1.

Republic vs Villasor 11 28 73

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of
Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory
by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment
with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of
AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

2. Department of agriculture vs NLRC 11-11-93

G.R. No. 104269 Case Digest

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

Department of Agriculture
vs NLRC
Ponente: Vitug

Facts:
The DA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services, pursuant to
the agreement guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the DA.
September 1990, several guards of Sultan Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages before Regional Arbitration Branch of
CDO against the DA and Sultan Security Agency.

The executive labor arbiter rendered that DA and Sultan Agency are jointly and severally
liable. Sultan didn't appeal the decision, thus it became final and executory. July 1991, the
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce the
judgment against the property of DA and Sultan's property.

DA, filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ
of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC CDO, saying that the writ issued was
affected without the labor arbiters jurisdiction over the petitioner. DA also pointed out that
the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

This petition charges NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
NLRC argued on the other hand that the DA has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Agency.

Issue: Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:
Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service,
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to
be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on
Audit.

We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No.
327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in
relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.

3. Philippine rock industries, inc vs board of liquidators 12-15-89

PHILROCK vs Board of Liquidators (Article 44- 46 New Civil Code)

PHILROCK vs Board of Liquidators 180 SCRA 171 G.R. No. 84992 (1989)

Petitioner: Philippine Rock Industries, Inc.

Respondent: Board of Liquidators, as Liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission
(REPACOM)

Facts:

PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as
liquidator of the defunct REPACOM, for: (1) the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing
machinery purchased from REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund the purchase at 31% of its
contract price; (2) reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of
maintaining the plant at Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and
exemplary damages; and (3) Php50,000 attorney fees plus expenses and costs of the suit.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a
notice of appeal on the ground that the payment for damages are public funds, hence,
exempt from attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of
Execution. Subsequently the Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
in the Court of Appeals where the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the
RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical
capacity, may be sued and held liable as litigators of REPACOM.

Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency, created under E.O. 372 to administer
the assets and pay the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM, thus it has no juridical personality,
separate and distinct from the government, and therefore, as a general rule, suing it is akin
to suing the State. The State enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business
through a government-owned and controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency set up
primarily for a business purpose, and even then, the State may not be liable for damages
since the purse of the State, or the disbursement of public funds is in the discretion of the
Legislature. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate specific
objectives, as appropriated by law. Although the liability of REPACOM has been ascertained,
the State is at liberty to determine for itself how to satisfy such liability. Funds should be
appropriated by the Legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgement in favor
of PHILROCK before said judgement may be paid.
4. Republic vs Sandoval 3-19-93

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch
9, Caylao et.alG. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the
Constitution underArticle XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued
without its consent. Some instances whena suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the
Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against anunincorporated government
agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a government offi cer but the
case is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the officer but to the government. W i t h
re s pe ct to the incide nt th at ha ppe ne d in Me ndiola on J anuar y 22, 1987
t h a t b e f e l l t w e l v e rallyists, the the case fi led against the military offi cers was
dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were held liable but it would not result in
financial responsibility to the government. The petitioner (CaylaoGroup) fi led a suit
against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when the
MendiolaCommission recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the
Mendiola incident and the acts andutterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to
the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunityand therefore, the government
should also be liable and should be compensated by the government . The case
has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military
Officer filed apetition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State
be liablefor the incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the
indemnifi cation of theheirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does
not in any way mean liability authomatically a t t a c h e s t o t h e S t a t e . T h e
purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that took place and
t h e recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of
President Aquino doesnot mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case
does not qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this case is sued by
name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. The military
officials are held liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they
haveexceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly andshould guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it
quite clear that even a high position in thegovernment does not confer a license to
persecute or recklessly injure another. The court rules that there isn o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r
an d no grave a buse of dic re tion com mite d by the
r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e i n i s s u i n g t h e questioned orders

5. Veterans man power and protective services, inc vs CA 6-10-98

VETERANS MANPOWER VSCOURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 91359FACTS:

VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA
5487(Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and
institutionalize the PADPAO(Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.).
Furthermore, VMPSI questions theprovision on requiring all private security agencies or
company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the
region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement wasexecuted by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for 8hours of security
service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of MetroManila.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged
MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates
provided in the MOA. As aresult, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine
Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security andInvestigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case isagainst the State which had
not given consent thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
Statewithout its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he
acts inbad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts
for which the PCChief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed
as part of their officialduties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may
be had against them in theirprivate capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals that theMemorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not
constitute an implied consent by the State tobe sued.The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, notfrom a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over
thepublic respondents.Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in toto.

