Martin Montoya and Vicente Montoya evidently lived together as husband and
wife, and are, therefore, presumed to have been legally married (Section 5, par. [bb] Rule
131, Rules of Court). This Court held that a man and a woman who are living under the same
roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses (Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil.
128), and in the instant case, no less than one of the herein petitioners, Marcelino Belamide,
testified that Vicenta Montoya married twice. The records suggest no other husband by the
first marriage than Martin Montoya, who then could have been the father of Hilarion Montoya
who, undisputedly, is the son of Vicente Montoya.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
With the law and the evidence showing with reasonable sufficiency that Hilarion Montoya
from whom private respondents would derive hereditary rights over the land in question,
is the legitimate son of Vicenta Montoya, the adjudication of said land by the lower court,
as specified in its decision, is in accordance with law.
2. The jurisdiction of the lower court as a land registration court to adjudicate the land for
purposes of registration cannot, as petitioners try to do, be questioned. The applicants
and oppositors both claim rights to the land by virtue of their relationship to the original
owner, the late Vicente Montoya. The Court is thus necessary impelled to determine the
truth of their alleged relationship, and on the basis thereof, to adjudicate the land to them
as the law has prescribed to be their successional rights. The law does not require the
heirs to go to the probate court first before applying for the registration of the land, for a
declaration of heirship. This would be a very cumbersome procedure, unnecessarily
expensive and unreasonably inconvenient, clearly averse to the rule against multiplicity
of suits.
Furthermore, petitioners Should not now be heard to complain after they have
themselves gone to the lower court to have their title to the land registered in their names
without having had a previous declaration of their heirship by the probate court. In filing
their opposition to the application, private respondents merely went to the same court
invoking its jurisdiction in exactly the same fashion as did the petitioners. In effect, there
was unanimity among the parties in consenting to, or acquiescing in, the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the land registration court, no matter whether Same is a limited one. With
this premise, and with the full opportunity given both parties to air their sides with the
presentation of all evidence as they may desire in support thereof, as fully as could be
done in the ordinary court with general jurisdiction, the decision of the lower court, sitting
as a land court, supported as it is with sufficient evidence, may no longer be questioned
on jurisdictional grounds. (See Martin Aglipay vs. Hon. Isabelo delos Reyes, Jr., G. R.
No. L-12776, March 23, 1960; Franco vs. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank, L-17610,
April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660; City of Tarlac vs. Tarlac Development Corporation, L-24557,
July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 466; City of Manila vs. Manila Lodge No. 761, L-24469, July 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 466; City of Manila vs. Army and Navy Club of Manila, L-24481, 24
SCRA 466; Demetrio Manalo vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, et. al., L-33850, January 22,
1976, 69 SCRA, 80).
For all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
7

G.R. No. 112795 June 27, 1994
AUGUSTO CAPUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO
BANEZ, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to
reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30030,
which affirmed the judgment by default of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Kalookan
City in Civil Case No. C-15501.
We grant the petition.
I time in seeing the plaintiff and confronted him about his receipt (payment of the
On July 15, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-
15501).
On September 5, petitioner was served with summons.
After petitioner failed to file any answer, private respondent filed on September 25, an Ex
parte Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
On October 23, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in default and
authorizing private respondent to present his evidence ex parte.
On October 28, private respondent presented his evidence ex parte.
On November 6, the trial court rendered a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff ERNESTO
BANEZ against the defendant AUGUSTO CAPUZ ordering the defendant to pay
the following:
1. The principal amount of P90,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from
June 13, 1992, the date of the written demand, until fully paid;
2. P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
3. P1,000.00 as litigation expenses and the costs (Rollo, p. 11).
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
On November 13, petitioner received a copy of the Order dated October 23, 1992 and
the Decision dated November 6, 1992.
On November 23, petitioner filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to set
aside the decision.
In said motion, petitioner averred that:
1. Defendant's failure to file his responsive pleading is due to fraud, mistake,
accident and/or excusable neglect, and that when defendant received a copy of
the summons and the complaint on September 5, 1992, defendant wasted no
subject obligation), plaintiff assured the defendant that he (plaintiff) will instruct
his lawyer to withdraw the complaint, and not to worry anymore. Defendant took
the word of his "compadre" the plaintiff. Hence, defendant did not file his answer
to the complaint (Rollo, p. 11).
On December 7, the trial court issued an order, denying petitioner's verified urgent
motion, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The filing of the motion to lift order of default did not stop the running of the
period of appeal, for his only right at the moment is to receive notice of further
proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not. On the
other hand, defendant could have appealed the Decision before the expiration of
the period to appeal, for he is granted that right by the Rules. Since he failed to
make a timely appeal, the decision rendered in this case has became (sic) final
(Rollo, p. 12).
On December 23, petitioner filed an urgent motion asking for the reconsideration of the
Order dated December 7, 1992, claiming: (1) that the said order was prematurely issued;
(2) that the trial court erred in holding that the decision had become final; and (3) that the
said order was contrary to law and jurisprudence.
On January 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals.
On November 18, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding:
(1) that petitioner's motion to lift the order of default and set aside the judgment was
8

improper because there was already a judgment by default rendered when it was filed;
(2) that having discovered the order of default after the rendition of the judgment, the
remedy of petitioner was either to appeal the decision or file a motion for new trial under
Rule 37; and (3) that the said motion could not be considered as a motion for new trial
under Rule 37 because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
II
In the instant petition, petitioner argues that the motion to lift the order of default and to
set aside the decision could be treated as a motion for new trial under Rule 37 and that a
separate affidavit of merit need not be submitted considering that the said motion was
verified.
We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a motion for new
trial. The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as the grounds for a
motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are: (1) that petitioner's failure to file his answer
was due to fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence; and (2) that he was a
meritorious defense. Petitioner explained that upon receiving the summons, he
immediately saw private respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing his
payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to
withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to be collected by private
respondent is a good defense to the complaint to collect the same loan again.
The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of petitioner as a
motion for new trial was because the said motion did not include an affidavit of merit.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Respondent court erred when it held that petitioner should have appealed from the
decision, instead of filing the motion to lift the order of default, because he still had two
days left within which to appeal when he filed the said motion. Said court must have in
mind paragraph 3 of Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that: "a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38."
Petitioner properly availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court because the appeal under Section 2, Rule 41 was not, under the
circumstances, a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In
an appeal under Section 2, Rule 41, the party in default can only question the decision in
the light of the evidence on record. In other words, he cannot adduce his own evidence,
like the receipt to prove payment by petitioner herein of his obligation to private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and the judgment dated November 6, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 130, Kalookan City is SET ASIDE. Let this case be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to a motion to lift

an order of default or for a new trial need not be embodied in a separate document but
may be incorporated in the petition itself. As held in Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425
(1975):

Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons
for the failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense
of the defendant and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal verification
nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary.

Speaking for the Court in Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA
166 (1991), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa opined that the affidavit of merit may either
be drawn up as a separate document and appended to the motion for new trial or the
facts which should otherwise be set out in said separate document may, with equal
effect, be alleged in the verified motion itself.

9
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies

G.R. No. L-48859 November 8, 1942

EMILIANO J. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, ET AL., respondents.

1. Appeal and Error; "PRo-Forma" Motion for New Trial is Offensive to New Rules of
Court and Does not Interrupt Period for Appeal; Necessity of Specifically Setting Out
Reasons in Support of Motion for New Trial.-

Petitioner's motion for new trial did not and could not interrupt the period for appeal, it
having failed to state in detail as required by the rules, the reasons in support of the
grounds alleged therein. Under Rule 37, section 2, third paragraph, it is now required to
"point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to
such findings or conclusions." And when, as in the instant case, the motion fails to make
the specification thus required, it will be treated as a motion pro-forma intended merely to
delay the proceedings, and as such, it shall be stricken out as offensive to the new rules.

2. Id.; Id.; Id.; Deliberate Attempt to Delay Proceedings.-

Petitioner's case justifies indeed the full rigor of the new rules, there being
circumstances showing a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the proceedings for his
own convenience. He filed his motion for new trial on November 22, 1941, and set it for
hearing almost one month thereafter, i. e., on December 20, 1941. The reason he gave
in his oral argument to justify such delayed hearing was that he wanted to have time to
study the transcript of the testimony of witnesses and find out reasons in support of the
grounds alleged in his motion. Unquestionably, therefore, he filed his motion without
knowing whether the grounds therefor were or were not good, and wanted to delay the
proceedings to gain time for study. Again, asked as to why, when he was already in
Manila and the Manila courts were already open, he failed to inquire as to the result of
his motion for new trial, he candidly answered that he was not interested in speeding up
the proceedings because he was the defeated party. With such an attitude this Court
cannot be moved to grant an equitable relief.

10

G.R. No. L-62896 August 21, 1989
SPOUSES CARLOS DAVID and TERESITA DAVID, and JESUS B.
PASION petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, (now
the Regional Trial Court, Baliuag Branch), FRANCISCA LAGMAN MANANGHAYA,
in her own behalf and as natural guardian of her minor children NOEL, NOLLY and
JOY, all surnamed MANANGHAYA, respondents.
On March 7, 1980, a gravel and sand truck driven by petitioner Jesus B. Pasion and
owned and operated by his co-petitioners, Spouses Carlos David and Teresita David, hit
Paulino Mananghaya in front of Mantrade Building, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila, resulting in the latter's death. Subsequently on May 25, 1980,
Paulino's wife, Francisca Lagman Mananghaya, in her own behalf and as natural
guardian of her minor children Noel, Nolly and Joy, (hereinafter private respondents) filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan an action for damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 1136-B against petitioners.
For failure to file their answer despite service of summons, petitioners as defendants in
said Civil Case No. 1136-B were declared in default. Private respondents as plaintiffs
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte, after which a decision was rendered on
April 10, 1981 1 ordering petitioners to pay private respondents jointly and severally the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages; P80,000.00 as exemplary damages; P100,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs. A copy of
said decision was received by petitioners on April 24, 1981.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial, which was denied in the lower court's order of
June 5, 1981 2 for having been filed one day late. In the same Order, the court granted
private respondents' prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution. A Writ of Execution 3 dated
June 10, 1981 was correspondingly issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of San Fernando,
Pampanga to cause to be made of the goods and chattels of petitioners the sums awarded to
private respondents in respondent court's decision of April 10, 1981. Consequently, some
personal properties of the spouses David were levied upon and sold at public auction, the
proceeds of which amounting to P12,000.00 were subsequently delivered to private
respondents.
Having received a copy of the Order of June 5, 1981 only on September 1, 1981,
petitioners filed on the same day a motion for reconsideration of the June 5, 1981 Order
and a motion to quash the writ of execution dated June 10, 1981, calling the attention of
the lower court to the fact that the 30th day of the reglementary period for the filing of an
appeal fell on a Sunday so that the filing of the motion on the 31st day was nevertheless
still within the reglementary period for appeal. On February 8, 1982, the lower court
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
issued an order 4 reconsidering its previous order of June 5, 1981, granting petitioners'
motion for new trial and recalling the writ of execution dated June 10, 1981.
Resultantly, petitioners were allowed to file their Answer with Counterclaim for damages
against private respondents, who countered with a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim and
Reply to Answer. The latter's motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court. On June
5, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion for Restitution which was resolved by respondent lower
court in its assailed Order dated June 8, 1982, 5 reading thus:
ORDER
Defendants' properties levied in execution are hereby ordered to be returned to
them pending new trial.
In the event that this could not be done, defendants may, in the event of
favorable judgment, go after plaintiffs' bond.
SO ORDERED.
Baliuag, Bulacan, June 8,1982.
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ J u d g e
In their motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Order, petitioners manifested that
they are in accord with the first paragraph of said order but seek a reconsideration of the
second paragraph by setting the same aside and ordering the return of the proceeds of
P12,000.00 obtained from the sale of their personal properties considering that private
respondents have not posted a bond as a condition precedent to the taking of said
properties as the same was done pursuant to a decision believed by the private
respondents to be final and executory but which later turned out not to be so in view of
the allowance of petitioners' motion for new trial by the respondent lower court.
Respondent court denied petitioners' aforesaid motion for reconsideration in its second
assailed Order dated December 1, 1982 on the ground that a new trial had been ordered
as early as February 8, 1982.
Hence this petition seeking to annul and set aside the two aforementioned Orders of
respondent judge, namely: the Order dated June 8, 1982 which required the return of the
properties of the petitioners levied upon in execution or, in the event that this could not
be done, for petitioners to go after private respondents' bond in case of a favorable
judgment; and the Order dated December 1, 1982 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the June 8, 1982 order. In addition, petitioners seek to enjoin
11

respondent court from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 1136-B except to issue a
corresponding order setting aside the herein assailed Orders of June 8, 1982 and
December 1, 1982 and ordering private respondents to return to Spouses Carlos David
and Teresita David the proceeds of the public auction sale of their personal properties in
the sum of P 12,000.00.
Petitioners submit that:
1. The Hon. Respondent Court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued
the Order of June 8,1982 directing that in the event return of the personal
properties of Petitioners Spouses could not be done by Private Respondents,
Petitioners spouses may, in the event of a favorable judgment go after Private
Respondents' bond, because there is no bond filed by Private Respondents in
said Civil Case No. 1136-B since said personal properties of Petitioners Spouses
were taken by the Sheriff from them by virtue of a writ of execution (Annex G)
and said writ of execution was set aside and declared null and void by Hon.
Respondent Court in its Order of February 8,1982 (Annex L).
2. The Hon. Respondent Court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued its
order of December 1, 1982 denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of
Said Order of June 8, 1982, for being contrary to law, established jurisprudence
on the matter and an outright denial of substantial justice to Petitioners. 6
Petitioners maintain that the setting aside of the writ of execution by the lower court naturally
entitled them to recover from private respondents their personal properties which were
prematurely and improvidently levied upon on execution, or to the reimbursement by private
respondents of the proceeds of the auction sale in the sum of P12,000.00 pending the
hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. 1136-B. They contend that in providing for an
alternative in its assailed order in the event restitution is not possible, the lower court unduly
deprived them of their substantial right without due process as there was no bond to speak of
in the first place.
On the other hand, private respondents submit that the lower court, under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, was merely exercising its sound judicial discretion
in not ordering restitution it appearing that the personal properties levied upon on
execution were already sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof given to them,
who, due to the untimely demise of the sole breadwinner in their family were left
orphaned and destitute. Furthermore, petitioners are barred by laches for not taking their
legal option to oppose the levy and public sale of their personal properties which took
place while their motion for new trial was still pending resolution by the lower court and it
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
was only on June 5, 1982 or almost a year after the levy was made, that they moved for
the return of the properties levied upon.
We rule for the petitioners. Although the Court is aware of private respondents' sad
plight, having suffered the untimely loss of the alleged sole breadwinner of the family,
nevertheless, the Court must go by the precepts of substantive as well as procedural law
in resolving the controversy at bar for to do otherwise would be tantamount to pre-
empting the lower court in its judgment in Civil Case No. 1136-B wherein a new trial had
been ordered as a result of the granting of petitioners' motion for new trial therein.
As provided under Section 5 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court: "If a new trial be
granted in accordance with the provisions of its rule, the original judgment shall be
vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo but the recorded evidence taken
upon the former trial so far as the same is material and competent to establish the
issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same."
The law is unmistakably clear that once a new trial is granted under aforesaid Rule, the
original judgment is vacated. The phrase "to vacate" applied to a judgment means "to
annul, to render void. 7
As petitioners' motion for new trial was subsequently granted by the respondent court, this
resulted in the nullification of its judgment by default dated April 10, 1981 against petitioners
in said civil case, including all the consequential effects thereof, to wit: the Writ of Execution,
the corresponding levy on the personal properties of petitioners and the public auction sale.
The Court thus finds validity and strength in petitioners' claim for restitution of the
P12,000.00 proceeds of the sale on execution of petitioners' personal properties levied
upon pursuant to a writ of execution which was subsequently recalled due to the granting
of a new trial in the subject civil case. Considering that the motion for restitution was filed
while the subject civil case was still undergoing trial, a stage wherein the rights and
obligations of the parties have not yet begin determined, it would be unfairly enriching the
private respondents, even temporarily, if they are allowed to keep possession of the
proceeds of the sale of petitioners' personal properties in the amount of P12,000.00. As
Civil Case No. 1136-B then stood, there has yet been no adjudication of rights and
obligations between the parties. Furthermore, there was never a plaintiff s bond to speak
of in the first place against which petitioners may proceed in case of a favorable
judgment since the writ of execution was issued pursuant to a judgment then thought to
be final and executory.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the second paragraph of the
Order of respondent court dated June 8, 1982 allowing petitioners as defendants therein
in case of a favorable judgment to go after the plaintiffs' bond if restitution was not
effected; and the Order of December 1, 1982 are hereby SET ASIDE. Private
12
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
respondents are hereby ORDERED to return to petitioners Spouses Carlos David and
Teresita David the proceeds of the public auction sale of their personal properties in the
sum of P12,000.00

SO ORDERED.

13

G.R. No. 110801 December 8, 1995
MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ISIDORO LIAMZON, JR., SPS.
BERNARDO AND DELIA ROSARIO, SPS. MANUEL AND NORMA SANCHEZ, SPS.
RUFINO AND MILAGROS JAVIER, SPS. RODOLFO AND SONIA OCAMPO, SPS.
LAZARO AND JULIETA SANTOS, SPS. TEODORO AND ZENAIDA BAUTISTA, SPS.
CHARLES AND MA. CORAZON MILLER, SPS. EDGARDO AND CRISTINA
VALENZUELA, FRANCISCO LIAMZON, MARIETTA LIAMZON, ROMEO THADEUS
LIAMZON, MICHAEL RAYMOND LIAMZON, ROBERTO ANTONIO LIAMZON,
ROSABELLE THERESA LIAMZON, RONALDO ISIDORO LIAMZON and RODRIGO
JESUS LIAMZON, petitioners, vs. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO, Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, RTC Manila; BASILIO SYTANGCO, as representative of the heirs of
JOSE REYES SYTANGCO; and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Jose Reyes Sytangco instituted a complaint for reconveyance of a piece of land situated
along Espaa Street, Manila, against petitioner Marikina Valley Development Corporation
("Marikina Valley") and Milagros Liamzon. In his complaint, Jose Reyes Sytangco alleged
that he and his wife, Aurelia Liamzon-Sytangco had entrusted some funds to Milagros
Liamzon, sister-in-law of Aurelia, in order to purchase the Espaa Street property from its
former owners. The Sytangco spouses had years ago built their house on that parcel of
land then leased from the original owners with whom they negotiated for purchase of that
land. Milagros Liamzon, however, in alleged violation of the trust reposed upon her,
purchased the Espaa Street property in her own name and had title to the same
registered in her name. Thereafter, she transferred title over that property to petitioner
Marikina Valley, a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon family.
In their answer, petitioner denied the allegations of Jose Reyes Sytangco and claimed
that Milagros Liamzon had purchased the Espaa Street property by and for herself, with
funds coming from petitioner Marikina Valley. For her part, Milagros Liamzon insisted,
among other things, that the Reyes Sytangco spouses had waived in her favor their right
to buy the property in question.
During the trial in the court below, Jose Reyes Sytangco died and he was substituted by
his heirs, who are private respondents herein. After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of
private respondent heirs in a decision dated 11 October 1991. The trial court directed
petitioner Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of Conveyance covering the property
involved in favor of private respondents.
On 28 October 1991, Marikina Valley and the other petitioners heirs of Milagros
Liamzon (Milagros having, in the meantime, passed away) received a copy of the
decision of the trial court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on 7 November 1991.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The Reyes Sytangco heirs opposed petitioners' motion for reconsideration upon the
ground that it was a pro forma one. The heirs contended that the allegations of
insufficiency of evidence were couched in very general terms, contrary to the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
On 21 November 1991, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit. The trial court said:
The defendant anchors his motion on the assertion that:
1. There is no sufficient evidence to show that the down payment for the property
came from the plaintiff;
2. That the money used for the property did not come from the plaintiff, hence, no
implied trust could have been created between Milagros Liamzon and Aurelia
Liamson;
3. That piercing the veil of corporate entity is not applicable to this case.
After a perusal of the arguments posed in support of these grounds, the court
finds that these arguments had been discussed and resolved in the decision.
There being [no] other matter of consequences asserted which has not been
considered in the decision, the Court resolves to deny the same.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners received a copy of the above order on 22 November 1991. On 25 November
1991, they filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
In the meantime, private respondent heirs moved for execution of the decision of 11
October 1991. They insisted that petitioners had failed to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period.
In its order dated 25 November 1991, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal filed
by petitioners for having been filed beyond the reglementary period to perfect an appeal.
The trial judge reasoned that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was pro forma and
hence did not stop the running of the reglementary period. Thereupon, the trial judge
granted private respondents' motions for execution.
14

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and injunction. They denied that
their motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma and claimed that they had filed
their notice of appeal seasonably. They also challenged the validity of subsequent orders
of the trial court directing execution.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, declaring that petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was indeed pro forma and, "therefore, clearly without merit." The
appellate court went on to say that:
[w]here a motion for reconsideration merely submits, reiterates, repleads,
repeats, or reaffirms the same arguments that had been previously
considered and resolved in the decision, it is pro forma.
The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners' pro forma motion for
reconsideration had not stopped the running of the period to perfect an appeal
and that, accordingly, the judgment had become final and private respondents
were entitled to execution as a matter of right. Petitioners sought reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals' decision, without success.
In their present Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners aver once more that their
motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court was sufficient in form and substance
and was not pro forma. They reiterate that their motion had effectively suspended the
running of the reglementary period, and that their notice of appeal filed three (3) days
from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration had been filed well
within the remaining period to perfect an appeal.
The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by a decision of a trial court may
move to set aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be granted when (a) the
judgment had awarded "excessive damages;" (b) there was "insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the decision;" or (c) "the decision was against the law." 2
A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) or (c) above must
point out specifically the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions. 3
A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance that is, when it
satisfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court interrupts the cunning of
the period to perfect an appeal. 4 A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with
those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated as pro forma intended merely to
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
delay the proceedings and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the reglementary
period. 5 The net result will be dismissal of the appeal for having been unseasonably filed.
The question in every case is, therefore, whether a motion for reconsideration is properly
regarded as having satisfied the requirements, noted above, of Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court. As already pointed out, the Court of Appeals took the position that where a motion
for reconsideration merely "reiterates" or "repleads" the same arguments which had been
previously considered and resolved in the decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion
is a pro forma one. In taking this position, the appellate court quoted at some length from
a prior decision of this Court:
. . . Said the Supreme Court in "Dacanay v. Alvendia, et al.," 30 SCRA 31, to wit:
In Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, recently decided by this Court, we once again called
the attention of the bar and litigants to the "principle already forged by this Court .
. . that a motion for reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time
is pro forma and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away." Mr.
Justice Dizon pointed out in his concurring opinion that "The motion aforesaid
is pro forma on yet another ground, in substance it was but a reiteration of
reasons and arguments previously set forth in respondent Sto. Domingo's
memorandum submitted to the trial court and which the latter had already
considered, weighed and resolved adversely to him when it rendered its decision
on the merits." And earlier in Lonaria v. De Guzman, we held that "[T]he filing of
the second motion on January 22, 1963 did not suspend the running of the
period, first, because it was " pro forma based on grounds already existing at the
time of the first motion." 6 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
It should, however, be noted that the circumstance that a motion for reconsideration
deals with the same issues and arguments posed and resolved by the trial court in its
decision does not necessarily mean that the motion must be characterized as merely pro
forma. More than two (2) decades ago, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion, in Guerra
Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, 7 to point out that a
pleader preparing a motion for reconsideration must of necessity address the arguments
made or accepted by the trial court in its decision:
. . . . Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is
precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary
to the law or the evidence (Rule 37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so,
the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the
court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would
be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. We find in the
15

Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a ruling that would, in effect
eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule 37. 8 (Emphases supplied)
The movant is very often confined to the amplification or further discussion of the
same issues already passed upon by the trial court. Otherwise, his remedy would
not be a reconsideration of the decision, but a new trial or some other remedy. 9
The kinds of motions for reconsideration which have been regarded as merely pro
forma are illustrated by Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 10 where a one sentence motion for
reconsideration, which read thus:
COMES NOW the petitioners-appellants in the above-entitled case and to this
Honorable Court respectfully move for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on November 8, 1966, copy of which was received by the
undersigned on November 9, 1966, on the ground that the same is contrary to
law and evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
was considered a pro forma motion for total failure to specify the findings or
conclusions in the trial court's decision which were supposedly not supported by
evidence or were contrary to law. Similarly, in Villarica v. Court of
Appeals, 11 a motion for reconsideration which no more than alleged the following:
1. that the order is contrary to law; and
2. that the order is contrary to the facts of the case,
did not suspend the running of the period for appeal, being a pro forma motion
merely. These kinds of motion present no difficulty at all.
A motion for reconsideration which is not as starkly bare as in Crisostomo and
in Villarica, but which, as it were, has some flesh on its bones, may nevertheless be
rendered pro forma where the movant fails to make reference to the testimonial and
documentary evidence on record or the provisions of law said to be contrary to the trial
court's conclusions. In other words, the movant is also required to point out
succinctly why reconsideration is warranted. In Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 12 the Supreme Court declared that:
it is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should state what part of the
decision is contrary to law or the evidence; it should also point out why it is
so. Failure to explain why will render the motion for reconsideration pro forma.
(Emphasis supplied)
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Where a substantial bonafide effort is made to explain where and why the trial
court should be regarded as having erred in its main decision, the fact that the
trial court thereafter found such argument unmeritorious or as inadequate to
warrant modification or reversal of the main decision, does not, of course, mean
that the motion for reconsideration should have been regarded, or was properly
regarded, as merely pro forma.
It is important to note that the above case law rests upon the principle that a motion for
reconsideration which fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 1 (c) and 2 of
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and is therefore pro forma merely, has no other purpose
than to gain time. It is intended to delay or impede the progress of proceedings and the
rule that such motion for reconsideration does not stop the period of appeal from
"slipping away" reflects both poetic and substantial justice. In Estrada, et al. v. Sto.
Domingo, et al., 13 the Court underlined.
[T]he principle [previously] forged by this Court that a motion for
reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro
forma and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away. It is in
recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a motion for reconsideration
in an election case is taken advantage of for purposes of delay to the prejudice of
the adverse party or where such motion forms part of a matrix delay, that motion
does not stop running of the five-day period for appeal. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the movant
merely to delay the proceedings, our Court has refused to characterize the motion as
simply pro forma. Thus, in the Guerra Enterprises case, the Court took note of the fact
that the motion for reconsideration had been filed within barely twelve (12) days (the
reglementary period was then thirty [30] days) after receipt by the counsel for the movant
party, which fact negated the suggestion that the motion had been used as "a mere
delaying tactic." 15 Dacanay v. Alvendia, 16 on which the Court of Appeals had relied, is not in
fact in conflict with the cases we have above referred to. In Dacanay, the motion for
reconsideration was in effect a fourth motion for reconsideration: the "reasons and
arguments" set out in the motion for reconsideration had on three previous occasions been
presented to the trial court and each time considered and rejected by the trial court.
In Lonario v. De Guzman, 17 the motion for reconsideration which the Court characterized
as pro forma was in fact a second motion for reconsideration based on grounds already
existing at the time the first motion for reconsideration was filed. Further, at the time of the
filing of the second motion, the period to appeal had already lapsed. This Court dismissed the
case for having been appealed beyond the reglementary period. In Samudio v. Municipality of
Gainza, Camarines Sur, 18 the Court had before it a "so-called motion for new trial based
exactly on the very ground alleged in [defendant's] first motion for reconsideration dated
October 17, 1952" and accordingly, held that the motion for new trial did not suspend the
period for perfecting an appeal "because it [was] mere repetition of the [first] motion for
reconsideration of October 17, 1952." 19 (Emphasis supplied)
16

We turn then to the application of the above standards to the motion for reconsideration
in the case at bar. The text of petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated 7 November
1991 is quoted below:
(a) There [was] no sufficient evidence introduced to prove the alleged fact that
the down-payment for the property in question came from Jose Sytangco. Private
transactions are presumed to be fair and regular (citations omitted). The
regularity of defendant Liamzon's transaction with the Prietos for the sale of the
property implies that the consideration came from her and not from plaintiff. This
presumption cannot be rebutted by the bare testimony of abiased witness;
(b) The money used to pay for the property not belonging to the plaintiff, there
could never be a trust between him and defendant Liamzon. Even then, plaintiff
merely claimed that what belong to him was only the down-payment, not the total
amount used to purchase the property, that the defendant Liamzon was the one
paying the installments can be gleaned from the fact that while plaintiff allegedly
authorized defendant Liamzon to purchase the property sometime in 1968, it was
only in 1981 that he came to know that the property was titled in the name of
defendant corporation. Plaintiff's (Jose Reyes Sytangco) total lack of knowledge
about the transactions regarding the property for 13 long years, meant that he
had no contract with the Prietos, the seller during this period. Assuming without
admitting that the down-payment belonged to plaintiff, he is only entitled to
reimbursement but not title to the property;
(c) Piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only to cases where the
corporation was created for purposes of fraud, usually in tax cases; fraud,
however, being the exception rather than the rule should be proven by convincing
evidences. That defendant Liamzon is a director of defendant Corporation is not
indicative of fraud. The money used to buy the property being advances from
defendant corporation, there is nothing wrong to have said property be titled in
the name of the corporation to offset said advances;
(d) It may be mentioned that the ejectment counterpart of this case had already
been decided with finality in favor of defendant corporation. 20
In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners claimed that the evidence submitted was
insufficient to show that the downpayment for the purchase of the Espaa Street property
had in fact come from private respondents' predecessor-in-interest Jose Reyes
Sytangco. In effect, petitioners here aver that the presumption of regularity of private
transactions carried out in the ordinary course of business had not been overturned by
the testimony of Jose Reyes Sytangco himself. This reflected petitioners' appraisal of the
trial court's conclusion that Jose and Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had handed over to
Milagros Liamzon the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the downpayment of the Reyes
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Sytangco spouses on the Espaa lot. The trial court had not discussed the presumption
of regularity of private transactions invoked by petitioners.
In paragraph (b) of their motion, petitioners, building upon their paragraph (a), argued
that since the money used to pay the property did not belong to the plaintiff, no
constructive trust arose between Jose Reyes Sytangco and Milagros Liamzon.
Petitioners further argue that assuming that the money for the downpayment had really
come from the Reyes Sytangco spouses, the rest of the payments on the Espaa
property had been made by Milagros Liamzon. Accordingly, they argue that the Reyes
Sytangco spouses would be entitled only to reimbursement of the downpayment and not
to reconveyance of the property itself. The trial court had not addressed this argument in
its decision; the trial judge had found Milagros Liamzon's testimony concerning whose
money had been used in the purchase of the lot as "filled with contradictions" which
seriously impaired her credibility. 21
The third argument of petitioners in their motion assailed the reliance of the trial court
upon the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil by asserting that that doctrine was
available only in cases where the corporation itself had been created for purposes of
fraud. Implicitly, petitioners argue that no evidence had been submitted to show that
Marikina Valley had been created precisely "for purposes of fraud." The trial court had
not touched on this argument. In paragraph (d) of their motion, petitioners aver that the
ejectment suit instituted by them had been decided in their favor. The trial court's
decision had not mentioned such an ejectment suit.
We are, therefore, unable to characterize the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners as simply pro forma. That motion for reconsideration, it may be noted, had
been filed no more than ten (10) days after receipt of the trial court's decision by
petitioner Marikina Valley.
It is scarcely necessary to add that our conclusion that petitioners' motion was not pro
forma, should not be regarded as implying however indirectly that that motion
was meritorious.
We note finally that because the doctrine relating to pro forma motions for
reconsideration impacts upon the reality and substance of the statutory right of appeal,
that doctrine should be applied reasonably, rather than literally. The right to appeal,
where it exists, is an important and valuable right. Public policy would be better served
by according the appellate court an effective opportunity to review the decision of the trial
court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a literal application of
the procedural rule relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, (a) the Orders of the trial court dated 27 November
1991, 12 December 1991 and 22 January 1992 and (b) the Decision of the Court of
17
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Appeals dated 8 December 1992, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court which is hereby DIRECTED to GIVE DUE COURSE to
petitioners' notice of appeal. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

18

G.R. No. 115703 July 8, 1997
EPIFANIO L. CASOLITA, SR., ARTHUR AQUINO, BENITO GATPATAN, JR., HENRY
RELOSA, EDGAR LA TORRE, BERNARDO OCAG and CECILIA
VIERNES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MANILA, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, BRANCH 34, Presided by Judge
Romulo A. Lopez, and ATROP, INC. respondents.
On March 28, 1990, private respondent ATROP, INC., a domestic corporation, filed a
complaint against herein petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for recovery
of possession of a parcel of land located at #731 Magallanes cor. Victoria Street,
Intramuros, Manila, ATROP, INC. claimed ownership, in fee simple, of said parcel of land
under TCT No. 68927 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. 1 In answer thereto, petitioner
Casolita through his counsel, Atty. Jose L. Aguilar, alleged that he and his family had been in
continuous possession of the land since 1953, having been designated as caretaker by the
supposed "real owners" Ramon LeQuina and Poria Pueo. The other petitioners, represented
by Atty. Benito Gatpatan, Jr. filed their answer unequivocally adopting and incorporating the
allegations of Casolita in his answer to the complaint. They further asserted that they were
not "squatters" on the land as they occupied the same in open, public, adverse and
continuous possession for more than ten years invoking Article 1134 of the Civil Code in
relation to the existing land reform code. Thereafter, trial ensued. On August 5, 1993, the
lower court 2 rendered a decision 3 in favor of ATROP, INC., ordering the defendants to vacate
the premises, to remove the structures they built, and to pay compensation for the use of the
land, attorney's fees and costs. Atty. Aguilar received a copy of the decision but failed to file a
notice of appeal. On the other hand, Atty. Gatpatan Jr. filed a notice of appeal on August 23,
1993.
In its omnibus motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of a writ of execution,
dated September 29, 1993, ATROP INC., argued that as far as petitioner Casolita was
concerned, the decision had become final and executory for his counsel, Atty Aguilar,
received a copy thereof without filing a notice of appeal. As to the other petitioners,
ATROP INC., observed that while they timely filed the notice of appeal the notice was
fatally defective for they did not serve the same to the counsel of ATROP, INC. In its
October 18, 1993 Order, the lower court 4granted the omnibus motion to dismiss and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. 5
Atty. Alfredo C. Baylon, Jr. thereafter filed a notice of appearance as "counsel for all the
defendants" 6 and moved for reconsideration of the October 18, 1993 Order alleging that the
dismissal of the notice of appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution ". . . is repugnant to
the principle of due process" as it amounted to denial of justice, citing Alonzo
vs. Villamor. 7 He contended that petitioners Casolita, et. al., were not properly notified of the
August 5, 1993, decision since Atty. Aguilar had withdrawn as counsel "due to poor health";
hence, the decision had not become final and executory. As a last ditch effort, said counsel,
for the first time, alleged that the issuance of the writ of execution ". . . would be violative of
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Article VII of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, particularly Section 28,
paragraph 2 thereof," without, however, elaborating why. On November 10, 1993, the lower
court denied the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit appeal. Thus:
There are two Notices of Appeal submitted by two different lawyers without
particularizing which among the defendants they represent. The Notice submitted
by Atty. Gatpatan, Jr., was received on August 23, 1993 and records show that
Atty. Gatpatan, Jr., received the copy of the decision on August 17, 1993, hence,
well within the period of fifteen-day to interpose an Appeal. Said lawyer
represented at the trial the following defendants: himself, Arthur Aquino, Carlito
Santosm, Henry Relosa, Edgar La Torre, Bernardo Ocag and Cecilla
Vienes, leaving defendant Epifanio Casolita who was represented by
Atty. Aguilar. Another Notice of Appeal was filed by a certain Atty. Alfredo C.
Bayhon, Jr. [should be Baylon], who at the trial was not a counsel of records for
any defendant. Atty. Bayhon, Jr. formally appeared only, per his appearance
received by this Court on November 3, 1993, long after the lapse of fifteen-day
period to Appeal, computed from the time Atty. Aguilar received a copy of the
decision on August 25, 1993. This Court presupposes that Atty. Bayhyon, Jr.
represents the defendant Casolita only. The records, however, does not show
that Atty. Aguilar ever withdrew from the case, hence, the appearance of Atty.
Bayhon, Jr. is improper and cannot be recognized by this Court, there being no
showing that Atty. Aguilar withdrew from the case.
When the plaintiff [herein private respondent] submitted a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution on the ground that the Notice of
Appeal is defective not having been served either on plaintiff or its counsel, no
opposition was filed. That was why the Court granted the motion and issued the
Writ prayed for.
The records show likewise, that Atty. Bayhon, Jr. submitted a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dismissing the Appeal of
Atty. Gatpatan, Jr., and granting execution. The motion for reconsideration
deserves scant consideration, because the lawyer who filed it has no personality
in the case. Moreover, the notice to the adverse counsel of the Notice of Appeal
is a mandatory requirement for perfecting an Appeal.
WHEREFORE, there being no merit to the motion, the same is hereby denied,
and this denials is final.
The Motion to Admit Appeal filed by Atty. Bayhon, Jr. is denied likewise.
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis Added)
19

A notice to vacate the premises having been made, the petitioners through Atty. Baylon
filed before respondent Court of Appeals a petition via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 seeking the annulment of the October 18, 1993
and November 10, 1993 Orders of the lower court. 9 On May 27, 1994, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition. The Court gave due course to this
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction" in denying their petition for certiorari based on their
failure to furnish private respondent with a copy of the notice of appeal. Such omission,
they insist, was a mere technicality which should be cast aside to attain substantial
justice. The contention lacks merit.
Under the previous rule, an appeal may be taken "by serving upon the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice
of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal". This provision was amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, particularly Section 39 thereof, by deleting the need to file an
appeal bond and record on appeal, except in multiple appeals and in special
proceedings, and by fixing the period of appeal to fifteen (15) days. The entire original
record of the case instead is transmitted to the appellate court. Appeals from final
judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are now taken to public respondent Court
of Appeals by simply filing a notice of appeal. 10 The simplification of the procedure for
elevating to a higher court final judgments or orders of the lower courts correspondingly
underscored the importance of the notice of appeal. The adverse party may only be
appraised initially of the pendency of an appeal by the notice of appeal. To deprive him of
such notice is tantamount to depriving him of his right to be informed that the judgment in his
favor is being challenged. This requirement should be complied with so that he may be
afforded the opportunity to register his opposition to the notice of appeal if he so
desires. 11 And service of the notice of appeal upon him may not be dispensed with on the
basis of the appellant's whims and caprices, as in this case. We quote with approval, in this
connection, respondent court's ruling, thus:
The judicial position on the requirement that a notice of appeal be served upon
the adverse party is articulated in the early case of Philippine Resources
Development Corp. vs. Narvasa, 4 SCRA 414 (1962), when the Supreme Court
stated:
Under Section 3, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken by
serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within 30 days from
notice of the judgment a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and a record on appeal.
This section clearly requires that not only shall the three documents be filed with
the court within the period of 30 days but that copies thereof shall be served
upon the adverse party. This requirement is made in order that the adverse party
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
may not only be notified of the intention of the appellant to take the case to the
appellate court, but also to afford him an opportunity to register his opposition to
any of them if he desires to do so.
As posited and as aptly argued in the private respondent's brief, the requirement
is not a mere technicality but goes into procedural due process which, in the
absence of opposition from the petitioners (Annex A, Petition), despite proper
notice and opportunity to do so (Annexes "2" and "3" Comment), cannot be
countenanced as basis for alleged grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the
motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was filed by counsel not of record, no
proper substitution having been made. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners additionally aver that respondent court also "abused its discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction" when it held that Atty. Baylon had no personality in this case
despite his formal appearance as counsel for petitioner Casolita. We hold, however, that
respondent court neither committed an error nor abused its discretion in upholding the
lower court's denial of Casolita's motion for reconsideration, motion to admit appeal and
notice of appeal on the ground that Atty. Baylon was not Casolita's counsel of record.
The records show that Atty. Aguilar was petitioner Casolita's counsel of record. Even Atty.
Gatpatan Jr. impliedly recognized his separate representation when he adopted the
allegations in the answer filed for said petitioner by Atty. Aguilar. That Atty. Aguilar was
the counsel of petitioner Casolita was noted by the lower court in its Order of November
10, 1993. This was buttressed by the fact that Casolita was furnished a copy of the
decision through said counsel of record. The failure of Atty. Aguilar to file a notice of
appeal binds Casolita which failure the latter can not now disown on the basis of his bare
allegation and self-serving pronouncement that the former was ill. A client is bound by his
counsel's mistakes and negligence. 13 And neither may Atty. Baylon's unsupported claim that
petitioner Casolita was in Cavite at the time the decision of the lower court can be given
credence. Indeed, the unrebutted observation of private respondent cast serious doubt over
Atty. Baylon's unsubstantiated claims. Thus:
It is noteworthy that the "Motion for Reconsideration", (wherein this alleged
withdrawal of Aguilar, etc., are raised for the first time by Baylon) is not
verified (under oath) by either Casolita or Aguilar.
More, it is difficult to conceive that Casolita, did not learn of the adverse
judgment, when copy thereof was received by Gatpatan. Gatpatan has
been collaborating with Aguilar, in the instant case, and is a personal friend of
Casolita. In fact, Gatpatan is a neighbor or Casolita. In fact, Gatpatan, Aguilar,
and Casolita had been acting in unison, all throughout the lengthy trial of the
instant case.
20
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
How can Casolita claim that he was unaware of the adverse decision, until
October 23, 1993 (when Gatpatan received [the] same, as early as August 19,
1993?) 14

It is a settled rule that a lawyer may not simply withdraw his appearance in a case
without a formal petition filed in the case. Substitution of counsel must be made in
accordance with Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 26. Change of Attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any
action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He
may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of the client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given
to the adverse party. . . .

There having no proper substitution of counsel, Atty. Baylon, as correctly noted by the
lower court, has no personality in the case.

Procedural rules, we reiterate, are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases. While the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application
of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
The instant case is no exception to this rule. 15

As regards petitioner's residual contention that the decision of the lower court and the
notice to vacate contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known
as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, which petitioners addressed for the
first time in their memorandum, the same does not deserve serious consideration. It is a
rule that issues not properly brought and ventilated below may not be raised for the first
time on appeal 16, save in exceptional circumstances none of which however, obtain in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

21
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies

G.R. No. 140473 January 28, 2003
MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
VICTORINA TIGLE, respondents.
This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 20, 1999, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50360, affirming the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, Branch 31, in Civil Case No. 12044. In its order 2 dated October 6, 1998, the RTC
dismissed herein petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Bayawan-Basay, Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 1062 for ejectment, and
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its order 3 dated October 30, 1998.
Petitioner also assails the resolution 4of the appellate court dated September 24, 1999,
denying her motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of this petition are as follows:
more or less, or SUB-LOT NO. 2-A, of LOT NO. 2, mentioned in Par. 5, Page 2 of
EXH. "B";
2. Ordering defendant MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, her agents,
representatives, and all other persons acting in her behalf to immediately vacate
the premises of the parcel of land mentioned in Par. 5, Page 2, EXH. "B",
otherwise known as SUB-LOT NO. 2-A of LOT NO. 2;
3. To remove and/or demolish all workings, constructions and improvements
illegally built and/or constructed in the parcel of land mentioned in Par. 5, Page 2,
of EXH. "B", otherwise known as SUB-LOT NO. 2-A of LOT NO. 2;
4. Ordering defendant MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ to pay to plaintiff the sum of
P3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses;

On February 29, 1996, herein respondent Victorina Tigle filed an action for unlawful 5. Ordering the defendant MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ to pay to plaintiff the
detainer against herein petitioner Melba Moncal Enriquez before the MCTC of Bayawan- sum of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees;
Basay, Negros Oriental. Tigle's complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1062,
alleged inter alia, that on December 14, 1994, she bought a parcel of land known as Lot 6. However, for failure to allege and pray for reasonable compensation and fair
No. 377, located at Tinego, Bayawan, Negros Oriental from Engracia Macaraya. Prior to rental value for the use and occupation of the premises of the parcel of land
the sale, Enriquez was staying at said lot by mere tolerance of Macaraya. Enriquez was mentioned in land mentioned in Par. 5, Page 2, of EXH. "B", known as SUB-LOT
given an option to buy said lot but she refused to exercise it. After the sale, Tigle then NO. 2-A of LOT NO. 2, the same is deemed waived;
made demands on Enriquez to vacate the property, but Enriquez adamantly refused.
7. On the other hand, moral and exemplary damages are not allowed in
In her Answer with Counterclaim filed before the MCTC, Enriquez averred that the ejectment cases;
subject property is owned in common by the heirs of Felix Moncal and any sale by
Macaraya (one of the heirs of Felix Moncal) could only refer to Macaraya's undivided 1/7
8. Any allegations by way of Counterclaim are dismissed for lack of sufficient
share of the lot. Since said 1/7 share of Macaraya is still unidentified, the same cannot
basis.
be a subject of ejectment pursuant to Article 4345 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.6
In its decision dated June 2, 1997, the MCTC of Bayawan-Basay, decreed:
Enriquez seasonably appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City. In its order of February
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby
16, 1998, the RTC directed respective counsel for the parties to "submit within fifteen
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff to be in physical, actual, and prior
(15) days from receipt of this order their respective memoranda and/or briefs." 7 The RTC
possession of the parcel of land described in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint
stated that upon expiration of the period to submit memoranda, it "shall decide the case
unlawfully occupied by defendant MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, and plaintiff is
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or such
entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the Complaint as follows:
brief(s) as may have been filed."8
1. Declaring plaintiff VICTORINA TIGLE to be in actual, physical and prior
The counsel for Enriquez failed to comply with the order to submit a
possession of the premises of the parcel of land mentioned in Paragraph 3 of the
memorandum. On October 6, 1998, the RTC issued the following order:
Complaint consisting of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) square meters,

22

For failure of defendant-appellant to file and submit a memorandum within the
reglementary period as required by Rule 40, Section 7 (b), 9 her appeal is
dismissed.
Upon finality of this order, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to remand the
records of this case to the lower court for execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.10
Enriquez then moved for reconsideration, manifesting that she was adopting her position
paper in the MCTC as her memorandum.
On October 30, 1998, the RTC denied Enriquez's motion on the ground that "the records
does (sic) not show of such manifestation."11
Enriquez then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which docketed her petition
as CA-G.R. SP No. 50360. The appellate court found the primary issue to be procedural
in character, namely: the correctness of the order of the RTC dismissing herein
petitioner's appeal for failure to file her memorandum on appeal.
On July 20, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 50360 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
The appellate court held that "under Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (the filing of a memorandum) is a mandatory obligation on the part of the
appellant, such that, the failure to do so warrants a concomitant dismissal of the
appeal."13
Enriquez moved for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, but this was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its order of September 24, 1999.14
Hence, the instant petition before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. HAS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR ARE ITS
DECISION (ANNEX "N") AND RESOLUTION (ANNEX "P") APPEALED FROM
NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT?
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
2. AND, THAT IN ORDER TO SERVE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND PREVENT
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, SHOULD THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 6,
1998 (ANNEX "I"); ORDER DATED OCTOBER 30, 1998 (ANNEX "K"); THE
DECISION (ANNEX "N") AND RESOLUTION (ANNEX "P"), BE ALL PLEASE
SET ASIDE AND THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE MCTC OF BAYAWAN-BASAY
(ANNEXES "C" TO "C-3") BE PLEASE ORDERED TERSELY DISMISSED WITH
COSTS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT AND THE RESPONDENT BE
ORDERED TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER THE MONETARY COUNTERCLAIMS
INTERPOSED IN THE ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM (ANNEXES "D" TO
"D-7")?15
Stated simply, the sole issue for our resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error in sustaining the order of the RTC which dismissed petitioner's appeal for
failure to file memorandum on appeal?
Petitioner faults the appellate court with grave error of law when it failed to rule that the
RTC should have decided her appeal before it in accordance with Rule 40, Section 7
(c)16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. She avers that the appellate court erred when
it did not rule that the RTC should have decided the case, based on the record of the
MCTC proceedings, instead of sustaining the order to dismiss for failure to file
memorandum.
Private respondent counters that an appellant's failure to file the memorandum required
under Rule 40, Section 7, compelled the RTC to dismiss the case. She points out that an
appealed case cannot be decided on the merits without an appellant's memorandum, as
the assignment of errors by the appellant is vital to the decision of the case. This is
different from the situation where it is the appellee who fails to file his memorandum, as
in this instance, the RTC may decide the case based on the records of the proceedings
in the court of origin and the appellant's memorandum. Moreover, the failure to file a
memorandum by the appellant manifests lack of interest to pursue her appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a new provision. Said
section is based on Section 21 (c) and (d) 17 of the Interim Rules Relative to the
Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) with
modifications. These include the following changes: (a) the appellant is required
to submit a memorandum discussing the errors imputed to the lower court within
fifteen (15) days from notice, and the appellee is given the same period counted
from receipt of the appellant's memorandum to file his memorandum; (b) the
failure of the appellant to file a memorandum is a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal.18
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum" and failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of
23
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the appeal." The use of the word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is
mandatory and compulsory.19 Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the
"duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moral obligation,
mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function,
commission, debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and)
engagement."20 Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is
duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a
matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to
perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.

