DRAFT PETITION FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS UNDER

HINDU LAW
Submitted to:

Mr. Shreyas Vyas

(Faculty: Drafting, Pleading and Conveyancing)

Submitted by:

Kevin James

Roll No. 76

Semester VIII

B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)

Submitted on:
15/02/2017

Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur

 DECLARATION
I, Kevin James, do hereby declare that the project work titled Draft Petition for
Restitution of Conjugal Rights under Hindu law is based on my own work carried out during
the course of my study under the guidance of Mr. Shreyas Vyas, Faculty of Drafting, Pleading,
Conveyancing, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur (C.G.). Further, where others ideas
or words have been included, I have adequately cited and referenced the original sources.

I also declare that I have adhered to all principles of academic honesty and integrity and
have not misrepresented or fabricated or falsified any idea/data/fact/source in my submission.

- KEVIN JAMES

SEMESTER VIII, ROLL NUMBER 76

B.A.LL.B. (HONS.)

i
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am very pleased to have been able to work on this project because it helps us to understand
Restitution of Conjugal Rights under Hindu law, both in a substantive as well as procedural sense,
as I got to draft a petition for the same too.

I wish to express my deepest regard and gratitude for our Faculty of Drafting, Pleading and
Conveyancing. His consistent supervision, constant inspiration and invaluable guidance have been
of immense help in understanding, analysing and executing this project.

I would like to thank my family and friends without whose support and encouragement, this project
would not have been possible.

I take this opportunity to also thank the University and the Vice Chancellor for providing facilities
like the extensive database resources in the Library, and the IT Lab for accessing online sources.

- KEVIN JAMES

SEMESTER VIII, ROLL NUMBER 76

B.A.LL.B. (HONS.)

ii
 LIST OF STATUTES
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949

Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

Special Marriage Act, 1954

LIST OF CASES
Bai Jiva v Narsing Lalbhai, AIR 1927 Bom 264.

Banti Devi v Moti Ram, AIR 1990 HP 35.

Bitto v Ram Deo, AIR 1983 All 371.

Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438, 31 L Ed 2d 349, 92 S Ct 1092.

Harvinder Kaur v Haminder Singh, AIR 1984 Del 66.

Jaswider Kaur v Kulwant Singh, AIR 1980 P&H 220.

Kharak Singh v State of U.P., AIR 1963 S C 1295.

KS Latitamma v NS Hirianniah, AIR 1983 Kar 63.

Murlidahr Rao v Vasantah Rao, AIR 1984 AP 54.

Russell v. Russell, (1897) AC 395.

Santosh Kumari v Mohan Lal, AIR 1980 P&H 325.

Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar, AIR 1984 SC 1562.

T. Sareeta v Venkatasubbiah, AIR 1983 AP 356.A.I.R. 1984 Del. 66.

Veena Handa v Avinash Handa, AIR 1984 Del 444.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................1

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE.................................................................................................................2

RESEARCH METHOD AND SOURCE OF DATA...............................................................................2

CHAPTERISATION..........................................................................................................................2

MODE OF CITATION......................................................................................................................2

SCOPE OF STUDY AND LIMITATION..............................................................................................2

HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS IN

INDIA..............................................................................................................................................3

CRITICISMS OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.................................................................4

PETITION FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS...8

AFFIDAVIT TO BE FILED IN SUPPORT OF PETITION UNDER SECTION 9 OF HINDU MARRIAGE ACT,

1955...12

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................14

REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................15

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 INTRODUCTION
Marriage constitutes the very basis of social organization. Hindu law regards marriage as a
sacramentindissoluble and eternal. This sacramental character of marriage has given rise to
certain anomalies. The declaration of Manu that neither by sale nor by desertion is wife released
from the husband was hitherto applied only to women and not men. Thus there was an element
of inherent injustice on the wife in Hindu law. To counter such inequalities among spouses and to
protect the sacramental aspect of marriage, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was enacted which provided
certain matrimonial remedies. One such remedy is that of Restitution of Conjugal Rights. The
remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is a positive remedy that requires both parties to the
marriage to live together and cohabit. But over the years, this remedy has been misused, abused
and exploited. Today it is nothing more than a springboard to other remedies. The non-compliance
to the decree of restitution is more ruthless than the remedy itself. The remedy directly affects the
right to life, right to privacy and the right to equality and hence unconstitutional. The purpose of
this paper is to throw light on the inherent disparities in this law and the need to do away with this
remedy. Finally an alternative remedy is suggested.

