Research On Delay

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 23, 2003]
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari assails Sandiganbayan Resolution1[1] dated May 8, 2000,
denying petitioners Motion to Quash2[2] the Information in Criminal Case No. 23848, for violation
of Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019,3[3] as amended. Petitioner also impugns said courts Resolution4[4]
dated November 9, 2000, denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed
Resolution No. 93-132,5[5] authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the
Philippine Armys 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement of Laoangs Bus
Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise mandated the municipal government to shoulder the
expenses for fuel, oil, and the subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators for the
duration of the project.
1[1] Rollo, pp. 30-35.
2[2] Records, Vol. II, pp. 480-503.
3[3] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
4[4] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
5[5] Id. at 181-182. RESPECTFULLY REQUESTING LT. COL. EDUARDO J. LENA, CSC (CE)
PA OF THE 53RD ENGINEERING BATTALION, PA, TO LEND ONE GRADER, PAY LOADER
AND A DUMP TRUCK TO THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOANG, NORTHERN
SAMAR TO BE USED FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE BUS TERMINAL IN BARANGAY
RAWIS, LAOANG, THIS PROVINCE.
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to respectfully request Lt. Col. Eduardo J. Lena CSC (CE) PA
of the 53rd Engineering Battalion, PA, to lend one grader, pay loader and a dump truck to the
municipal government of Laoang, this province to be used for the improvement of the bus terminal
area in Barangay Rawis, this municipality.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the municipal government shall likewise shoulder the
expenses for fuel and oil and the subsistence of the heavy equipment operators while the
improvement of said area is still in operation.
Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the petitioner, who was then the
town mayor6[6] of Laoang, to develop some of her private properties in Rawis, Laoang, Northern
Samar. A concerned citizen and ex-member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso,
Sr., filed a complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other municipal officers7[7] with the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Alfonso S. Sarmiento of the OMB ordered
herein petitioner and her co-accused to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other
controverting evidence. Thereafter, in a Resolution8[8] dated August 16, 1995, investigator
Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate criminal action against petitioner for violation
of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.9[9] Despite strenuous opposition and objections
by the defense, on August 1, 1997, two informations were filed against her at the Sandiganbayan
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847 and 23848, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 23847
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Madeleine
Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime
herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to herself and spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of her
official or administrative functions, caused the improvement or development of her private land in
Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and resources of the Philippine Army, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10[10]
This, however, was amended on October 27, 1998, so that Criminal Case No. 23847 would read as
follows:
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage
6[6] Later, Governor of Northern Samar. See Records, Vol. II, p. 480.
7[7] Vice Mayor Remus S. Dulay and Municipal Councilors Diosdado D. Ong, Democrito
V. Aquino, Emilio T. Giray, Fred P. Deananeas, Francisco A. Tang, Jose B. Bautista, Eddie
Cerbito, Concepcin E. Lipata.
8[8] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
9[9] Id. at 44.
10[10] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

or preference to her husband, Hector Ong, herself, and/or her family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of her official or administrative functions, caused the
improvement or development of a private land owned by her husband, Hector Ong, herself and/or
her family in Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and resources of the Philippine
Army, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
(2) Criminal Case No. 23848
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, request or receive, directly or
indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five (5) drums of
diesel fuel, for herself or for another from the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom
accused Mendoza-Ong, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain,
any Municipal Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus company, JB Lines,
owned by the aforenamed spouses, in consideration for the help given or to be given by the accused.
On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging in the
main that: (1) the informations especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed to allege facts
constituting an offense; (2) that the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so; and
(3) that the accused was deprived of her right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases
against her.
On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash. Petitioner duly moved for
reconsideration but this was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its order dated November 9,
2000.
Hence, the instant petition with assigned errors faulting respondent court as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS FILED
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CLEARLY DO NOT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS
CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE HENCE FAILING TO ALLEGE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
AGAINST PETITIONER, ACCUSED THEREIN.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS FILED BY AN
OFFICER WHO HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
HEAD OF THE PROSECUTION DIVISION OF RESPONDENT COURT HAD
RECOMMENDED THE DISMISSAL OF SAID CASES.
11[11] Records, Vol. I, p. 372.
12[12] Records, Vol. II, p. 421.

III. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS AGAINST ACCUSED WHO HAD BEEN
DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DETERMINATION OF THE CASE IN CLEAR
DISREGARD OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS RULINGS THAT INORDINATE DELAY IN
THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS WOULD WARRANT DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE.13[13]
Simply put, we find that the sole issue for resolution now is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred or gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner,
particularly on the ground that the information in Criminal Case No. 23848 does not constitute an
offense. The other assigned errors are, in our view, without sufficient merit and deserve no further
consideration.
Petitioner claims that in a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as
amended, the law requires that the gift received should be manifestly excessive as defined by
Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it is imperative to specify the exact value of the five
drums of diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong as public officer to determine whether such is
manifestly excessive under the circumstances.14[14]
The fundamental test of the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts alleged would establish the essential
elements of the crime as defined by law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.15
[15]
Petitioner is charged specifically with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. The pertinent portions of said law provide:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged in the assailed information are as
follows: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or
obtain, for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or indirectly requested or
received from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for
another; and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in
consideration for help given or to be given.16[16]
13[13] Rollo, pp. 8-9.
14[14] Id. at 11-12. See also Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 9.
15[15] Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109376, 20 January 2000, 322 SCRA 655,
664.
In the instant case, we find that the information in Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1) accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, (2)
committed the crime charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of her
official functions, (3) did request or receive directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary
or material benefit in the form of five drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses
Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or obtained, or
will secure or obtain, a Municipal Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus
company, JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration for help given or to be given by the
accused. After considering thoroughly this averment as formulated by the prosecution, we are not
prepared to say that the impugned information omitted an element needed to adequately charge a
violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must be read in its entirety. She argues that a provision of
R.A. 3019 such as Section 3(c) must be interpreted in light of all other provisions, particularly the
definition of receiving any gift, under Section 2(a) thereof, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms.- As used in this Act, the term
(c) Receiving any gift includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other
than a member of the public officers immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his
family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the
occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under
the circumstances manifestly excessive.
Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the above provision, the value of the alleged gift
must be specified in the information. But note that Section 2(c) abovecited mentions a situation
where (1) the value of the gift is manifestly excessive; (2) from a person who is not a member of the
public officers immediate family; and (3) even on the occasion of a family celebration or national
festivity.
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies regardless of whether the gifts
value is manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in our
view, is whether the gift is received in consideration for help given or to be given by the public
officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense charged
under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value in
order to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.
Evidently the legislature is aware that in implementing R.A. 3019, it will be precedents that will
guide the court on the issue of what is or what is not manifestly excessive.17[17]
16[16] Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, 16 November 1999, 318 SCRA 80,
90.
17[17] See Senate Proceedings in regard to R.A. 3019: It is impossible to lay down a
hard and fast rule on what value or amount will be construed as manifestly excessive. Thus the
judiciary will be guided by the precedents established in bribery cases on amounts that are
considered of such insignificant and small value so that they may be considered as ordinary token of
gratitude and friendship. 3 SENATE RECORD 248 (1960).
In sum, we are constrained to rule that respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in denying petitioners
motion to quash the information filed against her in Criminal Case No. 23848. This ruling, however,
is without prejudice to the actual merits of this criminal case as may be shown during trial before
the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23848 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 18, 2004]
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this Motion for Reconsideration,18[1] petitioner Madeleine Mendoza-Ong seeks a reversal of this
Courts October 23, 2003, Resolution dismissing her petition for certiorari and upholding the
Sandiganbayans denial of her motion to quash. She contends that the Court erred in:
holding that the information filed against [her] in Criminal Case No. 23848 has alleged the essential
ingredients of the offense charged [and in]
II
What is excessive or manifestly excessive is relative. The circumstances of person and of social
position have to be taken into account in determining whether the gift is actually excessive and also
the fact of whether it might influence action one way or another on the part of a public official.
There is no definite amount. 3 SENATE RECORD 258-259 (1960).
18[1] Rollo, pp. 262-274.

failing to resolve the fundamental issue of whether the excessive or inordinate delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation and filing of the informations after three (3) years had deprived
[her] of her Constitutional and statutory right to due process and speedy determinations and
disposition of the cases against her warranting dismissal thereof.19[2]
Concerning the first ground abovecited, the Court notes that the motion contains merely a
reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to the Court and found to be without merit.
Petitioner fails to raise any new and substantial arguments, and no cogent reason exists to warrant a
reconsideration of the Courts Resolution. It would be a useless ritual for the Court to reiterate
itself.20[3]
As to the second ground, we find it raises arguments that have already been passed upon.
Reconsideration on that ground may also be denied summarily. Nevertheless, we shall take time to
explain why her motion must be set aside for lack of merit, if only to clear any lingering doubt on
the matter.
Petitioner laments that although the complaint was filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas as early as December 13, 1994, the informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
only on August 1, 1997, and the amended informations, on October 27, 1998. According to her, the
delay of nearly three years to finish the preliminary investigation violated her constitutional rights
to due process and speedy disposition of cases. The established facts of this case, however, show no
such violation.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.21[4] In the determination of
whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.22[5] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.23[6] A mere mathematical
reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.24[7]
In this case, the Graft Investigation Officer released his resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner on August 16, 1995, less than six months from the time petitioner and her co-accused
submitted their counter-affidavits. On October 30, 1995, only two and a half months later,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had reviewed the case and had approved the resolution. Contrary to
19[2] Id. at 262-263.
20[3] Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 &
112564, 4 March 1996, 254 SCRA 234, 242.
21[4] Dimayacyac v. CA, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004, p. 11.
22[5] Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 8.
23[6] Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143885-86, 21 January 2002, 374 SCRA 200,
203.
24[7] Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158018, 20 May 2004, p. 4.

petitioners contention, the lapse of only ten months from the filing of the complaint on December
13, 1994, to the approval of the resolution on October 30, 1995, is by no means oppressive. Speedy
disposition of cases is consistent with reasonable delays.25[8] The Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient
government service to lodge freely their complaints against alleged wrongdoing of government
personnel.26[9] A steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results.27[10] Naturally,
disposition of those cases would take some time. Moreover, petitioner herself had contributed to the
alleged delay when she asked for extension of time to file her counter-affidavit.
That the informations were filed only on August 1, 1997, also did not violate petitioners
constitutional rights. The delay was not without valid reasons. The Special Prosecutor in charge of
preparing the informations felt a genuine need to specify in the informations (1) the value of the
five drums of fuel petitioner received as gift in violation of the anti-graft law and (2) the amount of
the subsistence allowance of heavy-equipment operators that the municipality of Laoang, Northern
Samar, paid for when petitioner used heavy equipment rented by the municipality to develop her
private property. The recommendation to specify these two amounts then had to undergo levels of
review and was approved by Ombudsman Desierto only on January 29, 1996. Unfortunately, the
needed information was not in the records, so the Deputy Special Prosecutor sought it from the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. As that office also did not possess the needed
information, it issued an Order on June 10, 1996, directing petitioner to supply the needed
information.
When petitioner received a copy of the Order, however, she sought additional time to comply with
the Order. She waited for two months before filing on August 23, 1996, a verified statement
supplying none of the information required of her. She claimed that the five drums of fuel were
merely donated to her and that she did not know their value. She also alleged that it was she and her
husband, and not the government, who spent for the subsistence allowance of the heavy-equipment
operator in the development of her private property. She did not object to the delay in the
termination of the proceedings against her, nor did she seek at that time to expedite its resolution.
Petitioners refusal to supply the information prompted the handling investigator at the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas to recommend on August 28, 1996, that the price of the five
drums of fuel be estimated instead. Notably, the Office of the Special Prosecutor could have filed
the informations then, but petitioner had filed with the said office a motion for reassessment of
evidence on June 25, 1996, and a supplemental motion on August 20, 1996. These motions, which
incidentally also failed to raise the issue of delay, effectively suspended the filing of the
informations.
Subsequently, the case had to be reassigned to another Special Prosecutor because the original
handling prosecutor was appointed Resident Ombudsman for the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Petitioners motion for reassessment was resolved only on June 27, 1997. The resolution again went
up for further review.
25[8] Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., No. L-45647, 21 August 1987, 153 SCRA 153, 163.
26[9] Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, 14 July 2000, 335 SCRA 581, 608.
27[10] Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145, 156.
Considering the number of times that the case had to be reviewed, the levels of review that the case
had to undergo, and petitioners own motions for additional time, the period that lapsed -- roughly
two years and five months (from the time petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-
affidavits on March 29, 1995, to the time the informations were filed on August 1, 1997) to
terminate the proceedings against petitioner -- could not be considered vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay. They were necessitated by exigency of the actions taken on the case. The period to
terminate the proceedings, in our view, had not violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed
rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.28[11]
Neither could the delay be said to have been prejudicial to her considering that she herself is guilty
of delay.29[12] The Court has held that if the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was not solely the prosecutions fault, but was also due to incidents attributable to the
accused and his counsel, the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases is not violated.30[13]
Petitioner cannot now seek the protection of the law to benefit from what she now considers the
adverse effects of her own conduct in this case.
Petitioners reliance on the doctrines in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,31[14] Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,32[15]

and Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman33[16] is misplaced.
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the cases against petitioner remained dormant for almost three years. In
ruling that the long delay violated not only Tatads constitutional right to due process but also his
right to speedy disposition of the cases against him, the Court considered three factors. First,
political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process.
Second, there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. And third, the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation
could not be justified on the basis of the records.34[17]
Worth noting, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, petitioners were denied the right to a preliminary
investigation altogether. They were not served copies of the complaint-affidavits and were not given
the chance to file counter-affidavits. The Graft Investigator merely required them to comment on a
civil complaint against them and on a Special Audit Report of the Commission on Audit, both of
which were not equivalent to the complaint-affidavits required by the applicable administrative
rules. In fact, the petitioners were unaware and were never informed that a preliminary investigation
was being conducted against them. The recommendations in the COA Special Audit Report were
28[11] See Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 9.
29[12] See Dela Rosa v. CA, G.R. No. 116945, 9 February 1996, 253 SCRA 499, 505.
30[13] Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 298.
31[14] No. L-72335, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70, 82-83.
32[15] G.R. No. 130191, 27 April 1998, 289 SCRA 721, 740-741.
33[16] G.R. No. 122728, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 304.
34[17] Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 8; Blanco v.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757-58, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA 108, 114.
already accepted even before the report came out, and the civil complaint had already long been
dismissed before the Graft Investigator required petitioners comment on it.
Additionally, in Duterte, although the petitioners had filed the manifestation in lieu of the required
comment on February 18, 1992, it was only on February 22, 1996, or four years later, that they
received the resolution recommending the filing of informations against them. Then, also,
informations were filed against petitioners in that case even in the absence of sufficient ground to
hold them liable for the crime charged.
In Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, the delay lasted for six years despite the fact that Angchangco,
Jr., had filed several omnibus motions for early resolution. Angchangco, Jr., even filed a motion to
dismiss. Sadly, however, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to act on said motion.35[18]
Unlike in the Tatad, Duterte, and Angchangco, Jr., cases where the delays were manifestly
oppressive, the facts of this case do not evince vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation. There appears, therefore, no persuasive much less
compelling reason to grant in this case the same radical relief granted in those three cases that
petitioner cited.36[19]
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143885-86. January 21, 2002]
MERCED TY-DAZO and ROLANDO QUIMINALES, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
35[18] Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA
301, 306.
36[19] See Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, 29 June 2001, 360 SCRA 478-
488.
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Merced Ty-Dazo and Rolando Quiminales assailing the
Resolutions, dated September 20, 1999 and September 27, 1999, of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021, respectively, which denied their motions to dismiss for lack of merit.
Petitioners likewise assail the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution, dated May 12, 2000, denying their
motions for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows: on February 19, 1993, the 362 PNP Mobile Force Company
nd
received a report about the illegal cutting of logs near the Salcedo Watershed. In response to said
report, several police officers were sent to the watershed to investigate. Along the highway near the
watershed, the police saw a mini-truck, then driven by petitioner Quiminales, being loaded with
sawed logs. The logs, allegedly owned by petitioner Ty-Dazo, were without the proper permit or
license. Hence, the logs were immediately confiscated. Upon recommendation of the local officers
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), criminal charges were filed
against petitioners for the illegal cutting, gathering and transporting of lumber.
Since petitioner Ty-Dazo was a public official (municipal mayor of Salcedo, Eastern Samar), the
charges against petitioners were referred by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Eastern
Samar to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 22021
(OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0632) for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) was received by the said office of the Ombudsman on September 1, 1993.
The information against petitioner Ty-Dazo was filed with the Sandiganbayan on February 17,
1995. Petitioner Ty-Dazo then moved for a reinvestigation on July 4, 1995. The motion for
reinvestigation was denied on March 5, 1999.
On the other hand, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 23656 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-03-0347) was
received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas on May 11, 1993. The corresponding
information against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 (Forestry Code), as
amended, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 28, 1997. Thereafter, petitioners moved for
reinvestigation. Resolving said motion, on January 4, 1999, the special prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case against petitioners for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman, however,
denied the special prosecutors recommendation. Instead, he (the Ombudsman) directed the special
prosecutor to proceed to trial. On January 25, 1999, the special prosecutor filed his manifestation
with the Sandiganbayan informing the latter of the Ombudsmans directive.
On March 5, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 23656, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
to dismiss alleging that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman violated their rights to due process and speedy disposition of their
case. In the assailed Resolution, dated September 23, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion to dismiss.i[1]
Similarly, on September 6, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 22021, petitioner Ty-Dazo filed a motion to
dismiss likewise alleging violation of her rights to due process and speedy disposition of the case.
On September 27, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner Ty-
Dazos motion to dismiss for lack of merit.ii[2]
Petitioners then filed their motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. Acting on these motions, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Joint Resolution,
dated May 11, 2000, denying these motions for lack of merit.iii[3]
Petitioners now come to this Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying their motions to dismiss. Petitioners contend that the delay in the termination
of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman constitutes a violation
of their rights to due process and speedy trial. The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly already
received the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in 1994. However, it
was only on April 28, 1997, or three (3) years after the receipt of the complaint, that the
corresponding information in Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the
other hand, while the information in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
January 18, 1995, it took the Office of the Ombudsman more than four (4) years to resolve
petitioner Ty-Dazos motion for reinvestigation.
Petitioners take exception to the pronouncement of respondent Sandiganbayan that they are deemed
to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their cases by the filing of the motion for
reinvestigation. Said motion was allegedly filed precisely to bring to the attention of respondent
Sandiganbayan that the unreasonable length of time that it took the Office of the Ombudsman to file
the information in Criminal Case No. 23656 violated petitioners right to due process and right to the
speedy disposition of their cases.
To support their contention, petitioners rely mainly on our ruling in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayaniv[4]
where we ruled that the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the then Tanodbayan violated the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the
speedy disposition of cases.
The petition lacks merit.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.v[5] In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.vi[6]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.vii[7]
In Tatad, this Court held that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
filing the information constituted a violation of the right of the accused to due process and to a
speedy disposition of cases after it took into consideration several attendant circumstances, namely:
that political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process;
that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct
of a preliminary investigation; and that the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation
could not be justified on the basis of the facts on record.viii[8]
Reliance by petitioners on Tatad is utterly misplaced. In the first place, there is no showing that the
filing of the cases against petitioners was politically motivated. Moreover, unlike in Tatad, the
established procedure prescribed for the conduct of preliminary investigation was observed in this
case. Petitioners were given the opportunity to submit their respective evidence to refute the charges
against them before the corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as
noted by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the delay, thus:
[T]he Court notes that notwithstanding their present claim that the lapse of time from the conduct of
the preliminary investigation until the filing of the cases already violated their constitutional right to
due process, accused filed a motion for reinvestigation of this case, which, admittedly, served to
further delay the case.ix[9]
The Court thus finds that there is no basis for petitioners allegations that their constitutional rights
to due process and speedy disposition of cases against them. The bare allegation that it took the
Ombudsman more than three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation and file the
necessary information would not suffice. As earlier stated, a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not be sufficient.x[10]
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the assailed resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant the issuance of the writ of
certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 154155
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
BEN C. JURADO,
Respondent. August 6, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NO less than Our Constitution guarantees the right not just to

a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of cases. 37[1] However,
37[1] CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. 3, Sec. 16:All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 38[2]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision39[3] of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58925. The CA reversed
and set aside the decision and resolution of the Ombudsman finding
respondent Bureau of Customs Division Chief administratively liable
for neglect of duty, penalizing him with suspension for six months
without pay.
The Facts
Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership

owned by Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina, filed an application
before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a Customs
Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the
evaluation of Magleis application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A.
Baliwag conducted an inspection of Magleis compliance with
38[2] Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 65,
93.
39[3] Rollo, pp. 34-43. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate
Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report 40[4]
recommending approval of the application.
On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of
the Warehouse Inspection Division, adopted the recommendation of
Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of Maglei to the Chief of the
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse Division (MMBWD).
The indorsement letter, in full, reads:
1st Indorsement
16 March 1992
Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within

papers relative to the request of MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to establish
and operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to
CMO 39-91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan City,
together with the attached report submitted by CBW Supervisor J. A.
Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention to the recommendation stated
therein to which the undersigned concurs.
(Sgd.)
Atty. Ben C. Jurado
Chief
Warehousing Inspection Division41[5]
Magleis application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of

the MMBWD for his comment and recommendation. In a
Memorandum (for the District Collector of Customs) dated March
40[4] Id. at 44.
41[5] Id. at 45.