In rules of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings,

or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected is mandatory. 21 As
private respondent points out, in appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant's
brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the
merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued
in the brief or memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over
the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. 22 Otherwise stated, an appellate
court has no power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.23

It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities should be avoided.24 But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the
Rules of Court.25 In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by
the rules.26 This the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of
appeal in Civil Case No. 12044 as required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. That she lost her case is not the trial court's fault but her own.

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law when it
upheld (a) the order of the RTC dismissing herein petitioner's appeal in Civil Case No.
12044, and (b) its order denying reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50360 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

24

G.R. No. 97535 August 4, 1995
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS,
INC., Judge BENIGNO T. DAYAW, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 80, Quezon City,
and Deputy Sheriff JOSE MARTINEZ, RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, respondents.
A complaint was filed on August 21, 1990, by private respondent La Campana Food
Products, Inc. (hereinafter La Campana) against petitioner Manila Electric Company
(hereinafter Meralco) for recovery of a sum of money with preliminary injunction after it
was served a notice of disconnection by the latter for alleged non-payment of the
following billings: (a) the differential billing in the sum of P65,619.26, representing the
value of electric energy used but not registered in the meter due to alleged tampering of
the metering installation discovered on September 22, 1986; and (b) the underbilling in
the sum of P169,941.29 (with a balance of P28,323.55) rendered from January 16, 1987,
to December 16, 1987, due to meter multiplier failure.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were duly served upon Meralco on August 23,
1990.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6480, was initially assigned on August 21,
1990 to Branch 78 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City presided over by Judge
Percival M. Lopez, but was re-raffled on September 25, 1990 to Branch 80, presided
over by public respondent Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, after Judge Lopez inhibited himself
from hearing the case upon Meralco's oral motion.
On September 7, 1990, Meralco filed a motion for extension of time of fifteen days from
said date within which to file an answer to the complaint at the Office of the Clerk of
Court after the clerk of Branch 78 allegedly refused to receive the same because the
case had already been re-raffled. The motion however, was not acted upon because it
did not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court.
Meralco's "Answer With Counterclaim" was actually received at Branch 78 only on
September 21, 1990 which is beyond the period to answer but within the requested
extension.
On account of Meralco's failure to file an answer to the complaint within the reglementary
period which expired on September 7, 1990, La Campana filed on September 28, 1990
an "Ex-Parte Motion, to Declare Defendant in Default," which Judge Dayaw granted in an
order of default dated October 8, 1990.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
After hearing and receiving La Campana's evidence ex parte, the court a quo rendered a
decision dated November 20, 1990, the decretal portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against
the defendant, ordering:
1) Defendant to reconnect within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of a copy of
this decision the disconnected electric service in plaintiff's building situated at No.
13 Serrano Laktaw St., Quezon City under Account No. 05373-0470-17 and/or
plaintiff is hereby authorized to engage the services of a duly licensed electrician
to reconnect the said electric service at the expense of the defendant;
2) Defendant to return the amount of P141,617.74 with 12% interest per
annum from the time that the same was paid by plaintiff to defendant, until the
same is fully reimbursed; [and]
3) [Defendant] To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Instead of appealing the said decision to the Court of Appeals under Section 2, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, Meralco filed on December 3, 1990, a "Motion to Set Aside
Judgment by Default and/or for New Trial" on the ground that it filed an answer to the
complaint and that the judgment by default was obtained by fraud.
In an order dated January 10, 1991, Judge Dayaw denied the said motion and opined
that Meralco cannot presume that its motion for extension will be granted by the court,
especially in this case where its motion for extension was defective in that it did not
contain any notice of date and place of hearing. He also stated that the motion to set
aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it did not
set forth the facts and circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud upon which
the motion was grounded.
On January 28, 1991, Meralco filed a notice of appeal. This was opposed by La
Campana on the ground that it was filed out of time since the motion to set aside
judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop the running of the period to appeal,
which expired on December 14, 1990, or fifteen days from the time Meralco received the
decision on November 29, 1990.
25

The trial court, in an order dated February 22, 1991, denied Meralco's notice of appeal
and granted the motion for execution earlier filed by La Campana. On March 11, 1991,
respondent Judge appointed respondent Deputy Sheriff Jose Martinet of Branch 96 of
the same court as special sheriff to enforce/implement the writ of execution which was
issued on March 12, 1991.
Meralco filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction on March 15, 1991, claiming that
Judge Dayaw committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering his decision dated
November 20, 1990. On March 20, 1991, the Court's First Division issued a temporary
restraining order in favor of Meralco.
After examining the trial court's assailed decision and orders, as well as the pleadings
and evidence presented below, we are convinced that respondent Judge committed no
abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, in the proceedings below.
The attention of Meralco is drawn to the fact that it indeed failed to indicate in its motion
for extension of time to file an answer a notice of place and date of hearing, an omission
for which it could offer no explanation. As we declared in the case of Gozon, et
al. v. Court of Appeals: 1
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no
authority to act upon.
Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it insisted in its motion to set
aside judgment by default and/or for new trial that it should have received notice of
hearing of the motion to declare it in default which La Campana filed ex parte. La
Campana correctly rebutted this argument by citing the early case of Pielago
v. Generosa 2 where the Court, in applying Section 9, Rule 27 of the old Rules of Court (now
covered by Section 9 of Rule 13), laid down the doctrine that a defendant who fails to file an
answer within the time provided by the Rules of Court is already in default and is no longer
entitled to notice of the motion to declare him in default.
Thus, when it filed in Branch 78 its answer with counterclaim on September 21, 1990,
fourteen days after the expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco
was already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of being in
default.
The judgment by default of November 20, 1990 was based solely on the evidence
presented by La Campana. No abuse of discretion attended such decision because, as
stated above, Meralco was already in default.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The records indicate that Meralco was not certain at this juncture what remedy to adopt:
a motion to set aside the judgment by default or a motion for new trial? Meralco chose to
play it safe by using the "and/or" option.
It must be clarified that under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is
the order of default, an interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not
the judgment by default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the
Court of Appeals. Notice that in the following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly
state that what may be set aside is the order of default, while the judgment itself may be
appealed to a higher court:
Sec. 3. Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time
after discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside
the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious
defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. [Rule 18]
Sec. 9. Service upon party in default. No service of papers other than
substantially amended or supplemental pleadings and final orders or judgments
shall be necessary on a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside the
order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to notice of all further
proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not. [Rule
13]
Sec. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38. [Rule 41] [Emphasis supplied]
Granting arguendo that the motion to set aside judgment by default was proper, it was
still correctly denied by respondent Judge for failure to show that Meralco's omission to
answer was due to any of the causes mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 18. At best, the
motion only stressed that it was filed on September 21, 1990, within the requested period
of extension, which, as earlier discussed, cannot be presumed to be granted.
On the other hand, as a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, Meralco's motion
likewise fails to convince. The fraud it claims is in the ex-parte motion of La Campana to
26
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
declare it in default. Meralco claims that the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to
deprive the defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, knowing that defendant actually
filed its answer." But how could La Campana have known about the answer with
counterclaim when it was actually received only on October 8, 1990, as evidenced by the
registry return receipt attached to Meralco's Annex "H," 3while the ex-parte motion to
declare Meralco in default was filed much earlier on September 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a
ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was
used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy." 4Meralco's failure to
go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply with the Rules of Court.

We agree with respondent Judge that Meralco's motion to set aside judgment by default
and/or for new trial is a mere pro forma motion inasmuch as it does not specify the facts
constituting the alleged fraud which under the Rules must be alleged with
particularity. 5 Being a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on November 29, 1990, Meralco had until
December 14, 1990, within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed
on January 28, 1991, was clearly filed out of time.

Having lost its right to appeal, Meralco cannot take refuge in the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The Court has always maintained that the special civil
action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, and there appears to be no
cogent reason why such policy should be waived in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED and the
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued on March 20, 1991, is hereby
DISSOLVED. The decision dated November 20, 1990, as well as the Orders dated
January 10, 1991 and March 11, 1991, issued by respondent Judge Dayaw in Civil Case
No. Q-90-6480 entitled "La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Manila Electric Company,"
are hereby declared FINAL. Accordingly, the Writ of Execution dated March 12, 1991 is
hereby declared VALID.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

27

G.R. No. 109053 October 7, 1995
GERSON R. MENESES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROCTER AND
GAMBLE PHILS., INC., respondents.
Petitioner urges us to set aside the Decision of 22 December 1992 1 of respondent Court
of Appeals dismissing the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29328 because it erred:
. . . IN NOT CERTIFYING CA-G.R. SP NO. 21328 [sic] TO THIS HONORABLE
COURT UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 50 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE 1991 CASE OF VICTORIAS MILLING VS. IAC; AND
. . . IN NOT REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DISMISSING
CIVIL CASE NO. 91-52339 [sic] FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, AS THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NLRC RATHER THAN THE
CIVIL COURTS HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE SAID CIVIL CASE.
In dismissing the petition, the respondent Court of Appeals held:
The petition in this case purports to be a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. But in its prayer, it seeks the annulment of the orders of
dismissal of the trial court. Considering the nature of the orders in question and
the issue being raised, petitioner should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(Rep. Act No. 296, as amended by Rep. Act No. 5440), and the petition should
have been filed not with this Court but with the Supreme Court. The orders being
alleged are in the nature of final orders and, therefore, appeal by certiorari is the
appropriate remedy. At the same time, since the only question raised concerns
the jurisdiction of the lower court, the matter comes within [the] exclusive
appellate [jurisdiction] of the Supreme Court. This Court has no jurisdiction over
this case. 2
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision was denied for lack of merit in the
Resolution 3 of 15 February 1993 thus:
Pursuant to Circular No. 2-90, sec. 4 of the Supreme Court an appeal taken to
either the Supreme Court or this Court by the wrong or inappropriate mode
should be dismissed. And as held in Murillo v. Consul, UDK No. 1591, March 1,
1990, there is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
appeals from one court to the other.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
In the Resolution 4 of 2 March 1994, we gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they complied with.
The antecedents of this case are not controverted.
On 29 May 1991, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a
complaint for damages 5against the private respondent. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
91-57339 and assigned to Branch 31 of the said court. The petitioner alleged therein as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Plaintiff was formerly employed by defendant in the Perla Department of its
plant at No. 2279 Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila as an operator of its "jumbo
machine" where the ingredients of soap are mixed. He worked in the said plant
for twelve (12) years before the accident complained of herein.
4. In the course of his duties, plaintiff had to go to another area of defendant's
plant to switch on a caustic system which feeds ingredients into the jumbo
machine.
5. As early as April 25, 1986, plaintiff had already recommended to defendant's
management that the caustic switch be transferred to a place nearer the jumbo
[machine]. . . . Defendant accepted this recommendation but failed to act on it.
6. The switch to the caustic system was located in the vicinity of several giant
steel storage kettles of boiling soap oil. These kettles were provided with steel
covers strong enough to contain the tremendous pressure built-up inside the
vessel upon boiling. Plaintiff does not know of any incident in his twelve years in
the said plant when the said steel covers failed to contain pressure build-up.
7. For reasons known only to defendant, shortly before the accident complained
of herein it changed the covers of one of these steel kettles near the caustic
system switch from the original steel to a cheaper but more brittle fiberglass
cover, with total and reckless disregard of its plant workers' safety.
8. On June 1, 1987 at around 3:30 in the afternoon, as plaintiff was leaving the
jumbo caustic switch after turning it on, the fiberglass cover of the said kettle
exploded.
28

9. Plaintiff was drenched in, and burned by boiling soap oil coming from the kettle
in question.
As a result of the explosion, plaintiff:
a. Suffered third degree burns over eighty (80%) percent of his body
surface leaving highly visible scars thereover;
b. Had seven (7) toes of his feet amputated;
c. Underwent psychiatric treatment;
d. Spent six (6) months of confinement in the Makati Medical Center; and
e. Spent seventeen (17) months of physical therapy conducted by the
same medical institution.
14. Shortly after the explosion, the kettle which exploded was repaired by
defendant. Its fiberglass cover was replaced by a steel cover.
15. Also after the accident, defendant transferred the caustic system switch
nearer the jumbo machine, away from the giant soap kettles.
Petitioner prayed for the following reliefs:
For the severe and permanent curtailment of plaintiff's capacity to earn and the
income opportunities lost to him due to [h]is limited mobility, loss of skills, and
general physical deterioration, actual damages of at least P1,500,000.00;
For plaintiff's continuous mental anguish, moral anxiety, disfigured appearance,
social humiliation, depression and inferiority complex, moral damages of at least
P2,000,000.00;
As an example to the public, on account of respondent's wanton, reckless and
malicious disregard of its obligation to observe due diligence in safeguarding its
worker's safety, exemplary damages of at least P500,000.00; and
For plaintiff's expenses in contracting counsel's services, attorney's fees of at
least 25% of the total award.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Instead of filing an answer, the private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on
grounds of laches and of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the nature and subject
matter of the suit, the same being within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its Order of 4
February 1992, the trial court deferred the resolution of the motion until the trial.
On 5 June 1992, acting on the private respondent's motion to reconsider the above
order, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. 6 The pertinent portion of the order reads as follows:
After a careful review and close scrutiny of the entire records, the determination
of the nature and subject matter of the suit is actually whether there is a claim for
damages filed by the employee against his employer arising from employer-
employee relationship, leaving the National Labor Relations having original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from said employer-
employee relationship, as decided in the case of the National Federation of
Labor vs. Eisma, (127 SCRA 419) and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. vs. Martinez (112
SCRA 578). The Supreme Court held that the coverage regarding disputes
involving the administration and enforcement of occupation safety rules,
regulations, standards, is exclusively vested with the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was denied by the trial court
in the order of 13 October 1992. 7
Instead of filing a notice of appeal, the petitioner filed within the period to appeal a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court but with the respondent Court of
Appeals. 8 It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29328.
After the respondent Court of Appeals had dismissed the petition as earlier adverted to,
the petitioner came to us imputing upon the Court of Appeals the commission of the
errors quoted in the opening paragraph of the ponencia.
The petitioner's first ground is devoid of merit. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court which he invokes provides him with no sanctuary. In Murillo vs. Consul, 9 this Court
ruled that "[t]here is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals
from one court to the other." The Court explained its ruling thus:
The two provisions just cited Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
Section 3, Rule 50 had reference to a situation in the past where appeals
could be brought from the Court of First Instance either to the Court of Appeals or
to the Supreme Court by the same procedure. Those appeals were governed by
Rules 41 and 42 of the Rules of court.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, not only the method of taking an appeal to either the Supreme Court or
to the Court of Appeals, but also the procedure thereafter followed in either court
for the ventilation and adjudication of the appeal, were essentially the same.
According to Section 1, Rule 56, unless otherwise provided by law, the Rules, or
the Constitution, the procedure in the Supreme Court in original as well as in
appealed cases was the same as that in the Court of Appeals. There was
therefore not much difficulty or delay entailed by a transfer of an appeal from one
court to the other.
However, these provisions, prescribing a common mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals and to this Court, and a common method of passing on and resolving an
appeal, are no longer in force and effect. They have been largely superseded
and rendered functus officio by certain statutes which have wrought substantial
changed [sic] in the appellate procedures in this jurisdiction, notably Republic
Acts Numbered 5433 and 5440 (both effective on September 9, 1968) and 6031
(effective August 4, 1969), as well as Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (effective August
14, 1981).
xxx xxx xxx
At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there is no way by which judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to this Court except by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. The proposition is clearly
stated in the Interim Rules: "Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by
petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in
two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. They are:
(a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error where judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original
jurisdiction, and by petition for review where judgment was rendered
by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and
(b) by petition for review where judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days
from notice of the judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error of
fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment
sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a notice of
appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings
or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal
is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only
course of action open is to dismiss the appeal. In other words, if an appeal is
attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that
appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the
notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and more than once has this
Court admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well as the attorney
taking the appeal, for causing the records to be sent up to this Court in such a
case. Again, if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught
but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And
finally, it may be stressed once more, it is only through petitions for review
on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court may properly be invoked.
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals
from one court to the other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the
law on appeals. It thus behooves every attorney seeking review and reversal of a
judgment or order promulgated against his client, to determine clearly the errors
he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or order, whether of fact or of law;
then to ascertain carefully which court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and
finally, to observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with
keen awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well
be fatal to his client's cause. (citations omitted).
The Murillo rule was embodied in Circular No. 2-90 of this Court which was issued on 9
March 1990.
Petitioner's reliance on Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 10 is
misplaced. In Victorias, the private respondent's complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court was dismissed by the said court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. On 19 July 1982 the private respondent filed a notice of appeal from the
dismissal order to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The petitioner then filed a Motion to
Dismiss or Certify Appeal alleging that only pure questions of law were involved. The motion
was denied by the IAC in a resolution dated 29 February 1984. We stated in that case that
30
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the IAC should have certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. Although it was decided in
1991, this Court did not, for the special attendant circumstances therein obtaining,
apply Murillo but the law then controlling at the time the IAC resolved the challenged motions
principally because there was, in fact, a seasonable alternative motion to certify the case to
this Court, which was then allowed by Section 3 of Rule 50. Clearly, Victorias did not
modify Murillo.

It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the
petitioner's complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put
an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed
of and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of the order. It
is a firmly settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and
not certiorari.11 That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be taken
only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal should be brought
to the Court of Appeals. 12 Pursuant to Murillo vs. Consul, 13 the appeal to this Court should be
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In the instant case then, if the petitioner had chosen to appeal from the dismissal order of
the trial court solely on questions of law, then he should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court. If he wanted to raise in his appeal both questions of law and
of fact, then he should have pursued the remedy of an ordinary appeal to the Court of
Appeals and not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court of Appeals did
not then commit any reversible error when it dismissed the petition for review of the
petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29328.

In view of the foregoing conclusion, it would no longer be necessary to discuss the other
issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

31

G.R. No. 139303 August 25, 2005
Cipriano Enriquez, Raymundo Enriquez, Concepcion Enriquez, assisted by her
husband Matias Quitanes, Tomas Enriquez, Luis Diaz, Cesar Diaz, Manuel Diaz,
Domingo Enriquez, Elpidio Enriquez, Filipina Enriquez, Casimira Dizon, Saturnino
Dizon, Jose Ramos, Amado Mislang, Antonio Quitaneg, Villamor Quitaneg, Jimmy
Clavo, Oscar Laborce, Sevilla Pizarro, Angelita Pizzaro, Isidro Rico, Pio Famisan,
Pantaleon Abille, Beinvenido Corum, Martina Hisole, Erna D. Enriquez, assisted by
her husband Ritchie Flauta, and Ignacio Enriquez, Jr., Petitioners, vs. MAXIMO
ENRIQUEZ (now deceased), substituted by CARMEN AGANA, IGMIDIO ENRIQUEZ,
CONCEPCION ENRIQUEZ, CIPRIANO ENRIQUEZ, DIONISIONENRIQUEZ, MAXIMO
ENRIQUEZ, CLEOFE ENRIQUEZ, TOMAS ENRIQUEZ, RAYMUNDO ENRIQUEZ and
NICOLAS ENRIQUEZ, Respondents.
Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated February
3, 1999 and July 7, 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV UDK-7011
dismissing the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court docket fee.
On November 17, 1988, Maximo Enriquez, later substituted by his heirs (now
respondents), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales a
complaint for partition against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-568-1. The
complaint involves a parcel of land situated at Amungan, Iba, same province, covered by
TCT No. T-28593, with an area of 44,984 square meters. He alleged that he owns 10/18
undivided portion of the property, 9/18 by purchase and 1/18 by inheritance; and that
petitioners have been residing in the premises without his knowledge and consent,
thereby depriving him of his undivided share of the property.
Petitioners, in their answer, averred that Cipriano Enriquez, one of the petitioners, owns
of the property, while the others are in possession of the other areas with his
knowledge and consent.
On June 4, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the
property and to surrender possession thereof to respondents.
A copy of the Decision was received by counsel for petitioners on June 22, 1998. On July
3, 1998, they filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. It was approved on July 7, 1998.
On February 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their
failure to pay the appellate court docket fee, thus:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
"For failure to pay docket fee, the appeal is deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED,
pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 50, Revised Rules of Court."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court in a
Resolution dated July 7, 1999, thus:
"Per copy of the official receipt attached to appellants motion for reconsideration, the
docket fee was paid on November 4, 1998 or 4 months after the notice of appeal was
filed on July 3, 1998.
Consequently, appellants motion for reconsideration is hereby denied."
In the instant petition for review, petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed
by the Appellate Court:
"I. The respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred in considering petitioners appeal as
deemed abandoned and dismissed for alleged failure of petitioners to pay docket fee.
II. the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the resolution considering petitioners appeal as deemed abandoned
and dismissed on the ground that the docket fee was paid on November 4, 1998, or four
(4) months after the notice of appeal was filed on July 3, 1998.
III. the respondent Court of Appeals in issuing the aforesaid resolutions gave premium on
technicalities rather on substance and substantial justice and disregarded the merits of
petitioners case."
In sum, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for
failure of the petitioners to pay appellate court docket fee.
In dismissing petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals cited Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx
32

(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section
4 of Rule 41."
Petitioners admit that the governing Rule on their payment of appellate court docket fee
is Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record of the record or the record on appeal."
Underscoring the sentence "Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the
appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal," petitioners
maintain that the trial court must first send them a notice to pay the appellate court
docket fee and other lawful fees within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, they
waited for the notice for them to pay the appellate court docket fee. When they did not
receive any, they paid the docket fee to the trial court. Consequently, they cannot be
faulted if they paid the appellate court docket fee four (4) months after their Notice of
Appeal was approved on July 7, 1998.
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, payment of
appellate court docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos
vs. Court of Appeals,1 this Court held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in
case of an appeal taken from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is
not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under Sections 20 2 and 233 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are
only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial
court of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the
last day to appeal by any party.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1,
1997, now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the
same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4,
Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees."
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term
"shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.4 Petitioners cannot
give a different interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be
made only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in
statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 5 Indeed,
petitioners cannot deviate from the Rule.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a case
decided by the RTC in the exercise of the latters original jurisdiction, shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Such
appeal is made by filing a notice thereof with the court that rendered the judgment or final
order and by serving a copy of that notice upon the adverse party. Furthermore, within
this same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. The payment of docket fee within this period is mandatory for the perfection of
appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of
the action, and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.6
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that payment of docket fee within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment,
the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and
the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.7
Petitioners argue that the Appellate Court, in issuing the assailed Resolutions, gave
premium to technicalities rather than substance and disregarded the merits of the
petition. They ask for a liberal construction of the Rules.
Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in
accordance with the provision set by law. The requirement of the law under Section 4,
Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal. 8
The payment of the docket fee within the period is a condition sine qua non for the
perfection of an appeal. Contrary to petitioners submission, the payment of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. 9
33
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
This Court has consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that
issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. The rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within
the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.10Anyone seeking exemption from
the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious
instances exist which warrant such departure.11

In the present case, petitioners failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason
to warrant a relaxation of the mandatory rule on the payment of appellate court docket
fee. Actually, the payment of the required docket fee was late because of the erroneous
interpretation of the Rule by petitioners counsel. Verily, to grant their petition would be
putting a premium on his ignorance or lack of knowledge of existing Rules. He should be
reminded that it is his duty to keep abreast of legal developments and prevailing laws,
rules and legal principles,12 otherwise his clients will be prejudiced, as in this case.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioners appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

34
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration 3 which petitioners received on
JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal 4 and
APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. 6
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob
Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of
Appeals.
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed
July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July
to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period
Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and
for appeal.7
the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default
appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held
was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs
further:
of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the
Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there
were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively
trial.1 renders the judgment final and executory.8

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of
prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on
the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy
of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was
denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I
35

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS
APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY
22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST
AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners
should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss
of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
BP 129,11as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-
eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12,
1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period
to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start
of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of
36

the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus
motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later
on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his
notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the
Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final
order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al.14 where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated
July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in
the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to
file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the
running of the 15-day appeal period. 15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on
the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file
the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however,
argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of
the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day
appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time
during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been
pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule
37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period
herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the
party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. 19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days.
BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal 21 and enhance the efficiency and
dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary
period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, 22 and only in
very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system
and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion
advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal
and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require
litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There,
we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of
fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we
have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
37

application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.
But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. 33 Hence, the use of "or" in the
above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or
from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. 34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v.
IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
38

