Case Digest of Llamzares v.

COMELEC
(Main Decision)
Vena V. Verga
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs
COMELEC et al G.R. NO. 221697
221698-700
J. Perez

FACTS:
Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime
1968. Parental care was passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person
who found the child. The relatives then reported and registered the child as a
founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary
Grace Militar. The child was subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and
Susan Roces sometime in 1974. Necessary annotations were placed in the
childs foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces
discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating Poes new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents.
Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in
the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.

At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988, she was
issued a Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and
flew to the US right after the wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child
in the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and she
obtained a US Passport that same year.

In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support her
fathers candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter. She then returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters.
Poe returned in December 2004 after learning of her fathers deteriorating
condition. The latter died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of
the funeral arrangements.

Poe stated that she wanted to be with her grieving mother hence, she and
her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for resettlement including
notification of their childrens schools, coordination with property movers and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the US.

Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN while her
husband stayed in the US. She and her family stayed with her mother until
she and husband was able to purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime
February 2006. On February 14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the
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Case Digest of Llamzares v. COMELEC
(Main Decision)
Vena V.
other Verga
family belongings. She travelled back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe
and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where
they built their family home.

On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition
to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with

2
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The Bureau
of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her
children were then considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in
August 2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.

On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before

assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the US before a notary public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The
following day, she submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and
took her oath as MTRCB Chairperson. According to Poe, she stopped using
her American passport from then on.

On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of

Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On
December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the US effective October 21, 2010.

On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator stating that she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6
years and 6 months before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a
Senator on May 16, 2013.

On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the
Philippine up to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.

Several petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident
of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9,
2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a
foundling. It was argued that international law does not confer natural born
status and Filipino citizenship to foundlings hence, she is not qualified to
apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as she is not a
natural citizen to begin with. Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen,
she lost it when she became a US Citizen.

In addition, one of the petitioners, Francisco Tatad, theorized that:

1. Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis and hence persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural born
Filipino citizens.
2. Using statutory construction, considering that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935
Constitution, the framers are said to have the intention to exclude
them
3. International conventions are not self-executory hence, local
legislations are necessary to give effect to obligations assumed by the
Philippines.
4. There is no standard practice that automatically confers natural born
status to foundlings.
Petitioner Valdez alleged that Poes repatriation under R.A 9225 did not
bestow upon her the status of a natural born citizen as those who repatriates
only acquires Philippine citizenship and not their original status as natural
born citizens.

Poe countered these petitions by alleging that:

1. The grounds invoked by the petitioners were not proper grounds for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Section 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
2. What the petitioners filed focus on establishing her ineligibility, hence,
they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, not the COMELEC.
3. The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration declaring her as
natural born, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the
decree of adoption reinforced her position as a natural born citizen
4. As early as first quarter of 2005, she started to reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines and that she can reestablish her domicile of choice
even before she renounced her American citizenship.
5. The period of residency as stated in her COC for senator was a mistake
in good faith.

COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born
citizen and that she failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES AND RATIO:

1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify POE

The procedure and the conclusions from which the Resolutions of the
COMELEC emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether the COC should be denied due
course on the exclusive ground that she made in the certificate a false
material representation. COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the
issue of qualifications of the candidate. It cannot, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of a candidate. Not one of the
enumerated powers of the COMELEC as stated in Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution grants the commission the power to determine the qualifications
of a candidate. Such powers are granted to the Electoral Tribunal as stated in
Article VI Section 17 and the Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution.
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23
of the COMELEC rules do not allow, are not authorization and are not
vestment of jurisdiction for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a
candidate. The facts of qualification must first be established in a prior
proceeding before an authority vested with jurisdiction. Prior determination
of qualification may be by statute, by an executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy cannot be
cancelled or denied due course on ground of false representations regarding
a candidates qualifications except if there exists self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. In this
light the COMELEC cannot cancel Poes certificate of candidacy lacking prior
determination of her qualifications by a competent body.