20, 1992, Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially complied
with the physical and documentary requirements relative to their
application for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse.
Mendoza further recommended that Magleis application be
approved. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of
the Bureau of Customs Emma M. Rosqueta (District Collector of
Customs); Titus B. Villanueva (Deputy Commissioner for
Assessment and Operations); and Atty. Alex Gaticales (Executive
Director of the Customs SGS Import Valuation and Classification
Committee) Magleis application was recommended for approval.
On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to

establish and operate CBW No. M-1467 located at 129 J. Bautista,
Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported various
textile materials which were then transferred to the said warehouse.
The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for
exportation.
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior

Storekeeper Account Officer George O. Dizon was tasked by
MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Magleis
CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW was existing and
operating. However, upon further verification by the Bureau of
Customs, it was discovered that the purported CBW of Maglei did
not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather, what was
reported located at the site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only a
small signboard bearing the name Maglei Enterprises Company was
posted inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further investigation
revealed that Magleis shipment of textile materials disappeared,
without proof of the materials being exported or the corresponding
taxes being paid.
Ombudsman Disposition
On August 11, 1992, the Bureau of Customs initiated a

complaint against George P. Dizon, Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C.
Medina for prosecution under the Tariff and Customs Code. After
receiving a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman conducted the
investigation on the complaint.
On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary

Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau of Customs be
reversed. The EPIB further recommended that the complaint against
George P. Dizon be dismissed and another one be filed against
Emma Rosqueta and Atty. Rolando Mendoza, subject to further fact-
finding investigation by the Fact Finding Bureau (FFB) of the OMB.
With regard to the case against Rose Cuyos and John Medina, the
EPIB recommended that the charges be taken up together with
those of Rosqueta and Atty. Mendoza. The case was then forwarded
to the FFB.
On September 29, 1997, the FFB submitted its report with the
following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, premises considered; the undersigned investigators

respectfully recommend the following:
1. That criminal charges for violation of Section 3(e) of RA

3019 and Section 3081 of the Tariff and Customs Code
be filed against the following officials namely:
a. Emma M. Rosqueta
Director Collector, Port of Manila
b. Rolando A. Mendoza
Chief, Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse Division
c. Alex Gaticales
Executive Staff, Deputy Commissioner
d. Ben C. Jurado
Chief, Warehouse Inspection Division
CBW Supervisor
e. Juanito A. Baliwag
CBW Supervisor
f. George P. Dizon
Senior Storekeeper
All of the Bureau of Customs, and

g. Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina
Owner, Maglei Enterprises
Private Respondents
2. That records of this case be forwarded to the EPIB, this

Office for the conduct of the required preliminary
investigation
3. That administrative charges for dishonesty and gross

misconduct be likewise filed against the above-named
BOC officials before the AAB, this Office.42[6]
On October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above

recommendation.
On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint

for falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code filed against respondent. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground of lack of prima facie evidence to charge
respondent of the crime.
On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative

Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OMB rendered judgment finding
respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with suspension
for six (6) months without pay. Respondents motion for
42[6] Id. at 56-57.

reconsideration of his suspension was likewise denied by the
Ombudsman.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal,

respondent argued, among others, that his right to a speedy
disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative
case against him should have been dismissed following the
dismissal of the criminal charges against him; and that there is no
substantial evidence on record to make him administratively liable.
CA Disposition
In a Decision dated July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside

the questioned decision and resolution of the OMB. The dispositive
part of the CA decision runs in this wise:
Foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GIVEN DUE

COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged Decision/Resolution of the
Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.43[7]
In ruling in favor of respondent, the appellate court ratiocinated:
43[7] Id. at 42-43.

Indeed, we are in accord with Petitioners arguments that his right
to speedy disposition of cases had been violated. To be sure, Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:
All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.
xxxx
In the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint
against Petitioner happened on March 16, 1992. And yet it was only on
November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years that the case
relative to the said incident was filed against him. Records disclose that
on August 11, 1992, the complaint only charged George O. Dizon and 2
others. Then on February 13, 1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another
recommendation which ultimately included Petitioner as among those to
be charged. From February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or a period of
more than one (1) year, what took them so long to decide that Petitioner
be included in the charges?
From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took

the Ombudsman almost six (6) years to decide that a case be filed
against Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We cannot fault Petitioner
for invoking violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.
More importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant

facts and circumstances can be held liable for negligence. First of all,
Petitioner as, Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and Operation, did
not have the duty to make inspection on the alleged warehouse. Such
duty belongs to other personnel/officers. Secondly, in Petitioners 1 st
Indorsement dated March 22, 1992, he merely stated thus:
Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This

Port, the within papers relative to the request of MAGLEI
ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs
Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to CMO 39-91,
to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan City,
together with the attached report submitted by CBW
Supervisor J.A. Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention to the
recommendation stated therein to which the undersigned
concurs. (p. 185, Rollo)
A careful reading of said 1st Indorsement undoubtedly shows that
Petitioner invited attention to the inspectors (Supervisor Baliwag)
qualified recommendation, to wit:
Approval respectfully recommended, subject to re-

inspection, before transfer of imported goods. (Underscoring
for emphasis.)
After Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any

participation nor was he under obligation or duty to make a re-inspection.
If afterwards damage was suffered, Petitioner cannot be faulted but
rather only those who had the duty to make re-inspection. It is precisely
because of such fact that the criminal complaint filed against Petitioner
did not prosper. Where there is no duty or responsibility, one should not
be held liable for neglect, as what has been done to Petitioner. 44[8]
Issues
Petitioner Ombudsman now comes to this Court, raising twin

issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS
VIOLATED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF HIS DUTY, AS THE CHIEF OF THE WAREHOUSING INSPECTION
DIVISION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT ENSURE THAT THE
SUPPOSED WAREHOUSE WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE. 45[9]
44[8] Id. at 40-41.
45[9] Id. at 22.

Our Ruling
No violation of respondents right
to speedy disposition of cases.
We shall first tackle the issue on speedy disposition of cases.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all

persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to
the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence,
under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.46[10]
It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees

the right to the speedy disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept.
Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case,
46[10] Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001,
364 SCRA 569, 578.
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.47[11] Just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial,
speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
render rights nugatory.48[12]
In determining whether or not the right to the speedy

disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 49[13]
Gleaned from the foregoing, We find that respondents right to

the speedy disposition of cases has not been violated.
First. It is undisputed that the FFB of the OMB recommended

47[11] Yulo v. People, G.R. No. 142762, March 4, 2005, 452 SCRA 705.
48[12] Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. L-45647, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 153, 163.
49[13] Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478,
485; Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 55, 63-64.
that respondent together with other officials of the Bureau of
Customs be criminally charged for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The
same bureau also recommended that respondent be
administratively charged. Prior to the fact-finding report of the FFB
of the OMB, respondent was never the subject of any complaint or
investigation relating to the incident surrounding Magleis non-
existent customs bonded warehouse. In fact, in the original
complaint filed by the Bureau of Customs, respondent was not
included as one of the parties charged with violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code. With respect to respondent, there were no
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he was
not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the
report and findings of the FFB.
Simply put, prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB
that respondent be criminally and administratively charged,
respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent
was charged only in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in
1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy
disposition of his case. The record is clear that prior to 1997,
respondent had no case to speak of he was not made the subject of
any complaint or made to undergo any investigation. As held in
Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals:50[14]
In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between

the termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on
October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found
that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling
the prosecutorial process against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the
Angchangco case, the criminal complaints remained pending in the Office
of the Ombudsman for more than six years despite the respondents
numerous motions for early resolution and the respondent, who had been
retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement
because of the still unresolved criminal complaints against him. In both
cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed for the resolution of
the cases against the petitioners therein was deemed a violation of the
accuseds right to a speedy disposition of cases against them.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any

persecution of the accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad
case. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any
vexatious process during the two-year period before the filing of
the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case where
petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an
unreasonably long time. Thus, the circumstances present in the Tatad
and Angchangco cases justifying the radical relief granted by us in said
cases are not existent in the present case.51[15] (Emphasis supplied)
50[14] G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 121.
51[15] Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, id. at 130-131.

Second. Even if We were to reckon the period from when
respondent was administratively charged to the point when the
Ombudsman found respondent administratively liable, We still find
no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of

the right to the speedy disposition of cases, this Court has time and
again employed the balancing test. The balancing test first adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo52[16] was
crucial in the Courts resolution of the recent case of Perez v.
People:53[17]
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and defendant are weighed. Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach

speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than
identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining
whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though
some might express them in different ways, we identify four such
factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendants
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering

mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that
go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the
right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of
the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for
52[16] 407 US 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
53[17] G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008.

an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious,
complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government

assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be
assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should
serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already discussed the third
factor, the defendants responsibility to assert his right. Whether and
how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors
we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the
length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and
most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always
readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The
defendants assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of

course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has
identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not
always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown.54[18] (Underscoring supplied)
54[18] Perez v. People, id., citing Barker v. Wingo, supra note 16.
The Court likewise held in Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan:55[19]
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere

mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether
that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused;
and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 56[20]
To reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy

disposition of cases when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. 57[21]
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,58[22] this Court found the delay of

almost three (3) years in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation violative of the rights of the accused to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. Said the Court:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
55[19] Supra note 13.
56[20] Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 485.
57[21] Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 10.
58[22] G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1998, 159 SCRA 70.
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973
and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the
Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-
ranking government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests
a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required
by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated
legal and factual issues necessitating such painstaking and grueling
scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged
bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the

preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the
complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation.
But an undue delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can
not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for
setting back time.59[23]
Too, in Angchangco v. Ombudsman,60[24] this Court ruled that

the delay of almost six (6) years in resolving the criminal charges
constitutes a violation of the right of the accused to due process
59[23] Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 82-83.
60[24] G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301.
and speedy disposition of the cases against them.
Here, the circumstance attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are

clearly absent. Records reveal that on September 29, 1997, the FFB
of the OMB recommended that respondent be criminally and
administratively charged. Subsequently, the OMB approved the
recommendation on October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit on February 2, 1998 and motion to dismiss on
October 8, 1998 before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of
the OMB. On August 16, 1999, the AAB rendered a decision finding
petitioner administratively liable for neglect of duty. More or less, a
period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and
recommendation of the FFB until the time that the AAB rendered its
assailed decision.
To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the

investigation can hardly be considered an unreasonable and
arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional right
to the speedy disposition of his case. Further, there is nothing in the
records to show that said period was characterized by delay which
was vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There was no inordinate
delay amounting to a violation of respondents constitutional rights.
The assertion of respondent that there was a violation of his right to
the speedy disposition of cases against him must necessarily fail.
Respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty.
It is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not

necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint
based on the same set of facts. 61[25] The quantum of evidence in
order to sustain a conviction for a criminal case is different from the
proof needed to find one administratively liable. Rule 133, Section 2
of the Rules of Court provides that for criminal cases, conviction is
warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.62[26] On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary
to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-

judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
(Underscoring supplied)
61[25] Dela Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera

Administrative Region, G.R. No. 146739, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 113, 124.
62[26] RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2:Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a
criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant
proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. 63[27]
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez,64[28] the Court

ruled:
x x x Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the

ground of insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent
doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative
action against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The
Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the
presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused.
Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an
absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of
evidence which, thought insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then
too, there is the substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings
which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 65[29]
Verily, respondent can still be held administratively liable

despite the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.
63[27] Regalado, F.D., Remedial Law Compedium, Vol. II, p. 850.
64[28] A.M. No. P-89-290, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 1.
65[29] Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, id. at 10.

We now discuss the administrative liability of respondent for neglect
of duty. We opt to reexamine the records considering the divergent
findings of the Ombudsman and the CA.
It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the

Warehousing Inspection Division (WID) of the Bureau of Customs.
The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of
Customs.
On March 16, 1992, CBW Inspector Baliwag submitted a report

to respondent showing the result of the ocular inspection of the
proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei. The report stated:
approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection before
transfer of imported goods is allowed.66[30]
On March 16, 1992, respondent, as Chief of the WID, issued a

1st Indorsement67[31] concurring with the recommendation of CBW
Inspector Baliwag that the application of Maglei be approved.
Respondents indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of

the MMBWD for comment and recommendation. The Chief of the
66[30] Rollo, p. 44.
67[31] Id. at 45.

