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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,
ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's
Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs.
Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government
is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On April 17,
1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they
would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is
in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS


Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas,
Alampay and Patajo, JJ.------------------------------------------
DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate

Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.

1. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and
manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this
Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not
Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of
the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under
the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, .

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioners lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary
that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a
suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision
is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission
refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and
provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the
President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have
sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No.
73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [Peoples Crusade
for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon
C. Aquino, et al.])
De Leon vs Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J

Facts:
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on
February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B. Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate
Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with
the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents from taking
over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace
them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982.

Issue: Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:
The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ
for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of petitioners position subject of this
petition.

Ratio
The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987
Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory
Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-
President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar
Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006

Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution, they filed
a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that
the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will
shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to
lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:
1. Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups
petition.

Decision:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The
Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and
effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode
of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition,
Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar

Facts:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners
Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument
that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No.
2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two
delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on
the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting
as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing
that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives, 1 and that any other details
relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention
shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution.
2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5,
and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132
practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

Issue:
1. Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;
2. Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Decision:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific
provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
Ratio:
Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by
votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is
reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less
population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification
is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote
more time to the Constituional Convention.
Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates
must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination
towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Fernando I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic,
professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue
common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by
the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.
Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval
1. set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
2. caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and
3. instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed
with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago
argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The
extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond
the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence
the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for Peoples Initiative to amend the constitution specifically to lift
term limits of elected officials.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN
PETITION.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.

Ratio:
Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient
standard tests.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no
leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that . . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House
Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact
Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body. Beyond
doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the
COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the
documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the
13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.

Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13 th elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special
election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as
Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course
to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA 6645, as
amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of
the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that
the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless
there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the
Comelec.
Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty
days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same
date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise
the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not
been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree
Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall
be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present
those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

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