1
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The project work has been designed to fulfill the following objective:

1. To study the background and criticisms of restitution of conjugal rights under Hindu laws.
2. To draft a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Hindu law

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF DATA

The doctrinal method of research has been used, which involve collection of data from both
primary and secondary sources; primary sources like statutes and case laws, and secondary sources
like books written by various eminent authors and articles found in journals and websites. Use of
internet also became very relevant to find out the most updated, relevant and apt information which
helped me in exploring the subject from various dimensions.

CHAPTERISATION
The research project is divided into three chapters.

Chapter 1: This chapter explores the historical and comparative background of restitution of
conjugal rights.

Chapter 2: This Chapter deals with the various criticisms pertaining to restitution of conjugal
rights.

Chapter 3: This Chapter contains the draft petition for restitution of conjugal rights and the
affidavit in support of the same.

MODE OF CITATION
The mode of citation followed for the purpose of this is Bluebook (19th ed.) Citation Format.

SCOPE OF STUDY AND LIMITATION

This research work is a study of provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 relating to restitution
of conjugal rights, so as to study their background and criticisms, and to draft a petition for the
same.

2
 1. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND OF RESTITUTION OF
CONJUGAL RIGHTS IN INDIA
When either the husband or the wife, has without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society
of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district Court, for restitution of
conjugal rights and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such a
petition and that there has been no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may
decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.1

The remedy of Restitution of Conjugal Rights is a new notion in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence
that finds its origin in the Jewish laws. The remedy was unknown to Hindu law till the British
introduced it in the name of social reforms. In fact it is the only matrimonial remedy which was
made available under the British rule to all communities in India under the general law.2 After
independence this remedy found place in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But even as the Hindu
Marriage Act was being passed in the Parliament, there were voices of skepticism regarding the
efficacy of the remedy. Mr. Khardekar had opposed the remedy, saying, to say the least this
particular cause is uncouth, barbarous and vulgar. That the government should be abettors in a
form of legalized rape is something very shocking.3 Bromley has also opposed this concept in
his book.4 Sir J. Hannen in Russell v. Russell5 also vehemently opposed the remedy saying, I
have not once known a restitution petition to be genuine, that these were merely a convenient
device either to enforce a money demand or to obtain divorce. Some scholars6 have even
expressed the view that the remedy should be abolished. Unfortunately all pleas to abolish the
remedy have fallen on deaf ears. The inherent incapacity of the remedy has been manifested
numerous times in various forms yet we are continuing with this archaic remedy even though it
has been abolished in England by the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1947.

1
Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2
Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce, 3rd edn., 1999.
3
Jaspal Singh, Law of Marriage and Divorce in India, 83 (1983).
4
Raj Kumari Agarawala, Restitution of Conjugal Rights: A Plea for the Abolition of the Remedy, J.I.L.I p. 256,1970
5
(1897) AC 395.
6
Raj Kumari Agarawala, Restitution of Conjugal Rights: A Plea for the Abolition of the Remedy, J.I.L.I. 256,1970;
Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law, 166(1985); Jaspal Singh, Law of Marriage and Divorce in India, 84,(1983), Kaul,J.l
and Dhingra,I.C. Hindu Women and Restitution of Conjugal rights: A plea for the Abolition of the remedy. Women
and the Law: Problems and Perspectives, Deep and Deep Publications (1996).