MMBWD eventually recommended that Magleis application be
approved since it has complied with all the necessary physical and
documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the
different divisions of the Bureau of Customs, Maglei was eventually
granted the authority to operate a CBW despite the fact that the
records disclose that there was no actual warehouse to speak of.
Respondent posits that since he was not the approving officer

for application for CBWs nor was it his duty or obligation to conduct
re-inspection of the subject warehouse premises, he cannot be held
liable for neglect of duty.
The CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be

held liable for negligence for the simple reason that it was not
respondents duty to make the inspection and verification of Magleis
application.
We cannot agree.
The finding of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 is more

in accord with the evidence on record:
Evidence on record shows that on 16 March 1992, respondent

Juanito Baliwag (Customs Bonded Warehouse Supervisor) submitted an
Inspection Report of the same date showing the result of an ocular
inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises
with the recommendation: approval respectfully recommended subject to
re-inspection before the transfer of imported goods is allowed and with
the observation that construction is going on for compartments for raw
materials, finished products and wastages by products. On the same
date, 16 March 1992, respondent Ben Jurado (Chief, Warehousing
Inspection Division) issued 1st Indorsement concurring with the
recommendation of CBW Inspector and co-respondent Juanito Baliwag for
the approval of the application.
xxxx
On 08 July 1992, respondent Rolando Mendoza

directed George Dizon (Documents Processor) to verify the
existence and operation of several bonded warehouses
including the warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises.
On 23 July 1992, the same George Dizon was again directed
by respondent Rolando Mendoza to verify the transfer of
shipment covered Boat No. 13853454 in a container van
with No. GSTV 824227 to the warehouse of Maglei
Enterprises (CBW No. M-1467). In those two occasions,
respondent George Dizon reported the existence of the
applicants Warehouse located at No. 129 Jose Bautista
Avenue, Caloocan City.
xxxx
Evidence on records likewise revealed that No. 129 Jose Bautista

Avenue, Caloocan City which was given as the location address of CBW
No. M-1467 is actually the address of a school, that of the School of
Divine Mercy.
xxxx
While respondent Dizon was authorized to verify the existence of

Maglei Enterprises Warehouse, it is admitted that he did not even look
and see the premises of the alleged warehouse. Likewise, CBW
Supervisor and co-respondent Baliwag made a report on the existence of
the bonded warehouse earlier on 16 March 1992 in his Compliance with
Structural Requirements For Customs Bonded Warehouse Inspection
Report. Both Dizon and Baliwag reported the existence of the Warehouse
in their respective and separate reports.
On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is apparent that
the immediate cause of the injury complained of was occasioned not only
by the failure of the CBW Inspectors to conduct an ocular inspection of
the premises in a manner and in accordance with the existing Customs
rules and regulations as well as the failure of their immediate supervisors
to verify the accuracy of the reports, but also by subverting the reports
by making misrepresentation as to the existence of the warehouse.
xxxx
Respondent, Ben Jurado, the Chief of the WID, cannot likewise

escape liability for Neglect of Duty since his Office is the inspection arm
of the District Collector of Customs.68[32]
As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division

is the inspection and audit arm of the Bureau of Customs.
Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said division, was duty-bound
to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his
subordinates. We agree with the Ombudsman that respondent
failed to validate the report of Baliwag and initiate, institute or
recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation immediately
upon discovery of the irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent
was clearly negligent in the performance of his duties.
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate

Court,69[33] defined the power of supervision as overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate
officials perform their duties.70[34] The Court added that in case the
subordinate fails or neglects to fulfill his or her duties, it is the
68[32] Id. at 79-84.
69[33] G.R. Nos. L-72969-70, December 17, 1986, 146 SCRA 294.
70[34] Id.
supervisors responsibility to take such action or steps as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties. 71[35] The doctrine was
reiterated in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court72[36] and
Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc. 73[37]
It bears stressing that public office is a public trust. 74[38] When a

public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform
the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and
diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in
the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution and
attention which careful men use in the management of their
affairs.75[39] Public officials and employees are therefore expected
to act with utmost diligence and care in discharging the duties and
functions of their office. Unfortunately, respondent failed to
71[35] Id.
72[36] G.R. No. L-71313, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 250.
73[37] G.R. No. L-78592, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 525.
74[38] Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. (Emphasis supplied)
75[39] Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA
168, 177-178.
measure up to this standard. Clearly, respondent should be held
administratively liable for neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper

attention to a task expected of him, signifying disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference. 76[40] By merely
acquiescing to the report and recommendation of his subordinate
without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in
overseeing that the duties and responsibilities of the WID were
performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was likewise
negligent when he failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or
recommend investigation and disciplinary proceedings against his
subordinate Baliwag after the anomaly was discovered. Clearly,
respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence
which the circumstances warrant.
We are of course not unaware that as a general rule,

superior officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their
subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where,
being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his
subordinates, he negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or
improper persons; or (2) where, being charged with the duty to
see that they are appointed and qualified in a proper manner, he
negligently or willfully fails to require of them the due conformity
to the prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or
negligently oversees, conducts or carries on the business of his
76[40] Dajao v. Lluch, 429 Phil. 620, 626 (2002); Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, G.R.
No. 140519, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 480.
office as to furnish the opportunity for the default; or (4) and a
fortiori where he has directed, authorized or cooperated in the
wrong.77[41]
In Advincula v. Dicen,78[42] the Court found a provincial agriculturist

liable for misconduct despite his protestations anchored on reliance
to a subordinate. In finding him liable, the Court scored the said
official for failing to scrutinize each and every document proffered
to him by subordinates. In Amane v. Mendoza-Arce,79[43]
respondent clerk of court was held liable for neglect of duty for
failing to discipline her subordinates and make sure that they
regularly and promptly performed their duties. In the case under
review, respondent was careless or negligent in overseeing,
conducting, or carrying on the business of his office as to furnish
the opportunity for the default of a subordinate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed

Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of
neglect of duty is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
77[41] Cruz, C.L., The Law of Public Officers, 1999 ed., pp. 149-150.
78[42] G.R. No. 162403, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 696.
79[43] A.M. Nos. P-95-1080, P-95-1128 & P-95-1144, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA
465.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126814. March 2, 2000]
JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, RAFAEL T. FLORES, HERMINIO C. ELIZON,

ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. GIL. P. FERNANDEZ,
SR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 217 and Benigno S. Montera, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to enjoin further
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66607-08, and to annul the Order, dated August
27, 1996, of Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, which denied
petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations.
Petitioner Judy Carol L. Dansal was the Department Manager of the Enforcement,
Investigation, and Prosecution Department of the National Food Authority ("NFA"), with
office address at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City. Petitioner Rafael T. Flores was
the Assistant Manager of the said department of NFA. Petitioner Herminio C. Elizon was
the chief of the Security Division of the same department of NFA, while Petitioner Arnulfo
S. Soloria was a security officer of the said department of NFA. Respondent Benigno S.
Montera, on the other hand, was employed with the Enforcement, Investigation, and
Prosecution Department of NFA.80[1]
On December 16, 1991, respondent Montera filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging the herein petitioners and one Ronaldo Vallada, a
casual security guard of NFA, with the offense of estafa through falsification of public
document.
On January 14, 1992, petitioners were required by the Office of the Ombudsman to submit
their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence. Petitioners complied.
On April 1, 1992, respondent Montera sent in a reply-affidavit.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner Dansal was directed to submit her verified answer to
respondent Monteras additional charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019.
On September 9, 1992, petitioner Dansal submitted her answer with a counter-charge.
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Dansal filed her rejoinder to respondent Monteras reply-
affidavit, after which the cases were ripe for resolution. 81[2]
On May 30, 1994, or after one (1) year and four (4) months, the office of the Ombudsman
came out with its Resolution, copy of which petitioners allegedly received on February 5,
1996.82[3] Said Resolution ruled:
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that

respondents Judy Carol Dansal, Rafael Flores, Herminio Elizon, Arnulfo
Soloria, Ronaldo Vallada be prosecuted for one count of estafa through
falsification of public document.
In addition thereto, a separate information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.

A. No 3019 be filed against respondent Judy Carol Dansal alone while the
additional charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No 3019 against the
other respondents be dismissed for lack of merit." 83[4]
On May 13, 1996, after the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the aforesaid
cases were referred to the deputized prosecutor of Quezon City, together with two
Informations, dated October 20, 1995 and January 15, 1996, respectively, accusing Judy
Carol L. Dansal of estafa through falsification of public document, and violation of Section
3(e) of R. A. No. 3019;84[5] and the other petitioners of estafa through falsification of public
document.
80[1] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
81[2] Ibid., pp. 5, 6.
82[3] As reflected in the NFA logbook, Rollo, p. 97.
83[4] Resolution, Annex "L", Rollo, pp. 94-95.
84[5] Rollo, ibid.

On July 18, 1996, petitioners interposed a Motion to Quash, contending that the delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation violated their constitutional rights to due process
and to a speedy disposition of their cases.85[6]
On August 27, 1996, the respondent court denied the said motion, ruling thus:
"After careful evaluation of the grounds raised by the accused in their Motion
to Quash viz--viz the Opposition filed by the prosecution, finding no basis in
fact and in law to warrant the quashal of the two informations against the
accused, as there appears no unreasonable delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation amounting to violation of the accuseds constitutional
right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases, the instant
Motion is hereby DENIED. Reset the arraignment and pre-trial anew on
November 25, 1996 at 8:30 oclock in the morning." 86[7]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition under Rule 65
with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, theorizing
that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH, FINDING NO BASIS IN
FACT AND IN LAW TO WARRANT THE QUASHAL OF THE TWO (2)
INFORMATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS OF FACTS AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHEN HE ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THERE
APPEARS NO UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASES."87[8]
On December 18, 1996, without giving due course to the Petition, the Court required the
respondents to comment and denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.88[9]
In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, the Solicitor General recommended
the granting of the petition.89[10]
The accusation against the petitioners is based on the "Affidavit of Complaint" alleging that
petitioners falsified the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ronaldo Vallada, by making it
appear that the latter reported for work during the month of July 1991 when, in truth and in
85[6] Ibid., Sec. 16.
86[7] Annex "A", Rollo, p. 18.
87[8] Rollo, p. 8.
88[9] Ibid. p. 137.
89[10] Ibid. p. 183-205.

fact, he did not so report, and that the petitioners collected the amount of P2,244.04 paid
on the basis of the falsified DTR.
In their answer, petitioners countered that the imputation against them is a mere
harassment by complainant Benigno S. Montera, so as to silence, embarrass and destroy
their (petitioners) credibility, and that the complainant lodged the complaint because prior
to the filing thereof, petitioner Dansal initiated an investigation of the complainant for
alleged irregularities involving the latters daily time record, which investigation was set by
petitioner Dansal after Ronaldo Vallada admitted having illegally punched in the Bundy
Clock the DTRs of several employees and the complainant, who requested him to do so,
and as a result, an administrative case was instituted against the complainant before the
Director for Legal Affairs, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1-05-92 for Dishonesty,
Falsification of Public Documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.90[11]
Placing reliance on the ruling in the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,91[12] petitioners seek
redress for what they theorized upon as a violation of their right to due process and
speedy disposition of their cases by reason of the alleged unreasonable delay of the
preliminary investigation against them.
The petition is barren of merit.
To begin with, the petition is flawed by the failure of petitioners to move for reconsideration
of the assailed Order. Settled is the rule that, except in some recognized exceptions, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for
certiorari.92[13] The rationale behind the rule is to give the respondent court an opportunity
to correct its supposed mistake and to rectify its questioned Order.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies"
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice.93[14] It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case";
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2),94[15] which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial.
90[11] Rollo, p. 188.
91[12] 159 SCRA 70.
92[13] Co Tuan vs. NLRC, 289 SCRA 415.
93[14] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,
1996, p. 489
94[15] Art. III, Sec 14 (2). " In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only
the period after the submission of the case.95[16] The present constitutional provision
applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.96[17]
Section 16 was first given flesh and blood in the Tatad case, which also involved a petition
seeking to reverse an order of the trial court denying a motion to quash the Information.
Applying Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the Court opined in that case:
"x x x We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary

investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners
constitutional rights."97[18]
But the concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and a
flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay.98[19]
In the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by petitioners has
been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason
thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such
delay.99[20] The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a partys right to present evidence and either in a plaintiffs
being non-suited or the defendants being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. 100
[21]
The Court believes, and so holds, that the aforecited doctrine laid down in Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan is inapplicable in light of the attendant facts and circumstances in this
case. Records disclose that the original complaint against petitioners was brought before
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
95[16] Bernas, id., citing Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 PHIL 599.
96[17] Bernas, id.
97[18] 159 SCRA 70, 82.
98[19] Bernas, supra..
99[20] Ibid., citing Barker vs. Wings, 407 US 524.
100[21] Padua vs. Ericta, 161 SCRA 458.

