THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him,
resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19

Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation to
support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A.
No. 9262 which equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligors nationality.24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum
of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he
is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents duty and obligation to give
support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give
support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to
give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that
the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.

In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit:
(1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule
42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken
to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e., whether or not a foreign
national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the
liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal
laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present
case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for
future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and
economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioners contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article
26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor
child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason
of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under Article
195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not,
however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces
the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well
as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of
status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not
liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support his child
is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law
would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao
Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support
his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just . Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioners son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts: chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or
her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:

xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family , or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an
act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioners
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case, which provides that:[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international
law and to treaty stipulations. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent
was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal
basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished
on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,*and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1896
dated November 28, 2014

1
Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and B to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.

Rollo, p. 6.
2

3
Id.

4
Id. at 7.

5
Annex F to Petition, rollo, p. 31.

6
Id. at 32.

7
Annex A to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.

8
Id. at 24.

9
Id. at 32.

10
Id.

11
Supra note 7, at 23-24.

12
Supra note 5, at 32.

13
Rollo, p. 7.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 22.
16
Id.

17
Id. at 24.

18
Id. at 8.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Supra note 7.

22
Id.at 24.

23
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
24
Annex R to Petition, rollo, p. 102.

25
Annex B to Petition, id. at 25.

26
Id.

Rollo, p. 10.
27

28
G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.

29
Id. at 332-333.

30
Supra note 23.

31
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

32
Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.

33
Id. at 122.

Supra note 23.

34

35
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Supra note 7, at 24.

36

Id.
37

38
G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.

39
Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)

EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).

40
41
Annex N to Petition, rollo, p. 84.

42
399 Phil. 342 (2000).

43
Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)

Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).
44

45
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

Rollo, p. 18.
46

Supra note 44.

47

48
Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied)

49
543 Phil. 275 (2007).

50
Id. at 290.

51
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)

Rollo, p. 15.
52

53
In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that:chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but
all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime
committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 205136, December 02, 2014

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For the consideration of the Court is the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules
of Court, assailing the ruling of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) which cancelled the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) and denied the substitution of
Kimberly by petitioner Olivia Da Silva Cerafica (Olivia).

On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC
stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the
elections,1 in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of
Taguig).2 As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17
December 2012.3 Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these
events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.

In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director Amora-Ladra) of

the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and consequently, the
denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec Resolution No. 9551,4 Director Amora-
Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted.

In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec adopted the recommendation
of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberlys COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an
effect of the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, viz:6
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendation of
Director Esmeralda-Amora-Ladra, Law Department, as follows:

1. To cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica without
prejudice to any civil, criminal or administrative liability that she may have incurred
pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution 9518; and

2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica as an

effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, Status Quo Ante Order, and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, raising the following
issues:7
I.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED MINUTE RESOLUTION RESULTING IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY (COC) OF ASPIRANT KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA AND THE DENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION
OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA AS AN EFFECT OF THE CANCELLATION
OF THE COC OF KIMBERLY.

II.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SUBSTITUTION BY PETITIONER FOR KIMBERLY RESULTING IN
THE MOTU PROPRIO DENIAL OF PETITIONERS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

III.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD,
THEREBY RESULTING IN THE MOTU PROPRIO DENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA
CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA.
In its Comment8 filed on 22 April 2013, respondent Comelec argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly
as the latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age,
and that, moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material
misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to.9 The Comelec further
averred that it can cancel Kimberlys COC motu proprio as it may look into patent defects in the COCs, such
as Kimberlys failure to comply with the age requirement.10 chanro bles law

In her Reply11 filed on 10 May 2013, Olivia countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for
election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official
candidate who may be substituted.12 Olivia also claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny
Kimberlys COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to
mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not
qualified.13
c han robles law

At the outset, we note that a verification with the Comelec database yields the finding that Olivia was not
among the official candidates14 for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for.15 As such, a ruling on
the present petition would no longer be of practical use or value. Even if we were to resolve the petition for
the purpose of determining Olivias legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such
purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the
2013 elections.16 c hanro bles law

Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to caution the
Comelec against the precipitate cancellation of COCs.

In Albaa v. Comelec,17 we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.
Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review. In this case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition in order to
prevent a repetition thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and peaceful elections. chan robles law

VALID SUBSTITUTION

In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus,
could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion.

Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates18 and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of COCs.19 chanro bles law

In Cipriano v. Comelec,20 we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to
COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is
ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go
into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of substitution of
candidates, to wit:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate
of the country, with the Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party may be substituted.21 In the case at bar, Kimberly was an
official nominee of the Liberal Party;22 thus, she can be validly substituted.

The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution; we
answer in the affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the last day for the
filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly
belongs;23 and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.24 chan roble slaw

In Luna v. Comelec,25 where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election day
and was substituted by a qualified candidate, we declared that such substitution was valid. The Court
eloquently explained:
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid

Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon Hans Rogers
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna.

On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have
filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate who could be substituted by
Luna.

When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code) provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt
of the certificate of candidacy.
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy. Thus, the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy.

On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person
who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written
declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his
certificate of candidacy before the election.

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the
Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who
dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate
of the country, with the Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all
the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may
not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date
of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person
filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate
of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans
Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus,
was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Lunas certificate of candidacy. In
effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy and
declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Rogers certificate
of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after the proper
proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was
never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared
that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was
denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna. 26 (Emphases
supplied.)
LACK OF DUE PROCESS

Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberlys COC and
denying the latters substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC,
the Court finds that the Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion.

The Court reminds the Comelec that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the
Constitution27 mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration,
by the En Banc.

Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not
involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is
deemed quasi-judicial.28 As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the
Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.

In Bautista v. Comelec, et al.,29 where the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of a
candidates COC for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was affirmed by the Comelec En Banc,
the Court held that the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a
prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate. The Court held:
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case
if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en
banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy without
first referring the case to a division for summary hearing.

xxxx

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation
proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in
division should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not
from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the
candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the
candidate.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination
of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.31 We thus caution
the Comelec against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the
recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the cases referral to a Division
for summary hearing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation of certificate of candidacy
is a quasi-judicial process, and accordingly is heard by the Commission on Elections in Division and En
Banc on appeal, we DISMISS the present petition for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Sereno, C. J., on official leave.

Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part, acted as Solicitor General.

Endnotes:

**
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1898-A dated 2 December 2014.

1
13 May 2013.

2
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the sectoral representatives shall be elected
as may be provided for by law. The elected member of the sangguniang panlungsod must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the election, a resident of the City for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, and a qualified voter therein;

Rollo, p. 26.
3

4
TO REFUSE TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO and CANCEL THE CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY of those who,
despite having known their apparent lack of qualification for being below the minimum age requirement
imposed by the Constitution, still deliberately filed their COCs for Senator. We find no other justification
other than that they have no genuine interest to run for senator but merely to put the election in mockery or
disrepute.

5
Rollo, pp. 23-25; Excerpt from the Minutes of the Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec held on 3
January 2013.

6
Id. at 25.

7
Id. at 7-8.
8
Id. at 40-49.

9
Id. at 45.

10
Id. at 46.

11
Id. at 55-60.

12
Id. at 56.

13
Id. at 57.

14
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2013NLE/Candidate/Certified List Of
Candidates. 22 August 2014.

http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2013NLE/Results/citymuni2013. 22 August
15

2014.

16
Garcia v. Comelec, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).

17
478 Phil. 941, 949 (2004).

18
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Sec. 69.

19
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Sec. 76.

20
479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004).

21
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 657 (1999).

Rollo, p. 23; Findings of fact of the Comelec as stated in the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Special En
22

Banc Meeting of the Commission on Elections Held on 3 January 2013.

23
Id. at 27; Accompanying Olivias COC is a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance issued by the
Chairperson of the Liberal Party of the Philippines, Taguig City.

24
Id. at 22; Olivia filed her COC on 17 December 2013 or not later than mid-day of election day, 13 May
2013.

25
550 Phil. 284 (2007).

26
Id. at 290-293.

27
Constitution, Art. IX-C, Section 3.

28
Cipriano v. Comelec, supra note 21 at 691.

29
460 Phil. 459 (2003).

30
Id. at 475-477.

31
Cipriano v. Comelec, supra note 21 at 691.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of suffrage should not be
arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance
candidate's certificate of candidacy without providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard.

