Swartz: The Revivification of in Loco Parentis Behavioral Regulation in Public Institutions of Higher Education To Combat The Obesity Epidemic

SWARTZ_FINALPG_101137PROOFED(DONOTDELETE) 1/10/20119:33:50AM
TheRevivificationofInLocoParentis
BehavioralRegulationinPublic
InstitutionsofHigherEducationto
CombattheObesityEpidemic*
CHRISTOPHERJAYSONSWARTZ**

ABSTRACT
In the past decade the obesity epidemic has exploded, leading to a

prevalence of health and wellness issues associated with obesity and
unhealthy weight. While recent litigation and legislation have aimed at
curtailing obesity, particularly in elementary and secondary schools, only
one program has attempted to curtail obesity in an institution of higher
education (IHE). In 2005, Lincoln University became the first IHE to
actively regulate studentsin anattempt to attack the obesityepidemic by
requiring students to take a physical education class, or to place out by
havingabodymassindex(BMI)below30.WhileLincolnsprogramhas
now become optional, its presence may be a harbinger of a possible
solution to the obesity epidemicmandatory educational programs in
IHEs.
While such a program may be desirable from a health perspective,
* This Note will solely deal with laws affecting public institutions of higher education.
Public entities and private entities are often treated differently under statutory and
constitutionalschemes;forexample,privateinstitutionsofhighereducationarenotbeholden
totheedictsoftheFederalConstitution.SeeTrs.ofDartmouthColl.v.Woodward,17U.S.(4
Wheat.)518,66062(1819).
** Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England School of Law (2011). B.A., Political Science,
ElonUniversity(2008).Iwouldliketothankmymother,towhomIamforeverindebtedfor
myloveofliterature,myfascinationwithwriting,andmyintellectualcuriosity,amongmany
other things. Further, I would like to thank my father, my brother, and my pugdog, whose
twinpillarsofcompanyandloveIhaveoftenfoundmyselfleaningupon.Iwouldalsoliketo
thankDr.JamesL.DeboyfortakingthetimetoprovidemewithaninternalviewofLincoln
Universitysobesityprogram.Lastly,Iwouldliketothankmyeditors,inparticularMatthew
Hranitz,whosediligenthandshelpedguidetheshapeofthiswork.
101
102 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101
there are many legal and social challenges to implementing such a

program.Beforethe1960s,IHEswerecapableofimplementingalmostany
regulation that would shape the morals, values, or behaviors of students
underthedoctrineofinlocoparentis.However,sincethattimecourtshave
been less willing to defer to IHEs and more willing to investigate IHE
studentrelations.ThisdoesnotmeanthatIHEscannotimplementsucha
program,itsimplycreateslegalperimetersfromwhichIHEscannotstray.
Suchlegalperimetersinclude:theFourteenthAmendmentDueProcess&
EqualProtectionClauses;theAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct;thecommon
lawrighttoprivacy;andvariousstateandlocalrestrictions.Likewise,an
IHE program may cause social backlash as students feel that they are
losingtheirautonomy.
This Note attempts to synthesize these concerns and propose a
workable,legallyinsulated,program.Byrecognizingtheselegalandsocial
concerns,IHEscanprepareforpossiblelitigationandsocialbacklash,and
preemptively articulate programs that furthers the fight against obesity,
whileprotectingthemselvestothefullestfromcriticismorlitigation.
INTRODUCTION
I
n 2005, Lincoln University, a predominantly AfricanAmerican
university located in Pennsylvania,1 required, as a condition for
graduation,thatstudentsbetestedfortheirbodymassindex(BMI).2
If the students BMI was above 30, the student was required to take a
physical education course as a condition of graduation.3 The program
1 Lincoln University is a staterelated institution. About Lincoln: A Legacy of Producing
Leaders, LINCOLN UNIV., http://www.lincoln.edu/about.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2010). The
University receives operational funding from the state yet remains under independent
control; the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that Lincoln is a
nonpublic nonprofit corporation chartered for educational purposes. Krupp v. Lincoln
Univ.,663F.Supp.289,292(E.D.Pa.1987).
2Obesityisdeterminedbyaweightheightratiocalledthebodymassindex.CalculateYour
BodyMassIndex,NATL HEART LUNG & BLOOD INST.,http://www.nhlbisupport.com/bmi/(last

visitedDec.13,2010).BMIisdeterminedonaslidingscalefrom0to30+,brokendowninto
fourcategories:lessthan18.5isconsideredunderweight;18.524.9isconsideredhealthy;25.0
29.9isconsideredoverweight;30.0ormoreisconsideredobese.Id.
3Marcia Wade Talbert, Lincoln University Repeals Controversial Health Requirement, BLACK
ENTERPRISE (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.blackenterprise.com/business/businessnews/2009/

12/22/lincolnuniversityrepealscontroversialhealthrequirement. The class was entitled
HPR 103: Fitness Walking/Conditioning, and students received a single credit for its
completion; enrolling in and passing the course was a precondition for graduation if the
studentdidnotqualifyforexemption.SeeLincolnUniversityCoreCurriculum,LINCOLN UNIV.,
http://www.lincoln.edu/math/forms/LUCoreCurriculum.htm(lastvisitedDec.13,2010).The
class has recently been redesignated as HPR 103: Fitness for Life. See Faculty Meeting
2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 103
proved to be controversial; critics found the condition to be overzealous,

paternalistic, and invasive, while supporters lauded it as a catalyst for
healthy living.4 While the program has become optional as of December
2009,5 its creation heralds a potential solution to the obesity epidemic via
behavioral regulation in institutions of higher education (IHE)6 and
represents a sensible starting point for any debate about what such
regulationshouldentail.
The question of whether educational institutions should use their
position of power to instill or maintain cultural values, morals, and
behavioralpracticesinstudentshasbeendebatedsinceantiquity.7Untilthe
1960s, it was part and parcel of the American collegiate system for
institutionsofhighereducationtoformulatevaluesystemsthatwouldbe
implemented through IHE policy and regulations.8 These institutional
Minutes, LINCOLN UNIV. (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.lincoln.edu/academicaffairs/

minutes200910/minutes120409.html.
4See Excerpt of Email from James L. DeBoy, Chair & Professor of the Dept of Health,
Physical Educ. & Recreation, Lincoln Univ., to the Faculty of Lincoln Univ. (Nov. 2009)
[hereinafterExcerptofEmailtotheFaculty](includinganattachmententitledObesityTesting
and HPR 103: Will Lincoln University Faculty Stay the Course?) (on file with author). Compare
KimberlyGarrison,TooBadLincolnFlinchedinItsAntiObesityEffort,PHILA. DAILY NEWS,Dec.
24, 2009, at 23, available at 2009 WLNR 25857678 (stating the program was bold and
courageous and quoting a Lincoln graduate as saying I wish the program had been
availablewhenIwasastudentatLincoln.MaybeIwouldnthavegainedthefreshman50and
todaybestrugglingwithmyweightandahostofhealthproblems.),withTianaY.Lawson,
OpEd., Too Fat to Graduate, THE LINCOLNIAN (Pa.), Nov. 18, 2009, http://media.www.
thelincolnianonline.com/media/storage/paper1282/news/2009/11/18/Opinion/TooFat.To.
Graduate3835966.shtml(statingthattheprogramisinvasiveandlimitspersonalchoice).
5SeeTalbert,supranote3.
6This
terminology has been borrowed from Peter F. Lake. Peter F. Lake, The Special
Relationship(s)BetweenaCollegeandaStudent:LawandPolicyRamificationsforthePostInLoco
ParentisCollege,37IDAHO L. REV.531passim(2001).Asusedhere,itreferstobothcollegesas
wellasuniversities.
7See generally 2 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE passim (Gilbert
Highettrans.,1943)(explaininganddiscussingthecreationandhistoryoftheAncientGrecian
doctrineofpaideia,oreducationthatinstilledbothknowledgeandethicalprincipals);PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 66102 (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1945) (explaining the role of education in
Socratesmodelcityandtheextentthateducationshouldshapethemoralsandvaluesofthe
student).
8See Spring J. Walton, In Loco Parentis for the 1990s: New Liabilities, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
247, 24748 (1992); see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION: STUDENT VERSION 16 (4th ed. 2007). Some authors may point to the American
spirit of individualism as having more to do with the atrophying of in loco parentis than
constitutional changes. Cf. C. Eric Mount Jr., American Individualism Revisited, 22 REV.
RELIGIOUS RES.362,362(1981)(notingthatAmericansmaybemoreindividualisticthanever
before).
value overlays were part of the longstanding AngloAmerican legal and

social doctrine of in loco parentis.9 Pursuant to this doctrine, IHEs legally
stood in the place of the parent.10 This formally granted IHEs the same
rightsinrelationtothestudentsasparentshavetotheirchildren;i.e.,the
right to mold students morals, behaviors, and cultural beliefs, and the
concomitant responsibility to protect the students from harm.11 As a
response to this relationship, courts tended to defer to the decisions of
IHEswithrespecttostudentaffairs.12
During the 1960s, drastic changes in constitutional interpretation,
particularlytheextensionofFourteenthAmendmentDueProcessrightsto
studentsinpublicIHEs,greatlyerodedinlocoparentis,andmostcourtsand
legalscholarsacceptedthatthedoctrinehadbecomeobsolete.13Thistheory
lasted for two decades, until a partial resurgence in the 1980s and 90s as
courtsbegantorequireIHEstoprotectstudentsinthecontextofalcohol
related injuries and deaths, personal injury claims stemming from third
party actors such as rape or assaults, and harm that occurs through
institutionalactions.14However,thecreationoflegaldutiesforIHEsisbut
oneportionofinlocoparentis.15And,whilethedutyportionofthedoctrine
has flourished in the past two decades, IHEs have tended to stay away
fromthecreationofpolicyrequirementsaimedovertlyatinstillingmorals,
values, or behavioral practices.16 This reticence, however, does not mean
that the loss of judicial deference has preempted IHEs from instituting
9SeeWalton,supranote8,at24748;seealsoKAPLIN&LEE,supranote8,at16.
10BLACKSLAWDICTIONARY858(9thed.2009).
11Lake,supranote6,at53334.
12SeeinfraPartII.A.
13See,e.g.,Dixonv.Alabama,294F.2d150,15457(5thCir.1961);Soglinv.Kauffman,295
F. Supp. 978, 98687 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (stating that courts will intervene with IHEs policies
where doing so is necessary to uphold student due process rights); see also William W. Van
Alstyne,TheTentativeEmergenceofStudent Power intheUnitedStates,17AM. J. COMP. L.403,
40508(1969)(discussingthedeclineanddisappearanceofinlocoparentisinlargerAmerican
IHEs);CharlesA.Wright,TheConstitutionontheCampus,22VAND.L.REV.1027,103032(1969)
(discussing that Dixon signaled a shift in thinking with respect to due process and college
students); Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey
andProposalforReform,44VAND. L. REV.1135,114851(1991)(reviewingthedeclineofinloco
parentisatIHEsduringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury).
14SeeWalton,supranote8,at25469;PhilipM.Hirshberg,Note,TheCollegesEmergingDuty
to Supervise Students: In Loco Parentis in the 1990s, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 189,
20921(1994).
15SeeWalton,supranote8,at256.
16Id.(Missingistheoncecomplementarypowerofcollegestopoliceandcontrolstudents
morals . . . .) (quoting James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges Increasing Exposure to
Liability:TheNewInLocoParentis,16J.L.&EDUC.453,465(1987)).
programsthatshapestudentsbehaviors.17Indeed,thecurrenttrendofIHE
restraintfromregulatingstudentsbehavioralchoicesintheareaofhealth
and wellness may be ending, as augured by Lincoln Universitys anti
obesityplan.
This Note will analyze the legal and social barriers to implementing
antiobesityprogramsatIHEs,andwillproposeaparadigmwithinwhich
IHEs can develop antiobesity programs without overstepping the legal
perimeters created post1960s. This Note further proposes that fashioning
and implementing these programs in IHEs would benefit society by
emphasizing the importance of maintaining a healthy weight, and
proactivelyattemptingtoshapestudentsbehaviorstoenhancetheirlong
termhealth.18
Part I of this Note will explore the problems emanating from the
obesityepidemicandtherationalebehindpublichealthinitiativesaimedat
curbingobesity.PartIIofthisNotewillinvestigatethedoctrineofinloco
parentis; explore the doctrines history; and detail its decline in toto, its
partial resurgence in the area of legal duties, and whether IHEs can
currently regulate student behavior. Part III will present a number of
possible legal and social consequences of instituting a program to curb
obesity in an IHE, including the possibility of constitutional and legal
challenges based on federal and state protections against discrimination,
invasion of the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and
common law, and possible social reproach for infringing on students
autonomy. Part IV of this Note will apply the concerns raised in the
previoussectionsinproposingaworkable,andlegallyinsulated,program
forcurbingobesityinIHEs.
I. ARecentHistoryofObesity
In the past two decades there has been a rapid escalation in the
percentage of Americans who qualify as overweight or obese.19 Between
2005 and 2006, 32.7% of Americans over the age of twenty qualified as
overweight,while34%ofAmericansqualifiedasobese.20Theseindividuals
are more likely to have a number of debilitating physical conditions
including cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, hypertension, lowered
17SeeinfraPartII.D.
18SeeinfraPartIII.
19SeeNATL INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION,
ANDTREATMENTOFOVERWEIGHTANDOBESITYINADULTS1,1223(1998).
20NATL CTR.FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PREVALENCEOF OVERWEIGHT, OBESITYAND EXTREME
OBESITY AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, TRENDS 197680 THROUGH 20052006, at 2 tbl.1
(2008),availableathttp://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/overweight/overweight_adult.pdf.
hormones, infertility, thyroid conditions, and cancer.21 Furthermore,