G.R. No. 167631 December 16, 2005
Jenette Marie B. Crisologo, Petitioner, vs. GLOBE TELECOM INC. and Cesar M.
Maureal, Vice President for Human Resources, Respondents.
Petitioner was an employee of respondent company. When she was promoted as
Director of Corporate Affairs and Regulatory Matters, she became entitled to an
executive car, and she procured a 1997 Toyota Camry. In April 2002, she was separated
from the company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which later dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner filed, on August 12, 2004, a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85679 assailing the NLRCs dismissal.
Pending said petition, respondent company filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong (Branch 213) an action for recovery of possession of a motor vehicle with
application for a writ of replevin with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. MC04-2480.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping
but this was denied by the trial court. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85927. 1 Petitioner also filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to enjoin proceedings
in the replevin case before the trial court.
Thereafter, respondent company filed a motion to declare defendant in default in Civil
Case No. MC04-2480, which was granted by the trial court. Respondent company was
thus allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order of default but it was denied by the trial court. On April 5, 2005, the trial court
rendered a judgment by default, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in all the foregoing uncontroverted facts supported by
documentary exhibits, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff to have the right of
possession over the subject motor vehicle and ordering defendant plaintiff to pay plaintiff
the following:
1. The amount of TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (p2,556,460.00) as damages in the form of unpaid daily car
rental for 730 (From 15 August 2002 until 22 June 2004) days at THREE THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED TWO PESOS (P3,502.00) per day;
2. The sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) AS AND BY WAY
OF Attorneys fee;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
3. The sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as exemplary
damages in order to deter others from doing similar act in withholding possession of a
property to another to which he/she has no right to possess; and
4. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated May 16, 2005, for
being the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Petitioner thus filed the present motion for reconsideration, alleging that the filing of said
petition is the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 798 (1969),
wherein it was ruled that a defendant declared in default has the remedy set forth in
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 of the old Rules of Court. 2 Petitioner then cited in her
motion, "Section 2, paragraph 3 or (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."3
Evidently, petitioner misread the provision cited in the Matute case as that pertaining to
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which states:
"(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45." Hence, she directly filed her petition for review
on certiorari with the Court.
Petitioner should be reminded that the Matute case is of 1969 vintage and pertained to
the old Rules of Court. As stated in the Matute case, a defendant validly declared in
default has the remedy set forth in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41. Note that under
the old Rules, Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 governed appeals from Courts of First
Instance, the Social Security Commission and the Court of Agrarian Relations TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS, and reads:
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38. (Emphasis supplied)
Had petitioner been more circumspect, she would have easily ascertained that said
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 of the old Rules of Court, as cited in the Matute case,
39

had already been superseded by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and
under these new rules, the different modes of appeal are clearly laid down.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this case is a judgment by default rendered by the
trial court in Civil Case No. MC04-2480. As such, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the different
modes of appeal from a Regional Trial Courts judgment or final order, to wit:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cerezo vs. Tuazon,4 the Court reiterated the remedies available to a party declared in
default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has
a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new
trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also
available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court
properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.5
The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to assail the default
judgment rendered by the trial court. Petitioner still has the available remedy of filing with
the Regional Trial Court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the trial courts default judgment. Note that petitioner admits that she was
"properly declared in default."6 Thus, there is no question of any improvident or improper
declaration of default by the trial court, and the remedy of filing a special civil action
for certiorari has been effectively foreclosed on petitioner. Her only recourse then is to file
an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Instead, she came directly to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, without
setting forth substantial reasons why the ordinary remedies under the law should be
disregarded and the petition entertained. Petitioner cannot even find solace in
the Matute case as the old Rules of Court then applicable explicitly laid down the remedy
of an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals, and not appeal by certiorari to this Court,
by a defendant declared in default.
Petitioner further argues that the petition involved questions of law, and the Court should
have taken cognizance of the case. The grounds set forth in her petition prove otherwise,
viz.:
GROUNDS
I
40

THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN FILED BY RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA AND
FOR RESPONDENTS VIOLATION OF THE RULES AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING
II
THE TRIAL COURT WENT AHEAD WITH THE EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE DESPITE THE PETITIONERS PENDING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
III
THE MONETARY AWARDS FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES ARE
UNWARRANTED AND UNJUSTIFIABLE CONSIDERING THAT SUCH ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the same Rule, which provides that an appeal may be dismissed when there is error in
the choice or mode of appeal.
Both Sections 5(f) and 6 of Rule 57 use the term "may," denoting discretion on the part of
the Court in dismissing the appeal or referring the case to the Court of Appeals. The
question of fact involved in the appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant a referral of
this case to the Court of Appeals for further appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The petition is reinstated
and the case is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

IV

THE COURT A QUO ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION IN A WAY THAT IT IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE BY THE SUPREME COURT OF ITS POWER OF
SUPERVISION

The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. 7 The issues on the award of
damages call for a re-evaluation of the evidence before the trial court, which is obviously
a question of fact. Cases where an appeal involved questions of fact, of law, or
both fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. 8 (Emphasis
supplied)

It is on this score that the Court is inclined to concur with petitioners argument that even
if the remedy resorted to was wrong, the Court may refer the case to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 56, Section 6, paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides: "(A)n appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from
the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals
for decision or appropriate action." This despite the express provision in Section 5(f) of

41

G.R. No. 190660 April 11, 2011
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ELIZABETH DIAZ, represented by FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN as Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondents.
Private respondent Elizabeth P. Diaz (Elizabeth) was the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land measuring approximately 15 hectares, situated in San Ricardo,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197132. Ten
hectares of the land were expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228.
The DAR valued the expropriated land (the land) at P54,880.59 plus increment
of P143,041.59 or a total of P197,922.18. Not satisfied with the valuation, Elizabeth,
through her attorney-in-fact Francisca P. De Guzman (Francisca), filed a complaint 1 on
November 28, 2001 against the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the DAR
before the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC). The complaint, docketed as Special Agrarian Case No. 1194-G,
prayed that just compensation be fixed at P350,000 per hectare or a total of P5,250.000.
Upon Elizabeths motion, three Commissioners were appointed to determine the just
compensation for the land.
By Decision of June 21, 2006,2 the SAC, adopted the DARs valuation on the basis of
average gross production and fixed the just compensation plus increment
at P19,107.235 per hectare or a total of P197,922.29. It held that given the formula used
in Gabatin v. LBP,3 the Commissioners Report and the fair market or assessed value of
the land can not be considered in the valuation.
Elizabeths motion for reconsideration was denied by Order dated August 31,
2006,4 hence, she elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.5
Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their appellees brief. During the pendency of the
appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee[s] Motion to
Dismiss Appeal,6 maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an ordinary
appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review, citing
Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Hence, Land Bank concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case,
the SAC decision having attained finality following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Leon7 which held that failure of a party to file the proper remedy within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice of the assailed decision renders it final.
By Resolution8 of June 2, 2009, the appellate court denied Land Banks motion to
dismiss. It faulted Land Bank for not filing an appellees brief as directed, and for filing
the motion to dismiss the appeal after the lapse of 157 days from the last day for filing
the brief.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, 9 Land Bank maintaining that the SAC
Decision had become final and executory and, therefore, the appellate court never
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by Elizabeth, a wrong mode of appeal.
Additionally, Land Bank ascribes bad faith on the part of Elizabeth for, instead of sending
a copy of her motion for reconsideration before the SAC and her subsequent Notice of
Appeal to Land Banks counsel of record Atty. Graciela L. Gutierrez at her address at the
Land Bank Field Office in Cabanatuan City, Elizabeth sent them to the Land Banks main
office in Malate, Manila where, it points out, the lawyers neither have control nor
possession of the records of the case.
In view of the filing of the present petition, action on Elizabeths appeal was held in
abeyance by the appellate court per Resolution dated June 7, 2010. 10
The petition is meritorious.
Indeed, following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 11 the proper mode of appeal
from decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The
Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that "before the instant
case reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to
appeal decisions of SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60
and 61 of RA 6657," held that "Sec. 60 of RA 6657 12 clearly and categorically states that
the said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted."
First, there is no conflict between Section[s] 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the
Rules of Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper
mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no
more than a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the
procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of
42

Special method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
in eminent domain cases.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review
is not permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not
relevant to determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from
decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, why they act as Special
Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies
without exclusivity in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the
contention that a petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases
inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the
Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court of Circular No. 1-
91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions
of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-
inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a
quasi-judicial agencies.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the
proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed
by this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.
Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with
Section 60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions
for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the
Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for
review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the
mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the
Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to
be followed for appeals in agrarian cases. 13 (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to
"hasten" the resolution of cases involving issues on just compensation of expropriated
lands under RA 6657. Thus the Court, still in the immediately cited Land Bank case,
pronounced:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases
decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for absolute
dispatch in the determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only
paying the correct amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its
acquisition. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a
petition for review.
1avvphi1
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition
for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. . . . 14 (Italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following then the same Land Bank case, resort by Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal
was fatal to her cause as it resulted in rendering the decision appealed from final and
executory. Her notice of appeal did not, it bears emphasis, stop the running of the
reglementary period to file a petition for review.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and
again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a
statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to
conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once
a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the
decision is erroneous or not and no court - not even the Supreme Court - has the power
to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final at some definite date fixed by law.15 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
June 2, 2009 is SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated June 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 33 sitting as a Special Agrarian Court in Agr. Case No. 1194-G is deemed final
and executory.
43
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
SO ORDERED.

44

G.R. No. 104222 March 3, 1994
ASTA MOSKOWSKY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO DORIA,
EDGARDO ALCARAZ and EVANGELINE DORIA, respondents.
Petitioner Asta Moskowsky claims that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion
when it admitted the private respondents' brief (as appellants therein) which she claims
was filed out of time. And she points to the fact that private respondents' motion for
extension of time to file appellants' brief were filed after the expiration of the time sought
to be extended. The private respondents deny this claim. Records of the case disclose
that in private respondents' peculiar case the last days when their motions were filed just
happened to fall always on holidays. In which case the private respondents had nor
recourse but to file their motions on the very first business days after the holidays. Can
such filing by the private respondents be sustained by this Court? Keeping faith with
earlier decisions by the Court, we rule in favor of private respondents.
The facts of this case are simple enough.
In Civil Case No. 51369 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig Branch 161, Metro Manila
entitled: "Asta Moskowsky vs. Antonio Doria," a decision was rendered on November 16,
1989 in favor of petitioner.
Said decision was appealed by private respondents and the records were elevated to the
Respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 30210.
Acting on a motion for extension of time to file appellants' brief filed by the private
respondents, the Respondent Court in a resolution dated August 15, 1991 granted
a non-extendible period of ninety (90) days within which to file appellants' brief or until
November 1, 1991.
On November 4, 1991, the private respondents through counsel filed an "Urgent Motion
for a Final Extension of 20 days to File Brief."
On even date, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the
ground that no appellants' brief had yet been filed despite the lapse of the reglementary
period on November 1, 1991.
On November 25, 1991 the private respondents filed an "Urgent Motion for Five (5) Days
to file Brief."
On December 3, 1991, the private respondents filed a "Motion to Admit Appellants' Brief."
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
In a Resolution dated December 19, 1991, the Respondent Court of Appeals resolved to
admit Appellants' Brief.
On January 6, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the period
within which to submit Appellants' Brief has expired and the admission of the Appellants'
Brief is contrary to Sec. 15 Rule 46 of the Rules.
In Resolution dated February 19, 1992, the Respondent Court of Appeals denied the
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 1
Hence, petitioner filed this instant petition.
Petitioner strongly argues that the filing of the "Urgent Motion For A Final Extension Of
20 Days" on November 4, 1991 did not operate to alter the expiration of the reglementary
period which was November 1, 1991. She states that the twenty-day period should be
counted from November 1, 1991 and the same would expire on November 21, 1991. The
filing of the "Urgent Motion For Five (5) Days To File Brief" on November 25, 1991 was,
therefore, four (4) days late. The subsequent "Motion To Admit Appellants' Brief" filed
December 3, 1991 was therefore filed out of time. As of November 22, 1991 there was
no longer any period to be extended as the decision of the trial court became final and
executory as of said date. The Court of Appeals therefore, committed grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the motions to be filed in violation of Section 15, Rule 46, Rules of
Court, as said motions were not filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended.
In reply, the private respondents aver that:
In the instant case all motions filed by respondents for extension of time
to file their brief before the Honorable Court of Appeals invariably stated
the periods of time prayed for within which to file the same. For example,
in the urgent motion for a final extension of twenty (20) days (Annex "C"
of petition) respondents informed the court that the last day for private
respondent to file their brief is November 4, 1991 which is a fact because
November 1, November 2 and November 3 were all non-working days,
and prayed that they may be granted another extension of twenty (20)
days. Necessarily, the twenty days should begin on November 4, 1991.
Again in the urgent motion for five (5) days to file brief (Annex "E" of
petition) private respondents ask for an extension of five(5) days from
November 25, 1991. And the Court of Appeals, in the interest of justice
45

and equity, for indeed our courts are not only courts of justice but also
courts of equity, impliedly granted these motions. . . . 2
Section 15, Rule 46, Rules of Court, reads as follows:
Sec. 15. Extension of time for filing brief . Extension of time for the
filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause,
and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the
time sought to be extended.
Private respondents' former counsel, Emeterio T. Balguna, filed on August 2, 1991, an
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension of Time To File Brief" 3 for a period of ninety (90)
days counted from August 3, 1991. Said ninety-day period would end on November 1, 1991.
November 1 is a regular holiday. Then President Aquino declared November 2, 1991 as a
special holiday. The next day, November 3, 1991 turned out to be a Sunday. The next
business day was, therefore, November 4, 1991 a Monday. Instead of filing a brief, private
respondents this time, through new counsel, filed a motion for a twenty-day extension to
file a brief on November 4, 1991 in the following tenor:
1. That due to the recurring illness, original counsel for defendant-
appellant Emeterio T. Balguna has withdrawn as counsel for defendant-
appellant and the matter of filing appellant's brief has been endorsed to
me by the said defendant-appellant;
2. That the undersigned counsel has been informed that the last day for
defendant-appellant to file his brief is today, November 4, 1991;
3. That the undersigned counsel was given the records only 10 days ago
and for which reason he will need time to study the records and file
appellant's brief;
4. That he will need another extension of twenty (20) days from today
within which to file appellant's brief;
5. That this motion is not intended to unduly delay the termination of this
case. 4
The law for pretermission of holidays is that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing any
act required or permitted by law falls on a regular holiday or special day, the act may be
done on the next succeeding business day." 5
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The abovementioned motion was, therefore, filed on time, i.e., the motion for the
extension sought was filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
The next question is: when should the extended period requested for commence to run?
A similar question was posed in Vda. de Capulong vs. Workmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc. 6 where the issue as formulated by the Court was as follows:
The issue presented in this case is quite simple. The private respondent
received a copy of the decision against it on January 4, 1969. On
February 3, 1969, the last day for perfecting its appeal, it filed a motion
for an extension of "at least thirty (30) days from the receipt of the Order
of this Honorable Court within which to file the Record on Appeal." The
late Judge Federico C. Alikpala of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
who rendered the decision, issued an order on February 4, 1969,
granting an extension but only for ten days and without indicating when it
would commence. This order was received by the private respondent on
February 7, 1969, and seven days later, on February 14, 1969, it filed the
record on appeal.
The question is: Was the record on appeal filed on time, that is, within the
extension? Or more to the point, when should the 10-day extension start
to run? 7
Here, the Court held as follows:
Regarding the date when the 10-day extension should begin, it is true
that as a rule the extension should be tacked to the original period and
commence immediately after the expiration of such period. But that rule
will not apply in the case at bar because the private respondent
specifically moved that it be given "at least thirty days from receipt of the
order" of the court allowing such extension. 8
Similarly, since private respondents specifically manifested that they "will need another
extension of twenty (20) days from today within which to file appellants' brief" and the
"today" (November 4, 1991) was the date of the filing of the motion, there was then
authority for private respondents to fix the commencement (of the extended period
requested) from November 4, 1991.
46

The same goes for the motion for another five days to file brief. The twentieth day from
November 4, 1991 fell on a Sunday and the brief was therefore to be filed on November
25, 1991. But, instead of the brief, the private respondents filed the abovementioned
motion for extension of time to file brief wherein they manifested that they would need
five (5) days from the filing of said motion the 25th of November 1991, to file said
brief.
Five days from November 25, 1991 is November 30, 1991 (Bonifacio Day) one of the
regular holidays of each year. 9 The next day, December 1, 1991, was a Sunday. The brief
had to be filed the next day, December 2, 1991, it being the first business day which was
neither a regular holiday or a special day.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
before submitting the private respondents' brief which included submitting the same
without any errors in its typing.
And since "Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice
and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense," we
therefore respect the appellate court's assessment of the good faith it perceived on the
part of private respondents' new counsel when it granted the motion to admit appellants'
brief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the appellate court for further proceedings. No costs.

The private respondents filed a "Motion To Admit Appellants' Brief" on December 3, 1991 SO ORDERED.
one (1) day after due date with the following reasons:

That the last day for him to file appellant's brief was yesterday, December
2, 1991. However, due to typing errors committed by the typist on some
pages of the brief, undersigned counsel had to ask that said pages be
retyped and for which reason, he was not able to file the brief yesterday;

That he is now filing the said appellant's brief, today, December 3, 1991. 10

A similar one (1) day delay occurred in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 11 and there the Court
ruled that:

The one (1) day delay in the filing of the said motion for extension can
justifiably be excused, considering that aside from the change of counsel,
the last day for filing the said motion fell on a holiday following another
holiday, hence, under such circumstances, an outright dismissal of the
petition would be too harsh. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on technicalities. In a number of cases,
this Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, has relaxed the stringent
application of technical rules in order to resolve the case on its merits.
Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial
justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. 12

The theme of private respondents' new counsel in the motions for extension of time to
file brief was that he had just been hired as counsel by the private respondents for which
reason he needed time to go over the records of the case and check his facts very well

47

G.R. No. 148116 April 14, 2004
ANTONIO K. LITONJUA and AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR., petitioners, vs. MARY ANN
GRACE FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF PAZ TICZON ELEOSIDA, represented by
GREGORIO T. ELEOSIDA, HEIRS OF DOMINGO B. TICZON, represented by MARY
MEDIATRIX T. FERNANDEZ, CRISTETA TICZON, EVANGELINE JILL R. TICZON,
ERLINDA T. BENITEZ, DOMINIC TICZON, JOSEFINA LUISA PIAMONTE, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64940, which reversed and set aside the June 23, 1999 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 65629, as well as its
Resolution dated April 30, 2001 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision.
The heirs of Domingo B. Ticzon3 are the owners of a parcel of land located in San Pablo
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36766 of the Register of Deeds
of San Pablo City.4 On the other hand, the heirs of Paz Ticzon Eleosida, represented by
Gregorio T. Eleosida, are the owners of a parcel of land located in San Pablo City,
covered by TCT No. 36754, also of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City.5
The Case for the Petitioners
Sometime in September 1995, Mrs. Lourdes Alimario and Agapito Fisico who worked as
brokers, offered to sell to the petitioners, Antonio K. Litonjua and Aurelio K. Litonjua, Jr.,
the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 36754 and 36766. The petitioners were shown
a locator plan and copies of the titles showing that the owners of the properties were
represented by Mary Mediatrix Fernandez and Gregorio T. Eleosida, respectively. The
brokers told the petitioners that they were authorized by respondent Fernandez to offer
the property for sale. The petitioners, thereafter, made two ocular inspections of the
property, in the course of which they saw some people gathering coconuts.
In the afternoon of November 27, 1995, the petitioners met with respondent Fernandez
and the two brokers at the petitioners office in Mandaluyong City. 6 The petitioners and
respondent Fernandez agreed that the petitioners would buy the property consisting of
36,742 square meters, for the price of P150 per square meter, or the total sum of
P5,098,500. They also agreed that the owners would shoulder the capital gains tax,
transfer tax and the expenses for the documentation of the sale. The petitioners and
respondent Fernandez also agreed to meet on December 8, 1995 to finalize the sale. It
was also agreed upon that on the said date, respondent Fernandez would present a
special power of attorney executed by the owners of the property, authorizing her to sell
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the property for and in their behalf, and to execute a deed of absolute sale thereon. The
petitioners would also remit the purchase price to the owners, through respondent
Fernandez. However, only Agapito Fisico attended the meeting. He informed the
petitioners that respondent Fernandez was encountering some problems with the tenants
and was trying to work out a settlement with them. 7 After a few weeks of waiting, the
petitioners wrote respondent Fernandez on January 5, 1995, demanding that their
transaction be finalized by January 30, 1996.8
When the petitioners received no response from respondent Fernandez, the petitioners
sent her another Letter9dated February 1, 1996, asking that the Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the property be executed in accordance with their verbal agreement dated
November 27, 1995. The petitioners also demanded the turnover of the subject
properties to them within fifteen days from receipt of the said letter; otherwise, they would
have no option but to protect their interest through legal means.
Upon receipt of the above letter, respondent Fernandez wrote the petitioners on
February 14, 199610 and clarified her stand on the matter in this wise:
1) It is not true I agreed to shoulder registration fees and other miscellaneous
expenses, etc. I do not recall we ever discussed about them. Nonetheless, I
made an assurance at that time that there was no liens/encumbrances and
tenants on my property (TCT 36755).
2) It is not true that we agreed to meet on December 8, 1995 in order to sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale. The truth of the matter is that you were the one who
emphatically stated that you would prepare a Contract to Sell and requested us
to come back first week of December as you would be leaving the country then.
In fact, what you were demanding from us was to apprise you of the status of the
property, whether we would be able to ascertain that there are really no tenants.
Ms. Alimario and I left your office, but we did not assure you that we would be
back on the first week of December.
Unfortunately, some people suddenly appeared and claiming to be "tenants" for
the entire properties (including those belonging to my other relatives.) Another
thing, the Barangay Captain now refuses to give a certification that our properties
are not tenanted.
Thereafter, I informed my broker, Ms. Lulu Alimario, to relay to Mr. Agapito that
due to the appearance of "alleged tenants" who are demanding for a one-hectare
share, my cousin and I have thereby changed our mind and that the sale will no
48

longer push through. I specifically instructed her to inform you thru your broker
that we will not be attending the meeting to be held sometime first week of
December.
In view thereof, I regret to formally inform you now that we are no longer selling
the property until all problems are fully settled. We have not demanded and
received from you any earnest money, thereby, no obligations exist. In the
meantime, we hope that in the future we will eventually be able to transact
business since we still have other properties in San Pablo City.11
Appended thereto was a copy of respondent Fernandez letter to the petitioners dated
January 16, 1996, in response to the latters January 5, 1996 letter.12
On April 12, 1996, the petitioners filed the instant Complaint for specific performance with
damages13 against respondent Fernandez and the registered owners of the property. In
their complaint, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, the following:
4. On 27 November 1995, defendants offered to sell to plaintiffs two (2) parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36766 and 36754 measuring a
total of 36,742 square meters in Barrio Concepcion, San Pablo City. After a
brief negotiation, defendants committed and specifically agreed to sell to plaintiffs
33,990 square meters of the two (2) aforementioned parcels of land at P150.00
per square meter.
5. The parties also unequivocally agreed to the following:
(a) The transfer tax and all the other fees and expenses for the titling of the
subject property in plaintiffs names would be for defendants account.
(b) The plaintiffs would pay the entire purchase price of P5,098,500.00 for the
aforementioned 33,990 square meters of land in plaintiffs office on 8 December
1995.
6. Defendants repeatedly assured plaintiffs that the two (2) subject parcels of
land were free from all liens and encumbrances and that no squatters or tenants
occupied them.
7. Plaintiffs, true to their word, and relying in good faith on the commitment of
defendants, pursued the purchase of the subject parcels of lands. On 5 January
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
1996, plaintiffs sent a letter of even date to defendants, setting the date of sale
and payment on 30 January 1996.
7.1 Defendants received the letter on 12 January 1996 but did not reply
to it.
8. On 1 February 1996, plaintiffs again sent a letter of even date to defendants
demanding execution of the Deed of Sale.
8.1 Defendants received the same on 6 February 1996. Again, there was
no reply. Defendants thus reneged on their commitment a second time.
9. On 14 February 1996, defendant Fernandez sent a written communication of
the same date to plaintiffs enclosing therein a copy of her 16 January 1996 letter
to plaintiffs which plaintiffs never received before. Defendant Fernandez stated in
her 16 January 1996 letter that despite the meeting of minds among the parties
over the 33,990 square meters of land for P150.00 per square meter on 27
November 1995, defendants suddenly had a change of heart and no longer
wished to sell the same. Paragraph 6 thereof unquestionably shows defendants
previous agreement as above-mentioned and their unjustified breach of their
obligations under it.
10. Defendants cannot unilaterally, whimsically and capriciously cancel a
perfected contract to sell.
11. Plaintiffs intended to use the subject property for their subdivision project to
support plaintiffs quarry operations, processing of aggregate products and
manufacture of construction materials. Consequently, by reason of defendants
failure to honor their just obligations, plaintiffs suffered, and continue to suffer,
actual damages, consisting in unrealized profits and cost of money, in the
amount of at least P5 Million.
12. Plaintiffs also suffered sleepless nights and mental anxiety on account of
defendants fraudulent actuations for which reason defendants are liable to
plaintiffs for moral damages in the amount of at least P1.5 Million.
13. By reason of defendants above-described fraudulent actuations, plaintiffs,
despite their willingness and ability to pay the agreed purchase price, have to
date been unable to take delivery of the title to the subject property. Defendants
acted in a wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner in violating the contract to
49

