Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REED, AND CLARENCE WRIGHT, through their attorney LISA MADIGAN, Attorney
General for the State of Illinois, to respond to Plaintiff FABIAN SANTIAGOS Motion for
Summary Judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Undisputed Facts
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs lengthy Local Rule 56.1 filing, the relevant facts in this case
are very simple. Plaintiff Fabian Santiago is a prisoner of the State of Illinois in the custody of
the Illinois Department of Corrections, and at all times relevant to this matter has been
incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center. (Pls St. of Material Facts 2, Dkt. No. 61.)
Plaintiff sent a letter, dated August 20 2014 (the August 2014 Letter), to then Governor Pat
Quinn. (Id. at 15.) At this time, Quinn, as the Governor of Illinois, was ultimately responsible
for the leadership of the Illinois Department of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/3-2-5 (Governor of
1
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:395
Illinois appoints Director and Assistant Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections). The
Listen to me you faggot motherfucker! I wrote your punk ass almost a month ago
notifying your office of these piece of shit, corrupt prison officials deliberately
having me placed into a celling location with an [inmate] categorized as an
extremely high escape risk in order to justify having my cell searched every
several days, completely destroying my cell, stealing my property & provoking
physical confrontations between myself, my cellmate & prison guards. These are
criminal acts of misconduct & your fuckin [sic] racist & corrupt office is refusing
to do anything about these abuses.
Plaintiff was charged with the prison offense of insolence, which forbids [t]alking,
touching, gesturing, or other behavior that harasses, annoys, or shows disrespect. ILL. ADMIN.
CODE 20, 504, APPX. A. After an investigation and a hearing before the Adjustment Committee,
Plaintiff was found to have violated the offense of insolence and was punished with, inter alia,
30 days incarceration in F-House. (Pls St. of Material Facts 26, Dkt. No. 61.).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a.) In determining whether factual issues exist, the Court must consider all of the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Feliberty v.
Kemper Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1996.) Summary judgment should be denied if a
2
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:396
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986.) Competing versions of events and credibility determinations fall within the
fact-finders purview, and are not properly resolved at summary judgment. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Majority of Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement is Not Material to the Current
Dispute and Should Not Be Considered By The Court
Although Plaintiff sets forth approximately thirty-five statements of fact in his Rule 56.1
Statement, including sub-parts, he cites to only four of them in his Motion for Summary
Judgment.1 (See generally Pls Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 60.) This is because only those facts
are pertinent to the sole legal issue set forth in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment:
whether punishing Plaintiff for insolence based on the August 2014 letter violates the First
Amendment. Plaintiff, by failing to cite the vast majority of ostensibly material facts set forth
in his Rule 56.1 Statement, essentially concedes that none of those statements are actually
material to that legal dispute. Accordingly, the Court should disregard those statements.
Seventh Circuit precedent holds that regulation on the type of speech used by the Plaintiff
in his letter to then Governor Quinn is a valid means of promoting prison security. A challenged
or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation, and is
1
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment cites only to paragraphs 15, 18, 19, and 26 of his Statement of
Material Facts, as well as Exhibits A, C, and D.
3
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:397
involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). Prison security and safety is
legitimate governmental interest justifying limitations on inmates First Amendment rights. See
The Seventh Circuit has found that punishment for insolence toward prison officials set
forth in outgoing mail is a permissible restriction on an inmates First Amendment rights. For
example, in Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit upheld an
inmates punishment for violating a regulation forbidding, among other things, disrespect or
insolence. The inmate in Ustrak had written a letter describing prison officers as stupid lazy
assholes and challenging them to bring their fat asses around the gallery at night. Id. at 781
F.2d at 580. The Seventh Circuit held that [i]f inmates have some First Amendment rights, still
they have only those rights that are consistent with prison discipline. . . .We can imagine few
things more inimical to prison discipline than allowing prisoners to abuse guards and each
other. Id. Similarly, in Carroll v. Tucker, 17 Fed.Appx. 392 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants where the plaintiff-inmate had been punished
for obscenities directed toward prison officials in a letter written to his wife. Id. at 393. Because
the derogatory comments were directed at and meant to [be] read by prison employees, the
Seventh Circuit found that the inmates punishment was justified by the constitutionally
legitimate regulation forbidding insolence directed toward prison staff. 2 Id. at 394.
