Force and Absolute Motion in Berkeley's Philosophy of Physics

Author(s): Lawrence A. Mirarchi

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1977), pp. 705-713
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708698
Accessed: 26-03-2017 21:52 UTC

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 FORCE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION IN BERKELEY'S
PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

BY LAWRENCE A. MIRARCHI1

Berkeley revealed some problems in Newtonian mechanics which

not recognized by the scientific community until Mach's rejection of the N
tonian concepts of absolute space and absolute motion along with the
ciated doctrine of real forces.2 Newton believed that all motion could be
referred to an absolute space with respect to which a body is absolutely at r
or absolutely in motion. While acknowledging the impossibility of distingui
ing real from absolute uniform motion, Newton argued that accelera
motion is absolute as demonstrated by the existence of a force attend
the acceleration. Assuming the invariancy of his second law under Ga
transformations, Newton could claim that the existence of an impressed fo
on a body entails the acceleration and hence absolute motion of that
Berkeley's phenomenalism precludes the existence of absolute spac
absolute motion for these could not correspond to any idea. Simi
force for Berkeley is unobservable and therefore nonexistent insofar
represents a quality of inanimate bodies. Yet Berkeley appears to
thoroughgoing Newtonian in his purely scientific speculations and hi
ceptance of Newton's laws of dynamics seems to pose a problem. Is Be
ley a metaphysical schizophrenic adopting a relativistic phenomenalis
his philosophy and ignoring it in his physical speculations? Are Berk
rejection of absolute motion and criticism of the Newtonian conce
force inconsistent with his acceptance of Newton's laws of dynamics
their distinctions between force-free and accelerated motion? I think not,
and I shall attempt to set the record straight by examining some mistaken
objections to Berkeley's views found in recent commentaries by Bruce
Silver3 and A. D. Ritchie.4 These mistaken objections arise from a failure
to distinguish the various senses of the word "force" as used by Berkeley,
and they are best discussed after these distinctions are made.
Four kinds of forces can be distinguished in the Berkeleyan framework.

I wish to thank Colin Murray Turbayne for his invaluable criticisms and
assistance both before and after my stay at the University of Rochester.
2 For some revealing comparisons of Berkeley and Mach: G. J. Whitrow,
"Berkeley's Philosophy of Motion," and Karl R. Popper, "A Note on Berkeley
as a Precursor of Mach and Einstein," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science,
4(1953). An interesting dissenting view is given by Richard J. Brook, Berkeley's
Philosophy of Science (The Hague, 1973), 123-25, 143-45. For a response to
Brook see my review of his book in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13(1975),
530-34.
3 Bruce Silver, "Berkeley and the Principle of Inertia," JHI, 34(1973), 599-6
4 A. D. Ritchie, George Berkeley: A Reappraisal, ed. G. E. Davie (Manchester
1967).

705

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 706 LAWRENCE A. MIRARCHI

First, there is force as an immaterial, activat

mind, or spirit: "This is certain that bodies are m
and accordingly the mind can be called cor
motion .. ." (De Motu, 25).5 This kind of for
of ideas and their activities, and it is therefo
Berkeley admits. But spirit is excluded from
in fact the business of physics or mechanics t
only the rules of impulsions or attractions,
motions and from established laws to assign
cause of particular phenomena" (DM, 35).
with a demarcation principle; physics deals on
and their relations to other ideas, whereas st
ideas to their real or efficient causes lie out
in the realm of metaphysics. If we label spir
we can conveniently distinguish them from
I shall call physical force, the existence of w
Physical forces are all of those used by the
explanations of natural phenomena. "Force,
of this sort are useful for reasonings and reck
in motion, but not for understanding the sim
for indicating so many distinct qualities" (D
clusion of efficient causes from inanimate n
physical force terms is based on phenomenali
do not refer to ideas, for only the actual ch
observable and not the physical forces th
those changes.
A third sense of "force" as used by Berkel
ence associated with the motion or resistance
I shall refer to this kind of force as haptic fo
conation belong properly to animate beings a
to other things, they must be taken in a me
haptic force derived from our sense of touch
idea, and is legitimately included in the ra
physics. But a haptic force can exist only in
inanimate body even when that body is accel
the observer, becoming actual if the observer
body: "While we support heavy bodies we fe
and discomfort. We perceive also in heavy
motion towards the center of the earth; and tha
4, my emphasis). Thus I experience a haptic
riding accelerates, if I am struck by a falling ap
According to Berkeley's theory of signs and his
of objects of sight and touch, acceleration, a

5 Berkeley, De Motu (hereafter DM), in The W

A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, 1950); Be
Knowledge, Text and Critical Essays, ed. C. M
will be cited as Prin. The Turbayne edition also co
to above.