3
This section is identical to section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The provision is in slightly
different wordings in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, but it has been interpreted in such
a manner that it has been given the same meaning as under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the
Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, the provision is different under the section 32 Indian
Divorce Act, 1869 but efforts are being made to give it such an interpretation so as to bring it in
consonance with the other laws. The provision under Muslim law is almost the same as under the
modern Hindu law, though under Muslim law and under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936
a suit in a civil court has to be filed and not a petition as under other laws.7 The constitutional
validity of the provision has time and again been questioned and challenged. The earliest being in
1983 before the Andhra Pradesh High Court8 where the Hon'ble High Court held that the impugned
9
section was unconstitutional. The Delhi High Court in Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh,
though had non-conforming views. Ultimately Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Sudharshan,10 gave
a judgment which was in line with the Delhi High Court11 views and upheld the constitutional
validity of the section 9 and over-ruled the decision given in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah.12

2. CRITICISMS OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

2.1. Insincerity of the Petitioner in Restitution Cases

The most fundamental problem with the remedy is the insincerity of the petitioner. The remedy is
blatantly misused to achieve ulterior purposes other than reconciliation. The root cause of this
problem lies in S.13 (1-A)(ii) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This section says that if a restitution
decree has not been complied with for a period of one year the parties can file for divorce. The
general trend in restitution claims is that the aggrieved party files a restitution petition, then does
not willingly comply with the decree and after the statutory period of one year, files for divorce
under S. 13 (1-A)(ii) on the ground of non-compliance with the decree. There is a string of cases

7
Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage & Divorce, 4th Ed., p. 328.
8
A.I.R. 1984 Del. 66.
9
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah, A.I.R. 1983 A.P. 356.
10
A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1562.
11
Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh, A.I.R. 1984 Del. 66.
12
A.I.R. 1983 A.P. 356.

4
to this point.13 In fact, Justice Rotagi in Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh14 recognised that the
legislature has created restitution of conjugal rights as an additional ground for divorce.

Yet another major problem with restitution petitions is that it is used as a defence for maintenance
suits. In England where until 1949, a married womans claim to maintenance could be sustained
only if she has already applied for some other matrimonial relief. Almost every restitution petition
made by the wife was to prepare the ground for claim of maintenance. This was aptly proved by
the fact that when the law was changed and maintenance could be claimed without any previous
claim to some other relief,15 the number of wives restitution petitions fell by more than sixty-three
percent within a couple of years. The situation is no different in India. In Veena Handa v Avinash
Handa,16 the husband in order to frustrate his wifes claim for maintenance sold all his property
like television, scooter, etc. He divested all his property to his relatives and alleged that he did not
own any property in land. The husband also spent a night with his wife, after the decree of
restitution was passed and then after a year he filed for divorce on the ground that there has been
no restitution for a year. When the trail court granted the relief, he immediately married another
girl, notwithstanding the wifes appeal against the divorce decree in the higher Courts. Similarly,
in Bitto v Ram Deo17 the husband falsely accused his wife of being unchaste to frustrate her claim
for maintenance when she filed for restitution. This shows how restitution petitions are blatantly
misused for ulterior purposes other than reconciliation. Moreover, restitution petitions are filed in
the District Court, these cases go unreported, thus making it difficult to get an estimation of the
actual number of petitioners who have been misusing the remedy. If we were to take into account
these cases then we would get the true picture of how the remedy is being blatantly misused.

2.2. Enforcement of Restitution Decree

The order of restitution of conjugal rights is observed by its breach rather than its obeyance.
When a person fails to comply with a decree of restitution the Court has a power to enforce the
decree under Order 21 Rule 32 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Under Rule 32(1), if the party

13
Jaswider Kaur v Kulwant Singh AIR 1980 P&H 220, Santosh Kumari v Mohan Lal AIR 1980 P&H 325,KS
Latitamma v NS Hirianniah AIR 1983 Kar 63, Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar AIR 1984 SC 1562, Harvinder Kaur v
Haminder Singh AIR 1984 Del 66, Banti Devi v Moti Ram AIR 1990 HP 35. Murlidahr Rao v Vasantah Rao AIR
1984 AP 54, T Sareeta v Venkatasubbiah AIR 1983 AP 356.
14
AIR 1984 Del 66.
15
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949.
16
AIR 1984 Del 444.
17
AIR 1983 All 371.