This is a Petition1 for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
following issuances of the COMELEC: first, Resolution No. 96102 dated January 11, 2013, declaring petitioner
Joseph B. Timbol (Timbol) a nuisance candidate and ordering the removal of his name from the certified list
of candidates;3 and second, Minute Resolution4 dated February 5, 2013, denying his Petition to have his
name listed in the certified list of candidates and printed on the ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.5 cra lawred

On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy6 for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena7 from
COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear before her
office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.8 cralawred

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing,
Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked
eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District
of Caloocan City. He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.9 cralawred

He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance
candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The
clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and that his
Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.10 cra lawred

In the Memorandum11 dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol's
Certificate of Candidacy be given due course.12c ralawred

Despite Election Officer Valencia's favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not removed from the list
of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website. With the printing of ballots for the automated
elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition13 praying that his name be
included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections.14 cra lawred

In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot,
considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.15 cralawre d

On March 15, 2013,16 Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance candidate.17 According to Timbol, the COMELEC
deprived him of due process of law when he was declared a nuisance candidate even before Election Officer
Valencia conducted the clarificatory hearing.18 He prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
the COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates for the position of Member of
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City.19 cralawred
In the Resolution20 dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on
behalf of the COMELEC.

In its Comment,21 the COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and academic, considering that
the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted.22 cralaw red

Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC maintained that it did not
gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbol's argument, he was given an opportunity to be heard when
Election Officer Valencia heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended the
clarificatory hearing with his counsel.23 cralaw red

Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Timbol's Petition to be included in
the certified list of candidates, considering that the printing of ballots had already started.24 cra lawred

With these arguments, the COMELEC prayed that this court deny the Petition for lack of merit.25 cra lawred

In the Resolution26 dated August 6, 2013, this court ordered Timbol to file a reply. When Timbol failed to file
his reply despite receipt of the order,27 we required Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras (Atty. Aspiras), counsel for
Timbol, to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for failing to file a reply on behalf of his
client in the Resolution28 dated September 2, 2014. We likewise reiterated our order for Atty. Aspiras to file
a reply for Timbol.29 Still, Atty. Aspiras failed to comply with our show cause resolution.

We dispense with the filing of the reply and resolve to decide this case based on the Petition and the
Comment.

The issues for this court's resolution are the following:

First, whether this case is moot and academic; and

Second, whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbol's Petition
for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.

We deny the Petition. chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

This case is moot and academic.

A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."30 When a case is moot and academic,
this court generally declines jurisdiction over it.31 c ralawre d

There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases
when: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character
and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review.32 (Citation omitted) cralawlaw libra ry

We may no longer act on petitioner's prayer that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and
be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with
this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots
on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already
proclaimed.

That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth "controlling and
authoritative doctrines"33 to be observed by respondent in motu proprio denying due course to or cancelling
certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the
alleged nuisance candidate's opportunity to be heard34 an essential element of procedural due process.35 c ralawre d
 II

Respondent's power to motu proprio deny

due course to a certificate of candidacy is
subject to the candidate's opportunity to
be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office[.]"36 To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law."37 Among these
limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."38 In Pamatong v. Commission on
Elections,39 this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for public office: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not
to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At
the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but
a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .

. . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the
mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a
one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice
on the part of the State.40
cralawlawlibra ry

To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be
denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party,"41 "subject to an opportunity to be heard."42 cralawred

The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of."43 In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand."44 cralawred

In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,45 this court explained: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

[T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of
fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the
resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one's right to run for public office, or, as in this case,
one's right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should
be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commission's inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be
allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.46 cralaw lawlib rary

Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy
without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.47 cra lawred

Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona
fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013
when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This
was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the
defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been given an
opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013,
respondent denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on
February 4, 2013.

We understand the "insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications"48of
reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified list if
candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots
previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are special as the have the capability of being
optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would,
indeed, be costly.

Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process."49 Respondent should also balance its
duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful"50 with the right of a
candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a
nuisance candidate. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

III

Counsel for petitioner must be fined for

failure to comply with the Show Cause
Resolution dated September 2, 2014.

Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the injunctive reliefs prayed for in time for the May 13,
2013 elections. However, this was no reason for him to defy our orders to file a reply on behalf of his
client. for such contumacious acts, he should be ordered to show cause why he should not be proceeded
with administratively.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.

Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be the subject of administrative actions for his
contumacious attitude towards repeated orders of this court, specifically, for his failure to comply with the
Resolutions dated August 6, 2013 and September 2, 2013. The action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras
will be docketed as a new and separate administrative case.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the initiation of the proper
disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave,
Jardeleza, J., no part.

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 3-9. This Petition was filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
1

2
Id. at 12-17.

3
Id. at 14 and 16.

4
Id. at 18-19.

5
Id. at 19.
6
Id. at 23.

7
Id. at 24.

8
Id. at 4.

9
Id. at 4-5.

10
Id. at 5.

11
Id. at 30-34.

12
Id. at 34.

13
Id. at 35-37.

14
Id. at 35-36.

15
Id. at 19.

16
Id. at 3.

17
Id. at 6-7.

18
Id.

19
Id. at 8.

20
Id. at 38.

21
Id. at 44-55.

22
Id. at 49.

23
Id. at 52.

24
id. at 53.

25
Id. at 54.

26
Id. at 57.

27
Id. at 60-61.

28
Id. at 67.

29
Id.

COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026,
30

August 6, 2013, 703 SCRA 165, 175 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

31
Baldo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 607 Phil. 281, 286-287 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En
Banc]; Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc]; De la
Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 276 Phil. 610 (1991) [Per J. Grino-Aquino, En Bane]. Alliance for Rural
and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013, 712
SCRA 54, 75-76 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

33
De la Camara v. Enage, 148-B Phil. 502, 504 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

34
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, rule 24, sec. 4, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.

35
See De la Camara v. Enage, 148-B Phil. 502, 504 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc], where the court,
despite the case being moot and academic, proceeded to set forth "controlling and authoritative doctrines"
for the guidance of lower courts in fixing the amount of bail "in order that full respect be accorded to such a
constitutional right."

Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100 [Per J. Tinga,
36

En Banc].

37
Id.

38
ELECTION CODE, sec. 69.

39
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 96 [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

40
Id. at 104-105.

41
ELECTION CODE, sec. 69.

42
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, rule 24, sec. 4, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.

Trinidad v. Commission on Elections, 373 Phil. 802, 811 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Sahtiago, En Banc], citing
43

Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 156 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division], in turn citing
Navarro III v. Damasco, 316 Phil. 322, 328 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division].

44
Id.

45
479 Phil. 677 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

46
Id. at 691.

47
See Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 689-690 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, March 22, 2011, 646
48

SCRA 63, 71 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

49
Id. at 80

Ciprano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 687-688 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
50
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015

MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, REPRESENTED BY JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner, v. GREGORIA TAGUFA,

ROBERTO TAGUFA AND ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 13,
2012 Decision1 and the January 25, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No.
122648 which reversed and set aside the July 1, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
Cabagan, Isabela (RTC), in an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession.

The Facts:

The undisputed facts were succinctly summarized in the August 31, 2010 Decision4 of the 3rd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Tumauini-Delfin Albano, Tumauini, Isabela (MCTC) before which a complaint5 for
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession with Damages was filed by petitioner Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela
(Hortizuela) represented by Jovier Tagufa against respondents Gregoria Tagufa, Roberto Tagufa and Rogelio
Lumaban (respondents). As quoted by the CA, said undisputed facts are: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Gleaned from the joint testimonies of R[u]nsted Tagufa xxx and Jovier Tagufa xxx are the following facts:

The property involved in this case is a parcel of land located at District IV, Tumauini, Isabela containing an
area of 539 square meters, more or less, and covered by OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of
Isabela. By virtue of the special power of attorney xxx executed by Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela, Jovier Tagufa
instituted this case against herein defendants praying for the peaceful surrender of the above-described
property unto them and further ordering defendant Gregoria Tagufa to reconvey in plaintiffs favor the same
property which was titled under her name via fraud.

Before it was titled in the name of Defendant Tagufa, said property was originally owned by plaintiffs
parents, Spouses Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez. Although untitled, the spouses mortgaged the
property with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for brevity). For failure to redeem the
property, DBP foreclosed the same and sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez xxx who, in turn, sold it back to
Runsted Tagufa, husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, on April 4, 2002 xxx using the fund sent by plaintiff
Hortizuela who was in America and with the agreement that Runsted will reconvey the said property to her
sister when demanded.