6. Begosa vs chairman, phil, veterans admin 4-30-70

Begosa vs. PVA

Gaudencio A. Begosa,
plantiff-appellee,
vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration;and Members of the Board of
Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
defendants
-
appellants
.
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
Date:
April 30, 1970
Ponente:
Fernando,
J.
Facts:

Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed hewas
entitled under the Veterans Bill of Rights.

H e fi l e d h i s c l a i m f o r d i s a b i l i t y p e n s i o n o n M a r c h
4 , 1 9 5 5 b u t w a s e r r o n e o u s l y disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable
discharge from the army.

The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on September 2,

1964,entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take effect on October 5 of that year.

Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim
wasdisapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362
amendingSection 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated person, which was
increased toP100 a month when RP 1362 was amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22,
1957, Begosafiled a case against PVA in the Court of First Instance.

CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.

Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remediesbefore resorting to court action and that the plaintiffs claim is in reality a suit
againstt h e G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h c a n n o t b e e n t e r t a i n e d b y t h i s C o u r t f o r l a c
k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n because the Government has not given its consent.
Issue:
WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:

Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whetherin the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded againstnot being
liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suitability
mayappropriately be invoked.

However, it has
no application where the suit against such a functionary hadt o b e i n s t i t u t e d
b e c a u s e o f h i s f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e d u t y i m p o s e d b y statue
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff.

Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower court beings o l e l y
one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants
b e i n g patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does
notcome into play

7. Republic vs purisma 8-31-77

R e p u b l i c v . P u r i s i m a G.R. No. L-36084

Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
,

where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the meritsof a
claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government
unless consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante
P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated
October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
WON the respondents decision is valid
Ruling:
No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this
provision of the presentConstitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent.""The
doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is alogical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase
Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right asagainst the state, in itself the source of
the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such aprinciple does
give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it
to engage in businesspursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice
thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of theirmoney
claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them
subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly
conclude as we did in the cited Providence WashingtonInsurance decision: "Thus the
doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated
inpractice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice,
considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute as pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant
Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no bindingforce on the government.

8. Callado vs irri 5-22-95

CALLADO VS. IRRI

G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on anofficial trip to the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by
IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, throughcounsel, that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity
considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no meritin
petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No.
1620, Article 3 provides:
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear.
Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the
Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.

9. Froilan vs pan oriental shipping 9-3-50

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.
Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure
the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said
vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-
payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered
said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of
the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to
the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights
under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded
from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter
refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of
replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances,
and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower
court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale, for
the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had
authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished
whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as
Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover
possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic
of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the
in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issues:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested
itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief
against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does
not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may
avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the
state.

10. Us vs guinto 2-6-90

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)

En Banc USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts:
 In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting
officer James F. Shaw
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which
was not included in the invitation to bid
The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne
Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the
Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club
concession
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation
Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against
USA which had not waived its non-suability
On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our
land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law
of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because
they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be
implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted
by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court
would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO,
except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of
the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the
court below for further proceedings.

11. Torio vs fontanilla 10-23-78

TORIO v. FONTANILLA
GR No. L-29993; October 23, 1978

FACTS:
On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No.
156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January
21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta
committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated
for the construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On
January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla
who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages.
Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the municipality.

ISSUE:
1) Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a
corporate function of the municipality?
2) Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?

HELD:
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised
Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta
but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of
respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla.
Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that
it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held
liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it.
Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not
directly participated in the defective construction of the stage

12. Usa vs ruiz 5-22-85

USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June
1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual
petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the
petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to
governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this
case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the
USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue
of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US
government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

14. republic vs sandiganbayan

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT),

petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.SANTIAGO,
respondents
.G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991FACTS:
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on
GoodGovernment (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint
whichinitiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting,restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order
No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr.
andSantiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out Some
Portionsof the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an
oppositionthereto,

and the movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a"motion
for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which thePCGG
responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January
29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayandenied with a
Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with CompulsoryCounterclaim. On
July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan apleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "AmendedInterrogatories to Plaintiff"'
as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.The Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion forproduction and inspection
of documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion forReconsideration of the Resolution of
August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to theAmended Interrogatories. Tantoco and
Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing,the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUES:1.

WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT INACCORDANCE

WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF COURT.2.

WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION ANDINSPECTION OF

SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THEPOSSESSION OF PCGG.HELD:1.

No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule,be sued
without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign
character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the levelof an ordinary litigant.
The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to theState, even while assuming to
represent or act for the State.
2.

No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to beproduced
and inspected had already been presented in Court and markedpreliminarily as PCGG's
exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized andeven offered objections thereto
and made comments thereon. Obviously, there isnothing secret or confidential about these
documents. No serious objection can

therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them duringthe trial for any
purpose allowed by law.

15. Amigable vs Cuenca 2-22-72

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for
recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for
comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just
compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

16. JUSMAG phils. Vs nlrc 12-15-94

G.R. No. 79253 March 1, 1993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MAXINE BRADFORD, petitioners,vs.

HON. LUIS R. REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, andNELIA
T. MONTOYA, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya, is an American citizen who, at
thetime material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S.
NavyExchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters inQuezon City. She is married to one Edgardo H. Montoya, a Filipino-American
serviceman employedby the U.S. Navy and stationed in San Francisco, California. Petitioner
Maxine Bradford, hereinafterreferred to as Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who was
the activity exchange manager atthe said JUSMAG Headquarters.As a consequence of an
incident which occurred on 22 January 1987 whereby her body andbelongings were searched
after she had bought some items from the retail store of the NEXJUSMAG, where she had
purchasing privileges, and while she was already at the parking area,Montoya filed on7 May
1987 a complaint 1 with the Regional Trial Court of her place of residence

Cavite

against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by
the latterin excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG.In support of the
motion, the petitioners claimed that JUSMAG, composed of an Army, Navy and AirGroup, had
been established under the Philippine-United States Military Assistance Agreemententered
into on 21 March 1947 to implement the United States' program of rendering
militaryassistance to the Philippines. Its headquarters in Quezon City is considered a
temporary installationunder the provisions of Article XXI of the Military Bases Agreement of
1947. Thereunder, "it ismutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power
and authority within the baseswhich are necessary for the establishment, use and operation
and defense thereof or appropriate forthe control thereof." The 1979 amendment of the
Military Bases Agreement made it clear that theUnited States shall have "the use of certain
facilities and areas within the bases and shall haveeffective command and control over such
facilities and over United States personnel, employees,equipment and material." JUSMAG
maintains, at its Quezon City headquarters, a Navy Exchangereferred to as the NEX-JUSMAG.
Checking of purchases at the NEX is a routine procedureobserved at base retail outlets
to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment pursuantto paragraphs 2
and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7 Thus, Bradford's order tohave purchases
of all employees checked on 22 January 1987 was made in the exercise of herduties as
Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG.

ISSUES:
whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
dismiss based on the following grounds:(a) the complaint in Civil Case No. 224-87 is in effect
a suit against the public petitioner, a foreignsovereign immune from suit which has not given
consent to such suit and(b) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in
the performance of her official functions asmanager of the U.S. Navy Exchange of JUSMAG
pursuant to the Philippines-United States MilitaryAssistance Agreement of 1947 and the
Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.
HELD:
The petition was DENIED for lack of merit. There can be no doubt that on the basis of
theallegations in the complaint, Montoya has a sufficient and viable cause of action.
Bradford'spurported non-suability on the ground of state immunity is then a defense which
may be pleaded inthe answer and proven at the trial.Since Bradford did not file her Answer
within the reglementary period, the trial court correctlydeclared her in default upon motion
of the private respondent. The judgment then rendered againsther on 10 September 1987
after the ex parte reception of the evidence for the private respondentand before this Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order on 7 December 1987 cannot beimpugned. The filing
of the instant petition and the knowledge thereof by the trial court did notprevent the latter
from proceeding with Civil Case No.224-87. "It is elementary that the mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari, commenced inrelation to a case pending before a lower
Court, does not interrupt the course of the latter whenthere is no writ of injunction
restraining it."
SALIENT POINTS:
The
Doctrine of State Immunity
sometimes called
the royal prerogative of dishonesty
as declaredin the Constitution affirms,
The state may not be sued without its consent".
This provision is merely recognition of the sovereign character of the state andan
express affirmationof the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courtsof
justice.According to JusticeHolmes the doctrine of non-suability is based not on any
formalconception or obsolete theory but onthe logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right against the authority, which makesthe law on which the right depends.
Another justification is the practical consideration that thedemands and inconveniences of
litigation will divert the time and resources of the state from themore pressing matters
demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.The doctrine is also available
to foreign states insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts ofthe local state. The
added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereignequality of states, underwhichone
state cannot assert jurisdiction over another inviolation of the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would unduly vex the peace of nations."