5
willfully does not comply with the decree, then the Court can attach the property of the decree-
holder. Under Rule 32 (3), the Court has the power to sell the attached property if the decree holder
has not complied with the decree for six months. The difficulty arises if the judgementdebtor has
no actual property in possession. In India, we find that in most cases and especially in rural India
that wives do not have actual possession over any property. In such cases, if a restitution decree
is not complied with, then the court is required to ascertain the share of the wife in the property of
her husband, when it is not divided and arrive at her share in the property, but this involves
cumbersome procedures. Difficulty also arises if the husband is a property-less personsay, a
daily wage labourer living in a slumhow will the Court execute the decree in such cases? It is
naive to think that coercing a person that his property would be attached and sold away can change
the attitude of the adamant spouse and make him obey the decree. The aim of this remedy is the
cohabitation of the spouses, but when the property is attached and sold, it will lead to bitterness
between the spouses and the purpose of the remedy is frustrated

2.3. The Right to Life, Equality and Privacy and Restitution of Conjugal Rights
Restitution of conjugal rights violates equality and right to life.18 Equality does not mean physical
equality between husband and wife, but it means equality of thought, action and self-realisation.
Moreover, it is anachronistic for educated women to be forced by State power to go and live in a
place, where from they have withdrawn. Some scholars recognise the continuance of the remedy
is bound to lead to unwanted pregnancies and assert it as infringement of a womans sense of self-
respect, dignity and individual fulfilment. The right to privacy is not expressly guaranteed in the
constitution, it is implicitly provided in Article 21 of the constitution. There has been no fixed
definition of privacy. Subba Rao, J. in Kharak Singh v State of U.P.19 any definition of right to
privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation and child rearing. In Bai Jiva v Narsing Lalbhai20 the Bombay High
Court held that the Courts have no right to force the wife to return to her husband against her will.
This compulsion of the Court acts as a psychological restraint on an individual. The US Supreme
Court in Eisenstadt v Baird21 held the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and

18
T Sareeta v Venkatasubbiah AIR 1963 AP 356.
19
AIR 1963 S C 1295.
20
AIR 1927 Bom 264.
21
405 US 438, 31 L Ed 2d 349, 92 S Ct 1092.

6
a heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person. The position is well explained by Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singhs case.
In that case he said that the right to personal liberty takes in right not only to be free from
restriction placed on his movements but also free from encroachments into his private lifeIn the
last resort, a persons house where he lives with his family is his castle: it is rampart against
encroachment against his personal liberty. If physical restraints on a persons movement affect his
personal liberty, a physical encroachment on his private life would affect it to a large degree.
Indeed nothing is more deleterious to a mans physical happiness and health than a calculated
interference with his privacy. We would therefore define right to personal liberty in Article 21 as
a right of an individual to be free from restriction or encroachments imposed directly or indirectly
brought about by a calculated measure.

7
 IN THE FAMILY COURT, BANDRA, MUMBAI

HMA Petition No. __/2017

Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, s/o Mr. Amitabh Bachchan, Hindu, aged 41 years, r/o Jalsa, B/2, Kapol
Housing Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra,
India... Petitioner

Versus

Mrs. Aishwarya Rai Bachchan, w/o Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, Hindu, aged 43 years, r/o 462,
Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai - 400013, Maharashtra,
India Respondent

PETITION FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 9 OF

THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

The petitioner respectfully submits as under:

1. That the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 20/04/2007 at
5AA Pali Hill, Next to Learners Academy School, St Andrews Road, Bandra West,
Mumbai - 400050, within the jurisdiction of this Court and according to Hindu rites and
ceremonies. Marriage stands registered with the Registrar of Marriages. A copy of the
marriage certificate evidencing the said marriage is hereto annexed and marked as Exhibit
'A'.
2. That the petitioner and respondent are Hindu by birth and continue to be so by practice.
3. That from this marriage, the petitioner and respondent have been blessed with a daughter,
Aradhya Rai Bachchan, born on 16/11/2011.
8
4. That the petitioner and respondent are both successful and famous actors in the Bollywood
Film Industry.
5. That the petitioner and respondent have been living together at Jalsa, B/2, Kapol Housing
Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra, India, for more than 9
years.
6. That since the past one year, the petitioner has noticed a remarkable change in the
behaviour of the respondent. She had started ignoring her daughter, and did not pay
attention to her despite repeated requests and complaints. On being asked by the petitioner
about the reason behind this sudden change of attitude, the respondent did not respond in
a civil manner, but instead started quarrelling on unrelated grounds.
7. That the respondent began acting in an extremely whimsical manner, and started
demanding expensive and unnecessary gifts from the petitioner. In the beginning, the
petitioner obliged in good faith, but she was never satisfied and there was no end to her
demands. On one occasion, when the petitioner finally refused to buy any more gifts, the
respondent created a violent scene at home and threw utensils and showpieces at him.
During this unfortunate episode, the parties daughter and the petitioners mother were
almost hurt, and were greatly disturbed.
8. That the respondent began verbally abusing her mother-in-law, the mother of the petitioner.
The respondent accused her of foul play during the initial days of marriage, and of coercing
her into marrying the petitioner, although this is not true.
9. That the respondent has more than once threatened the petitioner, without any reason, that
she will spread false rumours about him to the newspapers, thus destroying the impeccable
and unblemished public reputation of the petitioner. Despite repeated requests and
pleadings, the respondent continued to make these threats.
10. That the respondent has continuously mocked the petitioner regarding his acting career,
and this has caused great stress and discomfort to the petitioner.
11. That the petitioner, on several occasions, attempted to talk to the respondent about this
change in behaviour and tried to understand and solve the problem. Despite these efforts,
there has been no change in the behaviour of the respondent, and in fact the respondent
grew hostile towards these efforts.

