Prather v. Sun Life Financial Petition For Award of Attorneys' Fees

Case: 16-1861 Document: 35-1 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 5 (1 of 18)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LEE ANN PRATHER, )

)
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. ) No. 16-1861
)
SUN LIFE FINANCIAL )
DISTRIBUTORS, INC. (properly )
known as SUN LIFE AND HEALTH )
INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.), )
)
Defendants-Appellee )
PETITION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
The undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, hereby submits the following
application for an award of attorneys fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1):
1. Judgment was entered by the Court of Appeals in this matter on December
13, 2016. That judgment reversed the judgment of the District Court, ordered the district
court to enter judgment in Plaintiffs favor for the full amount of benefits sought, and
awarded costs to the Plaintiff-Appellant.
2. The underlying lawsuit was brought pursuant to the civil action provision
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) seeking benefits due under
the terms of an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).
3. The ERISA statute provides for fee-shifting and allows a reasonable fee
and costs of action to either party. 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1). The Supreme Court ruled in
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010)
that the trigger for fees is that a fees claimant must show some degree of success on the
merits before a court may award attorneys fees under 1132(g)(1). Although the
standard is not satisfied by a trivial success on the merits or a purely procedural
victory, the ruling here was neither trivial nor purely procedural since this court agreed
that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment awarding her the full amount of benefits due.
4. In addition to the threshold qualification requirements for an ERISA fee
award, this Circuit applies two tests that were enumerated in Raybourne v. CIGNA Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F.3d 1076, 1088-1091 (7th Cir. 2012) the so-called five-factor
test, and the substantial justification test adopted from the Equal Access to Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, although there is a question as to the continued vitality of the five-
factor test following Hardt. The five factors are:
(1) the offending parties' culpability or bad faith;
(2) the ability of the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorney's fees;
(3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees;
(4) the benefit conferred upon members of the pension plan as a whole; and
(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.
See, Jackman Fin. Corp. v. Humana Ins. Co., 641 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (detailing both
tests).
5. Regardless of which test is used, Defendants should be required to pay
Plaintiffs fees based on this Courts finding that Sun Life failed to make any plausible
showing that the surgery on Prathers ankle, rather than the accident that necessitated the
surgery, caused his death. Slip Op. at 5-6. Accordingly, Defendant must be deemed
culpable and thus liable for an award of fees. Sun Life Financial is also easily able to
satisfy a fee award based on 2015 operating net income of more than $2.2 billion. See,
http://www.sunlife.com/Global/Investors/Financial+results+and+reports?vgnLocale=en_
CA. The deterrent effect of a fee award is also evident since it would discourage both
Sun Life and other insurers that sell accidental death insurance from denying benefits in
situations such as what occurred in this case. And Lee Ann Prathers victory here will
also benefit other Sun Life accidental death insurance beneficiaries who may find
themselves in a similar situation. Finally, the relative merits of the parties position is
obvious based on the finding quoted above. That quotation also shows that Sun Life had
no justification whatsoever to deny Lee Ann Prathers benefit claim following her
husbands death.
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are the time sheets of counsel for Plaintiff-
Appellee. The 59 hours of time listed were all reasonably required to prosecute the appeal
by participating in mediation, by researching and submitting both an opening brief and
reply brief, as well as prepare for and deliver oral argument. The entries listed were
recorded at or near the time the services were incurred and were maintained in the regular
course of the business of the undersigned. The hourly fee of $630 claimed by the
undersigned is the same hourly rate that counsel charges and has charged throughout
2016 to clients who pay by the hour for counsels services. Such charges are also
commensurate with prior fee awards obtained by the undersigned (See, e.g., Paragraph 8
infra.). Thus, the total fee sought is $37,170.
7. In further support of the rate sought by the undersigned, the undersigned
has litigated hundreds of ERISA cases, has published and taught extensively in the field,
and devotes the bulk of his practice to such matters. His biography and full curriculum
vitae are available at http://www.debofsky.com/About-Us/Mark-DDebofsky.shtml.