Exemption: Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits ofexceptions.

It reads:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving Sta
te.He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the
case
of:xxx xxx xxx(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by t
he diplomatic

agent in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).How may
consent of the State to be sued given?The consent of the state to be sued may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may bemanifested either through a general law or a
special law. Implied consent is given when the Stateitself commences litigation or when it
enters into a contract. The general law providing for thestanding consent of the State to be
sued is Act No.3083, declaring that
the Government of the
Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involvingliability arising from contract,express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between
private parties.
Under C.A. No. 327 as amended by P.D. No. 1445, a claim against the government mustfirst
be filedwith the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within sixty (60)days.
Rejection of the claimwill authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to theSupreme Court
on certiorari and in effect suethe state with its consent.The express consent of the State to
be sued must be embodied in a dulyenacted statute and may not be given by a mere
counsel of the government.It should also beobserved that when the State gives its consent
to be sued, it does not thereby also to the executionof the judgment against it. Such
execution will require another waiver, lacking which the decisioncannot be enforced against
the State.When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?
Because actions are rarely instituted directly against the Republic of the Philippines,
theusualpractice is to file such claims not against the State itself but against the officer of
the governmentwho is supposed to discharge the responsibility or grant the
redresseddemanded. It is importantthen, to determine if the State is the real party in
interest, thatis, that the claim if proved will be adirect liability of the State and not merely of
theofficer impleaded. If this is shown, the action can bedismissed as a suit against the
Stateunless its immunity had been previously waived.There are many instances when a
public officer may be sued in his official capacitywithout thenecessity of first obtaining the
consent of the State to be sued. A publicofficer may be impleaded torequire him to do a duty
required by law, or to restrain himfrom doing an act alleged to beunconstitutional or illegal,
or to recover from him taxesunlawfully assessed or collected.It has been held also that
where an action is filed againsta public officer for recovery only of title orpossession of
property claimed to be held byhim in his official capacity, the said action is not a suitagainst
the State for which prior waiver of immunity is required. But it is different where there is
anaddition a claim for recovery of damages, such as accrued rentals, inasmuch as
it allowance wouldrequire thegovernment to appropriate the necessary amount for the
satisfaction of the judgment.Assuming the decision is rendered against the public officer
impleaded,enforcementthereof will require an affirmative act from the State, such as the
appropriation oftheneeded amount to satisfy the judgment. If it does, the suit is one against
the State anditsinclusion as party defendant is necessary. If on the other hand, the officer
impleaded may byhimself alone comply with the decision of the court without the necessity
o involvingthe State, thenthe suit can prosper against him and will not be considered a claim
againstthe State. Lastly, when apublic officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any
injurycaused by him is his own personalliability and cannot be imputed to the State.
What are the instances when a suit against the State is proper?Three instances are
considered suit against the state. These are:(A)
When the Republic is sued by name.
To sue the State, its express consent should be ask and bemanifested through a general law
or a special law, while the implied consent is given when the Statecommences litigation or
the state entering into a contract. The general law that provides for theconsent of the State
to be sued is Act No. 3083
(the Government of the Philippine Isl
ands herebyconsents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract,express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.).
(B)
When an Unincorporated government agency is sued
. If suit is filed against one of thegovernment entities, it must be ascertained whether or not
the State, as the principal that mayultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be
sued. This ascertainment will depend in the firstinstance on whether the government agency
impleadedis incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its
own that invests itwith a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the
University of the Philippinesand the City of Manila. On the other hand, the unincorporated
agency has no separate juridicalpersonality but is merged in the general machinery of the
government, like the Department ofJustice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government
Printing Office.If the agency is incorporated, thetest of its suability is found in its charter.The
simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the
functions itis performing. Municipal corporations like provinces and cities, are agencies of
the State when theyare engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity fromsuits. They are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charterprovides that they can sue and be sued. Unincorporated
agency, as there would be no charter andno separate juridical personality to consult, any
suit filed against it is necessarily an action againstthe Philippine Government of which itis
part of. This being so, it is necessary to determine the natureof the functions in which the
agency is engaged, so as to hold it suable if they are proprietary andnot suable if theyare
governmental. The test in every case is the nature of the primary functionsbeing discharged.
The non-suability of the State is available to the agency even if it is shown that itis engaged
not only in governmental functions but also, as a sideline, or incidentally in
proprietaryenterprises.
(C) When a public officer is sued in the performance of his official acts and the
ultimateliablity rest upon the State
. In such cases, it is important to determine if the State is real party in interest, suchas the
claim if proved will be a direct liability of the State and not merely of the
officerimpleaded.Three denominators are common among these three considerations. First is
that it mustrequire the government to disburse public funds to satisfy any award in that case
or an amount isappropriated, Second, it would mean loss of government property.May the
government validly invoke the doctrine of State immunity from suit if its invocation will
serveas an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen?Although the doctrine of
State immunity is sometimes called
the royal prerogative of dishonesty, it
must be observed in fairness that the State does not often avail itself of this rule to take
undueadvantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. The principle
fortunately has a built-in qualification: the state may, if it so desires, divest itself of
its sovereign immunity and therebyvoluntarily open itself to suit. In fine,the state may be
sued if it gives its consent.
17. China national machinery and equipment corp. vs santamaria 2-7-12
G.R. No. 185572