sell. By way of example or correction for the public good, defendants are liable to
plaintiff for exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
14. Defendants bad faith and refusal to honor their just obligations to plaintiffs
constrained the latter to litigate and to engage the services of undersigned
counsel for a fee in the amount of at least P250,000.00. 14
The petitioners prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor
ordering the respondents to
(a) Secure at defendants expense all clearances from the appropriate
government agencies that will enable defendants to comply with their obligations
under the Contract to Sell;
(b) Execute a Contract to Sell with terms agreed upon by the parties;
(c) Solidarily pay the plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. P5,000,000.00 in actual damages;
2. P1,500,000.00 in moral damages;
3. P500,000.00 in exemplary damages;
4. P250,000.00 in attorneys fees.15
On July 5, 1996, respondent Fernandez filed her Answer to the complaint. 16 She claimed
that while the petitioners offered to buy the property during the meeting of November 27,
1995, she did not accept the offer; thus, no verbal contract to sell was ever perfected.
She specifically alleged that the said contract to sell was unenforceable for failure to
comply with the statute of frauds. She also maintained that even assuming arguendo that
she had, indeed, made a commitment or promise to sell the property to the petitioners,
the same was not binding upon her in the absence of any consideration distinct and
separate from the price. She, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Dismissing the Complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs;
2. On the COUNTERCLAIM, ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant moral damages
in the amount of not less than P2,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
amount of not less than P500,000.00 and attorneys fees and reimbursement
expenses of litigation in the amount of P300,000.00.17
On September 24, 1997, the trial court, upon motion of the petitioners, declared the other
respondents in default for failure to file their responsive pleading within the reglementary
period.18 At the pre-trial conference held on March 2, 1998, the parties agreed that the
following issues were to be resolved by the trial court: (1) whether or not there was a
perfected contract to sell; (2) in the event that there was, indeed, a perfected contract to
sell, whether or not the respondents breached the said contract to sell; and (3) the
corollary issue of damages.19
Respondent Fernandez testified that she requested Lourdes Alimario to look for a buyer
of the properties in San Pablo City "on a best offer basis." She was later informed by
Alimario that the petitioners were interested to buy the properties. On November 27,
1995, along with Alimario and another person, she met with the petitioners in the latters
office and told them that she was at the conference merely to hear their offer, that she
could not bind the owners of the properties as she had no written authority to sell the
same. The petitioners offered to buy the property at P150 per square meter. After the
meeting, respondent Fernandez requested Joy Marquez to secure a barangay clearance
stating that the property was free of any tenants. She was surprised to learn that the
clearance could not be secured. She contacted a cousin of hers, also one of the owners
of the property, and informed him that there was a prospective buyer of the property but
that there were tenants thereon. Her cousin told her that he was not selling his share of
the property and that he was not agreeable to the price of P150 per square meter. She
no longer informed the other owners of the petitioners offer. Respondent Fernandez then
asked Alimario to apprise the petitioners of the foregoing developments, through their
agent, Agapito Fisico. She was surprised to receive a letter from the petitioners dated
January 5, 1996. Nonetheless, she informed the petitioners that she had changed her
mind in pursuing the negotiations in a Letter dated January 18, 1996. When she received
petitioners February 1, 1996 Letter, she sent a Reply-Letter dated February 14, 1996.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners on
June 23, 1999,20 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of plaintiffs ANTONIO K. LITONJUA and AURELIO K. LITONJUA and
against defendants MARY MEDIATRIX T. FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF PAZ
TICZON ELEOSIDA, represented by GREGORIO T. ELEOSIDA, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES; HEIRS OF DOMINGO B. TICZON, represented by MARY
MEDIATRIX T. FERNANDEZ, CRISTETA TICZON, EVANGELINE JILL R.
50

TICZON, ERLINDA T. BENITEZ, DOMINIC TICZON, JOSEFINA LUISA
PIAMONTE, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, ordering defendants to:
1. execute a Contract of Sale and/or Absolute Deed of Sale with the
terms agreed upon by the parties and to secure all clearances from the
concerned government agencies and removal of any tenants from the
subject property at their expense to enable defendants to comply with
their obligations under the perfected agreement to sell; and
2. pay to plaintiffs the sum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00)
Pesos as and by way of attorneys fees.21
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the respondents ascribed the following errors to the
court a quo:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A
PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE OF THE TWO LOTS ON NOVEMBER 27,
1995.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE VERBAL
CONTRACT OF SALE AS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ANTONIO
LITONJUA AND AURELIO LITONJUA WAS UNENFORCEABLE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LETTER OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FERNANDEZ DATED JANUARY 16, 1996 WAS A
CONFIRMATION OF THE PERFECTED SALE AND CONSTITUTED AS
WRITTEN EVIDENCE THEREOF.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A SPECIAL POWER
OF ATTORNEY WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
FERNANDEZ COULD NEGOTIATE THE SALE ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER
REGISTERED CO-OWNERS OF THE TWO LOTS.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION WITHOUT STATING THE BASIS
IN THE TEXT OF SAID DECISION.22
On February 28, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its decision reversing and setting
aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissing the petitioners complaint, as well as
the respondents counterclaim.23 The appellate court ruled that the petitioners failed to
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
prove that a sale or a contract to sell over the property between the petitioners and the
private respondent had been perfected.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts resolution:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT FALLS UNDER THE COVERAGE OF
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANTS DECLARED IN DEFAULT ARE
BENEFITED BY THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. 24
The petition has no merit.
The general rule is that the Courts jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. As the findings of
fact of the appellate court are deemed continued, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze
and calibrate all over again the evidence adduced by the parties in the court a quo.25 This
rule, however, is not without exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory. 26 Indeed, in this case, the
findings of the trial court and its conclusion based on the said findings contradict those of
the appellate court. However, upon careful review of the records of this case, we find no
justification to grant the petition. We, thus, affirm the decision of the appellate court.
On the first and second assignment of errors, the petitioners assert that there was a
perfected contract of sale between the petitioners as buyers and the respondents-
owners, through respondent Fernandez, as sellers. The petitioners contend that the
perfection of the said contract is evidenced by the January 16, 1996 Letter of respondent
Fernandez.27 The pertinent portions of the said letter are as follows:
[M]y cousin and I have thereby changed our mind and that the sale will
no longer push through. I specifically instructed her to inform you thru your
broker that we will not be attending the meeting to be held sometime first week of
December.
51

In view thereof, I regret to formally inform you now that we are no longer
selling the property until all problems are fully settled. We have not demanded
and received from you any earnest money, thereby, no obligations exist28
The petitioners argue that the letter is a sufficient note or memorandum of the perfected
contract, thus, removing it from the coverage of the statute of frauds. The letter
specifically makes reference to a sale which respondent Fernandez agreed to initially,
but which the latter withdrew because of the emergence of some people who claimed to
be tenants on both parcels of land. According to the petitioners, the respondents-owners,
in their answer to the complaint, as well as respondent Fernandez when she testified,
admitted the authenticity and due execution of the said letter. Besides, when the
petitioner Antonio Litonjua testified on the contract of sale entered into between
themselves and the respondents-owners, the latter did not object thereto. Consequently,
the respondents-owners thereby ratified the said contract of sale. The petitioners thus
contend that the appellate courts declaration that there was no perfected contract of sale
between the petitioners and the respondents-owners is belied by the evidence, the
pleadings of the parties, and the law.
The petitioners contention is bereft of merit. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that
the Letter of respondent Fernandez dated January 16, 1996 is hardly the note or
memorandum contemplated under Article 1403(2)(e) of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or
secondary evidence of its contents:
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale of real property or of an interest therein.29
The appellate court based its ruling on the following disquisitions:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
In the case at bar, the letter dated January 16, 1996 of defendant-appellant can
hardly be said to constitute the note or memorandum evidencing the agreement
of the parties to enter into a contract of sale as it is very clear that defendant-
appellant as seller did not accept the condition that she will be the one to pay the
registration fees and miscellaneous expenses and therein also categorically
denied she had already committed to execute the deed of sale as claimed by the
plaintiffs-appellees. The letter, in fact, stated the reasons beyond the control of
the defendant-appellant, why the sale could no longer push through because of
the problem with tenants. The trial court zeroed in on the statement of the
defendant-appellant that she and her cousin changed their minds, thereby
concluding that defendant-appellant had unilaterally cancelled the sale or backed
out of her previous commitment. However, the tenor of the letter actually reveals
a consistent denial that there was any such commitment on the part of
defendant-appellant to sell the subject lands to plaintiffs-appellees. When
defendant-appellant used the words "changed our mind," she was clearly
referring to the decision to sell the property at all (not necessarily to plaintiffs-
appellees) and not in selling the property to herein plaintiffs-appellees as
defendant-appellant had not yet made the final decision to sell the property to
said plaintiffs-appellees. This conclusion is buttressed by the last paragraph of
the subject letter stating that "we are no longer selling the property until all
problems are fully settled." To read a definite previous agreement for the sale of
the property in favor of plaintiffs-appellees into the contents of this letter is to
unduly restrict the freedom of the contracting parties to negotiate and prejudice
the right of every property owner to secure the best possible offer and terms in
such sale transactions. We believe, therefore, that the trial court committed a
reversible error in finding that there was a perfected contract of sale or contract
to sell under the foregoing circumstances. Hence, the defendant-appellant may
not be held liable in this action for specific performance with damages. 30
In Rosencor Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,31 the term "statute of frauds"
is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The
statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters
therein involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render
it enforceable. The purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations, depending for their existence on the unassisted memory of
witnesses, by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced
by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The statute is satisfied or, as it is often
stated, a contract or bargain is taken within the statute by making and executing a note
or memorandum of the contract which is sufficient to state the requirements of the
statute.32The application of such statute presupposes the existence of a perfected
contract. However, for a note or memorandum to satisfy the statute, it must be complete
52

in itself and cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol. The note or memorandum
must contain the names of the parties, the terms and conditions of the contract and a
description of the property sufficient to render it capable of identification. 33 Such note or
memorandum must contain the essential elements of the contract expressed with
certainty that may be ascertained from the note or memorandum itself, or some other
writing to which it refers or within which it is connected, without resorting to parol
evidence.34 To be binding on the persons to be charged, such note or memorandum must
be signed by the said party or by his agent duly authorized in writing.35
In City of Cebu v. Heirs of Rubi,36 we held that the exchange of written correspondence
between the parties may constitute sufficient writing to evidence the agreement for
purposes of complying with the statute of frauds.
In this case, we agree with the findings of the appellate court that there was no perfected
contract of sale between the respondents-owners, as sellers, and the petitioners, as
buyers.
There is no documentary evidence on record that the respondents-owners specifically
authorized respondent Fernandez to sell their properties to another, including the
petitioners. Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that a special power of attorney
is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is
transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration, 37 or to create or
convey real rights over immovable property,38 or for any other act of strict dominion. 39 Any
sale of real property by one purporting to be the agent of the registered owner without
any authority therefor in writing from the said owner is null and void. 40The declarations of
the agent alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or extent of her
authority.41 In this case, the only evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove that
respondent Fernandez was authorized by the respondents-owners is the testimony of
petitioner Antonio Litonjua that respondent Fernandez openly represented herself to be
the representative of the respondents-owners,42 and that she promised to present to the
petitioners on December 8, 1996 a written authority to sell the properties. 43 However, the
petitioners claim was belied by respondent Fernandez when she testified, thus:
Q Madam Witness, what else did you tell to the plaintiffs?
A I told them that I was there representing myself as one of the owners of the
properties, and I was just there to listen to his proposal because that time, we
were just looking for the best offer and I did not have yet any written authorities
from my brother and sisters and relatives. I cannot agree on anything yet since it
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
is just a preliminary meeting, and so, I have to secure authorities and relate the
matters to my relatives, brother and sisters, sir.
Q And what else was taken up?
A Mr. Antonio Litonjua told me that they will be leaving for another country and he
requested me to come back on the first week of December and in the meantime,
I should make an assurance that there are no tenants in our properties, sir.44
The petitioners cannot feign ignorance of respondent Fernandez lack of authority to sell
the properties for the respondents-owners. It must be stressed that the petitioners are
noted businessmen who ought to be very familiar with the intricacies of business
transactions, such as the sale of real property.
The settled rule is that persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at their peril,
and if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also
the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof
is upon them to prove it.45 In this case, respondent Fernandez specifically denied that she
was authorized by the respondents-owners to sell the properties, both in her answer to
the complaint and when she testified. The Letter dated January 16, 1996 relied upon by
the petitioners was signed by respondent Fernandez alone, without any authority from
the respondents-owners. There is no evidence on record that the respondents-owners
ratified all the actuations of respondent Fernandez in connection with her dealings with
the petitioners. As such, said letter is not binding on the respondents as owners of the
subject properties.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the letter of January 16, 1996 46 is not a note or
memorandum within the context of Article 1403(2) because it does not contain the
following: (a) all the essential terms and conditions of the sale of the properties; (b) an
accurate description of the property subject of the sale; and, (c) the names of the
respondents-owners of the properties. Furthermore, the letter made reference to only
one property, that covered by TCT No. T-36755.
We note that the petitioners themselves were uncertain as to the specific area of the
properties they were seeking to buy. In their complaint, they alleged to have agreed to
buy from the respondents-owners 33,990 square meters of the total acreage of the two
lots consisting of 36,742 square meters. In their Letter to respondent Fernandez dated
January 5, 1996, the petitioners stated that they agreed to buy the two lots, with a total
area of 36,742 square meters.47 However, in their Letter dated February 1, 1996, the
petitioners declared that they agreed to buy a portion of the properties consisting of
53
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
33,990 square meters. When he testified, petitioner Antonio Litonjua declared that the
48

petitioners agreed to buy from the respondents-owners 36,742 square meters at P150
per square meter or for the total price of P5,098,500. 49

The failure of respondent Fernandez to object to parol evidence to prove (a) the essential
terms and conditions of the contract asserted by the petitioners and, (b) her authority to
sell the properties for the respondents-registered owners did not and should not
prejudice the respondents-owners who had been declared in default. 50

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
appellate court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

54

G.R. No. 150888 September 24, 2004
TRAVERSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petitioners appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 43157 for lack of
jurisdiction and the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On July 21, 1980, the respondent, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), granted
a loan of P910,000.00 to the petitioner, Traverse Development Corporation, for the
construction of a three-storey commercial building on its property located in Tarlac (now
Tarlac City), with an area of 698 square meters covered by TCT No. 154736. The loan
was payable in fifteen (15) years, or until June 30, 1996. To secure the payment thereof,
the petitioner executed a real estate mortgage over a portion of said property, consisting
of 349 square meters. The contract of mortgage was annotated at the dorsal portion of
TCT No. 154736 as Entry No. E-20-10483.2
Under the real estate mortgage, the petitioner was required to secure an insurance policy
covering the building against fire and earthquake from an acceptable insurance company
and to endorse the corresponding policy/policies to the respondent. The respondent was
authorized to foreclose the mortgage extrajudicially in case the petitioner defaulted on its
obligation.
The petitioner secured a fire insurance policy from the FGU Insurance Corporation
for P1,000,000, effective until May 7, 1982. However, before the said date, the
respondent required the petitioner to secure another fire insurance policy, this time from
the Central Surety and Insurance Company (CSIC) also for P1,000,000. The petitioner
did as directed and secured Fire Insurance Policy No. TAR 1056 from CSIC covering the
building for the period of May 7, 1982 to May 7, 1983. 3 Under the policy, the CSIC
obliged itself to pay, in case of loss or damage to the insured property, the amount of
such loss or damage to the respondent or as its interests may appear.4
On August 9, 1982, the building was gutted by fire. The petitioner notified the
respondent, through a written notice, of the total loss of the building and, at the same
time, filed its claim with CSIC in the amount of P1,000,000 under the insurance policy.
On November 6, 1982, the CSIC proposed a settlement of the petitioners claim
for P230,748.00. The petitioner rejected the offer and filed, on February 28, 1983, a
complaint against the CSIC and the respondent in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-37497.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The petitioner alleged that, despite its demands, the CSIC refused to pay the amount
of P1,000,000 which was the amount of the insurance plus interests, and that because of
such delay, it failed to pay its loan to the respondent and to collect rentals from its
prospective lessees on the building. The respondent failed to convince the CSIC to pay
the said amount.
The petitioner prayed that it be granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, after hearing, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered by this Honorable Court in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff
the amount of P1,000,000.00, the amount for which Fire Insurance
Company Policy No. TAR 1056 was issued plus interest thereon at the
legal rate computed thirty (30) days after defendants received proof of
loss;
2. Sentencing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff actual
and compensatory damages in an amount of not less than P275,000.00,
more or less;
3. Sentencing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff,
rentals which it failed to receive from the premises due to the unjustifiable
delay of the defendants in the settlement of plaintiffs claim;
4. Sentencing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff the
interest and penalty charged to plaintiffs loan account with the
Development Bank of the Philippines due to the unjustifiable delay of
defendants in the settlement of plaintiffs claim;
5. Sentencing defendant SURETY to pay to plaintiff nominal damages in
an amount of not less than P100,000.00, more or less;
6. Sentencing defendant SURETY to pay to plaintiff exemplary damages
in an amount of not less than P100,000.00, more or less;
7. Sentencing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation;
55

8. Sentencing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs as may be just and equitable in
the premises.5
However, the RTC did not issue any temporary restraining order.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-37497, the respondent foreclosed the real
estate mortgage upon the petitioners default in the payment of its obligation under the
said contract. The respondent was the highest bidder at the sale at public auction, with
the bid price of P540,050.00. A certificate of sale was issued in its favor on May 30, 1990
and was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 154736. 6 The respondent
consolidated its title to the property in due course.
On May 28, 1991, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent in the RTC of
Tarlac, for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and damages; and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin the
defendant from selling the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
74327 which was raffled to Branch 63, Tarlac, Tarlac.
As its first cause of action, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage of the entire property, as well as the sale thereof at public auction to the
respondent, was null and void because only 349 square meters of the entire property, or
one-half (1/2) of the eastern portion thereof, was mortgaged to the respondent. The
petitioner alleged that its failure to pay its loan was due to the fire that gutted its building,
a fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the New Civil Code; as such, it was excused from
paying its loan. The petitioner also alleged that were it not for the delay of the payment of
its insurance claim from the CSIC, an insurance company chosen by the respondent, it
would have been able to pay its loan, as provided in the real estate mortgage.
On its second cause of action, the petitioner alleged that the respondent proceeded with
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of its property at public auction
despite the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-37497.
The petitioner prayed that it be granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
(1) immediately upon the filing of this Complaint, a temporary restraining
order be issued ex parte and, after notice and hearing, a writ of
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from consolidating ownership
over the foreclosed properties or issuing new transfer certificate of title;
(2) after trial, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants
[a] on the First Cause of Action, annulling the foreclosure sale
and enjoining defendants from consolidating ownership over the
foreclosed properties or issuing new transfer certificate of title
thereto;
[b] on the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00;
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the sum of P100,000.00;
Exemplary or corrective damages of P100,000.00; and
the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs as this Court may deem just and equitable in
the premises.8
Since the RTC did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent consolidated
its title on August 21, 1991 over the foreclosed property and was placed in possession
thereof.
Almost two (2) years thereafter, or on July 7, 1993, the petitioner filed another complaint
in the RTC of Tarlac against DBP for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings,
reconveyance of title, cancellation of writ of possession, damages and preliminary
injunction with prayer for a restraining order. The verification in the complaint was signed
by Angel Tadeo Q. Roxas. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7885 9 and raffled to
Branch 63 of the court.
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that, despite the respondents interference in the
procurement of a fire insurance policy over the still-to-be constructed building, and the
fact that the respondent was entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy under the
real estate mortgage and fire insurance policy in the amount of P1,000,000.00, the said
56

respondent still proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage;
the respondent failed to give notice to the petitioner relative to its agreement with the
respondent to await the outcome of Civil Case No. Q-37497 and Civil Case No. 7432
before the latter consolidated its title over the property and took possession thereof; the
petitioner was no longer obliged to pay its loan to the respondent because of the total
loss of the building; the petitioners failure to pay its loan was due to the delay in the
payment of the amount of P1,000,000 in insurance policy by the CSIC; since it was the
respondent which impelled the petitioner to procure the said policy, the petitioner should
not be faulted for failure to pay its loan. The petitioner prayed for judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a restraining order be immediately
issued by this Honorable Court prohibiting or restraining the defendant or any
other persons acting in its behalf from proceeding with the sale of plaintiffs (sic)
properties to third parties, either through public bidding or through negotiated
sale.
And after due hearing, judgment be rendered:
a) Making the restraining order and/or preliminary injunction permanent
and declare the extra-judicial foreclosure as null and void;
b) Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the title to the foreclosed
properties;
c) Declaring the Writ of Possession issued thereon as cancelled and
ordering defendant to return and surrender possession of the premises it
seized to the plaintiff;
d) Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in an amount
not less than P500,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum
of P100,000.00;
e) Ordering defendant to pay attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in
the amount of P100,000.00; and
f) to pay the cost of suit.
PLAINTIFF FURTHER PRAYS for such other reliefs this Honorable Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises.10
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The case was raffled to Branch 63 of the court. On July 15, 1993, the respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion11 in Civil Case No. 7885 for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
litis pendentia and forum shopping and to cite Angel Tadeo Q. Roxas and the petitioners
counsel, Atty. Jesus A. Concepcion, in contempt of court. The respondent asserted that
Civil Case No. 7885 was a duplication of Civil Case No. 7432 pending before the same
branch of the RTC, with the same parties, the same issues and the same reliefs being
prayed for by the petitioner. The respondent cited Section 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1985
Rules of Court, as its ground for its motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7885. It asserted
that Angel Tadeo Roxas, the petitioner and its counsel, were guilty of indirect contempt
and should be sanctioned for abusing the processes of the courts, citing the ruling of this
Court in Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes.12
The respondent opposed the motion asserting that the reliefs prayed for by it in the two
cases are different. It contended that in Civil Case No. 7432, it sought the nullification of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged property at
public auction and prayed for an injunctive relief to enjoin the respondent from
consolidating its title over the property; on the other hand, in Civil Case No. 7885, it
sought to enjoin the respondent from selling the property to third parties, and the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, including the sale at public
auction of the mortgaged property on account of the respondents violations of the real
estate mortgage provisions, and to cancel the writ of possession in its favor. The
petitioner contended that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 7432 was not a bar to
its action in Civil Case No. 7885 and that Roxas and his counsel were not liable for
contempt of court.
On August 20, 1993, the trial court issued an Order granting the respondents motion to
dismiss the case, but denied its motion to cite Roxas, the petitioner and its counsel for
contempt of court.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals in which it asserted the
following:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE
OF LITIS PENDENTIA.
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY
OF FORUM SHOPPING UNDER THE CONCLUSION THAT CIVIL CASE NO.
7432 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 7885 ARE BASED ON THE SAME ALLEGATIONS
OF FACTS INVOLVING THE SAME ISSUE, THE SAME TRANSACTION AND
ARE BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES.
57