8. As a specific example in support of both the rates claimed by the
undersigned and the hours incurred for comparable work, in October 2015, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit awarded the undersigned over $46,000 in fees that
were sought in the case of Stevens v. Santander Holdings, USA, No. 14-1481 (copy of fee
award attached as Exhibit B) (the court only excluded time incurred for travel), a case in
which the undersigned represented the appellee, Joseph Stevens. Counsel incurred 82.2
hours in representing the appellee in that matter during 2014 and 2015; and counsel
applied for fees at a rate of $600 per hour, which was the undersigneds hourly rate
charged to clients at that time. The fee application, exclusive of exhibits, is attached
hereto as Exhibit C.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays that the Court either grant his application
for fees in the amount of $37,170; or, in the alternative that the Court remand the
application for fees to the district court to be determined at the time the district court
enters judgment in accordance with the mandate of this Court.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, the undersigned declares under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 28, 2016
/s/ Mark D. DeBofsky
Mark D. DeBofsky
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Mark D. DeBofsky
DeBofsky, Sherman & Casciari
200 West Madison, Suite 2670
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 561-4040
mdebofsky@debofsky.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mark D. DeBofsky, the undersigned attorney, certifies that he served a copy of
the foregoing upon all counsel of record by CM/ECF on December 28, 2016.
/s/Mark D. DeBofsky
______________________
Mark D. DeBofsky
Mark D. DeBofsky
DeBofsky, Sherman & Casciari, P.C.
200 West Madison Street, Suite 2670
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 561-4040 (phone)
(312) 929-0309 (fax)
EXHIBIT A
(7 of 18)
Pratherv.SunLife,161861
Date User Description Dur/Qty Rate Total
5/23/2016 MDD Researchcaselaw;researchmedicalliterature;preparefor7thCir.mediation 2.1 630 1323
Pages: 2
5/24/2016 MDD Rule33conference(RoccoSpagna);EdnaKersting.SigSapinskiclientrep. 1.3 630 819

6/1/2016 MDD TCw/Roccodiscussoffer 0.3 630 189
TCw/clientconveyedsettlementofferandsuggestedwecounterwithbottom
6/2/2016 MDD line.Sheconcurs.Notifiedmediator 0.4 630 252
6/8/2016 MDD Begindraftingappellatebrief/research 5.5 630 3465
Filed: 12/28/2016
EmailGlennKantor(ERISAattorneyinCalifornia)reproposedargumentsandSun
6/10/2016 MDD Life'spositiontogetfeedbackfromcolleague 0.2 630 126
6/10/2016 MDD Continuedraftingbrief;researchingcases 4.8 630 3024
6/14/2016 MDD Editdraftofappellantbrief 2.2 630 1386
6/15/2016 MDD Additionalbriefediting;addcites/tables.Additionalresearch 2.6 630 1638
6/16/2016 MDD Prepareappendix,tableofcontentsofappendixandcertification 0.3 630 189
6/16/2016 MDD Finalreadthroughofbrief;addappendixcitesandcheckothercitations. 1.4 630 882
6/17/2016 MDD Formatbriefandappendixforfiling 0.2 630 126
ReadthroughAppelleebrief;sendtoclientandGregorySgro(counselindistrrict
Document: 35-2
9/8/2016 MDD court) 1 630 630

Digestappelleebriefandbeginpreparingoutlineforreply;additionalresearch
9/12/2016 MDD rereadcasesandclaimrecord 3.2 630 2016
9/13/2016 MDD Prepareddraftofreplybrief 6.8 630 4284
9/14/2016 MDD Addcitations 0.3 630 189
9/15/2016 MDD Editdraftofbrief 3.1 630 1953
9/16/2016 MDD Additionaleditingofbrief.Addadditionalcited. 2.5 630 1575
Case: 16-1861
9/17/2016 MDD Additionalrewritesandeditsandcreatetableofcontents/tableofauthorities 1.4 630 882

9/18/2016 MDD Furthereditingofreplybrief 0.6 630 378
9/19/2016 MDD Finaleditingofreplybrief 0.8 630 504
10/31/2016 MDD Oralargumentpreparation 7.5 630 4725
11/1/2016 MDD Preparationfororalargument 6.2 630 3906
11/2/2016 MDD Preparationfor/deliverappellateargument 3.8 630 2394
12/13/2016 MDD Reviewopinionandsendtoclient;callclient 0.5 630 315
Total 59 37170
EXHIBIT B
Case 3:11-cv-07473-PGS-TJB Document 82 Filed 10/21/15 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 1683
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

September 21, 2015
No. 14-1481
JOSEPH STEVENS
v.
SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC SELF INSURED SHORT TERM DISABILITY

PLAN;
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE CO OF BOSTON, DBA Liberty Mutual
SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC; SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC LONG
TERM DISABILITY PLAN,
Appellants
(D.N.J. No. 3-11-cv-07473)
Present: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
1. Motion by Appellee Joseph Stevens for Attorney Fees or, In the Alternative that
the Court Remand this Application of Fees to the District Court;
2. Response by Appellants In Opposition to Motion by Appellees for Attorney

Fees or, In the Alternative that the Court Remand this Application of Fees to the
District Court;
Respectfully,
Clerk/pdb
_________________________________ORDER________________________________
The foregoing motion for attorneys fees is granted as follows: an award of $46,020.00
for the services of Mark DeBofsky and $16,550.00 for the services of Bonny Rafel is
granted. The award of $46,020.00 excludes time for DeBofskys travel to and from
Philadelphia for argument. See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Intl, Inc., 426 F.3d
694, 710 (3d Cir. 2005).
By the Court,
s/ Morton I. Greenberg
Circuit Judge
Dated: October 21, 2015

PDB/cc: All Counsel of Record
A True Copy :
Marcia M . Waldron, Clerk

EXHIBIT C
Case: 14-1481 Document: 003112079420 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/18/2015
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JOSEPH STEVENS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee )
)
v. ) No. 14-1481
)
SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA )
)
)
Defendants-Appellant )
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
The undersigned, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, hereby submit the following
application for an award of attorneys fees and expenses in accordance with L.A.R. Misc.
108.0 and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g) and 28 U.S.C. 1927:
1. Judgment was entered by the Court of Appeals in this matter on August 24,
2015. That judgment dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The judgment and
issuance of the mandate occurred on September 15, 2015.
2. The underlying lawsuit was brought pursuant to the civil action provision
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) seeking benefits due under the
terms of an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court ruled in
favor of the Plaintiff (Civil Docket No. 54). The court granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment and denied the defendants motion for summary judgment. The court
also ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to the remaining short-term disability benefits he
was seeking, but the court remanded Plaintiffs claim for long-term disability benefits to
Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston, the insurer of the group long-term disability
benefits program sponsored by Plaintiffs employer, Santander Holdings, USA. Although
Plaintiff sought fees below, the court stayed a decision while the appeal was pending (Civil
Docket No. 74); and this motion relates solely to the fees incurred in relation to the appeal,
which this Court may decide to remand to the district court to consolidate with the pending
fee motion there.
3. Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the district courts ruling (Civil
Docket No. 58). Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction (Appellate Document 003111593219 filed on April 18, 2014).
Although the Court of Appeals later ordered the filing of briefs on the merits and heard
oral argument, this Court dismissed the Defendants appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
granted Plaintiff-Appellee costs.
4. The ERISA statute provides for fee-shifting and allows a reasonable fee
and costs of action to either party. 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1). The Supreme Court ruled in
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010)
that the trigger for fees is that a fees claimant must show some degree of success on the
merits before a court may award attorneys fees under 1132(g)(1). Although the
standard is not satisfied by a trivial success on the merits or a purely procedural victory,
the ruling here was neither trivial nor purely procedural since the court agreed not only
with the arguments raised in the Plaintiffs initial motion to dismiss, but also agreed with
the arguments regarding appellate jurisdiction that Plaintiff presented in his Brief for
Appellee, as well as at oral argument. Moreover, the court issued a published opinion on
those issues.
2
5. However, even if the court ultimately decides the issue is purely procedural,
in the alternative to Plaintiffs claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1), Stevens seeks fees
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, which provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.
6. In addition to the threshold qualification requirements for an ERISA fee
award, this Circuit applies Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1983) in
assessing fee requests. Ursic requires the court to consider the following factors:
(1) the offending parties' culpability or bad faith;
(2) the ability of the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorney's fees;
(3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees;
(4) the benefit conferred upon members of the pension plan as a whole; and
(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.
719 F.3d at 673. Although Hardt noted factors such as the Ursic factors no longer need to
be considered, the Supreme Court ruled that such factors may be considered.
7. The standards for fee awards under 1927 in this Circuit were recently
discussed in Prosser v. Gerber, 777 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) to apply to situations
where an attorney has (1) multiplied proceedings; (2) in an unreasonable and vexatious
manner; (3) thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in bad faith or