China National Machinery v. SantamariaFacts

: On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery& Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by itschairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum
ofUnderstanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation(Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for theconduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line
from Manila toSan Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).On 30 August 2003, the Export
Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank)and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF)
entered intoa Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China
agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the P
hilippinegovernment to finance the Northrail Project.
3
The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while thePhilippine
government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed
to extend an amount not exceeding

USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and
at the rate of 3% per annum.On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines,Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose
Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEGs
designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.On 30 December 2003,
Northrail and CNMEG executed a
Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the NorthLuzon Railway
System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis(the Contract Agreement).
7
The contract price for the NorthrailProject was pegged at USD 421,050,000.On 26 February
2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bankentered into a counterpart financial
agreement

Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement).

In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit
in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippinegovernment in order to finance
the construction of Phase I of theNorthrail Project.On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a
Complaint for Annulmentof Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary
Hearingto Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifyingthe Issuance of
Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and MandatoryInjunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the
Office of the ExecutiveSecretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management,
theNational Economic Development Authority and Northrail.

The casewas filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital JudicialRegion, Makati
City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the Complaint,respondents alleged that the Contract
Agreement and the
Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b)Republic Act No.
9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as theGovernment Procurement Reform Act; (c)
Presidential Decree No.1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and
(d)Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the AdministrativeCode.On 15 May 2007,
RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying
CNMEGs Motion to Dismiss and se
tting the case for summaryhearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for
shouldbe issued.
CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

whichwas denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008.

Thus,CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer forthe Issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.the appellate court dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari.

Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

which wasdenied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Petitioners Argument:
Petitioner

claims that the EXIM Bankextended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank
wasmandated by the Chinese government, and not because of anymotivation to do business
in the Philippines, it is clear from theforegoing provisions that the Northrail Project was
a purely commercialtransaction.
Respondents Argument:
respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for
being contrary to(a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184),otherwise
known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)Presidential Decree No. 1445,
otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known asthe Administrative Code.
Issues
: Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the
sovereign Peoples Republic of China.
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executiveagreement between two
sovereign states.
Ruling
: The instant Petition is
DENIED
. Petitioner China NationalMachinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity
fromsuit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement.
CNMEGs prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is
DENIED
for being moot and academic.The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
Holy See v. Rosario,

to wit:There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, eachwidely held and firmly
established. According to the classical orabsolute theory,
a sovereign cannot, without its consent, bemade a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign.
Accordingto the newer or restrictive theory,
the immunity of the sovereign isrecognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii
ofa state, but not with regard to private acts or acts
jure gestionis
.