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 FORCE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION 707

force, an object of touch, bear no necessary conne

stand in relation of sign to the thing signified.6 Ber
ton's laws a phenomenological interpretation by vie
an association between a visual sign, the idea of acc
sign, the idea of haptic force. According to the firs
car the fact that I do not experience a force signifie
motion and that of the car. According to the secon
riding in comes to a rapid halt I experience a hapt
that my car is coming to a stop. All references to
be replaced by references to actual or potential ha
in turn depend for their existence upon the existe
see an accelerating body I assume that if I were m
would experience a haptic force. A change in moti
thus serves as a sign for a potential haptic experien
the visual idea of acceleration cannot in itself contain the idea of force. In
this way Berkeley can claim that physical forces do not exist while retain
the meaningfulness of the force terms used in Newtonian dynamics.
The fourth sense of "force" in Berkeley is that of a "mathemat
hypothesis": "As for gravitational attraction, it was certainly introduced
Newton, not as a true, physical quality, but only as a mathematical hypot
sis" (DM, 17). The behavior of two bodies moving at a distance r ap
may be characterized as if they acted upon one another with a forc
attraction that varies inversely with r2. The mathematical function describin
this inverse attraction is then substituted for F in Newton's second law where
F -= m'. But the final equations of motion contain no references to force
only to masses, positions, and accelerations. Once the description of th
physical situation is formulated with the aid of signs referring, metaphor
ically, to physical forces, the metaphor is dropped and the resulting equa
tions yield information only about positions and velocities. For Berkeley th
forces of mathematical physics are nothing more than mathematical descri
tions of motion discovered with the aid of haptic forces and metaphoricall
referred to as if they were forces of the efficient or haptic kinds.7 Bearin
these distinctions in mind we can proceed to examine Silver's objection.
Silver argues that Berkeley's analysis of motion is inconsistent with his
acceptance of Newton's first law. The first law, also known as the principl
of inertia, states that "Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uni
form motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that stat

6 For a discussion of heterogeneity in the context of Berkeley's immaterialism

Rolf Sartorius, "A Neglected Aspect of the Relationship Between Berkeley's Theor
of Vision and His Immaterialism," American Philosophical Quarterly, 6(1969),
318-23. For a discussion of Berkeley's theory of signs: Berkeley, Works on Vision,
ed. C. M. Turbayne (New York, 1963), Introd.
7A profound analysis of the role of metaphor in Berkeley's philosophy is in
C. M. Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (Columbia, 1971); also Turbayne,
"Berkeley's Two Concepts of Mind," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
20(1959-60), 85-92, and 22(1962), 577-80; reprinted in the Turbayne edition
of Prin.

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708 LAWRENCE A. MIRARCHI

by the forces impressed upon it."8 Silver's m

odds with Berkeley's conviction that movem
always be regarded both as dependent and as
"It is the notion of continuous uniform movem
or proximate causes that conflicts with his [
nothing but an idea."10 That is, if uniform m
must be caused and if it is caused, then unifo
Silver views Berkeley as closer to Aristotle
cept of a passive matter in which rest is a n
motion must be maintained by an efficient
work, states of rest and of uniform motion
ing no further explanation. But Silver's criti
mental confusions which call for clarification.
Silver's mistake is implicit in the following passage:l1

For him [Berkeley], all movement or change in the position of a body h

to be caused and supported. This is built into his claim that motion mus
be viewed as an effect. The proposition "x moves" (where x is some phe-
nomenal object) is for Berkeley equivalent to or translatable into the prop
sition "x is moved." Rather than the law of inertia, it is Aristotle's fund
mental law of motion "everything that is in motion must be moved by som
thing," which is consistent with Berkeley's own conception of motion.