obesityrelatedillnesseshavebeenresponsiblefor300,000deathsperyear,
and may well be the leading cause of preventable deaths in the United
States.22 As a result, concerns over health and wellness issues connected
withbeingoverweightandobesehavebecomeincreasinglyprevalent.23
While some authors indicate that preventing obesity requires
decisionsaboutpersonalbehaviorthatbydefinitioncanonlybemadeby
the individual,24 many individuals often do not have the singular will
power to overcome the external pressures that lead to obesity.25 These
externalpressuresincludethesociallycontagiousnatureofobesity,26the
eatingandexerciseactivitiesofanindividualspeersandfamily,thecostof
food, the presence or lack of recreational parks and facilities,27 as well as
pervasiveadvertisingandmarketingfromfoodandbeveragecompanies.28
Forexample,companiesinthefoodandbeverageindustryhavesucceeded
inslowingdownlegislationintendedtolimitthesaleofhighcalorie,sugar,
and fat products, and have successfully lobbied legislation that protects
thesecompaniesfromobesityrelatedtortlitigation.29Thesefactorspresent
asignificantbarriertoindividualsattemptingtoloseweight.30
However, as awareness of the pervasiveness of obesity and its health
21SeeNATLINST.OFHEALTH,supranote19,at1223.
22DoraW.Klein,Unreasonable:InvoluntaryMedications,IncompetentCriminalDefendants,and
the Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 189 (2009) (citing OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
GEN., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERALS CALL TO ACTION TO
PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 8 (2001), available at http://
www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf).
23SeeNATLINST.OFHEALTH,supranote19,at1,1223.
24Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Legal Preparedness for Obesity Prevention and Control: The
StructuralFrameworkandtheRoleofGovernment,37J.L.MED.&ETHICS24,26(2009).
25See Jason A. Smith, Setting the Stage for Public Health: The Role of Litigation in Controlling
Obesity, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 443, 44445 (2006) (stating that obesity is a public
healthconcernthatisbornfromacomplexityof...environmentalfactors).
26SeeLeahLoeb,ChildhoodObesity:TheLawsResponsetotheSurgeonGeneralsCalltoAction
to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 295, 300 n.52
(2009).
27GarryEgger&BoydSwinburn,AnEcologicalApproachtotheObesityPandemic,315BRIT.
MED.J.477,479tbl.1(1997).
28DavidG.Yosifon,TheConsumerInterestinCorporateLaw,43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.253,275
77 (2009); Samantha Kwan, Individual Versus Corporate Responsibility: Market Choice, the Food
Industry,andthePervasivenessofMoralModelsofFatness,12FOOD,CULTURE&SOCY477,47881
(2009)(notingthatfoodindustriespromoteatoxicenvironmentforobesity).
29Yosifon,supranote28,at277(explainingthatthefoodindustryhassuccessfullylobbied
billsintwentythreestatesforbiddingtortsuitsagainstfoodcorporationsinconnectionwith
obesityrelatedillnesses).
30Seesupranotes2629andaccompanyingtext.
complications mounts, there has been some headway toward changes in

socialandculturalnorms:31[a]flurryofantiobesitylegislation...aim[ed]
at the environmental factors that have contributed to the epidemic...32
and consumer litigation against restaurants and food vendors.33 One
notableareawheresignificantlegislativeactionhasoccurredisinrelation
to food consumption by public schoolchildren, and the stocking and
availabilityofhighfat,caloric,andsugarfoodstuffsinschools.34
Incomparisonstateandfederallegislativeandlegalactionshavebeen
notably silent with regard to IHEs.35 Indeed, there has been a paucity of
mandatory IHE regulation besides those that are a result of student
pressureforhealthierchoices.36IHEshavealsooffered,typicallyoptional,
educationalprogramsdealingwithnutrition,healthyeating,andphysical
education.37 However in 2005, Lincoln University in Pennsylvania took a
31See,e.g.,AntonioVives,CorporateSocialResponsibility:TheRoleofLawandMarketsandthe
Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.KENT L. REV. 199, 20102 (2008) (stating that society has
nowbeguntoholdfoodmanufacturersliableforproducingunhealthyfoods).
32Claire Suddath, Does Obesity Rehab Work, TIME, Mar. 1, 2010, at 36; see, e.g., Obesity
Prevention Initiative Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/110 (2009); Oregon Menu Labeling Act,
H.B. 2726, 75th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/menu
/docs/hb2726enrolled.pdf. Congress recently passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
CareAct,Section4205ofwhichamendsSection403(q)(5)(A)oftheFederalFood,Drug,and
Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. 343(q)(5)(A)) by adding language requiring chain
restaurantstodisclosenutritionalinformationabouttheirmenuitems.ThePatientProtection
andAffordableCareAct,Pub.L.No.111148,4205,124Stat.119,57376(2010)(codifiedat
21 U.S.C. 343(q)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010)). A number of localities have also instituted
zoningregulations,snacktaxes,andbansontransfatsinanattempttolowerobesityand
promotepublicwellness.AllysonC.Spacht,Note,TheZoningDiet:UsingRestrictiveZoningto
ShrinkAmericanWaistlines,85NOTREDAMEL.REV.391,392(2009).
33Pelmanexrel.Pelmanv.McDonaldsCorp.,396F.Supp.2d439,44244(S.D.N.Y.2005)
(litigation brought by parents of two obese children against McDonalds Corporation for
negligence and violation of state consumer protection laws); see also Theodore H. Frank, A
TaxonomyofObesityLitigation,28U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.427passim(2006);Smith,supra
note25,at44546.
34Ellen Fried & Michele Simon, The Competitive Food Conundrum: Can Government
RegulationsImproveSchoolFood?,56DUKEL.J.1491passim(2007).
35Cf., e.g., Vending Machines in Schools, NATL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES.,
http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/vendingmachinesinschools2005/tabid/14108/defaul
t.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2010) (listing bills proposed and enacted between 20032005 to
regulateandprohibitsalesofcertainfoodandbeverageproductsinschools).
36See BERKELEY STUDENT FOOD COLLECTIVE, http://berkeleystudentfoodcollective.org (last
visitedDec.13,2010)(detailingastudentformedgroupfortheadvancementofhealthyfood
choicesontheUniversityofCaliforniaBerkeleycampus).
37Forexample, the University of Massachusetts offers a number of courses, including
NutritionforaHealthyLifestyle,whichisoptional.SeeFIVECOLLEGES,FALL2010COURSES2
(2010), availableat http://www.fivecolleges.edu/sites/chs/documents/Fall%202010_Courses.pdf;
more expansive and paternalistic approach to obesity and weight loss,

mandating that failure to participate in a physical education course, or to
place out of the course by having a BMI below 30, would lead to
ineligibilitytograduate.38
Themainproponentoftheprogram,Dr.JamesL.DeBoy,theChairof
Lincolns Health, Physical Education, and Recreation Department, has
statedthathebelievesthateducatorsaretaskedwiththeresponsibilityto:
[B]e honest with our students and inform them when behavior,
attitude,knowledgebasesorhabitsofmindarenotwhatwe,the
faculty, deem as acceptable. Any factor/trait/characteristic that
webelievewillhinderstudentsmaximumdevelopmentandfull
realizationoflifegoalsmustbe:(1)broughttotheirattention;(2)
substantiated as being detrimental; and (3) adequately
redressed.39
WhileDr.DeBoyadvocatesthatthesemessagesbecouchedinanurturing
vernacular,40 the fundamental questionas to whether educators can instill
behavioralchoices,andifso,iftheyshould,needstobeaddressed.41
II. InLocoParentisandIHEs
ThestatementsofDr.DeBoysignifythatapossiblecuretotheongoing
obesity pandemic may rest in the application of educational programs
intent on bending students values to match those that educators have
determined promote good health.42 The question of whether IHEs should
regulatethenormativebehavioroftheirstudentsisnotanewquestion;in
fact, for the majority of American history, similar behavioral, attitudinal,
andmoralregulationwasthestatusquoofIHEpolicy,andwasnotonly
toleratedbysociety,butexpected.43
A. InLocoParentis:ABriefHistoricalAnalysisPriortothe1960s
Priortoconstitutionaldoctrinaldevelopmentsinthe1960s,IHEs,both
public and private,44 were given essentially free reign to determine the
see also Faculty Meeting Minutes, supra note 3 (statement of Dr. Deboy) (Most colleges offer
(andmanyrequire)coursesonhealtheducation.).
38Seesupranote3.
39ExcerptofEmailtotheFaculty,supranote4.
40Seeid.
41SeeinfraPartIII.
42SeeinfraPartI.
43See
MICHAEL CLAY SMITH & RICHARD FOSSEY, CRIME ON CAMPUS: LEGAL ISSUES AND
CAMPUSADMINISTRATION35(1995);infraPartII.A.
44Schools that are privatized have been allowed more leeway in dealing with their
studentsbeliefsandbehaviorsastheyarenotconsideredpartofthestateandthereforeare
morals, values, and behavioral practices they wanted to instill in their

studentsbyexercisingaparentalroleinsecuringthephysicalandmoral
welfareoftheirstudents.45Startinginthe1800s,courtsheldthatcolleges
anduniversitiesstoodinlocoparentis,andhadthelegalrighttocreateand
enforce any rule or regulation pertaining to students social lives.46
AttachedtothisrightwasalargeamountofjudicialdeferencetoIHEsin
determining what was best for students; for example, in an early case,
Peopleexrel.Prattv.WheatonCollege,thecourtheldjudgesweretoactwith
deference to the decisionmaking of IHEs, so long as the rulesviolate[d]
neither good morals nor the law of the land.47 Some legal scholars have
noted that this limitationwaslargelytheoretical48 and that the scope of
deference to IHEs extended to any rule or regulation.49 This created an
environment where courts were reticent to debate the merit of IHE
decisions, and students who brought claims for wrongful dismissal and
suspensionbasedonIHEsocialpolicyrarelyfoundredress.50Thisreticence
went so far as to allow for almost arbitrary dismissals, based upon
unbecomingconduct,insubordination,oranythingthatIHEsdeemedtobe
appropriate reason[s].51 What constituted an appropriate reason
essentiallyextendedtoanyreasonanIHEcouldconceive;forexample,in
Anthonyv.SyracuseUniversity,thecourtupheldauniversitydetermination
todismissafemalestudentfortheexiguousrationalethatshewasnota
not beholden to the Constitution. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 66062 (1819). However, if the government is significantly involved in the affairs of the
privatelyrunschool,theschoolmaybecomeliabletostudentsasastateactor.Cf.,e.g.,Jackson
v.Metro.EdisonCo.,419U.S.345,351(1974).
45SeeHirshberg,supranote14,at195(quotingGottv.BereaCollege,161S.W.204,206(Ky.
1913)).
46SeeGott,161S.W.at206.
4740Ill.186,187(1866).
48AMYGAJDA,THETRIALSOFACADEME37(2009).
49SeeGott,161S.W.at206.Afullerstatementofthecourtisinstructive:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and