the Office of the Ombudsman on December 16, 1991. The same was deemed submitted
for resolution on January 15, 1993. On May 30, 1994, the investigator issued a Resolution
finding a probable cause, which finding was later approved by the Ombudsman.
Petitioners were furnished a copy of the said Resolution on February 5 and 6, 1996. On
June 30, 1996 were filed the Information dated October 20, 1995, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-96-66607, and the other Information dated January 15, 1996, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608.101[22]
The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more than one
year and four months to finish. But such a happenstance alone, or any like delay, for that
matter, should not be cause for an unfettered abdication by the court of its duty to try
cases and to finally make a determination of the controversy after the presentation of
evidence. In Francisco Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals,102[23] et al., the Court had this to say:
"While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly
from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to
the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights
should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash
of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in
the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as
well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably
and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of
the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper
and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to
dispense) substantial justice in the premises."
The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not operate as to
deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases or
generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair
opportunity to present their side.
Contrary to the stance of the Solicitor General, the delay adverted to in the cases under
consideration does not measure up to the unreasonableness of the delay of disposition in
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, and other allied cases. It cannot be said that the petitioners
found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of the delay and
without more.
In Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan et al., 103[24] this Court ruled that:
"x x x the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
101[22] Rollo, p. 192-193.
102[23] 257 SCRA 703, 716.
103[24] G.R. No. 128136, October 1, 1999.

tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be

sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case"
From the facts and circumstances at bar, the Court cannot glean any grave abuse of
discretion tainting the denial by the respondent court of petitioners motion to quash.
The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him. 104[25] But such
duty should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of
thoroughness and correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of
the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government
service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of government personnel,
thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.
As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman 105[26]
do not specifically prescribe a period within which a criminal complaint may be investigated
and decided. But the same Rules adopt the Rules of Court on Preliminary Investigation, as
modified by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman. Under the Rules of Court, 106[27] the
Investigating Officer has ten (10) days from submission of the case to come out with the
resolution.
But it bears stressing that the period fixed by law is merely "directory", although it can not
be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity.107[28] The records of the case
do not show any such complete disregard. In like manner, the circumstances averred in
the petition do not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance by
the Ombudsman of his functions, especially those involving the review of numerous
resolutions and recommendations of his investigating officers.
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and
to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full blown trial where it
104[25] Roque, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., supra.
105[26] Administrative Order No. 7
106[27] Rule 112, Sec 3 (f). "Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded
and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom.
Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or
not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
107[28] Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.

is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law and/or other constitutionally
guaranteed rights.108[29] But here, the Court finds none.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the respondent Regional Trial Court is hereby
ordered to attend with dispatch to the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal, Rafael T. Flores, Herminio T. Elizon
and Arnulfo S. Soloria", and Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal". No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000]
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a
rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated
December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City,
asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the
Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis
of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members
of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two
suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and
the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty.
Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of
arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the
next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents
on that day.xi[1] However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects.xii[2]
108[29] Ibid., p. 80, citing Salonga vs. Cruz Pao, et. al., 134 SCRA 438; Mead vs. Argel,
115 SCRA 256; Yap vs. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307; People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty.
Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829,xiii[3] which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an informationxiv[4] was filed against them, alleging that:
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely:
ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO
- Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of
their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime
in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY.
VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate
the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal
suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and
Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation
and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said suspects thus, leading to
the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA;
that said above acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full
knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus
preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the
case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the
Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of
petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
I.THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE
SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE
SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE;
AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO
PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.xv[5]
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by
the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule
113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers
in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from
justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b)
applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the
course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators
of the crime.xvi[6] They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr.xvii[7] in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-
appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting
the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of
his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the
presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused
was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case
involved the admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not
apply to this case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's
invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis
of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter
was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In the
words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had
"personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the
two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a
warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting
officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.xviii[8]
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the
crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were
not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were
doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police,
were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to
supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be
arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even
an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just
committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to
apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the
requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we
hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c), the Office of
the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the
SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually
leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively
identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive
identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants
in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ
members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec.
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest.
While this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they
had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous
crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the
reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' part, to
wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution
of the SJ members positively identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is in
this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not
the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasijudicial authority to rule on this matter.
Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed
of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested,
without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the
arresting NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner
that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the
NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those
who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.xix[9]
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were
guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant
issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any
of the cases provided in Rule 113, 5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well
have authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves.
Only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested
in flagrante delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in
recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:
All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the
accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police
headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made
on campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the
commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829.
Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant,
the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the
students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation
at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of
Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of
students, were acting within the bounds of law.xx[10]
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
SEC. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
....
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.xxi[11] But as has been held,
"[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."xxii[12] As we held in the similar case of Venus v.
Desierto:xxiii[13]
Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to
file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs.
Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760,
March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of
P.D. No. 1829, 1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest
of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not
have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had
asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because
petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men
to disregard constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the
escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to
surrender the students the following day.xxiv[14] Hence, the information against them charged that
petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the
successful escape of these students and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.xxv
[15] The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information,
a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners
prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the
student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. In the first place, they were not
sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains
that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as
they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for
their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the
supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted
arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented
from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be
held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring
to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement
agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be
remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights.
The absence of probable cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the
records. They cannot be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we
see no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with
the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners'
challenge to P.D. No. 1829, 1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court
will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case
can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law.xxvi[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby
prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a result of the incident
complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the
information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130191. April 27, 1998]

RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right, it is a substantive right. To
deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
In this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, petitioners seek to set
aside the Order of the Sandiganbayan dated 27 June 1997 denying the Motion to Quash
the information filed against them for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners similarly impugn the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated 5 August 1997 which denied their Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.
Pertinent to this case are the following facts:
In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city government of
Davao. The goal of said project was to make Davao City a leading center for computer
systems and technology development. It also aimed to provide consultancy and training
services and to assist all local government units in Mindanao set up their respective
computer systems.
To implement the project, a Computerization Program Committee, composed of the

following was formed:
Chairman: Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman, City Administrator
Members : Mr. Jorge Silvosa, Acting City Treasurer
Atty. Victorino Advincula, City Councilor
Mr. Alexis Almendras, City Councilor\
Atty. Onofre Francisco, City Legal Officer
Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr., Chief of Internal Control Office
Atty. Mariano Kintanar, COA Resident Auditor.xxvii[1]
The Committees duty was to conduct a thorough study of the different computers in the
market, taking into account the quality and acceptability of the products, the reputation and
track record of the manufacturers and/or their Philippine distributors, the availability of
service centers in the country that can undertake preventive maintenance of the computer
hardwares to ensure a long and uninterrupted use and, last but not the least, the capability
of the manufacturers and/or Philippine distributors to design and put into place the
computer system complete with the flow of paperwork, forms to be used and personnel
required.xxviii[2]
Following these guidelines, the Committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar
computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea
and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI).
After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor Kintanar, the Committee proceeded to
negotiate with SPI, represented by its President Rodolfo V. Jao and Executive Vice
President Manuel T. Asis, for the acquisition and installation of the computer hardware and
the training of personnel for the Electronic Data-Processing Center. The total contract cost
amounted to P11,656,810.00
On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao unanimously

passed Resolution No. 1402 and Ordinance No. 173 approving the proposed contract for
computerization between Davao City and SPI. The Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the
City Mayor (petitioner Duterte) to sign the said contract for and in behalf of Davao City. xxix
[3]
On the same day, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No. 1403 and Ordinance No. 174,
the General Fund Supplemental Budget No. 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00
for the citys computerization project.
Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the parties thereto and on 8
November 1990, petitioner City Administrator de Guzman released to SPI PNB Check No.
65521 in the amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 27 November 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao received a letter-

complaint from a concerned citizen, stating that some city officials are going to make a
killing in the transaction.xxx[4] The complaint was docketed as OMB-MIN-90-0425.
However, no action was taken thereon.xxxi[5]
Thereafter, sometime in February 1991, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 20,550-
91, was instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12 by Dean Pilar
Braga, Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw Foundation, Inc. against the
petitioners, the City Council, various city officials and SPI for the judicial declaration of
nullity of the aforestated resolutions and ordinances and the computer contract executed
pursuant thereto.
On 22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a proposal to
petitioner Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No. 449 and
Ordinance No. 53 accepting Goldstars offer to cancel the computerization contract
provided the latter return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to the City Treasurers
Office within a period of one month. Petitioner Duterte, as city mayor, was thus authorized
to take the proper steps for the mutual cancellation of the said contract and to sign all
documents relevant thereto.xxxii[6]
Pursuant to the aforestated authority, on 6 May 1991, petitioner Duterte, in behalf of Davao
City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly refunded.
In the meantime, a Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit was tasked to conduct
an audit of the Davao City Local Automation Project to determine if said contract
conformed to government laws and regulations.
On 31 May 1991, the team submitted its Special Audit Report (SAR) No. 91-05
recommending rescission of the subject contract. A copy of the report was sent to
petitioner Duterte by COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo on 7 June 1991. In the latters
transmittal letter, Chairman Domingo summarized the findings of the special audit team,
thus:
1.The award of the contract for the Davao City Local Automation Project to Systems Plus,
Inc., for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated contract rather than thru competitive
public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and 8 of PD 526. Moreover, there was no
sufficient appropriation for this particular contract in violation of Sec. 85 of PD 1445.
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc. covering 15% of the
contract cost of P11.6M in violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477 and Sec. 88 of PD 1445.
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under contract with Systems Plus,
Inc. (SPI) differed from the teams canvass by as much as 1200% or a total of
P1.8M.
4. The City had no Information System Plan (ISP) prior to the award of the contract to
SPI in direct violation of Malacaang Memo. Order No. 287 and NCC Memo. Circular
89-1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission resulted in undue disadvantage to the City
Government.
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team recommends that the contract with
Systems Plus, Inc. be rescinded in view of the questionable validity due to
insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of NCC-Memorandum Circular 89-1
dated June 22, 1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of computer
hardware/system should be strictly adhered to. xxxiii[7]
The city government, intent on pursuing its computerization plan, decided to follow the
audit teams recommendation and sought the assistance of the National Computer Center
(NCC). After conducting the necessary studies, the NCC recommended the acquisition of
Philips computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied with the NCCs
advice and hence, was finally able to obtain the needed computers.
Subsequently, on 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-Davao City Chapter, through one
Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
petitioners, the City Treasurer, City Auditor, the whole city government of Davao and SPI.
The League alleged that the respondents, in entering into the computerization contract,
violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), PD No. 1445 (Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code
and other pertinent laws. The case was docketed as OMB-3-91-1768. xxxiv[8]
On 9 October 1991, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Pepito A. Manriquez of the Office of
the Ombudsman sent a letterxxxv[9] to COA Chairman Domingo requesting the Special
Audit Team to submit their joint affidavit to substantiate the complaint in compliance with
Section 4, par. (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (A. O. No.
07).
On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No.
20,550-91. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground of
prematurity and that it has become moot and academic with the mutual cancellation of the
contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby denied. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.xxxvi[10]
On 12 November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768

directing petitioners, Jorge Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and
Manuel T. Asis of SPI to:
xxx file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-point comment under oath
upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Davao City Dean Pilar C. Braga, et al. vs. Illegality of City Council
of Davao Resolutions and Ordinances, and the Computer Contract executed Pursuant
Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees and Costs with Injunctive
Relief, including the Issuance of a Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction in which they filed a motion to dismiss, not an answer and (2) the
respective comments, also under oath, on the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of
which is attached.xxxvii[11]
On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the affidavits of the Special Audit Team
but failed to furnish petitioners copies thereof.
On 18 February 1992, petitioners submitted a manifestation adopting the comments filed