Silver's translation of the proposition "x moves" stems from two mistake
one on the level of metaphysics, the other on the level of physics. Let u
consider first the level of metaphysics. In Berkeley's system the propositi
"x moves" must correspond to the idea "x moves." The idea "x moves"
a complex idea containing the idea "x," a phenomenal object, as compone
Efficient causality then enters not into the motion of "x" but into the exi
ence of the idea "x moves." This is clearer if we consider the idea "x at
rest." The existence of "x at rest" arises from the same efficient cause
responsible for "x moves." Thus "x at rest" and "x moves" are bo
pendent" in Silver's and Berkeley's sense; both are ideas which must b
tained by the activity of Mind. If we accept Silver's thesis on unifor
tion, a state of rest is no more a natural state than a state of motio
both must be caused so that all rest must be "caused and supported.
consequence is not only absurd, but fundamentally at odds with Aris
well. Silver's error arises from confusing the metaphysical "forces"
sustain or change ideas with the physical forces which must be confi
the domain of ideas, i.e., the domain of physics. If we assume for a m
that Berkeley would admit the existence of physical forces, the phen
transition from "x at rest" to "x moves" is then effected on two le
transcendental efficient forces on the level of metaphysics, and by p
forces on the level of physics. Thus Berkeley could maintain both th
tion, viewed in a metaphysical sense, has a cause, and that uniform
viewed on the physical level needs no physical forces to sustain

8 Newton, Principia, 2 vols., Motte translation, revised by Cajori (1934;

Berkeley, 1971), I, 13.
9 Silver, 601. 10 Ibid. " Ibid., 606.

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 FORCE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION 709

Newtonian system of dynamics, including the princ

viewed as making useful distinctions within the dom
coming into conflict with Berkeley's metaphysical sc
Moving to the level of physics we find Berkeley
purely phenomenalistic grounds. Any meaningfu
respond to an idea. Physics as an empirical scien
observables. The proposition "x moves" thus cor
moves." But there is no idea "x is moved" for this
phenomenal object "that which moves x." But ther
which moves x," for ideas are passive and incapa
in another idea. Hence, one cannot translate the pr
"x is moved" for, according to Berkeley, the senses
Therefore, Silver's translation is completely at odds
of physics.
However, the following passage quoted by Sil
problem:

To denominate a body moved, it is requisite, first, that it change its distance

or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force
or action occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be
wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind or the pro-
priety of language, a body can be said to be in motion (Prin. 115).

If the body "moved" is meant by Berkeley to have been initially at rest as

his use of the adjective suggests, then it is consistent with the law of inertia
to claim that the force or action occasioning the change must be applied to
the body. But Berkeley seems to shift his meaning and uses the applied
force as a criterion of whether or not a body can be said to be in motion
thereby violating the law of inertia. The inconsistency vanishes, however, if
we note Berkeley's use of the word "occasioning," that is, the force acts only
as the occasion for a body initially at rest to be set in motion. One can draw
an analogy with Silver's paper as the occasion for my writing a response
though it is not Silver's paper that sustains my activity of writing. One need
not interpret this passage, therefore, as claiming that a force continues to
sustain motion in the body moved. But a more important problem arises in
connection with Berkeley's use of the term "force." In what sense is Berke-
ley using "force" when he applies it as a criterion of motion given that he
denies the existence of physical forces and rules out efficient causes from the
domain of physics? The question raised can be answered in light of an
earlier passage to be discussed below.
Silver has presented us with the problem of showing that Berkeley's sys-
tem can accommodate the principle of inertia. We now turn to the related
problem of accommodating the second law, that is, the distinction between
force-free motion and motion under the action of impressed forces, a distinc-
tion which is the fundamental basis of Newtonian dynamics.12 Further insight
into Berkeley's conceptions of force can be gained from a passage ignored
by Silver:

12 Brook's volume (ch. 3) contains an elaborate discussion of this problem.

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710 LAWRENCE A. MIRARCHI

But though in every motion it be necessa

one, yet it may be that only one is moved
causing the change of distance is impressed, o
the action is applied (Prin. 113).

In keeping with his relativism, Berkeley f

second body is a necessary condition for
if to contradict himself, that only one of
accompanied again by the use of "force" as
its apparent contradiction of the principle
claim that physical forces as efficient cau
A part of the problem is solved by noting
which suggests that Berkeley does not int
be" means that under certain conditions w
requisite conditions are clearly revealed in

Now I ask anyone whether, in his sense o

streets, the stones he passes over may be s
distance with this feet? (Prin. 113)

Berkeley's example of a person directed b

accidental. It is the very special case wher
upon which the "force" is impressed, e.g.,
force as I walk along the street. But even
ley does not ask whether the cobbleston
[anyone's] sense of "motion" the cobblesto
Berkeley is appealing to "the propriety of
ordinary usage the term "motion" is assoc
ence of haptic force is taken as a sign for
along the street reads his sensation of fo
But nature is indifferent as to whether the man moves or the stones move.
This indifference is expressed by Berkeley in connection with the law of
action and reaction:

For if the true nature of things rather than abstract mathematics, be rega
it will seem more correct to say that in attraction or percussion, the passio
bodies, rather than their action is equal on both sides (DM, 70).

Here Berkeley clearly asserts the nonexistence of forces in bodies in ke

with his view that forces do not represent qualities of objects and tha
nomenal nature as exhibited in ideas is passive. He goes on to say:

For example, the stone tied by a rope to a horse is dragged towar

horse just as much as the horse towards the stone. . . . And that chan
both sides, both in the body of the horse and in the stone, both
moved and in the resting is mere passivity (DM, 70).

Thus for Berkeley, nature is indifferent to the way in which we partition

activity between the stone and the horse. But then Berkeley parallel
moved" with the horse and "the resting" with the stone. In what sense
horse both moved and passive? First, viewed as a phenomenal obj
idea, the horse is incapable of self-action. On the level of physics we

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 FORCE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION 711

not assign an efficient cause for the motion of the

can for the stone. Therefore, while the horse move
active sense of the verb, for there is nothing in the r
cal forces, which can cause the horse to be mov
nomenal object the horse is passive. Second, viewe
the horse is moved in a metaphorical sense. Just a
self rather than to the cobblestones, I assign efficie
creature, the horse, leaving the stone passive not
sense but in a physical sense as well. The analog
Berkeley following the passage from Prin. 113 quot

As a man may think of somewhat which does not

moved to or from another body which is not itself

Notice the significant parallelism in the sentence s

is likened to a body moving and that which does n
rest. The relation of mind to body is one of the act
its real manifestation is activity of mind and exhib
thinking agent. Force as idea, the only kind which
force and this again can only exist in a sentient b
which the physicist would ascribe to inanimate bo
sion of subjective activity to inanimate nature. W
viewed as inhering in things themselves, it must b
sense. 13

Perhaps the strongest case for the existence of physical forces was made
by Newton by way of the whirling bucket experiment which has been much
discussed.'4 In keeping with his beliefs in absolute space and absolute
motion, Newton maintained that accelerated motion is absolute as evi-
denced by the forces accompanying the acceleration.

The effects which distinguish absolute from relative motion are the forces
of receding from the axis of circular motion. For there are no such forces
in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true and absolute circular mo-
tion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of the motion. If a
vessel, hung by a long cord, is so often turned about that the cord is strongly
twisted then filled with water, and held at rest together with the water:
thereupon, by the sudden action of another force, it is whirled about the
contrary way, and while the cord is untwisting itself, the vessel continues
for some time in this motion; the surface of the water will at first be plain,
as before the vessel began to move; but after that, the vessel, by gradually
communicating its motion to the water, will make it begin sensibly to revolve,
and recede by little and little from the middle, and ascend to the sides of

13See Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor, 47-48, for his discussion of the
metaphorical character of physical forces.
14 Two very thorough discussions of Berkeley's analysis of the whirling-bucket
experiment are found in Chapter 3 of Brook's volume and John Myhill, "Berkeley's
De Motu-An anticipation of Mach in George Berkeley," University of California
Publications in Philosophy, 29(1957). A very fine analysis of the bucket experi-
ment itself is given by Ernest Nagel in The Structure of Science (New York, 1961),
Ch. 8.

