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This paper examines the role of mutual knowledge in a psychological theory of conversational
inference. Contrary to recent proposals, I argue that speakers and listeners must coordinate what
they mutually know in order to comprehend utterances. Mutual knowledge is not only a result of
comprehension, but it is a prerequisite for it as well. I review recent arguments on this issue and
outline why mutual knowledge is necessary for listeners to draw the right inferences from what is
said in conversation. This is especially important if a theory of conversational inference is to meet
the criteria of a psychologically real model of human language behavior.
1. Introduction
Recent inquiries into understanding how people derive what is meant from
what is said in conversation have generally assumed that listeners make use of
various extralinguistic information. For example, consider the following brief
conversation.
* Preparation of this article was supported by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of
California, Santa Gruz. I wish to thank Kevin Brailey, Robert Cox, Gayle Gonzales, Rachel
Mueller, Guy Van Orden, and Patrick Whitnell for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Authors address: R.W. Gibbs, Jr., Program in Experimental Psychology, Clark Kerr Hall,
University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064, USA.
their utterances to meet the specific demands of their audience, but also how
listeners figure out the right inferences to make from speakers utterances.
My purpose in this article is to assess the role of mutual knowledge and
beliefs in a psychological theory of conversational inference. I will attempt to
support what I call the mutual knowledge hypothesis, which assumes that listen-
ers use the knowledge and beliefs they share with speakers in the process of
interpreting utterances in conversation. The idea that mutual knowledge plays
some role in conversational inference is widely assumed (see Bach and Harnish
(1979), Clark (1985), Brown and Yule (1983), Leech (1983), Levinson (1983));
however, there is little direct psychological evidence to support such an assump-
tion. One of my aims is to briefly review some of the existing data, as well as to
present some new empirical findings, which support the mutual knowledge hypo-
thesis. I will also suggest that many kinds of utterances can not be interpreted
without explicit reference to the shared beliefs existing between speakers and
listeners.
A related goal is to challenge what I call the relevance hypothesis, recently
formulated by Sperber and Wilson (1982,1986), and Wilson and Sperber (in
press) which suggests that problems inherent in establishing mutual knowledge
are great enough so that utterance interpretation may work without the benefit
of mutual knowledge. Although the relevance hypothesisstill characterizes con-
versation as essentially cooperative, it suggests that utterance interpretation can
be explained by a single Principle of Relevance which works without appeal to
the notion that speaker and listeners mutually assume certain knowledge and
beliefs. I shall demonstrate that there are a number of difficulties with the
relevance hypothesis and will conclude that it is premature to accept this alterna-
tive theory of utterance interpretation as a psychologically valid model of
conversational inference.
How do listeners make the right inference about what is meant in conversation?
Consider again, the exchange in (la,b).
What is the chain of reasoning that allows a hearer to recognize that (lb) is
meant as a refusal of the offer in (la)? Perhaps the most influential model of
how listeners derive inferences during utterance interpretation is that proposed
I will use the terms knowledge and belief somewhat interchangeably throughout this article,
although it should be noted that belief is a wider term than knowledge (Hintikka (1962)).
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 563
by Grice (1975,197s). Grice noted that much of the information that is con-
veyed from speaker to listener in conversation is implied, rather than asserted.
Grice argued that speakers and listeners expect each other to interpret their
utterances as if they were acting in a rational and cooperative manner. He
recognized several kinds of cooperation which he grouped into the maxims of
Quantity (make your contribution as informative as needed); Quality (do not
say what you believe to be false); Relevance (be relevant), and Manner (be
perspicuous, avoid ambiguity). Although Grice (19751978) does not argue that
this list is exhaustive, he suggests that these maxims describe the norms speakers
operate with in conversation.