by their co-respondents Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar dated 25 November 1991 and
17 January 1992, respectively.
Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, petitioners received a copy of a Memorandum

prepared by Special Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8 February 1996
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-
91-1768. Prosecutor De Guzman recommended that the charges of malversation, violation
of Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code against petitioners and their
co-respondents be dismissed. He opined that any issue pertaining to unwarranted benefits
or injury to the government and malversation were rendered moot and academic by the
mutual rescission of the subject contract before the COA submitted its findings (SAR No.
91-05) or before the disbursement was disallowed. However, Prosecutor De Guzman
recommended that petitioners be charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for having
entered into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the
elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to government being immaterial. xxxviii[12]
Accordingly, the following information dated 8 February 1996 was filed against petitioners
before the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Criminal Case No. 23193):
That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers,
accused Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of Davao City,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of their official functions, and conspiring and confederating with each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a negotiated contract for the
purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated for
and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-
SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN (P11,656,810.00), which contract is manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government, said accused knowing fully-well that the
said acquisition cost has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred (1200%) percent
and without subjecting said acquisition to the required public bidding.
CONTRARY TO LAW.xxxix[13]
On 27 February 1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 March 1996,
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
1.Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and
the speedy disposition of their case;
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with authority to enter into the
subject contract;
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government

since the subject contract has been duly rescinded.
On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On 18 June 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
It appears, however, that the accused were able to file motions for the reconsideration of
the Resolution authorizing the filing of the Information herein with the Ombudsman in
Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever decision which might have occurred
with respect to the preliminary investigation would have been remedied by the motion for
consideration in the sense that whatever the accused had to say in their behalf, they were
able to do in that motion for reconsideration.
Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does not
believe itself empowered to authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an inadequacy of
the basic preliminary investigation nor with respect to a dispute as to the proper
appreciation by the prosecution of the evidence at that time.
In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty. Medialdea that he represents not only
Mayor Duterte but City Administrator de Guzman as well, upon his commitment, the
arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at 8:00 oclock in the morning. xl[14]
On 15 July 1997, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above order but the same
was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997. xli
[15]
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioners allege that:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
(1)PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4, RULE II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07
(RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); AND
(2) ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED,

THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN TERMINATING THE SAME THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF THE CASE.
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE PETITIONERS

DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF R.A. 3019 IN THAT:
(1) PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS CLOTHED WITH FULL
LEGAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH
SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.,
(2) THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE

GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE SAME HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO
DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT;
(3) ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT RESCINDED, THE SAME CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.xlii[16]
On 4 September 1997, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 23193.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary investigation
of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in
Administrative Order No. 07.
In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely
directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 and SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single
affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law.xliii[17] They
were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA
Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a
preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary
investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to
adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose
recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with)
as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly
irregular. As a consequence, petitioners constitutional right to due process was violated.
Sections (2) and (4), Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman) provide:
Sec. 2.Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether or not it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the
case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation
xxx
Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed
in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider
the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the
respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a
motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the
complainants affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time
of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or
having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted
for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are
facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness
being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the
clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the
witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall be
forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities
for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
In what passes off as application of the foregoing rules, all that petitioners were asked to
do was merely to file their comment upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and on the COA Special Audit Report. The
comment referred to in Section 2(b) Rule II, of A.O. No. 07 is not part of or is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule II, of the same Administrative
Order. A plain reading of Sec. 2 would convey the idea that upon evaluation of the
complaint, the investigating officer may recommend its outright dismissal for palpable want
of merit; otherwise, or if the complaint appears to have some merit, the investigator may
recommend action under any of those enumerated from (b) to (f), that is, the investigator
may recommend that the complaint be: referred to respondent for comment, or endorsed
to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; or
forwarded to the appropriate office of official for fact-finding investigation. Now, if the
investigator opts to recommend the filing of a comment by the respondent, it is presumably
because he needs more facts and information for further evaluation of the merits of the
complaint. That being done, the investigating officer shall again recommend any one of the
actions enumerated in Section 2, which include the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation, on the other hand, takes on an adversarial quality and an

entirely different procedures comes into play. This must be so because the purpose of a
preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is
placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of public trial.xliv[18] It is also intended to protect the state
from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. xlv[19] While the right is statutory
rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal
justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to
trial for a criminal offense and hence, formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accuseds claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure
of his right to due process.xlvi[20]
Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is unverified or based only on official
reports (which is the situation obtaining in the case at bar), the complainant is required to
submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The investigating officer, thereafter, shall
issue an order, to which copies of the complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavits. In the preliminary investigation, what the
respondent is required to file is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the
respondent fails to file a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer consider the
respondents comment as the answer to the complaint. Against the foregoing backdrop,
there was a palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the fundamental
requirements of preliminary investigation.
Apparently, in the case at bar, the investigating officer considered the filing of petitioners
comment as a substantial compliance with the requirements of a preliminary investigation.
Initially, Graft Investor Manriquez directed the members of the Special Audit Team on 9
October 1991 to submit their affidavits relative to SAR No. 91-05. However, on 12
November 1991, before the affidavits were submitted, Manriquez required petitioners to
submit their respective comments on the complaint in the civil case and on Special Audit
Report (SAR) 91-05. Even when the required affidavits were filed by the audit team on 4
December 1991, petitioners were still not furnished copies thereof. The Ombudsman
contends that failure to provide petitioners the complaint-affidavits is immaterial since
petitioners were well aware of the existence of the civil complaint and SAR No. 91-05. We
find the Ombudsmans reasoning flawed. The civil complaint and the COA Special Audit
Report are not equivalent to the complaint-affidavits required by the rules. Moreover, long
before petitioners were directed to file their comments, the civil complaint (Civil Case No.
20, 550-91) was rendered moot and academic and, accordingly, dismissed following the
mutual cancellation of the computerization contract. In SAR No. 91-05, on the other hand,
petitioners were merely advised to rescind the subject contract which was accomplished
even before the audit report came out. In light of these circumstances, the Court cannot
blame petitioners for being unaware of the proceedings conducted against them.
In Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman,xlvii[21] this Court, speaking through Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, emphasized that it is mandatory requirement for the complaint to submit his
affidavit and those of his witnesses before the respondent can be compelled to submit his
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. Thus:
Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party, Rule I, 3 can only apply to the
general criminal investigation, which in the case at bar was already conducted by the
PCGG. But after the Ombudsman and his deputies have gathered evidence and their
investigation has ceased to be a general exploratory one and they decide to bring the
action against a party, their proceedings become adversary and Rule II 4(a) then applies.
This means that before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents, the complaint must submit his affidavit and those of his
witnesses. This is true not only of prosecutions of graft cases under Rep. Act No. 3019 but
also of actions for the recovery of unexplained wealth under Rep. Act No. 1379, because 2
of this latter law requires that before a petition is filed there must be a previous inquiry
similar to preliminary investigation in criminal cases.
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only
evidence may be considered. While reports and even raw information may justify the
initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after
sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution
of the case in court. As this Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end
in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial
proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereof.
II
Compounding the deprivation of petitioners of their right to a preliminary investigation was

the undue and unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularity conducted
preliminary investigation. Petitioners manifestation adopting the comments of their co-
respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or
four (4) years later, that petitioners received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996
submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman recommending the filing
of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their
case.xlviii[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,xlix[23] we held that an undue delay of close to
three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in
the speculative assumption that the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were
for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost
three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to
alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,l[24] the Court upheld Angchangcos
right to the speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a sheriff in the Regional Trial
Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In 1990 criminal complaints were filed against
him which remained pending before the Ombudsman even after his retirement in 1994.
The Court thus ruled:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges
against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as
the Ombudsmans own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For
all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in
September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the
government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombusman. If we
wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to
speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of
the writ prayed for.li[25]
We are not persuaded by the Ombudsmans argument that the Tatad ruling does not apply
to the present case which is not politically motivated unlike the former, pointing out the
following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutional process in this case.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law
for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-
affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation
and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutional process
lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We
cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving
the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly,
for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.lii[26]
The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present suit from the Angchangco case by
arguing that in the latter, Angchangco filed several motions for early resolution, implying
that in the case at bar petitioners were not as vigilant in asserting or protecting their rights.
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come into
play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such
distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation therein to justify the invocation of their right
to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts of each case must be taken into
consideration in the grant of the relief sought. In the Tatad case, we are reminded:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called radical relief and
to spare the accused from the undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutional
guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particularly regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to its case.liii[27]
In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan,liv[28] the Court observed that the concept of speedy
disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that
the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark,
petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already
been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or
even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay-the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the
meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was
the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated
factual and legal issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners three motions for extension of the
time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by
the motions for extension. The delay occurred after petitioners filed their comment.
Between 1992-1996, petitioners were under no obligation to make any move because
there was no preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O.
No. 07 to speak of in the first place.
III
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against
the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the
offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the
government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government. The second element of the crime that the accused public officers entered
into a contract in behalf of the government is absent. The computerization contract was
rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at
that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its
Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The contract,
after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if no contract was
ever executed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and Criminal Case No.
23193 is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 4 September
1997 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the
basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court
that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that
is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant
case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad
umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases
as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for
his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019,
which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation.
The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative,
while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed
fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until
now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition
of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502
and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues
raised by petitioner.
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial
or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice.21
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a
relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
be sufficient.22 Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners right to a speedy
disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time
to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SBs position that the conduct of
preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when Caares
prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This is belied by Section 4,
Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the "Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
xxxx
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or
approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the
proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under
preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officers
recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in
the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated
upon Caares preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the
time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were
terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsmans resolution of the case largely remains
unjustified.
To this end, the Court equally denies the SBs ratiocination that the delay in proceedings could be
excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision through the different
levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in addition to the steady stream
of cases which it had to resolve.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to
be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against officers and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service."25 This great responsibility cannot be
simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty
not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the
proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the
assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any
extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or
any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity any of which have not
been adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar there appears to be no justifiable
basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary
investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right
to speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the
March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years,
or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009.26 In this
regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been
terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case
altogether. Instructive on this point is the Courts observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this
case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-
affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to
assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even
novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for
the delay the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it
had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad
case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in
view of the fact that the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties
thereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners duty
to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsmans
responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v.
Wingo:28
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of
insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in
the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the
objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the
right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from
the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose.30 This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of
the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial
was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial,
he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion
and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v.
United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to
the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be
weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand,
the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against
the State. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the entire
proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should
equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:32
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional
provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the
right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the
periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII,
Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional
provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsmans resolution of
the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable
that petitioners constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been
violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the
Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are
resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as
it ought to determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SBs patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence
surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case
against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of the
petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil
liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to
pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar
the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the
judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.33 As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,34 citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered."
xxxx
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability
not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own
act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by
law."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the
present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has been given
the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as
to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their
part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.36 Consequently,
absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case
based on the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to
petitioners alleged malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated October 6,
2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for
violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of petitioners Rafael L.
Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without
prejudice to any civil action which the Province of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.
21
Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723, 732.
(Citations omitted)
22
Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 618,
626.
23
Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, supra note 21.
24
Id. at 733.
25
Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 627-630.
26
Rollo (G.R. No. 191411), p. 186.
27
352 Phil. 557, 582-583 (1998).
28
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
29
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 917 (2004). (Citations omitted)
30
Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 414, 423.
31
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 29 at 917-919.
32
383 Phil. 897, 905 (2000). (Citations omitted)
33
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court partly provides:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.
xxxx
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.
34
G.R. No. 80130, August 19, 1991, 200 SCRA 806, 814-815.
35
240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987).
36
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court partly provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of the Judgment.
xxxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 191871
EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD,

Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, G.R. No. 181851
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-

MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (ADT)
OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B.
DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO;
ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN and
MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and
IMELDA O. ABUTAL,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
March 9, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Decision109[1] dated 22 March 2007, and the Resolution110[2] dated 1 February
2008, of the Court of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 entitled, Capt. Wilfredo
G. Roquero v. The Chancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP
Manila), et al., a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which sought
to reverse and set aside the Orders dated 8 June 2004111[3] and 9 November 2004112[4]
of the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UP-Manila, chaired by Atty.
Zaldy B. Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as members.
The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the

Philippine General Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain.
Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency
who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.
The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal

with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct
against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and
docketed as ADM Case No. UPM-AC 97-007 reads as follows:
After preliminary investigation duly conducted in accordance with the

Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees, a prima facie case has been found to exist against you for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT punishable under the University Rules and
Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and Employees in
relation to the Civil Service Law, committed as follows:
109[1] Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo Zearosa, with Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo F. Sundiam concurring. Rollo, pp. 17-27.
110[2] Id. at 29-30.
111[3] CA rollo, p. 18.
112[4] Id. at 21.