by intentional misconduct. (citation omitted). The bad faith standard is comparable to
the culpability standard under 1132(g), which was discussed in Templin v.
Independence Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861, 868 (3d Cir. 2015), an ERISA fee dispute, to
3
mean reprehensible or wrong but not necessarily involving malice or a guilty purpose.
Templin also discussed the relationship between the culpability factor and the relative
merits factor under Ursic, and deemed the two closely related. 785 F.3d at 868. The court
also noted the importance of the deterrence factor.
8. Applying those rulings here, Defendants should be required to pay
Plaintiffs fees. When Defendants filed their notice of appeal from an order which
remanded a substantial portion of the matters at issue to Liberty, this Court had recently
ruled in Papotto v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013) that ERISA
remand orders were non-final and therefore non-appealable. Hence, the appeal brought by
Defendants, which was completely unsuccessful, was not warranted by applicable law and
has delayed Stevens receipt of benefits by more than a year and a half. Accordingly, under
the standards applicable to both 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 1927, Defendants
are culpable for their actions in filing the appeal and the appeal vexatiously multiplied the
legal proceedings unnecessarily. This Courts ultimate agreement with Plaintiffs initial
motion to dismiss the appeal shows that the relative merits of the positions advanced by
the parties favor Plaintiff on the fifth Ursic factor. Moreover, a fee award would deter
defendants such as the defendants in this case from delaying the payment of benefits by
filing needless appeals. Although a fee award is unlikely to benefit other plan participants,
the deterrence against unnecessary filings would undoubtedly encourage Defendants to
more promptly process disability benefit claims submitted by Santander employees.
Finally, with respect to the ability to pay, the amount of past-due short-term disability
benefits is only a few thousand dollars, which Santander would presumably be able to pay,
while Liberty is a large insurer that reports quarterly revenues in excess of $10 billion along
4
with substantial profits that are more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment Stevens would
be able to obtain for long-term disability benefits. See, Liberty Mutual Insurance at
http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/omapps/ContentServer?pagename=LMGroup/Views
/LMG&ft=3&fid=1138356793938 (visited on September 17, 2015). Accordingly,
Plaintiff qualifies for an award of fees for the appeal.
9. Attached hereto as Exhibits A and B are the time sheets of counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellee. The time listed was all reasonably required to defend the appeal and
brief the issues, as well as prepare for and deliver oral argument. The entries listed were
recorded at or near the time the services were incurred and were maintained in the regular
course of the business of the undersigned. Although this matter was handled on a
contingency fee basis, the hourly fees claimed are the rates the undersigned counsel bill
and have received from clients who pay by the hour for counsels services; and are
commensurate with prior fee awards. The rates are also deemed reasonable by the affiants
whose declarations are attached hereto.
Exhibit A constitutes the time records of Attorney Mark DeBofsky and seeks
compensation for 82.2 hours of services at an hourly rate of $600/hour, for a total sought
of $49,320.00
Exhibit B constitutes the time records of Attorney Bonny G. Rafel, who incurred
33.1 hours of services at an hourly rate of $500/hour, for a total sought of $16,550.00.
Attorney Mark D. DeBofsky was admitted to practice in the State of Illinois in
1980; and he has also been a member of the bar of the State of Hawaii since 2005. He also
has been admitted to practice by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, as well as this Circuit and numerous district courts around the
5
country. Mark DeBofsky has litigated hundreds of ERISA cases, has published and taught
extensively in the field and devotes the bulk of his practice to such matters. His biography
and full curriculum vitae are available at http://www.debofsky.com/About-Us/Mark-D-
Debofsky.shtml.
Attorney Bonny G. Rafel Was admitted to the practice in the State of New Jersey
in 1980. She has been admitted to practice by the United States Supreme Court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, The District of New Jersey, the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York and the Eastern District of Tennessee. Her curriculum vitae
is available at http://disabilitycounsel.com.
10. The declaration of Attorney Tybe Brett is attached hereto as Exhibit C. Also
attached as Exhibit D is a declaration prepared by Attorney Michael Quiat that was filed in
support of the fees sought by counsel in the district court.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned pray that the Court either grant the request for fees
sought in the amounts of $49,320.00 payable to attorney Mark DeBofsky and $16, 550.00
payable to attorney Bonny Rafel, or, in the alternative that the Court remand this
application of fees to the district court to be taken up with the pending fee request that was
previously filed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, the undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 18, 2015
Mark D. DeBofsky
/s/ Bonny G. Rafel
Bonny G. Rafel
6
Mark D. DeBofsky
DeBofsky & Associates
200 West Madison, Suite 2670
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 561-4040
mdebofsky@debofsky.com
Bonny G. Rafel
Bonny G. Rafel LLC
17 Hanover Rd., Suite 410
Florham Park, N.J. 07932
(973) 845-2600
bonny@bgrafel.com
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mark D. DeBofsky, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, hereby certifies that he
served the foregoing Application for Attorneys Fees via the courts CM/ECF system on
September 18, 2015.
Mark D. DeBofsky