In Grices approach, conversational inference (or implicature) involves
taking the meaning of the sentence uttered, in conjunction with background
knowledge, inference rules, and the above set of general pragmatic maxims, to
work out what the speaker might have meant. More specifically, Grice
(1975,1978) suggested that the conversational implicature of an utterance might
be determined as follows:
Taken literally, (lb) fails to answer the previous question, and would seem
to violate the maxims of Quantity and Relevance. One might expect (lb) to
be interpreted as a non-cooperative response. Yet it is clear that despite the
apparent failure of cooperation, most people normally assume that (lb) is
cooperative at some deeper level. We do this normally by asking ourselves what
possible connection there would be between the offer of some cake and the
assertion in ( 1b) that the speaker is on a diet. We can infer here that the speaker
of (lb) probably does not want a piece of cake in virtue of her diet, and
consequently we can view ( 1b) as implicating something like (3) :
Instead, listeners are more likely to make inferences about a speakers meaning
inductively, based on socio-cultural knowledge (see Gumperz ( 1982)). Consider
the following example (5) taken from Brown and Yule (1983: 34).
But listeners usually infer more from (5) than the set of inferences in (6a-c),
including that John is probably a schoolboy. Consider the utterance in (7).
pants beliefs and assumptions, including the beliefs the participants have about
each others beliefs and assumptions. Having decided that something is being
conveyed over and above what has been said, the listener has to infer what this
is on the basis of contextual information shared with the speaker. But what
constitutes this shared or mutual knowledge?
In the past, the concept of mutual or shared knowledge has been considered
as part of the analysis of speaker meaning and convention in philosophy (Lewis
( 1969) Schiffer ( 1972)). By definition, a speaker S and an addressee A mutually
know a proposition P if and only if
Sperber and Wilson (1982,1986), and Wilson and Sperber (in press) argue that
conversational inferences can be worked out deductively and done so without
mutual knowledge. They attempt to demolish the validity of the notion of
mutual knowledge as a viable part of a theory of communication by suggesting
that even if mutual knowledge can be truly established between speaker and
listener, which they argue is unlikely, this does not tell us (a) what role it
plays in the interpretation process, and (b) how particular items of mutual
knowledge are selected for the interpretation of utterances. Sperber and
Wilsons alternative account posits that the selection of contextual assumptions
used in utterance interpretation can be constructed without reference to mutual
knowledge.
566 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge
Sperber and Wilson (1986) acknowledge that any account of human commu-
nication must incorporate some notion of shared information. They argue that
there are a set of facts or assumptions which an individual is capable of men-
tally representing and accepting as true which correspond to his or her cognitive
environment. To the extent that any cognitive environment is manifest to two
or more individuals, then there is a mutual cognitive environment. The idea
of mutual manifestations differs from mutual knowledge or mutual as-
sumptions because to say that an assumption is mutually manifest is a
claim about cognitive environments rather than mental states or processes. As
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 45) state Human beings somehow manage to
communicate in situations where a great deal can be assumed about what is
manifest to others, a lot can be assumed about what is mutually manifest to
themselves and others, but nothing can be assumed to be truly mutally known
or assumed. When people communicate, they ostensively intend to alter the
cognitive environments of their addressees. Every act of ostensive communica-
tion carries with it a guarantee of relevance, and this fact, which Sperber and
Wilson call the Principle of Relevance, makes manifest the speakers ostensive
intentions.
The Principle of Relevance generally states that speakers try to be as relevant
as possible in a given situation. This single principle presumably can handle the
full range of phenomena @rices maxims were designed to explain. Formally,
Wilson and Sperber (in press) define relevance as follows:
On what ground might the speaker of (lob) have thought her utterance to be
relevant to the listener? Wilson and Sperber assume that the speaker in (10a)
would not have asked his question if he had not had a context immediately
accessible in which the information that the addressee could (or could not)
drive a Buick would be relevant. By providing this information directly, the
addressee would therefore be satisfying the Principle of Relevance. Nonetheless,
the speaker in (lob) does not provide the information directly, and the listener
must supply the contextual assumption in ( 1 la) in order to derive the conclu-
sion in ( 1 lb).
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 561
Although most pragmatic theories assume that the context for comprehen-
sion of an utterance is determined in advance, Sperber and Wilson argue that
the determination of the context is not a prerequisite for comprehension, but a
result of it. They suggestthat the search for the interpretation of which an
utterance will be viewed as most relevant involves a search for the context that
will make this interpretation possible. The listener constructs an interpretation
by looking at what contextual implications can be derived from the initial
context provided by the interpretation of the immediately preceding utterance
in the conversation. If the resulting inferences fail to satisfy the Principle of
Relevance, the listener can then go further back in the conversation and add
that information to the context. The listener may also add encyclopedic knowl-
edge from memory to the concepts mentioned in the utterance itself. The infor-
mation in a given encyclopedic entry is only accessed, however, via the presence
of that concept being in a set of propositions currently being processed. For
example, the utterance in (lob) gives the hearer immediate access to his encyclo-
pedic entry for car, which should in turn provide access to various propositions
of the form (12a-c).
Wilson and Sperber (in press) state that given normal assumptions about the
organization of memory, the previous mention of a Buick in (1 la) should act
as a prompt, making (12~) the most accessible proposition. The speaker of
(lob) assumes that her utterance is relevant since she expected it to be processed
in a context where ( 12~) was a contextual assumption which yielded ( 11 b) as a
contextual implication. In each case, there is no need for the listener to worry
whether these additions to the context are mutually known or believed by the
speaker.
Generally, the more contextual implications a proposition has in some con-
text, the more relevant it will be, and, all other things being equal, the greater
processing effort required to derive these implications, the less relevant it will
be. Processing effort is determined by three main factors: (1) the complexity of
the utterance (the more complex the utterance the greater the processing effort);
(2) the size of the context (the larger the context, the greater the processing
effort), and (3) the accessibility of the context (the less accessible the context,
the greater the processing effort). Sperber and Wilson suggest, then, that there
568 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. 1 Mutual knowledge
Sperber and Wilsons (1986) thesis that conversational inferences can be deter-
mined without mutual knowledge, but via some appeal to the idea of mutual
cognitive environments along with the Principle of Relevance seems, at first
glance, to be a reasonable one. However, on closer examination their approach
suffers from some of the same difficulties they wish to remedy. After all, if there
is a problem establishing some knowledge or beliefs as being mutually known,
then there should be similar problems in recognizing that some cognitive envi-
ronment is mutually manifest. Sperber and Wilson argue, nonetheless, that the
notion of what is manifest to an individual is weaker than the idea of something
being actually known or assumed and that something can be manifest without
really being known. For example, the fact that Ronald Reagan and Noam
Chomsky have never played billiards together is probably not, until now, an
assumption known to you, but is an assumption that is manifest to you. Simi-
larly, you may hear a car passing in the street, and because you have not paid
attention to it, you have no knowledge of it, or assumptions about it. But the
fact that a car is passing in the street is manifest to you.
The alleged distinction between some things being known and others only
being manifest is crucial to Sperber and Wilsons view of utterance interpreta-
tion. Consider the following example (Sperber and Wilson (1986: 43)). Mary
and Peter are looking at a landscape when Mary notices a distant church and
says ( 13) to Peter:
According to Sperber and Wilson, Mary does not ask herself whether Peter has
noticed the building, and whether he assumes she has noticed, and assumes she
has noticed he has noticed and, so on. Nor does Mary ask herself whether Peter
has assumed that the building is a church or whether he assumes that she
assumes that it is, and so on. All Mary needs is reasonable confidence that Peter
will be able to identify the building as a church when required (i.e. that a certain
assumption will be manifest in his cognitive environment at the right moment).
But, Peter need not have made any of these assumptions before Mary said what
she did.
Theissue of what kinds of experience constitute knowing or assuming as
opposed to merely being manifest is a delicate one. Yet making a distinction
between something being known and other things being manifest to someone
might artificially create a difference where none exists. Speakers and listeners
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 569
of input module (in Fodors (1983) sense), which results in its literal, context-
free, representation. This propositional representation is subsequently exam-
ined by a central processor containing general encyclopedic information in
order to find a context in which that proposition is viewed as most relevant.
Generally, sentences are considered to have specific semantic representations,
or literal meanings, with as many semantic representations as there are ways in
which a sentence is ambiguous.
This sketch of how utterances are initially processed to form propositional
representation is somewhat problematic and can be criticized on psychological
grounds (see Gibbs (1982,1984)). An immediate difficulty arises when a speaker
says an utterance that is not literally well-defined. Consider the following set of
indirect directives (14a,b).