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712 LAWRENCE A. MIRARCHI

the vessel, forming itself into a concave fi

shows its endeavor to recede from the axi
absolute circular motion of the water, whic
relative, becomes known, and may be mea

Newton's claim that the motion is absolut

there exists something apart from the actu
ing" or the "endeavor" of the water to r
motion. But the existence of the force is inferred from the motion and there
is no idea, in a Berkeleyan sense, of the force itself. It follows therefore,
that an unperceived "force" cannot serve as evidence for the existence of
a perceived motion to say nothing of the absolute nature of the motion.
Unless there is some independent way of ascertaining the existence of a force
apart from the mere motion, Newton's use of force as a criterion of absolute
motion appears invalid.
A. D. Ritchie asserts that "Berkeley was weak in dynamics as seen in
his comments on Newton's argument about the spinning bucket."16 Ritchie
sides with Newton and goes him one better by introducing an independent
collaborator in the form of a minnow: "Once the water is got spinning at
uniform speed the surface is found to be depressed in the middle of a uni-
form extent. But before it was set spinning the surface was flat. This can
be observed from outside the bucket, but equally well from within, e.g., by
an intelligent minnow. .."17 Ritchie commits the same fallacy as Newton.
The movement of the water is the only evidence for the existence of a force,
so the assumed existence of a force becomes evidence that the motion of
the water is absolute! Nor does the minnow provide the kind of indep
dent collaboration for the existence of a force that Ritchie is seeking
minnow rotating with the water would not see the water rotating for it wo
be stationary relative to the water. We assume by analogy with what
would expect to experience were we in the minnow's place, that the m
now experiences a sensation of haptic force associated with its acceler
in the bucket. Being an intelligent minnow it would then read its exp
enced force as a sign of motion and that motion would be absolute be
the minnow's experience is absolute. But this is no argument against Be
ley, it merely sidesteps the Berkeleyan issues involved. First, there is
way to ascertain that the minnow experiences a force except by reaso
from analogy. Second, even if the minnow did experience a force that
would not be proof of motion because Berkeley's theory of signs would
clude any necessary connection between the haptic experience of forc
the visual idea of motion. Finally, esse is percipi even for a minnow.
fact that the minnow has a perception of a force does not necessitate
existence of a force in the water. It is precisely the distinction betwe
haptic forces and physical forces which must be taken note of here b
which has been blurred by other commentators. If this is not yet convin
I offer the following counterexample. Consider the case of a hypothe
minnow, call it minnows, which evolved in a bucket of perpetually wh
water. Such a minnow would develop with a different sense of dynam

5 Newton, I, 10. 16 Ritchie, 106. 7 Ibid.

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 FORCE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION 713

balance than a "normal" minnow, minnow2, which e

terrestial conditions in "still" water. For minnow, lif
would be quite normal whereas if minnow2 were pla
it would experience a force. If the water were to st
minnow, would have cause for alarm, and this woul
an upset in its internal balance which would be e
Assume minnow2 is absolutely at rest. Using the Ne
absolute motion minnow1's experience of a force is
motion of the bucket which is at rest for minnow.. Thus the bucket is in
absolute motion when it is absolutely at rest and this is a meanin
assertion.
In sum, I have offered four distinct kinds of forces to be dealt with in
the Berkeleyan framework: efficient forces, haptic forces, physical forces,
and mathematical forces. We have learned to read our experience of haptic
force as a sign for motion. We transfer our inner experiences of haptic force
and efficient causuality to any visual experience of change in motion so that
acceleration becomes a sign for 1) a potential haptic experience of force
within ourselves, 2) the existence of efficient causality in nature in the form
of physical forces drawn in analogy with the kind of efficient causality we
experience when, for example, we lift a weight. Our experience becomes
summarized in the form of mathematical force functions which are meta-
phorically referred to as descriptions of efficient or haptic forces. Giv
these distinctions, Berkeley can deny the existence of physical forces wh
retaining the meaningfulness of the distinctions summarized in the thr
laws of Newtonian dynamics.

Hartwick College.

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