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION
OF CIVIL CASE NO. 7432 WITH CIVIL CASE NO. 7885.13
On July 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, ruling that the remedy of the petitioner from the trial courts order
dismissing Civil Case No. 7885 was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the sole issue raised by it on appeal being purely legal and not
factual.
The petitioner now comes to this Court, asserting that:
1. The appeal below raises not only questions of law but also questions of fact
that may very well be looked into.14
2. Contrary to the ruling of the lower court, the appeal below is the "correct
mode" of appeal.15
3. Because Civil Case No. 7885 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. 7432,
consolidation, not dismissal, is the proper remedy.16
The issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petitioners appeal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the same. The resolution
of the issue is, in turn, anchored on the determination of whether the petitioner raised
purely legal issues in the appellate court.
The petition has no merit.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute
as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a
question of law.19
We agree with the Court of Appeals that only legal issues were raised by the petitioner in
its appeal: (a) whether its action in Civil Case No. 7885 which was raffled to Branch 63 of
the court is barred by the pendency of Civil Case No. 7432, also pending in the same
court and, if so, whether the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; (b) whether Roxas, a
member of the petitioners Board of Directors, who signed the verification of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7885 and its counsel are guilty of forum shopping; and (c)
whether the trial court should have denied the consolidation of the proceedings in the two
cases considering that the same were raffled to the same court.
The petitioner appended to its brief a copy of its complaint in Civil Case No. 7432. The
records of Civil Case No. 7885 were elevated to the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 7885 and 7432 before it for review in
resolving the issue of whether or not the issues raised were purely legal or factual, and
whether it had jurisdiction over the petitioners appeal or not.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the Court of Appeals has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. Under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the
aggrieved party may appeal from the said decision by filing a notice of appeal and paying
the requisite docket fees therefor within fifteen days from notice of said decision.
However, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in cases wherein
the issues raised are purely legal.17 In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is
to appeal the decision via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

It has been held in a number of cases 18 that there is a "question of law" when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not call
58

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
"Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-
95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private
respondent from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him
as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH).
I 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from the
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business.
Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for
which he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those
under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19,
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension.
For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category
of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct
and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the
former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited
himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero
who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26,
administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved
of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final
and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right
of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she
found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules
of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others,
59

that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme
Court on pure questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall
promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance
of its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All previsionary orders at the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall
be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman
as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the
Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including
those rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal in administrative
cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she
definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent
statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her
petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The
parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying
Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et
al. 3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 4 were original actions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced
by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
al., 6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et
al., 8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, 9 which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus
under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely
denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for
ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the
issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the
writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original
action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious
though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
60

in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely
observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the
fact, which does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to
herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil
Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the
Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman
are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents,
the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of
Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is
sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would
dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and
to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that
Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17,
1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however,
is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the
courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative
body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute,
governs in a case before them for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not
raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It
does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding,
and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court
is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own
motion. 15 The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any
point in the case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized right
to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto
should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following
resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is
"an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order
(Re: Motion for Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411,
entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director,
Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved the latter from the
administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others.
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant
thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7
whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A.
No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof
pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
61

or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon
took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A.
No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571,
October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-
91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now substantially
reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and
involved in this case, and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn
the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the
Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first
resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their
position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their
corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such
requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented.
On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a
law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution,"
and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this
Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid
final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27
does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein
are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45
in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited
by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is
to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency
and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate
procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because
they are what are referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised
Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court,"
explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only
of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for
appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose
was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on
appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the
former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies.
62

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies 20 are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high
constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should
be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an
independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not
perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil
Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than
this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered
by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we
place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance"
by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too
tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact
but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the
cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have
pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if
it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a
general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time
likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution
of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of
passing upon the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private
respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is
precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not
applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered
by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is
precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with
settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the
same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against
a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. 23 was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the
difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case.
By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction.
63

Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent,
private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of
Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on
S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be
Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the
Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President
Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the
deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this
Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also
reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B.
No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter,
thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to
Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such
provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its
advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator
Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court
regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that
they should be appeals on certiorari. 27
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was
ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should
be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate
jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under
its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and
purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the
exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of
whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those
which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if
a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall
now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure
only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is
affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution
without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which
relate to the remedy. 34
64
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of
the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as
impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent
tribunal to administer that remedy. 35

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from
one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at
bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court
of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID
and of no further force and effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a
petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit
such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may
deem necessary and proper. SO ORDERED.

65

G.R. No. 147995 March 4, 2004
JESSIE MACALALAG, petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN, PABLO ALORO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
The elemental issue in the petition for review is whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases.
The factual antecedents of the case, summarized by the appellate court, are basically
undisputed
"x x x on February 3, 1997, private respondent Pablo Aloro lodged with the Office
of the Ombudsman for Visayas a complaint for dishonesty against the petitioner
Jessie Macalalag, an employee of the Philippine Postal Corporation, Bacolod
City. The petitioner was directed to file his answer through Orders dated February
18, July 7, and November 13, 1997 and April 24, 1998 but he did not bother to
file any. Instead, when the case was called for preliminary conference on 27
October 1998, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement and praying that
he be allowed to submit his position paper after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. Again, no position paper was ever submitted by him.
Accordingly, the investigator was constrained to resolve the case on the basis
solely of the evidence furnished by the private respondent.
"It was established that the private respondent, a resident of Bacolod City, is a
retired employee receiving a monthly pension from the Social Security System.
As of September 15, 1996, however, he failed to receive his pension checks
corresponding to the months of April, May and July, 1996. When he went to
Bacolod City Post Office to verify about the matter, he learned that his missing
checks were taken by the petitioner, an employee of the Philippine Postal
Corporation in Bacolod City, who endorsed and encashed them for his personal
benefit. When confronted by the private respondent, the petitioner issued to the
former his personal check in the amount of P7,320.00 in payment of the checks.
However, when the private complainant presented the check for payment, it was
dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
"Nonetheless, the private-respondent executed an affidavit of desistance for the
purpose of seeking the dismissal of the case against the petitioner. But said
affidavit was rejected and, instead, the petitioner was declared administratively
liable and ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
disqualification from government service. The petitioner sought a consideration
but the same was denied.
"The petitioner next appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari. However, in the light of the decision in Fabian vs. Desierto,
[(295 SCRA 470) 1998] and Administrative Circular No. 99-2-01-SC, the appeal
was dismissed.
"In the interim, the adverse Ombudsman decision attained finality."1
Petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals on the
ground that "the gross ignorance, negligence and incompetence of petitioner's former
lawyer deprived petitioner of his day in court which (would) justify the annulment of the
assailed Resolution and Order." The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction thereover; it ratiocinated:
"x x x Under Section 9 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, this Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial
Courts. Nothing is mentioned therein about judgments of other courts, much less
of the Ombudsman or any quasi-judicial body. The case of Fabian v. Desierto,
295 SCRA 470 (1998), vested this Court only with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions which should be taken via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."2
Undaunted, petitioner has filed the instant petition for review, arguing that Section 47 of
the Rules of Court on annulment of judgments, refers to "Regional Trial Courts" in its
generic sense that should thus include quasi-judicial bodies whose functions or rank are
co-equal with those of the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner's thesis finds no support in law and jurisprudence.
Rule 47, entitled "Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions," is a new
provision under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given
imprimatur by the courts.3 The rule covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
66
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate that every litigation must come to an end. It would be a clear mockery if it were
remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner." 4 An action for otherwise. Access to the courts is guaranteed, but there must be a limit to it.
annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled is rendered.5 The concern that the remedy could so easily be WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision, dated 24 January 2001, of
resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, 6 has prompted the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59361 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
safeguards to be put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment
of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction,7 and the remedy may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself
of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost
therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own
fault or negligence.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6770, also known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Fabian v.
Desierto8, the Court has declared Section 27 of the Act to be unconstitutional since it
expands the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without its advice and consent required under
Article VI, Section 30, of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, all appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are instead to be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule is reiterated in
Administrative Circular No. 99-2-01-SC.

Parenthetically, R.A. 6770 is silent on the remedy of annulment of judgments or final

orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Tirol, Jr. v. Del
Rosario,9 the Court has held that since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the
remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only, the right to appeal is not to be considered granted
to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative cases. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
law.10 There must then be a law expressly granting such right. 11 This legal axiom is also
applicable and even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an
exception to the rule on finality of judgments.

Moreover, petitioner may no longer resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment after
having filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Neither can he claim that he is not bound
by his lawyer's actions; it is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when
the courts can step in and accord relief to a client who would have suffered thereby. 12 If
every perceived mistake, failure of diligence, lack of experience or insufficient legal
knowledge of the lawyer would be admitted as a reason for the reopening of a case,
there would be no end to controversy. Fundamental to our judicial system is the principle
67

G.R. No. 134509 April 12, 2005
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner, vs NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XI, DAVAO CITY, respondent.
In this Petition1 filed pursuant to Section 27, 2 Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
"The Ombudsman Act of 1989," in relation to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner Venancio R. Nava (hereinafter, Nava) assails the disapproval 3 by the
Ombudsman of the Order4 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of the case against him and his co-accused Aquilina Granada (hereinafter,
Granada) for alleged Falsification Thru Reckless Imprudence in OMB Cases No. 3-93-
3219 and No. 3-96-0462, in which the public respondent National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) was the complainant. The Order was issued to resolve the Motion for
Reinvestigation5 filed by Nava. The Order reads in part:
Movant VENANCIO NAVA and AQUILINA GRANADA have to rely in good faith
upon their subordinates. In the absence of any proof that they have knowledge of
the irregularity committed by their subordinates they cannot be held criminally
liable for having acted with reckless imprudence. In the instant case the accused
could not have suspected any irregularity in the preparation of the PAL based on
the ERF's (sic) as the said ERF's (sic) were certified as true copies by the
responsible official in the Division Office therefore as noted by Superintendent
Luceria de Leon.
In short, absence of any proof to the contrary, the accused enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
Motion For Reinvestigation be GRANTED and that the case as against
VENANCIO NAVA and AQUILINA GRANADA be DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
Manila, Philippines, May 4, 1998.6
On 21 May 1998, the Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation of his subordinates
with nary an explanation.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The case subject of this Petition emanated from anonymous letter-complaints 7 filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao alleging that fake Equivalent Record
Forms (ERFs) of several teachers of the Davao City National High School were made
the bases for the Plantilla Allocation List (PAL) for calendar year 1988 and for the
teachers' corresponding promotion and salary upgrading. 8
The Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao referred the matter to the NBI in Region XI
(NBI-XI) and directed it to conduct a fact-finding investigation. 9 The investigation by the
NBI-XI disclosed, among others, the submission by a certain Myrna Rosales-Velez of a
Service Record (DECS Form No. 93) containing fabricated facts and the handing in of
fake ERFs by other teachers which were the bases of the PAL approved as correct by
Nava who was then the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Regional
Director for Region XI.10 The NBI recommended the filing of appropriate charges against
the teachers and officials concerned.11
Acting on the findings of the NBI, the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao, in a Joint
Resolution12 dated 23 October 1996, recommended the indictment of Nava before the
Sandiganbayan for Falsification of Official Documents thru Reckless Imprudence. 13 The
pertinent portions of the Joint Resolution state:
Likewise, this Office finds prima facie evidence to hold respondent DECS
Regional Director Venancio Nava and Administrative Officer Aquilina Granada
liable for Falsification of Official Documents thru Reckless Imprudence. Evidence
on record would show that respondents Nava and Granada are liable for the
charge of falsification for their act of approving and certifying as correct the
Plantilla Allocation List (PAL) based on the approved Equivalent Record Forms
(ERFs) of the subject teachers without verifying and scrutinizing the ERFs which
turned out to be only certified copies of none-existing documents. Their defense
that at their level of responsibility, it is not fair and right to expect them to be
responsible for such verification as they relied and depended on the processing
and verification of the subject documents to their subordinates, cannot be given
credence. In fact, such admission all the more bolstered the evidence against the
respondents for reckless imprudence in the performance of their official
functions. Indeed respondents Nava and Granada who are holding sensitive
positions, are liable for their failure to detect the falsity of the Equivalent Record
Forms (ERFs) and even approved and certified correct the Plantilla Allocation
List based on the fake or falsified Equivalent Record Forms. In fact, even their
subordinates in the Regional Office have knowledge of the non-existence of the
subject ERFs. On record is the list of DCHS teachers with approved ERFs as of
1988, submitted by Administrative Officer Rolando Suase (Records, pp. 47-48 in
OMB-3-96-0462). In the said list, not one of the subject teachers appear.
68

Moreover, a certification dated 15 January 1993, issued by Administrative Officer
Edilberto Madria disclosed that based on the files of subject teachers, same do
not have approved ERFs for the years 1987, 1988 and 1989 (Record, p. 61). 14
....
It is also recommended that respondents Venancio Nava and Aquilina Granada,
be indicted before the Sandiganbayan for Falsification of Official Documents thru
Reckless Imprudence.15
The Joint Resolution was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on 15 November
1996.16
Thus, the filing of an Information against Nava and his co-accused Granada before the
17
Sandiganbayan on 20 November 1996. The Information was docketed as SB Criminal
Case No. 23519, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That during the Calendar Year 1988 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
at Davao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, both public officers, Venancio R. Nava being the DECS-XI
Regional Director with salary grade 28 and Aquilina B. Granada, being the
Administrative Officer of the same office; while in the performance of their official
duties, thus committing an offense in relation to their office, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously through gross inexcusable negligence, certified as
correct and approved without verifying and scrutinizing the Plantilla Allocation List
for the Calendar Year 1988 and earlier of the Davao City High School Teachers,
based on the approved Equivalent Record Forms which turned out to be
photocopies of none (sic) existing Equivalent Record Forms, thereby enabling
the subject teachers to be upgraded in their salary grade from Teacher I to
Teacher III with corresponding salary increase as in fact same teachers were
able to collect salary differentials.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 18
Nava filed before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan a Motion for
Reinvestigation19 which was granted in a Resolution dated 22 September 1997.20 On 4
May 1998, Special Prosecution Officer Manuel A. Corpuz (hereinafter, Special
Prosecutor) recommended the dismissal of the charges against Nava and Granada for
insufficiency of evidence. This recommendation was, however, disapproved by the
Ombudsman.21 Hence, the instant Petition in which Nava contends that the Ombudsman
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
gravely erred or was "manifestly mistaken" in disapproving the recommendation of
dismissal of the case against him, which disapproval, he further avers, is based on an
erroneous conclusion drawn from "undisputed" facts which assumes the nature of a
question of law reviewable by this Honorable Court. Petitioner cites the cases of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan22 and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan23 to support his stance that the case
against him should have been ordered dismissed.24
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,25 the Court absolved the accused therein, who was an auditor
in an engineering district, from the indictment that he conspired in the overpricing of land
purchased by the government by approving the vouchers for its payment. The Court
concluded, to wit:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too
common problems dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives
of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final
approving authority.26
It further held that:
(H)eads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations . . . There has to be some added reason why he should examine
each voucher in detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies
or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There
are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting
papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling.27
In Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,28 the Court acquitted the accused therein, a regional
director, of the charges that he approved the payment of a work order based on a
Certificate of Completion and Accomplishment Report which turned out to be falsities,
allegedly in conspiracy with the contractor and the engineer who was tasked with the
duty to accomplish said certificate and report. The Court ruled in this wise:
In concluding petitioner's involvement in the conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan
could only point to Magsuci's having (1) noted the Accomplishment Report and
Certification submitted by Enriquez, (2) signed the disbursement voucher with the
69

usual certification on the lawful incurrence of the expenses to be paid, and
(3) co-signed four checks for the payment of P352,217.16 to Ancla. The
Sandiganbayan concluded that the petitioner would not have thusly acted had he
not been a party to the conspiracy.
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the action taken by Magsuci involved the
very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There
has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have
indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the
official reports submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for
conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to
commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality on the part of the cohorts.29
In the Comment30 filed by the Office of the Ombudsman on behalf of the NBI, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor,31 it was put forward that as head of office and the final
approving authority of the ERFs, it behooved Nava to see to it that the supporting
documents were attached to the PAL. Nava should have taken the necessary measures
to verify the contents of the ERFs. Yet he did nothing other than affix his signature
signifying that the ERFs were in order. His contention then that he had acted in good
faith crumbles since he had known that the ERFs of the teachers did not have the
supporting documents to warrant their approval and the eventual inclusion of the
teachers' names in the PAL.32
Corollarily, the NBI asserted that the Ombudsman did not err in not applying the
principles laid down by the Court in Arias v. Sandiganbayan33 and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan34 as Nava's knowledge of the infirmity of the ERFs cannot controvert the
truth that he had acted in bad faith when he approved the said ERFs and thereafter the
PAL.35
Moreover, it is discretionary on the Ombudsman whether or not to rely on the findings of
fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and
recommendation, as he can very well make his own findings of fact. And citing the case
of Knecht, et al. v. Desierto et al.,36 the NBI further pleaded that it is beyond the Court's
ambit to review the exercise of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint
filed before it.37
In the Comment38 filed by the Solicitor General also on its behalf, the NBI explained that
for the ERFs to be processed and approved, they must be accompanied by the teachers'
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
service records, performance ratings, special order of bachelor's degree, transcripts of
records of undergraduate course or masteral units earned, if any, and a consolidated
record of training seminars and workshops attended. Had Nava exercised ordinary
prudence or reasonable care or caution, he would have noticed the absence of
supporting documents accompanying the ERFs. Nava's sole reliance on the certification
and initials of his subordinates is indicative of a wanton attitude and gross lack of
precaution.39
The NBI also argued that the Ombudsman, in denying the recommendation of the
Special Prosecutor, committed no error in fact and in law. He merely exercised his
prosecuting powers based on the constitutional mandate. 40
Further, the NBI pointed out that the instant Petition is one for review
on certiorari pursuant to Section 27 of R.A. 6770 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which provision of law had already been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v.
Desierto41 and reiterated in Namuhe v. Ombudsman.42 Pursuant to the Court's ruling,
appeals from orders, directives or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In any event, as the instant case is not an
administrative disciplinary case, the proper remedy should have been a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, even assuming that this
remedy was pursued, since there is nothing on record to even suggest that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to have the case against
Nava dismissed, the NBI insists that the Petition must fail.43
Nava in his Consolidated Reply44 stressed that the instant Petition was filed on 3
September 1998 before the promulgation of the Fabian case on 16 September 1998; and
maintained that it was then his honest position that Section 27 of R.A. 6770 was
available as a remedy in non-administrative cases notwithstanding its silence on the
matter. In this instance, however, he posited that the Court of Appeals may likewise not
take cognizance of the Petition in light of the Court's ruling in Tirol, Jr. v. Justice del
Rosario,45 that the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted to an aggrieved party in
administrative disciplinary cases as ruled in Fabian is not available to a party aggrieved
by an order and decision of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable
cause to indict accused persons. Nava implored the Court to consider the
instant Petition instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as
the actuations of the Ombudsman amount to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.46
70

We first dispose of the remedy issue raised by respondent NBI in its Comment filed on
47
its behalf by the Solicitor General. It asserted that since the instant Petition was filed
pursuant to Section 27 of R.A. 6770, Nava's appeal should be taken to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court according
to Fabian. An alternative would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to the Court as the instant case is not an administrative disciplinary
case.48
We agree that the alternative remedy avails. Reiterating Tirol,49 we held in Mendoza-Arce
v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),50 that although as a consequence of the decision
in Fabian,51 appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases
in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 may be filed with this Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution.
In Kuizon v. Desierto,52 we held that the Court has jurisdiction over such petitions
questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. As
Nava himself beseeched the Court to consider his Petition as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, we shall treat the same as one.
Coming now to the merits, the Petition cannot succeed.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact are
generally not permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the
respondent tribunal had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion.53
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.54
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Deliberating upon the Petition and the arguments in support thereof side by side with the
comments of the respondent thereon, we find that the Petition fails to show a grave
abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Ombudsman. Nava's asseveration that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion
when he disapproved the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor urging the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner and without giving any reasons therefor is
specious. The Ombudsman is not duty bound to render anew a statement of facts or
elaborate on the applicable law.55 As we held in Cruz, Jr. v. People:56
It may seem that that the ratio decidendi of the Ombudsman's disapproval may
be wanting but this is not a case of total absence of factual and legal bases nor a
failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually involved here is
merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a
result of his study and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the
evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another investigation but is merely
determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by the
investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on
the basis of the findings of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating
prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and recommendation, as the
Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to
prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal
recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable
cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against
the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so,
without conducting another preliminary investigation. 57
Likewise, it cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion
because he opined differently from the Special Prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining
in the case, there is probable cause to believe that Nava is guilty of the offense charged.
If the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily
follows that it is also within his discretion to determine whether the evidence before him
is sufficient to establish probable cause. 58 In case of conflict between the conclusion of
the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, the former's decision shall prevail since the
Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman.59
71

The Ombudsman's act of disapproving the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor to
dismiss the case against Nava was not whimsical or capricious. He disapproved the
recommendation of the Special Prosecutor because in his estimation, there was
sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This was an exercise of the powers of the
Ombudsman based on constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such
exercise.
Congruently with the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through
a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, the Court ordinarily does not
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining whether there
exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, and thereafter in filing the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts,60 save for the following instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance;
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of the petitioners.61
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally mandated
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling
reason.62 In Alba v. Nitorreda,63 we have held that:
It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such
initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman, who beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service.64
While in the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,65 we
reiterated:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of
the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper
influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.' 66
This policy of non-interference is not only based on constitutional and statutory
considerations but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts would
be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.67
Further, it needs repeating that while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the
case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Information may not
be dismissed without the approval of said court.68
Next, Nava contends that he was not accorded the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration within five (5) days from receipt thereof and before the filing of
72
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the Information in violation of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by
69

Administrative Order No. 9, which provides that:

Sec. 7. Motion for Reconsideration.