(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suithas been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (
jureimperii
).
The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended tocommercial, private and proprietary
acts (
jure gestionis
).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it iscrucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved

whether theentity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed toproprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz Admittedly,
the Loan Agreement was entered into betweenEXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the
Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of thetransaction, the
foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which isan inextricable part of the entire
undertaking, nonetheless reveal theintention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify
the wholeventure as commercial or proprietary in character.Thus, piecing together the
content and tenor of theContract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14
September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October 2003, and the
Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct theLuzon Railways in pursuit
of a purely commercial activity performedin the ordinary course of its business

18. Suquia vs almeda lopez 8-17-49

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-1648August 17, 1949
Facts:
Plaintiffs, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three apartment
buildingssituated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts one for each of the three
apartments. The period for thethree leases was to be for the duration of the war and six
months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US.The apartment buildings were used
for billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila.Six months
after September 2, 1945 when Japan surrendered plaintiffs approached the defendants
GeorgeMoore and Erland Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings. Moore
and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that the US Army wanted to continue occupying the
premises. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate saidleases, to execute a lease contract for a period of
three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payableunder the old contracts. Respondents
sent a letter refusing to execute new leases but advised that the US Army willvacate the apartments
before February 1, 1947. Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffsformally
requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused
tocomply with the request. Because of the assurance that the US Government would vacate
the premises beforeFebruary 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the
buildings and accepted the monthlyrentals tendered by respondents. On February 17, 1947,
plaintiffs served a formal notice to the occupantsdemanding: (a) cancellation of said leases;
(b) increase in rentals to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d)release of said apartment
buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to comply with saiddemands.The thirty-day
period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with the demand. Plaintiffscommenced an
action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer
againstrespondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction over thedefendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real
party in interest was the US Government andnot the individual defendants. Furthermore, the
respondent argued that the war between the US and her allies on oneside and Germany and
Japan on the other had not yet been terminated and consequently the period of the three leaseshas not yet
expired. Also, a foreign government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without
itsconsent. That even though the US Government was not named as the defendant in the
complaint, it is neverthelessthe real defendant as the parties named are officers of the US
Government.The Municiapl Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower
court.
Issue:
(1)

W
ho is the real party in interest?(2)

Does the court have jurisdiction to hear and try the case?
H
eld:
(1)

The Court is convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the
USGovernment. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America
and thelease agreement themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as
her agents. Theconsiderations or rentals was always paid by the US Government. The original action in the
MuniciaplCourt was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this
courtthat any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the US Government
not only becausethe contracts were entered into by such Government but also because the
premises were used by officersof her armed forces during the war and immediately after the
terminations of hostilities.(2)

It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for
UnlawfulDetainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning
of theaction. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially
againsther, though not in name. Morever, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his
ownGovernment without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
foreigngovernment without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction
of the courts of this country

19. Republic vs Indonesia 6-26-03

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement
shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory
and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated
the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the
Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived
their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such
act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic
mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to
maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia
is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the
respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in
the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.

20. SSS vs CA 2-21-83

SSS vs. CA(120 SCRA 707)

FACTS:Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS
withresidential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with
their monthlypayments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a
petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaultedin payment, Pursuant for these application for
foreclosure notices were published on the second noticethe counsel for spouses Cruz sent a
letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date intheir payment of the
monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of thenotices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for
damagesagainst SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an
agency of the governmentperforming government function. The trial court and court
of appeal nevertheless awarded damages infavor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by
court of appeal, Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.

HELD:Negative.. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages.
The SSS doesnot enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent.It has corporated
power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These words sue and be sued
embrace all
civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunityfrom suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the
explicit provision of theaforecited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have
waived immunity in respect of theSSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that
statutory law has given to the private citizen aremedy for the enforcement and protection of
his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submitto the jurisdiction of the
court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

21. balquera vs. alcala

Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted
each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a
maximum amount equivalent to 30% of theemployees one month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive
benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies,
including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the
Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and
agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of
AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to
immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His powerincludes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify,
alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments,
bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads of
government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and
directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising
his power of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to
prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by
committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives
and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the
heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources.