moralwelfareandmentaltrainingofthepupils,andweareunabletosee
why, to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the
governmentorbettermentoftheirpupilsthataparentcouldforthesame
purpose.Whethertherulesorregulationsarewiseortheiraimsworthyis
a matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the
case may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion, the courts are not
disposedtointerfere....
Id.
50See,e.g.,StetsonUniv.v.Hunt,102So.637,640(Fla.1924);Gott,161S.W.at206;Tantonv.
McKenney,197N.W.510,51213(Mich.1924).
51See John G. Hill, Jr., The Fourteenth Amendment and the StudentAcademic Due Process, 3
CONN.L.REV.417,41920(1971);seealsoJackson,supranote13,at1148.
typicalSyracusegirl.52
Onafewoccasionscourtsdidauthordecisionsfavorabletostudentsin
which the courts recognized students minimum due process rights.53 In
those cases that found for students, the courts held that students were
entitled to predismissal hearings concerning the cause of their dismissal,
aswellastheabilitytopresentadefenseastothechargesaccused.54This
latter view was by far in the minority, and court decisions that found for
students met with widespread criticism.55 As IHEs argued, and courts
tended to agree, the role of courts in this area should be limited because
courts are less adept at dealing with appraising student conduct, court
decisions undermine school authority, and court decisions may impinge
thestudentuniversityrelationship.56
B. TheQuellingEmphasisofInLocoParentisandtheDoctrines
SuddenDeathinIHEs
Attheonsetofthe1960s,studentsrebelledagainstthepaternalismof
in loco parentis, claiming the right to regulate their own lives and value
choices.57 The doctrine became severely eroded in 1961 when the Fifth
CircuitheldinDixonv.AlabamaStateBoardofEducationthatstudentscould
not be summarily dismissed without notice and an opportunity for a
hearing.58 The students in this case were dismissed from Alabama State
College on the grounds that they had protested racial segregation by
entering a grill located at the Montgomery County Courthouse and
attempting to receive service.59 The appeals court overruled the lower
courts deferential finding, stating that the constitutional tenets of fair
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required, at a
minimum, that students who are to be expelled from the academic
communitybegivennoticeandahearingontheexpulsion.60Thisseminal
52231N.Y.S.435,43739(App.Div.1928).
53See Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. C. 77, 84 (1887) (reinstating student
who hadbeendismissedwithouta hearingfor disorderlyconduct);Walton,supranote8,at

249.
54Comment,AStudentsRighttoaHearingonDismissalfromaUniversity,10STAN. L. REV.
746,747(1958).
56Comment, PrivateGovernmenton theCampusJudicialReviewof UniversityExpulsions,72
YALEL.J.1362,1367(1963).
57Spring Walton et al., The High Cost of Partying: Social Host Liability for Fraternities and
Colleges,14WHITTIERL.REV.659,668(1993).
58294F.2d150,15457(5thCir.1961).
59Id.at15253.
60Id.at15859.
case was the first to conclusively sweep in loco parentis aside, and [t]he
avalancheofcourtdecisionsfollowing...Dixon...haveonebyoneadded
judicialnailsintothecoffinof[inlocoparentis].61
Furtherlegaldevelopmentsensuredthatstudentsinsecondaryschools
and IHEs did not shed their constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse
gate.62 Over the course of the next two decades constitutional principles
regarding the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures,63 and the First Amendment rights to freedom of
speechandassociation64werealsoextendedtostudentsatpublicIHEs.65In
general, courts across the nation retraced their abstemious deference to
IHEsbytreatingstudentsasfullylegallycognizablepersons,assertingthat
studentsnot IHEsshould claim the right to define and regulate their
lives.66 Furthermore, courts now took it upon themselves to investigate
school policy, which eventually lead to the erosion of in loco parentis; the
moreactiverolebythecourtswasthoughttohavegreatlydiminished...
[the doctrine to the point of being] not generally regarded as having any
substantial impact... on court decisions involving college students.67 In
response, IHEs took on the legal role of bystanders,68 which included
eschew[ing] overinvolvement in student life for fear of assuming
61D. Parker Young, Student Rights and Discipline in Higher Education, 52 PEABODY J. EDUC.
58,58(1974).
62Tinkerv.DesMoinesIndep.Cmty.Sch.Dist.,393U.S.503,506(1969)(holdingthatthe
FirstAmendmentrighttofreedomofexpressionandspeechisretainedbystudentsatpublic
institutions); see also Cheryl McDonald Jones, Note, In Loco Parentis and Higher Education:
TogetherAgain?,1CHARLESTON L. REV.185,188(2007).WhileTinkerdidnotdirectlyapplyto
IHEs,itstenetswereexpandedtoIHEsinsubsequentSupremeCourtcases.See,e.g.,Healyv.
James,408U.S.169,180(1972).
63SeePiazzolav.Watkins,442F.2d284,289(5thCir.1971).
64See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Healy, 408 U.S. at 194; Lewis Bogaty,
Comment, Beyond Tinker and Healy: Applying the First Amendment to Student Activities, 78
COLUM.L.REV.1700,170104(1978).Anumberoflowercourtcaseshavefurtherextendedthe
protectionsofactualandsymbolicspeechtostudentsatIHEs.See,e.g.,Burnhamv.Ianni,119
F.3d668,676(8thCir.1997).
65SeealsoJackson,supranote13,at115051&nn.12627.
66Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1979); Britton White, Student Rights:
FromInLocoParentistoSineParentibusandBackAgain?UnderstandingtheFamilyEducational
RightsandPrivacyActinHigherEducation,2007BYUEDUC.&L.J.321,326.
67KERNALEXANDER&ERWINS.SOLOMON,COLLEGEANDUNIVERSITYLAW411(1972).
68See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138 (American college is not an insurer of the safety of its
students.Whatevermayhavebeenitsresponsibilityinanearlierera,theauthoritarianroleof
todayscollegeadministrationshasbeennotablydilutedinrecentdecades.);seealsoRabelv.
Ill. Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 56061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726
P.2d413,419(Utah1986).
reprisalfromstudentsandthecourts.69
C. The1980s90sandtheResurgenceofInLocoParentis:TheDuty
Doctrine
Inbetween 1961 and the 1980s, the notion that IHEs could freely
regulatestudentbehaviorquelledtothepointthatalmostalllegalistshad
deemed that in loco parentis had become an archaic legal relic from
yesteryear.70 However in the 1980s, modern courts and scholars noted a
partial resurgence of in loco parentis in court decisions that affirmatively
created a duty for IHEs to ensure students safety.71 These cases dealt
primarily with IHEs duties to students issues concerning alcohol related
injuries and personal injury claims stemming from thirdparty actors to
students.72
Startinginthe1980s,anumberofcourtsheldthatIHEswererequired
toprotectstudentsfromphysicalattacksonthebasisofalandlordtenant
or landlordinvitee relationship.73 These cases noted that IHEs, as
landlords, were required to protect students from foreseeable criminal
activity such as rapes and physical assaults.74 As time elapsed, the
landlordtenantrationaleforthesecaseswassubsequentlyreplacedbythe
broader theory that IHEs were required to protect students on the basis
that IHEs had entered into a special relationship with students.75 In the
1990sthisrationalewasfurtherembraced,andcourtsheldthatIHEswere
responsible for educating students about potentially dangerous behavior,
warningthemofunsafeconditionsoncampus,andprotectingthemfrom
tortiousinjuryarisingtherefrom.76Ascommentatorsrightfullynoted,this
69Lake,supranote6,at532.
71SeeHirshberg,supranote14,at20921;Walton,supranote8,at25669.
72SeeHirshberg,supranote14,at20921;Walton,supranote8,at25469.
73SeeJaneA.Dall,Note,DeterminingDutyinCollegiateTortLitigation:ShiftingParadigmsof
the CollegeStudent Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485, 50106 (2003); Hirshberg, supra note 14, at
20507.
74E.g.,Millerv.State,467N.E.2d493,494(N.Y.1984);seeHirshberg,supranote14,at205
07.
75See,e.g.,SusannaG.Dyer,Note,IsThereaDuty?:LimitingCollegeandUniversityLiability
forStudentSuicide,106MICH.L.REV.1379,1387(2008).
76See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 522 (Del. 1991) (holding university liable for
studentsinjuryfromlyebasedburnsacquiredduringafraternityhazingritual);Robertsonv.
State, 747 So. 2d 1276, 1284 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding university not liable for students
death that resulted from his own reckless act of climbing the roof of the universitys
natatorium);Loderv.State,607N.Y.S.2d151,153(App.Div.1994)(holdinguniversitytobe
sixtypercent liable for students injury that occurred when she was kicked in the face by a
horseduringequinestudies).
dutytoprotectstudentsfromthemselvesverymuchresembledthespecial
relationship between IHEs and students that is the sine qua non of in loco
parentis.77
D. InLocoParentisLives?:FromDutytoRulemaking
While the response of IHEs to Dixon and its progeny has been an
unequivocal shunting of the behavioral regulation of students,78 with the
exception of those behavioral regulations that the court has determined
IHEstohaveadutytoenforceforthesakeoftheirstudents,79thisresponse
isbutonepaththatIHEscouldhavefollowed.Itisincontrovertiblethatthe
judiciary will not shy away from evaluating student claims of IHE action
thatisillegal,resultsinstudentharm,orviolatestheconstitutionalrights
ofstudents,forthesakeofdeference.80However,Dixonanditsprogenydo
notevisceratebehavioralregulation,butrathercreatedefinitiveparameters
withoutwhichanIHEmaynotstray.81Indeed,courtdecisionsinthe1990s
definitively answered the question of whether IHEs have the right to
regulate student behavior in the affirmativeat least where the courts
founditnecessarytoensurestudentsafety.82
It is therefore foreseeable that under the current paradigm an IHE
could create a program aimed at the regulation of students attitudes,
behaviors,ormorals,solongasitdidnottripanyoftheconstitutionalor
legal landmines that line the postDixon perimeter. For the purposes of
this Note, the essential inquiry is how IHE programs intended to curb
obesitymaystepbeyondtheperimetercreatedbyDixonanditsprogeny
byregulatingstudentbehaviorinawaythatviolatesconstitutionalorlegal
guarantees.83OncetheperimeterofpossibleIHEregulationisascertained,
aworkableplancanbeformulatedforsuchaprogram.84
77SeeBradshawv.Rawlings,612F.2d135,139(3dCir.1979)(Aspecialrelationshipwas
created between college and student that imposed a duty on the college to exercise control
over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of protection by the
college.).
79SeesupraPartII.C.
80SeesupraPartII.B.
81These parameters are the constitutional and legal perimeter over which IHEs may not
crosswithoutjudicialreproach.SeeJones,supranote62,at18889.
82Id.at204.
83SeeinfraPartIII.
84SeeinfraPartIV.
III. Discussion:TheLegalandSocialPerimeterWatchingWhereIHEs
ThrowTheirWeight
While Dixon and its progeny leave open the possibility of moral or
behavioralregulationinIHEs,itisimportantforanyIHEtobecognizant
ofthepossiblelegalandsocialpitfallswhendetermininginwhatcapacity
to regulate obesity.85 Because some programs may differentiate between
partieswhoareoverweight/obeseandthosewhoareofahealthyweight,it
is important to determine whether such division would constitute illegal
discrimination.86 Likewise, because these programs deal with students
decisionsconcerningtheirbodiesandinformationconcerningtheirbodies,
there is a substantial chance for claims that these programs invade upon
students privacy rights.87 In addition to these legal concerns are more
fundamentalsocialandphilosophicalconcernsthatunderlieourconcepts
of privacy and discrimination, particularly whether IHEs should infringe
upon students autonomy to take a paternalistic role for the sake of
studentshealth.88
A. Discrimination
Oneofthemostlikelystumblingblocksforanobesityprogramatan
IHEisthepossibilityofdiscriminationclaimsfromstudents.89Aprogram
that delineates between students on the basis of a single characteristic
engages, at least nominally, in a discriminatory practice.90 However, not
everyactofdiscriminationisillegalunderstateandfederallaw.91Thereare
three relevant sources of protections for students at public IHEs from
discrimination: (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;(2)statutoryprotectionunderTitleIIoftheAmericanswith
DisabilitiesAct(ADA);and(3)statebasedantidiscriminationlaws.92

85SeesupraPartII.D.
86SeeinfraPartIII.A.
87SeeinfraPartIII.B.
88SeeinfraPartsIII.A,III.B.3.
89See Graham M. Catlin, Comment, A More Palatable Solution? Comparing the Viability of
SmartGrowthStatutestoOtherLegislativeMethodsofControllingtheObesityEpidemic,2007WIS.
L.REV.1091,1094.
90Discriminateisdefinedastomakeadifferenceintreatment...onaclassorcategorical
basis....WEBSTERSTHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY648(2002).
91SeeinfraPartIII.A.13.
92SeeinfraPartIII.A.13.
1. FourteenthAmendmentEqualProtectionClause
TheFourteenthAmendmentstatesthat[n]ostateshall...denytoany
personwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.93InUnited
States v. Carolene Products, Co., the Supreme Court of the United States
indicated that the Equal Protection Clause may protect individuals from
being discriminated against on the basis of being part of a discrete and
insularminorit[y].94TheCourthasexpandedonthisnotionbyindicating
thatwhenapublicentitydiscriminatesonthebasisofdiscreteandinsular
minorities,orsuspectclasses,thecourtswillusestrictscrutinyanalysisto
decide if the regulation comports with the Constitution.95 Strict scrutiny
requires that state regulations based on a suspect classification must not
only serve a compelling state interest, but the classification must be
necessary... to theaccomplishment ofitslegitimate purpose.96 Sofar
theCourthasonlyaffordedthisformofraisedscrutinytoracial,religious,
andethnicbaseddiscrimination.97Theseregulationswillonlybeupheldif
thereisacompellingstateinterestandtheregulationisnarrowlytailored
so as to be the least discriminatory as possible.98 The Court has also
recognizedthatdiscriminationbasedongenderdeservesamoresearching
analysis than rational basis, though the Court has not required that the
regulationmeetthelevelofscrutinyaffordedtoracial,religious,andethnic
93U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,1.
94See304U.S.144,152n.4.AsCharlesTaylornotes,thesehierarchicalclassificationswere
based primarily on social construction that, once unmasked as such, were without basis in
thenatureofthings...andhenceultimatelywithoutjustification.CharlesTaylor,Conditions
ofanUnforcedConsensusonHumanRights,inTHE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGEFOR HUMAN RIGHTS
139(JoanneR.Bauer&DanielA.Belleds.,1999).
95SeeLovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1,12(1967)(holdingthatmiscegenationlawsareinvalid
undertheEqualProtectionClause);Brownv.Bd.ofEduc.,347U.S.483,495(1954)(holding
that segregation of races in public schools does not comport with the Equal Protection
Clause);Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214,216(1944)(announcingthatrestrictionson
thecivilrightsofasingleracialgrouparesubjecttothemostrigidscrutiny);seealsoRomer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking a law that discriminated between homo and
heterosexualsunderrationalbasisscrutiny);CityofCleburnev.CleburneLivingCtr.,Inc.,473
U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that discrimination on the basis of mental retardation does not
warrant heightened scrutiny, however, still finding that the record does not reveal any
rationalbasis...tothecityslegitimateinterests....).
96Marc R. Shapiro, Comment, Treading the Supreme Courts Murky Immutability Waters, 38
GONZ.L.REV.409,425(2003)(quotingPalmorev.Sidoti,466U.S.429,43233(1984)).
97See id.; Elizabeth E. Theran, Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious: Weightbased
DiscriminationandtheLogicofAmericanAntidiscriminationLaw,11CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POLY

113,114(2001).
98KimberlyA.Collier,Lovev.LoveHandles:ShouldObesePeopleBePrecludedfromAdoptinga
ChildBasedSolelyUponTheirWeight?,15TEX.WESLEYANL.REV.31,50(2008).
discrimination.99TheCourthassetforththreefactorstodeterminewhether
agroupdeservesheightenedreview:(1)hasthegroupsufferedahistoryof
purposeful discrimination; (2) does the group lack the ability to influence
the political process; and (3) is the discrimination so unfair as to be
inconsistent with the rationale behind equal protection?100 The Court has
beenresistanttoallowingnewclassificationsintothepantheonofsuspect
classes.101
Ifaclassificationdoesnotmeetthecriteriaoftheabovetest,thenitwill
notbeprotectedbyheightenedreviewundertheEqualProtectionClause;
rather it will be heard under rational basis review, which involves an
investigation of whether the stated purpose of the governments action is
rationally connected to a legitimate end.102 These classifications are split:
thoseclassificationsbasedonpermanentorsemipermanentconditionsof
the individual and not transient qualities that can change and fluctuate
sometimes receive raised rational basis, which involves an actual
investigation into the means and purposes of the legislation.103 All other
classifications receive regular rational basis review; these classifications
are of a more transitory nature,104 such that the person who is part of the
groupisnotconfinedtothatgroupfortheentiretyoftheirlife.105AnEqual
99See,e.g.,Craigv.Boren,429U.S.190,20405(1976)(holdingthatdiscriminatorytreatment
ofalcoholsalesbetweengendersviolatestheEqualProtectionClause);Reedv.Reed,404U.S.
71,7677(1971);Backv.HastingsonHudsonUnionFreeSch.Dist.,365F.3d107,118(2dCir.
2004).
100SeeShapiro,supranote96,at42829.
101SeeTheran,supranote97,at114.
102SeeRomerv.Evans,517U.S.620,631(1996);CityofCleburnev.CleburneLivingCtr.,
Inc.,473U.S.432,448(1985).
103SeeCleburne,473U.S.at448.
104E.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 31213 (1976) (holding that age is not a
suspect classification); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(holding socialeconomic status discrimination does not receive heightened review). [I]f a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Equal Protection
Clauseisnotviolatedsolongasitbearsarationalrelationtosomelegitimateend.Romer,
517U.S.at631.
105Frontierov.Richardson,411U.S.677,68687(1973).
[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic

determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
wouldseemtoviolatethebasicconceptofoursystemthatlegalburdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . . And
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
performorcontributetosociety.
Protectionchallengewillonlysucceedifastateactionhasillegitimateends,
orthemeanstowhichtheendisattainedarearbitraryandcapricious.106
Some authors note an extensive history and prevalence of
discrimination aimed at overweight and obese individuals.107 Likewise, at
leastonecourthasheldthatobesityshouldreceivequasisuspectstatuson
thebasisthatphysicalcharacteristicsareoftenattributabletothepersons
genetics and gender.108 However, most courts have steadfastly held that
individualswithobesityarenotconsideredtobepartofasuspectclass,109
primarily because individuals with obesity do not endure continuing
prejudice...[that]depriv[es]themofrights.110Withonethirdofvotingage
Americanadultsbeingconsideredobese111itwouldbeimpossibletoclaim
thatobeseindividualslackthepoliticalcloutthattheSupremeCourtwas
concerned with when it announced its discrimination protections.112
Likewise, the lines between who is obese, overweight, and of normal
weight are everchanging; as individuals lose weight or gain weight they
automatically switch classes, making an exact finding of who is part of a
discreteclassofobeseindividualssubstantiallydifficult.113Assuchmost
courts have steadfastly held that discrimination on the basis of weight
shouldreceiverationalbasisreview.114
Id.at686(quotingWeberv.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,406U.S.164,175(1972)).
106SeeCatlin,supranote89,at1103.
107Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Comment, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight
Individuals:ShouldObesityBeaProtectedClassification?,30SANTACLARAL.REV.951,958(1990);
LucyWang,Note,WeightDiscrimination:OneSizeFitsAllRemedy?,117YALE L.J. 1900,191114
(2008); Svetlana Shkolnikova, Weight Discrimination Could Be as Common as Racial Bias, USA
TODAY,May21,2008,at7D,availableat2008WLNR9558436.
108Collier, supra note 98, at 51 (discussing Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826, 835
(N.D.Tex.1977),affd,565F.2d1214(5thCir.1977)).
109SaywardByrd,Comment,CivilRightsandtheTwinkieTax:The900PoundGorillainthe
WaronObesity,65LA.L.REV.303,347(2004).
110JessieBodeBrown,TheCostsofDomesticViolenceintheEmploymentArena:ACallforLegal
Reform and CommunityBased Education Initiatives, 16 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 1, 41 n.237 (2008)
(emphasisadded).
111KatherineM.Flegal,etal.,PrevalenceandTrendsinObesityAmongUSAdults,19992008,
303JAMA235,238(2010)(statingthatoverthirtypercentofAmericansareconsideredobese).
112SeeShapiro,supranote96,at42829.
113Jessica
Meyer, Obesity Harassment in School: Simply Teasing Our Way to Unfettered
Obesity Discrimination and Stripping Away the Right to Education, 23 LAW & INEQ. 429, 44546
(2005).
114SeeDonelsonv.Fritz,70P.3d539,54445(Colo.App.2002)(holdingperemptorystrikes
againstjurorsonthebasisofweightreceivednoheightenedreview);Statev.Elie,936So.2d
791, 798 n.7 (La. 2006) (discussing that heightened equal protection analysis is not triggered
whenperemptorystrikesarebasedonobesity);Peoplev.Dolphy,685N.Y.S.2d485,487(App.
Div.1999)(holdingthatdiscriminationonbasisofweightistobeheardunderrationalbasis
Under rational basis review, an IHE simply needs to show that the
antiobesityprogramservesalegitimatepurpose,anditsapplicationisnot
arbitrary and capricious.115 IHEs may claim that protecting the future
health of students, as well as furthering their holistic education, is a
legitimate interest, and that applying these programs only to obese or
overweightstudentsisrationallyconnectedtotheirpurposeofachievinga
healthier student population.116 Under Supreme Court jurisprudence it is
notnecessaryunderrationalbasisforaprogramtodealwithawholeissue
atonetime;ratherIHEscanattempttocurbobesityonestepatatimeby
focusingonthoseareasIHEsbelieveneedimmediateattention.117
While some authors have lambasted the current paradigm of equal
protection analysis, calling for changes in both jurisprudential and
legislative controls over who is protected from discrimination to include
the overweight, their concerns tend to deal with the negative side of
discrimination.118 Programs such as the one at Lincoln University are not
aimed at demonizing the overweight, but rather creating an environment
wherestudentscanfurtherexplorethepossibilitiesofhealthyliving.119Far
from being a difference in phrasing and perception, the intent of
discriminatoryactionsforthebenefitofthosewithobesityisanimportant
andlegitimatestatepurpose.120
2. StatutoryProtectionsUndertheAmericanswith
DisabilitiesAct121
The ADA protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of

havingadisabilityinavarietyofcontextssuchasemployment(TitleI),122
public accommodations (Title III),123 public transportation (Title II),124 and
review).
115SeeCatlin,supranote89,at1102;supratextaccompanyingnote106.
116SeeExcerptofEmailtotheFaculty,supranote4.
117SeeWilliamsonv.LeeOpticalofOkla.,Inc.,348U.S.483,489(1955)(Evilsinthesame
fieldmaybeofdifferentdimensionsandproportions,requiringdifferentremedies....Orthe
reformmaytakeonestepatatime,addressingitselftothephaseoftheproblemwhichseems
mostacute....).
118SeeTheran,supranote97,at15271.
120Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) (stating that
legislation intended to benefit, rather than disadvantage . . . would generally withstand

examinationunderatestofheightenedscrutiny).
121AmericanswithDisabilitiesActof1990,42U.S.C.1210212213(2006).
1221211112117.
1231218112189.
1241214112150,1216112165.
bypublicentities(TitleII).125ApublicIHEqualifiesasapublicentityunder
TitleIIifitisaninstrumentofthestateand/oritreceivesfederalfunding.126
ForanindividualtoreceiveprotectionfromdiscriminationundertheADA
they must have a disability, defined as (A) a physical or mental
impairmentthatsubstantiallylimitsoneormoreofthemajorlifeactivities
of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regardedashavingsuchanimpairment.127
Before 2009 the courts had determined that general obesity did not
qualify as a disability.128 For an obese person to be considered impaired,
they typically needed to be considered morbidly obese,129 and even if the
persondidqualifyasmorbidlyobesethecauseofthatobesitymusthave
been physiologicalsimply making poor health decisions did not qualify
as a disability.130 Further, the impairment must have been significantly
substantial; even extensive impositions on an individuals life, such as
needinghelptogetdressed,maynothavequalified.131TheSupremeCourt
had further stated that the determination of whether a person was
substantially impaired should be made from the perspective of any
mitigating or corrective action.132 For individuals with obesity this meant
1251213112134.
126SeeDarianv.Univ.ofMass.Bos.,980F.Supp.77,84(D.Mass.1997)(citingColemanv.
Zatechka,824F.Supp.1360,1367(D.Neb.1993));NinaGolden,AccessThis:WhyInstitutionsof
HigherEducationMustProvideAccesstotheInternettoStudentswithDisabilities,10VAND.J.ENT.
& TECH. L.363,367(2008);SusanE.McGuigan,DocumentingLearningDisabilities:LawSchools
ResponsibilitytoSetClearGuidelines,36J.C.&U.L.191,200(2009).
12742U.S.C.12102(2)(2006&Supp.2009).
128See,e.g.,EqualEmptOpportunityCommnv.WatkinsMotorLines,Inc.,463F.3d436,
443 (6th Cir. 2006) (405pound dockworker was not physically impaired pursuant to the
ADA).ButseeNedderv.RivierColl.,944F.Supp.111,120(D.N.H.1996)(denyingsummary
judgmentongroundsthatjurycouldfindthatpartysobesitysubstantiallylimitedherability
towork).
129SeeSmawv.Va.DeptofStatePolice,862F.Supp.1469,147273,1475(E.D.Va.1994);
ErinE.Patrick,Comment,LoseWeightorLoseOut:TheLegalityofStateMedicaidProgramsThat
Make Overweight Beneficiaries Receipt of Funds Contingent upon Healthy Lifestyle Choices, 58
EMORYL.J.249,27172(2008)(citingAndrewsv.Ohio,104F.3d803,809(6thCir.1997)).
130Patrick, supra note 129, at 27172; Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, and Law
Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 53 n.143 (1999) (stating that
temporarydisabilitiessuchasobesitytypicallydonotqualifyundertheADA).
131Patrick, supra note 129, at 27173 ([I]mpairments causing an individual to avoid
sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she
playswithherchildren,gardens,anddriveslongdistancesdonotsubstantiallylimitmajor
lifeactivities.)(quotingToyotaMotorMfg.,Ky.,Inc.v.Williams,534U.S.184,202(2002)).
132Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,527U.S.555,56566(1999);Murphyv.UnitedParcelServ.,Inc.,527U.S.516,521
(1999).
that the determination would be made in light of potential diet and

exercise regiments, or even surgery.133 Further, itisunlikely that general
obesitywillbecoveredundertheADAbecausetheCourthasnot,asofyet,
decided whether obesity is the result of some form of physical addiction.
Oftenwherethecauseofthedisabilitycomesfromanexternalsource,such
asalcoholismanddrugabuse,theCourthastreatedphysicaladdictionas
thelynchpinforADAprotection.134
InJanuary2009theAmericanswithDisabilitiesActAmendmentsAct
of 2008 (Act)135 became law.136 The most significant purpose of this Act
wastoredefinethetermdisabilitymorebroadly,inanattempttomore
closelyreplicatetheintentofCongressinpassingtheADA.137Indeed,the
Act does not change the wording of the ADA, but rather changes the
interpretation of what it means to be disabled by changing the
interpretationofwhatitistohaveaphysicalormentalimpairmentthat
substantiallylimitsoneormoremajorlifeactivities;havearecordofsuch
animpairment;or[be]regardedashavingsuchanimpairment.138
Thenewinterpretationofsubstantiallylimitsisintendedtorequirea
far lower showing of impairment and altogether rejects the notion the
Supreme Court advocated in Sutton, which required that the judgment of
whether one has a disability be determined from the perspective of
ameliorative measures.139 Instead, the determination is made from the
perspective of the person at the time the determination is to be made.140
TheActalsochangestheinterpretationofmajorlifeactivitiestoincludean
nonexhaustive list that includes caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks,seeing,hearing,eating,sleeping,walking,standing,lifting,bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating,andworking,141andincludesmajorbodilyfunctionssuch
asfunctionsoftheimmunesystem,normalcellgrowth,digestive,bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and
133SeePatrick,supranote129,at273.
134Carol R. Buxton, Comment, Obesity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 BARRY L.
REV.109,12627(2003).
135ADAAmendmentsActof2008,Pub.L.No.110325,122Stat.3553(codifiedat29U.S.C.
705andscatteredsectionsof42U.S.C.).
136Id.
137JosephA.Seiner,PleadingDisability,51B.C.L.REV.95,108(2010).
138Id.at10809.
139AlexB.Long,IntroducingtheNewandImprovedAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct:Assessing
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 22021 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44/LRColl2008n44Long.pdf.
140Id.
14142U.S.C.A.12102(2)(A)(West2010).
reproductive functions.142 These changes overrule the strict reading of

disability, providing expanded protection in areas that would not have
qualifiedforprotectionbeforetheamendment.143
Thestringentshowingrequiredforanindividualtoqualifyasdisabled
under the previous Title II made it unlikely that a majority of students
would be able to claim that they were covered by the protections of the
ADA.144 However, the lower requirement under the Act makes the
possibility that a student will be able to claim a disability much more
likely.145Onethingthatstandsinthewayofstudentsreceivingprotection
isthatunderprecedenttheyarestillrequiredtoshowaphysiologicalcause
to their obesity to enjoy protection under the ADA.146 Whether the
amendment is interpreted as to reach to general obesity as opposed to
physiological obesity will have a significant impact on IHE policy for
regulating students.147 As of yet, federal courts have not had ample
opportunitytoapplythenewstandardintheareaofobesity,andlittlecan
be gleaned from the courts findings to note that a significant change has
occurred.148Assuch,itisclearthatanIHEcannotdiscriminatebetweenthe
treatment of physiologically obese individuals and the treatment of other
students solely on the basis of their obesity.149 Until the question of
physiologicalversusgeneralobesityprotectionisresolved,anIHEwillnot
beabletodeterminetheextenttowhichtheycancreateprogramsthattreat
those that are not physiologically obese differently from those that are in
longtermcourseplanning.150
14212102(2)(B).
143SeeAvery Williams,Comment, Obesity,CanadasOne PassengerOneFareRule andthe
PotentialEffectsontheU.S.CommercialAirlineIndustry,74J.AIRL.&COM.663,692(2009).
144Seesupranotes12834.
145SeeWilliams,supranote143,at69293.
146Seeid.at692.Cf.JenniferL.Pomeranz&LawrenceO.Gostin,ImprovingLawsandLegal
Authorities for Obesity Prevention and Control, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 62, 71 (2009) (advocating
theremovalofthephysiologicalrequirement).
147Williams,supranote143,at69293.
148The last federal case hearing an obesity claim under the ADA was Hill v. Verizon Md.,
Inc., No. RDB073123, 2009 WL 2060088 (D. Md. July 13, 2009). While purporting to
implementthenewregulation,itreferstothephysiologicalunderpinningsasnecessaryfora
claimtosurvive.Seeid.at*6.
149Seesupranote127andaccompanyingtext.
150See Williams, supra note 143, at 69293. Assessing whether a student is physiologically
obesewouldinvolveaninvestigationintowhethertheyhadadysfunctionofthemetabolic
system,lackofappetitesuppressionsignalstothebrain,geneticdisposition[or]anabnormal
number and size of fat cells. William C. Taussig, Note, Weighing in Against Obesity
Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REV. 927, 929 (1994). Such an investigation will
3. StateProtections
Some states have explicitly extended statutory protection from

discriminationtopeoplewithobesity.151Thefirstofthesestatuteswasthe
ElliotLarsenCivilRightsAct,whichprotectsindividualsinMichiganfrom
discrimination on the basis of weight in the realm of contracts and
employment.152Itremainstheonlystatutoryprotectionthatfullyprotects
overweightandobeseindividualsfromdiscrimination.153
Other states have created antidiscriminatory protections for obese
individuals in more restrictive situations, such as Georgias Morbid
Obesity Antidiscrimination Act, which protects individuals from being
discriminated against for being morbidly obese by health insurers.154 The
District of Columbia has made discrimination based on personal
appearance illegal under its statutory construction.155 While not explicitly
protective of obesity, a fair reading of the statute appears to protect
overweight and obese individuals from discrimination.156 The
municipalitiesofSantaCruzandSanFrancisco,California;Urbana,Illinois;
and Madison, Wisconsin have also passed antidiscriminatory legislation
makingdiscriminationonthebasisofweightillegal.157
AnIHEinthesemunicipalitiesandstateswillnotbeabletocreateanti
obesityprogramsthatmakedistinctionsbetweenindividualsonthebasis
of their weight, or in the case of the District of Columbia, their
appearance.158 An IHE in another municipality or state will necessarily
wanttocheckforanyforthcominglegislationthatmayrestrictthemfrom
discriminatingbetweenstudentsonthebasisofweightiftheydecidethat
doingsoisanappropriatewaytostructuretheirprogram.
necessitate testing the studenttesting that is likely to invade the students right to privacy
underthecommonlaw.SeeinfraPartIII.B.2.
151See, e.g., D.C. CODE 21401.01 (LexisNexis 2001) (prohibiting discrimination based on
personalappearance);MorbidObesityAntidiscriminationAct,GA.CODEANN.332459.7
(2005&Supp.2009);ElliottLarsenCivilRightsAct,MICH.COMP.LAWS37.2102(2001).
152MICH. COMP. LAWS 37.2102; see, e.g., Brenda K. DeVries, Note, Health Should Not Be a
Determinative Factor of Whether One Will Be a Suitable Adoptive Parent, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
137,161(2009);Bierman,Jr.,supranote107,at958(describingfrequentdiscriminationagainst
overweightpeopleintheemploymentarena).
153DeborahL.Rhode,TheInjusticeofAppearance,61STAN.L.REV.1033,1088(2009).
154GA.CODEANN.332459.7.
155D.C.CODE21401.01.
156See Courtney N. Kubilis, Note, Weighting for Protection in Massachusetts: The Myth of
EqualOpportunityinEmployment,42SUFFOLKU.L.REV.211,22526(2008).
157Id.;
Mridu Khullar, Fat Activists Seek Law Banning Weight Discrimination, WOMENS
INTL PERSP. (July 8, 2009), http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2009/07/fat_activists_seek_
law_banning.html.
B. PrivacyandAutonomyRights
In formulating an antiobesity program, an IHE must determine

whether the program will overstep the perimeter laid down in Dixon by
violating students right to privacy. As authors have said, [a]t the most
fundamental level, the ethos of public health takes the wellbeing of the
communityasitshighestgoodandwould,totheextentdeemednecessary,
limit freedom or place restrictions on the realm of privacy in order to
prevent morbidity from taking its toll.159 Another way of saying this is
that the utilitarian design of public health initiatives, such as curbing
obesity, often restricts an individuals right to privacy, and that the
protection of this privacy can often interfere with the ability of... the
statetoachievecollectivegoals.160
TodeterminewhetheranIHEprogramviolatesanindividualsrightto
privacy involves a multilayered analysis, as there is no single right to
privacy.161 The concept of the right of privacy is in actuality manifold,
entailing protections from state intrusion for the purposes of promoting
selfrealization and individual autonomy; protecting individuals intimate
personal knowledgesome of which may be embarrassingfrom being
divulged without their assent or acquiescence; and to ensure, on a more
primal level, that individuals have the simple right to be left alone.162
Becausetherightitselfismanifold,theprotectionsoftherighthavebeen
manifold.163
Legallytherearetwotypesofprivacyrightsthatmaybeimplicatedin
the creation of an IHE antiobesity program: (1) the generalized
159ChristinLawler,Comment,AnInternationalPerspectiveonBattlingtheBulge:JapansAnti
ObesityLegislationandItsPotentialImpactonWaistlinesAroundthe World,11SAN DIEGO INTL

L.J.287,300(2009)(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoElizabethWeeksLeonard,The
Publics Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335,
134445(2009).
160EllenFrankelPauletal.,IntroductiontoTHE RIGHTTO PRIVACY,atvii(EllenFrankelPaul
etal.eds.,2000).
161See John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 9
(2009)([O]urconceptoftheprivateishopelesslyequivocal.);LloydL.Weinreb,TheRight
toPrivacy,inTHE RIGHTTO PRIVACY, supranote160,at2529(Itisscarcelysurprisingthatthe
righttoprivacyisproblematic,ifitissouncertainwhatitisarightto.).
162SeeJudithWagnerDeCew,ThePriorityofPrivacyforMedicalInformation,inTHERIGHTTO
PRIVACY,supranote160,at213(Privacyshieldsusnotonlyfrominterferenceandpressures
that preclude selfexpression and the development of relationships, but also from intrusions
and pressures arising from others access to our persons and details about us.); Alexander
Rosenberg,PrivacyasaMatterofTasteandRight,inTHE RIGHT TO PRIVACY,supranote160,at
68; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
163SeeinfraPartIII.B.2.
constitutional right to privacy emanating from the Fourteenth

Amendment; and (2) the common law right to privacy.164 As with
discrimination,IHEsshouldalsobekeenlyawarethatanintrusionintothe
realm of privacy that would not constitute a violation of constitutional or
legalprivacymaystillleadtopossiblesocialadmonition;assomeauthors
pointoutthereisaperceivedrighttoprivacynotdependentonpositive
law, such that it ought ordinarily... be respected without regard to the
consequences,goodorbad,simplybecauseitisright.165
1. FourteenthAmendmentRighttoPrivacy
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no

state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
processoflaw....166TheFourteenthAmendmentDueProcessClausenot
only guarantees individual procedural rights but also protects certain
rights that are fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty, or in the
vernacular of the Court: substantive due process rights.167 As the Court
stated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, [i]t is a
promiseoftheConstitutionthatthereisarealmofpersonallibertywhich
the government may not enter.168 While the Court has given many
rationales for the fundamentality of these liberties, one of the earliest
rationales, and one that has continuing significance, is that there is an
entrenched right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment that is created
from the aggregate of privacy rights in the other portions of the Bill of
Rights.169 The Fourteenth Amendment therefore essentially protects
privacy interests, but unlike the Courts analysis of the Fourth
Amendment, where the Court has specifically stated that the rationale is
the protection of individuals privacy rights from unreasonable searches
andseizuresfromthegovernment,170therighttoprivacyintheFourteenth
164SeeinfraPartIII.B.12.
165Weinreb, supra note 161, at 25 (emphasis added). As political philosopher Hannah
Arendt reminds us, [t]he distinction between the private and public realms . . . equals the
distinctionbetweenthingsthatshouldbeshownandthingsthatshouldbehidden.HANNAH
ARENDT,THEHUMANCONDITION72(2ded.1998).
166U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,1.
167See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72022, 727 (1997); see also, e.g., Joseph F.
Kadlec, Note, Employing the Ninth Amendment to Supplement Substantive Due Process:
Recognizing the History of the Ninth Amendment and the Existence of Nonfundamental
Unenumerated Rights, 48 B.C. L. REV. 387, 38889 (2007) (arguing that the Fourteenth
AmendmentprivacyprotectionsshouldbebuttressedbytheNinthAmendment).
168505U.S.833,847(1992).
169Griswoldv.Connecticut,381U.S.479,48485(1965).
170SeeKatzv.UnitedStates,389U.S.347,361(1967)(Harlan,J.,concurring).
Amendmenthasnotbeenexplicitlyarticulated.171
As Justice Douglas stated in Griswold v. Connecticut, the penumbra of
theprivacyrightsintheotheramendmentsoverlapandcreateaprotected
zone of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.172 So far the Court
has specifically found that the rights to procreation, contraception,
abortion, child rearing and education, and private consensual acts of
sexualitybetweenadultsarewithintheprotectedzone.173Tyingallofthese
rights together is the belief in the constitutional necessity of privacy to
liberty.174 While it is disputed as to the exact privacy interest that is
protectedbytheFourteenthAmendment,manymodernauthorsagreethat
it primarily protects the right to autonomous decision making.175 These
authors principally hold that respecting privacy concerns is a method of
affirming the centrality of uncoerced individual decisionmaking in
important areas of human activity.... Privacy is protected in order to
allowustodecideaboutissuescentraltoouridentity....176
Thisviewofprivacyforautonomyssakeisreiteratedinanumberof
courtcasesheardbytheSupremeCourt.InEisenstadtv.Baird,whichheld
thatalawthatprohibitedthesaleofcontraceptiontopersonsthatwerenot
marriedwasunconstitutional,JusticeBrennanstatedthat[i]ftherightof
171Teri Dobbins Baxter, Private Oppression: How Laws that Protect Privacy Can Lead to
Oppression,58U.KAN.L.REV.415,421(2010);SheilaFleischhacker,WeighingtheLegal&Ethical
ImplicationsofBMIMeasurementsinSchools,12MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L.185,199(2008).This,
forexample,isinstarkcontrastwithotherdemocraticsocieties,suchastheEuropeanUnion,
whichspecificallyguaranteestherighttoprivacy.SeeAdamLiptak,WhenFreeWorldsCollide,
N.Y.TIMES,Feb.28,2010,atWK1,availableat2010WLNR4357035.
172381 U.S. at 484. Specifically, the Court found that the overlap is created by the First,
Third,Fourth,Fifth,andNinthAmendments.Id.at48485.
173See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 57879 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas
statute that made consensual homosexual intercourse illegal); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of
Health,497U.S.261,278(1990)(recognizingtherighttorefuseunwantedmedicalcare);Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding a womans right to choose an abortion should
receivehigherthanrationalbasisscrutiny);Lovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1,12(1967)(holding
thattherightofindividualstoenterintoaninterracialmarriageisfundamental);Griswold,381
U.S. at 485 (protecting the choice to use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 54142 (1942) (finding that procreation is a fundamental right);
Piercev.SocyofSisters,268U.S.510,535(1925)(findingafundamentalrightforparentsto
rearandeducatetheirchildren).
174Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 n.* ([T]his right of privacy . . . affect[s] the very essence of
constitutionallibertyandsecurity.).
175See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 141920 (1974);
Weinreb,supranote161,at2529;GaryL.Bostwick,Comment,ATaxonomyofPrivacy:Repose,
SanctuaryandIntimateDecision,64CALIF.L.REV.1447,144849(1976).
176PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 108 (1996) (internal
quotationmarksomitted).
privacymeansanything,itistherightoftheindividual...tobefreefrom
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.177 In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice OConnor
statedthat[m]atters[]involvingthemostintimateandpersonalchoicesa
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.178 These statements clearly denote that the fundamental
interestisinthedecisionmakingprocessandintherightofindividualsto
befreefromgovernmentintrusionintothatprocess.179Inaccordancewith
the view that these autonomous rights are fundamental, the court has
affordedthemheightenedreview.180
However,heightenedreview,thoughrhetoricallyallocatedtointerests
that implicate autonomy, has been allotted to only those enumerated
rightsthatarewithinacertainspectraofprocreation,marriage,andchild
educationandrearing.181Indeed,theCourthasstatedthatalthoughmany
of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in
personal autonomy... [it does not follow] that any and all important,
intimate,andpersonaldecisionsaresoprotected....182Forthoseinterests
thatdonotfitwithintheambitofanenumeratedconstitutionalright,the
courtwillreviewtheconstitutionalityofthelawbyevaluatingwhetherthe
stateactorhasalegitimatepurposebehindthelaw,andwhetherthemeans
are rationally connected to that end.183 Under this initial inquiry an IHE
program to curb obesity will receive rational review unless it implicates
one of the enumerated rights, as courts have been very conservative in
determiningwhatconstitutesafundamentalprivacyright....184
The one area where IHEsmayabut the FourteenthAmendment right
to privacy is if parts of the program involve forced medical treatment.
The Supreme Court has determined that the Fourteenth Amendment
protectsanindividualfromforcedmedicaltreatment,i.e.thatindividuals
have a right to refuse medical treatment.185 This right is thought of as a
177405U.S.438,453(1972)(secondemphasisadded).
178505U.S.833,851(1992).
179Eisenstadt,405U.S.at453.
180SeeHill,supranote161,at29.
181Id.
182Washingtonv.Glucksberg,521U.S.702,727(1997).
183SeeHill,supranote161,at31.
184SeeAnnHendrix&JoshBuck,Comment,EmployerSponsoredWellnessPrograms:Should
YourEmployerBetheBossofMoreThanYourWork?,38SW.U.L.REV.465,488(2009).
185See,e.g.,Sellv.UnitedStates,539U.S.166,176(2003)([T]hisCourtscasesmakeclear
[that]involuntarymedicaltreatmentraisesquestionsofclearconstitutionalimportance....A
corollary to a patients right to informed consent186 and as a protection of

an individuals autonomy and selfdetermination.187 As the Court has
stated, the right to refuse any medical treatment emerged from the
doctrines of trespass and battery, which were applied to unauthorized
touchings by a physician.188 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, the Court assumed that individuals have a vested constitutionally
protected interest in refusing medical treatment.189 The Court concluded
that a Missouri law requiring clear and convincing evidence of an
individuals desire to terminate palliative medical care if the individual
wasinavegetativestatewasconstitutionallypermissiblebecauseitupheld
animportantstateinteresttherightofanindividualtoretainthechoice
to refuse medical treatment.190 The Court stated that a violation of an
individuals right to refuse medical treatment will be determined by
balancing [the complaining parties] liberty interests against the relevant
state interests.191 While the analysis was somewhat unclear, it appears
thattheCourtendorsedtherationalbasistest.192
In determining whether the right to refuse medical treatment covers
the area testing of an individuals weight, the term medical treatment
must first be determined. In common parlance the term refers vaguely to
thecareandmanagementofapatienttocombat,ameliorate,orpreventa
disease, disorder, or injury.193 This definition can further be delineated
into separate categories of treatment determined by the degree, location,
andtemporalityofthetreatmentinconnectionwiththeinjury.194Whilethe
courtshavelongusedthephrasemedicaltreatment,theSupremeCourt
has typically applied the right to refuse constitutional analysis to
compelled[medical]intrusionintoanindividualsbody...implicatesexpectationsofprivacy
andsecurityofgreatmagnitude....(quotingWinstonv.Lee,470U.S.753,759(1985))).
186Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16
DUKEJ.GENDERL.&POLY223,239(2009).
187Seesourcescitedsupranote175andaccompanyingtext.
188Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 n.4 (1982); see Seema Shah & Patricia Zettler, From a
Constitutional Right to a Policy of Exceptions: Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to
ExperimentalTherapy,10YALEJ.HEALTHPOLYL.&ETHICS135,143(2010).
189497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (We
have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the
traditionalrighttorefuseunwantedlifesavingmedicaltreatment.).
190Cruzan,497U.S.at284.
191Id.at279(quotingYoungbergv.Romeo,457U.S.307,321(1982)).
192PaulC.Redrup,Comment,WhenLawEnforcementandMedicineOverlap:TheCommunity
CaretakerExceptionandtheRighttoRefuseMedicalTreatment,38U.TOL.L.REV.741,757(2007).
193MOSBYSMEDICAL,NURSING,&ALLIEDHEALTHDICTIONARY1744(6thed.2002).
194Id.at174445.
palliative treatments,195 or the administration of drugs to unwilling

patients.196TheSupremeCourthasbeenremisstoextendtherighttorefuse
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, stating in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,thattherearemanifoldrestraintstowhicheverypersonis
necessarily subject for the common good, over the petitioners argument
that he should be able to refuse mandatory vaccinations because they are
hostiletotheinherentrightofeveryfreemantocareforhisownbodyand
healthinsuchwayastohimseemsbest.197
However, even if a program treating obesity is viewed as medical
treatment, the courts will still likely hear it under the rational basis
balancing test, which requires simply that a legitimate state interest is
provided, and that the means are rationally connected to those ends.198
While it is clear that individuals have a desire to maintain privacy and
autonomyovertheirbodies,itisequallyclearthatIHEshavealegitimate
goalinfurtheringtheholisticgrowthofstudentstoprovidethemwiththe
tools to succeed in the outside world, as well as in protecting students
health.199 Although the potential for constitutional challenges over
aggressive wellness programs is very real,200 the likelihood that an
individual will be able to assert that an IHE program aimed at curbing
obesityisconstitutionallyinvalidishighlyunlikely,astheywouldhaveto
prove that the IHE had no legitimate purpose or that the means to that
purposearecompletelyirrational.201Itisnotenoughtoclaimthatthegoal
is under or over inclusive, or that it is unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought.202 The goal of promoting
195Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Vacco v.
Quill,521U.S.793,807(1997).
196See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 13435 (1992) (forcing antipsychotic drugs on a
prisoner violated Fourteenth Amendment unless state has overriding justification);

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (finding that the forcible injection of
medication into the body of a nonconsenting person substantially interfered with that
personsliberty).
197197U.S.11,26(1905).
198SeeHill,supranote161,at31(settingoutstandardforrationalbasis);BrandonS.Swider,
Judicial Activism v. Judicial Abdication: A Plea for a Return to the Lochner Era Substantive Due
Process Methodology, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 315, 341 (2009) (explaining that nonfundamental
rightsreceiverationalbasis).
200Hendrix&Buck,supranote184,at488.
201See David N. Mayer, The Myth of LaissezFaire Constitutionalism: Liberty of Contract
DuringtheLochnerEra,36HASTINGSCONST.L.Q.217,26162(2009)(describingthedueprocess
testasthedifferencebetweenvalid,orreasonable,policepowerexercisesfrominvalid,or
arbitrary,exercisesofgovernmentalpower).
202Williamsonv.LeeOpticalofOkla.,Inc.,348U.S.483,48788(1955).
health is one of the fundamental police powers, and therefore would be

considered a legitimate IHE goal.203 Likewise, the means are likely to be
upheld since any program will require that students take steps to live a
healthierlifestyle,denotingadebatablerationalmeansendsconnection.204
2. CommonLawRighttoPrivacy
WhereastheFourteenthAmendmentprincipallyprotectstheinterests
of individuals for the purposes of promoting autonomy and self
determination, the common law right to privacy primarily protects an
individuals informational privacy, a persons control over others
acquisitionanddistributionofinformationabouthimself.205Thecommon
lawrighttoprivacyhasbeenrecognizedbymanyasatortremedyforthe
invasion of privacy that protects a persons right to solitude or
seclusion.206FirstproposedintheseminalwritingsofSamuelWarrenand
LouisBrandeis,207therighttoprivacyisrecognizedinsomeformbymany
jurisdictions in the United States.208 A person becomes liable for the
invasion of anothers privacy if that individual intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
privateaffairsorconcerns...iftheintrusionwouldbehighlyoffensiveto
areasonableperson,209orifunreasonablepublicityisgiventoapersons
private life if the matterpublicized isof akind that (a) would be highly
offensivetoareasonableperson,and(b)isnotoflegitimateconcerntothe
public.210 The main issues with an invasion of privacy cause of action
against an IHE for a program aimed at loss of obesity are whether a
studenthasaprivacyinterestinthepublicknowledgeoftheirobesity,or
against testing for obesity, and if so, whether such knowledge or testing
wouldbefoundtobehighlyoffensive.211
For the purposes of a common law claim of invasion of privacy, an
203SeeMayer,supranote201,at26162.
204See16BAM. JUR. 2DConstitutionalLaw965(2009)(Ifitisatleastdebatablewhethera
rational relationship exists between a governmental policy and a conceivable legitimate

governmentalobjective,thereisnosubstantivedueprocessviolation.).
205Weinreb,supranote161,at34.
206SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS652A(2)(a),652B(1977).
207SeeWarren&Brandeis,supranote162.
208See,e.g.,Sidisv.FRPublgCorp.,113F.2d806,80810(2dCir.1940);Brentsv.Morgan,
299S.W.967,96970(Ky.1927);Feeneyv.Young,181N.Y.S.481,482(App.Div.1920).
209RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS652B(1977).
210Id.
652A(2)(c), 652D. A common law invasion of privacy can also occur in the
appropriationofanothersnameorlikeness,orifapersonisplacedinafalselightpublicly.
Id.652A(2)(b),(d).
211Seeid.652(2)(c),652D;seealsoHendrix&Buck,supranote184,at496.
obesepersonmostlikelydoesnothaveareasonableexpectationofprivacy
in being obese, because such information is publici.e., we can usually
seeapersonisoverweight.212Thequestionthatismoreimportantforthis
analysis is whether a particular method of testing for wellness, such as
BMI,ortestingthatfocusesonanonpublicaspectofanindividualsmake
up, such as their cholesterol levels and genetic makeup, and any
information gleaned from these methods is subject to liability under this
tort.213
While defining the boundary between public and private space can
sometimes be troublesome,214 it appears possible that some information
fromtestingwouldbeconsiderednonpublic,andhighlyobjectionableby
the parental and student populations, and would therefore be protected
from invasions of privacy.215 Testing based on BMI is one of the least
intrusive means of testing for obesity, as it involves only external
measurements, most of which can be roughly estimated based on visual
inspection of a student, but which are traditionally determined by
informationreceivedfromthepatientorfromactualmeasurements.216Both
weightandheight,thebasisofBMItesting,canberoughlyascertainedby
the public through visual inspection, and therefore it is unlikely that the
courtswillfindthatthisinformationwasprivatetobeginwith,orthatits
collection or dissemination would be highly objectionable.217 However,
other methods of testing for obesity, while being more accurate, are also
more intrusive; these include: skinfold thickness measurements,218
ultrasound,219 hydrometery,220 bioelectrical impedance analysis,221 and
212Hendrix&Buck,supranote184,at496.
213Id.at49697.
214WILLIAM K. JONES, INSULTTO INJURY: LIBEL, SLANDER,AND INVASIONSOF PRIVACY22830
(2003) (detailing the facts of Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 47577 (Cal.
1998)).Awomanwhowasinjuredinanaccidenthadhervoicerecordedwhilelayingonthe
groundandwhileinanemergencyresponsehelicopter.Shulman,955P.2dat47577.Thecourt
heldthatthewomansrighttocommonlawprivacywasviolatedwhenshewastapedinthe
helicopter,butnotwhenshewasontheground.Id.at48992.
215SeeHendrix&Buck,supranote184,at497.
216But see Fleischhacker, supra note 171, at 19495 (suggesting that a BMI measurement
wouldnotbecompletelyaccurate).
217Cf.Gillv.HearstPublgCo.,253P.2d441,44445(Cal.1953)(citingMelvinv.Reid,297
P.91,91(Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1931))(holdingapicturetakenofahusbandandwifeinpublic
and subsequently published did not rise to the level of invasion of privacy and stating that
[t]herecanbenoprivacyinthatwhichisalreadypublic).
218See
Anna Bellisari & Alex Roche, Anthropometry and Ultrasound, in HUMAN BODY
COMPOSITION109,10922(StevenB.Heymsfieldetal.eds.,2ded.2005).
219Seeid.at12227.
220SeeDaleA.Schoeller,Hydrometry,inHUMAN BODY COMPOSITION,supranote218,at35
49.
D.E.X.A.(dualenergyXrayabsorptiometry)scans.222Becausethesetesting
methods have the ability to uncover information that is secret, the
disclosureofwhichwouldlikelybeoffensive,astudentmaylikelyhavea
claimofinvasionofprivacyforanyinformation,suchascholesterollevels
and genetic makeup, that is discovered through these more intrusive
testing practices.223 Likewise, disclosure of private information found
throughtheseteststothepubliccouldalsobeconsideredhighlyoffensive
and therefore an IHE may face potential litigation for disclosing
information to [the public] resulting from wellness programs.224 For
programs that stick to BMI testing, such as the program at Lincoln
University,orwhichdonotrequireanyformoftesting,thesequestionsare
essentiallymoot.225
3. PaternalismandSocialBacklash:ShouldIHEsLimit
StudentAutonomy?
RegardlessofwhetheranIHEcanregulatestudentbehaviorandvalues
for the purpose of curbing obesity,226 it stands to reason whether IHEs
should regulate student behavior. The aim of in loco parentis regulation to
curb obesity by IHEs necessarily falls into the rubric of paternalistic
action,227 as it aims to protect students from making certain decisions by
forcing or manipulating individuals to change their behavior for their
own good.228 The main claim against IHEs paternalistic regulating of
student behavior, outside of the legal context, is that it infringes on the
more expansive right of students to make private autonomous decisions
221SeeWm.CameronChumela&ShumeiS.Sun,BioelectricalImpedanceAnalysis,inHUMAN
BODY COMPOSITION, supra note 218, at 7988; Henry C. Lukaski et al., Assessment of Fatfree
Mass Using Bioelectrical Impedance Measurements of the Human Body, 41 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 810, 81011 (1985) (explaining that bioelectrical impedance measures fat tissue
massbysendingalowlevelelectricalcurrentthroughaperson).
222See Timothy J. Lohman & Zhao Chen, DualEnergy XRay Absorptiometry, in HUMAN
BODYCOMPOSITION,supranote218,at6377.
223SeeHendrix&Buck,supranote184,at497.
224Id.
225SeeFleischhacker,supranote171,at19495.
226SeesupraPartIII.AB.
227ThewordpaternalismhasitsrootsintheLatinwordpater,whichmeanstoactlikea
father.SeeTaiwoA.Oriola,EthicalandLegalAnalysesofPolicyProhibitingTobaccoSmokingin
EnclosedPublicSpaces,37J.L.MED.&ETHICS828,831(2009).
228MarioJ.Rizzo&DouglasGlenWhitman,LittleBrotherisWatchingYou:NewPaternalism
on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 685 (2009); see Kelly Sarabyn, The TwentySixth
Amendment:ResolvingtheFederalCircuitSplitoverCollegeStudentsFirstAmendmentRights,14
TEX.J.C.L.&C.R.27,7879(2008).
about themselves.229 The basic concern with paternalistic action is the

concept that autonomy is incompatible with the powers of authority, as
authority forces the individual to surrender his rights to formative
decisionmaking.230 Critics argue that the ability for students to make
autonomousdecisionsisnecessarytothecreationofonesself,231andthat
paternalism reinforces immaturity, conformity, and disinterest, instead
of promoting selfdetermination.232 To the liberal theorist, the very
impositionofmoral,behavioral,orattitudinalvaluesontheindividualby
anotherinpoweriswrong.233AsJohnStuartMillstatesinhistreatiseOn
Liberty, [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
overanymemberofacivilizedcommunity,againsthiswill,istoprevent
harmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficient
warrant.234
Ontheotherhand,othersclaimthatpublichealthinitiatives,whilein
tension with private autonomy, are of greater importance.235 They argue
that social planning saves individuals from selfinflicted harm,236 and
promotes utilitarian objectives by protecting society from the secondary
fallout of poor decisions, such as greater healthcare costs caused from
obesity.237Thebasisofthisclaimisthatindividualsoftenbehaveinways
229SeeSarabyn,supranote228,at7879.
230But see THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 12627, 129
(1998)(attemptingtoreconcileauthorityandautonomy).
231SeeWeinreb,supranote161,at3839.
232See Note, Private Government on the CampusJudicial Review of University Expulsions, 72
YALE L.J. 1362, 1395 n.159 (1963) (citing HAROLD TAYLOR, U.S. NATL STUDENT ASSN,
RESOLUTION ON IN LOCO PARENTIS (1962), available at http://content.cdlib.org/
view?docId=kt3f59n69g&chunk.id=d0e1197&brand=calisphere&doc.view=entire_text); see also
F.A. HAYEK,Forewordtothe1956AmericanPaperbackEditionofTHE ROADTO SERFDOM,in THE
ROADTOSERFDOM:TEXTANDDOCUMENTS4849(BruceCaldwell,ed.2007)(citingL.J.BARNES,
YOUTH SERVICE IN AN ENGLISH COUNTRY: A REPORT PREPARED FOR KING GEORGES JUBILEE
TRUST1821(1945)).
233See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CONCERNING THE COMMON SAYING: THIS MAY BE TRUE IN
THEORYBUT DOES NOT APPLYTO PRACTICE (1793), reprintedin BASIC WRITINGSOF KANT 42021
(AllenW.Wooded.,CarlJ.Friedrichtrans.,TheModernLibraryClassics2001).
234JOHNSTUARTMILL,ONLIBERTY(1859),reprintedinUTILITARIANISMANDONLIBERTY9495
(MaryWarnocked.,BlackwellPublg2ded.2003).Thepracticalrealityisthatgovernmental
and private institutions have become increasingly engaged in the management of the life
of...people.F.A.HAYEK,supranote232,at66n.2.(citingJOHNMAYNARDKEYNES&THEUK
COMMITTEEONFINANCEANDINDUSTRY,REPORT45(1931)).
235SeeLeonard,supranote159,at134546.
236DanielI.Wikler,PersuasionandCoercionforHealth:EthicalIssuesinGovernmentEffortsto
ChangeLifeStyles,56MILBANKMEMORIALFUNDQ.HEALTH&SOCY303,308(1978).
237SeeLeonard,supranote159,at134849.
that are disadvantageous to themselves and to society.238 Further, while

autonomy assumes that individuals decisions are well thought out, it is
clear that individuals often make inferior decisions regarding their
personalwelfaredecisionsthattheywouldchangeiftheyhadcomplete
information,unlimitedcognitiveabilities,andnolackofselfcontrol.239As
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler posit, the fact that a large
percentage of people are obese or overweight, even in light of
overwhelming evidence that obesity causes serious health risks,...
[makesit]quitefantastictosuggestthateveryoneischoosingtheoptimal
diet.240 The authors state that individuals often make poor decisions
because of a mixture of default rules, starting points, perspectives, and
inertia.241 For many individuals, decisions are made based off of faulty
information,ignorance,ordoingwhatothersaroundthemaredoing.242
Whileautonomyisanimportantconsideration,iftheprimarygoalisto
protectindividualsfrompoordecisionsconcerningtheirhealth,itappears
thatanIHEantiobesityprogramwillnecessarilyneedtoassumetheform
ofsocialplanning.243However,thisdoesnotmeanthatallstudentchoices
needbedisregarded;paternalismcomesingradients,frompurerestrictive
control over an individuals decisions (enforced through punishment in
someform),tomanipulationofanindividualsenvironmentinanattempt
to shape their subconscious and conscious decisions.244 As authors point
out, even the slightest changes in a students behavior can be considered
coercively paternalistic, but that does not mean that students necessarily
lose the ability to make choices, it simply means that they may have to
make choices more actively to retain pure autonomy.245 For example, a
liberal or soft program may have classes on nutrition, exercise, and
practical culinary skills, or may reorganize the cafeteria to place healthy
238KatherineJ.Strandburg,Privacy,Rationality,andTemptation:ATheoryofWillpowerNorms,
57RUTGERSL.REV.1235,1294(2005);seeWikler,supranote236,at308.
239SeeCassR.Sunstein&RichardH.Thaler,LibertarianPaternalismIsNotanOxymoron,70
U.CHI.L.REV.1159,1162(2003).
240Id.at116768.
241Seeid.at117482.
242Rizzo&Whitman,supranote228,at686;Sunstein&Thaler,supranote239,at1181.Cf.
Michael Cardin et al., Preventing Obesity and Chronic Disease: Education vs. Regulation vs.
Litigation, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 120, 121 (2007) (discussing how changes in an individuals
environmentcanhaveagreateffectonanindividualschoiceset).
243See Oriola, supra note 227, at 83133 (discussing the paternalism of proscribing tobacco
useinenclosedpublicspaces);supratextaccompanyingnotes22728.
244SeeSunstein&Thaler,supranote239,at118890.
245See Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INTL L.J. 51,
10910(2010).
foodsinamoreprevalentplace.246IHEswillnecessarilyneedtodetermine
thelevelofinvolvementinstudentdecisionsthattheywishtopartake,and
thelevelofautonomytheywishtoleavewiththestudents,whenchoosing
theformofprogramthattheywishtoinstitute.
IV. ProposalforaFeasibleAntiObesityProgram
IndescribingafeasibleantiobesityprogramforanIHE,itisnecessary
to keep in mind two parameters: (1) that Dixon and its progeny have
createdalegalperimeteraroundwhichbehavioralregulationcanentail;247
and(2)thatthecomplexenvironmentalissuesaffectingobesitynecessitates
targetingmultipleaspectsof[an]individual[s]environment[]toworkat
maximum efficiency.248 From a legal perspective it is important that any
programdoesnotinfringeuponconstitutionalorlegalrightstoprivacy,or
discriminateunfairlybetweenindividuals.249Programsthataremostlikely
to be challenged on these fronts are those that discriminate between
individuals who are obese or overweight from students who have
normalweights,andprogramsthathavemeasuringmethodologiesthat
invade students common law right to privacy, or divulge intimate
informationaboutstudents.250
The analysis above demonstrates that discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment is an unlikely candidate for a constitutional
challengetoanIHEprogramsincestudentswhoareobeseoroverweight
do not constitute a protected class, and IHE regulation has the legitimate
purpose of promoting the health of its student population.251 The
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims are also likely to
fail, as the courts will likely hear them under the rational basis test,
requiring only that IHEs show some legitimate purposehealth
concernsandrationallyrelatedmeansimplementinghealthregulations
that further the purpose of promoting healthy lifestyles.252 Further, while
some headway has beenmadefor protecting obese individualsunder the
ADA, such protections have been reserved for only those individuals
whoseobesityconstitutesadisabilityundertheADAwhocontinueto
246SeeSunstein&Thaler,supranote239,at118890.
247SeesupraPartIII.
248ChristinaD.Economos&SonyaIrishHauser,CommunityInterventions:ABriefOverview
andTheirApplicationtotheObesityEpidemic,35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 131,133(2007);seeEgger&

Swinburn,supranote27,at479;supraPartII.
249SeesupraPartIII.
250SeesupraPartsIII.A.,III.B.2.
251SeesupraPartIII.A.1.
252SeesupraPartIII.B.1.
represent only a small percentage of obese individuals.253 Common law

privacy may provide students with more protections, depending on the
testing method used by the IHE in its program and whether or not that
informationisdisclosedtothepublic.254AnIHEthatdeterminestoemploy
compulsory testing should therefore employ a method that is the least
invasive,andwhichhastheleastchanceofdivulgingprivateinformation
aboutstudents.255
However, even though IHEs can legally regulate student behavior to
promote healthier lifestyles, there are still significant issues concerning
studentautonomyandsocialbacklash.256Inthefaceofthis,IHEswilllikely
wanttoimplementaprogramthatimposeslessrestrictiverequirementson
students, while still attempting to efficiently promote antiobesity. Some
waysofformingsuchaprogrammightinclude:
Mandatoryculinary,nutrition,andfitnessclasses:Institutingeducational
classes in the areas of nutrition, fitness, and cooking provides a holistic
view of health that aims to allow students to respond to the myriad
environmentalpressuresthatleadtoobesity.257Byrequiringclassesinthe
nutritionandtheculinaryarts,IHEswillprovidestudentswiththeskillsto
activelychoosethequalityandquantitythattheyeat,andallowstudents
totailortheirdiettopromotehealthyweightgoals.258Byrequiringfitness
classes, IHEs can teach students how to exercise safely, and about the
physiologyoftheirbody,sothattheyarepreparedtomakelifelongfitness
goals to attain a healthy weight.259 In taking these courses, students will
learnpracticalmethodsofreducingweightandlivinghealthier,andIHEs
can ensure that students will have the knowledge to make active and
informed decisions about their health.260 An educationalbased program
has the added advantage of curving student behavior without
253SeesupraPartIII.A.2.
257Seeinfranotes26263andaccompanyingtext.
258SeeJamieOliver,JamieOliversTEDPrizeWish:TeachEveryChildAboutFood,TED(Feb.
2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/jamie_oliver.html. The United Kingdom has

already implemented legislation that makes cooking classes mandatory in state secondary
schools for children between the ages of eleven and fourteen by 2011. Nicola Woolcock,
Compulsory Cooking Lessons for School Kids, TIMES (London), Sept. 12, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article4733953.ece.
259See Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built Environment: Challenges and
Opportunities, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 821, 822 (2008) (explaining the relationship
betweenobesity,foodconsumption,andexercise).
260See Kathleen Seiders & Ross D. Petty, Obesity and the Role of Food Marketing: A Policy
AnalysisofIssuesandRemedies,23J.PUB.POLY&MARKETING153,156(2004).
commandeering students direct decisions about their bodies, just their

decisionsastowhatclassestheyarerequiredtotake.
NonDiscriminatoryApplication:Bymakingaprogrammandatoryforall
students,issuesconcerningdiscriminationaremooted.261Ifallstudentsare
required to take classes there is also a lower possibility of social outrage
from parents and students who feel they are receiving disparate
treatment.262 Furthermore, requiring all students to take the class furthers
the IHEs utilitarian concerns with obesity; by providing every student
with the knowledge to make informed health decisions, IHEs assure that
all students have a higher chance of staying healthy, as opposed to just
thosewhoaredeterminedtobecurrentlylivingunhealthylifestyles.263
Voluntary Testing: While testing can be extremely helpful in
determining body composition and articulating the exact issues that an
individualmayhavewiththeirhealth,itcanalsobeanextremebreachofa
students privacy and autonomy.264 Some testing methods, such as BMI
testing, are unlikely to cause legal issues for IHEs, but more intrusive
testing may lead to litigation based on invasions of student privacy.265
While it would be necessary to test an individual if the purpose of the
program was for shortterm weight loss, if the point is to instill students
with the tools to make proper weightloss decisions, testing becomes of
secondary importance.266 Because an antiobesity program that is
mandatory on all students would not require testing to determine which
students need classes and which ones do not, testing would not be
necessaryforsuchaprogramsimplementation.267

261See,e.g.,Buxton,supranote134,at124(Thecourtrefusedtoholdthat[theplaintiff]was
discriminatedagainstbecause...hewastreatedasanyother...wastreated.)(summarizing
thecourtsdecisioninSellickv.DennysInc.,884F.Supp.388,392(D.Or.1995)).
262SeeElizabethLandau,CollegesTooFattoGraduateRuleUnderFire,CNN(Nov.30,2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/11/30/lincoln.fitness.overweight/index.html; Too Fat to

Graduate?,FOXNEWS(Dec.23,2009),http://video.foxnews.com/v/3945297/toofattograduate.
263SeeSeiders&Petty,supranote260,at156(statingthatlackofinformationonthecauses
andconsequencesofobesityisacauseofanindividualsfailuretomakeadvantageoushealth
decisions).
264Seesourcescitedsupranotes21822.
267This is in contrast to the Lincoln University program, where testing was used to
determinewhowouldtaketheclass.SeeLandau,supranote262.
CONCLUSION
The role of in loco parentis behavioral regulation in IHEs has been

severely limited in the past fifty years.268 However, with Lincoln
Universitys antiobesity program as a harbinger, it may be time to
reinstitute in loco parentis behavioral regulation as an effective means of
curbing the obesity epidemic.269 While in loco parentis regulations are
paternalistic by nature, and therefore infringe on students autonomous
decisionmaking, they are not violative of constitutional or legal
safeguards.270 Because of the special relationship between students and
IHEs, IHEs are in the best position to create fundamental differences in
students health and knowledge about obesity.271 While IHEs can legally
intrudeonstudentsdecisionmakinginregardstoobesity,theymaywish
to formulatea plan that not only conforms to the constitutionaland legal
requirements to a degree that will lead to a lower chance of student
instigatedlitigation,butalsotakesstudentautonomyintoconsideration.272
268SeesupraPartII.BD.
269SeesupraPartII.D.
270SeesupraPartIII.
271SeesupraPartIV.
272SeesupraPartIV.

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SWARTZ_FINALPG_101137PROOFED(DONOTDELETE) 1/10/20119:33:50AM

In the past decade the obesity epidemic has exploded, leading to a

102 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

there are many legal and social challenges to implementing such a

1 Lincoln University is a staterelated institution. About Lincoln: A Legacy of Producing

BodyMassIndex,NATL HEART LUNG & BLOOD INST.,http://www.nhlbisupport.com/bmi/(last

ENTERPRISE (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.blackenterprise.com/business/businessnews/2009/

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 103

proved to be controversial; critics found the condition to be overzealous,

Minutes, LINCOLN UNIV. (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.lincoln.edu/academicaffairs/

104 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

value overlays were part of the longstanding AngloAmerican legal and

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 105

19SeeNATL INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION,

106 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

hormones, infertility, thyroid conditions, and cancer.21 Furthermore,

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 107

complications mounts, there has been some headway toward changes in

108 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

more expansive and paternalistic approach to obesity and weight loss,

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 109

morals, values, and behavioral practices they wanted to instill in their

College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and

110 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

who hadbeendismissedwithouta hearingfor disorderlyconduct);Walton,supranote8,at

56Comment, PrivateGovernmenton theCampusJudicialReviewof UniversityExpulsions,72

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 111

112 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 113

114 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 115

DiscriminationandtheLogicofAmericanAntidiscriminationLaw,11CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POLY

116 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 117

107Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Comment, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight

118 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

The ADA protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of

legislation intended to benefit, rather than disadvantage . . . would generally withstand

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 119

120 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

that the determination would be made in light of potential diet and

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 121

reproductive functions.142 These changes overrule the strict reading of

143SeeAvery Williams,Comment, Obesity,CanadasOne PassengerOneFareRule andthe

122 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

Some states have explicitly extended statutory protection from

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 123

In formulating an antiobesity program, an IHE must determine

ObesityLegislationandItsPotentialImpactonWaistlinesAroundthe World,11SAN DIEGO INTL

124 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

constitutional right to privacy emanating from the Fourteenth

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 125

126 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 127

corollary to a patients right to informed consent186 and as a protection of

128 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|101

palliative treatments,195 or the administration of drugs to unwilling

prisoner violated Fourteenth Amendment unless state has overriding justification);

201See David N. Mayer, The Myth of LaissezFaire Constitutionalism: Liberty of Contract

2010 Regulating Obesity at Institutions of Higher Education 129

health is one of the fundamental police powers, and therefore would be