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or

resolution shall be allowed; the same to be filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or of the Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, within an
inextendible period of five (5) days from notice thereof.

b) No motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be entertained after the

information shall have been filed in court, except upon order of the court wherein
the case was filed.70

We find that the issue not of momentous legal significance for non-compliance with
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 7 does not affect the validity of the Information filed
with the Sandiganbayan. An aggrieved party's motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation may nevertheless be filed and acted upon by the Ombudsman if so
directed by the court where the information was filed such as what had taken place in
this case.71

Finally, reliance on the cases of Arias and Magsuci cannot be countenanced as they are
not on all fours with the present Petition. In both cases, trial on the merits had already
been held, as in fact the judgment of conviction was challenged in the petition, and
therefore the Court had the opportunity to appreciate the evidentiary matters which came
out of the trial. On the other hand, Nava's allegations in the case involve evidentiary
issues which could be resolved only in a full-blown trial and not presently in this Petition.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

73

G.R. No. L-55694 October 23, 1981
ADALIA B. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, ESTER FRANCISCO, ADELUISA
FRANCISCO and ELIZABETH FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. HON. BENIGNO M.
PUNO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena
City and JOSEFINA D. LAGAR respondents.
Petition for certiorari impugning the resolution of respondent judge of October 8, 1980
granting private respondent's petition for relief from the judgment rendered by the same
respondent judge on January 8, 1980 in Civil Case No. 8480 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon which dismissed private respondent's complaint for reconveyance of
a parcel of land and damages. That decision was rendered notwithstanding the absence
of petitioners at the pre-trial by reason of which they were declared in default. It was
based alone on the testimony of private respondent Josefina D. Lagar and the
documents she presented.
On August 29, 1979, private respondent filed with respondent judge a complaint for
reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages alleging inter alia that respondent's father
caused the land in question titled in his name alone as "widower", after her mother's
death, in spite of the property being conjugal, and then sold it to the predecessor in
interest of petitioners from whom they bought the same.
After the defendants, herein petitioners had filed their answer, wherein they alleged lack
of personality of plaintiff to sue, prescription and that they are buyers in good faith, the
case was set for pre-trial, but petitioners failed to appear thereat. Taking advantage of
such absence, private respondent's counsel move that they be declared in default and
that private respondent, with the assistance of her counsel, Atty. Pacifico M. Monje, be
allowed to present their evidence. The motion was granted and after presenting her
evidence, counsel rested her case. On the same date, respondent judge rendered
judgment finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged and
therefore dismissing the complaint. That was on January 8, 1980. On February 15, 1980,
respondent's counsel was served with copy of the decision. (See Annex G of the
petition.)
On February 16, 1980, private respondent filed, thru a new counsel, Atty. Bienvenido A.
Mapaye, a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging that the insufficiency of
her evidence was due to the fault of her counsel who presented the same without her
being fully prepared. In other words, she claimed, she had newly discovered evidence
that could prove her cause of action. It is relevant to note that said motion was signed
and sworn to by private respondent herself together with her counsel.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Acting on the said motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, on April 28, 1980,
respondent judge denied the same for having been filed out of time. Indeed, from
January 15, 1980, when respondent's counsel was served with the decision, to February
16, 1980, when the motion was filed, more than 30 days had already elapsed (32 days to
be exact).
Persisting in her effort to pursue her claim, under date of May 7, 1980, private
respondent filed, thru another new counsel, Atty. Ricardo Rosales, Jr., a petition for relief,
purportedly under Rule 38, claiming:
1. She filed civil case 8480 for Reconveyance and Damages against defendants
Luis Francisco, et al., on August 29, 1979.
2. The main trust in petitioner's action against defendant was her unlawful
deprivation of one-half of the property covered by TCT No. 2720 and
denominated as Lot 4864 of the cadastral survey of Lucena, as said parcel
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Dionisio Lagar and Gaudencia Daelo,
plaintiff-petitioner's immediate predecessor-in-interest.
3. Gaudencia Daelo having predeceased her husband, petitioner contends that
one-half of the property belongs to her mother and therefore should rightfully by
inherited by her after her mother's death, but failed however, to inherit any part
thereof, because her father sold the entire parcel to the defendant Luis
Francisco.
4. On January 8, 1980, a pre-trial hearing was scheduled, where defendants
were declared as if in default thereafter an order of default was issued and
plaintiff adduced evidence ex-parte.
5. On the same date, January 8, 1980, a decision was rendered dismissing the
case after plaintiff took the witness stand, who through excusable neglect was
not able to expound on very vital points and inadvertently failed to introduce in
support of her theory.
6. Because plaintiff-petitioner was under the belief that the scheduled hearing
was one where no testimony is yet to be taken, coupled by the fact that she was
not prepared to testify, and that it was her first time to take the witness stand, she
did not fully comprehend the questions propounded to her.
74

7. Plaintiff-petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or new trial but was
denied in its order dated April 28, 1980, which petitioner received on May 5,1980.
8. If plaintiff-petitioner will be allowed to introduce evidence in her possession,
which by excusable neglect and/or mistake were not introduced, the same will
necessarily alter and, or change the decision in her favor, attached is her affidavit
of merits.
9. Evidence in support of her claim that it is a conjugal property consist of a deed
of sale executed by Manual Zaballero and Germana Ona in favor of the conjugal
partnership of Dionisio Lagar and Gaudencia Daello (Doc. No. 412; Page No. 55;
Book No. 11; Series of 1948 of Notary Public Francisco Mendioro xerox copy
thereof is attached herewith as Annex "A".
10. The deed of sale ratified by Notary Public Ramon Ingente (Doc. No. 68; Page
No. 7; Book No. VI; Series of 1955 executed by Dionisio Lagar should refer only
to one-half (1/2) and therefore is annulable in so far as the other half of the
property is Concerned.
11. That the petition wherein Dionisio Lagar sought [4) change his civil status was
not known personally to the plaintiff-petitioner and/or not understood by her,
otherwise she could have made reservations in that petition eventually protecting
her right insofar as one-half (1/2) of the property is concerned.
12. Plaintiff-petitioner has a valid substantial cause of action consisting of
evidence enumerated above, which by excusable negligence or error was not
presented otherwise, the decision will be in favor of the plaintiff herein petitioner.
(Petition for Relief of Judgment, pp. 50-52, Record
Answering the petition for relief, petitioners maintained that aside from the fact that no
excusable negligence has been alleged, for, on the contrary, there was an evident effort
oil respondent's part to take advantage of the absence and default of petitioners when
respondent presented her evidence, the petition for relief was filed out of time in the light
of Section 3 of Rule 38, which provides that such a petition should be " filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such
proceeding was taken."
In his resolution of October 8, 1980 now under question, respondent judge ruled that:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Defendants' claim that plaintiff is presumed to have learned of the judgment of
January 8, 1980, either on January 15, 1980 when Atty. Monje received a copy
thereof or on February 15, 1980, when plaintiff signed the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial prepared by Atty. Mapaye, in either case, the
petition for relief of May 8, 1980 by Atty. Rosales was resorted to beyond the 60-
day period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court; from
January 15 to May 8 is a period of 114 days and from February 15 to May 8 is a
period of 84 days; in either case, the filing of the petition for relief is beyond 60
days from the time plaintiff is presumed to have learned of said decision of
January 8, although, in either or both events, the filing thereof is admittedly within
6 months from the issuance of said decision; on the other hand, the plaintiff
stated that she did not actually learn of the decision of January 8, until she
received a copy thereof on March 17, 1980 (p. 67 of Record or Exh. "G") and that
she was not informed of the contents of the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration on February 15, 1980 when she was made to sign it (TSN, pp.
20-21, July 28, 1980).
Q From where did you secure that copy of the decision?
A I went to the court myself and secured a copy of the decision. (TSN, p.
16-id).
xxx xxx xxx
Q And you are sure of the fact that you only became aware of the
decision in the month of March, 1980?
A Yes. sir, (TSN, p. 20, Id).
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, it is the opinion of the
Court that it is the date when plaintiff actually learned of the decision from which
she seeks relief that should be considered in computing the period of 60 days
prescribed under Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court for purposes of
determining the timeliness of the said petition for relief; this opinion finds support
in Cayetano vs. Ceguerra et al., No. L-18831, 13 SCRA, where the Supreme
Court, in effect, held that the date of 'actual knowledge' (and not the presumed
date of receipt or knowledge) of the decision, order or judgment from which relief
is sought shall be the date which should be considered in determining the
timeliness of the filing of a petition for relief; in that case, the Supreme Court said:
75

It is conceded that defendants received a first registry notice on January 13,
1961, but they did not claim the letter, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
five (5) days after receipt of the first notice, the defendants were deemed to have
received the letter. This Court, however, cannot justly attribute upon defendants
actual knowledge of the decision, because there is no showing that the registry
notice itself contained any indication that the registered letter was a copy of the
decision, or that the registry notice referred to the case being ventilated. We
cannot exact a strict accounting of the rules from ordinary mortals, like the
defendants. (Resolution, pp. 67-68, Record.)
We cannot agree, for two reasons. First, according to Chief Justice Moran:
The relief provided for by this rule is not regarded with favor and the judgment
would not be avoided where the party complaining "has, or by exercising proper
diligence would have had, an adequate remedy at law, or by proceedings in the
original action, by motion, petition, or the like to open, vacate, modify or
otherwise obtain relief against, the judgment." (Fajardo v. Judge Bayona, etc., et
al., 52 O.G. 1937; See Alquesa v. Cavoda L-16735, Oct. 31, 1961, citing 49
C.J.S. 695.) The remedy allowed by this rule is an act of grace, as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance. Being in the
position of one who begs, such party's privilege is not to impose conditions,
haggle or dilly-dally, but to grab what is offered him. (Palomares, et al. v.
Jimenez, et al., L-4513, Jan. 31, 1952.) (Page 226, Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1979 Edition.)
In other words, where, as in this case, another remedy is available, as, in fact, private
respondent had filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging practically the
same main ground of the petition for relief under discussion, which was denied, what
respondent should have done was to take to a higher court such denial. A party who has
filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for relief after his motion has been
denied. These two remedies are exclusive of each other. It is only in appropriate cases
where a party aggrieved by a judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial
that a petition for relief can be filed.
Second, it is beyond doubt that the petition for relief of private respondent was filed out of
time. We cannot sanction respondent court's view that the period should be computed
only from March 17, 1980 when she claims self-servingly that she first knew of the
judgment because, as stated above, she signed and even swore to the truth of the
allegations in her motion for new trial filed by Atty. Mapaye on February 16, 1980 or a
month earlier. To give way to her accusations of incompetence against the lawyer who
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
handled her case at the pre-trial, which resulted in a decision adverse to her despite the
absence of petitioners, and charge again later that her new counsel did not inform her
properly of the import of her motion for new trial and/or reconsideration is to strain the
quality of mercy beyond the breaking point and could be an unwarranted slur on the
members of the bar. That, however, Atty. Mapaye cud not pursue the proper course after
his motion for new trial was denied is, of course, unfortunate, but We are unaware of the
circumstances of such failure and how much of it could be attributed to respondent
herself, hence We cannot say definitely Chat it was counsel's fault,
In any event, We hold that notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for
purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that notice to the party, when he is
represented by a counsel of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for the
very same reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed Lo know the next procedural
steps or what ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection of the rights of the
client, and not the latter.
Under the circumstances, We hold that respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of private respondent's petition for relief and, therefore, all his
actuations in connection therewith are null and void, with the result that his decision of
January 8, 1980 should be allowed to stand, the same having become final and
executory.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the resolution of respondent
judge of October 8, 1980 and reinstating his decision of January 8, 1980 in Civil Case
No. 8480 of his court, which latter decision may now be executed, the same being
already final and executory. No costs.
76

G.R. No. L-17722 October 9, 1961
MAURICIO GORDULAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAREO GORDULAN, defendant-
appellant.
This appeal, which was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals because only
issues of law are raised, questions an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
denying defendant's petition for relief from a final judgment by default.
It is uncontested that in Civil Case No. 2488 of the court below, a suit for the recovery of
land, the defendant therein, Cesareo Gordulan, although duly summoned, failed to file
his answer in due time. Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendant was declared in
default. After reception of evidence for the plaintiff, the lower court rendered judgment
against defendant (now appellant). Availing himself of the provisions of Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, the defendant Cesareo Gordulan sought to set the judgment aside,
claiming that he had good and valid defenses against plaintiff's complaint and that it was
excusable negligence on his part that his counsel failed to file an answer.
His petition having been denied, the defendant interposed this appeal.
The questioned order should not be disturbed. Section 2 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court are explicit, and require not only a sworn statement of the facts constituting
petitioner's good and substantial defense, but likewise a showing that the failure to file an
answer was by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. While
appellant's petition for relief contains a recital of facts, duly sworn to by him, that the lot in
dispute is owned in common by the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares, nothing
is, however, offered to show that there was fraud, mistake, accident or excusable
negligence in the failure of the lawyer to timely join issues with the plaintiff.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
al. vs. Mangantilao, L-7970, February 28, 1956; Robles, et al. v. San Jose, et al.,
L-8627, July 31, 1956; 52 Off. Gaz. 6183; Vivero v. Belo, No. L-8105, February
28, 1956; 52 Off. Gaz, 1924); that the defendant could have easily inquired from
the records as to the status of the case inasmuch as his residence in Muoz is
only less than one hour by bus from Cabanatuan City; and that his duty to make
such an inquiry is underscored by his claim that his harvest of palay of 16 cavans
from the land for the agricultural year 1956-57 was attached by the plaintiff's
mortgagee, the petition for relief is hereby denied.
Rule 38 is a special remedy and the requirements therein set forth are considered as
conditions sine qua non to the proper allowance of relief.
Neither is it arguable that defendant should not be held to suffer for his counsel's
shortcomings, for a client is bound by the acts, even by the mistakes and negligence, of
his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Of course, the door is open for him to
seek redress against the erring lawyer for the wrong suffered (Isaac vs. Mendoza, L-
2820, June 21, 1951).
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

The trial judge, Honorable Felix V. Makasiar, has correctly pointed out in the appealed
order:

considering that the negligence of Atty. Antero Tomas, as counsel for the
defendant, in failing to file his answer to the complaint within the reglementary
period is not excusable and, therefore, not a ground for relief; that Atty. Antero
Tomas has not even submitted any affidavit with respect to his alleged
negligence; that the defendant had the duty to inquire from Atty. Tomas as to
what he did with the complaint or whether he filed his answer thereto or the
status of the case before the order of default on May 27, 1957, or before the
plaintiff presented his evidence on July 18, 1957 and could have presented a
motion to set aside the order of default prior to July 18, 1957 (See Taguinod, et

77

G.R. No. L-46674 September 16, 1985
LAUREANO ARCILLA, petitioner, vs. BASILISA ARCILLA, SERAPIA ARCILLA,
MARCELA ARCILLA, DIONISIA ARCILLA, ZACARIAS ARCILLA, GAVINA MOLO
VDA. DE ARCILLA, CESAR M. ARCILLA, GLORIA M. ARCILLA, ANTONIO M.
ARCILLA, POMPEY M. ARCILLA, ERNESTO M. ARCILLA, ELENA M. ARCILLA,
ASUNCION M. ARCILLA, RANULFO M. ARCILLA, IGLESIA A. CAETE,
ROSABELLA A. CAETE, and HONORABLE FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, Presiding
Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondents.
The instant special civil action for certiorari and PROHIBITION assails the Order 1 dated
May 18, 1977 issued by respondent Judge Francis J. Militante, presiding Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX in Civil Case No. 395-T, denying Laureano Arcilla's
Petition for Relief from Judgment, for having been filed beyond the period prescribed by
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner was among the several defendants in Civil Case No. 395-T, an action for
Annulment of Sale with Damages, filed by the herein private respondents before the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu on May 28, 1973.
After the issues were joined by the filing of defendants' Answer, the case was set for pre-
trial conferences. At the scheduled pre-trial on July 29, 1975, the lower court issued the
following Order. 2
Let the continuation of the pre-trial of this case be set to October 2, 1975 at 8:30
a.m. in Cebu City.
Attys. Duaban and Monteclaros are notified in open court.
On October 2, 1975, defendants (among whom is the petitioner herein) and their counsel
did not appear. Whereupon, on motion of plaintiffs' (now private respondents) counsel,
defendants were declared in default 3pursuant to Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court
and the plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
On October 27, 1976, judgment 4 was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive
portion of which reading as follows
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'E') allegedly executed by Segunda Vda. de
Arcilla in favor of defendant Laureano Arcilla as null and void;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
(2) Declaring the eight (8) children of Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla (including
defendant Laureano) as co-owners on equal shares of the one-half (1/2) portion
of that parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 00347 which was
adjudicated to her in the Extrajudicial Partition Settlement and as co- owner in
eight (8) equal shares of the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 00349
which was intended for her full usufruct
(3) Dismissing the complaint as against defendant Nemesio Jubay.
Although the defendants had been declared in default, let a copy of this decision be
furnished them through their counsel.
SO ORDERED.
A copy of the aforesaid decision was sent to and received by defendants' counsel of
record, Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros, on November 8,1976.
On March 25, 1977, herein petitioner, as one of the defendants in said Civil Case No.
395-T, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Set Aside
the Decision dated October 27, 1976, 5 which was denied by respondent Judge in his Order
dated April 12, 1977.
On April 16, 1977, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, 6 alleging mainly
That on July 29, 1975, a Court Order was issued setting the pre-trial of the
above-entitled case to October 2, 1975; however, on October 2, 1975, the then
Hon. Presiding Judge of this Court, without previous examination of the records
as to whether or not said defendants were duly notified of the setting for pre-trial
on that same date (October 2nd) and upon oral motion by counsel for the
plaintiffs, declared defendants in default based and in accordance with the
supposed provisions of Sec. 2 of Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court . . . the
declaration of default under said Sec. 2 of Rule 20 is within supposition that the
defendants sought to be declared as such should be shown that they actually
know of such setting, but the records of the case disclose that no notice was ever
served upon said defendants;
That, defendants, particularly the principal defendant Laureano Arcilla, learned of
the decision of October 27, 1976 only on March 24, 1977 when the herein
undersigned counsel showed him a xerox copy of the same which the
undersigned counsel procured a day earlier. (Mar. 23)
78

That the defendants therefore seek the setting aside and lifting the effects of the
decision aforementioned based on mistake and/or excusable neglect for their
failure to inquire from their lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or with this Court believing
that they will be duly notified of any proceeding in connection with the above-
entitled case either by their lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or by the Office of the Clerk
of Court of this Court inasmuch as they are not the plaintiffs and are therefore in
the defensive side of the case.
That an Affidavit of Merit is attached to the present petition for Relief of Judgment
based on Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court and herein marked as Annex '1'
to form an integral part hereof executed by principal defendant Laureano Arcilla
and said defendants, in accordance with the obligations contained in said
affidavit of merits, has a good and valid defense against the claim of plaintiffs,
considering that the late Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla voluntarily and willingly
executed the document of sale sought to be annulled, the contents thereof
having been fully explained to her by the notary public and it was for a valuable
consideration.
On May 18, 197 7, respondent Judge issued his now assailed Order denying petitioner's
Petition for Relief, the pertinent portion reading as follows
The plaintiff in her opposition, contends that the petition for relief from judgment
is already filed out of time because the judgment of this Court was received by
counsel for the defendants on November 8, 1976, hence, the defendants had
only up to January 8, 1977 to file a petition for relief from judgment. Sec. 3 of
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court clearly states that "A petition provided for in either
of the preceeding section of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was
entered or said proceeding was taken". It is claimed by the defendants that they
learned only of the judgment on March 24, 1977. This contention of the
defendants cannot be given weight because notice to counsel is notice to the
client and since the defendants' former counsel Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros
received the judgment on November 8, 1976, then the date to be reckoned with
is the date when the defendants' counsel received the judgment which is
November 8, 1976.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
This Court is in sympathy with the pathetic plight of the defendants if it is really
true that the order declaring them in default was not through a fault of their own
but since they slept on their rights for quite a time such as would bar the present
petition, this Court is not in a position to extend the period within which to file the
present petition for relief from judgment.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for relief from judgment is hereby denied for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period."
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing the
aforesaid Order, petitioner now comes to Us through the instant petition praying that the
said challenged order be set aside and declared null and void.
The only issue then to be resolved in this case is whether or not the lower court acted
with grave abuse of discretion and/or without jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Relief
from judgment for having been filed out of time.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court on "Relief from
Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings" state
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other
proceeding thereof.When a judgment or order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification. A petition provided for
in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to
be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was
entered or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and
the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.
In the case of Turqueza vs. Hernando, L-51626, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 483, this Court
held that
79

The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality of judgments is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that
at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or "last chance" of a timely
petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days
from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38 supra, but
such grace period must be taken as "absolutely fixed, inextendible, never
interrupted and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency. Because
the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace,
as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance, and
failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or
the Rules of Court is fatal.
The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be
entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and
strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently, in assailing the lower
court's dismissal of his petition for relief for having been filed out of time, it is incumbent
upon herein petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary
period specified in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do so, instead he argues on the
merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the same was filed on time in the
court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be dismissed.
Moreover, We agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was filed late.
We note that the decision sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976.
Petitioner, through counsel, received a copy of the said decision on November 8, 1976,
and he filed his petition for relief from judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the same
was filed beyond the period allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As in previous cases, this
Court holds and so rules that the instant petition filed after the lapse of the reglementary
period cannot be entertained. 7
Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner's main contention is that the
order of default was illegally and improperly issued because he was not notified of the
pre-trial on October 2, 1975, consequently, all subsequent proceedings including the
judgment by default were all null and void.
At first blush, petitioner's aforesaid contention appears very tenable, for indeed it is
settled that a declaration of default, in the absence of a notice of pre-trial constitutes
denial of due process. 8 But a deeper examination of the pleadings and the record of the
case would show that petitioner was present during the pre-trial conference on July 29, 1975
when the lower court re-set the pre-trial to October 2, 1975. On the said date, however,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
although notified, both petitioner and his counsel did not appear, hence, the declaration of
default pursuant to Sec. 2, of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.
The case filed before the lower court is for annulment of a deed of sale allegedly
executed by Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla in favor of one of his sons, herein petitioner
Laureano Arcilla. It was originally filed and instituted by the said Segunda O. Vda. de
Arcilla but she died even before the pre-trial of the case and was therefore substituted by
her other children. The other defendant in the case Nemesio Jubay was the Notary
Public who allegedly notarized the document. From the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs, the lower court found
A careful perusal of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "E") sought to be annulled bear and
bare that the same was written in English and that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is
an illiterate who do not know how to write having affixed her thumbmark on the
said document which fact is corroborated by the testimony of Marcela Arcilla.
While it is true that the natural presumption is that one always acts with due care and
signs with full knowledge of all the contents of a document for which he can not repudiate
the transaction (Abaya vs. Standard Vaccuume Oil Co. L-9511, August 30, 1957; Javier
vs. Javier, 7 Phil . 261; Tan Tua vs, Jy Liao Sontua, 56 Phil. 20) this presumption referred
to cannot apply in the case at bar when one of the parties is unable to read and write the
contract in a language not understood by one of the parties (Art. 1332, New Civil Code).
In both cases, the person enforcing the contract must show the terms thereof have been
fully explained to the party (Ayala vs. Balderama Lumber Manufacturing Co., Inc. (CA)
490 O.G. 980)
Furthermore, the record is replete of proof that the care and custody of the deceased
Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla was burdened on the defendant Laureano Arcilla and this
fact, coupled with the age, infirmity and intelligence of the former, advantage may have
favored the situation of the latter which lead to the consummation of the questioned
document (Exh. "E") by virtue of which the latter has the burden of proof to dislodge such
misapprehension. With respect to Atty. Nemesio Jubay, he should be reminded of the
protective mandate of Art. 1332 of the New Civil Code for those illiterates and those
documents drawn in English or Spanish."
Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same appears verified and
accompanied by an affidavit of merit, the allegations of fact made therein do not prove
either fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, nor show a valid defense in
favor of the party seeking relief ... The general allegation made therein to the effect that
"petitioner has a good and valid defense considering that the late Segunda O. Vda. de
Arcilla voluntarily and willingly executed the document of Sale", is not sufficient
80

compliance with the rules. Since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was written in
English and it is admitted that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is an illiterate and do not know
how to read and write, it would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have secured
the affidavit of Nemesio Jubay, the Notary Public who allegedly notarized the document
as well as the witnesses to the execution and signing thereof to show that the contents of
the document was fully explained to said Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla and that she
voluntarily signed the same. This way, petitioner could convince the Court that in his
legal fight, he had a leg on which to stand. It thus results that reversal of the order
complained of, as well as the judgment rendered thereon would be an Idle ceremony. It
would not advance or for that matter serve the ends of justice. It would only result in
another waste of time, effort and expense. Paraphrasing what this Court has stated
in Paner vs. Yatco 9 it would be pointless to re-open this case, "for like a mirage it would
merely raise false hopes and in the end avail her (him) nothing."
For the reasons stated above, the Order of the lower court dated May 8, 1977 denying
herein petitioner's Petition for Relief should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant special civil action is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE A. NIDEA, and HILDA RALLA-
ALMINE, respondents.
Petitioners brought an action in the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Tabaco, Albay which ordered the Register of
Deeds to issue a new owner's duplicate certificate of title to private respondent. Their
petition was, however, denied due course on the ground that the fraud alleged therein
was not extrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which did not justify setting aside
the final decision of the trial court. Hence this petition for review of the decision of the
Copurt of Appeals. 1
The allegations of the petition for annulment of judgment are summarizzed in the
following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Alleged in the petition, among other things, are that petitioners are the co-owners
(to the extent of 2/3) of Lot No. 7651-A of the subdivision survey PSD-05-005263
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
(a portion of Lot 7651 Cad. 221 Tabaco Cadastre) situated at Poblacion,
Tabacco, Albay, containing an area of one
thousand ten (1,010) square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-65878 of the register of Deeds of the Province of Albay in the name of
Pablo Ralla, private respondent's deceased father (hereinafter referred to as the
"Property"); that petitioners acquired two-thirds of the Property from Miriam
Catherine Ralla by virtue of two deeds of absolute sale both executed on 11 July
1985, the sale from Miriam Catherine Ralla was reconfirmed by another Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on July 1986 [sic], while the sale from Joan Pauline R.
Belista was ratified and confirmed by virtue of an order date 11 May 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi City; that at the
time of the sale of the Property to the petitioners, there was a ten-year lease
contract over the property which was scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for
this reason, the petitioners decided to await the termination of the lease before
registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name; that soon after the
expiration of the lease contract, sometime in the first week of August 1991, the
father of the petitioners went to the Register of Deeds to have the deed of sale
registered and to obtain new title in the name of the petitioners; that to his great
surprise and shock, the father of petitioners learned from the Register of Deeds
that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch
16, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in the possession of the
petitioner had been declared of no further force and effect and that a new second
owner's duplicate copy of said title has been issued to the private respondent;
that subsequent investigation by the petitioners disclosed that on Sept. 20, 1990
private respondent filed a petition with the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 and
docketed as CAD Case No. T-1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently alleged
that
"the owner's duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-65878 was lost and/or destroyed while in the possession and custody of
herein petitioner as per her Affidavit of Affidavit of Loss and despite earnest effort
to locate said title, the same have been fruitless, "that the representation of
private respondent in her aforesaid petition and affidavit of loss that the owner's
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate No. T-65878 was delivered to her mother
after the death of her father and that she lost the said copy during the
devastation brought by typhoon "Sisang" is patently false, fraudulent, and
perjurious since she knew fully well or ought to have known that 2/3 of the
property covered by TCT No. T-65878 had already been sold to the petitioners on
July 11, 1985 and the owner's duplicate copy of the said title was delivered by
private respondent's brother, Gerardo Ralla, to the petitioners on the same day;
that on the basis of the fraudulent representation of the respondent Judge
Rhodie A. Nidea, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco,
81

