PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATION

SESSION FOUR

A. Problem Area 1: Initiation of Inquiry

B. Problem Area 2: Jurisdictional Challenge

C. Problem Area 3: Judicial Intervention

D. Cases to read:

1. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20

November 1991
FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and
the Filipino people.

The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged
take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the
FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon
the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC])
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to
due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in
case before the Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its
investigation of the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that
the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
one of the defendants of the civil case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.

3. Whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire
into.

4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

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RULING:

1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. The Court has provided that the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task
which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case,
"(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

2. No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1
of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid
of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither
Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private
citizens.

4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or
prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in
the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.

What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the
Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or
when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand
completely.

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 2. Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R.
No. 167173, 27 December 2007
FACTS: SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA
8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid
of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed
that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry. In the
petition that reached the SC, petitioners argue that the Senate has no jurisdiction to conduct the
inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of pending cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon
the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING: No. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as
initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal
practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the
conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the
committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there
is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory
or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or
remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may
include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear
liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would
only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the
liabilities of the offender.

3. Arnault vs.Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950

FACTS: This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses
called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L.
Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at
the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
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ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses
to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due
process of law.

4. Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006

Facts: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the
ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP
officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive
Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the
hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and
prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this
Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent.
Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials
invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Ruling: To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two
different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the
power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the
1987 Constitution. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads appearance is
merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of
department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the
1987 Constitution.
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In aid of Legislation:

The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article
6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution. The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the
power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. This is the
power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure
to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons
falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly
state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend
the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by
the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers
the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or
an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se.
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might
be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President
or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of
the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void.
Section 1(a) is however valid.

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 5. Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives Committees, G.R.
No. 170338, 28 December 2008
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007
election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano,
COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome
in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house
of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the
court praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200
or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no
proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to
further proceed with their investigation?

Held: No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing

that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet
web page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure,
and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or
revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet
is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
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of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the
Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also,
the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web
page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the
court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct
such inquiry in aid of legislation.

6. Sabio vs. Gordon, G.G. No. 174340, 17 October 2006

FACTS: Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455
(Senate Res. No. 455),[61][4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon,
wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one
of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose
of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only
to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.
Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions
are also available to the committees.
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It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and
that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the
principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28),
and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law
cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional
basis.

7. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760,

29 July 2003
Facts: This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry
into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon
Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth
P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated
that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the
service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent
refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO
directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of
action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging
that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

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Ruling: YES. The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal
basis. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to
Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each
is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in
Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any
court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent t
appear and testify before it.

Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in
this case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In
Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more
within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in this
case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and mismanagement
of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights
and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.

8. Spouses de la Paz vs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

G.R. No. 184849,

13 February 2009

FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to
attend an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de
la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area
for he was carrying with him 105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him
45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount
and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was later
released but the s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz
was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation of the
Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the
case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the
Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph
12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure.They further claim that respondent
Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the
required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise
assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the
Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative
to the Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
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HELD: Yes. Section 16(3) Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant
of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a
matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of
the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with
the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.

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