Ervin-Tripp (1976) has noted that indirect directives spoken with casual pro-
nunciation, like (14a,b), are abundant in both childrens and adults speech. It
is unlikely that understanding such requests requires listeners to first expand
these utterances to their full grammatical forms to analyze their literal meanings
before figuring out their intended interpretations. Similarly, it seems implaus-
ible to suggest that other innovative phrases and expressions, such as (15a,b),
must be fully expanded into complete literal sentences before being understood.
Many metaphoric utterances, such as (16), are also not well-formed in the
strictly literal sense.
And Nunberg (1979) has shown how reference can transcend the literal mean-
ing of some sentences, such as (17), which a waiter might use to designate the
customer who ordered a ham sandwich.
* Sperber and Wilson (1986: 186) leave open the issue of when context inhibits the generation of
inappropriate inferences. They allude to the possibility that sentence decoding works in a clause-by-
clause manner where the input module submits the possible interpretations of a sentences first
constituent to a central processor which decides which interpretation is most plausible or relevant.
This sketch of the comprehension process still assumes that there is some stage of linguistic
processing where the meanings of the individual words are accessed and combined to form a literal
representation.
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 571
the listener must (a) compute the literal meaning of the utterance, (b) decide
if the literal meaning is the intended meaning of the utterance, and (c), if the
literal meaning is inappropriate for the specific context, compute the conveyed
or metaphoric meaning via a cooperative principle or by the rules of speech
acts.
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978) tested the psychological impli-
cations of this model by having subjects read sentences like (19) in either a
literal or metaphoric context.
true. However, when subjects read the target sentences with minimal context,
metaphorical targets took significantly longer to read than literal sentences.
These results strongly demonstrate that context plays a crucial role in the
interpretation of metaphoric language. With sufficient linguistic and social con-
text, people understand the nonliteral interpretations of metaphoric utterances
directly without first analyzing their putative literal meanings. Similar findings
have been reported for interpreting other kinds of figurative utterances, such
as indirect requests (Gibbs (1979,1982,1983,1984)), idioms (Gibbs (1980)
Swinney and Cutler ( 1979)), proverbs (Kemper ( 198 l)), and sarcasm (Gibbs
(1986a,b)). Other studies have even demonstrated that people are unable to
ignore metaphorical meanings when they are explicitly instructed to verify their
literal meanings (Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin ( 1982)).
In general, understanding utterances whose intended meanings depart from
their literal interpretations does not necessarily introduce any additional
difficulty. If people do not automatically analyze the literal meanings of utter-
ances, then Sperber and Wilson are incorrect in assuming that conversational
inferences (conveyed meaning) can be determined by finding a contextual
assumption which makes some proposition (or literal meaning) most relevant.
Making the right inferences about speakers ostensive intentions can be done
in an expectation-driven manner (Riesbeck and Schank (1978)) so that people
can infer exactly what is meant directly by relying on a contextual frame-
work partially composed of the knowledge and beliefs shared by speakers and
listeners.
It is surprising that Sperber and Wilson do not refer to this large body of
psycholinguistic research on figurative language understanding in their discus-
sion of the importance of relevance for interpreting metaphor and irony (Sper-
ber and Wilson (1986)). For example, Sperber and Wilson regard irony as one
of a variety of utterance types in which the speaker does not express his or her
belief, but echoes the beliefs of someone else, and perhaps, expresses his or her
attitude to those beliefs. Compare (20a,b) and (21a,b)
In each instance, the response in (b) echoes the opinion expressed in (a).
However, the speaker of (20b) clearly endorses the opinion in (20a), but the
speaker of (2 1b) is ridiculing the opinion in (2 1a). The utterance of (2 1b) is seen
as ironic because its point is to show how silly the speaker of (21a) was to hold
his opinion. Sperber and Wilson ( 198 1,1986) argue that there is no more reason
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 513
The relevance hypothesis proposes that there are general processing principles
determining the accessibility of senses and referents which should enable the
speaker to predict with some confidence the order in which interpretations of
(23) are likely to come to a listeners mind. Exactly what is meant by accessibil-
ity here is unclear, although Wilson and Sperber (in press) state that psycholin-
guistic research has shown that certain meanings of ambiguous words and
phrases are more common and accessed more quickly than other meanings. The
word hot in (23) for example, will refer to the temperature so that (23) will
mean something like His food is not warm enough to eat, rather than a spicy
interpretation of hot. Presumably, the context may make it immediately acces-
sible to anyone there that the food served was not hot enough and should have
enough contextual implications to satisfy the Principle of Relevance.