2) Whether it can be concluded that Poes parents are Filipinos.

Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in
Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof
was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.

Private respondents should show that Poes parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In
fact, there is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor
General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that
from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On
this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would
be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that
Poes parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poes parents are the fact
that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to

the ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poes
parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

3) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution
is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would exclude
them either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a
need to examine the intent of the framers.

The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to

include foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are
not citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on
adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee,
rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent
legislation all expressly refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.

The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate are acts to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence, the argument that as a
foundling, Poe underwent a process in order to acquire or perfect her
Philippine citizenship, is untenable.

Having to perform an act means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this case, the determination of foundling status was done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the process is to determine the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the
process is not analogous to naturalization proceedings.

Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted

principles of international law which include international customs form part
of the laws of the land. The common thread of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The
principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of
Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality
of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed
born of citizens of the country where he is found)

bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.

Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory

to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article 14
of the Hague Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a
generally accepted principle of international law.

Poes evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South
America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as
citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in
which it is found.

Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

 4) Whether Poes repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born
citizenship.
The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine
nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing
R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with
the Congress determination.

Neither is repatriation an act to acquire or perfect ones citizenship. In the

case of Bengson, the Court pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is
no third category for repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a
judicial precedent. Hence, COMELECs decision is wrapped with grave abuse
of discretion.

5) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years

Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when
she returned for good from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to
remain (animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile
(animus non-revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must
be voluntary and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005
and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of
household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her
children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting
on June 2005 etc.

COMELEC refused to consider the petitioners domicile has been timely

changed as of May 24, 2005 and maintained that although there is physical
presence and animus manendi, there is no animus revertendi. Respondents
contend that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired Philippine citizenship
since she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of previous cases
ruled upon by the Supreme Court.

SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein
residence was counted only from the acquisition of permanent residence
were decided as such because there is sparse evidence on establishment of
residence. These cases cannot be applied in the present case. In the case at
bar, there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that
Poe decided to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary
transient.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a
mistake in good faith. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her
but it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence
submitted by Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration these overwhelming evidence, its decision is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled
and set aside. Poe is thus declared qualified to be a candidate for President
in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
Case Digest of Llamzares v. COMELEC (J. Carpio
Dissenting Opinion)
Vena V. Verga
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs
COMELEC et al G.R. NO. 221697
221698-700
J. Carpio Dissenting Opinion

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS:
A presidential candidate who is deemed a natural born citizen by less than
a majority and deemed not a natural-born Filipino citizen by five Justices
and with no opinion from three Justices is now allowed to run for
President of the Philippines. J. Carpio dissents.
He notes that the ruling of the majority will lead to absurd results by
allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be
potentially elected. The majority wants to resolve the citizenship status
only after the election, and if the petitioner wins.
Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
of the Philippines for the last ten years hence, she is not eligible to run as
President of the Republic of the Philippines.

ON COMELEC JURISDICTION:
Section 2(1), Article IX-C vests in the COMELEC the power, among others, to
enforce and administer all laws... relative to the conduct of the election.
Screening initially the qualifications of the candidates lies within this specific
power. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially
disqualify those lacking any of the qualifications before the conduct of the
election.

The Supreme Court in the case of Timbol upheld the COMELECs power to
disqualify a nuisance candidate. It cannot be disputed that a person not a
natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore, ineligible, who files a certificate of
candidacy for President, puts the election process in mockery. Such person
is therefore a nuisance candidate. Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the COMELEC is empowered, motu propio, to cancel a COC if it has
been filed to put the election process in mockery. The electorate is
needlessly misled to cast their votes if an ineligible candidate is allowed to
run. COMELEC cannot be a party to such a mockery; otherwise, it will be
committing a grave abuse of discretion

ON CITIZENSHIP:
The 1935 Constitution, which is applicable in Poes case, allows only two
methods of acquiring Philippine citizenship:
1
Case Digest of Llamzares v. COMELEC (J. Carpio
Dissenting Opinion)
Vena
1. V.
ByVerga
blood relation to the father or mother who must be a Filipino citizen
2. By naturalization according to law

The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the law of the
blood to determine citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino
citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological

2
descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view is made evident by the
suppression from the Constitution of the jus soli principle.

Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed included in par. 3 and 4 of

Article IV of the 1935 constitution (Par 3 - Those whose father are citizens of
the Philippines and Par 4 - those whose mother are citizens of the Philippines,
and upon reaching the age of majority, elects Philippine citizenship).

Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers of the 1935 Constitution voted to

categorically reject the proposal to include foundlings as Citizens of the
Philippines. The delegates actually voted to reject Rafols amendment to
consider children of unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. Three delegates
even voiced out their objections to this amendment and stated that the
Congress should instead provide an enabling law for foundlings to be
considered as Filipino citizens.

Poe argues that the reason why the provision on foundlings was not included
in the 1935 Constitution was because there is already a clear principle
existing in domestic and international law on foundlings. Carpio comments
that there is no such domestic law as well as international law existing during
the proceedings of the 1935 Constitutional Convention explicitly governing
citizenship of foundlings and thus there could not have been any redundancy
to speak of. The Spanish Civil Code which has a provision on foundlings
ceased to have any effect in our land upon the cession by Spain of the
Philippines to the US.

Likewise, only the 1930 Hague Convention relating to the Conflict of

Nationality law, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of
foundlings, was in existence during the deliberations of the 1935
constitution. This Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling
at birth and there is no prevailing customary international law at the time, as
there is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings
at birth.

While the framers of the 1935 Constitution discussed the matter of

foundlings, they not only rejected the proposal to include a provision relating
to them (foundlings) but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be
citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers. The framers
intended to exclude foundling from the definition of natural born Filipino
citizens by expressly rejecting Rafols proposal.

Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to
natural-born citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact
of being born to fathers who were Filipino citizens nothing more nothing
less. As a matter of course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens
or are both unknown, as the case of foundlings, cannot be considered natural
born Filipino citizens.
FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
It is a fundamental principle that every independent state has the right and
prerogative to determine who its citizens are. This principle is applied in the
Philippines as early as 1912 in the case of Roa. The 1930 Hague Convention
explicitly recognizes this principle. Hence, it is the municipal law, both
constitutional and statutory, which determines and regulates the conditions
on acquiring citizenship.

There is no customary international law presuming a foundling as a citizen of

the country where the foundling is found. Poe anchors her claims on the
Convention of the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the 1930 Hague Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (CRS).
1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified by the
Philippines only on August 21, 1990. This convention binds the
Philippines only on the day of ratification. Since Poe was born in 1968,
her citizenship at birth cannot be affected in any way by the
Convention. Moreover, the CRC does not guarantee a child a nationality
at birth much less a natural citizenship at birth as understood under
the Philippine constitution, but merely the right to acquire a nationality
in accordance with a domestic law.
2. ICCPR the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976. The ICCPR
does not obligate states to automatically grant a nationality to children
at birth. The covenant does not guarantee a foundling a nationality at
birth.
3. UDHR The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a nationality) is merely a
declaration. It does not obligate states to automatically confer
nationality to a foundling.
4. 1930 Hague Convention the Philippines is not a signatory to this
convention, hence, Philippines is not bound by it. Poe claims that this
convention is evidence of generally accepted principles of
international law. Note that Article 14 of this convention states that
foundlings shall have the nationality of the country OF birth. It does
not say that a foundling shall have the nationality AT birth. There is
nothing in this article that guarantees the nationality of a foundling at
birth, much less natural born citizenship at birth as understood under
the Philippine constitution. Moreover, Article 15 of the convention
acknowledges the fact that acquisition of nationality by reason of birth
in a states territory is not automatic. It actually states that municipal
law determines the conditions governing the acquisition of nationality.
5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness the Philippines is not a
signatory to this convention. The convention does not bind the
Philippines. Likewise, Art. 2 of the CRS which states that foundling
found in the territory of a contracting state, shall in the absence of
proof to the contrary, to have been born within that territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that state binds only contracting states,
of which, the Philippines is not.
 In sum there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a
contracting party, which provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is
deemed a natural born citizen of the country in which the founding is found.