That you, Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of the UP Manila Police
Force, sometime in April 1996, while conducting an interview
on MS. IMELDA ABUTAL who was then applying for the
position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency to be
assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to her that if she agreed to be
your mistress, you would facilitate her application and give
her a permanent position; that despite the fact the MS.
ABUTAL rejected your proposal, you still insisted on
demanding said sexual favor from her; that you, therefore, are
liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT under Section 22,
paragraph (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 on Civil Rules.
x x x x.
On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days by Chancellor Santos-Ocampo, the material portion of said Order reads:
Considering the gravity of the offense charged and pursuant to

Section 19 of Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty
Members and Employees and Section 26 and 27 Rule XIV of Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 and Omnibus Rules, you are hereby
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days effective upon receipt
hereof.
While on preventive suspension, you are hereby required to appear

before the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) whenever
your presence is necessary.
Thereafter, the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of

Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the
instant case. Atty. Paul A. Flor, as University Prosecutor, represented the prosecution.
He was later on replaced by Atty. Asteria Felicen. Petitioner was represented by Atty.
Leo G. Lee of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was then replaced by Public
Attorney Philger Inovejas.
The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After
the completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the
prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July
1999.
xxxx
The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within
the period agreed upon.
Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and
his counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely called by telephone and requested Atty.
Docena to reset the case to another date. Atty. Docena then ordered the resetting of
the hearing on the following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. On 11 August
1999, only petitioner and his counsel came. No representative from the prosecution
appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor again called and asked for the postponement of
the hearing. By reason thereof, Atty. Docena issued an Order, which reads as
follows:
The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set to September

29, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., with the understanding that if and when the
parties fail to appear at said hearing date, this case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution based on the evidences already obtaining in
the record of the case.
SO ORDERED.
11 August 1999.
On said date, the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear.
On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying

that complainant (private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her
rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file her
Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days from 1 July 1999 or up
to 16 July 1999.
The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years.
Due to the unreasonable delay, petitioner, on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion
asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him. The Motion to
Dismiss was anchored on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not
formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on
22 October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were
filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the
case.
On 26 May 2004, the prosecution, represented by Atty. Felicen in view of the

resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999, filed its Comment/Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss. The prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits
had been filed on 24 January 2004, of which a copy thereof was received by Atty.
Lee, petitioners counsel, on 30 January 2004, per registry return receipt. However,
petitioner has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer.
Furthermore, the prosecution explained in its Comment/Opposition that in

view of the resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999 but who had been on leave by
mid-July 1999, the Formal Offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all
the transcript of stenographic notes have been furnished to the counsel that replaced
Atty. Flor. Meanwhile, the stenographer, Jamie Limbaga, had been in and out of the
hospital due to a serious illness, thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutors Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits.
On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss, to wit:
Acting on respondents Motion to Dismiss, as well as the

University Prosecutors Comment and/or Opposition to said Motion,
and finding that said Motion to Dismiss to be bereft of merit, the
same is hereby DENIED.
In view of the failure of the respondent to file his comment on

the Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence, the Exhibits (A to G-1) of
the Prosecution are hereby ADMITTED for the purpose for which the
same have been offered.
The respondent is hereby directed to present his evidence on

June 22, 2004 at 10:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied
in an Order dated 9 November 2004.113[5]
Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging
therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion
to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.
In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the
petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The Court of Appeals ruled, thus:
The main issue to be resolved is whether the ADT gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Order
denying petitioners motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.
We rule in the negative.
113[5] Id. at 18-23.

Petitioner argues that the administrative case against him should be dismissed
because of the failure of the prosecution to file its Formal Offer of Evidence within
the agreed period.
We do not agree.
The appropriate rule in this case is Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which provides, to wit:
When the presentation of evidence has been concluded, the parties

shall formally offer their evidence either orally or in writing and
thereafter objections thereto may also be made either orally or in
writing. After which, both parties may be given time to submit their
respective memorandum which in no case shall [be] beyond five (5)
days after the termination of the investigation. Failure to submit the
same within the given period shall be considered a waiver thereof.
The failure to file a formal offer of evidence amounts to no more than a

waiver of the right to file the same. In administrative cases, particularly, where the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service applies, the absence of a
formal offer of evidence does not bar the adverse party from presenting its evidence.
Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

provides:
Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily

adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings.
While under the Rules of Court, a formal offer may be indispensable because
the rules on evidence so require it, the same is not true in administrative cases. There
is no provision in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
akin to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, Section 27 of the Uniform Rules states that the failure to file a
formal offer of evidence amounts to a mere waiver thereof, and not a dismissal of the
action. As such, petitioner cannot claim a vested right to a dismissal of his case
below just because a formal offer was not filed within the agreed period.
In addition thereto, the Uniform Rules give the hearing officer a leeway when
it provided that x x x the hearing officer shall accept all evidence deemed material
and relevant to the case. In case of doubt, he shall allow the admission of evidence
subject to the objection interposed against its admission.
In the case at bar, records show that in fact, a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. The
action of the ADT in admitting the prosecutions exhibits was consistent with the
above-mentioned Rules. Thus, the tribunal acted within the bounds of its authority.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
To reiterate, the admission of the exhibits for the prosecution is in accordance

with Section 3, 27, and 28 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. In admitting the exhibits for the prosecution, petitioner was not denied the
opportunity to present his evidence. In fact, he could have presented his evidence as
early as 11 August 1999 but he did not do so.
WHEREFORE, for utter lack of merit, the instant petition with prayer for
temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.114[6]
Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on 1 February 2008.
Roquero is now before us seeking the reversal of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve
Roqueros Motion (to declare complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right to
submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he seasonably filed on 22 October 1999
and the assailed Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of
Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years
violated the constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.
We find merit in the petition.
114[6] Id. at 23-26.

The Court of Appeals faulted petitioner for his failure to present his own
evidence which he could have done as early as 11 August 1999.115[7] It must be
noted, however, that petitioners 22 October 1999 motion to declare complainant to
have waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit remained unresolved.
This is reason enough for Roquero to defer presentation of his own evidence.
Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in

Civil Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within
the given period shall be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the
prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January
2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either present
his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary
length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.
We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. 116
[8] The admission by ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly
filed did not cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioners 1999 motion to
deem as waived such formal offer of evidence. Indeed, the delay of almost five (5)
years cannot be justified.
The prosecution tried to explain in its Comment/Opposition dated 26 May

2004, that the resignation of Atty. Paul Flor in August 1999, who had by then already
been on leave since mid-July 1999, contributed to the delay of the filing of the formal
offer and that the formal offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the
115[7] Rollo, p. 26.
116[8] Id. at 25.

transcripts of stenographic notes had been given to him. Also, it was pointed out that
the stenographer, Jaime Limbaga, had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious
illness.117[9]
The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook, line and sinker
without asking why it took him almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the
excuses were true, the prosecution could have easily manifested with the ADT of its
predicament right after Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the formal
offer. It is evident too that the prosecution failed to explain why it took them so long
a time to find a replacement for the original prosecutor. And, the stenographer who
had been in and out of the hospital due to serious illness should have been replaced
sooner.
While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict

adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings,118[10] the same however should not violate the constitutional right of
respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
117[9] Id. at 22.
118[10] Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil
and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.119[11]
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of
the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is
a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.120[12]
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.121[13]
119[11] Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39, 49 (2001) citing Cadalin v.
POEAs Administrator, G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721, 765.
120[12] Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 65,
95.
121[13] Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001) citing Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55, 63.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for
the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in
resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found
necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay;
and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he
did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to
petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and
during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him
remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of

cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the
administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. 122[14] The
adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord
with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better
serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights
of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.123[15]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated 22 March 2007 and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the Philippines-
122[14] CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., p. 295.
123[15] Matias v. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, 3 August 1998, 293 SCRA 532, 538-539.
Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as
Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to
DISMISS the administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[Syllabus]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118808. December 24, 1996]
JUDGE ANA MARIA I. DOLALAS, EVELYN K. OBIDO AND WILBERTO B. CARRIEDO,

petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO and
BENJAMIN VILLARANTE, JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Under consideration is the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order dated January 16, 1995. Petitioners, Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido
and Wilberto B. Carriedo - Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur, were charged administratively by
private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross neglect of
duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute Criminal Case
No. 5881 for an unreasonable length of time before public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.
The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated July 6, 1994 arose
out of said criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent by a police officer.
Private respondent alleged that after submitting his counter-affidavit relative to the said criminal
case before petitioners court, there has been no pre-conference, arraignment or pre-trial held or
conducted by petitioner judge. Private respondent claimed that the said criminal case was
maliciously filed by one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with petitioner judge in order to discourage
the former from instituting a criminal complaint against said police officers men for abuse of
authority and police brutality with physical injury.lv[1]
Private respondent also claimed that said criminal case filed against him has been unnecessarily
delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo and petitioner-judge totally failed to prosecute their own malicious
action within a reasonable length of time thus prejudicing the constitutional right of the former to an
impartial investigation and a fair and speedy trial. Said criminal case against private respondent also
held in abeyance his own complaint against the police officers allegedly to his prejudice.lvi[2]
On the basis of the letter-complaint filed by herein private respondent, Graft Investigation Officer I
Melinda Alconsel Dayanghirang of public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed
petitioners to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Petitioners motion to dismiss dated
September 14, 1994 as well as their motion for reconsideration dated December 2, 1994 were
denied by public respondent, hence the petition before this Court.
In this petition, petitioners pray that for the preservation of their rights pending this proceeding, a
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order be issued against the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao commanding said office to desist from further proceeding with the case against the
petitioners. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court in a resolution dated May 23,
1995.
Petitioner was basically being charged with undue delay in the disposition of the said criminal case
filed before petitioners court. The issue posed, therefore, in this petition is whether or not the Office
of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of the complaint against petitioner for purposes of
investigation and possible prosecution in accordance with its mandate under Section 13 (1) and (2)
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitutionlvii[3] for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.lviii[4]
Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into the alleged undue delay in the disposition of the case as said charge relates to a
judges performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has administrative control
and supervision, as mandated under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution.lix[5] Public
respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao, however, contends that referral to the Supreme Court is not
essential in this case as what will be investigated is not whether there was undue delay in the
disposition of a simple criminal case for five years, which it admits is administrative in nature. It
added that what is sought to be determined by the investigation is whether or not any undue delay in
the disposition of the alarms and scandals case resulted in injury to private respondent through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and/or undue advantage to any
party, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of
the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged
with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1lx[6] and Rule 3.05, Canon 3lxi[7] of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the
disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms
and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of
Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated
under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court
over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is