However, the correct interpretation of ambiguous words and phrases de-
pends on information other than which meanings are most accessible from
semantic memory. This is particularly true in cases where speaker and hearer
share certain idiosyncratic information about each others beliefs and attitudes
(cf. Gerrig (1986)). For instance, in a situation where two people are eating
514 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge
at a Mexican restaurant, and it is mutually known that the speaker in (23) loves
his food spicy hot, the listeners interpretation of (23) will immediately be that
the food is not spicy enough for the speakers taste. Most importantly, the
speaker of (23) knows that he can state this utterance with the understanding
that the listener will take the mutually held belief about spicy food into account
when interpreting (23). It is this coordination between speaker and listener
which makes for the easy interpretation of ambiguous utterances such as (23),
not simply that certain interpretations of ambiguous phrases and words are
more accessible from semantic memory. Kess and Hoppe (1985) review a vari-
ety of experiments which show that the interpretation of ambiguous lexical
items, such as hot, are indeed affected by context. This contextual information
is composed of both common knowledge and other idiosyncratic shared
knowledge that exist between particular speakers and hearers.
As with ambiguous language, the search for the acceptable interpretations of
most metaphors will involve a large range of cultural conventions and mutually
held beliefs, some of which may be quite idiosyncratic to particular people and
contexts. In many instances of conversation, a speaker will not merely fall back
on what can be generally taken to be shared, nor will s/he simply tailor his/her
utterance to the mind of the listener. Instead, the speaker will be inclined to
select from whatever s/he shares with the other person just those topics that
allow him/her to employ allusive phrases that only the recipient will immedi-
ately understand. Clark (1983) provides examples of such phrases, called
contextual expressions. Thus, if two people use the word teapotted to mean
something unique such as rubbing the back of someones leg with a teapot,
then the expression in (24) can only by interpreted correctly by people who
share this intimate knowledge.
(25) A and B mutually know that p, if and only if some state of affairs G holds
such that:
(a) A and B have reason to believe that G holds.
(b) G indicates to each of A and B that the other has reason to believe that
G holds.
(c) G indicates to A and B that p.
G is called the basis for the mutual knowledge that p. Essentially, if A and B
make certain assumptions about each others rationality, they can use certain
states of affairs as a basis for inferring the infinity of conditions all at once.
There is no need to confirm each and every one of the infinity of conditions,
even though in practice this can be attempted. Clark and Marshalls mutual
induction scheme prevents the infinite number of iterations usually seen as a
necessary consequence of establishing mutual knowledge.
Clark and Marshall also note a second, and related, assumption regarding
mutual knowledge. This assumption suggests that mutual beliefs can only be
inferred for infinitely many pieces of evidence, one piece for each belief stated.
Once again, Clark and Marshall argue (also see Lewis ( 1969), Schiffer (1972))
576 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. 1 Mutual knowledge
that only one piece of evidence is really needed to establish some mutual belief
as long as it is the right kind of evidence. For example, if A and B agree before
a foot race to start running when a gun fires, this agreement can serve as the
only grounds necessary for their mutual beliefs that the firing of a gun is when
they are both to start running. It can be formalized by the mutual induction
scheme as follows:
(264 Aand B have reason to believe that the agreement holds that they will
both start running when the gun fires.
G6b)The agreement indicates to A and B that A and B each have reason to
believe that the agreement holds.
(26~) The agreement indicates to A and Beach that the firing of a gun indicates
that they are to start running.
Bill, while travelling in Southern Europe, offers a cigarette to a peasant whom he believes to be
ignorant. The peasant answers No thank you, I have read the latest statistics. Bill is surprised, but
understands correctly that the peasant wants him to take as part of the context the fact that the
latest statistics show that smoking is hazardous to ones health, and to infer from the context and
the peasants answer the reason why his offer of a cigarette is declined. (Of course, Bill cannot be
sure that this is what the peasant meant.) As a result of this act of comprehension, the fact that
smoking is hazardous becomes mutually assumed to be known.
This definition, as Sperber and Wilson acknowledge, does not preclude the
possibility of unintentional communication including unauthorized contextual
implications not specifically intended by the speaker. Some of these unintended
inferences may be desirable as in the case of poetic effects where the listener/
reader derives a large array of weak implicatures in the ordinary pursuit of
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 581
relevance.3 The issue of which implicatures are intended and which are not is
complex, but necessary to deal with. A major goal for a psychological theory of
conversational inference is to specify how listeners figure out which inferences
are intended and authorized by speakers. Peoples ability to distinguish
between authorized and unauthorized inferences shows that intentionality is
a key aspect of ostensive-inferential communication. Although Sperber and
Wilson (1986) comment that it is easy enough to modify definition (30) and
make intentionality a defining feature of communication, it is not at all clear
how this modification can be made without acknowledging the specific role
mutual knowledge has on the determination of m-intended inferences.
The results of numerous psychological studies have shown that people use
contextual knowledge during language interpretation, some of which were
reviewed earlier in this article. These studies do not, however, carefully distin-
guish between the larger set of previous knowledge a listener may have about
a speaker from the smaller set of knowledge that is mutually shared by speaker
and listener. Recently, there has been an explicit attempt in psycholinguistics to
directly examine the role of mutual knowledge and beliefs in the processes of
speaking and listening. The aim of this section is to briefly review two of these
studies and to show how their results support the predictions of the mutual
knowledge hypothesis.
The first study isconcerned with the role of mutual knowledge in demonstra-
tive reference. When referring to objects or other people in the world, there are
a number of special devices available for referring to what we are talking about.
Speakers can use definite descriptions as in (31a), indefinite descriptions as in
(3 1b), and personal pronouns as in (3 lc).
But how do we choose which device to use? Suppose that I point to a group of
school children and tell you (32).
3 In discussing the relationship between implicature and linguistic style Sperber and Wilson (1986:
217-218) state . . . a speaker not only aims to enlarge the mutual cognitive environment she shares
with the hearer; she also assumes a certain degree of mutuality, which is indicated, and sometimes
communicated, by her style. This seems quite true, but, again, raises the problem of how mutuality
is established and assumed, the very thing Sperber and Wilson want to avoid.
582 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge
Because this description does not pick out one girl from the entire referent
array, we must rely on our coordinated knowledge and figure out the intended
referent. Clark, Schreuder and Buttrick (1983) found evidence that people were
able to do this quite well. In their studies, an experimenter approached students
on the Stanford University campus and handed them a photograph of President
Reagan standing next to his then director of the budget, David Stockman.
People in an independent survey had said that they assumed that Reagan was
well known to everyone but Stockman was not. Each student was asked either
(33a) or (33b).
Note that the same definite description, this man, is used in both utterances.
Nonethelsss, in (33a) students replied with answers such as Yes, thats
Reagan, and never suggested that Stockman was the person being referred to.
On the other hand, when students were asked question (33b) they most often
responded with comments like Yes, I believe thats Stockman. For question
(33a) the experimenter presupposed that students ought to know who was
being referred to, but in (33b) he doubted that they would. It was these presup-
positions, and the community knowledge that Reagan is better known, that
enabled students to come to a unique referent in each case.
When listeners are addressed by someone, they usually assume the speaker
has done his/her best to enable them to understand him/her. Clark et al. (1983)
state this principle of optimal design as follows:
(34) The speaker designs his utterance in such a way that he has given reason
to believe that the addressee can readily and uniquely comprehend what is
meant on the basis of utterance along with the rest of their common
ground.
their first utterance relevant to the context, but exactly how is this done? What
determines the exact wording used in situations where the precise context has
yet to be established? Clark et al.s findings show that the surface form of a
question influences its interpretation. I have recently gathered some evidence
from my own laboratory demonstrating that people use mutual knowledge
information in formulating the precise surface forms of questions in conversa-
tion.4 The hypothesis tested was that speakers specify their utterances, even
from the beginning of conversation, to best fit what the listener knows and what
the listener knows about what the speaker knows, etc.