Ustrak and Carroll clearly apply to the case at bar, as the Governor of Illinois is, by any
2
Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant did not bring a charge specifically relating to outgoing mail (Pls
MSJ at 4, Dkt. No. 60) is irrelevant, given that the Seventh Circuit has found that derogatory insults
directed toward prison officials in outgoing mail violates the insolence rule codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE
20, 504, APPX. A. See Carroll, 17 F. Appx at 394.
4
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:398
definition, an official of the Illinois prison system. The Illinois Governor is the executive directly
in charge of the Illinois Department of Corrections. 730 I LL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-2-5.
Furthermore, Illinois law requires the Governor to periodically visit IDOC facilities to
examin[e] into the affairs and conditions promulgated by IDOC. See 730 I LL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/3-2-4. Santiagos abusive letter concerns the perceived inadequacies of his cell
assignment and the frequency that staff searched his cell. It deals directly with the affairs and
conditions of his incarceration. He wrote the letter to the highest State official that could assist
him with these issues. By subjecting then Governor Quinn to his disrespectful and insolent
attack, Plaintiff implicated the same concerns regarding prison discipline and safety as was
Plaintiff bases his entire argument in favor of summary judgment on Moore v. Miller, No.
96 C 1347, 1997 WL 269595 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 1997), an unpublished District Court case that
has no precedential value. Price v. NCR Corp., 908 F. Supp. 2d 935, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(Castillo, R.) ([T]he decisions of other courts in this District are not binding upon this Court and
have no precedential value.) (citing Townsel v. DISH Network L.L.C., 668 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir.
2012)). In addition, the facts of Moore are far afield from this case. As conceded by plaintiff,
Moore involved an inmates communication with the Ron Goldman Justice Fund. Moore, 1997
WL 26959 at *1. Thus, the target of the disrespectful communications in Moore had no role in
the administration of the Illinois prison system, and the courts decision was based on the
principle that the language used in that case present[ed] no threat to prison order or security.
Id. at *5. That is not the case here, where Governor Quinn was the executive at the head of the
5
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:399
Plaintiff also argues that the insolence statute under which Plaintiff was punished, I LL.
ADMIN. CODE 20, 504, APPX., is overbroad. (Pls Mot. for Summ. J. at 6-7, Dkt. No. 60.)
This argument ignores the Seventh Circuits decision in Carroll, which affirmed summary
judgment against an inmates First Amendment challenge of punishment under the same
insolence statute at issue in this case. See Carroll, 17 F. Appx at 394. In affirming summary
judgment, Carroll explicitly rules that the language, harasses, annoys, or shows disrespect, is
appropriate under Constitutional standards, id. This is the same language Plaintiff here argues is
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages from Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Thus,
Plaintiff must establish that [each Defendant] was personally responsible for the deprivation of
a constitutional right. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v.
Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff can only satisfy the personal responsibility
requirement of section 1983 if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at [the
officials] direction or with his knowledge and consent. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757
(7th Cir. 2011). That is, [the official] must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,
condone it, or turn a blind eye. Id. In short, some causal connection or affirmative link between
the action complained about and the official sued is necessary for 1983 recover. Id.
Here, even if the Court finds that Plaintiffs punishment was somehow violative of the
First Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of any sort of connection between
most of the Defendants and this punishment. Indeed, the only Defendants Plaintiff even attempts
6
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:400
to implicate in his legal arguments are Wright and Franklin, who ultimately found Santiago
guilty of insolence. (Pls Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Dkt. No. 60.) Because Plaintiff fails to connect
any actions of Rabideau, Turner, Pierce, Tarry Williams, Christopher Williams, or Daniel Reed
to Plaintiffs asserted constitutional injury, the Court should decline to enter summary judgment
Court to deny summary judgment against them, and for such further relief the Court finds
Respectfully submitted,
7
Case: 1:15-cv-01856 Document #: 66 Filed: 05/31/16 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:401
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on May 31, 2016, he electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois using the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered