Estrada vs.

Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a
son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as
if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State
has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.