However, plaintiff discovered that the same unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagufa
under OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela xxx. Investigating further, plaintiff discovered
that Gregoria Tagufa was able to title the said property by virtue of a free patent application before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the execution of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig dated May 9, 2003 xxx.
Plaintiff now seeks to recover possession of the said property which is presently occupied by Gregoria Tagufa
and her co-defendants and have the same be reconveyed unto them.6
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

In its Order, dated May 5, 2010, the MCTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default and allowed
Hortizuela to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, the MCTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit ruling that in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a
wrong cause of action.7 cralawlawlib rary
Not in conformity, Hortizuela appealed to the RTC. In its July 1, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed the MCTC
ruling. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads as follows: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the Decision dated August 31, 2010,
is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Gregorio Tagufa to reconvey to the plaintiff Mariflor Tagufa
Hortizuela the land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the same land and to surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the following amounts, jointly and severally:
cralaw red

a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as Moral Damages;

b) Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorneys Fees.

SO DECIDED.8

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.

The reversal being unacceptable to them, respondents filed a petition for review before the CA questioning
the RTC decision. This time, the case was disposed in their favor. According to the CA, although Hortizuela
filed with the MCTC a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession of the subject lot, she was also
questioning the validity of the Torrens title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-846609. 9 The CA
pointed out that this was in contravention of Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which
provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law

It cited the well-settled rule that a Torrens title could not be collaterally attacked; that the issue of whether
or not the title was fraudulently issued, could only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose; and that an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession was not the direct action
contemplated by law.10 Hence, the dispositive portion of the CA decision reads in this wise: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 1, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The present Complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession with damages is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Hortizuela filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution,12 dated January 25, 2013.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE SUBJECT
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY LAW.

Hortizuela claims that respondent Gregoria Tagufa (Gregoria), being the wife of Runsted, was certainly
aware that the subject land was actually sold by Atty. Romulo Marquez (Atty. Marquez) to her (Hortizuela).
Runsted, only acted as attorney-in-fact in the sale transaction. Thus, the action for reconveyance was not a
collateral attack on the said title because Hortizuela was not seeking the nullification of the title, but rather
the reconveyance of the property, covered by the said title, which Gregoria was holding in trust for her
benefit as the real owner. Gregoria should, therefore, reconvey the property and its title to her, being the
rightful owner.

Position of Respondents
Respondents counter that although Hortizuelas complaint was denominated as one for reconveyance and
recovery of possession, its main objective was to nullify the title held by Gregoria over the subject property.
For said reason, the complaint would amount to a collateral attack on the title which was proscribed under
the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. To rule that the action for reconveyance was not a collateral
one would result in the nullity of the decree of registration.

Another argument that respondents want this Court to consider in resolving the subject petition is the fact
that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of
possession was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 3813 of Act 496 within the
prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the free patent by the government.

Finally, granting that the title over the property would be nullified and the property be reconveyed to
Hortizuela, still the latter would be ineligible to own the same pursuant to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 223
which requires, among others, that an applicant for a free patent must be a Filipino citizen. Hortizuela, by
her own admission, is an American citizen who has been residing in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D. No.
1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.14 A Torrens title
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the
Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.15 In its
decision, the MCTC wrote: chanRoblesvirtual La wlibra ry

Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of sale by and between Romulo Marquez and
Runsted Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and OCT No. P-84609 registered in
the name of Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the plaintiff, fraudulently caused the titling of the same.

In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the following indicia of fraud committed by Gregoria Tagufa that
would allegedly justify reconveyance:

First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses Leandro Tagufa
and Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only a grand daughter-in-law,

Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent that plaintiff was already the owner of the land
she was applying for;

Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent that plaintiffs parents were not anymore the
owners of the land as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and

Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the property when she applied for it.

All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.

Studying the merits of this case and removing all its superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the title
generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.
However, in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action.16
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was convinced that fraud was attendant in the
registration of the land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an accepted remedy.

Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a
collateral attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a
recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not
sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person
for value.17 cralawlawl ibra ry

There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned through a
direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that in a complaint for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What
is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its
rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in
whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action
for reconveyance of the property.18 cra lawlawlib rary

The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of
the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may
be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.19 cralawlawl ibra ry

Furthermore, respondents argument that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for
reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section
38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the patent by the
government, is weak. As was similarly held in Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by respondent
Gregoria through fraudulent machinations by means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her
name, she was deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her
actions. Article 1456 provides: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be assailed by the
government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.21 In Sherwill
Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc.,22 this Court pointed out that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should
not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru
its duly-authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to
the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may
file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter
to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title
over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has
been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed
in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.23
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

An action for reconveyance is proper

The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A recognized exception is that situation where
plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of public land unlawfully and in breach of trust
titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. This was the ruling in Larzano v.
Tabayag, Jr.,24 where it was written: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof was
issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or mistake and
has been registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action
for reconveyance, thus:
cralaw red

It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the
decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to
plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was
given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the
property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to
be noted that as the patent here has already been issued, the land has the character of registered property
in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the
remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance.
(Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. 3 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)

In the same vein, in Quiiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we stressed that: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a 1953 decision, Director
of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: The sole remedy of the land owner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to
set aside the decree, as was done in the instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." Such a doctrine goes
back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the
institution of registration would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to cover and
shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view
would encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." It
would indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved
party is considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the
undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to
be guarded against. So it has been before; so it should continue to be. (Citations omitted)

In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking
a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What
she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on account of the fraud committed by
respondent Gregoria. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the
registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.25 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right
of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make the
Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud. To reiterate,

The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of
the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may
be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.26
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Finally, respondents supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject property pursuant to B.P.
Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered for having been raised only for
the first time on appeal. It must be noted that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.27 The reason therefor is due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, 2012 Decision and the January 25, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 122648 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
July 1, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1910, dated
January 12, 2015.

1
Rollo, pp. 49-55. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino
and Assocciate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

2
Id. at 57.

3
Id. at 42-47. Penned by Judge Felipe Jesus Torio II.

4
Id. at 37-40.

5
Id. at 28-33.

6
Id. at 50.

7
Id. at 40.

8
Id. at 47.

9
Id. at 52.

10
Id. at 54.

11
Id. at 55.

12
Id. at 57.

13
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be
entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened
by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgments or decrees: subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
the land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx
(Underscoring ours)

14
Wee v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014.

15
Sampaco v. Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011, 654 SCRA 36, 53-54.

16
Rollo, pp. 38-39.

17
Wee v. Gonzalez, supra note 14.

18
Campos v. Ortega, G.R. No. 171286, June 2, 2014.

19
Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 56.

20
524 Phil. 574 (2006).
21
Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides:

Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines.

22
500 Phil. 288 (2005).

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 262 Phil. 677, 685 (1990).

23

Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38.
24

Leoveras v. Valdez, G.R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 61, 71.
25

Naval v. Court of Appeals, 518 Phil. 271, 282-283 (2006).

26

Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, et al., G. R. No. 178110, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 143, 158.
27
 PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales) assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535, finding the accused Morales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 entitled "An Act
Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person one (1) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which gave positive result to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as follows: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control three (3) heat-scaled
transparent sachets each containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which gave positive results to
the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.5 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses as against the bare denials of the accused. The presumption of regularity of performance of duties
was upheld in the absence of any improper motive on their part to testify falsely against the accused. The
dispositive portion reads:
c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7534. finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Sale of Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 5, 1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500, 000.00).

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG (Violation of Section 11, 2nd par., No.3, Article II, R.A.
9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years and one (l) day
to Twenty (20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of all the
elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation of the corpus
delicti of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in court. The procedural steps required by
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were liberally construed in favor of the prosecution in view of the
preservation of integrity and identity of the corpus delicti. Conformably, the finding on the presumption of
regularity of performance of duties was affirmed in the absence of ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.

On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal7 was filed by Morales through counsel before the Supreme Court.

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-Charge
Emerenciana M. Divina8 informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died while committed at the
Bureau of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death Report9 signed by New Bilibid
Prison Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas.

The death of accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal
liabilities.

Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

xxxx

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability needs
extinguishment. chan robles law

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y
Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-
7535 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby
declared MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Rollo, p. 109.
1

2
Id. at 2-17.

3
RTC Decision, CA rollo, p. 11.

4
Id. at 11-12.

5
Records, p. 22.

6
CA rollo, p. 16.

7
Id. at 108.

Rollo, p. 33.
8

9
Id. at 36.