DIRECTED to REFER the complaint filed by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. to this
Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.

i[1] Rollo, pp. 19-22.
ii[2] Id., at 23-26.
iii[3] Id., at 34-35.
iv[4] 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
v[5] Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 (1999); Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199
SCRA 298 (19991).
vi[6] Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136757-58, November 27, 2000.
vii[7] Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
viii[8] Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 83; See also Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan, id.
ix[9] Resolution, Criminal Case No. 23656, September 23, 1999, p. 3; Resolution,
Criminal Case No. 22021, October 1, 1999, p. 3.
x[10] Tai Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 521 (1999).
xi[1] Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
xii[2] Resolution dated Aug. 4, 1997, p. 5; Rollo, p. 52.
xiii[3] Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 1; Rollo, p. 37.
xiv[4] Annex C; Rollo, pp. 45-46.
xv[5] Petition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 9-10.
xvi[6] Comment, p. 12; Rollo, p. 81.

xvii[7] 205 SCRA 772, 778 (1992).
xviii[8] People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1991).
xix[9] Annex B; Memorandum dated September 8, 1997, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
xx[10] Resolution dated August 4, 1997, pp. 6-9; Rollo, pp. 53-56.
xxi[11] Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
xxii[12] Id., p. 448.
xxiii[13] 298 SCRA 196, 214-215 (1998).
xxiv[14] Resolution dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
xxv[15] Rollo, pp. 45-46.
xxvi[16] Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).
xxvii[1] Rollo, p. 7.
xxviii[2] Ibid.
xxix[3] Id., at 38-41.
xxx[4] Id., at 42.
xxxi[5] Ibid.
xxxii[6] Id., at 43-45.
xxxiii[7] Id., at 46-47.

xxxiv[8] Id., at 48-62.
xxxv[9] Id., at 71-72.
xxxvi[10] Id., at 68.
xxxvii[11] Id., at 69.
xxxviii[12] Id., at 75.
xxxix[13] Id., at 76.
xl[14] Id., at 143.
xli[15] Id., at 162-164.
xlii[16] Id., at 16.
xliii[17] A.O. No. 07, Rule II, Sec. 4(b).
xliv[18] Rodis, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618 (1988); People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 155 (1988).
xlv[19] Tandoc vs. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37 (1989).
xlvi[20] Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1980); Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA
138 (1992).
xlvii[21] 239 SCRA 283 (1994).
xlviii[22] Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that:All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
xlix[23] 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
l[24] 268 SCRA 301 (1997).
li[25] Id., at 306.
lii[26] See note 23 at 81.
liii[27] Id., at 80.
liv[28] 220 SCRA 55 (1993).
lv[1] Complaint, p. 10, Rollo.
lvi[2] Supra.
lvii[3] Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
xxx xxx xxx
lviii[4] R.A. No. 3019.
lix[5] Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
lx[6] A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

lxi[7] A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
periods required.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129978. May 12, 1999]
FELICIDAD M. ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN; HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and HON. MARGARITO P.
GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution
commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public
officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is
clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is
entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.
The Case
Filed before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus praying that the respondent public officers be
directed to dismiss Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203 and
subsequently to issue the necessary clearance in petitioners favor.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are narrated in respondents Memorandum[1]as follows:
Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her
compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991 (pp. 2-3, Petition).
Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS,
assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997 (ibid.)
On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of
COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on
the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices
(Annexes M and N, Petition).
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies and violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular
Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445
(ibid.).
Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner
Roque on May 16, 1991 (ibid.).
In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints
proper for a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner Mabanglo was docketed as
OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0203
(Annex O, Petition).
Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits (p. 4, Petition).
On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, was resolved by the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents [were] probably guilty of
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019).
The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents, among them,
petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo. The same was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24229.
On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was resolved by the
Office of the Ombudsman-MIndanao, recommending the filing [of cases] and prosecution of all the
respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019. The same was approved by
respondent Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.
Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act
3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended, were filed
before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations charged several respondents, among whom
was petitioner Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 24105 and Criminal Case No.
24106, respectively.
On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the
allegation that [a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were
issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present[,]
or more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent [and no] case
[has] been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner (par. 3, p. 4, Petition).
On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary restraining order directing
respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases filed against petitioners.[2]
On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in contempt, contending that a
criminal information was filed in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). In
compliance with this Courts Resolution dated October 21, 1998,[3] the respondents filed their
Comment to the Petition for Contempt.[4]
Issues
In their Memorandum,[5] petitioners present before this Court the following issues:
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints against
petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a] speedy
disposition of cases[; and]
Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints against
petitioners, would warrant dismissal of said complaints.[6]
In addition, we shall also discuss (1) the propriety of mandamus as a remedy and (2) the
respondents liability for contempt for allegedly violating the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on November 24, 1997.
The Courts Ruling
The Court grants the Petition for Mandamus, but denies the prayer to cite respondents in contempt
of court.
Preliminary Issue: Propriety of Mandamus
Respondents argue that petitioners cannot, by this special action for mandamus, compel the
ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a
discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.
The argument is not meritorious. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus.
This Court, however, has held that the rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.[7] In First Philippine Holdings
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained:
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is gross abuse
of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority equivalent to denial of a settled right
to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ
shall issue.[8]
The Court gave a similar ruling in Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government:
[9]
Although as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by Mandamus to act
but not to act one way or another, yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control
his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
In Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,[10] this Court likewise held:

It is correct, as averred in the comment, that in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one
way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.[11]
The exceptions cited apply to this case. It is undisputed that there has already been a long and
unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners. The Complaint
against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao way back on
May 7, 1991, and that against Petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. On June 11, 1991, the said Office
found the Complaints sufficient for preliminary investigation. Significantly, no action was taken
until after the lapse of almost six years. For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same Office
recommended the filing of an Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only on March 18, 1997,
and against Petitioner Roque only on April 30, 1997.
Main Issue: Violation of Petitioners
Constitutional Rights
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the
Constitution[12] and Republic Act No. 6770,[13] to act promptly on complaints before him. More
important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by
Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no
explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints.[14]
Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had been pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as follows:
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the
inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases...[15]
Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[16] this Court dismissed the Complaints, which the then
tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the lapse of three years since the cases had been
submitted for disposition, viz.:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-
ranking government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republc Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years
in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case. (Emphasis supplied.)
We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and
academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and
the Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein
the Court declared that the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints
against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. The Court ruled:
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True --- [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for
setting back time.
x x x the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in
the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process
and the speedy disposition of cases against him. Accordingly, the informations x x x should be
dismissed x x x.[17]
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman
Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this Court, in the interest of the speedy
disposition of cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with
Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner therein
sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.
Additional Issue: No Contempt of Court
Petitioner Mabanglo moves to have respondents and their agents cited in contempt of court for
allegedly filing an Information against him in violation of the November 24, 1997 TRO issued by
the Court, which ordered them to cease and desist from proceeding with the cases.
The Petition to cite respondents in contempt is patently devoid of merit. In the first place, the
Information against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed on September 25, 1997, before the issuance of
the TRO on November 24, 1997. Hence, the TRO could not have been violated. In the second place,
the said Petition for Contempt was filed in contravention of Section 4 (2), Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Court,[18] which states that if a petition for contempt arises from or is related to a principal
action pending in court, it shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court orders
that both the principal action and the petition for contempt be consolidated for joint hearing and
decision. In the instant case, the Petition for Contempt, which arose from the Petition for Mandamus,
was filed as an integral part of the latter and under the same docket or case number. There is no
showing that this Court has ordered their consolidation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-91-
0201 and OMB-91-0203 are accordingly DISMISSED. The Petition to declare respondents in
contempt is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997]
CASIANO A. ANGCHANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ZALDY

TAMAYO, GILDA NAVARRA, ODELIA LEGASPI, SALVADOR TAMAYO, GASPAR
ABORQUE, ROEL ABAS, REMEDIOS OLITA, ET AL., TEODORO TORREON, ET AL.,
JIMMY MARTIN, MENRADO ALLAWAN, MARGARITO ESCORIAL, NORBERTO OCAT and
ALEJANDRO ERNA, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for mandamus seeking to: a) compel the Ombudsman to dismiss Ombudsman
Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-
0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192; and b) direct the Ombudsman to issue a
clearance in favor of petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco.
The facts are as follows:
Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the Regional
Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X) rendered a decision
ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers
the sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued
directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as
the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ of execution issued, caused the satisfaction of the
decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients.
In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo,
Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. The
regional trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the
enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in a Memorandum
dated July 31, 1992, recommended its dismissal for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that petitioner illegally
deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative aspect of the complaints which was docketed
hereat as A.M. No. 93-10-385-OMB. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25,
1993 dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case.
Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal
complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions
for early resolution.
When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a
consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his
retirement benefits was denied.
With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988). Sad to say,
even this motion to dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Hence, the instant petition.
Acting on the petition, the Court issued a resolution dated December 20, 1995 requiring respondents
to comment thereon. In compliance therewith, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion (in lieu of Comment), which is its way of saying it agreed with the views
of petitioner. On July 22, 1996, we issued another resolution requiring the Ombudsman to file his
own comment on the petition if he so desires, otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for
resolution without such comment. After several extensions, respondent Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a comment dated October 7, 1996.
The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to
be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court).
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the
inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases
pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988]),
wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Yap, said:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years
in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary investigation can not be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty mandated by
the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof."
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being
its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise
of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume III by Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).
It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one
way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156
SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against
petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner
has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of
the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction
of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his
retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls
for the issuance of the writ prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to GRANT the
same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-
90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190, MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 23, 2003]

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

1[1] Rollo, pp. 30-35.

2[2] Records, Vol. II, pp. 480-503.

3[3] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

4[4] Rollo, pp. 36-37.

(1) Criminal Case No. 23847

8[8] Rollo, pp. 40-44.

9[9] Id. at 44.

10[10] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

(2) Criminal Case No. 23848

I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

II. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT

12[12] Records, Vol. II, p. 421.

13[13] Rollo, pp. 8-9.

14[14] Id. at 11-12. See also Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 9.

SEC. 2. Definition of terms.- As used in this Act, the term

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 18, 2004]

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

18[1] Rollo, pp. 262-274.

19[2] Id. at 262-263.

21[4] Dimayacyac v. CA, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004, p. 11.

22[5] Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 8.

24[7] Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158018, 20 May 2004, p. 4.

Petitioners reliance on the doctrines in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,31[14] Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,32[15]

28[11] See Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 9.

31[14] No. L-72335, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70, 82-83.

34[17] Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, 3 March 2004, p. 8; Blanco v.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on leave.

[G.R. No. 143885-86. January 21, 2002]

MERCED TY-DAZO and ROLANDO QUIMINALES, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

The petition lacks merit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 154155

Respondent. August 6, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

NO less than Our Constitution guarantees the right not just to

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision39[3] of

Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership

Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within

Magleis application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of

40[4] Id. at 44.

41[5] Id. at 45.

On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to

Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior

On August 11, 1992, the Bureau of Customs initiated a

On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary

WHEREFORE, premises considered; the undersigned investigators

1. That criminal charges for violation of Section 3(e) of RA

All of the Bureau of Customs, and

2. That records of this case be forwarded to the EPIB, this

3. That administrative charges for dishonesty and gross

On October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above

On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint

On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative

42[6] Id. at 56-57.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal,