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American Academy of Political and Social Science

The Army and Navy in India


Author(s): P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar
Source: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 145, Part
2: India (Sep., 1929), pp. 19-26
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of
Political and Social Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1016882
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The Army and Navy in India
By SIR P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYAR, K.C.S.I.; C.I.E.
Member of the Executive Council, Madras, 1912-17; Advocate-General, 1908-12; President, Re-
cruitment Committee for India Defence Force, 1917

troops was sent to garrison the island of


T HEasked
subject
to upon which to
contribute I have
the been
pages Bombay. When the island was trans-
of this journal is a very large one to ferred to the East India Company, the
which it is not possible to do even the control over the garrison also passed to
barest justice within the limits usually the Company. After the renewal ,of
allowed to an article. The subject may the charter of the East India Company
be dealt with from various points of in 1798, the three presidencies were
view. I do not propose to deal with it formed and each had an army of its
from the professional and technical own. The army then consisted of
points of view, not merely because as Europeans recruited from England or
a civilian and an outsider I do not feel locally enlisted, of half-caste Goanese
competent to deal with these aspects, and of Indian sepoys.
but also for the reason that these as- It was in 1848 that the Company
pects are not likely to be of interestmade to the first appointment of Com-
the general public. I will therefore mander-in-Chief of its forces in India
content myself with dealing with and the it was in the same year that, follow-
general aspects only of the subject ing the example set by the French, the
which are likely to appeal to the ordi- Company raised a small body of sepoys
nary reader. in Madras for the defence of its settle-
The army of India in the broad sense ment here. It is not necessary to refer
of the term includes not merely the to the course of events which obliged
regular and professional army of British the Company gradually to expand its
India but the Non-Regular Forces, army side by side with the growth of its
consisting of an Indian Auxiliary territorial acquisitions; nor is it neces-
Force, the Indian Territorial Force, sary to refer to the numerous changes in
the Indian Army Reserve of British the organisation of the Company's
India, and also, the Indian State army. Till the year 1857 the Indian
Forces, which are maintained by the
troops which were organised in com-
various Indian States and placed at the
panies were under the command of their
disposal of the Government of Indiaownin Indian officers. When the intro-
time of need. The most important duction of a British element in the
Indian units was resolved upon by
portion of the defensive forces in India
Clive, he decided to retain the Indian
is that which may be called the Regular
Army of British India. This army command and a higher proportion of
Indians to British officers. When the
again consists partly of British troops
and partly of Indian troops. army was reorganised in 1796, the pro-
portion of British officers assigned to
EARLY HISTORY OF THE
the Indian Infantry Battalions was
REGULAR ARMY
greatly raised and the number of Brit-
The beginnings of the Regular Armyish officers was fixed at 22 per infantry
of India may be traced back to the year battalion. The power and status of
1662 when a detachment of King'sthe Indian officers, which had already
19

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20 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

of Pioneers should be formed for the


been affected by the changes introduced
purpose by
by Clive, were still further reduced of relieving European Sappers
the later reorganisation. from duties entailing exposure to the
climate.
REORGANISATION
In pursuance of the policy of amal-
The European troops in British gamation of the European troops of the
India consisted partly of the King's Company with those of the Crown, the
troops and partly of the Company's system of linked Battalions was intro-
troops. After the mutiny of 1857, duced by the Cardwell scheme of 1872.
steps were taken to reorganise the army The problem of providing European
and in accordance with the recommen- troops for British India and the colo-
dations of the majority of the Peel
nies, besides the British Army serving at
Commission, the distinction betweenhome, was attempted to be solved by
the Royal troops and the Company's this arrangement. The Infantry Regi-
European troops was abolished as thements of the line were linked together
result of an amalgamation between the
in pairs. Out of each pair of battalions,
two. one was to serve at home and be re-
The recommendations of the Peel sponsible for supplying men to the
Commission were of a momentous other battalions serving abroad. Prior
to the mutiny, the total strength of
character and laid down several princi-
ples which have to this day continued
the military establishment in India was
to influence the organisation of2,77,746
the of which 24,363 was the
Indian Army and the military policy
strength of the Royal troops.
of the British Government. Before Another important commission un-
the mutiny, the greater part of derthethe presidency of Sir Ashley Eden
artillery in India was manned was by appointed in 1879 for the purpose
Indian soldiers. After the mutiny,of the
exploring the avenues for retrench-
total strength of the European troops
ment of military expenditure and sug-
was largely increased and that ofgesting
the measures for improving the
Indian army largely diminished. It
efficiency of the army for war. The
was decided that the ratio of Indian to strength of the three presidency armies
British troops should never greatlyin 1879 was 2,00,000 consisting of
exceed two to one and that the field 65,000 British troops and 1,35,000
Indian troops. The most important
and other artillery should be exclusively
or almost exclusively manned byrecommendations of the commission
Europeans. They considered the mili-were the abolition of the presidential
tary police to be an element of future
system and the placing of all the armies
danger and would not therefore give under the direct control of the Com-
them a stricter military training than
mander-in-Chief in India, the linking
was required for the maintenance of together of Indian Infantry regiments
discipline. The commission further in groups of two or three battalions,
recommended that the Indian section the addition of British officers to
of the army should be composedIndian
of Cavalry and Infantry regiments
different nationalities and castes whichand the reduction of the strength of the
should, as a general rule, be mixed Indian section of the army.
promiscuously in each regiment; that
Europeans alone should, as far as PURPOSES FOR MAINTENANCE
possible, be employed in the scientific The purposes for which the army of
branch of the services and that a CorpsIndia was maintained were defined to

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THE ARMY AND NAVY IN INDIA 21
end in 1895 and they were all brought
be (1) preventing or repelling invasions
under the direct control of the Com-
actual or threatened from foreign
mander-in-Chief. The reorganisation
countries, (2) the prevention and sup-
of the army with a view to the im-
pression of rebellion within British
India or its feudatory states andprovement
(3) of its efficiency has been
watching and overawing the armiesengaging
of the attention of the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Government
feudatory Indian states. They pointed
of India almost continuously since the
out also that the duty of preserving
order and of protecting propertyappointment
and of Lord Kitchener as
Commander-in-Chief in 1902.
quelling disturbances was the primary
function of the civil police employed
POST-WAR CHANGES
by the civil government. They em-
In 1912, a committee was appointed
phasized the importance of keeping the
strength of the forces maintained byunder
the the presidency of Lord Nicholson
Indian feudatory states within the
to consider and report on the numbers
limits prescribed by the treaties and and
of constitution of the army required
to meet the military obligations of
not allowing them to be equipped with
improved modern armament. Arms India.
of Before the recommendations
of this committee could be carried out,
precision were not to be supplied to the
troops of Indian States and the British
the great war broke out and the various
Government should take no steps to
defects of organisation which were
employ the contingents of different
brought to light by the experience of
states together. the war led to the appointment of a
committee in 1919 under the presi-
As regards the position of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, the commission were
dency of Lord Esher. This committee
in favour of removing him from was the asked to report upon the organisa-
Executive Council. Apart from tion the of the army in India, including its
inability of the Commander-in-Chief
relations with the War Office and the
India Office and relations of the two
to maintain continuous personal con-
tact with the whole army and beingoffices to one another, upon the position
in his place in the Executive Coun-
of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual
cil at the same time, the commission
capacity as head of the army and
member of the Executive Council, and
pointed out that the existing system
was unprecedented in the organisa-upon other relevant matters. This
tion of any European Governmentcommittee
or made many important rec-
army and that it was contrary ommendations
to and the task of re-
one of the most essential and sal-
organisation was vigorously taken in
utary principles of sound administra-
hand by Lord Rawlinson who was
tion and to the common instinct and appointed Commander-in-Chief in
experience of all administrations 1920. Various important changes have
whether representative or despotic.
since been made in the organisation
The commission accordingly recom-of the army. The enormous growth
mended that the relative positions of
of military expenditure involved in the
the Government of India and the very extensive proposals for reorgani-
Commander-in-Chief should be the sation and reequipment and the
embarrassed condition of Indian fi-
same as those of the Secretary of State
for War and the Commander-in-Chief nances, led to the appointment of a
in England. The separate existence retrenchment committee, under Lord
of the presidential armies came to an Inchcape, which recommended con-

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22 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

siderable reductions in expenditure.


into three classes: the covering troops,
At the same time, the committee ex-
the field army and the internal security
pressed the opinion that no vitaltroops. serviceThe covering troops are sta-
of the army should be unduly weakened tioned on the North-West Frontier of
and that it should retain the essential India and are intended to bear the
features of the organisation of a modernbrunt of the first attack of a hostile
force and to secure sufficient time for
army and a capacity for expansion in war.
The strength of the army at themobilisation of the troops behind.
present time according to the estimates The field army is the striking force in
for the year 1928-29, is for India any major war and is intended to deal
proper and Burma 231,511 of which primarily with external danger. The
68,000 odd may be roughly taken as Internal Security Troops are primarily
representing the strength of the British intended to deal with internal disorder
officers and other ranks and 163,000 and maintain the internal security of
as representing the strength of the the country. While, in time of exter-
Indian officers with Viceroy's com- nal peace, the field army may be utilized
missions and other ranks. The total to assist in the maintenance of internal
strength of the Fighting Units alone,
order, it should be released in time of
British and Indian, is 197,000 odd, war
and to carry out its duties in the field
the remainder is distributed amongwithout
the being disturbed by any calls
staff of the Ancillary Services, including
to assist in the preservation of internal
the Training establishments, Educa-
order.
tional establishments, Army Service
One curious feature of the arrange-
Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Medicalments for these three purposes is that
Service, Veterinary Service, Remount
while in the covering forces the ratio of
Service, various miscellaneous estab-
British to Indian troops is one to 6.7
lishments and the Air Force establish- and in the Field army the proportion
ment. The strength of the Reserve between the British and the Indian
sanctioned for the new financial year soldiers is one to 2.7, the ratio is very
is 35,750. Of the total number of much higher in the internal security
officers holding King's commissions, troops, the proportion of the British
that is, 6,998 in the Indian army, the troops to the Indian troops being 1.24
number of Indians holding such com- to one. This feature calls for an ex-
planation. The fact that in the Strik-
missions on the first of April 1928, will
be only 84. The budget estimate of ing forces the British element bears
the total of the military expenditure only a proportion of one to 2.7 of the
for the new year is Rs. 55,10,00,000 Indian element is explained by a refer-
which amounts at the official rate ofence to experience in war as to the most
exchange to 41,000,000 pounds sterling efficient proportion of combination.
while the total estimated revenue forMaking allowance for the fact that the
the next financial year is 97,000,000 British portion of the Internal Se-
pounds odd. The military expendi- curity Troops may have to serve the
ture of the country is, therefore, a little
purpose of making good the wastage in
over 42 per cent of the whole of the the British section of the Field Army
central revenues of the country. during war before further recruits can
arrive from England, there can be no
FUNCTIONS IN WAR
doubt that the proportion of the British
With reference to the functions of element in the Internal Security Troops
the army in war, it has been divided is excessively high and it can only be

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THE ARMY AND NAVY IN INDIA 93

ascribed to a policy of distrust of the


King's Commissions have been granted
people. to Indians since the year 1918. The
The control of the army under the number of commissions granted every
Commander-in-Chief has been divided year is ten and they have been confined
into four commands, the object being only to the Cavalry and the Infantry.
to restrict the areas of command for the There are no Indian officers holding
purpose of securing effective adminis- King's Commissions in the Head
tration. The enormous distances in Quarters, in the staff of Commands or
India and the defects of communica-
in the Ancillary Services, such as
tions in the interior are among the
Supply and Transport, Veterinary
reasons which have led to the increase
Services, Ordnance, Remounts, Mili-
in the number of commands to four. tary training and Educational services.
Various other considerations are said
It may be mentioned here that there
is an inferior class of commissions
to be responsible for the arrangement
but it is needless to enter into them. known as Viceroy's commissions
granted to, men in the ranks. The
MILITARY POLICY
highest office under a Viceroy's com-
It has been already pointed out that mission is that of a Subedar-Major or a
the policy of distrust, which inspired Risaldar-Major. But these officers,
the recommendations of the Peel Com- however long their standing, and how-
mission in 1859, has continued to in- ever meritorious their services, can
spire the military policy in India downtake rank only below the latest sub-
to the present moment. It is part of altern holding a King's commission.
this policy that Indians should be It was the same policy of distrust
carefully excluded from the Artillery that led to the exclusion of Indians
and all branches of the military servicefrom the Volunteer Corps until the
requiring any scientific knowledge. Itexigencies of war suggested the forma-
is part of this policy that Indians tion of a Territorial Force. This
should not receive any training which policy of distrust was not confined t
could develop initiative and capacitythe people but to all classes of the
for leadership. In pursuance of thisIndian Army and the Police and th
policy, Indians have till recently beenStates. It rested upon the belief that
practically excluded from the ranks of the British rule in India can only b
King's commissioned officers. It is maintained by the sword and by incu
part of this policy that Indians have cating in the Indian's mind the idea
been practically excluded hitherto from of his permanent racial inferiority t
the Air Force, the Tank Corps, thethe British soldier and the invincibility
Indian Signal Corps, the Royal Engi-of the white races. Various circum-
neers and the Royal Artillery. Indiansstances have occurred to produce a
are now employed as drivers and arti-change in the outlook of the Indian and
ficers in the Royal Horse and Fieldthe Englishman alike. The defeat
Artillery and in Medium Batteries andof Russia by Japan, the achievements
as gunners, drivers and artificers in the of the Indian Army in the great war,
Pack Artillery. In the Frontier Garri-the growth of a national consciousness
son Artillery, they are employed asamong Indians, the declaration of the
gunners and artificers and in the Indian 20th of August, 1917, by the British
Coast Artillery as gunners only. Parliament and the discovery of the
In consequence of the services of thevalue of India as a reservoir of military
Indian Army during the war, a fewstrength have brought about a slight

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24 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

Force
change in the angle of vision ofon the
attractive conditions and the
British Government. It cannot be abolition of all invidious distinctions
between the Territorial Force to which
said, however, that the change has been
considerable or has gone very deep Indians were admitted and the Auxil-
iary
or that the feeling of distrust of theForce to which Europeans and
Eurasians were admitted. It would
people has disappeared from the British
mind. take too much space to reproduce all
the resolutions which were passed on
EFFORTS FOR INDIANISATION
this occasion which summed up the
The disabilities under which Indians demand of Indians for the Indianisa-
labour in the army of their own coun-tion of the army on lines which recom-
try and their natural aspiration tomended themselves to the Government
make their country self-contained inof India as then constituted, and to the
the matter of defence have found re- Commander-in-Chief.
peated expression in and outside the
legislatures. When Indians ask for COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
responsible government, they are told A committee was subsequently ap-
that they cannot expect full responsible pointed in 1924 under the presidency
government until they can defend of the Adjutant-General, Sir John Shea,
themselves and when they ask that to consider the problems connected
they should be trained for undertaking with the Indian Territorial Force and
the defence of the country, they are Auxiliary Forces, and another commit-
denied adequate facilities for the tee was appointed under the presidency
purpose. The whole question was of the Chief of the General Staff, Sir
dealt with in a series of resolutions in Andrew Skeen, to consider the feasi-
the Indian Legislative Assembly in bility of establishing a military college
1921, the very first year it came into like Sandhurst in India. Both these
existence, and though the resolutions committees submitted unanimous re-
were passed with the concurrence of the ports. The recommendations of the
Government of India, no serious at- Territorial Forces Committee have
tempt has been made to give effect to been substantially accepted in theory,
any of them. but there is no sign of any intention
One of these resolutions pressed for of giving effect to these resolutions.
the establishment of a military college The most important recommenda-
in India corresponding to Sandhurst, tions made by this committee were that
at which Indians should be trained for the University Training Corps should
all branches of the army. Another be expanded to the fullest possible
resolution recommended that the King limits and that Urban Battalions
Emperor's Indian subjects should be should be created for the purpose of
freely admitted to all arms of the mili- giving military training to educated
tary, naval and air forces in India, the Indians on the same conditions as those
Ancillary Services and the Auxiliary under which it is given in the Auxiliary
Forces, that every encouragement Force to Europeans and Eurasians.
should be given to Indians, including The existing strength of the University
the educated middle classes, subject to Training Corps and the Territorial
prescribed standards of fitness, to Forces is 19,000 odd. The maximum
enter the commissioned ranks of the strength of these two forces for which
army. Another resolution urged the provision is made in the military
organisation of an adequate Territorial budget for 1928-29 is only 20,000 and

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THE ARMY AND NAVY IN INDIA 25

the margin for increaseand is not to any


less than other
a units. The ob-
thousand. Though there ject is noscheme
of the room was to prevent the
for any doubt that the University
remotest possibility of any European
Training Corps can be easily commissioned officer who may be re-
doubled
and a few complete Urban cruitedBattalions
in future years from serving
can be raised, it is impossible under an Indian
to do officer.
so That this
owing to the limitation of wasthethemaximum
real object of the scheme has
strength to 20,000. On the other been admitted by the Army Secretary
hand, the provision made for the in the debate which recently took place
Auxiliary Forces contemplates a in the Indian Legislative Assembly on
a vote of censure on the Government.
strength of 36,000 odd of all ranks and
an expenditure of Rs. 61,00,000 odd. At the rate at which King's Com-
missions are proposed to be granted
If there was any bona fide intention of
giving effect to the recommendationsto Indians in the Indian Army, it will
of the Territorial Forces Committee,probably take a few centuries before
provision should have been made for the army can be Indianised or an In-
a much larger expenditure than 29 dian Officer can rise to a high position
lakhs. of command. It is no wonder that the
The recommendations of the Sand- policy, which has been pursued by
the British Government in the matter
hurst Committee have been practically
rejected by the Government. The of the organisation of the army in
Government declared their intention India, has caused deep discontent
of raising the number of King's com-
and distrust in the minds of the people
missions granted every year to 37,of India. They are unable to believe
that the Government could be sincere
including a few commissions in the
in the declarations of their intention
Royal Artillery, the Engineers and the
Air Force. The recommendations for to help India to attain responsible
annual increments in the number of government.
commissions have been turned down
and the Government have refused to INDIAN NAVY

establish a military college in India A few words will suffice for the
for the training of Indian cadets for
description of the situation with regard
the Indian army. to the Indian Navy. It was an oft
Another recommendation made byrepeated demand of the Indian people
the Skeen Committee was that what that they should be eligible for admis-
has been called the Eight Units' sion to the Naval Force. It was
Scheme should be abandoned. For the announced by Lord Reading in
that the Royal Indian Marine w
benefit of American readers, it may be
stated that the Eight Units' Scheme
be converted into a Royal Indian
was condemned by nearly all the wit- Navy and that commissions would be
granted to suitable Indians by compe-
nesses, official and non-official, military
and civil, who appeared before the
tition.
Skeen Committee, and was condemned The necessary measures for the
by the committee itself. This scheme creation of the Royal Indian Navy was
was devised by the military authoritiespassed through parliament a short
for the purpose of posting Indian cadets
time ago, but, when the bill which was
who succeeded in obtaining King's intended to provide for the discipline
commissions to these Specified eightof the navy, was introduced in the
units of Cavalry and Infantry only
Indian Legislative Assembly, it was

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26 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

rejected by the Assembly. At first


ATTAINMENT OF IDEAL
sight, the attitude of the Assembly
would seem to require explanation;
The ideal of modern India is to have
an army, navy and air force of its own
but the reasons for which the Assembly
refused its consent to the measure willand officered by Indians in the
manned
same they
satisfy an impartial observer that way as the forces of the self-
are not arbitrary or inconsistentgoverning
with a Dominions are constituted
due sense of responsibility. The and main
under the control of the Govern-
ment of India. Indians recognise
reasons which influenced the rejection
of the measure were that the control
that theof
attainment of their ideal must
the proposed Navy is intended take to
somebetime, but they contend that
vested not in the Governmentanof Indiabeginning should be made
earnest
but in the British Government, that
at once and that a definite programme
the proportion of commissions shouldtobe framed for Indianising the
which Indians would be eligibledefensive
is oneforces within a reasonable
out of three, that it imposes no statu-
period of time. Of this there is no sign
tory obligation for the manningon the part of the British authorities
of the
and it is
ships by Indians and that it enables theone of the root causes of the
Imperial Government to employ distrustthe
of the British Government.
Indian Navy in any part of the Canworld
Indians be blamed if they feel that
without legally imposing upon it aonly hewers of wood and
they are
liability to pay the expenses incurred
drawers of water in the army of their
during the period of such employment.own country, which is maintained en-
All these objections were pointed tirely out
at the cost of the Indian taxpayer,
during the passage of the billand in if
the
they resent the treatment ac-
House of Commons but the Conserva- corded to them as dictated solely by
tive Government was obdurate and racial considerations and a distrust of
made no concessions. If the Indian their loyalty? How can loyalty be
Legislative Assembly felt that it would
ever promoted by a policy of distrust?
prefer not to have a Navy at all to
Self-government within the British
having a Navy on these conditions,
Commonwealth is still the ambition
of India. But the narrow-minded Im-
could it be said that the Indian Legis-
lature acted unreasonably? There was perialism of the British Government
an Indian Navy in existence in India is calculated to instil the belief in the
but it was abolished in the year 1863.
minds of Indians that England is not
Like the famous chapter on snakes in really prepared to satisfy their legiti-
Iceland, the chapter on the Indian
mate natural aspirations to full re-
Navy will now have to contain only onesponsible government within any rea-
word "nil." sonable distance of time.

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