Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea

Law on Public Officers Right to Due Process Public Office is Not a Property

FACTS:

Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by

Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses
under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and
that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained
that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints.
The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted
on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing
date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of
counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared
on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ
Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his
right to security of tenure.

ISSUE:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during
an administrative inquiry?

HELD:

No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and
in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued
invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The
investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not
be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that
without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the

opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due
process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a
property guaranteed of due process. But when the dispute concerns ones constitutional
right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a
limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the
right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in this case, that
the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public
officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner
denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in
any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments
ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING:
 Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations
under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it
is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the
above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be

made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect
a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Government Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan (2002)

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness
in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On
May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate
arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could
act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for
his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court,
Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence
to guide lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
2. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
3. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is
directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
1. YES.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important
as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of
probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and
the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice
of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under
oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate
must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned
to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

2. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at
issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United
States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty
in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
 It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.
Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the
extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch
out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should
be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground
and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The
doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal
case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system
through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in accordance
with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing
among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for
lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of
Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)
of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated for [it]
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI
was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule
of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing
validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from
[the] ruling case law.