On the issue of customary international law, one of its elements (widespread

and consistent practice of states) was not duly proven by Poe. She failed to
show that Article 2 of the CRS is an established, widespread and consistent
practice of a majority of sovereign states. On the other hand, international
law writers generally accept that the CRS does not constitute customary
international law precisely because of the small number of states that have
ratified the convention. Since the first element of customary international
law is missing, the second element (opinion juris) is lacking as well. There is
no general international law, whether customary international law or
generally accepted principle of international law, obligating the Philippines,
or any state, to automatically confer citizenship to foundlings at birth.

There are only two general principles of international law applicable to

foundlings;
1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the
foundling is found (they have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at
birth)
2.A founding is deemed born in the country where the foundling is
found. These two general principles have nothing to do with
conferment of nationality.

Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter, a customary

international law conferring nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings
could not be considered as natural born Filipino citizens as such would
conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution. In
case of conflict between customary international law and the Constitution,
the constitution prevails.

Moreover, there is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus

soli and citizenship at birth because of jus sanguisinis. The former may be
granted to foundlings under the constitution but the citizenship granted is
not of a natural-born citizenship but that of naturalized citizenship. Only
those citizens at birth because of jus sanguisinis, which required blood
relation to a parent are natural citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitution.

On Statistics
The statistics shown speak of foreign and Filipino births in the Philippines
with known parents, either Filipino or foreigner. It does not show the number
of foundlings born in the Philippines. This data also do not show the number
of foundlings who were later determined to have Filipino parentage. If there
is 99% probability that a child born in the Philippines is a natural born citizen,
it does not automatically follow that there is 99% probability that a foundling
born in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The data on
foundlings, if any, may show a different statistical data. For the Solicitor
General to assert that a foundling with a blond hair, blue eyes and milky
white Caucasian skin is a natural born citizen is the height of absurdity.
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is not determinative of natural
born citizenship
The term natural born Filipino citizen does not appear in the domestic or
inter-country adoption act. In fact, while the term Filipino is mentioned, it is
only in the title of these laws. The text of the adoption laws do not contain
the term Filipino. There is no specific provision in these adoption laws
requiring that adoptees must be Filipinos, much less natural born Filipinos.
These adoption laws do not distinguish between a Filipino child and an alien
child found in the Philippines. Hence they apply to both Filipino and alien
child found in the Philippines over which the government exercises
jurisdiction. The case of Ellis and Duncan does not apply in the case at bar
because: 1) the case do not involve foundlings 2) the issues raised therein do
not involve citizenship.

On burden of proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of
proving his or her Philippine citizenship. A person who claims to be qualified
to run for the position of President, because he or she, is a natural born
citizen, has the burden of proving that he/she is indeed a natural born
citizen. Any doubt should be resolved against him/her. In this case, there is
no dispute that petitioner is a foundling with unknown biological parents.
Hence, her certificate of live birth does not show on its face that she is a
natural born Filipino citizen. This shifted the burden of evidence to the
petitioner that she is eligible to run and she could have used evidence such
as DNA.

Summary: Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because:

1. No Philippine law automatically confers Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth
2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being
considered natural born citizens
3. There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether
natural or naturalized.
4. There is no treaty, customary international law or general principle of
international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth.
5. Assuming that there is a customary law presuming that foundling is a
citizen of the country where it is found, such presumption cannot
prevail over the Philippine constitution which adopts the jus sanguinis
principle
6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural
born Filipino citizen
 7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his/her status as a
foundling to acquire a Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling
can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because he/she has
to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.

Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose

certificate of candidacy for President can motu propio be cancelled by the
COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.