9
12. That on 20/01/2017, the respondent went to her fathers house at 462, Senapati Bapat Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai - 400013, Maharashtra, India, giving word that there was an
emergency due to which her presence was urgently required, and that she would be back
in 10 days.
13. That despite repeated enquiries by the petitioner regarding the nature of this sudden
emergency, the respondent ignored him and did not answer any questions.
14. That the respondent did not return after the stated 10 days, and therefore did not abide by
her word.
15. That upon the completion of said 10 days, on 31/01/2017, the petitioner went to his father-
in-laws house in order to request the respondent to return to their marital home. On this
occasion, the respondent refused to meet the petitioner, and her father did not co-operate
with the petitioner at all. In fact, he threatened the petitioner without any reason
whatsoever, and cast unfounded aspersions on the petitioners character.
16. That on 02/02/2017 and 03/02/2017, the petitioner again attempted to secure the return of
respondent to their matrimonial home by going to his father-in-laws house. However, on
both these occasions, the respondent refused to meet the petitioner on some or the other
pretext, and once again her father was hostile and offered no explanation.
17. That finally, petitioner on 05/02/2017 once again went to his father-in-laws house in order
to ask the respondent to return with him, but despite repeated requests, even on behalf of
the parties daughter, and despite a final threat of legal action, the respondent refused, and
continues to remain at her fathers house.
18. That the respondent has withdrawn from the petitioners company without any reasonable
or lawful excuse. Hence the necessity for the petition arose.
19. That the petition is not being presented in collusion with the respondent.
20. That this petition is being presented without any unnecessary or improper delay on the part
of the petitioner.
21. That no litigation has taken place between the parties to the petition earlier.
22. That this Honble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition as the marriage
was solemnized at 5AA Pali Hill, Next to Learners Academy School, St Andrews Road,
Bandra West, Mumbai - 400050, Maharashtra, and the parties had last resided together at
Jalsa, B/2, Kapol Housing Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra,

10
 India and even presently the respondent is residing within the jurisdiction of this Honble
Court, at 462, Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai - 400013, Maharashtra, India.

That in view of the aforesaid, the petitioner therefore prays:

(a) That a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights be passed in favour of the petitioner against
the respondent.

(b) That any other relief or reliefs which the court may deem proper under the circumstances be
also awarded to the petitioner.

Place: Mumbai

Date:

Abhishek Bachchan

(Petitioner)

Kevin James

(Advocate)

VERIFICATION

I, Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, s/o Mr. Amitabh Bachchan, Hindu, aged 41 years, r/o Jalsa, B/2, Kapol
Housing Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra, India, do hereby state
verify on solemn affirmation that whatever is contained in paragraphs Nos. 1 to 19 of the petition
is true to my own knowledge and that whatever is contained in paragraphs Nos. 20 to 22 is based
on legal advice received and believed to be true by me.