The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
executive departments.

22. Bureau of printing vs bureau of employees assoc. 1-28-91

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA,

petitioners, vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), et al.
respondents.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
Facts:
The action in question was

upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)Pacifico

Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran

filed by an acting prosecutor of theIndustrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of

Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and
Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that
SerafinSalvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by
interfering with, or coercing theemployees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the
members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discouragethem from pursuing the union activities.The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practicesattributed to the
and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico
Advincula,Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending
result of an administrativeinvestigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and
regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purposeof
gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they
prayed that the case bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could
be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion"asking for a preliminary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of thetrial of the
case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion
was granted, butafter hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated
January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of thecourt on the theory that the functions of
the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,consequently, denied the
prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court
inbanc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As suchinstrumentality of the Government, it operates under
the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is"charged with
the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes,
required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said
Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence,
and itsappropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
Issue:
whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality,
the Bureau of Printingcannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, actionor proceeding against the Government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without itsconsent, much
less over its objection.It is true that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work onregular working days and on holidays,
but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusivelyproprietary in
nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the
service so requires.As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be
paid, but such payment is discretionary withthe head of the Bureau depending upon its
current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that thefunctions of said
Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed
toundertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or
business concern. The

additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be

deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are

separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
23. Mobil Philippines exploration, Inc. vs customs arrastre service and bureau of costums 12-
17-66

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

18 SCRA 1120
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to
MobilPhilippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the
CustomsArrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre
operations therein. TheCustoms Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of theshipment.Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the CustomsArrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amountof P18,493.37 plus other
damages.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law,defendants cannot be sued.Appellant contends that not all
government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of
the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functionsand as such,
can be sued by private individuals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity.
HELD:
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary
innature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
isundertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
thesovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.The Bureau of
Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart
from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, thatof assessing
and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff andcustoms duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function,arrastre service is a
necessary incident.Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessaryincident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs, so that engagingin the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could notperform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereignimmunity, granted as to the end, should not be
denied as to the necessary means to that end.

24. Municipality of san Miguel vs Fernandez 6-25-84

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-61744 June 25, 1984

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO,
ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO
PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.

Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.

The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of
San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered
judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,
represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:

1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased
Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27,
1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831
are concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are
among those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,

2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over

the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided
one-half () share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion,
Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and
the remaining undivided one-half () share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E.
Pineda and Lucila Pongco;

3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion

mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00
corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and
occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus interest thereon
at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid;

4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question
in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned;

5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attomey's
fees; and to pay the cost of suit.

The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence
presented to substantiate the same.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its
failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private
respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Respondent judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to wit:

Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in
G. R. No. L-59938 and;

Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated
July 23, 1983;

Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. (p. 10,
Rollo)

Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the
municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash
was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ
of execution stands in full force and effect.

On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:

It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds
to meet its judgment obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San Miguel,
Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby
ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao
against said municipality. In like manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel,
Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the property
already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution.

Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within
which to submit their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)

When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13,
1982, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon
compliance thereof.

Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel,
Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel,
respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money
judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.

Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this
was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in
trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would
materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not
only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be
seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments
rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner
municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the
possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are
exempt from execution.

Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration",
Section 2 (a), provides:

SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local government financial affairs, transactions,

and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder:

(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory authority.

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the
case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this
effect.

Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the
enforcement of money judgment:

(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not
otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for
the purpose;

(b) By selling the property levied upon;

(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and accruing costs; and

(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed
by judgment or order of the court.

The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982,
granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the
order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan
and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are SET
ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.

25. Sanders vs veridiano 6-10-98

 Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity.
Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city.
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the
Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-
time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which
the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters,
the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the
complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent
to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with
the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged
offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

26. Lansang vs CA 2-23-2000

Lansang vs. Court of Appeals (Consti1)

Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind, Inc., and Jose
Iglesias, respondents.

February 23, 2000

Quisumbing, J:

Facts:
 Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal
contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this
verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang,
sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that
they vacate the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to
indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC
against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the
state which could not be sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a
government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for
acts done without or in excess of his authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC,
is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It
is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.