Albay, Branch 16, issued an order dated Dec. 7, 1990 ordering the Register of
Deeds to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of transfer certificate of title No.
T-65878 with all the annotations and encumbrances thereon, which shall be of
like faith and credit as the one lost and declaring the lost or destroyed owner's
duplicate copy of the TCT No. T-65878 of no further force and effect, and that
pursuant to the order, the Register of Deeds issued a new second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 to the private respondent; that despite
repeated demands by petitioners and despite protracted attempts at settlement,
private respondent refused to deliver or turn over to the petitioners the second
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 65878 issued pursuant to the aforesaid order
of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea; that the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea has
become final and executory, that it was clearly issued on the basis of the false
and fraudulent representation of private respondent, hence, it is null and void and
must be annulled and set aside, and that because of private respondent's refusal
to satisfy the petitioners' plainly valid and just claim, the petitioners have been
compelled to litigate and to hire counsel for a fee and to incur other expenses of
litigation.
On the basis of these allegations the appellate court ruled that the fraud alleged was, if at
all, only intrinsic and not extrinsic in character:
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud
is extrinsic or collateral in character. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent
(Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 326
cited in Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA 160). On the other hand, intrinsic fraud takes
the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged
or false document or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of
the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case" (Libudan vs.
Gil, 45 SCRA 17). In the present petition, the allegation of fraud involves
admission by the respondent court of an alleged false affidavit of loss, which
alleged fraud is intrinsic in character. Thus, as the alleged fraud committed by the
private respondent is not extrinsic in character, the instant petition for annulment
of the said December 1, 1990 order of the lower court should be dismissed.
The appellate court is certainly right in holding that the use of a false affidavit of loss
does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant the invalidation of a final judgment. The use
of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private respondent is similar to the use during trial
or forged instruments or perjured testimony. In the leading case of Palanca
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
v. Republic, it was held that the use of a forged instrument constituted only intrinsic fraud for
2
while perhaps it prevented a fair and just determination of a case, the use of such instrument
or testimony did not prevent the adverse party from presenting his case fully and fairly. In the
case at bar, petitioners were not really kept out of the proceedings because of the fraudulent
acts of the private respondent. They could have rebutted or opposed the use of the affidavit
and shown its falsity since they were theoretically parties in the case to whom notice had
been duly given.
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud
but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra
v. Court of Appeals, 3 on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already
held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired
jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26,
18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be found or
recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore,
error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the
petitioners.
Nor was the filing of such a petition forum shopping in violation of Circular No. 28-91.
Private respondents allege that in an action for recovery of possession of the lands which
they had brought against the JB Line in the Regional Trial Court of Albay (Civil Case No.
T-1590), petitioners intervened and alleged substantially the same facts as those alleged
by them in their petition for annulment of judgment. We have gone over petitioners'
answer in intervention in that case. We find that the allegation of forum shopping is
without basis. While they indeed alleged that private respondent had obtained a second
owner's duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land covered by the certificate
had been sold to them and that the "2nd owner's copy should be cancelled and recalled
considering the fact that the original is in fact still existing and not lost, "the allegation
was made more for the purpose of demanding a partition, recognizing that private
respondent is the owner of 1/3 of the land. Petitioner's intervention is thus different from
their action in the Court of Appeals which is solely for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the judgment in CAD Case No. T-1024 granting private respondent's
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
82

G.R. No. 156118 November 19, 2004
PABLO T. TOLENTINO and TEMPUS PLACE REALTY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Quezon City, Br. 97 and SPOUSES GERARDO CINCO, JR. and PAMELA H.
CINCO, respondents.
Petitioners Pablo T. Tolentino and Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation seek
the review and reversal of the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59506 entitled "Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation and
Pablo T. Tolentino vs. Hon. Oscar Leviste, Presiding Judge, RTC - Quezon City, Branch
97 and Sps. Gerardo Cinco, Jr., and Pamela H. Cinco." The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners petition for annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 97, on the action for specific performance with damages filed by
respondents Spouses Gerardo and Pamela Cinco against them.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1996, respondents Spouses Gerardo Cinco, Jr. and Pamela Cinco filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners Tempus Place
Realty Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino. The complaint alleged that
respondents purchased from petitioners a condominium unit in Tempus Place
Condominium II at Katarungan St., Diliman, Quezon City. Despite, however, the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the delivery of the owners copy of the
condominium certificate of title, petitioners failed to deliver possession of the unit
because they have allegedly leased it to a third party. The complaint further alleged that
petitioners refused to pay the corresponding capital gains tax and documentary stamp
tax on the transaction, and execute the necessary board resolution for the transfer of the
property, thus preventing respondents from registering the Deed of Absolute Sale and
transferring the title to the unit in their names. The respondents claimed that because
petitioners refused to deliver possession of the unit and instead leased it to a third party,
they are entitled to a reasonable rental value in the amount of P20,000.00 a month from
May 1994 until the time the possession of the unit is delivered to them. They also
claimed moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00. 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
As petitioners failed to file their answer to the complaint, Hon. Oscar Leviste, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 97, Quezon City, issued an order on January 17, 1997 granting
respondents motion to declare petitioners in default. He also appointed the Branch Clerk
of Court to act as commissioner to receive respondents evidence ex parte. 2After
reception of evidence, the trial court, on April 15, 1997, issued a decision for the
respondents. It stated:
This Court after considering the oral and documentary evidences presented by the
plaintiff finds that the allegation contained in their pleadings are all true facts and are
entitled to the relief as prayed for, to wit:
1) To deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of the condominium unit covered by
CCT No. 5002 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
2) To pay the corresponding capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax on
the transaction, and deliver the receipts thereof to the plaintiffs;
3) To execute and deliver to the plaintiffs the necessary Board Resolution;
4) Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the following:
a. Actual damages in the amount of P20,000.00 a month from May 1994,
up to the time possession of the condominium units (sic) is delivered to
the plaintiffs representing the reasonable rental value of the unit;
b. Moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
c. Exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
d. Attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.3
Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for new trial. They contended that their right to fair
and impartial trial had been impaired by reason of accident, mistake or excusable
negligence of their former counsel, a certain Atty. Villamor. 4The trial court denied the
motion for new trial for lack of merit.5
On November 3, 1997, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. Ricardo A. Santos,
filed a notice of appeal of the April 15 decision of the trial court. 6 The Court of Appeals,
however, dismissed the appeal on February 26, 1999 on the ground of abandonment as
83

petitioners failed to submit the required appeal brief. The decision became final and
7
executory on March 26, 1999 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 8
On July 4, 2000, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for annulment of
judgment based on the following grounds:
1. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for in the
complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable violation of
the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Section 14, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the petitioner
to substantive and procedural due process.
5. Corrollarily, the gargantuan award for damages by the court a quo in patent
and blatant violation of the law and settled jurisprudence [is] unconscionable and
clearly violative of substantial justice and equities of the case.
6. Petitioners have good and substantial defenses in respect of private
respondents claims.
7. A fortiori, the court has no jurisdiction and/or authority and has committed a
grave abuse of discretion in awarding amounts in excess of what is prayed for in
the complaint nor proved by the evidence as well as in palpable violation of the
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court and applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the challenged judgment in
default is an absolute nullity.9
On April 23, 2002, the appellate court issued a decision modifying the trial court decision.
It explained that the annulment of judgment may be based on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and it is important that petitioner failed to move for new trial,
or appeal, or file a petition for relief, or take other appropriate remedies assailing the
questioned judgment, final order or resolution through no fault attributable to him. The
Court of Appeals found that the trial court decision may not be annulled on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. It stated that the failure of petitioners counsel to file an appellants brief in
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
the Court of Appeals did not amount to extrinsic fraud as to justify annulment of
judgment, as it was not shown that their former counsels omission was tainted with fraud
and/or deception tantamount to extrinsic or collateral fraud. Neither may it be annulled on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the action for specific performance and damages was
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Nonetheless, the appellate court, in the interest of
justice and in the exercise of its sound discretion in determining the amount of damages
that may be awarded, held that the moral damages in the amount of one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was excessive. It lowered the moral damages to P100,000.00. It also
reduced the exemplary damages to P100,000.00, and the attorneys fees to
P100,000.00.10
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED in that the
dispositive portion of the assailed decision is modified as follows:
a) Actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 a month from May 1994, up to
the time possession of the condominium units [sic] is delivered to the plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) representing the reasonable rental value of the unit.
b) Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
c) Exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00); and,
d) Attorneys fees in the amount of One [H]undred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review of the decision and amended decision of
the Court of Appeals. They raise the following arguments:
1. The petitioners can avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment to annul the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-29707 as Hon. Judge Leviste had no
jurisdiction and/or acted without jurisdiction in issuing the April 15, 1997 Decision
because:
84

a. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for
in the complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
b. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable
violation of the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule 9, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
c. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution and Sec. 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
d. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the
petitioner to substantive and procedural due process.
2. The petitioners were prevented from having their day in court because of the
gross negligence of their former counsel, which gross negligence amounts to
extrinsic fraud.
3. The remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioners.
4. The petitioners have valid and substantial defenses to respondents cause of
action.12
The petition is without merit.
The issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for review is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
The governing rule is Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Annulment of
Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions. Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule provide for its
coverage and the grounds therefor, thus:
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed
of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments may only be availed of on the
following grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.13
Petitioners in this case did not allege nor present evidence of fraud or deception
employed on them by the respondents to deprive them of opportunity to present their
case to the court. They, however, assert that the negligence of their former counsel in
failing to file the appeal brief amounts to extrinsic fraud which would serve as basis for
their petition for annulment of judgment. We disagree. The Court has held that when a
party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsels actions and decisions
regarding the conduct of the case. This is true especially where he does not complain
against the manner his counsel handles the suit. 14 Such is the case here. When the
complaint was filed before the trial court, summons was served upon the
petitioners.15 They allegedly referred the matter to Atty. Villamor who was holding office at
the building owned and managed by respondent Tempus Place Realty Management
Corporation.16 However, after they have endorsed the summons to said lawyer, they did
not exert any effort to follow up the developments of the suit. Hence, they were declared
in default and judgment was rendered against them. Even in the course of the appeal,
they never bothered to check with their counsel, Atty. Ricardo Santos, the status of the
appeal. The notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 1997 and petitioners learned of
the dismissal of the appeal in October 1999, after petitioner Tolentino received notice of
garnishment of his insurance benefits in connection with the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-96-29207. It was only at that time that they learned that Atty. Santos had migrated to
Australia. This only shows that petitioners, as what happened during the pendency of the
case before the trial court, never bothered to confer with their counsel regarding the
conduct and status of their appeal. The Court stated in Villaruel, Jr. vs. Fernando: 17
85
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
xxx Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioners other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors
stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel. which are the proper subject of an appeal.23 The errors raised by petitioners in their
The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts petition for annulment assail the content of the decision of the trial court and not the
long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.18 courts authority to decide the suit. In other words, they relate to the courts exercise of its
jurisdiction, but petitioners failed to show that the trial court did not have the authority to
We reiterate the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel except when decide the case.
the negligence of his counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court. 19 Only when the application of the general rule would result Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioners petition for annulment of
in serious injustice should the exception apply.20 We find no reason to apply the judgment had no basis and was rightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
exception in this case.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition at bar is DENIED.
In addition, it is provided in Section 2 of Rule 47 that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or SO ORDERED.
petition for relief. In other words, it is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a
ground in an available remedial measure. 21 The records show that after petitioners
learned of the judgment of default, they filed a motion for new trial on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. It was however denied by the trial court. They filed a notice of appeal
thereafter. Hence, they are now precluded from alleging extrinsic fraud as a ground for
their petition for annulment of the trial court decision.

We are also not persuaded by petitioners assertion that the trial court judge lacked
jurisdiction so as to justify the annulment of his decision in Civil Case No. Q-96-29207.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.22 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court, or by
coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. The
trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, the petitioners
herein, when the latter received the summons from the court. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined
from the allegations in the complaint. Under the law, the action for specific performance
and damages is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners submission, therefore, that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction does not hold water.

We note that petitioners arguments to support their stand that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction actually pertain to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the same
as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.

86

G.R. No. 93687 May 6, 1991
ROMEO P. CO and MARCELITA CO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
EDUARDO R. MEMIJE and ADELAIDA H. MEMIJE, respondents.
From a coaptation of the records of this case, it appears that sometime in 1965,
1
petitioner Marcelita Co contracted to buy two parcels of land owned by Andres Gabriel at
Malabon, Rizal. The sale was on installment basis and she paid the entire consideration.
Upon completion of the installment payments in 1966, Andres Gabriel, who was to
execute the final deed of sale of said properties, suggested that the titles to said
properties be placed in the name of one who still had no real property registered in his
name to avoid any difficulty in registering said properties. Consequently, Marcelita Co
had the final deeds of sale executed in the name of her brother, Ruperto Padonan. This
arrangement was to constitute Ruperto Padonan only as a trustee of said properties.
One of the lots was later sold to one Hipolito Tamayo, while the other was titled in the
name of Ruperto Padonan and a house was constructed thereon.
On January 28, 1973, in furtherance of said trust agreement, Ruperto Padonan
simultaneously executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner Marcelita Co and a
special power of attorney constituting petitioner Romeo Co as attorney-in-fact authorizing
him to alienate and encumber said properties. It does not appear that the deed of sale in
favor of petitioner Marcelita Co was registered.
On September 10, 1974, Ruperto Padonan executed a deed of absolute sale of the lot
registered in his name, together with the house thereon, in favor of private respondent
Eduardo Memije. Although Transfer Certificate of Title No. 457594 was issued for the lot
in the names of private respondents, they were not able to take possession of said
properties as they were occupied by petitioners. Hence, on March 5, 1975, private
respondents sued petitioners in Civil Case No. C-3489 of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XIV, Caloocan City, for recovery of possession and quieting of title
involving said properties. That case was apparently not prosecuted but was dismissed.
Sometime in 1976, private respondents filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession in the original land registration proceeding (GLRO Rec. No. 1230 of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal) so that they could be placed in possession of the
properties which they bought from Ruperto Padonan. Said writ was issued by the lower
court but on March 18, 1983 the same was, however, set aside by this Court in G.R. No.
L-46239. 2
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
Petitioners then filed Civil Case No. C-11063 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120,
Caloocan City, for the annulment of the deed of sale and title involving the lot and house
in question, with damages against private respondents. This case however, was
dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
On November 14, 1983, private respondents filed Civil Case No. 370-MN in the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, against petitioners for the recovery of possession of
the aforesaid residential lot and house registered in their names. Petitioners raised the
affirmative defenses of fraud and their ownership over the land, and interposed the same
as a compulsory counterclaim, instead of refiling a separate action for annulment of the
deed of sale and title executed and issued in favor of private respondents.
After trial, the court a quo ruled against herein petitioners, as defendants, and rendered
judgment on May 18, 1987 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants to vacate the property in question and deliver possession to plaintiffs
as the lawful owners thereof, to pay plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 a month from
September 15, 1974 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
said property until they shall have vacated the same and to pay plaintiffs P
5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Defendants' counter-claims are dismissed for lack of merit. 3
On appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Civil Case No. 15050, said respondent
court affirmed, with modifications, the aforequoted judgment of the court below in Civil
Case No. 370-MN. It held that in an action recover possession of realty, attacking the
transfer certificate of title by way of affirmative defenses on the ground that there was
fraud committed by Ruperto Padonan when he sold the property in question to private
respondents, is an improper procedure as this amounts to a collateral attack on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title; that petitioners should have pursued their original
complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale and title which was dismissed without
prejudice; and that private respondents appear to have a better right of possession
considering that they are the registered owners of the property in question.
Accordingly, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED to read thus: In view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the appellants (defendants) to
vacate the property in question and deliver the possession thereof to the
87

appellees (plaintiffs); to pay appellees P500.00 monthly from November 14, 1983
as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of said property until they shall
have vacated it; and to pay the costs of the suit. The counterclaims are
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs. 4
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners are now before us,
5
contending that respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in
a) totally disregarding the compulsory counterclaims of ownership and fraud even
if undisputed, and in effect, limits the relief of a party-defendant in a recovery of
possession case;
b) finding that the affirmative defense of fraud and at the same time raised as a
compulsory counterclaim is a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the transfer
certificate of title;
c) summarily dismissing the counterclaims of the petitioner without stating the
legal grounds for its dismissal;
d) disregarding the sentence of bad faith in the registration of the subject
property; and
e) holding that there is a double sale in this case contrary to the evidence
presented by the parties. 6
The counterclaim filed by petitioners in the aforesaid case was correctly dismissed by the
trial court. A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim. In the case at bar, there appears to be two distinct transactions, namely,
the sale in favor of petitioners which was not registered and the sale in favor of private
respondents which was duly registered. The only apparent peculiarity is that the
petitioners are in possession of the property in question.
Obviously, it would not be procedurally unsound for petitioners to resort to a separate
case for the annulment of the deed of sale in question. They did file such a case but did
not proceed with it to its ultimate conclusion. That is the plausible and available remedy
at law which is open to them, not a counterclaim in a case based on a discrete cause of
action. This is evident from the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim, viz.: (1) it arises
out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (3) the
court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 7
Anent the issue on whether the counterclaim attacking the validity of the Torrens title on
the ground of fraud is a collateral attack, we distinguish between the two remedies
against a judgment or final order. A direct attack against a judgment is made through an
action or proceeding the main object of which is to annul set aside, or enjoin the
enforcement of such judgment, if not yet carried into effect; or, if the property has been
disposed of, the aggrieved party may sue for recovery. A collateral attack is made when,
8
in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made as an
incident in said action. This is proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null and
void, as where it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has no
jurisdiction. 9
In their reply dated September 11, 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and
ownership raised in their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an
independent complaint which they may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of
the transfer certificate of title of private respondents. That theory will not prosper.
While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those
in the basic complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the
nature of a separate and independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is
subject to explicit conditions, as above set forth, particularly in its required relation to the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Failing in that respect, it cannot even be
entertained as a counterclaim in the original case but must be filed and pursued as an
altogether different and original action.
It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to
the property in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the
10
land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be
threshed out in a proper action. The two proceedings are distinct and should not be
confused. 11
88

Keeping in mind that in CA-G.R. Civil Case No. 15050 herein petitioners were the
appellants and herein respondents were the appellees, we quote the further disquisitions
of respondent Court of Appeals on the position espoused by petitioners:
The rest of the affirmative defenses (pars. 13 to 16 of the answer), quoted above,
are allegations attacking the validity of the deed of absolute sale over the subject
property executed by Ruperto Padonan in favor of the appellees Memije, as well
as attacking the validity of TCT No. 457594, covering the same property, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in appellees' name by virtue of deed of sale.
Obviously, in an action to recover possession of a realty, in the present case,
attacking the TCT covering said property by way of affirmative defenses is an
improper procedure. Appellants should have pursued the case they filed with the
RTC Br. 120 at Caloocan City for "annulment of deed of sale and title with
damages" after that court dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. In other
words, after dismissal of their complaint, appellants should have filed the same
action, as observed by that court, with the RTC at Malabon, Metro Manila, where
the property is situated.
The affirmative defenses raised by appellants in the present case alleging
fraudulent connivance between Ruperto Padonan and appellees in the sale of
the subject property by the former cannot overcome the evidence of appellees'
ownership over said property, i.e., a torrens title designated as TCT No. 457594
in their name. Hence, in the present case to recover possession of the realty as
its registered owner, i.e., accion publiciana, appellees certainly have a better right
to its possession than appellants.
In fine, whatever right of possession appellants may have over the subject
property cannot prevail over that of appellees for the simple reason that
appellants are not the registered owner, while appellees are. If, as appellants
alleged, fraud had vitiated the sale between Ruperto Padonan and appellees,
and consequently the issuance of said TCT No. 457594 in appellees' name by
virtue of such sale is void, then their remedy was not to attack collaterally by way
of affirmative defenses but to institute a proceeding purposely to attack directly
such sale and torrens title.
It is a well-known doctrine that a torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and
indefeasible, and the duty of the court is to see to it that this title is maintained
and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. (Natalla Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, G.R. 78290-94, May 23, 1989; Gonzales vs. IAC, G.R.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
69622, Jan. 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 587; Cimafranca vs. IAC, L-68687, Jan. 31,
1987, 147 SCRA 611; Barrios vs. Court of Appeals, L-32531, Aug. 31, 1977, 78
SCRA 427; Magay vs. Estandian L-28975, Feb. 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 456; Director
of Lands vs. Gan Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951, 89 Phil. 184). This, appellants
failed to do.
12
Petitioners raise the issue of whether or not private respondents were in bad faith in
registering the subject property. It has been held that a purchaser in good faith is one
1wphi1
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property. Also, in order that a purchaser of land with a Torrens title may be considered
13
as a purchaser in good faith, it is enough that he examines the latest certificate of title
which in this case was issued in the name of the immediate transferor. The purchaser is
not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from
whom he has purchased the property. 14
Petitioners maintain that although respondent spouses are the registered owners of the
subject property, they were, however, in bad faith when the land was purchased and
subsequently registered. But, as found by the trial court, the only evidence petitioners
have to buttress their position is the self-serving statement of petitioner Marcelita Co that
it is a known fact in Malabon that she is the owner of the said property, and the
circumstance that Eduardo Memije was always with Ruperto Padonan during the trial of
the criminal case filed against herein petitioners. These do not suffice to prove prior
15
knowledge of petitioners' claim as would attribute bad faith to respondent spouses.
Furthermore, as established by respondent Eduardo Memije without contradiction, the
property was already paid in full and the deed was registered before respondent spouses
learned of the supposed adverse claim of petitioners. In his testimony, said respondent
declared that he and Padonan, after agreeing on the projected sale, went and paid the
mortgage on the property and, thereafter, Padonan executed the deed of sale prepared
by the counsel of said private respondent. On the basis of said deed of sale and the
release of mortgage over the property, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 457594 in the names of respondent spouses. It
was subsequent thereto when the keys to the house had been given to respondents by
Padonan and the former went to occupy the house that they were prevented from doing
so by petitioners. Although respondent spouses duly reported that matter to Padonan
and the latter promised to settle the matter, no further action was taken on their
protest. Consequently, private respondents had to take judicial recourse.
16
89

Finally, on the question of double sale, the pertinent provision of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendors, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier narrated, the final deed of sale of the land was executed in 1966 in the name
of Ruperto Padonan. On January 28, 1973, Ruperto Padonan executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of petitioner Marcelita Co. Again on September 10, 1974, Ruperto
Padonan executed a deed of absolute sale of the same property in favor of respondent
Eduardo Memije. These facts disclose that there was indeed a double sale, hence the
abovequoted provision of law finds application.
Petitioners, however, contend that no double sale may arise due to the fact that an
implied trust was created between them and the alleged vendor, Ruperto Padonan. The
trust agreement was indeed recognized by the trial court in its decision, thus:
Defendants' evidence that the purchase price for the acquisition of the property in
question was paid by them has not been controverted. Consequently, said
property, which was registered in the name of Ruperto Padonan was held in trust
by the latter for the benefit of defendants. Thus, defendants claim that it was in
compliance with the trust agreement that Ruperto Padonan executed a deed of
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Post Judgement Remedies
sale covering the subject house and lot in favor of defendant Marcelita Co on
January 28, 1983 (sic, 1973) in order that the title to said property could be
transferred in the latter's name as the real owner thereof. 17
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a trust agreement, the conflict is between the Co
spouses, on the one hand, and the Memije spouses, on the other. The trust agreement is
between Ruperto Padonan and herein petitioner Marcelita Co. Private respondents are
not in privity with petitioners or Ruperto Padonan as far as the trust agreement is
concerned. Private respondents relied on a clean transfer certificate of title in the name
of Padonan, which title does not contain any annotation concerning the trust agreement.
Under the present posture of this case, therefore, it appearing that private respondents
are the duly registered owners of the land, without sufficient proof of any flaw in their title
thereto having been adduced by petitioners, the right of the former to the possession
thereof and to be protected therein has to be conceded and respected.
WHEREFORE, without prejudice to such appropriate remedies as petitioners may avail
themselves of with respect to their claim of ownership of the property in question, the
instant petition is DENIED and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
90