In this study subjects read short scenarios involving two or more characters.
The scenarios were systematically manipulated to depict different degrees of
mutual knowledge between two of the main characters. The subjects task was
to read each story and choose from a set of three alternatives the question that
best fits the context. Consider the following story:
Bob and Ann are eagerly waiting for a weekend visit from their friend, Ken, who is
supposed to arrive in time for dinner on Friday evening at a local restaurant. On Friday
morning, however, Ken phones Ann at work and tells her that he will not be arriving in
town until Saturday morning due to engine problems with his car. Ann phones Bob at
work and leaves a message with a co-worker, Sally, for Bob concerning Kens delay.
Later on Ann runs into Sally who says that she gave Bob the message. That evening
when Ann and Bob meet at home Ann says to him. . .
Which of these alternatives is the best choice? Note that in this situation Ann
and Bob both individually know that Ken will not be in town for dinner that
night. Moreover, they both know that the other person also knows this fact.
This can be stated more formally as S (speaker) knows p (proposition), A
(addressee) knows p, and both know that each other knows p. Consequently, it
is somewhat redundant to state information that is already mutually known to
both participants. Subjects, therefore, should choose alternative (a) as the best
utterance in this situation. The data supported this prediction as subjects picked
alternative (a) significantly more often than either of the other choices.
Suppose now that the above scenario is changed to reflect a different state of
mutual knowledge between the participants as in the following story.
Bob and Ann are eagerly waiting for a weekend visit from their friend, Ken, who is
supposed to arrive in time for dinner on Friday evening at a local restaurant. On Friday
morning, however, Ken phones Ann at work and tells her that he will not be arriving in
4 This work was done in collaboration with Rachel Mueller, Kevin Brailey, Robert Czx, and
Patrick Whitnell.
584 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge
town until Saturday morning due to engine problems with his car. Ann phones Bob at
work and leaves a message with a co-worker, Sally, for Bob concerning Kens arrival.
Later that evening Ann sees Bob and says to him . .
In this case the mutual knowledge between Ann and Bob can be character-
ized as S knows p, but S doesnt know if A knows p. After all, Bob might not
have received Anns message about Kens late arrival. Consequently, the utter-
ance Ann is most likely to use here should take this uncertainty into account,
which is best reflected in choice (b). Once again, the data supported this expec-
tation as subjects chose alternative (b) significantly more often that they did
either of the two other possibilities.
Consider now the last story context which describes another state of mutual
knowledge between the participants.
Bob and Ann are eagerly waiting for a weekend visit from their friend, Ken, who is
supposed to arrive in time for dinner on Friday evening at a local restaurant. On Friday
morning, however, Ken phones Ann at work and tells her that he will not be arriving in
town until Saturday morning due to engine problems with his car. Ann phones Bob at
work and says. . .
The mutual knowledge existing between Ann and Bob in this scenario is
viewed as S knows p, and S knows that A doesnt know p. Thus, Ann knows
for sure that Bob doesnt know that Ken is arriving on Saturday and must take
this into account when formulating her utterance to Bob. The best way of doing
this is to explicitly mention Kens difficulties, which is done in choice (c). Once
again, the results of my study showed that subjects chose the correct alternative
(c) significantly more often than either of the other two choices.
The evidence from this study indicates that people will design their questions
in light of the mutual knowledge which exists between themselves and their
listeners. These findings complement the Clark et al. (1983) work by showing
that production of language demands recognition of the shared beliefs and
knowledge between speakers and listeners. The results of both of these studies
provide additional support for the mutual knowledge hypothesis.
8. Concluding remarks
Sperber and Wilson have correctly recognized that pragmatics, the study of
utterance interpretation, is a branch of cognitive psychology. The main aim of
pragmatic theory is to produce an explicit account of how human beings inter-
pret utterances (Sperber and Wilson ( 198 1: 28 1)). The purpose of this article
has been to evaluate the competing claims of the mutual knowledge hypothesis
and the relevance hypothesis in light of the very goals Sperber and Wilson state
for a pragmatic theory of utterance interpretation.
R. W. Gibbs, Jr. / Mutual knowledge 585
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