Prather v. Sun Life Financial Petition For Award of Attorneys' Fees

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Case: 16-1861 Document: 35-1 Filed: 12/28/2016 Pages: 5 (1 of 18)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

LEE ANN PRATHER, )

PETITION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES

The undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, hereby submits the following

application for an award of attorneys fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1):

1. Judgment was entered by the Court of Appeals in this matter on December

awarded costs to the Plaintiff-Appellant.

the terms of an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).

standard is not satisfied by a trivial success on the merits or a purely procedural

4. In addition to the threshold qualification requirements for an ERISA fee

factor test following Hardt. The five factors are:

(1) the offending parties' culpability or bad faith;

(3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees;

(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.

5. Regardless of which test is used, Defendants should be required to pay

by participating in mediation, by researching and submitting both an opening brief and

infra.). Thus, the total fee sought is $37,170.

7. In further support of the rate sought by the undersigned, the undersigned

vitae are available at http://www.debofsky.com/About-Us/Mark-DDebofsky.shtml.

8. As a specific example in support of both the rates claimed by the

enters judgment in accordance with the mandate of this Court.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, the undersigned declares under penalty of perjury

that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 28, 2016

/s/ Mark D. DeBofsky

Mark D. DeBofsky, the undersigned attorney, certifies that he served a copy of

5/24/2016 MDD Rule33conference(RoccoSpagna);EdnaKersting.SigSapinskiclientrep. 1.3 630 819

9/8/2016 MDD court) 1 630 630

9/17/2016 MDD Additionalrewritesandeditsandcreatetableofcontents/tableofauthorities 1.4 630 882

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC SELF INSURED SHORT TERM DISABILITY

(D.N.J. No. 3-11-cv-07473)

Present: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

2. Response by Appellants In Opposition to Motion by Appellees for Attorney

Dated: October 21, 2015

Marcia M . Waldron, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

The undersigned, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, hereby submit the following

108.0 and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g) and 28 U.S.C. 1927:

issuance of the mandate occurred on September 15, 2015.

benefits program sponsored by Plaintiffs employer, Santander Holdings, USA. Although

fee motion there.

lack of jurisdiction (Appellate Document 003111593219 filed on April 18, 2014).

granted Plaintiff-Appellee costs.

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, which provides:

6. In addition to the threshold qualification requirements for an ERISA fee

(1) the offending parties' culpability or bad faith;

(3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees;

(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.

by intentional misconduct. (citation omitted). The bad faith standard is comparable to

the culpability standard under 1132(g), which was discussed in Templin v.

also noted the importance of the deterrence factor.

8. Applying those rulings here, Defendants should be required to pay

the deterrence against unnecessary filings would undoubtedly encourage Defendants to

more promptly process disability benefit claims submitted by Santander employees.

/LMG&ft=3&fid=1138356793938 (visited on September 17, 2015). Accordingly,

Plaintiff qualifies for an award of fees for the appeal.

whose declarations are attached hereto.

Attorney Mark D. DeBofsky was admitted to practice in the State of Illinois in

and full curriculum vitae are available at http://www.debofsky.com/About-Us/Mark-D-

support of the fees sought by counsel in the district court.