Place: Mumbai

Date:

(Signature of Petitioner)

11
 IN THE FAMILY COURT, BANDRA, MUMBAI

AFFIDAVIT TO BE FILED IN SUPPORT OF PETITION UNDER SECTION 9 OF

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, s/o Mr. Amitabh Bachchan, Hindu, aged 41 years, r/o Jalsa, B/2, Kapol
Housing Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra,
India... Petitioner

Versus

Mrs. Aishwarya Rai Bachchan, w/o Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, Hindu, aged 43 years, r/o 462,
Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai - 400013, Maharashtra,
India Respondent

Affidavit of Mr Abhishek Bachchan, Petitioner, affirms and says as follows:

1. That I am the petitioner in the accompanying petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 and am well acquainted with the facts of the case.
2. That I have gone through the contents of the accompanying petition. I reaffirm the contents
of the petition, which are not being repeated here, for the sake of brevity.
3. That the petition is not being presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent.
4. That this petition is being presented without any unnecessary or improper delay on the part
of the petitioner.
5. That there is no other legal ground as to why the decree prayed for should not be granted
in favour of the petitioner.

12
Place: Mumbai

Date:

(Signature of Petitioner)

VERIFICATION

I, Mr. Abhishek Bachchan, s/o Mr. Amitabh Bachchan, Hindu, aged 41 years, r/o Jalsa, B/2, Kapol
Housing Society, VL Mehta Road, Juhu, Mumbai 400049, Maharashtra, India, do hereby verify
on oath that the contents of the affidavit above are true to my personal knowledge and nothing
material has been concealed or falsely stated therein.

Place: Mumbai

Date:

(Signature of Petitioner)

13
 CONCLUSION
A member of the Indian Parliament once suggested that the remedy for restitution might be
substituted by reconciliation.22 R. K. Agarwala in her article has accepted this view. The tone in
restitution seems to be quite harsh and compelling. The petitioner is asking the unwilling
respondent to cohabit; this might further deteriorate the relationship than make it up. The tone of
reconciliation is more mild and requesting. If the remedy is reconciliation then it might be
inoffensive and might not only lead to cohabitation but also clears the misunderstanding.

R.K Agarwala has provided in her article the way we can actually bring about reconciliation:

The Court might be authorised to appoint a committee for reconciliation consisting of the
judge himself, the spouses and one or two of the relatives or friends selected according to
the choice of the spouses on each side.
The Court should not sit as a Court to condemn or adjudge but as a conciliator.
It the committee fails in its purpose, but it feels that reconciliation might be attained through
the help or guidance of an expert, e.g. psychiatrist it might take such help.
The procedure should be termed as counselling.
The failure of this procedure should not bar the claim for maintenance.
Further, the failure of such counselling need not be considered as a ground for divorce.

Perhaps, the Courts will consider this as a better solution as it will be less burdensome on the
Courts, since no cumbersome procedure will be involved. Reconciliation is fast, effective and
practical solution to restitution of conjugal rights. Perhaps it is the only solution to put an end to
this barbarous remedy.

22
Mrs.Renu Chakravarthy,Lok Sabha Debates, pt.2,session 9th 1955, vol 4, p.7625.

14
 REFERENCES

Books
D.K. Gupta, A Guide to Conveyancing Drafting & Deeds, Kamal Law House (2nd ed.,

2005)

J.D.M. Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law, 288 (1st ed. 1970).

Jaspal Singh, Law of Marriage and Divorce in India, (1983).

Kaul, J.L and Dhingra,I.C. Hindu Women and Restitution of Conjugal rights: A plea for

the Abolition of the remedy, Deep and Deep Publications (1996).

Mayne, Hindu Law & Usage, 15th edition (2003) Bharat Law House, New Delhi.

Mrs.Renu Chakravarthy, Lok Sabha Debates, Session 9th 1955, Vol 4.

Mulla, Hindu Law, 673 (13th ed. 1966).

N.S. Bindra, Pleadings and Practice, Universal Law Publishing (9th ed., 2011)

Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage & Divorce, 4th Ed. (2010).

Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law, (1985).

Articles
Raj Kumari Agarawala, Restitution of Conjugal Rights: A Plea for the Abolition of the

Remedy, J.I.L.I (1970)

Websites

www.ecourts.gov.in

www.jstor.org.

www.legalservices.com

www.manupatra.com

15